

Routledge Studies in Religion

RELIGION, MODERNITY, GLOBALISATION

NATION-STATE TO MARKET

François Gauthier

Gauthier proposes nothing less than a revolution in the study of religion—one that abandons preoccupation with the nation-state to take more seriously the influence of neoliberalism on religion and new forms of spirituality. This is a profound theoretical intervention with far-reaching implications for how we study society and religion.

—*Linda Woodhead, Distinguished Professor of Religion and Society, Lancaster University, UK.*

François Gauthier has long been one of the most creative thinkers in the sociology of religion. This book shows why. *Nation-State to Market* argues that the context of world society has changed, reshaping religion. Nation-states are now less powerful vis-à-vis market ideologies and forces. Religions of all kinds have responded, producing an increasingly diverse religious sphere. Yet, Gauthier shows us the connections behind this diversity. Religious individualism, religious resurgence, secularisation, and post-secularity all respond to this deep-seated social shift. This book is a must-read for anyone trying to understand religion today.

—*James Spickard, Professor of Sociology and Anthropology, University of Redlands, USA.*

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Religion, Modernity, Globalisation

This book argues that the last four decades have seen profound and important changes in the nature and social location of religion, and that those changes are best understood when cast against the associated rise of consumerism and neoliberalism. These transformations are often misunderstood and underestimated, namely because the study of religion remains dependent on the secularisation paradigm which can no longer provide a sufficiently fruitful framework for analysis.

The book challenges diagnoses of transience and fragmentation by proposing an alternative narrative and set of concepts for understanding the global religious landscape. The present situation is framed as the result of a shift from a National-Statist to a Global-Market regime of religion. Adopting a holistic perspective that breaks with the current specialisation tendencies, it charts the emergence of the State and the Market as institutions and ideas related to social order, as well as their changing rapports from classical modernity to today. Breaking with a tradition of Western-centredness, the book offers probing enquiries into Indonesia and a synthesis of global and Western trends.

This book offers a bold new vision for the social scientific study of religion and will be of great interest to all scholars of the Sociology and Anthropology of religion, as well as Religious Studies in general.

François Gauthier is Professor of Religious Studies in the Department of Social Science at the University of Friborg, Switzerland. His research focuses on religious, political, cultural, and social changes in contemporary consumer and market societies. He has edited many books and authored many articles in these fields including the forthcoming Routledge Handbook on Religion in Global Society (with Jayeel Cornelio Serrano, Tuomas Martikainen, and Linda Woodhead), as well as Religion in Consumer Society (2013) and Religion in the Neoliberal Age (2013) (both with Tuomas Martikainen).

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Religion, Modernity, Globalisation

Nation-State to Market

François Gauthier

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Contents

Foreword ix

1 Introduction: acknowledging a global shift 1

PART 1
Analytical framework 25

2 The rise and fall of the Nation-State regime 27

3 The Market and the problem of social order: from Adam Smith to Keynes 62

4 Neoliberalism and the rise of the Market regime 91

5 From consumption to consumerism 118

6 RCT, RIP! Rethinking marketisation 158

7 From mediatisation to hyper-mediatisation 187

8 The marketisation of religion 201

PART 2
First analyses 231

9 Indonesia: from *ratio* to Market Islam 233

10 From pope to coach: marketed institutions, re-invented traditions 254

11 Conclusion: thinking a changing world 285

Bibliography 291
Index 321

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Foreword

This book has been long, very long in the making. The idea that our societies are embedded in 'economics' came to me over the course of the 1990s, as I observed (and participated in) the emergence of the alterglobalist movement. Contrary to earlier anti-capitalist protest movements, the modes of action of the alterglobalist movement were infused with a carnivalesque and festive character that sharply contrasted with the 1970s tradition of marches and action directed against the state. In the wake of the GATS accords that were to form the vector for the acceleration of economic globalisation and the unification of the world into a single, enmeshed market, the alterglobalists' aims were the new supranational instances where un-democratic decisions were being made that were to profoundly affect national constituencies. As in the 1999 Seattle protests, militants primarily aimed at multinational corporations and their power over nation-states. While the state was the focus of protests in the 1970s, it was now the forces of the 'market' that were the object of contestation in the name of the state as legitimate depository of the people's sovereignty. Moreover, rather than confronting security forces in the form of increasingly well-armed and trained police and riot squads, militants dressed up as fairies and proceeded to tickle the latter, or improvised rave parties amidst the raining down of tear gas.

This indicated to me that the foundations of our societies were no longer the political, 'secular' ones that had been long-windedly institutionalised over the course of what we call 'Modernity.' The flourishing of all sorts of concepts sporting the prefix 'post,' starting with postmodernity, and extending to post-structuralism, post-colonial, post-secular, and so on pointed in a similar direction. Designating something as 'post' says a lot about where we were, but less about where we are. It seemed to me that the implicit assumptions on which our theoretical analyses were built were not allowing us to adjust to the shift underway. These inherited lenses were essentially political. Modernity projected to steer away and free itself from the constraints of tradition, but also and perhaps especially, religion. It dawned on me that a major player was missing: Economics. Or rather, that economics was treated as if we knew what it was, that we could trust

the economists to tell us what it was about, that it was rational, and that it was disenchanting and therefore secularising. In other words, nothing that could help us see further than our limited view.

But I didn't believe this narrative. The consumer society that I saw was not very rational, and neither was the financial sector which was now heralded as being the motor of globalisation. Of course, I was critical of capitalism. I wasn't interested in alterglobalist protests because of some great leap beyond myself. But I was not a Marxist, and was not schooled into Marx, which I never felt was particularly relevant as a general template because too materialistic. I chose to do my post-doctoral Fellowship with Alain Caillé, professor of sociology at Nanterre and founder of the MAUSS (*Mouvement anti-utilitariste en sciences sociales*) precisely to learn about what I missed in my training in Religious Studies at the Université du Québec à Montréal (UQAM): A firm base in general social sciences, including sociology, political philosophy, more anthropology, and perhaps especially, economics—or rather political economy, as it used to be called. This is how I learned that the standard model of orthodox economic theory, which I define and historicise in Chapters 3 and 4, fails to account for what we label as pertaining to the economic domain, starting with consumption.

In this book, I bring into the discipline some of the basics I feel I lacked. I also engage with my matter from a holistic outlook that prefers to understand how wider social logics are modelling religion, and vice versa, rather than trying to carve out a specific and legitimate place for religion, at more or less distance from 'the secular.' At UQAM, we were fortunately not educated into the study of religion from the standpoint of secularisation theories. We looked at this field of scholarship with a sneer. Rather, the Department of Religious Studies, which was *not* an offshoot of Theology (UQAM was born out of the Quiet Revolution, and even a non-confessional, social scientific, and humanities outlook on religion was something of an oddity), was largely founded on the competing theory of the 'displacement of the sacred' and the re-composition of religion. When we as students read Peter Berger's *Sacred Canopy*, for instance, we pretty much all dismissed the second part as 'obvious rubbish' (we *had* read Durkheim in the original French and were free from Parsons' inflexions) and rather looked for what, in our modernised societies, played out the sacred canopy function that he wrote about in the first part of the book. And we came up with a lot of answers: Politics, the State, the Nation, Work, Industry, Reason, Human Rights, Progress, Technology, Science, the Individual, Society, Art, and even Sports. Our graduate research was more typically on rave culture (my own path) and the religious dimensions of sexuality than on quantitative measurements of the rapidity by which the pews were continuing to empty. Many of us felt that nothing is as boring as a mass, and let's face it, there was so much stuff happening out there! I was perhaps the one who most started to perceive that we were living an epoch of paradigmatic changes, and I wanted to be one of the forerunners to figure things out.

Two things struck me: First, that the characteristics of religion were stable and reaffirming for decades, since baby boomers came to maturity to be precise, but that sociological assessments were still going on talking about transience, fragmentation, and secularisation. Second, that the whole social scientific study of religion seemed not to have noticed that the 'New World Order' was ushering in blatant examples attesting to the reconfiguration of the entirety of our societies due to the sharp and all-encompassing rise of market economics as a standard for thinking and evaluating every aspect of society, and even subjectivities. Was I the only one to have noticed the ubiquity of advertising, the deregulation of media, that we now talked about 'managing' everything from our emotions to our careers and sex life? Was I the only one to find this relevant for thinking religion?

I was not. Around 2007 or 2008, an email reached me originating from Tuomas Martikainen, who was looking for people interested in crossing the study of religion with market economics and neoliberalism outside of a Rational Choice approach. I was perhaps the only one to answer. I owe a lot to Tuomas, first and foremost for finding a way into explaining to a Northern European and English-speaking audience what I thought was relevant as a general framework for thinking religion, against the backdrop of the neoliberal and consumer revolution. We started with a panel at the 2009 ISSR in Santiago-de-Compostella (a brilliant place to hold a conference!) on the theme, and convinced Linda Woodhead to be part of it. All three of us were on the same wavelength, and things went on from there, with many collaborative works and conferences, until today. Linda provided much of the needed legitimation within the sociology of religion, and I thank her warmly for her support, input, and just plain class—not to mention intelligence. We conspired for what we called the 'Revolution' in order to push our discipline further and embrace the changes that are remodelling every aspect of our societies. For me, the Revolution meant acknowledging the importance of the rise to dominance of economics on our globalising societies, critiquing the insufficiencies of materialist economics for doing precisely that (whether liberal political economy or Marx-derived historical materialism), and radically transcending the equally hindering insufficiencies of secularisation, and what I call the secularisation paradigm.

We were on to something. At the 2011 ISSR Conference in Aix-en-Provence, we had more paper proposals than we had possible slots over the course of the entire conference. What began to strike me then was the fact that people were now coming with case studies from a wide spectrum of regions across the world and showing the effects of neoliberalism and how consumerism was deeply impacting religion and every other social aspect. What was initially a Western template proved valid and fruitful in areas where I had no idea we could actually talk of consumerism and neoliberalism: Pakistan, Kazakhstan, the nomad Maasai… This global picture also changed some of the elements of the theory. It brought certain characteristics sharper into focus, and toned down others. For instance, religion

provides a formidable vehicle for the enculturation of both consumerism and neoliberalism in most non-Western parts of the world. The present volume only superficially manages to cover its global pretence, but it will be followed by more work that will go as much in detail as possible in the variegated pathways into what I call here the Global-Market regime. In the end, I contend that this global extension is especially interesting because it regionalises 'the West.' For example, I think one understands the transformations of religion in Canada, the Netherlands, or France much better when taking them in from the Indonesian vantage point than the contrary. The break between both regimes, the Nation-State and the Global-Market one, is much sharper and discernible in other parts of the world. In addition, most places in the world were not 'secularised' in the Western, ideological, and institutionalised sense, and this leads to much more readable transformations. The influence of the Market, for instance, is obvious in many regions of the world, and it has been better documented, without as much of the distorting effects that we see in the West or the Middle East. It also seems clear to me that while the West has led the way in exporting its models of modernity to the rest of the world over the period covered by this book, i.e. from the end of the nineteenth century to the present, the future will emerge from dynamics which will not be as clearly impartible to North Atlantic influences.

What these conferences and publications also hinted at is the fact that the recent wave of globalisation was diffusing with the help of a framework that was already global, and which had the Nation-State at its core. It appeared that I could better sketch out the particularities of the present age if I contrasted them against the former one. This is the biggest novelty with respect to my prior work. I have always had a strong historical inclination, and already had the material to go back a few centuries. A closer look revealed that the last century and a half allowed me to cut out two very distinct and global formations: The Nation-State and Global-Market regimes. These overarching structures shape the entirety of the social, and not just religion, and scholars could also apply this model to other phenomena. Some already have. Diletta Guidi has just shown in a brilliant thesis how the Nation-State to Global-Market framework helps explain the mutations of France's cultural policies (*politiques culturelles*) and its rapport to Islam and the Other, more generally. The same could apply to Law, social work, health, education, and welfare provision, for example, and many other topics.

Apart from Linda and Tuomas, this book owes a lot to a number of persons, the first of which are Jim Spickard and Peter Beyer, who have been extremely supportive and generous with their comments over the years. I would like to especially thank Michele Dillon for scolding me while we were having dinner with Inger Furseth at the expert meeting on post-secularism organised by Peter Nynäs (whom I thank for the invitation) in Turku, in June 2015. Michele convinced me it was time to push things aside

and actually sit down and write this book. I also thank Thomas Faist for his encouragements while I passed through Bielefeld University for a presentation that same year, and who started to convince me that my framework had reached a mature state. It still took three years before I could manage that time. I also thank Alain Caillé and Philippe Chanial at the MAUSS, because France is still the very best place in the world for theory, Jacques Pierre, Pierre Lucier, Guy Ménard, and Raymond Lemieux in Québec for inoculating me against secularisation and the secular, Philippe Portier and the GSRL-EPHE in Paris, Deirdre Meintel for being so wonderful, Roberte Hamayon for the ton of inspiration her work gives me, Géraldine Mossière for the future, the 'young Finns': Marcus Moberg especially, who is perhaps the person who has best understood what this is about and has appropriated it, Teemu Taira, Titus Hjelm (if you don't see the critical edge in this one…), Christiane Königsberg, and all at Äbo and Turku Universities, Robert Crépeau and his crew, the Romanians in Cluj-Napoca: Sorin Gog, Anca Simionca, Simion Pop, Alexandru Racu, and the others (the chapter on Eastern Europe will be in the next book), Samir Amghar, Michael Houseman, Ansgar Jödicke, and the ISSR (the best international association, namely because it unites sociologists *and* anthropologists and is truly international). This book was mostly written during a semester in which I was freed from teaching at the Université de Fribourg (it should be a year, really) in January to August 2018, and finalised in the spring of 2019, in sub-optimal conditions, amidst the needs of my then new-born baby Tara, those of my other children Octave and Jeanne, and with as much help as possible from my lovely and inspiring wife Doritt. Work/family conciliation is indeed a very complicated issue to manage. Thanks also to Ursula and Heinz for all their help and presence as grand-parents. No thanks to the archaic Swiss parental leave system, which allows a single day of paid leave for fathers, and where two weeks, as a current proposal projects, is considered 'too expensive.' Thanks finally to my assistants over the years: Diletta Guidi, Aurore Schwab, and Mélanie Lozat, who helped with some of the research, and Robin Jolissaint in the last phase for helping out with the bibliography.

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1 Introduction
Acknowledging a global shift

We live in consumer societies. From Jakarta to Nairobi, from Delhi to Sao Paulo, from Johannesburg to Lahore, from Dallas to Moscow, from Baku to Istanbul, from Casablanca to Montreal, from Paris to Bucharest, from Shanghai to Tokyo, from Sydney to Leeds, from Cairo to Santiago de Chile, from Rome to Turku, and from Dubai to Tallinn, consumerism has penetrated deeply into social strata and has contributed to transform the world, so the habits of consumption are now part of the daily life of billions of human beings. A marking trait of the last decades of the twentieth century has been the irresistible rise of economics in human lives, not only in "the West," but everywhere in the world. The transformations of the economy into global, financialised, connected markets have been the main vector underlying the profound restructurings of international politics and the shaking of the nation-state-founded world order which had progressively emerged out of the prior centuries and their theatre of colonialism, imperialism, commerce, and wars. Every social sphere has been affected by this latest and most radical wave of globalisation. Following the collapse of the Soviet bloc, which had contributed in structuring international relations as well as commerce and cultural fluxes for parts of the twentieth century, consumerism has continued to expand and spread across the globe, reaching even some of the most remote and unfathomable areas, thereby becoming the world's dominant social and cultural ethos. At the same time, in the so-called 'Global South,' free-market capitalist ideologies rose to dominance with the neoliberal overtake of the political ideologies and doctrines that had sustained and promoted the ideal and institutions of the Welfare state.

I was born into a French-Canadian family in 1973 and grew up on the Quebec side of English majority Ottawa. In my lifetime, I have seen the rise of economics on two fronts: Consumerism and neoliberalism. I have witnessed the apparition of logos on t-shirts and on everything else. I have seen the arrival of computers and the vertiginous rise of electronic and digital communications, and the deregulation of television and airwaves. Advertising has become pervasive, including in public toilets, and the range of 'products' advertised has expanded to previously non-commercial objects

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and services. Management, marketing, and business curricula have moved from being inexistent or minor programmes in universities to becoming their most important and most profitable, while private sector members have continuously increased their power on university boards. Sectors formerly reserved by the modern state as part of its public and welfare mission such as education, health, and social services are now evaluated in economic terms of cost-effectiveness in government practice and public discourse alike. Students have become customers, individuals investing in their future. The sick and the hospitalised have become users, customers, and consumers, and the mission of the state is now commonly understood in terms of service provision. NGOs, universities, and other public sector actors are now obliged to develop brand images and communication strategies to compete for rarefied resources in an environment of increased competition, evaluation, and bureaucratisation. Talk of government has ceded to the language of governance, while private management techniques have been applied to public and non-governmental actors.

Meanwhile, religion has made a comeback in public debates, and new religious phenomena such as fundamentalisms and charismatic movements have been on the rise, taking new forms that challenge classical analyses. 'Traditional' religious institutions are often dwindling and made to adapt to this changing environment, while new religious authorities emerge from the media and business sector. Religion and spirituality 'without religion,' i.e. at a distance from inherited religious institutions, experiential, born-again, and personalised, has risen to amazing rates, including outside the West.[1] Holistic 'spiritualities' have become mainstreamed practically worldwide and provide health and therapeutic complements that are recognised by the state and insurance systems, while modern medicine is losing some of its authority and shifting towards a more holistic anthropology. Immigration has caused an important remix of indigenous population make-ups not only in the West but also, we tend to forget, in many other parts of the world, introducing exogenous religious practices and challenging established integration models and national identity formations.

As flawed as it always was, the secularisation narrative *did* function to provide a unifying frame for understanding religion in modernity and organising public and academic discourses. The scientific validity, heuristic potential, and overall plausibility of secularisation theories may be rattled; it is still the epistemological frame from which religion is commonly interpreted in public discourse and political debates, and it still understands most policy efforts in dealing with the new challenges brought by today's social environments and the profound reconfiguration of religion. Secularisation is still the dominant cultural narrative through which religion is apprehended, and a more up-to-date alternative has failed to emerge as of yet. None of the propositions currently on the table have managed to provide a unifying frame, a new narrative to structure and orient how we understand religion. This evaluation is probably only half-true if one considers

that the 'postmodern' epistemologies that value fragmentation and hyper-relativism function as a paradoxical yet powerful narrative that unifies on the grounds of the impossibility of unification. This state of affairs certainly plays in favour of the unhindered spread of market ideologies, as it emasculates critical thought, which becomes, if anything, busied with the critique of itself and the abandonment of any general endeavour.

Curiously, the omnipresence of economics-related rationalities and social realities and the prominent part they play in the dynamics of globalisation have been highly neglected by the social scientific study of religion. The transformation of post-industrial capitalism into a financialised and globalised brand of consumer capitalism is all but absent from the bulk of academic discussions that continue to focus on the rapports between politics and religion. This is particularly true of 'post-secularity' scholarship, which simply ignores the role of neoliberal ideologies and practices in the establishment of supranational regulative institutions. Similarly, studies of religious practices, rarely if ever, take into account the ways in which today's cultures and social practices are drenched in consumerism. At best, neoliberalism and consumerism appear as independent factors amongst others, of which the development of electronic modes of communication, in research concerned with the effects of globalisation and transnationalisation on religion. Although critical of secularisation *theories*, these works remain inscribed within the wider frame of the secularisation *paradigm*, and privilege a political reading of religious transformations that downplays the social, cultural, political, and religious effects of the dominance of market economics over social life.

This book argues that the recent changes that have affected religion can best be understood against the backdrop of the combined emergence of 'consumerism' and 'neoliberalism.' According to this approach, consumerism and market ideologies (including neoliberalism, but also governance, finance, marketing, and management) are driving forces behind the processes of globalisation. This proposition does not mean to reduce social realities to economic determinations (as did Marx-inspired materialism), nor does it entail that we understand social realities with economic theory (as does Rational Choice), but rather that we understand the non-economic dimensions and effects of market economics and its correlates in our globalising societies. Ideal-typically, the concept of *consumerism* allows us to analytically grasp these recent transformations from 'below,' i.e. from the ways in which a consumerist cultural and social ethos helps shape social realities at the level of social actors and affects their rapport to religious organisations. The concept of *neoliberalism*, on the other hand, allows for an analysis in which the institutional and political aspects of these same global trends come to the fore and find a comprehensive explanation. Neoliberalism enables an approach from 'above,' in which the transformations at the macro level affect the *meso* level of religion in its societal environment and institutionalisations.

Such an approach is not new to this volume. It has been explicitly in the making for the last decade in a series of publications, edited volumes, and articles. It is best exemplified by two edited volumes under the title *Religion in the Neoliberal Age* and *Religion Consumer Society*.[2] Yet, it is important to stress that consumerism and neoliberalism must be understood together as participating in a single, complex, and multi-layered phenomenon that drives globalisation. The dynamics that are described in this book are not intended to be understood as a massive and homogenising process (in the singular), but rather as a variegated, localised ('glocalised'), equivocal, non-linear, and multi-speed set of processes (in the plural) that are context-dependent and contingent. Yet, contrary to the analyses published to date, this book claims that a recognisable, coherent, and systematisable set of logics are operating beneath the surface. The perspective outlined here differs from former interpretations of religious change by insisting on the systematic character of the major global reconfigurations affecting religion by recasting them against the backdrop of the globalisation of economic ideologies and consumer practices, which have gone hand in hand with the development, democratisation, and dissemination of communication technologies, namely digital media. Moreover, the pretention here is that this is a global, and not just a Western, phenomenon. In fact, while the present logics find their origin in Western modernity and its cultural programme, the cases presented in this book tend to show that the West is perhaps no longer the main driver for the ongoing transformations, and even less so for what may lie ahead.

From Nation-State to Global-Market

While the development of consumerism and neoliberalism is usually analysed separately, they can best be understood as forming a complex and multifarious set of processes through *which economics have dislodged politics as a structuring and embedding force*. These processes traverse the whole fabric of the social, affecting all social spheres, including religion, on the institutional as well as the social and cultural levels. With respect to the aforementioned edited volumes, this book adds a more profound social and historical account of the changes of the last half-century by contrasting them with what existed before. This narrative is therefore an attempt to understand how the ideals of Modernity and the processes of modernisation have shaped religion, and vice versa. Taken together, I argue that this perspective can not only help us better understand recent transformations, but also provide a more comprehensive interpretation of the global religious landscape for the preceding period, which stretches from the end of the nineteenth century to the end of the twentieth, than what secularisation-embedded perspectives have allowed for until now. What follows captures the main thrust of this proposition.

The hypothesis here is that *a political-embedded, National-Statist regime has ceded to a Global-Market one in which economics now play a structuring, embedding role*. By regime, I mean a macro-level ideal-type of social

regulation that allows for comparative analyses and the objectivation of social realities. A regime is a multi-dimensional, relatively stable, and discernible constellation organised around a series of structuring characteristics or principles.[3] Regime here has a more extensive signification than 'political regimes,' which are *meso*-level institutionalisations. I prefer to think of regimes here on the macro level, as a set of conditions and structures within which such institutionalisations occur. In linguistic terms, a specific regime would be like the grammar which structures expressions and their syntax. I argue that we can distinguish two such regimes since the nineteenth century. The first of these regimes, which I call the *National-Statist regime*, emerged around the structuring principles of the State as the natural modern political institution and political form, and the Nation as its community of reference. The State inherited the verticality of the previous *Ancien régime*,[4] which was founded on absolute monarchic rule and theological-political principles. The Nation was more or less painfully constructed in the place of former familial, clanic, and hierarchical social bonds which the processes of modernisation progressively broke down. As an encompassing characterisation of modern societies during this period, the National-Statist regime corresponds to a specific formatting and localisation of religion. In a nutshell, religion in the National-Statist regime is characteristically rationalised, institutionalised, scripturalised, dogmatic, belief-centred, differentiated, (mono)theistic, hierarchical, centralised, ideological, homogenised, institutionalised, territorial, and nation-bound. Its corresponding *regime of authenticity* is grounded in claims of Truth and Rationality, and is pillared on belief and institutional regulation—Weber's 'legal-rational' mode of authority.[5]

Starting roughly in the 1960s in the West, the Global-Market regime emerged from the former National-Statist regime as a result of the radicalisation and accentuation of certain modern cultural logics brought to the fore by the rise of the Market as the main social and societal structuring actor instead and place of the State. What has happened since then has been the progressive embedment of all social spheres within economics, and their reshaping according to the logics of the latter. One of the main effects of the shift from the National-Statist to the Global-Market regime has been the renewed visibility of religion or, more precisely, the transformation of religion into constitutively visible forms. This trend has been widely appreciated, starting with José Casanova's diagnosis of the 'de-privatization,'[6] or re-publicisation of religion. Yet, another coextensive trend has been widely ignored, especially by authors who mobilise an essentially political perspective: That of the blurring and de-differentiation of social spheres.

Modern societies as embedded and integrated wholes

Casanova famously argued that the secularisation paradigm contained three distinct propositions: Religious decline, social differentiation, and privatisation. Of these, only the second, i.e. differentiation, is the

'defendable core.'[7] If modernisation can indeed be said to imply the differentiation of social spheres into distinct, institutionalised, and (relatively) autonomous wholes, this process has probably been much exaggerated. Central to some of the most influential sociological theories, such as those of Max Weber, Talcott Parson, Niklas Luhmann, and Immanuel Wallerstein, differentiation has been taken for granted more than it has been an object of enquiry.

One effect of the secularisation paradigm and its assumptions about the differentiation process has been the validation of the idea that modern societies can no longer be thought of as integrated wholes. This is the essence of Max Weber's "polytheistic" conception of modern, disenchanted societies. Differentiation is also foundational to Parsons and Luhmann's functional systems theory, which are, in many respects, Weberian interpretations of Durkheim. Yet, there is another interpretation of Durkheim which is truer to his work in my opinion. Such a reading is best exemplified by Marcel Mauss, Durkheim's nephew, who only diverged from his uncle on a limited yet important set of elements.[8] The fact that human societies—*all* human societies, including modern ones—can be thought of as integrated wholes is not one of them. Scholars, especially in the English world, have tended to blur the evolution of Durkheim's thought, from his emphasis on the division of labour and social differentiation in his earlier work to *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life*[9] and its emphasis on social integration. Nothing illustrates this better than Mauss' own concepts of 'the gift' and 'total social fact.'[10] With both of these, Mauss aimed to draw attention to the ways in which the different dimensions of social facts, for instance political, economic, cultural, aesthetic, judicial, religious, and so on, are traversed by common logics which, once grasped, allow to seize a given society in its *totality*.[11]

Social sciences of religion have been massively Weberian in their preference for a differentiation-grounded approach and a substantive definition of religion. In the face of recent changes, I believe that there is much to gain by adopting a Durkheimian (and Maussian) perspective. Here, I propose to cross a Durkheimian approach with Karl Polanyi's idea of the embedment of social spheres in a determining sphere.[12] This is not to deny any consistency to the idea of differentiated social spheres, but to challenge the idea that modernity accomplished some kind of major and unique anthropological rupture with respect to how human societies have constituted themselves since the beginning of time. Mauss and Polanyi have insisted on how modern societies are both in continuity and in rupture with past societies. Starting from an investigation of archaic societies, they both provided seminal insights into the dynamics of modern societies while avoiding ideological pitfalls, amongst which political economists claim of the timeless existence of the 'market' and *homo economicus*. From the perspective I derive from Durkheim, Mauss, and Polanyi, modern societies are above all human societies.

The fact that modernity accomplished some kind of anthropological jump through social differentiation is one of the least examined assumptions in social sciences; yet, it is the one that seriously hinders an analysis of religion. Following Polanyi, then, social spheres do not simply 'co-construct' themselves (Parsons, Luhmann); they are embedded in a dominant, embedding sphere. As Durkheim argued, it is possible to show that all social spheres emerged historically from religion, which also functioned to totalise, or embed the whole. My proposition, which is based not only on Durkheim, Mauss, and Polanyi but also on Louis Dumont,[13] is that the political sphere dislodged 'religion' (*stricto sensu*) as the embedding sphere over the course of modernity, before the economic sphere dislodged it, in turn. As we will see in the chapters that lie ahead, this abstract theory is vividly illustrated by the evolution of religion from the late nineteenth century until today.

Life in the Global-Market regime

Zygmunt Bauman's idea of a 'liquid modernity'[14] to characterise contemporary consumer societies is one popular expression that points towards a reverse process of de-differentiation. If we accept such a claim, the argument that differentiation is the 'defendable core' of the secularisation paradigm collapses. In contrast, the blurring of the frontiers between social spheres and their profound remodelling makes sense from the perspective of the Global-Market regime, as today's capitalism erodes at the regulating and legitimising functions of societal institutions in favour of transversal and transnational fluidity.

As a consequence, religion has re-emerged in public life across the globe in old and new ways, including in the field of welfare provision, education, social integration (e.g. of immigrant populations), dispute settlement, healthcare, healing, entertainment, etc. For example, 'faith-based initiative'[15] (FBI) types of intervention have spread in a form or another worldwide. Parallel to this, expressive forms of religious practices have similarly emerged all over the world (the case of the Muslim veil is paradigmatic). As consumerism promotes individual choice as the main expression and accomplishment of one's subjectivity, the religious forms that are founded on the imperatives of choice are faring well, such as born-again movements and the nebula of personalised 'spiritualities' that cater to the contemporary quest culture. On a general level, religion has been reformatted to address issues of identity, belonging, and the pragmatics of life ethics. The institutionalised, parochial, rationalised, modern forms of religious belief, belonging, and practice, on the other hand, are generally in decline. They are also forced to adjust to the new regime, often with important changes in their very substance and location.

The de-differentiation of social spheres leads to a situation that is inherently variable, yet within a set of definable, common characteristics.

In the space opened by the erosion of the regulative powers of religious institutions and the state, new actors (women, immigrants, new charismatic religious authorities) have emerged and have become central to ongoing trends. The last few decades have also seen the rise of novel religious movements of an entirely new sort: Non- or feebly institutionalised, entrepreneurial, media-savvy, franchised, and transnational religious forms. These movements offer an experience-based, emotional, healing-oriented, and often charismatic brand of religion, focused on meeting individual "needs." Globally, the forms most corresponding to the National-Statist model are those that are the most affected by decline and pressure for reform, while those espousing the Global-Market model are experiencing growth and vitality. All over the world, new religious manifestations are emerging, offering much more than compartmentalised religion and weekly rituals. This regime also introduces novel types of authenticity claims in tune with the exigencies and needs of everyday life. As we will see, it tends to warrant on the grounds of personal experience, in conformity with the 'culture of authenticity and expressivity'[16] embedded in consumerism, as well as the rise of *charismatic* types of authority. All of these, I argue, are integral to the new capitalist world order.

The erosion of the National-Statist regime means that the national frame is challenged and can no longer be considered the natural container for understanding contemporary religious dynamics. The nation is no longer the obliged community of reference, and the last decades have seen the emergence of de-territorialised global religious communities, such as the global Muslim *Ummah*, but also the global Pentecostal family, the global community of Catholics (e.g. the World Youth Day manifestations), the global community of First Nations, the international Hindutva, or the transnational Christian Orthodox community. Even national communities now tend to include their diaspora, with important consequences for religion in countries like China, for instance.[17] Similarly, as a mass of scholarship has shown in the last years, the current trends affecting religion cannot be understood without paying significant attention to the transnational fluxes made possible by communication technologies, increased mobility, and the networks of a globalised economy.

The erosion of the sovereignty of the state, as well as that of the nation as the natural and most secure support for identity also explains the rise of conservative and fundamentalist movements which, faced with the blurring of the formerly recognisable landscape and the loss of certainty brought forth by economic and cultural globalisation, and fuelled by the disenchantment regarding the utopian promises carried by the political, precisely aim to go back to a golden era, be it the times of the Prophet Mohammed (Salafism, ISIS), pre-Soviet imperial times (Russia, Romania, Hungary, etc.), or Post-War America (Trump). Neo-fundamentalist movements (including religious radicalism) and populist-nationalist movements are two faces of the same coin, and build on each other's momentum. Religion often plays an

important role in neo-nationalist movements (e.g. India, ex-Soviet block). These movements also tend towards authoritarian forms of government, which can readily be interpreted as the desire to re-instate both the Nation as the community of reference and the State as the undisputed societal regulator and purveyor of security. Yet, they do so in a way that remains bound to the Market regime: Critical of political and cultural liberalism, they are much less critical of the economic liberalism and free-market reforms. Rather than signal a *dépassement* of the neoliberal age, the rise of populisms, which are often championed by successful entrepreneurs from the business world or former television and movie stars, is better understood as the very consequence of the shift from the National-Statist to a Global-Market regime.

As a whole, religion has come out of its box, so to speak. It is no longer confined to a well-guarded, differentiated social sphere. It has been republicised as a result of the expressive thrust of consumer culture and the neoliberalism-inspired dismantling of the state's former mission regarding welfare provision. Religion appears in many new guises, and mixes with other social spheres such as healthcare, education, law, politics, but also entertainment, cultural and subcultural movements, sports, arts, etc. On the institutional level, religious institutions and organisations are increasingly adopting neoliberal values, discourses, and practices, as well as branding and marketing strategies. Use of digital media is now an obligation which affects religion by reformatting it according to the principles of visibility, recognisability, and branding. Religious organisations tally to answer the needs no longer catered for by the state in areas relating to health, integration, education, legal counsel, social services, and social security. Religion is no longer centred on belief, faith, and creed as it reconfigures to answer practical as well as ethical and identity issues: How to live one's life, including social and intimate relationships, to which community belong, and how to be recognised. Emotional and mystical trends, which had been side-lined, discredited, and even violently repressed in the former National-Statist era, find new legitimacy and thrive under Global-Market conditions. New religious authorities emerge from the worlds of entertainment and business, with little or no frequentation of the instituted circuits of religious authority, just as they have in the political and other realms.

Religion in the Market regime is constitutively transnational, and affiliations tend to be cast against a global backdrop. Religion and identity are no longer contained by the Nation, which becomes available for reactionary and populist movements. Religious practices are no longer kept to sober and weekly rituals, and extraordinary and ephemeral events such as festivals, pilgrimages, seminars, and other mass or intimate forms of gathering are on the rise.[18] Similarly, communities are increasingly voluntary, and de-traditionalisation continues through urbanisation and the renewed critique or heralding of cultural particularisms. Choice, self-realisation, self-discipline, self-discovery, individual responsibility, adaptability to

change, mobility, empowerment, entrepreneurship, and personal progress are all neoliberalism-linked values promoted (or contested) by religion in the Market era. In contrast to the vertical, institutional type of regulation that was preferred in the National-Statist regime, the Global-Market regime espouses a supposedly more 'efficient' horizontal, democratised, pragmatic, experiential, anti/non-institutional, personalised, de-territorialised, and transnational *modus operandi* organised via networks more than institutional structures and central planning.

Re-examining 'globalisation'

The notion of a National-Statist regime points to the State as the main actor in the social regulation of modern societies. Yet, the State, as the natural political form of 'High Modernity,' only exists with respect to, and can only be legitimated by the territorialised Nation as its coextensive form of community. Therefore, the idea of a National-Statist regime combines social and cultural determinations in the form of the Nation with a specific type of regulating institution, the State, whose function is the optimal regulation of society and the creation of modern individuals. Similarly, the Global-Market regime defines the Market as its main regulative actor and the Global as the de-territorialised backdrop against which communities are imagined.[19] Note that I use capitals for State, Nation, Market, and Global when I am referring to more than the empirical, societal institutions they designate, for instance, the *idea* and *ideal* of 'the State.' The National-Statist and Global-Market regimes are similarly capitalised to mark the difference with the actual nation-state and global market. This is most important as concerns 'the market,' as it must not be understood as referring to the automatic and spontaneous mechanism of price of neoclassical economic theory. This is one of the main arguments that I want to make in this book: Social sciences of religion must become more knowledgeable about economics and stop trusting economists. In this day and age, economics are simply too important to be left to economists.

In his celebrated history of modern capitalism, Karl Polanyi (2001) contested neoclassical claims that 'the market' was a natural (i.e. a-historical and universal) trait of human societies by showing how it was a socially and historically contingent *ideology* before it acquired any kind of substance. He argued that economies were traditionally *embedded* in the social and governed by the laws of the gift rather than the supposedly natural laws of offer and demand, and that it is only very recently that economics were made into an autonomous domain of social life. From the French Physiocrats to Adam Smith, the naturally and spontaneously harmonising mechanism of the 'free market' emerged as an answer to the political (and religious) question of social regulation outside of a theological-political framework. In other words, the 'Market' was liberalism's answer to the question of a utopian social order without God as a founding and regulating principle.

We can only understand the progressive rise of an economic ideology and its pervasiveness today if we take the Market to be a social regulation mechanism rather than a purely economic one (Chapter 3). Yet, the Market, and the industrial-capitalist economy which this idea supported, remained embedded within the Nation-State, and thereby the political, until quite recently. The originality of neoliberalism is to have successfully reactualised the classical political project of a marketised society (Chapter 4). Hence, neoliberalism—and its concurrent processes of neoliberalisation—combined with the massification of consumerism have accomplished a major revolution in the very workings of modern society by making economics into the new embedding social sphere in the place and stead of the political, and by promoting the 'Market' as the new preferred actor for the regulation of all social spheres in the place and stead of the State.

The shift from the National-Statist to the Global-Market regime is not something that occurred all at once, all over the world. These regimes are ideal-types in the most classical Weberian sense: They are intellectual means that aim to provide a 'comprehensive explanation' of complex social realities and the dynamics of change. They do not exist 'in reality.' Both the National-Statist and the Global-Market regimes are constructions that exaggerate certain traits that I consider defining. Furthermore, it is useless to try and find a date at which the balance of power shifted from one regime to another. Both regimes continue to overlap today in a variety of ways, and in variable degrees, depending on where we look. Identifying the tipping point between regimes in a given location should not mobilise scholars' energies. A year like 1989, with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the beginning of the collapse of the Soviet bloc, is certainly an important moment, as it ended the Cold War and inaugurated the beginning of a 'New World Order'; yet, its ripples were perhaps not felt with as much strength in Indonesia, Vanuatu, or the Inuit Arctic before some time, if at all.

Consumerism became massified in the West somewhere in the late 1950s and 1960s, while it is a very recent phenomenon in India's lower middle classes, and is a suspended process in less developed and war-torn countries like Syria or Yemen. As concerns neoliberalism, which has become a sort of all-encompassing and meaningless buzzword in recent years, it is imperative to grant it a lengthy discussion. We can distinguish two workable definitions of the term: A more restrictive signification that applies to neoliberalism as an economic and political doctrine, and a wider signification that refers to a much wider and more diffuse market ideology and an ensemble of policies and actors (Chapter 4). Neoliberalism as a doctrine inflated into an ideology as it went from being a marginal political economy to a dominant set of policies on the world stage in the very early 1980s, which has, from this point onwards, affected different countries in different ways and at different times and speeds.

A given regime shapes religion in more than explicit, positive ways (positive in the sense of direct, explicit, and immediately measurable).

The Global-Market regime does not limit itself to the promotion of entrepreneurial types of religious movements and explicit prosperity theologies. Such trends are certainly part of the picture; yet, they are only the tip of the iceberg. By defining regimes in terms of grammar, I want to insist on how religion can be structured 'negatively' or, as we say in French, *en creux*. Religion can be opposed to the explicit values and characteristics of a given regime. Yet by defining against something, one is not freed from it, on the contrary. This point is important, and should guard against lazy interpretations of the model presented here. Such negative constitution could be exemplified by some of the transformations of the Eastern Orthodox Church in ex-communist Eastern European countries, for instance. A regime, therefore, has symmetrical effects, and it is this symmetry that attests its systemic nature.

The shift away from the National-Statist regime does not mean the end or the dissolution of the nation, nor that of the state. As many authors have argued, the recent phase of globalisation has forced a reconfiguration of the state's mission away from its totalising and salvific ideal, coupled with a strong welfare mission, towards a more instrumental conception in which its essential mission is realigned according to neoliberal principles such as security, protection of propriety, and intellectual (e.g. patent) rights, as well the promotion of an environment for economic growth and competitiveness. The sovereignty of the state is furthermore contested by mostly economic supranational regulative institutions. The state 'drops a notch' from the sovereign heights to which it had ascended. It loses, thereby, some of its transcendence, some of its 'charisma.' As for the nation, it has lost its progressivist signification, and its function as an implicit backdrop for collective identities and social utopianism has been eroded. Yet, this paradoxically makes it available for new, conservative symbolic investments, such as populist, neo-nationalist, and neo-fascist movements that are no longer progressivist (i.e. oriented towards progress, as early twentieth-century Fascism was).

The narrative exposed in this book is a story of globalisation. Yet, 'globalisation' is not part of the main set of concepts that I mobilise. The reason for this is that globalisation spans the whole of the period concerned. Some authors have opened heuristic avenues with this concept in the last three decades. Yet, this concept has also served to blur some of the novelties of the last few decades by reinserting them in a longer periodicity that flatten them out. The concept of globalisation has also contributed to turn the focus away from the economic dimensions of the latest phase of globalisation and the cultural dimensions of neoliberalism and consumerism.

Religious, religion(s), religiosity

The question of the definition of religion is unavoidable. Still, a full development of this question would deviate this book from its objectives.[20] Suffice it to say that I consider religion to be a *concept*, and as such to have no

essential reality. 'Religion' does not exist in 'nature,' no more than politics, aesthetics, capitalism, the state, or any other concept. It is simply a means to objectify a set of social phenomena in order to cast some light on their characteristics, dynamics, history, and interactions with other such abstractions. As other concepts of this level of generality, the definition of religion can either be functional or substantive, the first being more encompassing while the latter being more restrictive, as it is usually modelled on 'historical religions,' i.e. what is commonly referred to as the 'World's Great Religions' (Christianity, Islam, Judaism, Hinduism, Buddhism, and so forth). Opting for one or the other type of definition is a matter of epistemological choice, and should be determined by the research question and the type of phenomena under study. It would be largely counter-productive to investigate the 'religion of Human Rights' or of 'Progress' from a substantive perspective, as much as it would be to research the very tangible rapports between Church and State in Armenia with a functional definition.

The bulk of what is discussed in this book can be filed under a substantive, Weberian definition of religion. Yet, it is important to keep an open mind from the outset as to what constitutes religion. For example, I argue that the explosion of the global market for halal products and services, the boom of Islamic finance, and the development of Muslim fashions, including the *burkini* and Islamic sportswear, are at the core of what constitutes Islam today. Do these phenomena fit a Weberian-type definition of religion, in which gods, scriptures, institutions, clergy, and so on are fundamental? Maybe yes, maybe not. The weak point of substantive definitions is that they evaluate religion with respect to past forms. Yet, what happens when religion *changes* radically? We know that, in Roman times, Christians were persecuted for their irreligion, as their conversion-based, universal brand of 'religion' was inassimilable to the polytheistic, political, and civic religion of the Empire. Two thousand years later, it is the Roman religion that appears distant from what most of us would spontaneously call religion. Is Roman religion truly a religion? Is Aztec religion a religion? Is hunter-gatherer Siberian shamanism truly a religion? Is African ancestor worship a religion? From a substantive, Weberian perspective that most scholars adopt today, a positive answer is less than certain. Yet, does it make sense to exclude these forms from our conception of religion? In my opinion, not really.

The fact is, then, that religion has changed in the past, and there is no reason it will not change in the future and adopt novel and unimaginable forms. Our concept of religion, as scholars have abundantly demonstrated in the last years,[21] is tied to the colonial and imperial experience of the West, which has constructed homogeneous bodies of "religion" on the model of Post-Reformation Western Christianity, alongside other categories such as "race" that were essential for categorisation and rule.[22] It is indeed in the nineteenth century that the term "religion" became fixed into a scientific notion, and later into a concept. And it is at this very same time that the National-Statist regime became fully constituted, namely through

colonial interactions. Yet as Casanova argues, the category of religion was already mobilised by the Jesuits in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in their encounters with the cultural Others that were native Americans (South and North), Africans, and Asians.[23] Hence, there is no reason to limit the use of the concept of religion to the last two or three centuries of Western-led globalisation.

The hypothesis of this book implies that "religion" has been changing quite radically, away from a Post-Reformation Christian model. As a consequence, we would be ill-advised to stick to National-Statist-born conceptions of religion. Such conceptions rested on clear differentiation, a particular type of institutionalisation, a certain rapport between belief, behaviour, belonging, practice, morality, etc. Therefore, if the processes of de-differentiation and de-institutionalisation, as well as the shift towards practice- and experience-based, de-territorialised religiosities have any consistency, then our conception of religion must be supple. This is why this book rests on a functional, Durkheimian theoretical backdrop—i.e. how systems of practices and representation relative to interdicts are legitimated and how they unify, found, totalise, and integrate within recognisable communities. The object here is not to discuss the possibility of a universal definition of religion. Nevertheless, functional definitions are best suited for tracking major changes, as they are not substantially tied to contingent historical formations. In other words, a functional approach in Roman times would not have deemed burgeoning Christianity irreligious. I argue that because the social scientific study of religion has been massively attached to substantive definitions of religion, it has neglected the *nature* of the changes before us, obsessed as it has been with the sole perspective of decline.

For this reason, I distinguish between three levels of religion: The *religious*, *religion(s)*, and *religiosity*. The religious, like the political (*le politique* in French), refers to the macro level and requires functional approaches. At this level of generality, religion is tied to social functions of foundation, legitimation, naturalisation, totalisation, integration, production, and reproduction of social structures, imaginaries, and identities in a rapport with an invisible realm on the one hand, and the inviolable core of shared values on the other. The religious acts as the grammar of the lower, *meso,* and micro levels. While it remains relatively stable given periods of time, major changes on this level have important repercussions on the whole of 'religion.'

The second, intermediate level which I call *religion(s)* refers to the variably autonomised and institutionalised[24] religious forms in a given society at a given time. These forms have been remarkably diverse across human history and have known a number of profound transformations, and include varieties of animism and shamanism to the Imperial and sacrificial religions of the Great Civilisations (Sumer, Egypt, Babylon, Mesoamerican), the Great World Religions, right up to contemporary charismatic movements and self-realisation religiosities. This level also includes strands of popular religion which conflict with 'official' religion—something which the

Medieval tension between carnival and lent expresses very well.[25] Hence, the mid-level of religion(s) is almost always one of the conflicting value-orders and practices, of orthodoxies and heterodoxies, of orthopraxies and heteropraxies, of making and unmaking and continuous re-interpretations, as Max Weber so brilliantly exposed. This level, which Marcel Mauss called "religion *stricto sensu*,"[26] is therefore the most appropriate for comparative historical investigations over relatively stable periods, and is the preferred field of application of substantive definitions. Developments at this level go hand in hand with the differentiation of religion from other social spheres. This is therefore the most recent level to have appeared both logically and historically, following the growing specialisation of social activities through the gradual complexification of societies.

Finally, *religiosity* refers to the personal appropriations and experiences of religion on the micro level, or lived religion.[27] Individual religiosity can often appear at some distance from the religion prescribed by religious authorities and institutions. Religion at this level is also often undifferentiated from other dimensions of life, intricate within a web of meanings and practices that are both expressions of social determinations (one cannot invent one's religion outside the spectrum of what is socially possible at a given time and place) and of personal liberty or creativity. Religion on this level can either be seized through substantive approaches (such as the effects of religious ethics on the lived ethos, as analysed by Weber) or through functional ones (religion as the foundation of one's identity, means of integration into a social body, of providing security, salvation, etc.). Religiosity, therefore, is not limited to the sphere delimited by personal adherence to 'a religion.'

All three levels are obviously intertwined, and it is useless to try and draw clear frontiers. Macro-level religion is necessarily instituted into a set of symbols which can be difficult to separate from *meso* or micro religion. All three levels are furthermore interrelated, and relations between levels obey neither a strict bottom-up nor a top-down scheme. Recast against this tri-level model, this book's thesis is that a shift has occurred that concerns the highest and most encompassing level, that of *the religious*, where social spheres are embedded into one another. Clearly, the passage from an embedment in the political via the State to an embedment in the Market is a macro-level phenomenon. As a consequence, both religion(s) at the institutional, *meso* level, and religiosities undergo a series of changes as they are translated into a new grammar. I will use the general term 'religion' as I have in this introduction when referring to the whole of religion or when entertaining a certain ambivalence that is not harmful to the argument, and will specify which of the three levels I am talking about when needed and useful.

Beyond secularisation

Religion is not what it used to be. Until recently, this sentence would have readily been interpreted as signifying the decline of religion. Today, we

know that things are more complicated. Quantitative research shows how secularisation (decline of religious affiliation and regular attendance, institutional crisis of mainline churches) trends in the West are maintaining themselves, while other research shows how the situation today is profoundly different and diffracted into a multiplicity of practices. I argue that religion—as other social spheres such as politics—has been profoundly transformed under the conditions of modernity, and particularly, as interests us here, in the last half-century or so. This situation calls for an in-depth assessment of our conceptual tools.

As a result, I wish to leave aside the concept of the secular. Debates in the English language and in Northern Europe in particular have been framed by the couple religious/secular and its derivatives (religion, secularity, secularism) for decades now, to the extent that it appears to be inescapable. Yet, the fact that such a couple has not been as important in French sociology as well as the anthropology of religion underlines its profoundly contextual embedment and relativity. The opposition between religion and secular is indeed a strange one, as it opposes religion to potentially the whole of social life and therefore two things of a very different nature. No other 'social sphere' has deserved such a treatment. To me, this hints at the fact that the concept of the secular and the religion/secular couple is profoundly ideological and is grounded in the modern aspiration to found itself against 'religion' (i.e. Christianity and its institutions) in order to build a utopian 'autonomous' society in which individuals could find morality within themselves rather than through the prescriptions of 'external authorities, be they political or religious' (Kant[28]). The concept of the 'secular' and the religion/secular division is therefore essentially normative rather than descriptive, and translates rather badly into a social scientific concept. I argue that the religion/secular distinction remains bound to this highly ideological content and is therefore largely non-operational and problematic, especially in contemporary societies. As we will see in greater detail, it is constitutive of the National-Statist regime, and implies a strong differentiation of 'religion' within society. What happens, then, when social de-differentiation occurs and boundaries between the 'religious' and the 'secular' become blurred?

Since the 'secular' causes more analytical problems than it solves, especially with respect to contemporary phenomena, I suggest to leave it out of the discussion altogether in the space of this book. The same goes for secularisation. This book will not discuss whether the Global-Market regime is secularising or not, neither will it attempt to measure 'degrees' or 'varieties' of secularity. It is remarkable that parts of the discipline have shifted from measuring signs of religious decline (or revival) to measuring levels and varieties of secularity, due to some sort of mirror effect as secularisation theories are increasingly disqualified. What this scholarship seems to miss, as do the tenants of a reverse process of de-secularisation, is how it reproduces the assumptions of secularisation and thereby fails to grasp the originality and nature of recent changes.

The secularisation paradigm, as Casanova rightly argued, is constitutive of modern social sciences and modern self-understandings. The assumptions that make up the secularisation *paradigm*, in short, correspond to the characteristics of religion in the National-Statist regime, which it has contributed to naturalise. As for secularisation *theories*, which explicit the paradigm's core elements, they emerged precisely at the historical moment when the National-Statist regime was at its apex (during the Welfare state era) and these characteristics appeared self-evident and eternal.

Similarly, the shift towards the Global-Market regime entailed the emergence of two interrelated epistemological trends. The first of these is the self-proclaimed 'new paradigm' of the Rational Choice approach to religion. This current appeared in the 1980s, a decade after Chicago neoliberal Gary Becker proclaimed that all social facts, and not only economic ones, could be usefully studied using neoclassical economic theory. As will be further discussed in Chapters 4 and 6, Becker's 'putsch' was part of what became the neoliberal revolution not only in politics and the whole of social life, but also within social sciences. The second current to emerge out of the Global-Market regime is postmodernism, which conveys the basic idea that society is fragmented and better thought of as a rhizome of networks rather than as an integrated whole.

Both of these have contributed to the naturalisation of the idea of a Market society, made up of uncoordinated individuals seeking to maximise various types of 'capital.' Rational Choice and its derivatives operate a straightforward naturalisation of neoclassical economic concepts, starting with the individual as a *homo oeconomicus*, and the legitimation of an essentially economic worldview. Such an ideological function is served, albeit often unintentionally and unknowingly, via the use of market-derived terminology such as 'religious economy,' 'spiritual market,' 'religious offer and demand,' 'pick and choose,' and '*à la carte* religion,' etc. Rather than providing an insightful analysis, such metaphorical terminology parallels Rational Choice's reduction to economics rather than providing an analysis of the impacts of economics on religion. As for postmodernism, it has promoted a set of hyper-relativistic and hyper-particularistic theories and methods, combined with a suspicion regarding any general theoretical effort. Postmodernist currents have, unknowingly and unwillingly for the most part, contributed to legitimise neoliberalism through its radical critique of the state, which it casts as essentially exerting a type of domination on modern subjects. The postmodernist idealisation of a free and unique individual and its celebration of particularisms prefers the 'freedoms' of the market to the 'coercion' of the state, and thereby harmonises well with the imperatives of neoliberalism and consumerism. In sum, secularisation, Rational Choice, and postmodernism are essentially specular to the characteristics of religion in the respective National-Statist or Global-Market regimes. They are mirror images, and as such fail to provide proper analytical tools for understanding social realities. They are, in a word, profoundly

normative and ideological, as they serve an essentially legitimising function, whether for the State or the Market. This is why there is an urgent need for new avenues.

My proposition here is by no means a 'theory of everything' meant to explain every social fact, everywhere. Nor is it teleological: There is no historical, natural, or anthropological necessity behind the shift from a political to an economic embedment of societies. History has no Meaning, nor Orientation. Yet, this does not mean that there are no logics at work. History is never revolutionary. However radical a rupture may appear to be and however original new developments might be, history is always a mixture of continuity and discontinuity. The idea here is to sketch a historical and comparative framework in which to understand how the multiplicity of modernising pathways has developed worldwide, according to two configurations. The fecundity and the limits of any such enterprise are tied to its level of generality: Social phenomena will correspond more or less with the model. This book is admittedly partial: It does not, nor can it give the whole picture. The whole challenge is to try and describe a certain variety of structural possibilities, which other scholars are invited to test, develop, and try out. Furthermore, this proposition does not conflict with micro-ethnographic studies and particularity-oriented research: It is *complementary*. What follows is indeed heavily indebted to quality fieldwork. Still, it is false to think that macro-level theory is unnecessary: When narratives at this level are not explicit, they are *implicit*. One of the problems is precisely that such implicit narratives (secularisation, market imageries, fragmentation) have blinded social sciences with respect to the importance of certain trends that this book attempts to bring to the fore.

Chapter overview

This study faces a peculiar difficulty. Since it is first the story of the institutionalisation and global dissemination of the Nation-State and then its partial breakdown in the face of transnational flows and the latest phase of globalisation, a major question has been which cases to examine and where to put the focus. While a hint of methodological nationalism is almost a must for the National-Statist period, the present Global-Market one requires that we give precedence to transversal, transnational dynamics. This difficulty can be at least partly raised by insisting on how the National-Statist regime was already itself globalised, and that the characteristics of religion over this period were not entirely dependent on national contexts. National differences, as we will see, were above all variations on a more generalised theme, and therefore while we are brought to see how the Nation-State provided the container for religious transformations, putting methodological nationalism aside allows that we pan in an out of a series of levels, ranging from the sub-national to the national, the 'regional,' and the global. In general, the chapters, whether theoretical and historical

or analytical, are, in principle, not restricted to specific nation-states but rather illustrate more transnational dynamics.

The divorce of sociology and anthropology over a century ago has had fatal consequences regarding our capacity to meet the present challenges. I draw inspiration from Marcel Mauss here again, who refused to separate the two. The reason for this is that social sciences have crystallised a division of intellectual labour in which sociology is concerned with advanced, complex, modern, and secular societies, while anthropology is supposed to be concerned with traditional, simpler, backwards, and religious societies (or cultures). This characterisation is no longer valid of course, since modernity has transformed almost all of the Earth's people to such an extent that even in the most remote forests of the Amazon or Borneo, we are faced with largely 'modernised' societies and cultures. Anthropology has itself been divided into social and cultural anthropology as a result, and has for some time turned its lens inwards to the study of Western societies. Sociology, meanwhile, has also both spread its gaze to non-Western societies and diffracted into a myriad of evermore specialised sub-disciplines. One effect of these developments is to hinder global, synthetic, and macro-level analytical propositions, and the deconstruction of ethnocentric and even evolutionist assumptions (which remain sometimes hidden in the most ultra-particularistic and anti-essentialist endeavours). In order to counter these limitations and help face the challenges of today's situation, I chose to reintegrate sociology and anthropology within a single yet multifaceted social science as a heuristic move.

Chapters 2–8 form Part 1 of the present book, and are by far the lengthiest and most substantial. It contains the core of my theoretical and analytical argument, by which I carefully describe the historical and ideological constitutions of both the National-Statist and Global-Market regimes and their impact on religion. Chapter 2 presents the material linked to the National-Statist regime, including a global history of state and nation formation, and the characteristics of religion within this mould. It also discusses the epistemological consequences of this situation for the study of religion over the better portion of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. This is when the secularisation paradigm crystallised in the form it did, acting to naturalise the National-Statist characteristics of religion as a well-differentiated, institutionalised, privatised, scripturalised, etc., social sphere. This chapter recapitulates some existing work; yet, it also aims to show how taking some distance with respect to the assumptions of the secularisation paradigm, namely social differentiation, allows for a fresh outlook on a period that has seen the birth of the social scientific study of religion as a discipline.

Chapters 3–5 present material that is completely new within the discipline. One of the reasons why the sociology of religion has neglected the impact of economics-derived phenomena on today's religious landscape is due to the fact that the essentials of the modern history of capitalism and the

basic tenets of economic theory have figured neither in its curricula nor in its discussions. To be blunt, most scholars ignore almost everything about economics, including the fact that both Weber and Durkheim's sociologies of religion were founded *against* the precepts of neoclassical or standard economic theory, and that their respective sociologies are quite explicitly critiques of 'political economy' (liberal economic theory). Such knowledge has become fundamental, however, in a world dominated by free-market economics. Chapter 3 therefore starts from the beginning and charts the rise of political economy in modern thought and its preoccupation with a post-theological-political solution for social order, from the Physiocrats to Adam Smith. The chapter follows with a joint historical account of industrial capitalism and political economy up to the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, which saw the generalised implementation of Welfare capitalism and the Keynesian compromise. Central to this narrative is how throughout this period, the Market never ceased to be linked to social order, yet remained embedded in the political and regulated by the State.

Chapter 4 pursues this story by showing how neoliberalism emerged as an attempt to renew liberalism through a return (or a reduction) to classical political economy. Kept in the margins of the discipline and at bay from economic policy implementations for decades, the crisis of the Welfare state in the 1970s provided the context for a remarkable return to nineteenth-century free-market policies and the beginning of an era in which the institutionalisations of the Welfare state were dismantled and economic, financial, and media regulations were abolished, all in the name of progress and global economic integration. This chapter provides key material to clarify much of the haze, approximations, and opportunism that surrounds the concept of neoliberalism. Far from being a strictly economic doctrine, neoliberalism is first and foremost a political and cultural ideology that gives precedence to market efficiency over any other regulative process, especially that of the state. Neoliberalism is also a wide-ranging set of practices, such as governance and management, which are similarly defined and contextualised.

Chapter 5 changes the focus to social and cultural practices, and picks up some of the loose threads that were left pending in the prior chapters. Shifting from production to consumption, this chapter first draws a history of modern consumption and the historical context in which, for the first time in human history, the cult of the new overthrew the unquestioned and unquestionable legitimacy of the past and tradition, somewhere in the eighteenth century. The dynamics and specificities of modern consumption are defined, and linked to the emergence of a modern ethics complementary to that of rationality: Sentimentalism, and especially Romanticism. In the post-War decades that accompanied the reign of the Welfare state, consumption morphed into an all-encompassing ethos—consumerism—which massified what Charles Taylor calls the ethics of authenticity and expressivity. Retracing the history of marketing, it becomes clear that the neoclassical model is fatally erroneous in its appraisal of consumption, and that

an anthropological perspective, rooted in Mary Douglas' seminal work, is needed if we are to understand contemporary consumer cultures.

Chapters 2–5 can therefore be read as introductory chapters into economics and the dynamics of offer (production and marketing) and demand (consumption). Crucial to this *tour d'horizon* is how inherently flawed and problematic neoclassical economic theory is for understanding economic phenomena. Chapter 6 seeks to establish the best analytical way into the concept of marketisation. It examines the social scientific critiques of neoclassical economic theory, starting with Durkheim and Weber, and gives substance to my claim that sociology and with it the sociology of religion were founded against political economy. The chapter continues by surveying other critiques of the neoclassical model, such as that of Karl Polanyi, before attending to some of the radical critiques voiced by economists themselves. The chapter ends by promoting a socio-anthropological understanding of marketisation, hinged upon the concepts of market society and consumer culture.

Chapter 7 takes a short side-step to interrogate the rapports between consumerism, neoliberalism, and media. As will appear throughout this book, the emergence of electronic media, starting with the telegraph and stretching to include newspapers, radio, television, portable phones, the Internet, and more recently social media, is integral to the changes that have occurred since the nineteenth century. Scholars have recently proposed to make media into a distinct and driving force in the reshaping of contemporary religion. Here, I critique the bases on which these claims are founded and contest their empirical relevance. Rather, I argue that from the nineteenth century until today, media have certainly played a defining role in the shaping of society in general and religion in particular; yet, they are better understood as part of the wider and more encompassing trends that I describe as the National-Statist and Global-Market regimes.

Chapter 8 can finally proceed to interrogate how the rise of economics into structural dominance over the rest of the social affects religion (and vice versa). The chapter presents an in-depth theoretical discussion that aims at defining a workable theory of 'marketisation' that subsumes the ways in which the Global-Market regime shapes religion. In so doing, the discussion turns to enouncing the most radical critique of Rational Choice theory (RCT) and the 'economics of religion' current to date, arguing namely that if this theory is flawed as concerns simple economic behaviour (for instance, the purchase of a deodorant), as has been established by a landmass of social scientific scholarship, then how could it even have a remote interest for the study of religion? The rise of RCT, then, appears as the epistemological counterpart to that of the Global-Market regime, which it mirrors, thereby contributing to naturalise a neoliberal worldview just as the secularisation paradigm naturalised the National-Statist regime. In other words, RCT is a science-clad ideology, not a scientific theory. Instead, I propose a comprehensive, socio-anthropological theory of marketisation which avoids the problems inherent to most uses of market and branding terminology to date.

I hope the reader will agree that the aforementioned chapters are not only useful, but necessary. Part 1 needs to be as extensive as it is since most of the material is new, and because the perspective I am suggesting is so different from the one that has become common in the social scientific study of religion. It is also necessary in order to make sure that what I mean by consumerism, neoliberalism, market, capitalism, and marketisation is understood in a way that avoids the normative trappings and shortcomings which have ridden the use of these terms in the discipline. As a consequence, Part 2, which presents some applications of the model I propose, can only be short—too short—in comparison. There is little doubt that the analyses and cases presented in Chapters 9 and 10 are insufficient in themselves to support my claims, and I am not pretending that the most sceptical readers will be converted to my heuristics. Yet, they are an important step in this direction. Both chapters adopt a radically different approach in an attempt to show how the Nation-State to Global-Market analytical frame can be applied in a variety of ways, at different levels (religious, religion(s), religiosity), and with respect to a wide array of phenomena, worldwide.

As concerns religion, anthropology has remained somewhat distanced and sheltered from the secularisation paradigm, although it has busied itself far more with deconstruction than re-construction (e.g. Talal Asad). Yet, it is very likely that many debates in the sociology of religion, including those regarding the definition of religion and secularisation in particular, would have been quite different if sociologists had anything more than vague knowledge about the religious practices and systems of non-Western and indigenous peoples. Indonesia, the world's largest Muslim majority country, is a good example and constitutes the focus of Chapter 9. Trodden by anthropologists more than by sociologists, its study in the recent decades has been relatively spared from many of the very normative and essentially political issues that have characterised the study of Islam in the Middle East. Incidentally, research has paid attention to trends that are important from the perspective of Indonesians and do not fit the secularisation mould. From colonisation to independence to Sukarno's socialist-inspired secularist republic to Suharto's capitalist-friendly New Order to IMF-guided neoliberal reforms to the current situation, Indonesia presents a singular yet ideal-typical pathway in which the National-Statist and Global-Market regimes of religion are clearly visible. Starting with a portrait of Indonesia also shows how the nationalisation and statisation of religion have been historically more important than the variables of secularisation and secularity.

I have chosen the case of Indonesia for a variety of reasons, the first one being that I think that the dynamics and logics that have unravelled over the last century or so appear in a much cruder light if we look at them from afar. The grand narrative I am presenting here is not the result of a deductive approach. It is the result of discussions with scholars from many parts of the world, and of a research process that has led me to 'visit' places, in

the flesh or through literature, that were initially not on my radar. This has been the case for Indonesia, whose trajectory I find striking. Sociologists of religion have been way too Western-focused, and this is something that I want to contribute to change. It is my belief that, in order to understand ongoing changes, we are better to take one step back and another one sideways. In brief, looking at religious change in North America, Western Europe, or Australia from the point of view of Indonesia proves to be much more fertile than the other way around. We are still too stuck in the National-Statist regime's assumptions to see ourselves clearly. Call it my response to the Post-Colonial challenge.

Chapter 10 starts with Latin America before illustrating many trends that are taking shape in 'the West.' This chapter highlights some of the ways in which marketisation is operating to reshape religion through a series of snapshots. Drawing from some of the best work done to date on the subject, the chapter refines the analytic by discussing various responses to the pressures of marketisation. While phenomena such as the vertiginous rise of Global Pentecostalism are perfectly fitted into the Global-Market mould, they are just the tip of a much larger iceberg. Looking at European mainline Protestant denominations as well as the Catholic Church, the discussion shows how a priori neoliberal-sceptical faiths are—sometimes inadvertently—being reshaped within a Global-Market model, both from within, through structural reforms, communication strategies, and modes of governance, and without, through the lifestylisation of religion of the many who prefer new 'low-threshold' offers (meditation, mysticism, festivals, pilgrimages, laying of hands healing techniques, female worships, etc.) to pews. Important in this regard is the shift from traditional and institutional authorities to charismatic ones, with important consequences for religious institutions. These transformations are part of a much deeper shift by which the ethics of authenticity have contributed to mainstream New Age-derived conceptions and practices while fusing them with management themes, as illustrated by the 'coaching' phenomenon.

Because of space, the present book is limited to these two illustrative chapters; yet, I reassure the reader that my endeavours will not be limited to such a small collection of examples. In preparation at the time of finishing this book is the forthcoming *Routledge Handbook of Religion in Global Society*, which I am co-editing with Tuomas Martikainen, Jayeel Serrano-Cornelio, and Linda Woodhead, and for which the Nation-State to Global-Market regime perspective forms the overarching framework. Similarly, a further volume is already in the works in which I will present some other case studies that I have had to set aside for this one. In this future Routledge book, I will examine in detail the following phenomena: The rise of Market Islam worldwide, religious change in post-communist, and Orthodox Christian countries, as well as in India, China, and Sub-Saharan Africa. My only hope with the present volume is that it may not be met with indifference.

Notes

1 For the US, see Roof (1993), Fuller (2001), and Kripal (2007). The growth of this tendency and the shape it can take outside of the West are exemplified in Chapter 9 on Indonesia.
2 Martikainen and Gauthier (2013), and Gauthier and Martikainen (2013), respectively. See also Gauthier, Martikainen, and Woodhead (2011); Gauthier and Martikainen (2018); and Cornelio, et al. (forthcoming); as well as publications listed under Gauthier in the bibliography.
3 My use is close to that of François Hartog's (2003) 'regimes of historicity,' even if there is no direct correlation between the temporalities discussed.
4 Tocqueville (1967).
5 Weber (1956).
6 Casanova (1994).
7 Casanova (1994: 7).
8 Tarot (1999, 2003).
9 Durkheim (2001).
10 Mauss (1950).
11 Tarot (2003), Karsenti (1994, 1997).
12 Polanyi (1977, 2001), Maucourant (2011).
13 Dumont (1977).
14 Bauman (2012).
15 See Hackworth (2013), Ashley and Sandefer (2013).
16 Taylor (1991).
17 See Goossaert and Palmer's (2011) extraordinary book on religious change in China from the late nineteenth century until today. I will get to China in a following book.
18 Gauthier (2014a).
19 As explained below, this is coherent with my choice of a Durkheimian perspective. In *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life*, Durkheim (2001) insisted on how religion is tied to social morphology (see also Tarot, 2003). This is why the regulating principle and actor (the State or the Market) are coupled with its corresponding social form (the Nation or the Global).
20 For a more substantial discussion, see Gauthier (2016, 2017b).
21 Asad (1993), Beyer (1994, 2006), Veer (2001).
22 Anidjar (2016).
23 Casanova (2017).
24 My use of the concept of institutionalisation, inspired by Marcel Mauss, is more anthropological than strictly sociological. One of the breakthroughs accomplished by Mauss in *Les techniques du corps* was to consider forms of behaviour (walking, making love, eating, for instance) as techniques in their own right and therefore social institutions (Malinowski held a similar position). Holistic spiritualities, to take a contemporary example, appear as institutionalised forms of highly personalised religion. Mauss (1950: 363–86).
25 McGuire (2008).
26 Mauss (2002). The whole of 'religion' for Mauss was composed in addition to religion *lato sensu*, which includes superstitions and a variety of social rituals and conventions, as well as magic and 'divination.' See Camille Tarot's brilliant books on Mauss and the Durkheimian school (1999, 2003).
27 The concept of religiosity provides a fruitful contribution to discussions regarding 'lived' or 'vernacular religion.' See McGuire (2008), Bowman and Valk (2012), Dessing, Jeldtoft, and Woodhead (2016).
28 Kant (1992).

Part 1
Analytical framework

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2 The rise and fall of the Nation-State regime

The aim of this chapter is to map the emergence of the Nation-State regime and describe how this affected religion. It incidentally aims to show how the secularisation paradigm came to be, and how it naturalised a specific set of characteristics of religion. In order to do so, I trace the emergence of the modern state as well as that of its hyphenated corollary, the nation. The rise of the nation-state is both a long and a short story. Long, because the history of the state is rooted in Antiquity, and because the autonomisation of politics from religion constitutes one of the major developments that occurred over a period that stretches over two millennia. Short, because the state reached its accomplished modern form late in the nineteenth century in the case of the handful of dominant Western powers, and in the twentieth century for others. It is only around the time of the First World War that the nation-state was effectively disseminated around the world as the natural political form of modernity. Yet, as far as the sociology of religion is concerned, its very constitution and subsequent development is so embedded in this regime that it seems to have been operative for much longer.

History does not unfold by alternate phases of rupture and continuity. It is always a complexion of both. Drawing up eras and pivotal dates are constructions, as are our concepts. Where does the history of the state start? Does it appear with the invention of writing, in the antique City-State of Ur, 5,000 years ago? Or earlier, in an unknowable past, when tribal societies ceased to be structured *against* the social division between rulers and ruled, on which is founded the state?[1] Or was it in the Axial Age (800–200 BC), which 'cut the history of religion in two,'[2] according to some authors. Or later still, in the crucible of Christianity, when St Augustine separated the Celestial and Terrestrial Cities? The only certainty is that the history of the state is inseparable from that of religion, wherever we choose to start.

The State, the Market, and social order in the absence of God

In his remarkable work on the classical period of Western Christian mysticism (sixteenth–seventeenth centuries), Michel de Certeau argued that the rise of mysticism was coextensive to that of a novel form of eroticism (e.g.

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don Juan, *amour courtois*) and that both had to do with a nostalgic refusal of the progressive disappearance and 'transcendentalisation' of God and the putative rise of the modern state. For de Certeau, the outward expansion of Western Europe across the Atlantic and the interior movement of the mystics were not coincidental. From his historical, anthropological, and psychoanalytical perspective, the encounter of the external 'other' (in the Americas and beyond) was structurally linked to the ecstatic quest of the absent Other within. Michel Foucault similarly focused on this period as marking the birth of modernity through an epistemological shift that separated words and things, paving the way for the development of humanities and social sciences.[3] Yet, this inaugural period itself had antecedents, for example in the thirteenth century, when theology specialised (e.g. Thomas Aquinas), mysticism erupted (Meister Eckhart), and heresies started to pop up, particularly in the borderlands of the Western Christian Empire, e.g. Southern France. By the sixteenth century though, the unity of the Western Christian Empire was rattled, as the times of heresies (e.g. the Cathars) gave way to the Reformation and divided what is now Europe into North and South.

Western Europe had been composed of a matrix of overlapping jurisdictions, across which Christianity functioned as a uniting force. During the time of heresies, the Roman Catholic Church still held the monopoly on truth that allowed her to define orthodoxy, orthopraxy, and dissidence. Yet with the Protestant schism, the Church lost its capacity to act as a unitary reference over the complex networks of competing feudal powers. The universal pretences of each Church, Protestant and Catholic, only exacerbated the divisions, as the *Guerres de religions* broke out and tore Europe apart. Wars of religion were not only wars that opposed neighbouring principalities, they were also civil wars in which factions of same people turned against one another.

In this context, the unitary function the Church could no longer perform was deferred to the State. The king or regent was now the institution which could police the confrontation between religious differences within a *political space*. Oppositions without but also within the Churches coalesced increasingly around the Prince, who became the cornerstone of a new type of political regulation of differences.[4] The Prince, as the head of state and embodiment of the 'Reason of State,' a notion about which a score of commentators wrote at the time, was thereby raised over the Church and promoted to the rank of highest authority. The Peace of Westphalia (1648), which ended the Thirty Years' War, represents a crucial moment in this history, as its treaties consecrated the primacy of politics over religion and laid the foundations for the sovereignty and legitimacy of the modern territorial state. The Latin maxim *cujus regio, ejus religio* (the religion of the ruler is the religion of the land) submitted religion to the exercise of rule, and therefore to the state. As Peter Beyer writes, this newfound 'sovereignty or ultimate authority significantly included the right to

determine which religion—namely, in this case, which Christian Church, Lutheran, Calvinist, or Roman Catholic—would hold sway within a given political realm and how.'[5] Unity over a territory and people was henceforth ensured by the monarch (as the head of state), since religion could no longer provide the societal cohesion it had in earlier times. The state was therefore elevated so as to transcend any religious particularism.[6] In the words of Beyer, the Peace of Westphalia was 'to coordinate the foundational religions—now plural or, more precisely in the European context, "confessional"—with the foundational polities in the form of the states. [… Hence] each state would be a kind of society of its own,'[7] under one rule. The multiple layers of sovereignty that characterised feudal Europe, with Christianity acting as a unifying 'sacred canopy,' were replaced by a 'set of plural, contiguous and competing states; not by another Empire.'[8] The legacy of Westphalia was the creation of (relatively) religiously homogeneous states or sub-states (e.g. German *Ländern*, Swiss cantons) with corresponding 'national' churches, while pluralism became managed according to the doctrine of tolerance applied to minority communities (and not yet individuals). From this point onwards, the Churches in particular and the religion in general were submitted to the modern political project carried and enacted by the state.

At the same time, in the realm of ideas, Thomas Hobbes inaugurated modern political philosophy with his *Leviathan*, published in 1651—three years after the Peace of Westphalia and in the midst of the English Civil War, which started in 1642. In these war-torn years, Hobbes' vision of humankind was sombre. In his work, societies were composed of egotistical atoms called individuals who would spontaneously be at each other's throats if left in the natural state of brutishness. 'Man is a wolf to man,' Hobbes famously wrote, who also believed that a world without a state to ensure order was equal to a 'war of all against all.' Hobbes' *Leviathan* was decried and hotly debated; yet, it formulated what would be the bases of modern politics, namely individual rights and the natural equality of all men.[9] As regards religion, Hobbes is pivotal since he inverted the hierarchy between religion and politics by submitting the former to the needs of the latter and first enouncing the founding principle of the modern political structure, i.e. sovereignty no longer derives from an onto-theological source (God or Divine Right) but from the assent of the people. He thus formulated what was to be the modern question par excellence: How to ensure social order and social optimum (e.g. happiness and the common good) for a society of self-interested individuals, without resorting to theological foundations and legitimation (i.e. without putting God in the equation). Hobbes' answer was the first version of the social contract theory in which undetermined, free, and self-interested individuals agree to depart a portion of their sovereignty in favour of a strong, absolutist ruler, whose function is to ensure peace and order (Hobbes preferred monarchy to democracy and aristocracy). Hobbes submitted all other powers, civil, judicial, military,

and religious, to the political. In the *Leviathan*, it is the ruler who appoints religious leaders and can even interpret the Bible when conflict occurs. Religion, in his mind, was to serve the state.[10]

It is important to call upon political philosophers because of the peculiarity of modernity. When Plato and Aristotle digressed about politics, Athenian democracy was already in place. They were therefore reflecting on something that was already there, and which they attempted to better. In the case of modern political philosophy, we are struck by the fact that in this time of Enlightenment, social upheaval, and utopian projects, models for society were thought and penned down before they were institutionalised. This was the case for Hobbes, who was mandated by the Royalists against the Parliamentarians. But it was also the case for so many others. Political treatises of all sorts, constitutions, and charters were published across Western Europe, with the outright objective to be implemented. What united them was the overarching modern project, based on 'the belief in the possibility that society could be actively formed by conscious human activity.'[11]

Debates in political philosophy opposed two families of answers which continue to delimit the political field today: *Republicans*, who argue in favour of a strong *state*, legitimated by social contract and preferred to ensure social regulation, the common good, individual rights and liberties, as well as resource redistribution; and *Liberals*, who argue against the state and in favour of the *market* as a preferred social regulator.[12] While the social contract theory founding republicanism was re-actualised by Jean-Jacques Rousseau in the eighteenth century, illuminating many French revolutionaries, Adam Smith followed in the steps of the French Physiocrats, Bernard de Mandeville, and Scottish Enlightenment philosophers such as Hutcheson and Hume and devolved the function of social regulator to the market, an idea that was pursued in the nineteenth-century liberalism of John Stuart Mill and beyond. In their ideal-typical form, the Republican and Liberal conceptions contain the political ideological possibilities of Western modernity by insisting on either the *state* (conservative republicanism, socialism, communism) or the *market* (liberalism, anarchism) as optimal regulators of post-theological societies.[13] One can see this matrix—state or market—applied to all social and societal domains, from environmental issues to religion. On the one hand, strict state regulation (e.g. coercive environmental measures, French-style *laïcité*), and on the other, market-based, or market-type *laissez-faire* mechanisms (e.g. voluntary carbon emission markets, multiculturalism—let everybody be and do what they want to and things will sort themselves out spontaneously). Modern republicanism is rooted in classical republicanism, which it refreshes by insisting on equality. Liberalism, on the other hand, is born with modernity, and emphasises liberty over equality. In reality, Western modern states are all liberal states; yet, they present variations on how they blend these ideal-types both in theory and practice.

What this brings to our discussion is how the 'State' and the 'Market' are more than an administrative institution and an abstract economic plane: They are *ideals and ideas* bound to the modern question of social regulation in a post-theological frame. Both far exceed the confinements of their respective 'social sphere' (politics and economics), and this is why they have been invested with such overarching and foundational functions.

We will get back to the market in Chapter 4. In the following section, I will concentrate on the state and examine how its idea and ideal became actualised in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The fact that the state grew to be the main modern social regulator is not only a theoretical question: It is also an empirical one. Functional differentiation theories see politics as a social sphere that became autonomised with modernisation, along with the other social spheres. While they emphasise how social spheres co-construct in interaction, it is counter-intuitive, within this model, to designate one social sphere as being dominant and invested with regulative and foundational functions, for the specificity of modernity in this perspective (as in the modern ideology) is precisely the end of integrated societies. This has extremely important consequences on how one understands religion, and how one thinks about religious change.

Modernity as a double project

What is modernity? One useful definition of modernity is historical. As all attempts to define historical periods, beginning and end dates are always subject to debate. Focusing on 1492 as a start date for the modern period is one heuristic option. In this year, Europe, via the Spanish Empire, 'discovered' radical otherness in America and expelled its close other (the Muslim Arabs and Jews) from its territory. This new rapport to otherness certainly has its relevance with respect to a history of religion. It is partly because of this encounter with alterity, and with indigenous practices and representations, that defining such a notion as 'religion' became a critical issue.

Yet, what is more important for us here is to underscore how modernity was a *project* before it became a *programme*: That of finding an alternative to the Christian, theological-political foundations[14] of the former social order (the 'Great Chain of Beings,' which linked all beings and things in a hierarchical pyramid anchored in the transcendence of God). Modernity is the project to find social order on empirical and scientific grounds. It is the shift from being heteronomous to being autonomous, i.e. self-founded. Hence, European thinkers became obsessed with the idea of 'Nature' from the sixteenth century onwards. For where is one to find the bases for such a project if not in the Laws of Nature which the burgeoning sciences promised to unravel? The project of autonomy did not signify a radical departure from a belief in the Christian God, since the laws of nature were understood as having been given by God at the time of Creation. Isaac Newton, for example, was profoundly Christian. When he discovered gravitation, he simply

thought he had found one of the rules that made up this divine script.[15] Whether it be the state or the market, the solutions for an autonomous, utopian society rested on such conceptions of nature: Natural Law and the Natural rights of individuals were foundational for theories of social contract. Liberalism added the natural right of private property (John Locke), while self-interest was believed to be the human equivalent of gravitation.[16]

Modernity was therefore the project of a new, autonomous society regulated in such a way as to provide optimal common good and, increasingly, optimal aggregate individual happiness conceived as the greatest sum of pleasures (utility).[17] Yet, it was also the project of a new Man: The pre-social, atomised, undetermined individual. Modernity therefore invented society and the individual at the same time. As with society, the individual was also summoned to become autonomous, this time by finding the moral law within himself, through reason and against outside authorities, be they religious or political, as Emmanuel Kant stated with unparalleled clarity in his famous answer to the question 'What is Modernity?' in 1784. Reason, which was the cornerstone of modern philosophy, was itself believed to be founded in nature (*raison naturelle*).

Nineteenth-century state formation

The history of Western Europe from the aftermath of the French Revolution (1789) until the last quarter of the twentieth century can be read as the progressive increase of the hold of the state on society. If modernity invented society, society had its counterpart in the state. The modern state was built out of the—relative—autonomisation and separation of the political sphere; yet, it was also grounded in a conception of society as a nation. For, as Marcel Mauss noted in his unfinished essay on the nation, the modern state is a hyphenated entity: The 'nation-state.'[18] The essential link between state and nation was already announced by Hobbes' *Leviathan*, as it affirmed that the state was not only territorialised but also tied to a *political body* of citizens. It is possible nevertheless to separate the state formation process from that of the nation for discussion purposes, as the state precedes the nation historically. It is indeed the state that created the nation in many, if not most, cases. If it is true, as Ernest Gellner argued, that nationalism created nations and not the contrary,[19] it is also a rule that nations emerged within constituted states.

The pre-modern monarchic state was clearly separated from society. It was founded on divine right, and as such was founded on obedience, distance, hierarchy, and inequality. Its main function was outwardly oriented, and monopolised by the conduct of war. Following the Peace of Westphalia, it appeared that the Leviathan solution, coupled with a distinction between the private and the public spheres, *did* end the Wars of Religion. While absolutist European states spent 47% of their time warring between 1610 and 1715, this proportion went down to 28% from 1715 to 1789 and,

after the Napoleonic parenthesis, to only 2% in 1815–1914.[20] Freed from the imperatives of war, the state could henceforth turn its resources and attention inwards. The state's interest morphed into the mission to guard the general interest of its people. The modern state was no longer separated from society: It was immersed in it. The sovereign state became immediate to society: It was its reflection and representation. The social and political body became fused. As Pierre Rosanvallon writes:

> The state is not only an administrative apparel, it is also an abstract political figure, inasmuch as it embodies the principle of sovereignty. It is an *efficient form of social representation* [...] The state shapes society at the same time as it is constituted by the image that society has of it.[21]

Peter van der Veer similarly insists on the 'moral mission of the state' as the guarantor of the 'health, wealth and welfare of its citizens': 'the modern state is not an entity but a nexus of projects and arrangements through which society is organized.'[22] It is interesting that even amongst classical liberals, the state was recognised as being more than an administrative machine. For Hobbes before them, the state was defined as a 'reducer of uncertainty.'[23] In sum, the construction of the modern state exceeded the limits of politics and became endowed with a moral mission consisting in the realisation of the nation's interests *and* the production of social bonds.

Taxation by the state was exceptional and punctual until the seventeenth century, after which it became generalised. The slogan 'no taxation without representation' shows how this evolution forced the state to become representative and responsible for the common interest. Generalised taxation was paradoxical, as it allowed society to appropriate itself the state. At the same time, the exercise of power shifted from being based on force to being based on knowledge. For to govern, one must *know* society, hence the invention of statistics as a means of rational government. Statistics produced a mirror-image of society. It was also a means to 'dissipate the opacity of the social for the state, to unveil [...] what is hidden in the most intimate folds of society.'[24] Through the foundation of statistical institutes and offices in the nineteenth century (e.g. the French *Bureau de la statistique* in 1833), the state could penetrate society and seize it in its very movement.[25] This, in turn, contributed to its task of producing and instituting the nation, in a way complementary to mass education, maps, and museums. As Benedict Anderson argued, censuses and maps, which gave a powerful and direct representation of the unity of the nation, produced the nation at the same time that it 'put people under state surveillance.'[26] Religion, by the way, was a primary census classification (and therefore regulation) in the mid-nineteenth century, before being replaced by that of 'race.'[27]

The moral mission of the state in the nineteenth century is nowhere more explicit than in the rise of hygiene as a governmental concern.

It is remarkable how important medical doctors were in the construction of the modern state. An equation was made between the human and social bodies, and the legislator was seen as a social doctor. Louis Pasteur's discovery of bacteria and the mechanisms of illness transmission had a profound effect on how the state was conceived. Hygiene was a powerful vector for the transformation of the rapports between state and society, as it linked individual health to public hygiene. With hygiene, the public/private division was recast in such a way as to allow the state into the intimate lives of its citizens. The nineteenth-century 'Hygienist state'[28] reinforced its hold on society and individuals as it aimed to create both a new, healthy society, and a new individual by 'daring to review and correct the work of nature.'[29] The development of two institutions, the asylum and the prison, shows how the hygienist state envisioned to heal the social body of its diseases. By attending to radical forms of deviance, Rosanvallon writes,

> the state symbolically put at the heart of its action the project of changing man to recompose the social tissue; its untiring effort to mend its most apparent tears testifying to its role as institutor of society. A work which highlights its new function of coordinator of a whole set of agents and institutions, indifferently private or public. The history of the state dissociates itself increasingly starting in this period from that of administration strictly speaking, its action and ascendancy on society going far beyond the frame of its sole direct interventions.[30]

This type of social hygiene enacted the utopian dimension of state formation. State modernisation developed into a veritable programme that included the management of conducts. If the American or English states were not invested, as was the French, with the same 'sacramental'[31] function of producing social unity, they were nonetheless invested with similar utopianism. In France as elsewhere, with local variations and degrees, the nineteenth century was torn between the republican ideal of civic fusion and the liberal principles of a market society. The utopian dimension of the state was clearly at work in even the most liberal of minds, as Jeremy Bentham's (1748–1832) philosophy so vividly illustrates. A close friend of free-market activist James Mill, himself the father of the then young John Stuart, Bentham's doctrine of utilitarianism projected a completely rational government through a judicial arithmetic of pains and pleasures.[32] Even if his *Panopticon* penitentiary, famously analysed by Michel Foucault, did not see the light of day, his project of reforming society through the modification of its legal framework was highly influential. While they promoted laissez-faire in economics, in matters such as hygiene, liberals celebrated state centralisation and interventionism.[33] According to Rosanvallon, this utopianism was not confined to intellectuals and idealists: 'it is useless to

sharply oppose the utopianism of the numerous audacious reformers of the times to the prudence and pragmatism of the state administrators.'[34] State utopianism, in other words, was deeply rooted in nineteenth-century social imaginaries.

Contrary to de Tocqueville and Marx, who saw the post-revolutionary state as prolonging the process of centralisation that was initiated by the absolutist state in the sixteenth century, Rosanvallon insists on the novelty of the modern state in terms of its constitution and function, namely that of producing the nation. He distinguishes between three historical processes that combined to create the modern nation-state. The first of these is the *secularisation* of politics, i.e. its autonomisation from its former theological-political foundations, and the separation of politics and religion.[35] This long-winded process was linked to the crisis of the late medieval imperial state, whose limits were vague and whose regulation was loose. In comparison, 'the modern state embodies a type of power that is both more concentrated and more limited,'[36] in the sense that it exerts itself within the confines of a delimited territory over which it is recognised as sovereign, and coordinates attributions which were formerly dispersed. The second is *liberalisation*, i.e. the clarification of the judicial nature of the state on the basis of the private/public divide that institutes the inviolability of the individual and the distinction between religion and morality, through the concepts of social contract and natural law. It is, in other words, the institutionalisation process of the 'rule of law.' The third is *democratisation*, i.e. the establishment of forms of representation, which became inevitable as the state was legitimised with respect to civil society under the form of the nation. As Eric Hobsbawm writes: 'after 1870 it became increasingly clear that the democratization of the politics of states was quite inevitable. The masses would march on to the stage of politics, whether rulers liked it or not.'[37]

The ways in which these three processes unravelled distinguish the particular trajectories of Western European states. In England, all three movements started simultaneously as early as the thirteenth century, with an accentuation of the liberalisation process after the 1688 revolution. In France, where the state preceded the nation, these processes appeared in three distinct moments. Because of its particular history and the liaison of Church and Throne, the state became invested with the function of producing efficient symbols of social unity for a post-revolutionary society that was imagined as consisting of equal individuals.[38] The profound divisions of French civil society, which endured for a good century after the revolution, explain why the state was invested as much as it was with the function of unification. In Germany, the nation preceded the unified state, and the democratic movement can be said to have preceded liberalisation. Yet, behind these variegations, 'there is indeed a unique matrix of the modern state'[39] which combines these processes within a specifically utopian ideological framework.

How did this unravel concretely? By the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the state apparatus had reached 'down to the humblest inhabitant of the least of its villages,'[40] even outside of the West. Over the course of the nineteenth century,

> interventions became so universal and so routinized in "modern" states that a family would have to live in some very inaccessible place if some member or other were not to come into regular contact with the national state and its agents: through the postman, the policeman or gendarme, and eventually through the schoolteacher.[41]

From the mid-century onwards, states commanded the tremendous development of railway systems, all publicly owned outside of the US, as was the postal system and the telegraph, which by then linked up all areas of the world, namely through underwater cables laid deep on the ocean floors. The state deployed censuses and recorded births, marriages, deaths, thereby combining information on all its citizens. Through the creation of a 'machine of administration,' inhabitants came increasingly into direct contact with the state, a tendency which only increased in the new twentieth century. As Hobsbawm captures it: 'Government and subject or citizen were inevitably linked by daily bonds, as never before.'[42]

Mass education was instrumental to the state's outreach, as was compulsory military service or, at the very least, military and police presence over the land. The logic of the state is one of *compartmentalisation* and *homogenisation*, as the promotion, through the school system, of a vernacular language into a shared and uniform state language, chosen amongst the various existing dialects. All of this not only contributed to the construction of the modern state: It also participated in the creation of its hyphenated corollary, the nation.

Nation formation

The construction of the modern state and the implementation of its programme are inseparable from the construction of this other artefact, the nation. In the period ranging from 1848 to 1875,

> traditional western historiography has little doubt: it was about the creation of a Europe of nation-states. There might be considerable uncertainty about the relation between this facet of the age and others which were evidently connected with it, such as economic progress, liberalism, perhaps even democracy, but none about the central role of nationality.[43]

The constitution of the modern state *required* the creation of a substantive body out of the atomised individuals in its constituency, be it democratised

or not. Since no longer legitimated by the use of force, the modern state also needed to incite obedience. The nation, as an object of attachment and identification (patriotism), provided this legitimation. History shows how this obedience morphed into devotion, even fanaticism, and infused individuals with such passion and zeal that nationalism had sent millions to their death by the mid-twentieth century.

The first states that emerged between the years 1776 and 1838 (namely France, the US, and most of Latin America) provided a blue-print that defined what nations should look like.[44] By the 1870s,

> there had been states seeing themselves as representing nations (France, Britain, Germany, Italy), and states which, although based on some other political principle, were regarded as representing the main body of their inhabitants on grounds which could be thought of as something like national[45] (Russia, Christian Orthodox countries).

By 1914, while dynastic realms were still a majority in Europe, most were reimagining themselves and their legitimacy in the national frame.[46] Since the end of the nineteenth century, bodies of people identifying as nations started to form within the Habsburg and Ottoman Empires, and also in the colonies.[47] The late nineteenth century saw states transform into sovereign nation-states, 'with a coherent territory defined by the area settled by the members of a "nation," which was in turn defined by its past history, its common culture, its ethnic composition and, increasingly, its *language*,'[48] not to mention its *religion*—a neglected feature in most accounts.

In the shift from a theological-political principle of legitimation to the sovereign body of 'the people,' an equation emerged in which 'a state = a nation = a territorially-embedded-people.' Originally, neither language nor religion were primary binding factors. Yet, this equation, along with the state's intrinsic movement towards rationalisation, proved homogenising, making heterogeneity a problem. From this situation, two definitions of the nation arose. The first, which is that of the French and American revolutionaries and democrats, took inspiration from social contract theories, be it that of Hobbes, Locke, or Rousseau. The nation in this sense was seen as 'an everyday plebiscite,' according to Ernest Renan's famous phrase, and united everyone who identified with both state and nation. Opposed to this inclusive definition is a second, exclusive and 'ethnic' one, which defined the nation against an 'outside' embodied by strangers, foreigners, or 'inassimilable' internal others (Jews, Romani, communists…).[49] By the early twentieth century, as parts of the masses became torch-bearers of the nation in right-wing political movements, the meaning of the term nation coalesced around a definition best summed up by no other than Josef Stalin: 'A nation is a historically evolved, stable community of language, territory, economic life and psychological make-up manifested in a community of culture.'[50]

From a social scientific perspective, the nation has been described by Benedict Anderson as 'an imagined political community' that is both 'limited' and 'sovereign.' Limited, because it is territorial, and therefore finite—a nation amongst nations. In other words, the nation is inherently international, seated in a comparative and competitive environment of equally constituted others.[51] The unity of the nation supposes difference that is best dealt with in the form of other homogeneous nations. Sovereign, because the modern principles of legitimacy replace that of the 'divinely-ordained, hierarchical dynastic realms.'[52] Imagined, finally, because it is a form of community based on virtual rather than actual bonds, instating a 'deep horizontal friendship'[53] or, as the French have it, *fraternité*—an imagined horizontal kinship, or brotherhood.

Nationalism, a principle that holds that 'the political and national unit should be congruent,'[54] developed first within the literati before inspiring the urban middle and upper middle classes in the third quarter of the nineteenth century. Yet, it only became a significant mobilising social force when it gained support amongst the lower classes, workers and peasantry, at the end of the century.[55] It is interesting that it is amongst these classes that nationalism endures globally in its hardest forms today. The middle classes were nevertheless the 'cultural carriers'[56] of nationalism, as they were for pretty much every important cultural phenomenon in modern times. The vehicles for creating a national sentiment included mass education, which developed quickly and penetrated ever-deeper into the social fabric: 'it could teach all children how to be good subjects and citizens. Until the triumph of television, there was no medium of secular propaganda to compare with the classrooms.'[57] By the turn of the twentieth century, the artefact of the nation had become the main focus of identification, superior to other forms of identity, as well as the backdrop against which these forms (social class, family) could coalesce.[58] Attesting the power of the state and the depth of its social and cultural outreach, the nation replaced age-old identities and forms of community:

> with the decline of the real communities to which people had been used—village and kin, parish and *barrio*, gild, con-fraternity or whatever—a decline which occurred because they clearly no longer encompassed, as they once had done, most contingencies of people's lives, their members felt a need for something to take their place. The imaginary community of "the nation" could fill this void.[59]

The nation as an identity profited from the massive de-traditionalising mobility caused by the shift from an agrarian society to an increasingly urbanised, industrialised one. Attachment to the nation and patriotism were promoted all the more intensely by the state than it provided a rampart against the revolutionary potentials of class identification for the masses. It is in this context that the nation acquired 'self-evident plausibility.'[60]

The nation-state as a globalised form

The story I have been telling up to now has mostly been a Western one. Indeed, both the state and the nation can only be understood if one considers their emergence within Western modernity. Yet, an argument has to be made about how nation and state formation were a global affair. According to Roland Robertson, the history of globalisation starts in Europe in the early fifteenth century and stretches into the mid-eighteenth century, namely through the expansion of the Catholic Church in non-European lands. In his by now classical account of globalisation, this 'germinative' phase was followed by an 'incipient' one that extends to 1870, and whose main characteristic is to have consecrated the unitary, homogenous modern state as the basic unit of the new international society that expanded to include both Western and non-Western regions alike. Yet, it is only from 1870 onwards that globalisation, understood as 'the compression of the world and the intensification of the consciousness of the world as a whole,'[61] came into full swing.[62] This period was one of intense political development and economic growth across the globe: 'In this era industrial capitalism became a genuine world economy and the globe was therefore transformed from a geographical expression into a constant operational reality.'[63] World history prior to this moment was a sum of more or less independent parts. As of 1870: 'History [...]became world history.'[64]

Only twenty years ago, Shmuel Eisenstadt put the axe to monolithic, Western-centric, and evolutionist conceptions of modernity and modernisation processes by stressing the multiplicity of ideals and patterns that took place around the world. By insisting that 'modernity and Westernization are not identical,'[65] Eisenstadt opened the history of modernity to include 'a multiplicity of cultural programs'[66] that were the result of local appropriations, reformulations, and contestations by non-Western societies of originally Western institutional patterns which were disseminated worldwide through 'military and economic imperialism and colonialism,'[67] as well as missionary enterprises.[68] According to Eisenstadt: 'Modernity first moved beyond the West into different Asian societies—Japan, India, Burma, Sri Lanka, China, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Malaysia, Indonesia—to the Middle Eastern countries, coming finally to Africa.'[69] By the end of the nineteenth century, in 'all these societies the basic model of the territorial state and later of the nation-state was adopted, as were the basic premises and symbols of Western modernity.'[70]

Various authors have since expanded on Eisenstadt's idea of 'multiple modernities.'[71] In the sociology of religion, important comparative historical work has been accomplished under the 'multiple secularities' banner, shedding light on how the secularising dimensions of the modern programme, and secularism as a cultural and political ideology, were variously interpreted and incorporated. Yet, the sum of these works has not fundamentally amended Eisenstadt's proposition. On the contrary, one may

wonder if the emphasis on diversity and the witch-hunt against 'essentialisms' that characterises some of these works has not diverted the attention away from a fundamental element of his thesis, which is that the cultural programmes of modernity and the historical pathways may well be variegated; yet, they remain *variations on a single theme*: The modern project of an optimally regulated, autonomous society, and the project of an autonomous individual, embodied in the institutional and ideological artefacts of the nation-state. In other words, as Adam Possamai, Bryan Turner, and Patrick Michel argue: 'multiple modernities are not so multiple.'[72] The contemporary emphasis on difference and deconstruction loses the big picture and holds any attempt at generalisation in check, while essentialising differences and isolating local realities from the global interactions in which they are embedded.[73] As I will try to show later, this trend is constitutive of the present phase of capitalism, and is partly responsible for the difficulties in finding an alternative to secularisation. 'Multiple' and 'modernities,' then, are two terms that are best understood as being linked by complex rapports and tensions within a definable and structuring frame.[74]

In the profound reshaping of the world that happened as a result of Western colonialism and imperialism, Latin America was the first to seize the potentialities of the nation-state. By the early nineteenth century, before most Western European countries, the Americas had adopted the nation-state form through the importation of the Western model and had applied it in forms that were as radical as the utopian 're-set' situation of the New World allowed. For example, Auguste Comte's industrialist philosophy was highly influential in the constitution of Brazil and Mexico, albeit at the price of exclusionary politics that kept autochthonous and African-originated peoples in the margins.[75] White European immigration to the Americas, which was planned and was massive contrary to immigration before and since, reached 3.2 million on a total population of 16.9 million at the end of the eighteenth century, ensuring cultural coherence and political domination. The routinised use of '"new" versions of "old" toponyms,'[76] such as Nueva Vizcaya, New London, and New Amsterdam/York, also stresses how the Americas were extensions of Europe, even south of the US.[77]

Elsewhere, official nationalism, i.e. Russian-style state-led, top-down nation-building, was exported, fuelling nationalist movements amongst Croats, Lithuanians, Georgians, and Armenians, as well as across Asia and Africa. As Anderson writes: 'Finally, refracted into non-European cultures and histories, [nation-building policies] were picked up and imitated by indigenous ruling groups in those few zones (among them Japan and Siam) which escaped direct submission.'[78] The nation, once created, 'became "modular," i.e. capable of being transplanted, with varying degrees of self-consciousness, to a great variety of social terrains.'[79] Nationalism in the colonies was the paradoxical result of colonialism and imperialism, made possible namely through education, which initiated segments of the indigenous population to Western concepts and the

modernist project, before turning the coloniser's ideas against him. In the case of sub-Saharan Africa, where no such elites pre-existed colonisation, education created them.

European domination was never as complete, unchallenged, and unquestioned as it was in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. In historical terms, colonisation was a short-lived phenomenon; yet, its impact was considerable. The number of Westerners directly involved in the colonial enterprise was 'relatively small—but their symbolic significance was enormous.'[80] This 'Age of Empire' (1875–1914), as Hobsbawm calls it, was a total phenomenon: Not only an economic and political one, but also a cultural and religious one. It 'transformed images, ideas and aspirations, by force and institutions, by example and by social transformation.'[81] Colonisation transformed both parties, the coloniser and the colonised, although to very different degrees, and in different ways. The impact on the colonised was 'dramatic and decisive, even without occupation,'[82] and touched all aspects of social life and social institutions. The impact on the metropoles, on the other hand, was negligible in materialistic terms,[83] yet important by all other measures.

If modernity was multiple and modernisation does not equal Westernisation, the world's political landscape was in fact modelled on the Western principles of the nation-state. As Hobsbawm writes:

> There clearly existed a general model of the desirable structure and institutions of a properly "advanced" country, give or take a few local variations. It should form a more or less homogeneous territorial state, internationally sovereign, large enough to provide the basis of national economic development, enjoying a single set of political and legal institutions of a broadly liberal and representative kind [...] And so on. These were aspirations, and not only for the "developed" countries (all of which by 1880 conformed to some degree to this model) but for all others who did not wish to cut themselves deliberately off from modern progress. To this extent the liberal-constitutional nation-state as a model was not confined to the "developed" world.[84]

This model was implemented superficially in some countries, and more literally in others, either by deliberate importation (e.g. Japan and Turkey), revolutionary inspiration (USSR, China, Cambodia, and North Korea), or as a result of colonialism.[85]

The early twentieth century continued on this route, reaching its apogee with two nationalism-infused World Wars. The end of the First World War saw the collapse of the last of the multinational empires of Eastern Europe (the Habsburg and the Ottoman), marking the triumph of the principle of nationality. Because the ideology of the nation and nationalism 'could be used as an ideology of colonial liberation,' it 'became available to groups of *any size* which chose so to describe themselves.'[86] By the end of the

1960s, the newly founded United Nations, which cast the globalisation of the modern nation-state in stone, contained an overwhelming majority of non-Western, Third World nations, as the consequence of the end of outright colonialisation, yet within the frontiers inherited from colonial division.[87]

The nation-state and the economy: from container to welfare

It is interesting to note that, as important as it is in historical reconstructions, the nation was an indigestible anomaly for both liberal and Marxist doctrines.[88] The reason for this is that both of these philosophies share the same materialistic perspective that submits politics to economics—and in the case of Marxism, its underlying logic: Class domination—relegating culture to the subaltern function of 'super-structural' legitimation of the ruling order. As we will see in more detail in Chapter 4, liberalism only recognises individuals (and firms, which are thought to behave as individuals). Any type of human community is thus inassimilable for liberalism and cast as a 'collection of individuals' rather than as a community of citizens. Yet, classical economic theory, as well as concrete economic development from the sixteenth century onwards, was international in practice, in the sense that it 'proceeded on the basis of territorial states.'[89] Economies were *national* economies. Adam Smith's famous opus, which founded modern economics, is tellingly entitled *Enquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Riches of Nations* (1776).[90] If the nation is neither theorised nor even thematised in Smith's book, 'the economy' as he pictures it is a collection of rival *national* economies, as it was a century later for neo-classical economist David Ricardo. 'The economy' only made sense as German, British, and French economies. Moreover, the economic dimension of the idea of a nation meant the existence of the following: A national bank, national responsibility of state debts, protection of national industry by protectionist measures such as tariffs, and compulsory excise.[91] If liberal economic theory is inherently globalising, our period saw the nation as both a reality and a necessity, 'second-best to world unity.'[92]

While the nation was the container for thinking and developing the economy, the latter also required the state to ensure, at the very least, the security of property and contracts, even for the most radical tenors of laissez-faire. As a flourishing economy was a condition for the development of the state, the state was a condition for the development of the economy.[93] Even if the development of the capitalist economy occurred relatively independently of politics, the first wave of industrialisation required the protection of the state. This was particularly the case in the 'liberal era' of stark economic growth that stretched from 1848 to the 1870s. The last decades of the nineteenth century were made up of a cycle that included a recession (the Great Slump) followed by a reprise, with the state becoming more directly and heavily involved in the economy in order to attenuate the effects of market dysfunctions.

At the turn of the century, capitalist economies went through a profound transformation, moving from individually or family owned private firms towards corporate oligopolies and deeper globalisation. Production and distribution were revolutionised according to rational principles, rapid urbanisation turned the economy and the culture further away from agrarian society, the economy became more broad-based geographically, real wages increased, consumption expanded past articles of basic needs, the advertising industry was born, credit-buying appeared, big banks swallowed local ones, and the tertiary sector grew strongly, while the cities became increasingly industrial and peopled with the working class—two-thirds of those living in big cities. Technological revolutions included the creation of the first veritable mass media, the newspaper (1890), but also the telephone, the phonograph, the cinema, the automobile, the bicycle, the aeroplane, aspirin, mass market priced gas-cookers and, last but not least, the vacuum cleaner.[94]

The 1919–1939 inter-war economic crises and the US finance-sector-born Great Depression of 1929 especially contributed to increase the states' hold on the economy and 'reinforced the self-contained "national economy" in the most spectacular manner.'[95] Even the British, who were the only ones to have maintained a free-trade policy over the entire nineteenth century, took protectionist measures. Corporate capitalism was anything but laissez-faire, as it was made of 'large blocks of concentrated enterprise, supported, protected, and even to some extent guided by governments. The war itself had greatly accelerated this shift towards a state-managed, even a state-planned capitalism.'[96]

While the state's ascendency over society grew over the course of the nineteenth century, social expenditures remained remarkably small at the turn of the century, apart from education. Germany was the first to develop a social safety net, with mandatory health insurance as soon as 1883, followed by a pension system in 1889.[97] England followed, and by 1911, the triad composed of public health insurance, unemployment insurance, and pensions led Lloyd George to celebrate how the state would henceforth protect individuals 'from the cradle to the grave.' France and other Western countries followed suit, and the state became everywhere the 'natural insurer,' the main agent of redistribution, the guarantor of equality as well as the 'arbiter and motor of social progress.'[98] The modern state thereby shifted from managing peripheries (poor, criminals, the ill, the 'insane,' etc.) to exercising management over society as a whole. The Hygienist state of the nineteenth century gave way to the Welfare state of the twentieth through the extension of the interventionism of the state to the whole of the social as well as over the economy, legitimated by new applications of the notion of individual rights. The preamble of the French constitution of 1946 spells this mission out: 'The Nation ensures individuals and families the necessary conditions for their development. It guarantees to all, especially children, mothers, and aged workers, the protection of their health, material security, rest, and leisure.'[99]

After the Second World War, neo-classical economics stood discredited as the theory of the 'natural equilibrium of the market' did not resist even superficial fact-checking, and English economist John Maynard Keynes (1883–1946), who had been until then a thoroughly orthodox neo-classical economist, envisaged to save capitalism from itself by developing an acceptable compromise between the wealth-creating virtues of free capital and state regulation.[100] Politics that would have appeared as 'the antechamber of Bolshevism before 1914'[101] were implemented across the board as an acceptable brand of capitalism for reformists and socialists, who were particularly powerful at this time. In the Keynesian perspective, public expenses contributed to economic development. Social progress and economic growth no longer appeared to be contradictory for the first time in modern history. As Richard Sennett writes: 'The profits that markets put in jeopardy, bureaucracy sought to repair. Bureaucracy seemed more *efficient* than markets.'[102] As a result, the economic role of the state increased considerably after 1945. By becoming a central planner, the state endorsed the role of main investor, banker, and industrial. This was, of course, linked to the post-War conjuncture, but it also accomplished a cultural revolution by putting the state at the fore of national pride and identification. As Rosanvallon writes: '[economic planning]was only the *symbolic image* of a whole set of transformations that were operating elsewhere, the point of mythical convergence of an efflorescence of dreams and projects.'[103]

Gosta Esping-Andersen's work on welfare capitalism goes in the same direction. For him, whether one looks at the social-democratic model of Scandinavian countries, the conservative model of countries such as France, Germany, and Austria, or the liberal model adopted by Anglo-Saxon countries, the Welfare state became 'deeply embedded in the everyday experience of virtually every citizen. Our personal life, he continues, is structured by the welfare state, and so is the entire political economy.'[104] This perspective is important as it highlights the foundational and structuring function performed by the state in empirical terms. By showing how the Welfare state shapes the actual economy, including labour markets, Esping-Andersen contradicts neo-classical economics which view labour markets as closed and autonomous systems made up of independent actors responding to price signals in a self-regulating, equilibrium-tending market (see Chapters 3 and 4). It also attests to the ways in which this regulatory function of the state is rooted in everyday experience, and that it is not simply an abstract, theoretical issue. Through the Welfare state, the state's (and the idea of the State) empire on society reached its apex in capitalist societies. The National-Statist revolution, which started with the Peace of Westphalia, was complete.

As a consequence, the Welfare state was often invested with religious signification and infused with patriotic pride. Writing about Britain, Linda Woodhead notes how the

> welfare project was a national—and often a nationalistic—one. It enabled Britons to retain some pride despite their diminished status in the

> world. It was largely forgetful of Empire [...]More than an idea or a policy, this was an ideology, a belief, an ethic, a form of economic arrangement, a type of politics, a cultural mood, and a restoration of national pride. It affected every person, and it effected significant change at personal level, local level, and state level. Just like religion—but in place of it—it promised to look after every individual "from cradle to grave." Throughout the 1950s and into the 1970s, this utopian project was at its height. It seemed to deliver employment, prosperity, renewed national confidence and pride.[105]

Particular institutions like the British National Health Service (NHS) coalesced these sentiments and made up an ensemble that 'had many features of a religion—but a secular, civil religion.'[106] The French name for the Welfare state, *l'État Providence*, shows how religious significations were commonly attached to the nation-state, both in common language and scholars' analyses.

The Cold War that ensued opposed the Welfare model of capitalist countries to the totalising state of the communist bloc. In the latter case, no special demonstration is needed to support the argument that the state was invested with foundational, regulative, and structuring functions. Communism, as National-Socialism, has been often analysed in terms of secular or political religions, as they mobilised an armada of liturgies, symbols, and rituals for their uphold.[107] The rapports between the state and the nation were nevertheless different in the communist states, as we will see in Chapter 11 (the communist ideology was internationalist in theory, but produced nations in practice). This particular experience accounts for the contemporary revivals of nationalism and religion, amongst other things.[108] Yet, what is important for the present discussion is how these two Cold War models, the Welfare state and the totalising communist state, are variations on the theme of the state's hold on the whole of society and of its investment with a transformative mission. As such, they served as models and reference points for other, 'peripheral' (Wallerstein), and 'non-aligned' countries. The following chapters provide some examples of how this functionality was institutionalised and operationalised in the post-colonial state, and what the consequences for religion were.

Religion in the National-Statist regime

The lengthy treatment given to the history of the formation, globalisation, and institutionalisation of the nation-state is necessary to show how the important transformations that affected religion from the nineteenth century into the twentieth are coherent within this frame. The nation-state emerged as the organising framework and actor for the realisation of the modern project of a new society and a new Man (and Woman). The modern state was invested in such a way that it reconstructed and shaped other social spheres, including—and perhaps especially—religion. In a nutshell,

the transformation of religion within the globally disseminated National-Statist regime amounts to its *statisation* and *nationalisation*.

What is commonly referred to as 'traditional religion' in the West, associated with parochial images of pews, churches, clergy, and belief, is in fact a profoundly modern form which only fully crystallised late in the nineteenth century. It developed out of post-Reformation Christianity and was very different from earlier medieval Christianity.[109] This transformation of religion can be linked to the emergence of the nation-state. As Peter van der Veer argues: 'With the rise of the nation-state comes an enormous shift in what religion means.'[110] It affects the very *location* of religion, as well as its substance—what it is composed of, what it *is*. For van der Veer, then, the question of the 'location of religion in the modern world should […]be addressed in relation to the historical emergence of the modern idea of the nation and its spread over the world.'[111] My analysis follows this lead and reframes it within a theoretical frame that considers the Nation-State to be the embedding framework within which religion was reformed in modernity. This means that the idea and the institution of the State as well as the 'imagined community' of the Nation provided the structure (or 'grammar') and the substance (the elements of language, the material, the resources, and the symbols) for this re-composition.

Perhaps the most important transformation induced by the transition into the National-Statist regime is religion's differentiation into a specific institutional pattern that (partly) distinguished it from the rest of the social spheres and forms—a process captured by the secular/religious distinction. Yet, this differentiation developed in a manifold manner that is rarely acknowledged. It meant the location of religion within a defined (or confined) social space—the church—and social time—the mass/service. The parish, which was re-invented in the late nineteenth century in order to answer the challenges of urbanisation by transferring a rural model of religious belonging to the city, affixed religion to a specific geographical location.[112] Religion, in other words, was territorialised—attached both to a local and exclusive community of believers and to the Nation. Emphasis was placed on belief rather than on practice (recall the Inquisition had no questions related to belief, but only to practice), which corresponds to a location of religion within the individual and the familial cell, but also, as scholars have begun to recognise, in civil society.[113] Practice itself was made to be sober and rational rather than emotional, and religion became a question of 'believing and belonging.'

Fundamental to this formatting of religion is the way it was embedded and encompassed within the nation. The Westphalian legacy in Europe is to have created correspondingly territorialised, monopoly striving national Churches. 'Churching,' as Beyer calls this process, promoted the development of Christianity as organised institutions in relation to self-described communities: 'In parallel with the states' developments as "national societies" in which citizens fundamentally "belonged," in which they had their

primary identity and lives, religion developed as churches that incorporated their "members"[…] and that expected those members to be involved in an encompassing and continuous basis, in many ways, as totalistically as their roles as citizens of states.'[114] This churching of religion, which Beyer also calls its Westphalian modelling, developed through a series of oppositions that were forged within the ideological framework of evolutionism and modernism: Reason vs irrationality, modernity vs tradition, rational religion vs superstition, Church vs sect, secular (*laïc*) vs religion, public vs private, state vs civil society, nation/society vs individual, etc.

Peter Beyer has shown how this Westphalian type of churched religion globalised; or rather, how it formed as a 'global system.'[115] The universalisation of 'religion' as a category, through Western colonialism and imperialism, had a profound impact on religion in the non-Western world. Authors have argued that the 'World's Great Religions' were constructed or 'invented'[116] in the nineteenth century. Peter van der Veer has shown how British rule and European Orientalism 'gradually systematize[d] knowledge about the people of India and their various beliefs and practices into an integrated coherent religion called Hinduism,' as part of the 'larger, empirical enterprise to "map" India and its inhabitants.'[117] The 'same can be said about Islam or Buddhism or, in comparable ways, about the strange category, "tribal religions."'[118] The list is not exhaustive, as one may imagine, and can be made to include Confucianism, Shintoism, Sikhism, Jainism, and even Judaism.[119] As the case of Indonesia shows (see Chapter 9), these constructions had important effects in real life. In the West, they provided the grounds for a dismissal of irrational Oriental traditions compared to the 'rational religion of Western Christianity.' In India as elsewhere, they provided the grounds for revivalist movements which reinterpreted these invented traditions within the post-Reformation Christian frame: Monotheistic, scripture-oriented (text-based), belief-centred, exclusive belonging, territorialised, differentiated in time and space, universal, rational, scientific, set against image worship and other 'superstitious' and popular practices, etc. In various parts of the world, native religions were mobilised against the invader, yet were reconfigured in reference to the Western Christian model. Hindu movements, for example, 'resisted the colonial project while adopting some of its important features.'[120] The 'irrationality' of Hinduism was turned on its head, and widespread Hindu revivalism was presented as the offspring of the ancient, rational, and universal wisdom of the Vedas, in whose source one could find in essence both the scientific knowledge of the West and the spiritual antidote to Western materialism.

For Marcel Mauss, religion, like language and race, was a defining feature of the nation.[121] This view challenges the commonly held idea that religion and nationalism are heterogeneous: The first belonging to tradition, the second to modernity. Anderson's analysis of the nation agrees with Mauss, since paying attention to the cultural conditions of the formation of the nation attests to the importance of religion. Similarly, Hobsbawm notes

that if Christian Churches were universal in theory, they were national in practice, and that religion was a powerful cement for the development of nationalism.[122] If this alliance was explicit in countries like Ireland and Poland, the new neutrality of the state in matters of religion opened up a space for religious investments of civil society, with important consequences for colonial interactions. It is in this sense that religion became nationalised in Western Europe. While this nationalisation seems obvious for national Churches, the same goes for minority religions. Van der Veer gives the example of nineteenth-century Britain's recognition of religious minorities, namely Catholics and Dissenters, but also Jews, as a step in the process of the separation of Church and state. This enfranchisement resulted for these minority groups in 'a shift of political loyalty from religious identity to national identity.'[123] Outside of the West, even a quick glance shows how the birth and rise of nationalism, as well as its dissemination within the masses, were intimately tied to religion. The case of Eastern Europe and the ex-Soviet countries illustrates this trend. Elsewhere, observation shows how the colonial state 'gave religion a strong new impulse'[124] and how it was mobilised in national identity construction and national struggles.[125] This is obvious in cases such as India,[126] but a similar argument could be made for a score of Muslim majority countries, starting with Malaysia, Indonesia, Turkey, Egypt, the Maghreb, and so on. Overall, religions were made to contribute to the production of the nation as an imagined community, imagined territory, and ultimate identity in a world composed of other nations, each tending towards universality in theory but competing and rivalling each other in practice in an international space.

So much for the nationalisation of religion, which finds more extensive illustrations in the case studies presented in this volume. As regards its statisation,[127] it is important to come back to the very logics of the modern state. In an era of industrialisation and decline of traditions, the state was invested with the mission and power of transforming society in consonance with its utopian programme. Through education, museums, libraries, archives, health and its administration, as well as the management of religion, the state controlled—or at the very least shaped—the values of society. In order to compile, plan, and administer, the state produces broad and exclusive categories, and tends towards homogeneity (linguistic policies, which promote a specific vernacular to the status of official language, are a good illustration). It also seeks to deal with entities that it can assimilate, i.e. organisations and institutions rather than un-structured entities, and it prefers and promotes well-delimited and exclusive compartments. As Anderson writes: 'the census, the map and the museum illuminate the late colonial state's style of thinking about its domain. The "warp" of this thinking was a totalizing classificatory grid, which could be applied with endless flexibility to anything under the state's real or contemplated control: peoples, regions, religions, languages, products, monuments, and so forth. The effect of the grid was always to be able to say of anything that it was this, not that; it belonged

here, not there. It was bounded, determinate, and therefore—in principle—countable'[128] and compartment-able. The state in the National-Statist era exercised a specific type of power (or 'governmentality') that Philippe Portier, following Foucault, calls 'government.'[129] Government-type governmentality designates a centralised, vertical exercise of power within well-delimited hierarchies and categories, and contained by the nation. This type of governmentality corresponds to Weber's conception of the state, and is consonant with the exigencies of modernity: Concentrated, exclusive, pyramidal, bureaucratic, and rational, it exercises rule from top to bottom, and from centre to periphery.[130] The state, furthermore, encourages fixity and continuity and as such discourages mobility, ambivalence, and blurred boundaries. It exerts what Weber calls a rational-legal mode of authority, vs traditional and charismatic modes. This type of authority is derived from the 'inherent' legal legitimacy of the state and is translated into a public morality based on the sentiment of 'duty.'[131] This conception of the state was institutionalised in all Western European countries before spreading across the globe, and survived well beyond actual colonialism.

The effects of this type of state governmentality on religion have been to transform religion into organisations and institutions, and make it contribute to its mission as well as to nation-building. The late medieval Church may have provided a model for the construction of the Westphalian state, but now it was the modern bureaucratic state that provided the template not only for the national Churches, but for religious groups in general, namely through its political and legal frameworks. In Indonesia, as we will see, religious currents were made to organise within associations recognised more or less explicitly by the totalising state. The Muslim modernist movement Muhammadiyah perfectly illustrates how a government-type of structure and administration developed in this period, with its hierarchical structure and way of dealing with decentralisation. Many authors have noted how modernity has caused an authority crisis within Islam and a contestation of traditional types of authority.[132] The example of the Indonesian Muhammadiyah is typical of twentieth-century developments as it introduced a rational-legal type of legitimacy, linked to its institutional constitution. Like the state, and because of some of the state's fallibility to provide certain services and realise its utopian mission, religious organisations like the Muhammadiyah developed social assistance, educational programmes, etc. Similarly, in the West, Christian Churches often provided health and education in the nineteenth and even the twentieth century, as was the case in Quebec. These services were fulfilled with the agreement of the state, on the state's behalf, and Churches often willingly handed these activities officially over to the state when the latter was 'modern' enough to manage them. In their own conception of what religion was and should be, Churches then saw their distinctive missions as 'naturally' more restricted, and did not challenge this type of takeover by the state (in the case of Quebec, even facilitating it). In general, religious organisations modelled their

constitution and governmentality on that of the state and exerted a vertical and hierarchical type of power and authority.

The state was therefore a model that transformed religion into something like itself, or at least like something it could deal with. This transformation was enforced with more or less coercion. Yet at least as important as the direct means of state intervention in this reconfiguration process is how the state was also a powerful *idea*, or 'political imagination.'[133] In other words, the State also shaped religion because it was the 'dominant political idea of the period.'[134] Examples presented in the following chapters show how the National-Statist regime shapes religious movements, even when they present themselves as 'mirrored reversals of colonial secularism.'[135] Yet, the inversion of some of the *substantive* elements of Western secularism acted as a vector for the *structural* transformation of religion within the National-Statist frame. Incidentally, while secular ideologies (secularism) are core to Western-European incorporations of the National-Statist regime, they are not necessarily central to non-Western pathways—or, to be more precise, they are important in a complex, oblique, or mirrored and antagonistic manner. In order to successfully and legitimately oppose Western secularism, Islamists, for example, needed to rearticulate their vision of Islam in the grammar provided by the National-Statist regime.

The case of Indonesia shows how religion that did not fit the National-Statist mould could be brutally repressed and made to transform, or disappear. 'Religion' was made to conform to a very particular socio-historical form (post-Reformation Christianity) in theory as well as practice. Whole arrays of practices and currents were wiped out, made to conform or become clandestine, with a profound impact on the religious landscape. Still, religion did not entirely institutionalise within this frame. To stay in Indonesia, the village religious traditions of popular Islam related by Clifford Geertz in his famous ethnographies did not disappear all of a sudden. Popular religion, in particular non-urban practices were kept alive; yet, it was clear for Geertz that he was witnessing a breed of religion that was eventually going to vanish and that his registers would end up on the shelves of museums' folklore section.[136] The formation of this global religious system delimited a set of margins in which other types of religiosities, such as popular religion or what Meredith McGuire calls 'unofficial religion,'[137] could survive and develop. As such, they could be 'ignored' as irrelevant—including by sociologists[138]—when they were not judged to be threats by the authorities. What did not fit in the box thereby became invisible.[139]

Secularisation as the naturalisation of the National-Statist regime[140]

The National-Statist regime profoundly impacted how social sciences understand religion. Sociology of religion is born at the turn of the twentieth

century, when Western imperium over the globe was at its peak, and when the future of modern societies was only imaginable as self-contained national societies amongst rival national societies. The interest that both Weber and Durkheim manifested towards religion in their respective sociologies was due in part to religion's decline and/or major transformation in modernity. At the end of the Second World War, sociology of religion's programme changed radically and became marginalised within social sciences as it became further entrenched within the secularisation paradigm. As noted in the introduction, the secularisation narrative is best understood as more than a set of theories, rather as a paradigm. As José Casanova argued: 'the theory of secularisation may be the only theory which was able to attain a truly paradigmatic status within the modern social sciences.'[141] It

> is so intrinsically interwoven with all the theories of the modern world and with the self-understanding of modernity that one cannot simply discard the theory of secularisation without putting into question the entire web, including much of the self-understanding of the social sciences.[142]

This is the reason why it continues to endure until today, however discredited secularisation theories may be.

The secularisation theses emerged amidst a flurry of competing narratives that Casanova systematised into three by now well-known propositions: Religious decline or loss of the social function of religion, privatisation, and the differentiation of social spheres. As a paradigm, though, these propositions only tell part of the story. Similarly constitutive of the secularisation paradigm is its engrained *methodological nationalism*, which means 'when the modern nation-state is treated as the natural and necessary representation of modern society; [and]when the nation-state and modern society become conceptually as well as historically indistinguishable.'[143] Methodological nationalism, in other words, is 'the naturalization of the nation-state'[144] in social theory, which implies that the territorial and ideational frontiers of the nation are taken as the implicit container for social—and religious—facts and their analysis. Read from the National-Statist regime perspective, we can appreciate how this naturalisation could be expected in an era where religion was indeed nationalised, first of all through national Churches. It is significant that the critique of methodological nationalism only emerged within social sciences when the plausibility and self-evidence of the national container—and hence the National-Statist regime itself—were eroded, due to the last wave of globalisation (and the shift to the Global-Market regime). While this critique has slowly seeped through to the social scientific study of religion, many concepts and methods (above all those related to quantitative analyses) remain firmly embedded in its assumptions.

Another characteristic of the secularisation paradigm is to favour a *political* reading of religion, and a corollary focus on *institutions*. Illustrative of this trend is Bryan Turner's article on the sociology of religion in *The SAGE Handbook of Sociology*:

> Within this tradition, I take the study of institutions to be our primary concern, partly as an analytical strategy to affirm that our topic of inquiry is not with individuals or persons. If we define sociology as the study of institutions, then religious institutions have been a central preoccupation of sociologists.[145]

Turner and many other scholars are indeed responsible for making the 'religion and politics' section the largest in the catalogue, of which 'Church and state' relations represent an important portion. One understands how this makes sense from the perspective of the National-Statist regime. Because the political sphere was embedding, and since the state had been endowed with the mission of realising the modern project in many respects *against* religion, it is no surprise that the bulk of social scientific works on religion belong to a political sociology of religion. The autonomisation of politics and its ascendency over society was achieved in the West chiefly through the separation of Church and state and the institutionalisation of either republican or liberal models of regulation, in which the state was the main actor. Similarly, the statisation of religion favoured organised and institutionalised forms, attracting the gaze of sociologists to the detriment of other forms.[146]

The secularisation paradigm also carries a significantly *gendered* perspective. Men are indeed more than overrepresented precisely in those areas favoured by the National-Statist regime: Formal institutions as well as vertical, 'rational,' and hierarchical religious forms, to the detriment of supposedly female, emotional, and informal manifestations. Many accounts converge in saying that women are more religiously active than men; yet, this hardly translates in the research.[147] This has begun to change recently, as we move out of the National-Statist regime (we will see how women are at the centre of recent transformations); yet, gender-interested research has tended to reproduce some of the assumptions of the secularisation paradigm by predominantly emphasising political issues, especially through the concepts of power and domination. As a whole, though, twentieth-century sociology of religion has been predominantly male and white as concerns both the subject and object of enquiry.

Similarly, the secularisation paradigm's *American and Euro-centric* tendency has endured far beyond the sell-by date of evolutionism, belief in inevitable progress, and Hegelian philosophies of history. This is built-into sociology in a way, since sociology and anthropology institutionalised a division of academic labour in which the study of 'us' (the developed West) and 'them' (the underdeveloped, coloured, or backwards other) is

foundational. The implicit belief that underpins sociology in general and the sociology of religion in particular has been that the analysis of Western trends can help us understand what is going on or will eventually happen in the Global South.[148] Western sociologists have tended to export their secularisation paradigm-rooted concepts to the study of non-Western religion, focusing almost exclusively on issues related to politics and religion, especially religious institutions. Non-Western sociologists have imported secularisation-drenched concepts (including secularisation theories) to contexts in which their application was less than optimal, with the result that a lot of the overall production has been highly normative, less concerned with understanding what is then lamenting more or less explicitly about what ought to be (e.g. fully secularised). The result is a deficiency in solid work in regions sometimes as close as Eastern Europe. There has been significant progress in this respect in the last decade or two; yet, the overall gaze remains largely enmeshed in the secularisation paradigm.

A final consideration has to do with something more diffuse. As Casanova argued, the secularisation paradigm is inscribed in the very core of social sciences. As such, it carries modernity's troubled rapport to religion. As stated earlier, the two main modern projects are the utopian creation of a new autonomous society and a new Man—both of which imply taking a distance from 'religion.' This has had profound and enduring effects on the study of religion. Thus, secularisation, as a constitutive part of the modernisation process, could only mean if not the disappearance, at least the marginalisation, privatisation, and sharp differentiation of religion. Religion *had* to fit into 'its' box in order for modernity to unravel, and scholars have actively participated in this process. One can therefore understand why the unending debate as to whether religion is in decline or returning continues to shape the discipline, since it is tied to the very episteme of modern thought.

Perhaps the most important effect of the secularisation paradigm—and perhaps the least observed—has to do with the very definition of religion. The normative rapport that researchers maintain with religion in the light of the nature of their adherence to the modern project has a lot do with the emotionality and resilient character of the debate on the definition of religion. By comparison, debates over the definition of politics, economics, aesthetics, law, capitalism, the state, the market, and so on have not been as sensitive. No other academic discipline is as preoccupied with the conditions of the discipline's very existence than the sociology of religion and religious studies. In no other discipline can one find articles, books, and theses that conclude their discussion by arguing that the object of enquiry is, all things considered, *not* religious. One would have much difficulty finding a work in political sciences which concludes that the object being discussed is, in fact, *not* political. There are no records of scholars getting heart attacks after Michel Foucault extended the analysis of power relations (and therefore politics) to the interstices of daily life. Yet, attempts to

analyse the—implicit, secular, profane, quasi, etc.—religious dimensions of a wide variety of social phenomena, be it sports, art, raves, human rights, nationalism, totalitarianism, or the belief in the natural virtues of the free market, have encountered their share of heart-felt resistance. The argument that religion might just be a very useful, even necessary concept—and just a concept—as is politics has not been a very audible one. The reasons for this can be attributed to the secularisation paradigm and the ways in which it has naturalised this particularly sensitive rapport to religion.

Westphalian or National-Statist?

The tale I have been telling, which links a certain modelling of religion to the emergence of modernity and the rise of the nation-state, is not an essentially novel one. Peter Beyer has described the emergence of what he calls the 'Westphalian model' of religion starting in the seventeenth century.[149] Beyer coined this appellation in order to distinguish recent transformations which he argues have ushered in a new 'Post-Westphalian model' of religion. My proposition shares many similarities with Beyer's, and I will get back to this discussion in the chapters to come. For the time being, it is pertinent to compare his terminology and mine as concerns the historical period covered in the present chapter. While I have no major objection to Beyer's model, apart from the assumption of social differentiation, I find the Westphalian label both a good and a not-so-good idea. A good idea because, as we have seen, the Peace of Westphalia of 1648 is an essential and foundational element in the emergence of religion as a differentiated social sphere with the characteristics we have highlighted. Not-so-good because the term is both too extensive and too limited. Extensive since the Westphalian model only really crystallised in the late nineteenth century, vs the much longer period that the label spontaneously suggests. Limited, because the Westphalian reference is strictly European. The Euro-American region is indeed the exclusive focus of the article in which Beyer introduced the Westphalian terminology. In a second and more recent article, he goes on to discuss the cases of Turkey, India, and Canada. In Beyer's account, Turkey appears to be the most straightforwardly Westphalian country of the lot, namely because of its importation of the French model of *laïcité*. While Canada is obviously aligned with the European states, it is also like India in that it is not *directly* Westphalian, even though the Westphalian frame is that within which, through colonialism, it was made to evolve. Discussing more recent developments, Beyer writes that 'the question of where India is headed in post-Westphalian terms is as difficult as the question of whether it was ever Westphalian in the first place.'[150] Beyer's model, therefore, is curiously undecided, and avowedly limited when it comes to shedding light on more recent developments outside of Europe and its overt zone of influence.

In comparison, the National-Statist regime has considerable advantages. The Nation and the State are two of the most powerful ideas and

institutions of modernity, which have been effectively appropriated across the entire globe, with variations that are contained within a specific set of constants. The Nation-State is also historically more specific, as it came into full efflorescence at the turn of the twentieth century. At the most profound level, the State is modernity's preferred social regulator and depositary of its utopian cultural programme. It is also, as we have seen, an empirical reality whose institutionalisation process and globalisation can be described and ascribed. The Nation, meanwhile, accompanies the State as its corollary-sacralised community and means of legitimisation. Taken together, the Nation-State qualifies the whole of modern societies and satisfies the criteria for a Durkheim-inspired investigation of religion in High Modernity. There is no question as to whether India, Canada, or any other country's social, cultural, political, and religious make-up can be effectively investigated within the parameters of the Nation-State, hence a significant heuristic advantage. Finally, talking of a regime rather than a model also presents the advantage of insisting on how the Nation-State conditions the transformations of religion. A model is neutral, and implies the possibility of loose, partial, or voluntary conformity. The concept of regime, on the other hand, insists on the structural and, to a certain extent, inescapable nature of nationalisation and statisation in the context of a globalising world. The case of Indonesia, which in this respect is far from being an exceptional case, highlights how coercive nationalisation and statisation is a possibility within this perspective, without it being particularly 'Westphalian.'

Following Durkheim's insights on the rapport between social morphology (the type of society) and religion (tribal societies will have tribal religion, etc.), the Nation-State hypothesis provides the analytical tools for investigating the parameters within which variations occur. The constitution of the nation takes on a reality of its own depending on the 'traditional' (read: pre-modern) forms of community and social bonds from which it proceeds, for example ancestor or familial-centred, imperial, etc. Similarly, the modern state was erected or grafted on existing power structures which affected its institutionalisation (and its failures, e.g. in most of Africa). Religion can therefore be expected to be reshaped in tune with the variations observed in the institutionalisation patterns of the nation-state, whether directly Westphalian or not.

The erosion of the National-Statist regime

Nothing lasts forever. Shmuel Eisenstadt's strong thesis on the multiple patterns of modernity was accompanied by the recognition that social movements had been increasingly shifting away from the nation-state and towards a *mélange* of local and global. Increased world financial and commercial flows, as well as intensified international migrations and other trends have combined to reduce the control of the nation-state over the

whole of society. The ideological and symbolic centrality of the nation-state has been weakened: 'All of these developments attest to the decomposition of the major structural characteristics and the weakening of the ideological hegemony of the once-powerful nation-states.'[151] What happened to the nation-state? What has emerged in the nation-state's wake? And how does all of this affect religion?

Eisenstadt is far from being the only one to acknowledge some kind of important shift in the last decades. According to Mathias Koenig, recent developments, including the expansion of communication technologies, have challenged the political regulation of religion instituted in the nation-state's mission. Many scholars have made a similar diagnosis, and struggled to find a satisfying explanation. For Koenig, these developments evidence the erosion of the 'charisma' of the nation-state and its partial replacement by 'Human Rights.' This allows for new particularistic identities, including religious identities, to emerge as legitimate expressions of the universal which concur the nation.[152] Have Human Rights replaced the Nation-State as the charismatic locus of late modern societies, as Koenig proposes? It seems evident that Human Rights, by themselves, fall short of characterising the structuring principle of the whole of contemporary societies to the extent that the Nation-State did.

We have seen how the idea of the State as a social regulator and transformative engine was coupled with its institutionalisation as such in reality. The same cannot be said of Human Rights. Also, the state as a social regulator requires a social form, in this case the nation. There is no such social form corresponding to Human Rights, apart perhaps individualism and an abstract notion of Humankind. Yet, individualism was already coextensive to the idea of the nation as a community-of-individuals, as Durkheim readily observed.[153] Human Rights certainly play an important role in global society through their institutionalisation in the United Nations charter and associated organisations; yet, they remain mostly (and unfortunately some would say) tied to Western conceptions and Western realities, as the news remind us on a daily basis. They certainly cannot be said to effectively operate as a charismatic locus or sacralised entity outside of the West.

There is certainly much to keep from Koenig's analysis; yet, it remains an essentially *political* analysis of the erosion of the container functionality of the nation-state. It is, in other words, an analysis of the dis-embedding of society from the nation-state as seen from within the National-Statist regime and its corollary epistemology, and this is why it fails to shed light on the structuring dynamics of the new configuration. It is a portrait of *where we are as seen from where we were*, hence its indeterminacy. Certainly, religious change is not structured by Human Rights as it was by the Nation-State, especially not on a global scale. It is hard to see what Human Rights have to do with the emergence of a global halal market and Islamic finance, the global efflorescence of Pentecostalism, the dissemination of Faith-based initiatives which have come to replace the state in the

provision of Welfare, or the rise of a transnational neo-shamanic movement and 'spiritual tourism.' What, then, has replaced the governmentality of the Nation-State?

This is where our gaze turns to the cultural revolution of consumerism and the come-to-dominance of neoliberalism. But first, we need to make a detour in order to understand how and why the free market emerged in the way that it did in Western thought as the main rival to the state, before overthrowing it as the preferred mechanism for social regulation and conquering the world.

Notes

1 Clastres (1974).
2 Gauchet (1985: 42).
3 Foucault (1966).
4 Certeau (1982: 33–4).
5 Beyer (2012).
6 Portier (2010b: 241).
7 Beyer (2013: 667).
8 Beyer (2013: 667).
9 For women, as we know, this would come much later.
10 This was not entirely new. Machiavelli (1469–1527) had also made a point in submitting religion to a political function. In his case though, antique Roman polytheism was judged to be far superior to Christianity in ensuring political stability and legitimacy.
11 Einsenstadt (2002: 5).
12 I distinguish between these two answers to the modern political project by using the terms Republicanism and Liberalism, following Donegani and Sadoun (2007). I am more explicit about these two ideal-types and the consequences for religion in Gauthier (2017c). Many other thinkers have identified these two poles, yet often with different emphases and different appellations. Shmuel Eisenstadt, for instance, qualifies these two 'tendencies' as such:

> The first, crystallized above all in the Great Revolutions, gave rise, perhaps for the first time in history, to the belief in the possibility of bridging the gap between the transcendental and mundane orders—of realizing through conscious human agency, exercised in social life, major utopian and eschatological visions. The second emphasized a growing recognition of the legitimacy of multiple individual and group goals and interests, as a consequence allowed for multiple interpretations of the common good. (2002: 5)

As many political sociologists, especially in the English-speaking world, Eisenstadt misses the fundamental mechanism of the market in the liberal solution. See Chapters 4 and 5.
13 Caillé (2011).
14 I am translating from Claude Lefort's (1986) notion of the *théologico-politique*.
15 Nelson (2014: 229).
16 See Caillé, Lazzeri and Senellart (2001).
17 This reduction of happiness to pleasure is one determining characteristic of modernity. See Caillé, Lazzeri, and Senellart (2001).
18 Mauss (1920). Van der Veer (2001) has also picked up on Mauss' insistence in order to make a similar argument.

19 Gellner (1994).
20 Meyer (1983), quoted in Rosanvallon (1989: 23).
21 Rosanvallon (1989: 14). My translation.
22 Veer (1999: 39).
23 This qualification was also used by Locke. Rosanvallon (1989: 140).
24 Rosanvallon (1989: 43).
25 Rosanvallon (1989: 41).
26 Anderson (2016: 168). See also Veer (1999).
27 On the category of 'race' and its relations to that of religion, see Anidjar (2016).
28 Rosanvallon (1989: 120).
29 Rosanvallon (1989: 121). My translation. This shows a significant shift in the rapport to religion and God from the times of Isaac Newton. The nineteenth century moves from knowing the God-written laws of Nature to transforming nature in the glory of God.
30 Rosanvallon (1989: 124). My translation.
31 Rosanvallon (1989: 104). My translation.
32 On Bentham and utilitarianism, see Audard (1999).
33 Leroy-Beaulieu, quoted in Rosanvallon (1989: 209). My translation.
34 Rosanvallon (1989: 125–7). My (loose) translation.
35 I have consciously been oscillating between the two concepts of (the) political and politics. In line with the theory expounded in the introduction, I understand 'the political' as the macro level which includes and contains politics at the *meso* level. Following once again Claude Lefort (1986) and the use of *le politique* in French (which I translate as the political), this adds a superior level to the usual distinction in English between politics, policies, and polity (although some authors' use of polity resembles that of *le politique*).
36 As a French liberal economist wrote in 1863: The state 'is the representative of social perpetuity.' Rosanvallon (1989: 272–3).
37 Hobsbawm (1987: 85).
38 Rosanvallon (1989: 104). Rosanvallon talks of signs rather than symbols.
39 Rosanvallon (1989: 273). My translation.
40 Hobsbawm (1990: 80).
41 Hobsbawm (1990: 81).
42 Hobsbawm (1990: 81).
43 Hobsbawm (1975: 103).
44 Hobsbawm (1962: 164–79, 1990); Anderson (2016: 80–2).
45 Hobsbawm (1987: 145).
46 Hobsbawm (1990: 84); Anderson (2016: 22).
47 Anderson (2016: 111).
48 Hobsbawm (1975: 105). Emphasis in original.
49 Hobsbawm (1990: 22, 1987: 147).
50 Josef Stalin, 1912, *Marxism and the National and Colonial Question*, p. 8. Quoted in Hobsbawm (1990: 5).
51 Anderson (2016: 17).
52 Anderson (2016: 6).
53 Anderson (2016: 7).
54 Gellner (1994: 3).
55 Hobsbawm (1975, 1987).
56 Campbell (1987).
57 Hobsbawm (1987: 149). For primary school numbers, see Hobsbawm (1975: 118).
58 Hobsbawm (1990: 11).

59 Hobsbawm (1987: 148).
60 Anderson (2016: 12).
61 Robertson (1992: 8).
62 Robertson (1992: 58–60).
63 Hobsbawm (1975: 63).
64 Hobsbawm (1975: 63).
65 Eisenstadt (2002: 4).
66 Eisenstadt (2002: 2).
67 Eisenstadt (2002: 13).
68 Burchardt and Wohlrab-Sahr (2013: 607).
69 Eisenstadt (2002: 14).
70 Eisenstadt (2002: 14).
71 By emphasising the transnational and civilizational interactions and interrelations (in the 'entangled modernities' current), or by drawing attention to social problems and inequalities of all sorts (in the 'fragmented modernity' current), for instance. For an overview, see Spohn (2006). My thanks to Steven Engler for this reference. Engler's own article (2003) on Bourdieu and the consecration of the state is pertinent for this discussion in this chapter.
72 Michel, Possamai and Turner (2017b: 9–11).
73 See Gauthier (2018b), Vandenberghe (2018).
74 In conferences available for viewing on the Internet, Eisenstadt insists on the underlying unity of the 'modern cultural programme' and warns against over-emphasising multiplicity. I thank Ilana Silber, who worked closely with Eisenstadt, for also confirming this understanding of his ideas.
75 Hobsbawm (1987: 24).
76 Anderson (2016: 188).
77 This is one reason I have chosen not to make a case study out of Latin America.
78 Anderson (2016: 110).
79 Anderson (2016: 4).
80 Hobsbawm (1987: 82).
81 Hobsbawm (1987: 76).
82 Hobsbawm (1987: 73).
83 Hobsbawm (1987: 73).
84 Hobsbawm (1987: 22).
85 Braud (1997: 134–48). On the exportation of the Western state model around the world, see also Badie (1992).
86 Hobsbawm (1987: 337).
87 Hobsbawm (1987: 336).
88 Anderson (2016: 3–4).
89 Hobsbawm (1990: 25). See also Wallerstein (1974).
90 Smith (2012).
91 Hobsbawm (1990: 26–8).
92 Hobsbawm (1990: 31).
93 Esping-Andersen (1990: 79).
94 Hobsbawm (1990).
95 Hobsbawm (1990: 132).
96 Hobsbawm (1990: 132).
97 Rosanvallon (1989: 166). On pensions, see also Esping-Andersen (1990).
98 Rosanvallon (1989: 181).
99 Rosanvallon (1989: 185). My translation.
100 Keynes (1942).
101 Hobsbawm (1987: 333).
102 Sennett (2006: 22). Emphasis in original.

103 Rosanvallon (1989: 250). Emphasis in original. My translation.
104 Esping-Andersen (1990: 141). I find Jepperson's (2002) article to be a stimulating complement to think the varieties of Nation-State institutionalisation. Portier (2010b) brings them together for thinking how this affects the institutional regulation of religion by the state in what is probably the best typology available.
105 Woodhead (2012: 10).
106 Woodhead (2012: 10).
107 Lefort (1986), Voegelin (1994), Rivière (1988), Gentile (2005).
108 Spohn (2003).
109 McGuire (2008).
110 Veer (2001: 20).
111 Veer and Lehmann (1999: 4).
112 Willaime (1999), Bobineau (2005).
113 Veer (1999, 2001).
114 Beyer (2012: 117).
115 Beyer (1994, 2006).
116 Hobsbawm and Ranger (1984).
117 Veer (2001: 26). See also Beyer's synthesis (2006: 188–224).
118 Veer (2001: 26, 1999).
119 Heschel (2016).
120 Veer (2001: 29).
121 Mauss (1920). See also Veer (1999), Anidjar (2016).
122 Hobsbawm (1987: 68, 154).
123 Veer (2001: 22).
124 Veer (2001: 24).
125 Hobsbawm (1990: 152).
126 Veer (1999, 2001).
127 The case of the Vatican City State, founded as an independent state in our period (1929) at the same time that Roman Catholicism was recognized as the official religion of the Italian state as part of the Latran Treaty, is perhaps the most striking example of this process of statisation of religion. It is also a unique and incomparable one that highlights how the National-Statist regime was tied to a Western Christian type of religion.
128 Anderson (2016: 184).
129 Governmentality is defined by Foucault as the 'techniques and procedures destined to guide the conducts of men' (2001: 181). Portier's government qualifies a type of governmentality that was intrinsic to the state's exercise in the twentieth century before the neoliberal turn, which introduced a new form of polity which he calls 'governance.' We will come back to this shift in the next chapters. Portier (2008: 173).
130 Weber (1956).
131 Weber (1956), Gauthier (forthcoming a).
132 See, namely Roy (2004), as well as Chapter 9.
133 Iqtidar (2011b: 537). The notion is inspired by Charles Taylor's (2003) 'modern social imaginaries,' which are broader and deeper than scientific concepts as they are rooted in the imaginary fabric of the social.
134 Iqtidar (2011b: 542). See also Iqtidar (2011a).
135 Iqtidar (2011b: 539).
136 Geertz (1960), Beatty (1999).
137 McGuire (2007).
138 Spickard (2017).
139 Luckmann (1967).
140 Some of the ideas in this section are developed in Gauthier (forthcoming b).

141 Casanova (1994: 17). See also Tschannen (1994), who also talks of a secularisation paradigm, analysed within a strictly Kuhnian framework.
142 Casanova (1994: 18).
143 Chernilo (2017).
144 Wimmer and Glick-Schiller (2003).
145 Turner (2005: 284).
146 More recent developments, for instance in Northern European religious studies (Germany, the Netherlands, etc.), which remained entrenched within religious phenomenology for most of the twentieth century, include an important investment in 'discursive' methodologies that also tend to favour a political reading, albeit in Foucault-inspired 'soft' versions of domination and power, and an approach to religion often limited to World (i.e. institutionalised) religions.
147 McGuire (2008), Woodhead (2005, 2008).
148 See Spickard (2017).
149 Beyer (2011, 2012, 2013).
150 Beyer (2013: 673).
151 Eisenstadt (2002: 18).
152 Koenig (2005). See also Beauchemin (2004).
153 'Individualism has walked into history at the same pace as statism.' Durkheim (1975: 171), quoted by Rosanvallon (1989: 97). My translation.

3 The Market and the problem of social order

From Adam Smith to Keynes

What is the market, and how did it come to be? Today's commonsensical answer finds its origins in Adam Smith's *Wealth of Nations*. Smith based his arguments on what he believed to be human nature. Nature is where modern thinkers sought the bases for their models, since the transcendence of God was no longer a credible foundation. For Smith, human nature is characterised by 'a certain propensity [...] to truck, barter, and exchange one thing for another.'[1] The 'necessary,' albeit 'slow and gradual' consequence of this natural tendency had been the 'division of labour, from which flow so many advantages'[2] and to which, according to Smith, we owe 'all human achievements and civilization' itself. These quotes from the *Wealth of Nations*' opening pages provide modern economics with its founding mythology: That the modern market economy is the result of an intrinsic and natural human tendency which was gradually allowed to fully express itself though the movements of History: 'Every man thus lives by exchanging, or becomes in some measure a merchant, and the society itself grows to be what is properly a commercial society.'[3]

For Adam Smith, the division of labour, a process by which individuals came to specialise in the production of differentiated goods and services, is intimately tied to the concomitant process of social differentiation, by which the economy acquired its autonomy. As is the case with many philosophical works of the Enlightenment, Smith's argument starts with a speculation about the state of nature. Here, self-interested and inherently maximising prehistorical men and women began specialising, one busying himself with the production of bows and arrows, another in 'covering small huts,' and so on, as the natural result of a simple 'calculus of interest.' In this primal scene, each individual is said to naturally produce a surplus that he is sure to be able to barter against something else. Because of the inconvenience of such a system when one does not exactly have what the other is looking for in exchange for what one wants, tens of thousands of years later, the story goes, money was finally invented to fluidify transactions. The emergence of what Smith called a 'commercial society' is therefore seen as proceeding from the long-awaited 'liberation' of these natural

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dispositions in mankind that were for such a long time bridled by abusive traditional and authoritarian regulations.

As anthropologist David Graeber writes:

> Tellingly, this story played a crucial role not only in founding the discipline of economics, but in the very idea that there was something called "the economy," which operated by its own rules, separate from moral or political life, that economists could take as their field of study.[4]

In this narrative, human economies are always and invariably more or less hindered market economies, whether barter-based or modern: 'The economy is where we indulge in our natural propensity to truck and barter.'[5] From this perspective, the only difference between the primal barter economy and today's informational and financialised capitalism is the use of money. Such a narrative started circulating in seventeenth-century Europe, and in England in particular, well before Adam Smith penned it in the opening pages of the 1776 book that became political economy's founding scripture. Interestingly, Adam Smith's romantic version of the origins of the market-based economy survived untouched well into the nineteenth century, when it was taken to be factual by thinkers such as David Ricardo, and from then on until today. A version of this narrative can be found in every economics textbook used in university classrooms around the world. Ask any economist, or your neighbour in the bus: This is the story you will get. Ask any scholar of religion: The answer will probably be the same.

The problem with this account? It is simply contrary to historical facts. As Graeber writes: 'The problem is there's no evidence that it ever happened, and an enormous amount of evidence suggesting that it did not.'[6] Graeber is just one of many on a long list of thinkers who have objected to this narrative and its sociological and anthropological underpinnings—e.g. that humans can be thought of as rational, self-interested, maximising calculators. Yet, this narrative is robust, as all founding myths are.

How is this important for the study of religion? If one wants to investigate the rapports between religion and economics, it is very important. For who does one trust when talking about economics? The answer, sadly, is that people in general, and sociologists of religion in particular, contract economic issues out to economists. A telling example is the 'Economics' entry in the recently published *Oxford Handbook for the Study of Religion*, which typically celebrates Adam Smith's 'liberation' of economic thought from unnatural and 'excessive' feudal regulations, dismisses the bulk of Marxian economics as being 'false' (since being 'proven wrong' by the collapse of the Soviet bloc), advances erroneous historical claims about the antiquity of economic thought in Aristotle, completely ignores the landmass of works filed under economic sociology and economic anthropology, including those of the Durkheimian school and Mark Granovetter, and ends with the false claim that Adam Smith included religion as a marketable good in

the conclusion of the *Wealth of Nations*, thereby anticipating the Rational Choice approach to religion which the authors happen to celebrate.[7] This introduction to economics for scholars of religion is nothing more than neo-classical propaganda, and a clumsy one at that. This example is telling since the editors (which are also the editors of a very serious academic journal) are renowned scholars who would never have published anything faintly equivalent in their own field of expertise. If such an ideological, biased, and outright erroneous text made it to print in such a glamourous publication, it is because social scientists leave economics to economists—another consequence of the differentiation thesis and its corollary division of academic labour—and because they lack any type of basic knowledge with respect to economics. Still, as bad and fatally normative and partial an introduction to economics as the aforementioned entry is, it does provide an ideal-typical example of the way that mainstream economics (or 'orthodox' economics as it likes to call itself) considers itself and its object of study.

One thing that scholars of religion ignore, not the least because it seems totally unfathomable, is that contrary to all other social sciences, political economy-cum-economics is not a discipline made of competing theories that have been challenged, tested, amended, and bettered over time. It is a single theory whose fundamentals have not changed in any significant manner since the days of Adam Smith and which pushes 'heterodox'—read: critical—perspectives aside.[8]

In order to fill a very serious lack, this chapter explores how the market came to be in its modern acceptation. It traces the emergence of the idea of the market in the Enlightenment and its institutionalisation as the dominant and exclusive form of legitimate economy worldwide. It provides a synthetic presentation of economic theory and the history of the discipline of economics, as well as the history of the developments of capitalism. In order to do so, I draw from an array of sources and disciplines, as in the preceding chapter. Changing the focus from differentiation to integration and foundation allows to capture how the Market emerged as a *political* response to the question of social order and social regulation, providing insights into the rapports between the Market and the Nation-State. Mapping this evolution requires that we not only track the developments of modes of production, but also how consumption emerged as a dominant ethos and a type of culture: Consumerism. In all these aspects, the perspective of orthodox political economy appears terribly limited, when it is not downright flawed. The conclusion of this discussion is that economics are too important to be left to economists.

Market economy as a modern phenomenon

Anyone familiar with the ethnographic and anthropological material on 'primitive' cultures should know that political economy's barter fable is far-flung and inaccurate. 'Primitive' exchange is ceremonial, ritual, and

festive far more than it is profit-seeking and utilitarian. Marcel Mauss, in the conclusion of his celebrated essay on the forms of exchange in archaic societies, captured the essence of this when he wrote that the maximising, calculating, and self-interested individual of economic theory, or *homo economicus*, was not behind us, in tribal societies, but before us, in modern capitalist societies.[9] Prior to modernity, the form of exchange in human societies was the gift, a complex of altruistic and self-interested behaviour that was obligated and obligating as much as it was free and voluntary. Historian and economist Karl Polanyi came to similar conclusions and insisted that the sphere of economics could not be reduced to market-type exchange (barter or money-based) prior to modern times. Exchange, he wrote, was embedded in the wider social order, e.g. within the structuring impetus of statuses and obligations proper to traditional societies. Polanyi distinguished between modern market economies and *market-places*, which are public and visible events which occur at regular times and places, and within which prices are not primarily the result of the meeting of buyers and sellers but the expression of ascribed relationships, conventions, rules, status relations, honour, tradition, and trust, as well as the value of people more than the abstract value of goods.[10] Market-places are liminal spaces framed by social conventions, as they are spaces of intense communication. In Mauss' terms, market-places are total social facts whose social significance by far exceeds their sole economic dimensions.

Fernand Braudel criticised Polanyi's sharp distinction between traditional non-market societies, in which economics were embedded, and autonomised modern market societies.[11] For Braudel, the distinction cannot be as clear-cut. For Braudel, gift-types of exchange endured in modernity, while market-type exchanges existed in certain trade centres of Antiquity. Market-type exchanges, in which the price of goods was to some important extent the consequence of the availability of (offer) and demand for these goods, were nevertheless marginal, restricted, and depreciated. For him, the invention of money, understood as a general equivalent and objective measure of value, is a key condition for the development of market-type exchange, and not the other way around, as Smith's fable holds true. Yet, the earliest signs of such a conception of money are attested in the great Near-Eastern City-states of Antiquity, and only in an inchoate form.[12] Braudel notes that before modernity, the value of money was tied to the status of people, not of objects. It was the contrary of a general and multifunctional equivalent, since the principle of archaic money is its singularity. While modern money abolishes debt, archaic money, on the contrary, served a system of general indebtedness.[13] Braudel therefore distinguishes between public and private markets, the former corresponding to Polanyi's market-place. As for the private market, it only started to develop in Western Europe in sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, when it increasingly became thought of as a 'conceptual, strategic, abstract space of calculation and commercial

opportunity.'[14] The rise of private markets in Europe coincided with the decline of fairs and itinerant markets, and the arrival of banks and stock markets, a trend which intensified over the course of the eighteenth century. Whether one privileges Polanyi or Braudel's analysis, both agree on the essential: That the market emerged, as Mauss wrote, 'very recently,'[15] as a result of a rupture that occurred in the century of the Enlightenment. Before that, offer-and-demand-structured markets might have (Braudel) existed or not (Polanyi), but there is no doubt that pre-modern economies were anything but a market economy.[16]

The emergence of the Market as a social regulator

As Max Weber argued against Adam Smith and the assumptions of political economy: 'A man does not by nature wish to earn more and more money, but simply to live as he is accustomed to live and to earn as much as is necessary for that purpose.'[17] Similarly, Weber noted how religious ethics in every known culture discouraged the pursuit of personal interest and the accumulation of wealth. Far from being the result of the liberation of natural tendencies, capitalism departed from eons of human culture. How could this happen? Weber's thesis in the *Protestant ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* converges with the idea that 'market society preceded market economy, and not the other way around.'[18] For Weber: 'Economic ideology did not follow commercial society but preceded it.'[19]

According to linguist Emile Benveniste, no specific expression denoted commercial exchanges in Indo-European languages. Commerce was not part of traditional social activities, unlike cultivating, governing, fighting, praying, etc., and was not part of traditional occupations, practices, and techniques. People engaging in the exchange of goods were simply said to be occupied, or busy (hence 'business'). Commerce was embedded in institutions and regulated by special statutes.[20] For Aristotle, economic activity at large, which he called 'chrematistic,' was included in the sphere of moral actions. He distinguished 'natural,' domestic economic activities, and 'artificial' economic activities which consisted in commerce:[21] 'He considered the first as legitimate since it was destined to acquire goods which answered a need, a use, while the second was condemnable since centred on the search of profit for profit.'[22] For Aristotle, and more widely in Ancient Greece, economic activity was therefore subordinated to what was considered the natural forms of socialisation and the pillars of the Antique social structure: The (extended) family and the Polis. Aristotle's view of economics as needing to be submitted to political and moral finalities, because of the risk of social dislocation inherent to commercial activity, is typical of traditional and pre-modern societies.[23]

Two millennia later, Montchrestien's (1575–1621) *Traité d'économie politique* opposed Aristotle's understanding by suggesting that the economical coincided with the political, thereby providing it with a completely novel

status.[24] Later still, John Locke (1632–1704) took over Hobbes' problem of governing a society of self-interested individuals and proposed an alternative theory of social contract that introduced economics as an operating mechanism in the 'arithmetic of passions.' Locke introduced the revolutionary idea that private property was part of the core of individual rights: The individual and property were two ways to say the same thing.[25] Private property, which is foundational to the very idea of market exchange, was thereby cast as being rooted in human nature, providing a fertile ground for the emergence of modern economic thought.

The Enlightenment was busy with the question of social regulation outside of a theological-political frame. Liberalism, in opposition to Republicanism, offered an alternative to the state as the social regulator in the guise of the free market, as a direct result of the Montchrestien and Locke's revolutionary innovations. While republican political philosophies stressed social cohesion and unity, and held community (or society) to be more than the sum of its parts, classical Liberalism recognised only individuals. The sovereignty of the individual and the primacy of individual liberty over equality form liberalism's foundation. The main thesis of Liberalism is that

> there is no natural subordination of human beings and each individual is sovereign and free to decide for himself in the face of all authorities, moral or religious, all powers, political and others, all despotisms, that want to subdue him. This unlimited sovereignty is founded on a conception of human nature as being individuated before being social.[26]

As John Stuart Mill wrote in the nineteenth century: 'The only freedom which deserves the name, is that of pursuing our own good in our own way, so long as we do not attempt to deprive others of theirs, or impede their efforts to obtain it.'[27] The individual is both a fact and a value for Liberalism: It must be defended and promoted. It is what confers meaning and legitimacy to human action—and therefore to government.[28]

Significantly, the exercise of individual liberty was increasingly conceived as occurring in the space of the market, and civil society itself was conceptualised as its extension. Following Locke, philosophers of the Scottish Enlightenment increasingly pinned their political theories on civil society and the market rather than on the state and the idea of a social contract. Schaftesbury (1671–1713), Hutcheson (1694–1746), Hume (1711–1776), Smith (1723–1790), and Ferguson (1723–1816): All of them grafted liberal political philosophy evermore so onto political economy. And all of them founded their theories on what was believed to be the equivalent of the law of gravity in human affairs: Self-interest, which was to become the cornerstone of economic theory.[29]

The invention of the idea of the 'Market' must be understood within this liberal tradition. Seventeenth- and eighteenth-century writings and public

debates on 'the market' were not concerned with technical aspects, but rather about the problematic of social and political regulation. As Pierre Rosanvallon argues:

> The birth of economic liberalism was not only a theory—or an ideology—that accompanied the development of productive forces and the rise of the bourgeoisie as a dominant class: it did not restrain itself to claiming or translating the emancipation of economic activity from morality. It must above all be understood as an answer to the problems left unresolved by social contract theorists.[30]

The market is therefore a central concept for Liberalism, and not just economic liberalism.

In his essay on the genesis of economic liberalism, Louis Dumont identified two conditions for the autonomisation of economics as a social sphere: First, that the economy be perceived and felt to be a distinct system with its own internal coherence, in particular with respect to politics. Second, that economic activity, understood as the pursuit of individual interests, contributed to the common good, contrary to the precepts of traditional and Christian morality. In other words, the birth of market-economics required a double emancipation: From politics, and from religion. Both of these conditions were united in Adam Smith's *Wealth of Nations*.

With respect to the first of these conditions, Joyce Appleby has shown how seventeenth-century England saw an explosion of works and pamphlets on economic issues in which the word 'market' shifted from meaning the 'village marketplace' to describing 'an invisible flow of goods and payments girdling the globe and crisscrossing the English countryside.'[31] The market therefore grew as an abstraction that had its own logic: 'let me sell as the market goes' became a popular adage. Meanwhile, in France, the Mercantilists, Jansenists, and Physiocrats (literally 'the rule of [the laws of] nature') of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were the first to argue that the meeting between a buyer and a seller was not a zero-sum affair, in which one's benefit was necessarily at the detriment of another, but rather that it was a win-win situation which, as a consequence, was beneficial from the perspective of the general interest. These overlapping currents were the first to affirm something like a self-regulating principle in economic matters. Still, though, it is clear that at that time, the aim of economic development was still very much subservient to political power.[32] The most prominent of the Physiocrats, François Quesnay (1694–1774), a doctor, economist, and counsel to Louis XV, authored an *Economic Table* (1658) that both Marx and Schumpeter recognised as the first to present 'the economic domain as a coherent whole, as a whole constituted of parts linked to one another.'[33] The annual circulation of agricultural production in the *Royaume de France* represented in Quesnay's *Table* was modelled on the circulation of blood in the human body and was thought to illustrate

'Nature's Laws,' in consistency with God's divine order. Adam Smith was greatly impressed by Quesnay's work, and the two men met during the former's stay in France (1764–1768).[34]

The second condition implies that self-interest and the pursuit of profit could be freed from the stringent moral condemnations of the Christian faiths. Another doctor, Bernard de Mandeville (1670–1732), who was born in a French family in Holland and practised in England, was determinant in dismissing Christian morality in economic matters through the publication, in 1705, of *The Fable of Bees: Or, Private Vices, Public Benefits*.[35] As its title suggests, Mandeville argued that self-interested behaviour, even vices, were beneficial for commerce and the industry, and therefore for the common good, contrary to benevolence, honesty, and frugality. In the *Fable*, these Christian values were shown to lead to economic stagnation, social dwindling, widespread sorrow, and even chaos.[36] In other words, Mandeville turned traditional interdicts regarding the pursuit of profit on their heads. For Mandeville, prosperity was the key word, and it was equalled, without further analysis, with the common good, or what Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832) would later call 'the greatest happiness for the greatest number.' Noteworthy is how this equation translates a more profound shift from a classical conception of happiness, defined as wisdom and the equilibrium of passions, to the one defined as the sum of pleasures subtracted the sum of pains and displeasures—what Bentham termed 'utility.'[37] Mandeville's *Fable* was met with ferocious critiques and created a wide polemic that crossed the Channel and ignited continental Europe. Decades later, though, most of Mandeville's ideas had seeped into the thinking minds of the century and were reformulated in the *Wealth of Nations*, above all the idea that the individual pursuit of self-interest serves the common good, as the following well-known quote serves to argue:

> It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own self-interest. We address ourselves not to their humanity but to their self-love, and never talk to them of our own necessities, but of their advantages.[38]

In Mandeville as in Smith, the 'pursuit of Happiness,' which appeared as an inalienable right in the 1776 American Declaration of Independence (the same year as Smith's opus), was conceived as the satisfaction derived from property and consumption.

Enlightenment philosophy, in the wake of Hobbes, was in search of an answer to the question of limiting war and favouring peace. In *L'esprit des lois* (1748), Montesquieu (1689–1755) wrote that commerce acted as a softener of mores and cultivated states of minds disposed towards peace. From the perspective of commerce, he wrote, the world was a single nation—a utopian and optimistic belief that became central to liberal philosophy. The eighteenth century was also after a simple solution for government, an

organising principle that would be as simple as the divine principle—i.e. God—it was seeking to replace. Claude-Adrien Helvetius (1715–1771), for example, wrote:

> I believe nonetheless in the possibility of a good government, where the liberty and the property of the people would be respected, where we would see the general interest result [from] particular interests. *This would be a simple machine*, whose workings, easy to manage, would not require this grand apparatus of cogs and counterweights[39][i.e. the state]

What, then, could this simple machine be? For Helvetius, traditional conceptions of virtue and morality were to be set aside, and society should be governed through a lucid analysis of human passions, i.e. starting from the postulate that they were driven by self-interest. Smith's answer, which came in a clearer and more radical form than anything written before, was the simplest machine of all: Laissez-faire. For Smith, it was useless to call onto good will or an innate 'moral sense': 'it is pursuing his own interests that man often advances that of society's, more efficiently that if he willed to.'[40] This pursuit of self-interest meant freedom to trade within an essentially economic conception of civil society in which 'the market' constitutes the core: It appears as 'a bounded, self-regulating system with an inherent tendency towards equilibrium,'[41] and hence an ideal machinery to invest with the function of social regulation. For Smith,

> an unfettered market is the most efficient and effective means for encouraging individual autonomy and assuring that the simultaneous pursuit of individual pleasure does not devolve into anarchy. Within this frame, society is best served when individuals are able to pursue their needs and wants through the mechanisms of price.[42]

The birth of the idea of the market, in other words, is inseparable from its promotion as a preferred means for social regulation outside of a theological-political framework, in the place and stead of the Christian God. It is therefore not coincidental if the idea of a self-regulating market is captured by Smith's image of the 'invisible hand':

> [The rich] consume little more than the poor, and in spite of their natural selfishness and rapacity […] they divide with the poor the produce of all their improvements. They are led by an *invisible hand* to make nearly the same distribution of the necessaries of life, which would have been made, had the earth been divided into equal portions among all its inhabitants, and thus without intending it, without knowing it, advance the interest of the society, and afford means to the multiplication of the species.[43]

Yet, the metaphor of the invisible hand cannot be interpreted as a substitute for Providential intervention or Divine Will, as if 'there would be a hidden power somewhere endowed with will and intelligence to harmonize interests at every moment.'[44] On the contrary, the self-regulating mechanism of the market is intended as a radically immanent mechanism. Indeed, Smith does away with the explicit idea that the workings of the laws of the market correspond to the laws that God wrote in the fabric of Nature, although he probably believed this was so. In the context of his written works, the invisible hand, which also comes into play in the *Theory of Moral Sentiments*, which he published prior to the *Wealth of Nations* and actually considered to be his masterwork, is a metaphor describing the spontaneous—versus given, pre-ordained—balance of needs and interests.[45] There is no scholarly consensus on Smith's rapport to religion. Raised as a Calvinist,[46] it is safe to say that he was neither a firm believer (like Isaac Newton) nor a militant atheist. Yet, his 'idea of a natural economic system was like entering a wedge between [the transcendent] God and His created universe.'[47] From the perspective of a history of religion, it appears to be a decisive moment in the shift away from a purely transcendent order and towards a form of immanent-transcendence.

Smith's concept of the market provided a simple and seductive solution to political philosophy's enduring question concerning social order. The invisible hand or, as Elie Halevy called it, the 'natural harmonisation of interests,'[48] opened onto a conception of society without a regulating centre, and presented the market as operating a natural law for the regulation of society without a legislator.[49] Individuals were cast as competing interests divided between buyers and sellers, in other words as demand and supply. The spontaneous result of this encounter in the abstract space of the market was a measure of value, 'price,' which fixed itself automatically and naturally, without any exterior intervention. It follows from this conception that the 'law' of supply and demand that settles the rapports between merchandises is transferrable to the harmonisation of the rapports between people. Hence, the market provided a model for government that could all but do away with the vertical, external, and 'artificial' action of the state.

Well before Marx, Adam Smith situated the essence of society, its determining factors, in its material conditions. Smith accomplished much more than the autonomisation of economics (and the reduction of exchange to market-type exchange): He defined economics as 'the *only space* possible for social harmonisation.'[50] He did not reduce social life to economic activity as much as he defined the economy as the *foundation of society* and the market as the *operator of social order.* Smith's political economy 'founded social order in relations of exchange between private individuals, rather than in a structure of vertical relations to a sovereign state. The market economy, in this way, became the organising principle for society itself.'[51] He is the one who truly substituted a political conception in terms of social contract for the one based on the economic mechanisms of the market.[52]

For Smith, and for political economy and Liberalism generally after him, market economy and market society are one and the same thing.[53] In this classical conception of economics, the market, Rosanvallon writes, 'not only structures society, it is the means and the goal of its development.'[54] Finally: 'It is because wealth is the motor of society and that consumption is the goal of wealth, that economic society is the space where the general interest is realized,'[55] with the consequence that the consumer, already in Smith, is the model of the citizen of a market society.[56]

As radical as his perspective was, Adam Smith did not do completely away with the state. It is more precise to say that he shifted the regulating principle of social order from the state to the market. State implication in economic matters was not only 'unwarranted, but ineffective, much like statutes against floods and earthquakes.'[57] As Slater and Tonkiss write: 'Private economic action, that is, cannot be governed in any wise or even properly informed way. The market economy is understood as distinct from, and ultimately impenetrable by, procedures of government.'[58] Yet, the efficiency of the market in economic matters extends well beyond its autonomised jurisdiction, to the whole of society. In classical political economy, the market is to displace the state as the preferred means for allocation and coordination of resources, and as the 'model and mechanism for achieving order and ethical life throughout society.'[59] The portion remaining in the government's list of responsibilities is national security, the protection of private property, 'the legal system of justice, the erection and maintenance of public works and [...] "certain publick institutions,"'[60] like education. In other words, state intervention is to be limited to ensuring the minimal conditions for the market to work properly, while the free market 'is the chief instrument of economic and social organisation.'[61] To the vertical power relations characteristic of the state, political economy substitutes a horizontal and dynamic system of exchange between competing private interests mediated by the natural—or at least spontaneous and automatic—mechanism of price. As such, politics are deemed useful in performing the aforementioned functions; yet, they are '*inessential*' as concerns the 'formation and maintenance of the social bond.'[62]

The invention or discovery of the market, as we see, was not limited to a differentiated sphere of economics. The market was, from the very beginning, thought of as an *instrument of social order.* The market, in other words, was as moral and political as it was economic in its inception. The free market, for all of political economy's scientific and empirical pretentions, is inherently normative and utopian in its design. Also, it is because the frontier between politics and economics is porous, moving, and fragile that liberal economists have been historically obsessed with limiting state intervention. Preserving the autonomy and consistency of economics from political intervention, furthermore, went hand in hand with the spilling over of economics onto other social spheres, to the extent that civil society (i.e. the whole of society minus the state) was thinkable in economic terms.

This is what a holistic approach to the social allows us to see, versus a differentiation-minded approach that simply records and acquiesces political economy's claim over the economic domain, while overlooking the fact that the market is first and foremost the operator of a political function and the answer to modernity's foundational question. This perspective also introduces a welcome complement to Max Weber's thesis on the genesis of capitalism. Without dismissing Weber's analysis of the Puritan origins of the capitalist ideology (Smith, as noted earlier, was raised as a Scottish Calvinist), this angle of approach shows how the free market ideology did not enter modernity from its margins, as a haphazard and fortuitous unintended consequence of religious ethics.[63] Economic liberalism affirmed itself through modernity's 'most profound and necessary movement' as a 'concrete solution to the most decisive problems of the seventeenth and eighteenth century.'[64]

This approach also corrects a common misrepresentation of Liberalism in scholarship. Liberalism is a political ideology that has three different dimensions: *Economic* liberalism, whose axioms we have just defined and which considers the market as where individual liberties are expressed and reconciled with the greater good; *political* liberalism, which consecrates political pluralism and the protection of the rights of individuals; and *moral*, or *cultural* liberalism, which basically refers to the unlimited sovereignty of the individual in matters of values, conducts, and preferences, and which is at the basis of claims as diverse as the rights of women over their own bodies, sexual orientation, and freedom of belief and opinion. It has become habitual (especially for left-leaning liberals) to distinguish between an essentially democratic political liberalism and a potentially savage economic liberalism, as if both could be divided. This trend leads to definitions of Liberalism that emphasise the political, democratic, and legal protection of individual liberties over its economic aspects. An example of this is Shmuel Eisenstadt's quotation in the preceding chapter,[12] which completely eludes the economic aspect of Liberalism. Yet, the economic foundations of Liberalism were crystal clear for liberals of the nineteenth century, for instance John Stuart Mill. If the unrestrained liberty and sovereignty of the individual is Liberalism's founding principle, the space of exertion of this liberty is that of the market, understood as the extension of the private sphere.[65] The inherent problem of Liberalism, i.e. deriving social optimum and social order from pre-social, self-interested, and sovereign individuals, finds its solution in the free market, and nowhere else. In other words, liberal liberty requires the market for both its expression and its regulation, and therefore political liberalism cannot be amputated of its corollary: Economic liberalism. As Pierre Manent argues, economic and political liberalism correspond and respond to one another.[66] There aren't two Liberalisms: A 'good,' political one, and an 'evil,' capitalist one. There is one Liberalism, which is ridden with tensions that account for its diffraction into its many currents.

John Stuart Mill was the son of radical liberal economist James Mill, also a high official of the East Indian Company, and thus active in the colonial administration (a position that was handed down to his son). It is often forgotten that for Stuart Mill, the free market was more important than democracy, as it was for a majority of liberals. Liberals typically feared democracy and the extension of individual rights to the masses in the nineteenth century, as they thought that the masses would jeopardise, amongst other things, economic growth and the economic wisdom (as well as the preeminence and privileges) of the bourgeoisie. The equivalence between capitalism and democracy, therefore, is not constitutive of Liberalism but rather the result of a later development, typical of twentieth-century Keynesian-era liberalism. As Rosanvallon argues, classical political liberalism refers to two separate doctrines: The affirmation of individual rights (what he calls 'positive liberalism') on the one hand, and the affirmation of market society on the other (which he calls 'utopian liberalism'). Positive liberalism is often in contradiction with the effects of economic liberalism, namely the production of inequalities. Yet, history shows how economic liberalism wins over positive liberalism in practice every time. Liberalism is therefore not at all at odds with authoritarian political regimes a priori, as long as the market is free to operate at least in economic affairs. Economic liberalism, and not political liberalism, is the theoretical and practical core of Liberalism.[67] This is something that neoliberals have well understood, as we will see.

The utilitarian and neoclassical adjunct

After Smith, political economy developed into two complementary directions. The first one, already mentioned, was Jeremy Bentham's 'utilitarianism.' The second pursued the works of Smith by developing some of the theory's elements and assumptions in what is commonly referred to as neoclassical economic theory. Bentham's utilitarianism aimed at complementing Adam Smith's model by interrogating what could be a fitting government for the free exercise of passions. Bentham rejected notions such as social contract, moral sense, and natural rights, and only admitted the empirical existence of a utilitarian anthropology in which pre-social, undetermined individuals rationally seek to maximise their 'utility.' Nature and its laws, which were so important for the Enlightenment's emancipation from a God-ordained episteme, were boiled down to a minimum in the early nineteenth century: The natural attraction to pleasure and repulsion of pain.[68] Bentham proceeded to develop the principles of an entirely rational, thoroughly efficient type of government based on these utilitarian principles in order to provide the 'greater happiness of the greater number.' Bentham thereby pursued economic liberalism's erosion of the political in favour of an almost entirely judicialised and administrative exercise of government. The role of government was to measure the consequences of its interventions in terms of effective 'utility,' itself translated into economic

growth. While the free market should reign in economics, Bentham refused the idea of a natural harmonisation of interests and had doubts about the market's capacity to ensure social order by itself. For Bentham, only appropriate legally enforced sanctions could reconcile individual and collective interests measured as the sum of pleasures, a solution Halevy labelled the 'artificial harmonisation of interests.'[69] The level of happiness in a society could 'easily be established' through its measure in money: For Bentham, it is always pleasures and pains that are exchanged through the interposition of objects and services.[70] In other words, a growing economy is the proof of happy people.

Bentham's concept of utility was taken over by neoclassical economists, who nonetheless disagreed with him in economic matters such as monetary expansion and the importance of attaining full employment (Bentham's government was too interventionist and too social-minded for their taste). Utility is what allows utilitarian and neoclassical economists such as Jean-Baptiste Say (1767–1832) 'to compare apples and oranges,'[71] and is defined by Bentham as 'that property in any object whereby it tends to produce benefit, advantage, pleasure, good, or happiness, or reduce pain.'[72] The content or nature of such an object is left entirely to the individual: It could be helping others, buying a new car, having sex with multiple partners, receiving a revelation in a Pentecostal church, or eating sushi. Any qualitative evaluation is pushed outside of the equation: Values, preferences, beliefs, and morality, as well as culture, are non-sequitur. Bentham and neoclassical economists abstract individuals from their particular needs and contexts: 'Utility is defined simply as the capacity of an object to satisfy a desire. The nature of the desire is irrelevant: utility simply represents the abstract, empty desire-satisfying attribute of a good.'[73] It is therefore a purely formal concept that aims at perfect moral neutrality. The multiplicity and complexity of human desires is replaced by a single, content-less desire: The desire for utility. By evacuating particularistic needs, desires, contexts, and social determinants, utilitarianism and neoclassical economics replace concepts such as 'society' and 'culture' (the substantive character of human wants in particular ways of life) with that of utility: A rational, abstract means of calculation and quantification.[74]

The neoclassical moment in political economy, which stretches over most of the nineteenth century, was essentially concerned with shifting the discipline founded by Adam Smith away from explicit concerns with morality and politics and turning it into a 'veritable science' modelled on Newtonian physics and expressed in mathematical or logical formulations. Smith himself had taken Newtonian physics as a model, with self-interest as the equivalent of the law of gravity in human affairs, society as 'an immense machine,' and the free market as a 'system of natural liberty.'[75] Later in the nineteenth century, Darwinian biology became the model for how competition operated in a free market, but also for how societies in general 'evolved' with respect to competitive social and natural environments.[76] Similarly, English industrialist and economist David Ricardo's *Principles*

of Political Economy and Taxation (1817) sought to develop a scientific analysis of the market as a proper system or mechanism, and therefore as a technical rather than moral order:

> In particular, he sought to analyse the conditions for general equilibrium in markets, and stressed their self-regulating nature as economic systems *sui generis*. Accordingly, Ricardo saw threats to economic stability as coming from outside the market order; being caused by such factors as war, force of nature, or political intervention. […] Via Ricardo's political economy, then, the concern with social and moral order that animated Adam Smith's work translates into a more formal concern with the *inherent* order of markets.[77]

Market equilibrium became the focus of modern economics understood as 'the study of choice under conditions of scarcity.'[78] Market exchange became the main object of economic enquiry and 'the market' its primary institution. The development of the 'alternative utility theory' specialised classical political economy's project by outlining the market as the central and most efficient mechanism for the allocation of resources, providing 'answers to the core economic questions: what is to be produced, how is it to be produced, and form whom.'[79] Authors such as the British Stanley Jevons (1835–1882), the Austrian Carl Menger (1840–1923), the French Léon Walras (1834–1910), and the Italian Vilfredo Pareto (1848–1923) developed an increasingly mathematical approach to market analysis (how did markets 'clear,' or how they achieve equilibrium between supply and demand[80]), setting the content and methods of what was to become the standard or normal theory in economics that still rules today. The so-called 'marginalist' economists formalised the shared assumptions of classical political economy and utilitarianism, namely that the good is defined as the maximisation of pleasure and happiness and is given by the subtraction of pleasures and pains. Foundational to this edifice is a conception of man as what Pareto called a *homo economicus*:[81] i.e. an abstract individual, without passions or sentiments, who seeks more than anything to maximise, through a rational calculus, his satisfaction, understood as utility (pleasure) minus dis-utility (pain). A further innovation of the marginalist school was to extend micro-level analysis to macro-economics. In other words, the model that saw perfectly informed individual buyers and sellers engage in market exchange with the mediation of the price mechanism was expanded and taken to give an accurate picture of the economy as a whole. Just as liberalism views societies as aggregates of individuals and nothing else, the economy as a whole is understood as the sum of individual buying and selling acts. On all levels, then, neoclassical economics assumes that:

> (1) individuals possess wants, which can be ranked in order of preference;
> (2) conditions of scarcity apply, such that there are limited resources

> with which to satisfy individual wants; (3) in this context of scarcity, individuals make choices in order to maximize their own benefit.[82]

Finally, marginalists distinguish between price (exchange value, or purchasing power) and utility (use value: What someone is prepared to pay as a function of the ensuing augmentation of pleasure or reduction of pain).

The mathematisation of political economy that continues today serves to legitimise the claim that the study of the economy is a natural—rather than a social—science. The shedding of the name 'political economy' (which makes explicit the aim of moral and political regulation of market theory) for the more modern and value-neutral sounding 'economics' illustrates these pretentions.[83] While twentieth-century economics no longer digressed on the laws of nature as a foundation for its theory, one needs not scratch the surface for very long to find that very little has changed. Indeed, the neoclassical framework survived until today as the dominant economic theory, also known as the 'standard,' 'orthodox,' or 'normal' theory.[84] Ultra-influential American neoliberal economist Milton Friedmann casually confirmed this analysis when he commented in 1991:

> The substance of professional economic discussion has remained remarkably unchanged over the past century while at the same time the language in which economic analysis is presented has changed so drastically that few economists who contributed to the early volumes would have been able to read most articles in recent volumes.[85]

In other words, contemporary economics are eighteenth- and nineteenth-century ideas in mathematical garb.

This standard model can be briefly described as the following. The market, simply put, consists in the interdependent formal components of supply, demand, and price. It is an integrated system of exchange, which can be reduced to the meeting of buyers and sellers which are integrated into a network of exchange. Goods are assumed homogenous, qualitative differences that are neutralised through the impenetrable and pre-given nature of preferences and the convergence of alternative ends within the concept of utility. Firms and corporations appear as collections of individuals, or mega-individuals, and thus act like single individuals. All actors pursue private interests in the market and act rationally, through a calculus with maximising ends. Conflicts of interests are reconciled through the automatic mechanism of price, which acts as the general coordinator for the allocation of resources. This allocation is optimal, and the market, apart from external disturbances, is *always* in equilibrium. Markets are not institutions as such: They are *sui generis* to exchange, and are believed not to have structures, rules, or even conventions. They are also supposed to be value-free and objective, as is their related science. Finally, price liquidates debt, and debt is the root of all evils.

The neoclassical market and the problem of social order

How to understand these neoclassical developments? At first glance, the growing emphasis on the market mirrors developments in the real economy, where market-based exchange grew to dominance over the course of the nineteenth century. Incidentally, this attests to an increasing process of differentiation and autonomisation of economics as a social sphere. The epistemological corollary, then, is to leave economics to economists and their overt will to reign without challenge over issues relating to production, distribution, allocation, coordination, and consumption of goods and services. An emphasis on differentiation, a tendency that is particularly strong amongst sociologists of religion as we have seen, gives credence to the neoclassical vision of economics as a separate social sphere which is believed to obey its own—natural—rules.

Yet, pure market economies never existed.[86] Seen from the foundational and holistic perspective, the pretentions of political economy to cordon off a sphere of economics that obeys its own rules are problematic. The mathematisation of political economy did not alter the original aims of market theory as much as it obscured them. The neoclassical moment is an adjunct far more than it is a revolution or a turn, even for its liberal adherents. This is why Adam Smith is anything but an otiose reference still today, as he enunciated the basic tenets of what is still unanimously taught in economic faculties around the world. The market, therefore, remains a political, moral, and social concept rather than a purely technical one. Beneath the equilibrium and clearance of markets dear to neoclassical authors lies a social utopia that announces a civil society immediate and transparent to itself as it auto-regulates through the spontaneous and automatic mechanisms of the market. Economic liberalism is therefore essentially an a-political answer to modernity's political question. The market opposes social contract and state regulation by advocating a type of regulation and social organisation dissociated from any form of hierarchy or authority: 'it realizes automatic adjustments, proceeds to transfers and redistributions without the will of individuals nor that of their rulers having to play any role whatsoever.'[87] Notwithstanding neoclassical pretensions, the market is far more than a technical mechanism in which supply and demand are resolved by price: It is an *idea* that acts as a new representation of the social—a *model of* and a *model for* modern society.[88] It is 'a mechanism for social organization more than it is a mechanism for economic regulation.'[89] The neoclassical market is in continuity with modern political philosophy, not in rupture with.

In his book *Free to Choose*, neoliberal economist Milton Friedmann argues the *political* superiority of the market over any other form of social organisation, as extolled by Adam Smith and furthered by neoclassical economic theory:

> Adam Smith's flash of genius was his recognition that the prices that emerged from voluntary transactions between buyers and sellers—for

> short, in a free market—could coordinate the activity of millions of people, each seeking his own interest, in such a way as to make everyone better off. It was a startling idea then, and it remains one today, that the economic order can emerge as the unintended consequence of the actions of many people, each seeking his own interest. The price system works so well, so efficiently, that we are not aware of it most of the time.[90]

The non-economic consequences of the free market are patent in this quote: The market is the most efficient way to accomplish the modern ideal of individual autonomy and liberty through its depersonalised and unintentional mechanism. For Liberalism more widely, then, the market realises the modern project of auto-foundation and auto-regulation by doing away with any external or transcendent reference. From this angle, non-economic issues of social order cannot be done away with, with important consequences for all other social spheres. The question of social order is therefore intrinsic to market theory. Keeping to a postulate of social differentiation draws a curtain on what is an essential dimension of modern economics.

A brief history of early capitalism

At the time of Adam Smith, there was no such thing as 'capitalism.' Smith ignored the word, as did Marx—it is absent from *Das Kapital* (1867). It only came into usage after the publication of Werner Sombart's *Der Moderne Kapitalismus* in 1902. 'Capital,' from the Latin *caput* (head), is attested in the twelfth century and means merchandise or amount of money, while 'capitalist' emerged in the seventeenth century and referred to the rich, i.e. he who had capital.[91] Adam Smith wrote about 'commercial society,' i.e. an economy based on trade, before anything like industrialisation ever occurred.

Recent historians converge on the idea that capitalism did not emerge out of historical necessity. Neither did it evolve out of the emancipation of a capitalist inclination natural to mankind (Smith), nor did it result from the explosive unfolding of an age-old process in which merchants and money-lenders involved in simple commodity production begot a dominant owner class distilling profit dominated labour classes (Marx).[92] The founding fathers of sociology—and of sociology of religion—Max Weber and Emile Durkheim, both disagreed with Smith and Marx. For Weber, such an unnatural behaviour as profit-seeking and instrumental rationality required a revolution in mentalities, the development of a specific *Geist*, or 'spirit.' Whether one follows Weber's thesis in the *Spirit of Capitalism and the Protestant Ethic* or not, the idea that such a cultural disposition was necessary to propel traditional agrarian societies into industrialisation is a strong thesis. Whatever individual professions of faith may have been, capitalism was the product and the result of concrete and practical economic and practices by which the dominant social class, the bourgeoisie, controlled and transformed the economy into a market economy.[93]

As Polanyi argued, capitalism, i.e. an economic system in which there is a perpetual (re)investment of capital in the objective of generating profit,[94] is one type of economy amongst others.[95] Capitalism is a particular system for producing and distributing goods that emerged in a specific time in history and in a specific place.[96] Joyce Appleby similarly argues that capitalism was not the extension of trade, as 'it required a different set of attitudes and skills.'[97] European explorations and trade, which started at the end of the fifteenth century, and whose momentum shifted from South-West European countries like Portugal and Spain to northern countries such as France, Britain, and the Netherlands, did not naturally develop into capitalist markets. What it did was to link Europe with Asia, the Americas, and eventually Africa. According to Appleby, 'capitalism began when private investments drove the economy, and entrepreneurs and their supporters acquired the power to bend political and social institutions to their demands.'[98] In this respect, the first free market, in which the dynamics of investment in the pursuit of profit maximising operated fully, she argues, was the slave trade, which was financed by European centres and resulted in the displacement, through multiplied processes of buying and selling, of close to twelve million African men, women, and children, over the course of two and a half centuries.[99]

Adam Smith could hardly have ignored the existence of the first free market, the slave trade, which was a crucial element in the international trade system that animated British ports; yet, he makes no mention of it. Rather, his *Wealth of Nations* accounts for the transformations that occurred in Britain over the course of the two preceding centuries.[100] As with other important developments taking place in the crucible of modernity, what was happening in the realm of ideas was determinant. As Appleby argues:

> The advent of the market, and the reorganization of social life through it, made men reconsider the terms of their lives. Like the simultaneous effort to reimagine the mechanical relationships of the physical universe, the process of conceiving the market economy became an intellectual influence of paramount importance to the it investigated. The imaginative reconstruction of economic relations by seventeenth-century thinkers created new truths, suggested possible activities, imposed moral lessons, and contributed to analogies to the other areas of social thinking. As men studied the market, they in turn were changed by their studies. The order they discerned became an object and was given power in the minds of its creators and their contemporaries. The selection of analytical tools became social determinants because the new economic concepts influenced policies. They also contributed to the ideology that produced a socially cohesive moment toward the modern restructuring of their society.[101]

Born in England, capitalism disseminated and evolved in different local conditions, with distinct local flavours. In England, market formation was enabled by a mixture between private enterprise and state initiatives. In France, unsurprisingly, markets were born out of their freeing from the hold of the state—hence the recurrence of the phrase 'laissez faire' in the works of the Physiocrats and nineteenth-century French liberals. In countries like Italy, Belgium, and Germany, whose unity was only achieved late in the nineteenth century, the market grew in the absence of a nation-state, and then in its margins.[102] While in Europe, and especially in England, the market ideology developed in part as a model to understand and shape the changes that were under way, in the United States, namely because of the egalitarian conditions of the New World, economic liberalism provided a blue-print for shaping society as a whole.[103] Still, the basic matrix was the same. It was appropriated in every Western region, and the consequences were everywhere important, well beyond material circumstances:

> Always much more than an economic system, capitalism persisted in Europe in changing mores and values however deeply embedded they once had been. This adaptability was to become a critical factor in the spread of capitalism beyond its homelands in the West.[104]

What had happened over a relatively long period of time in England and in the Netherlands happened at great speed through industrialisation everywhere else, starting in the nineteenth century.

Most historians date the beginning of the 'Industrial Revolution' in Britain in the 1780s, and in continental Europe somewhere in the 1830s, when public debates and literature started recording the brutal passage from traditional agrarian society to industrial ones.[105] The third quarter of the nineteenth century has been labelled the 'liberal era' by historians, because of the rise to dominance of both liberal parties in government and liberal economic policies in a majority of Western countries. Industrialisation intensified and disseminated geographically, in this period, to Eastern Europe, the Americas, and Japan. The period that followed, ranging from 1873 to 1890, put a halt to this intense liberalisation following the 'Great Slump.' This was the first economic depression with international consequences amongst a long series of up and down cycles since. It somewhat paradoxically saw a stagnation of economic growth and real wages on the one hand, with an accompanying generalised feeling of malaise, and the continued growth of production and economic globalisation on the other. This period concerns us in particular because over-production in the West meant finding new markets to liquidate stocks—sometimes, as it had already been in China, by the use of force. Non-Western regions were not only providers of raw material (iron ore, cotton, or people), but also, increasingly, producers and consumers of goods.

The Great Slump meant protectionism with respect to importations, and energy for exportations. Only Britain clung to free trade, as its economy profited from the global flows it controlled at the height of its Empire (yet was the first to pass laws restraining immigration). Western imperialism was intrinsically tied to the developments of capitalism; however, hard political economists deny the fact. As we saw in the last chapter, the economic situation of the last quarter of the nineteenth century encouraged a stronger hold of the state on economic affairs, despite liberal calls for continued laissez-faire. Protectionism only hardened the way in which capitalist economies developed within national containers, in conditions modulated by political institutions and political developments. Neoclassical economic theory, in the wake of Adam Smith's, was constitutively global and globalising, and the only equilibrium it recognised was a worldwide one. In this perspective, the nation, or 'civil society' depending on the author,[106] was not accounted nor accountable in liberal theory. Yet in reality, every political economist took national economies (in an international space) for granted as the environment for the development of market economies. Even recent and heterogeneous countries such as Belgium had economies that functioned as wholes.[107]

The ensuing period that stretches from 1890 to 1913 was characterised by a return to green economic indicators and rapid globalisation of the world's economy as part of what Robertson labels the take-off phase. End of the nineteenth-century capitalism was impersonated by the bourgeois entrepreneur and infused with bourgeois values. The figure of the entrepreneur as a conqueror, daring and innovating, opened a new space of liberty through economic activities that opposed traditional society and its statuses and obligations. Capitalism was glorified by the belief in progress and the perceived benefits of industry to society as a whole. This first-wave capitalism started to give way at the turn of the century to corporate capitalism, in which the individual entrepreneur was replaced by the organisation, led by new figures such as the chief executive officer (CEO) and the manager. The US became the new trend-setter in this second phase of capitalism in which big was beautiful, mass production sought economies of scale, highly bureaucratised corporations proposed opportunities for workers to 'climb the ladder,' and employment was secure.[108] In order to widen profit margins in an intensifying competitive environment and as prices fell due to accrued productivity, a new type of 'scientific management' appeared that promoted further rationalisation of production, which, in turn, favoured concentration. Large corporations replaced smaller, private firms, and controlled new nationwide distribution patterns: 'Executives, engineers and accountants therefore began to take over from owner-managers. The "corporation"[…] replaced the individual.'[109] In this phase, corporate capitalism was anything but free from state protection and intervention. Henry Ford (1863–1947) and Frederick Winslow Taylor (1856–1915) were the most influential proponents

of scientific management, hence the terms 'Fordism' and 'Taylorism' as convenient shorthand labels 'for the rational use of machinery and labour to maximize production'[110] that became attractive for capitalists, national-socialists, and communists alike. The method consisted essentially in specialising tasks and workers while transferring control over production processes to professional managers, as well as adjusting wages in order to couple mass production with mass consumption.[111] Taylorist management rested on three principles: The application of scientific research to the organisation of work, the consideration of workers' interests in order to increase productivity, and the cooperation between capital and work. In order to secure production, promote growth, and avoid costly internal conflicts, Taylor and Ford believed that profit increases needed to be accompanied by increases in workers' wages.

Trained as an orthodox neoclassical economist, British economist John Maynard Keynes was already influential in both academia and politics when he wrote his *General Theory* in the midst of the Great Depression, which aimed to reform the neoclassical model in the light of the mounting evidence which attested that Marx might have been right when he insisted that markets are not self-regulating, that they can self-destruct, and that they have a tendency to bubble and bust if not stabilised by targeted interventions by various levels of government.[112] Keynes' book argued that, contrary to Say's neoclassical Law of supply and demand equilibrium, free markets tended towards instability and crisis, namely under the form of excessive production ('aggregate supply') with respect to consumption ('aggregate demand'). In neoclassical terms, Keynes argued that markets fail to automatically 'clear.' Keynes also rejected the eighteenth-century claim that prices were dependent on the quantity of money in circulation ('money supply'). Finally, Keynes rejected that economic actors are purely rational, since they must form expectations about the future and can often act on 'purely psychological impulses.' For Keynes, government should steer the economy with respect to two aims: Full employment and social welfare—social criteria that were deemed unduly external disruptions from the perspective of the standard model.[113] What was perceived as an assault on the untouchability of the standard theory caused Keynes to appear as a heretic to many liberal economists, even though he re-conducted such neoclassical fundamentals as its subjective theory of value and its conception of microeconomics. Keynes 'accorded legitimacy to regular government economic intervention'[114] and appealed to politics as a worthy compromise between neoclassical political economy and the risks of socialism. After the Second World War, a 'neoclassical synthesis' became mainstream in public policy and economic faculties alike, led in the US by figures like Cambridge economist Paul Samuelson, who championed a mixture of neoclassical orthodoxy and watered-down Keynesianism.[115]

The Keynesian compromise adjusted well to the bureaucratic, Taylorist–Fordist brand of production-based capitalism. Taylorism promoted what

was described in the last chapter as a state-type of governmentality—government—with its vertical and hierarchical exercise of management based on a division of labour within well-defined and circumscribed departments. Taylorist management resorted to psychology to try and generate pre-programmed types of behaviour, and was based on the notions of discipline and duty. In other words, corporations took model on the state and its values for managing the complexities of gigantism within an 'each firm does-it-all' model. The state therefore did not only exercise an unprecedented level of control, intervention, and direction of economic affairs: The idea of the State was a powerful model of reference for enterprise. Similarly, planned economic development meant the state defined which industries would be prioritised (forest, mines, iron, aluminium, automobiles, nuclear energy, armament, hydro-electricity, fast trains, etc.), thereby determining the conditions of possibility for investment and economic development. The construction (or post-war reconstruction) of infrastructures through departments of public works (versus private enterprise) was common to Western and non-Western countries in this period, legitimised by the idea that the state was more efficient and systematic, as well as a better protector of the common good than private corporations. The state's action included significant shares of public investment in joint ventures up to outright nationalisation. Expanding on nineteenth-century initiatives, the state further developed, founded, standardised, or nationalised public services as diverse as the post-office, transport (including railway and national airlines), energy, and telecommunications (telegraph, telephone, radio, television). Parallel to this, the Welfare state (or the post-Independence state in non-Western countries) was invested with the function of realising the common good and the utopian modern project. The state was the arbiter of 'social dialogue' between worker unions (who were at the apex of their political strength) and corporations. It was almost natural, in this environment, for the state to enforce active wealth redistribution, with the result that social and economic inequalities fell to record levels by the 1970s. In sum, the market was to all extents and purposes created, delineated, and regulated by the state.

As the Republican dream of the egalitarian state was close to being realised, the liberal vision of a market-based social order was seriously challenged, and was forced to democratise and socialise itself. Capitalism did thrive in many parts of the world, but it was a harnessed brand of capitalism, especially when judging in retrospect. The Cold War also had a role to play in this picture, as the 'communist' bloc opposed a state-directed type of society in which markets were marginalised to the so-called 'free-world' of capitalist countries (the equation of capitalism with democracy was by now fully operational). Non-aligned, developing countries, meanwhile, tended to situate themselves somewhere in the middle, which meant more or less state in practice. Some semi-peripheral countries, such as Spain and Greece, were dictatorships for some time, which coupled an invasive state

with a relatively free, yet un-liberal economy.[116] Everywhere, the State, with its corollary the Nation, were the pillars on which societies were built and around which social imaginaries coalesced.

Max Weber, who wrote during capitalism's nascent, family business, entrepreneurial phase, saw in Puritan Protestantism a set of powerful ethical motivations that allowed the break with traditional custom and inspired entrepreneurs in their actions aimed at the accumulation of capital. Yet in the conclusion of *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, Weber wrote that '[t]he Puritan *wanted* to work in a calling; we are forced to do so […] The victorious capitalism […] no longer needed this support once it had become established on a mechanical base':[117] the cold calculus of instrumental rationality. In the *New Spirit of Capitalism*, Luc Boltanski and Eve Chiapello distance themselves from this passage and argue that capitalism always comes with a distinctive 'spirit' or ideology that provides a cultural justification: 'The spirit of capitalism is precisely this set of beliefs associated to the capitalist order that contribute to justify this order and to withhold, by legitimising them, the modes of action and the dispositions that are coherent with it.'[118] A corollary of this thesis is that as capitalism changes, so does its spirit. The authors also argue that the ideological justification of capitalism changes in response to its critiques and its internal contradictions. The critical discourse of the 1960s counter-cultural movements, for instance, was aimed at the Taylorist–Fordist mass-production and mass-consumption capitalism, denouncing its alienation, standardisation, and anonymity. It is in reaction to this critique, as well as to the limits of the utopian state, that capitalism morphed into its current, fully globalised form.

Boltanski and Chiapello's constructivist perspective is welcome since it complements a Weberian approach, concerned with subjective motivations, with a Durkheimian one, concerned with overarching processes of justification.[119] It shows how material conditions and the symbolic fabric of societies are indissociable, and how, against liberal economic and Marxian analyses, that culture matters. It furthermore highlights how social logics are not reducible to rapports of domination and power (as Weber's sociology tends to do), while at the same time opposing the idea that social actors are monads freely exercising choice amidst an array of possibilities (as economic theory posits). In other words, Weber's contemporaries were not only 'forced' to submit to capitalism's logic: They found ample legitimation in the cultural zeitgeist to go along with it and even embrace it. Social actors are both determined *and* agents of their own lives, as they are the producers of the society that produce them.

Conclusion

This chapter has attempted to provide a sort of introduction course to economics for social scientists of religion. From a historical perspective, the emergence of the idea of the market is indissociably tied to the modern

project of finding a utopian mechanism for social regulation. We have seen how the 'free market' emerged as an alternative means of ensuring social order that is central to Liberalism. Rather than being the abstract field of economic theory, the Market is better understood as both an economic model and a powerful idea and ideal. This sheds significant light on the otherwise simple, even simplistic principles of classical and neoclassical political economy. What stands out is that this theory has remained remarkably stable from the times of Adam Smith until today, and that the processes of mathematisation and the claim of being a natural science have served to obscure the profoundly political and normative substance of political economy. This discussion should lead social scientists to reconsider outsourcing economic matters to economists, and rather insist on re-embedding the market and its idea in its social and cultural contexts. For all the emphasis on laissez-faire and throughout the cycles of economic booms and busts, the history of capitalism from the nineteenth century to the mid-twentieth is inseparable from the rise of the Nation-State. More profoundly, the discussion shows the embedment of the economic sphere within the political, and of the market within the nation-state, for the period examined.

What is important for us now, though, is the idea of a third change in the constitution of capitalism, one whose roots can be found in the cultural revolution of the 1960s. If the Keynesian consensus ruled over economic and political matters during the post-war decades, the signs of a new metamorphosis of capitalism were already visible in the late sixties. A decade later, the tide had turned.[120] The oil crises of 1973 and 1979, and the persistence of 'stagflation' (the conjunction of small or null growth, high inflation, and rising unemployment), as well as concerns regarding public debt challenged Keynesian economics which attempted, without success, to promote employment through public expense.[121] This opened the way for the unexpected return of neoclassical laissez-faire economics to an extent never before seen with the neoliberal revolution. Yet in the West, the consumer revolution, which led to the rise to dominance of consumerism as a cultural ideology and social ethos, came first. My argument here is that, in addition to these economic and political conditions of the 1970s, Western societies were already profoundly penetrated by consumerism, and that this cultural ethos, in which individuals became used to the practices of selling and purchasing, contributed to make the neoliberal turn acceptable. Neoliberalism, as we will see, does not have a powerful social utopia to make it inherently desirable, as did classical liberalism's adoption of the market ideal. Neoliberalism rather professes a sober and rational 'realism' that has little to offer to wanting crowds. This desirability was and is produced by what Boltanski and Chiapello define as capitalism's new spirit, but also by consumerism and its ideal of plenty. This powerful new culture is still in the process of globalising, and has mixed relations with neoliberalism: Sometimes consumerism came first, as in the West, and sometimes the neoliberalisation of the economy ushered in consumerism, as in post-communist

countries and large sections of Africa. I will turn to the issue of consumption and consumerism, but only after pursuing my discussion of political economy into neoliberalism.

Notes

1 Smith (2012: I.2.i).
2 Smith (2012: I.2.i–ii).
3 Smith (2012: I.2.i–ii). See Appleby (1984: 26).
4 Graeber (2011: 27).
5 Graeber (2011).
6 Graeber (2011: 28).
7 Seele and Zapf (2016).
8 Caillé (2005b), Keen (2011), Clarke (2005).
9 Mauss (1950: 272).
10 Polanyi (1977, 2001), Maucourant (2011), Slater and Tonkiss (2001).
11 Braudel (1979, Vol. 2). The same critique of Polanyi's otherwise brilliant account has also been voiced by economists Mark Granovetter (Slater and Tonkiss, 2001: 100) and Alain Caillé (2005b).
12 Braudel (1979).
13 Caillé (2005b), Graeber (2011), Orléan (2011).
14 Slater and Tonkiss (2001: 14), Braudel (1979, Vol. 2). See also Appleby (1984).
15 Mauss (1950: 271).
16 The argument could be broadened to include Max Weber's doctoral thesis on the importance of guilds in Medieval European economies.
17 Weber (2005: 24).
18 Rosanvallon (1979: 62). My translation.
19 Rosanvallon (1979: 65). My translation.
20 Rosanvallon (1979: 63–4).
21 Aristotle (1999: I.2). See Rosanvallon (1979).
22 Rosanvallon (1979: 128).
23 Compare this resume of Aristotle with Seele and Zapf's (2016) opportunistic reinterpretation.
24 Rosanvallon (1979: 128).
25 Rosanvallon (1979: 107, 1989). See also Lazzeri (2001) and Caillé, Lazzeri, and Senellart (2001).
26 Audard (2009: 29). My translation. See also Manent (1987), Laurent (2002).
27 Mill (1863: 28–9). See Audard (2009).
28 Audard (2009), Manent (1987), Hackworth (2007), Laurent (2002).
29 Nelson (2014), Caillé, Lazzeri and Senellart (2001).
30 Rosanvallon (1979: 11). My translation.
31 Appleby (1984: 30).
32 Latouche (2001a: 41). Latouche quotes Nicole (1670) and Boisguilbert (1705) who anticipated Adam Smith's famous passages on the self-interested versus benevolent motivation of the butcher and the invisible hand of the market in almost exact terms. Still, both do not go as far as Smith as concerns the extension of the market and its self-regulating nature. See also Dumont (1977: 44–64).
33 Dumont (1977: 51).
34 That is, exactly during the period of time that separates the publication of his *Theory of Moral Sentiments* (1759) and *The Wealth of Nations* (1776). Smith's *Wealth of Nations* would have been dedicated to Quesnay had he not died shortly before its publication. See Dumont (1977: 105–34).

35 Dumont (1977: 83–104), Latouche (2001b), Laval (2007: 108–26).
36 Mandeville's provocative fable was denounced as scandalous, cynical, and blasphemous at the time of its publication; yet, it circulated widely in both Britain and continental Europe and had a significant impact. Its argument did percolate through the thought of the times and became, to a large extent, commonsensical. While Adam Smith publicly kept his distances with Mandeville, he reproduced the main elements of his arguments in his own works, albeit in a less abrasive formulation.
37 The history of the rise of such a conception of happiness coupled with the concept of utility forms the narrative thread of Caillé, Lazzeri, and Senellart's (2001) two-volume anthology. On Bentham, see Cléro (2001), Audard (1999), and Laval (2007).
38 Smith (2012: I.2.i–ii).
39 Quoted in Rosanvallon (1979: 29). Emphasis in text. My translation.
40 Smith (2012) quoted by Laval (2007: 223). My translation back to English.
41 Slater and Tonkiss (2001: 121).
42 Hackworth (2007: 4).
43 Smith (2012, IV.5). Emphasis added. The invisible hand appears only once in the *Wealth of Nations*, but was already mentioned twice in the *Theory of Moral Sentiments*.
44 Laval (2007: 224). My translation.
45 Audard (2012: 137). For a careful and nuanced analysis of Adam Smith's works and the meaning of the 'invisible hand,' see Dupuy (2008).
46 Audard (2009: 137).
47 Appleby (1984: 34).
48 Halévy (1900–1903).
49 Rosanvallon (1979: 46).
50 Rosanvallon (1979: 60). Emphasis in text. My translation.
51 Slater and Tonkiss (2001: 119).
52 Rosanvallon (1979: 70). Emphasis added.
53 Rosanvallon (1979: 73).
54 Rosanvallon (1979: 74).
55 Rosanvallon (1979: 78).
56 Rosanvallon (1979: 79).
57 Appleby (1984: 34).
58 Slater and Tonkiss (2001: 119).
59 Slater and Tonkiss (2001: 31).
60 Slater and Tonkiss (2001: 119). The authors quote Smith (2012).
61 Slater and Tonkiss (2001: 118).
62 Laval (2007: 229). Emphasis in text. My translation.
63 Yet, Weber's thesis is consistent with his emphasis on differentiation rather than foundation. Again, it is not that it is not significant (critiques, of course, have noted how capitalism also emerged out of Catholic ports such as Antwerp), only it should be complemented by a Durkheimian perspective such as the one recounted here. For a critique of Weber along these lines, see Musso (2017).
64 Rosanvallon (1979: 41).
65 Weintraub (1997).
66 Manent (1987), Rosanvallon (1979), Audard (2009).
67 Rosanvallon (1979). See also Slater and Tonkiss (2001: 118).
68 Laval (2007: 291).
69 Laval (2007), Audard (1999), Cléro (2001).
70 Cléro (2001: 126).
71 Slater (1997: 44).

72 Ryan (1987: 66), quoted in Slater (1997: 44).
73 Slater (1997: 44).
74 Slater (1997: 45).
75 Nelson (2014: 282–4).
76 Nelson (2014: 229). Nelson notes how economics have been unable to follow natural sciences beyond Darwin, into quantum physics and relativity. Doing so would require that economics abandon its positivistic epistemology and become more concerned with empirical reality than abstract models, something that the discipline is obviously not prepared to do, more than a century later.
77 Slater (1997: 45).
78 Slater and Tonkiss (1999: 46).
79 Slater (1997: 46).
80 Slater (1997: 47).
81 Rosanvallon (1979: 220). See also Caillé (2005b).
82 Slater (1997: 48).
83 Boltanski and Chiapello (1999), Caillé (2005b).
84 Stiglitz (1994). See also Slater and Tonkiss (2001).
85 Friedman (1991: 33). Quoted in Nelson (2014: 298).
86 Slater and Tonkiss (2001: 55, 105). Braudel (1979, Vol. 2: 262).
87 Rosanvallon (1979: iv).
88 Geertz (1973).
89 Rosanvallon (1979: 70).
90 Friedman (1980: 13–4).
91 Braudel (1979, Vol. 2: 267ssq).
92 It is interesting to note how the Marxian (and Marxist) analysis shares the same materialistic bases as economic liberalism and posits that the seeds of capitalism are coincidental to mankind, in other words that a capitalist mentality pre-existed capitalism. Marx's essential disagreement with Smith, whose *Wealth of Nations* he is said to have kept on his desk when writing *Das Kapital*, is that the development of capitalism was not a smooth process but the result of domination and coercion.
93 Rosanvallon (1979), Appleby (2010).
94 I am adapting Boltanski and Chiapello's definition of capitalism (1999: 37). Joyce Appleby (2010: 22) has a similar definition.
95 Polanyi defines the economy (or the economical) in general as the 'institutionalized process of interactions between men and nature which allows for a regular supply in material means for the satisfaction of needs' (2001: 37; 1977). For Polanyi, political economy's formal definition of economics as 'the relationship between ends and scarce means which have alternative uses,' whose formulation he borrows from Lionel Robbins (1934), has no relevance prior to modernity.
96 Appleby (1984: 23, 2010: 7,12).
97 Appleby (2010: 54).
98 Appleby (2010: 118).
99 Appleby (2010: 10). Eric Hobsbawm's trilogy (1962, 1975, 1987) also argues in this direction.
100 Appleby (2010: 15).
101 Appleby (1978: 22–3).
102 Rosanvallon (1979: 121–3).
103 Appleby (1984: 50).
104 Appleby (2010: 49).
105 Hobsbawm (1962: 42ssq).
106 Such as Adam Ferguson in his famous *Essay on the History of Civil Society* (1767). See Foucault's discussion (2004: 295–320).

107 Hobsbawm (1987: 41–2).
108 Boltanski and Chiapello (1999: 54–8).
109 Hobsbawm (1987: 45). See also Pinard (2000).
110 Hobsbawm (1987: 45).
111 Hobsbawm (1987: 45), Appleby (2010: 258–9).
112 Hackworth (2007: 7).
113 For a good resume of Keynesian economics, see Lapavitsas (2005).
114 Lapavitsas (2005: 32).
115 See Nelson (2014), Lapavitsas (2005).
116 On Spain, see Ban (2016).
117 Weber (1967: 223). Loose translation from the French translation.
118 Boltanski and Chiapello (1999: 46). My translation.
119 I interpret it as a Durkheimian reading of Weber to be more precise. In conformity with my own methodology, I consider, like Boltanski and Chiapello, that the substantive approach is better hinged onto an encompassing functional approach.
120 The ending chapter of Milton Friedman's *Free to Choose* (1980) is entitled 'The Tide is Turning.' Indeed it was.
121 See Asselain (1995). As the title of Asselain's book suggests, stagflation acted to disqualify Keynesian economics and open the door to the de-nationalisation of Western economies.

4 Neoliberalism and the rise of the Market regime

Defining neoliberalism is important, both with respect to its doctrinal contents in the ways in which it has been disseminated and variously implemented around the world. If there is little doubt amongst most scholars that neoliberalism is 'the dominant mode of economic thinking of our time,'[1] the term 'has become something like a *rascal concept*—promiscuously pervasive, yet inconsistently defined, empirically imprecise and frequently contested.'[2] In continuity with the method I have been using, I consider neoliberalism as both a theoretical ensemble and a set of socio-political practices and policies, 'all of which are directed toward extending and deepening capitalist market relations in most spheres of our social lives,'[3] namely because they have coalesced into a widely disseminated cultural ideology. The aim of this chapter is to show how neoliberalism represents a major and global turn by which the Market—i.e. market mechanisms and the market understood as a regulative idea, or 'social imaginary'[4]—has been made to replace the State as the structuring principle in globalised societies. In order to do so, we 'must distinguish at the outset between neoliberalism as a system of thought and actually existing neoliberalism,'[5] and show how both entail a series of particular consequences that have combined to substantially change post-War societal dynamics. The present chapter first describes the theoretical content of neoliberalism and how it became institutionalised in political economy. The question that follows is how this theoretical reordering materialised in reality, in variegated and context-dependent forms. The picture that emerges is the one in which the neoliberal revolution constitutes a 'restructuring of the global political economy *and* the reconstitution of the international order.'[6]

The preceding chapter showed that political economy's conception of the market was a political answer to modernity's question with respect to the foundations and regulation of social order. The present chapter reveals how neoliberalism 'emerges as a thoroughly *political* project'[7] that not only consciously revived classical political economy's pretensions but radically extended it to engulf the whole of the social, namely all other social spheres, including religion, and all levels of human activity and human relations.

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The doctrines of neoliberalism

For political philosopher Serge Audier, neoliberalism is not a clear set of consensual propositions, nor is it a unified doctrine. There is not one but many neoliberalisms.[8] At the historical roots of neoliberalism, one finds the diagnosis of a crisis of Liberalism in the face of increased state interventionism in the 1930s especially and the following rise of Keynesianism. The term itself appeared in this period amidst a flurry of 'neos' that attempted to renew Liberalism, and only gained limited currency after the Walter Lippmann Colloquium held in Paris in 1938. This founding event, which assembled a heterogeneous mix of intellectuals, was prolonged by the annual meetings of the Mount Pelerin Society in Switzerland. The original make-up of neoliberal doctrinaires comprised three currents: The German ordo-liberals, including Lippmann, who wrote that 'the state must limit itself to the administration of justice between men going about their business'[9]; the Austrian school led by Ludwig von Mises and his young protégé, Friedrich von Hayek; and the American school represented by the young Milton Friedman.[10] Many of the participants shared in the conviction that humanity was facing the perils of totalitarianism and that world salvation depended on the renovation of Liberalism through the re-investment of its economic dimension.

Audier notes two main orientations in the Lipmann Colloquium: A first one, which took the social and moral critiques of capitalism seriously in their renovation attempt (German ordo-liberals and, to a certain extent, the Austrian school), and a second, which renewed with the intransigence of Herbert Spencer's utilitarianism (the Chicago school and, to a certain extent, the Austrian school). For the latter especially, free markets, and only free markets, could ensure individual freedom. Overall, neoliberal doctrines share a belief in the virtues of the free market as the 'optimal organising mechanism for capitalist economies'[11] *and* societies, on the one hand, and, on the other, a 'phobia of the state'[12] based on the belief that the latter constitutes in itself an 'absolute evil.' Neoliberal pioneers founded their analyses and theoretical models on the argument that *any* state intervention in economic matters engaged societies on a slope which automatically led to totalitarianism and death camps. In other words, they saw no difference in nature between Keynes-inspired state planning and Stalin or Hitler's brands of totalitarianism, the former being the first milestone on the ensuing 'road to serfdom,' to use the title of Hayek's famous opus.[13]

Neoliberal ideas were confined to the margins of political economy for decades, and were mocked by leading economists like Joseph Schumpeter (1883–1950). The turning point was the 1973 oil crisis and the concomitant crisis of the Keynesian welfare state. A year later, in 1974, Hayek received the 'Swedish National Bank's Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel,' followed by Friedman in 1976. It is noteworthy that this prize was initiated by Swedish bankers in 1968 in order to augment the

political influence of a radical version of neoclassical economics against the ruling social-democrats. This prize is the only one that was not willed by Alfred Nobel, who stated in a letter: 'I have no training in economics myself and also hate it from the bottom of my heart.'[14] Nobel created the prizes in order to crown advancements in the natural sciences as well as literature and peace. Clearly, the introduction of a 'Nobel prize in Economics' was a political gesture that successfully usurped the Nobel name and reputation to legitimate neoclassical political economy's claim to be a natural rather than a social science. This means that its results are understood to be statements on reality, rather than social facts that could be seen as constructed. The attribution of the Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel, as it is truly called, to the two intellectual leaders of the Mount Pelerin Society, followed by a series of other neoliberal laureates, set the table for what Audier calls the 'spectacular turnaround'[15] that announced the victories of Margaret Thatcher's Conservatives in Great Britain in 1979 and Ronald Reagan's Republicans in the US in 1980. The 'Nobel prize in Economics' has since continued to be an extremely efficient means of propaganda for the revival of the neoclassical model, and the spread of neoliberal ideas in and outside the economics discipline worldwide.[16]

As far as content goes, neoliberalism shares all of the basic assumptions of classical and neoclassical political economies. In many respects, neoliberals simply sought to erase the developments introduced by Keynes in order to go back to nineteenth-century neoclassical and eighteenth-century classical political economies. For example, Milton Friedman's monetarism is essentially a resurrection of the nineteenth-century Quantity Theory of Money, while Robert Lucas, another major University of Chicago economist and 1995 'Nobel' laureate, gave new life to Jean-Baptiste Say's Law of market equilibrium that served a laissez-faire agenda in economic matters.[17] Similarly, Lucas' wildly popular 'rational expectations theory' concurred to demonstrate that any state intervention in economic affairs is annulled by the anticipation of actors (and is therefore counter-productive), while Arthur Laffer's 'tax curve' aimed to show that state redistribution through progressive income taxes is inefficient in comparison with free-market incentives (low, flat-rate taxes).[18] Yet, neoliberalism, from the doctrinal point of view, is not simply a return to eighteenth- and nineteenth-century political economies. It is not a repetition as much as a re-actualisation that introduces a new type of liberalism and a new political project for societies as a whole.[19]

From the perspective of this book, there is little interest in tracking the nuances in neoliberalism-identified authors. It is the implementation of neoliberal policies and its effects that should capture most of our attention. Yet, the realm of ideas does have its importance inasmuch as its governing principles point to some intricacies and consequences of their actual institutionalisations. Commenting on early liberal economic theory (that of the Physiocrats and Adam Smith), Michel Foucault wrote that the market, as a supposedly natural occurrence, reveals 'something that is something

of a truth.'[20] The market, he argues, emerges as a mechanism by which government finds its truthfulness.[21] Foucault notes how the market, from its inception, was conceived as part of the liberal realisation of the philosophical project—i.e. the search for truth—through the discovery and formalisation of the laws of nature.[22] While this pretention was obscured in neoclassical developments, it was revived by neoliberalism. Far from simply carving out a space for the market, classical liberalism invested the market with functions of social order that exceed the economic domain.[23] As such, the different varieties of neoliberalism accomplish and radicalise political economy's project of producing social order through the mechanisms of the market, while taking it a step further.

The case of the German ordo-liberals is particularly interesting since some of its prominent voices were called upon, in the context of post-War West Germany, to reconstruct the state after the Nazi catastrophe. One immediately understands the problem: On what foundations could a state be reconstructed after totalitarianism? For ordo-liberals, the answer laid in the free market: It was to be the *foundation*, as well as the *organising principle* of the state. The market, therefore, was promoted to a function that was not as explicit in classical liberalism: To be the producer and reformer of society *as well as* the state.[24] This is what is profoundly new and has enormous consequences. For German ordo-liberals, the market could therefore cleanse the state of its inherent flaws, namely its supposed tendency towards totalitarianism. In classical liberalism, the market was introduced as a barrier which ensured that the action of the state would be restrained to a necessary minimum. In ordo-liberalism, the market became the state's foundational and organisational principle.

While civil society was theorised on the model of the market in classical liberalism, in neoliberalism, this morphogenesis function extends to the state as well. In practice, this signifies introducing a competition principle within the very administration of the state. Re-actualising the fascination that nineteenth-century political economy had for Darwin's theory, neoliberalism turns competition into a preferred regulative mechanism.[25] Competition needs to be applied in the functioning of the administration of the state, for example through constant performance evaluations, and the state's action must be made to compete with the private sector, including in areas related to social welfare. One thing that is interesting for us here is that the political content of ordo-liberalism goes well beyond laissez-faire, as the state must be intensely active in order to ensure the operation of competition. As Foucault writes, competition is a means as much as an objective, and as such it requires that government accompany the market economy from start to finish. The market economy does not subtract an area of intervention from the state's government. It provides the general index that defines all government action. The state must therefore govern *for* the market and govern *as* the market.[26] For ordo-liberals, neoliberal governmentality implies that the state be as active as the Keynesian state, only

according to substantially different principles. It is not the state that must contain and guide the market, but rather the market that indexes a general art of governing. Neoliberalism appears from this angle as an active polity without direction: 'Neoliberalism does not place itself under the principles of laissez-faire but, on the contrary, under the auspices of a permanent vigilance, activity and intervention.'[27] With these principles, German neoliberalism could be assimilated by republican political currents that were reticent to pure laissez-faire. Indicative of the success of this strategy, the West-German socialist party was the first in Europe to shed its Marxist foundations in favour of a 'market-based social economy,' decades before Britain, France, and even the US.

Outside West Germany, Friedrich Hayek, and Milton Friedman have been the most influential neoliberal thinkers.[28] Both shared a pronounced hatred for the state, both repeatedly attacked the Welfare ideal, both were ferocious proponents of laissez-faire, and both wrote at least as much about politics and policy recommendations than they did on economic matters. Hayek was closer to nineteenth-century liberalism and the project of political economy as he refused the virtues of mathematisation. His conception of equilibrium was also a dynamic one: Markets did not 'clear' at every instant, as neoclassical theory had it; rather, they tended towards equilibrium over time. Yet, Hayek's influence on neoliberal policies is generally recognised to be minimal.[29] Milton Friedman's influence, on the contrary, is hard to overstate. Not only did he lead the neoliberalisation of economics at the University of Chicago, which supplanted Samuelson's soft-Keynesian perspective as the dominant current in US economics, but he was also extremely present in the mainstream media, preaching the virtues of neoclassical theory to a large public. Chicago neoliberals such as Friedman, but also Gary Becker (1992 'Nobel prize in economics') and Robert Lucas, 'were achieving their professional reputations amidst a period of remarkable changes in American values'[30] (i.e. the 1960s), and capitalised on the growing individualism. Friedman's conception of market equilibrium was purely neoclassical, and his 1962 book *Capitalism and Freedom* promotes measures such as deregulation of transport and other industries, deregulation of professional restrictions, floating exchange rates (i.e. submitted to the mechanism of price), flat-rate income tax, deregulation of anti-trust laws, the abolition of military draft (in favour of voluntary and contractual enrolment), and other measures which were 'met initially with rejection if not disbelief,' yet 'in many cases [… were] adopted over the following thirty years.'[31] Friedman and Hayek pruned down Liberalism to its effective core, economic liberalism, while the ideals of political liberalism not immediately tied to property and economic freedom are set aside judged superfluous. Even democracy is considered a luxury that only affluent countries can afford (this, as we will see, has its importance for the analysis that lies ahead).[32]

For Friedman, Hayek, and the ordo-liberals, free-market advocacy amounts to much more than an economic policy and the standard plea for

laissez-faire in economic matters: It stands as the only acceptable political regime and a means for the regulation of society. As a result, there is virtually no domain in which the protection of the state is deemed better than the mechanisms of the market, be it poverty, education, health provision, pensions, or social insurance. 'Government, wrote Friedman, is a threat to freedom,' while the market offers a means of achieving 'co-operation [...] without coercion.'[33] American neoliberalism is nevertheless different than German ordo-liberalism in its relation to the state. Chicago neoliberalism was not concerned with providing legitimacy for the state. Rather, its profoundly libertarian attitude translates in the radical promotion of personal freedom to the detriment of the state. The state is therefore de-politicised and its powers are devolved to the judicial and the mechanisms of Law. The state's main mission is thus to enforce a strict respect of the sovereignty of economics and the indexation of state administration on economic principles of efficiency, with an emphasis on the protection of property and intellectual rights as well as a strong focus on security. American neoliberalism and German ordo-liberalism therefore sketch out two variations on the theme of a market-based type of polity and governmentality. The common characteristic of the neoliberal radicalisation, though, remains the submission of society as a whole, and the state in particular, to the structuring and regulative powers of market economics.

The core of neoliberal ideas is essentially the standard model described in the preceding chapter. If the post-War mainstream in political economy was universally inspired by a Keynesian-neoclassical consensus (more Keynesian in continental Europe, and more neoclassical in the US), the 1970s started a shift that progressively ejected Keynesianism from the discipline. More recent currents like the 'new institutional economics' have declared a will to go beyond the limits of prior schools, yet have only rehashed the standard model.[34] Meanwhile, openly critical strands have simply been ejected from the orthodox cursus and have struggled to find a relay within academia, including in less liberal-inclined countries such as France. On the whole, the centre of the discipline has moved to the right, while Keynesian principles of state regulation of the economy have been relegated to the extreme left of the spectrum, or simply dismissed as heretical. In other words, the frontier separating economic orthodoxy and heterodoxy has moved to exclude Keynes from the former. Today, a so-called heterodox economist like Joseph Stiglitz, 2001 'Nobel prize in economics,' ex-World Bank director and well-known critique of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and of his former institution, is by far closer to neoclassical orthodoxy than was Keynes, as he defends the idea of the efficiency of markets (only under limiting conditions), while Keynes defended the idea that free markets were inherently unstable. While Keynesian—and even Marxian—economics have gained new currency following the 2008 financial crash in public discourse, the effect on the academic discipline has been negligible. It is not difficult to find newspaper articles that relay student complaints regarding the absence

of concern for the 2008 crisis, as political economy almost unanimously continues to preach the self-regulating virtues of the market despite the facts.[35] This follows a global trend, by which virtually all political economy departments in the world teach the same cursus, which is not as much a discipline as variations on a single theory.[36]

Gary Becker and the putsch

University of Chicago economist Gary Becker deserves our attention, since we owe him the extension of Rational Choice theory to areas traditionally treated by sociology, as well as the concept of 'human capital.' While neoclassical political economy's concern in the nineteenth century was to solidify the claim that market economics were the only type of economics and that its domain was coherent with respect to the laws of supply and demand, Becker's contribution to the neoliberal revolution has been the extension of the domain of application of economic theory to the whole of society, thereby providing the perfect complement to political economy's overrule of the state. For Becker, *all* human actions can (and should) be analysed using the conceptual tools of neoclassical economic theory. In other words, all human behaviour can be understood as a 'relationship between ends and scarce means which have alternative uses.'[37] Concretely, Becker generalised neoclassical anthropology (*homo economicus*) to the entire scope of human behaviour: 'Chicago economists developed their analysis on the basis of the assumption that the full-fledged pursuit of individual advantage—necessarily including opportunistic calculations—was motivating virtually every social actor in virtually every area of society.'[38] This radical brand of 'methodological individualism' proceeded on the basis that actors behave rationally in all situations, and that even altruistic behaviour is a manifestation of self-interest (altruism as an individual's preference).

Overstepping the tautological nature of this reduction of all actions to self-interested motives and the metaphysical character of the affirmation that self-interest is a natural law, Becker developed his analysis on a score of non-economic phenomena such as discrimination (tossing aside such motives as hatred and bigotry), marriage (cast as an beneficial long-term contract in terms of utility), sex (a commodity like others made available by commitment or marriage), criminality (criminals are *homo economicus* like us all, except their 'benefits and costs differ'[39]), euthanasia (the most rational and cost-effective choice if future utility previsions are negative), etc. Becker considered his work on the family, collected in his 1981 *Treatise on the Family*, to be his most important. In his account, familial, marital, and friendship-type relationships are not founded on muddy and unstable notions such as love, duty, or obligation, but rather on 'individual incentives.' Mutual devotion, for instance, 'is in fact just a disguised way of achieving a higher rate of return on individual investment.'[40] Meanwhile, Becker's notion of 'human capital,' which has totally penetrated the zeitgeist, aimed

to translate individual talents, heritage, social determinations, acquired knowledge, and social relations into economic terminology. The concept of human capital is key to Becker's project of replacing social scientific concepts with quantitative and computable economic notions. For Becker, the individual is not only a being of (insatiable) needs, as neoclassical political economic theory had it, he is also an investor, an entrepreneur[41] who can (must!) convert these different non-economic capitals into economic capital, under the form of revenue and profit.

James Coleman further developed this vision by transferring the human capital model to the study of organisations and management, translating relations of trust as economies on costs of transactions.[42] Becker's legitimacy was largely derived from political economy's claims of scientificness, and his publications are replete with tables, graphs, statistics, and mathematical equations which provide the legitimacy of a pure and objective science.[43] Such a strategy goes a long way in convincing those who believe that scientificness derives from the correct application of a method rather than from a sound epistemology. What is more, Becker and the Chicago neoliberals did not think that the application of the neoclassical formal model of rationality to social phenomena was an inventive and interesting *addition* to sociology and the social sciences: They thought it was the best way to understand social realities and that their model *should* be adopted by social sciences as a whole and *replace* existing concepts, in the same way that neoclassical theory reigns supreme in mainstream economics worldwide.

How did sociology, and social sciences in general, react to University of Chicago economists' hostile takeover of the social and societal domain? Weakly, to say the least. Rational Choice theory became widely influential in political sciences, international relations, the sociology of organisations (under the heading 'public choice'), moral philosophy (e.g. John Rawls' adoption of the *homo economicus* as the basis for his theory of justice[44]), and even in certain strands of anthropology. In sociology, Raymond Boudon smoothed out Becker's reduction to self-interest by extending rationality beyond formal rationality and founding a widely influential current, along with 'game theory' and 'strategic analysis theory.'[45] More than a rapprochement of sociology and political economy, the currents that emerged in the wake of Becker's extension participated in an absorption of the former by the latter.[46] While Beckerian Rational Choice allowed for the complete evacuation of non-individual notions such as society and culture, it took less than a decade for scholars to complete the takeover by introducing Rational Choice theory in the study of religion;[47] A self-declared new 'paradigm' which is still dominant in the US and remains widely influential worldwide. I will return to the Rational Choice Theory of religion.

A much less recognised heir of Becker is Pierre Bourdieu, who critiqued the former for not going far enough in his abolition of the separation between the economic and the non-economic spheres. Rather than defining the economic 'field' as a social domain and therefore open it to sociological

enquiry (as Durkheim and his school did), Bourdieu proposed 'to conceptualise the social rapport as an enlarged modality of the economic rapport.'[48] While the sociological tradition, exemplified by Marx but also Auguste Comte, Alexis de Tocqueville, Simmel, Weber, Durkheim, Mauss, and others,[49] all stressed the social and non-economic dimensions of exchange, Bourdieu followed Becker by extending the economic analysis to the whole of society. This is why Bourdieu presented his sociology as a 'general *economy* of social practice.'[50] He also recuperated Becker's concept of human capital by distinguishing between other, non-economic capitals: Social, cultural, and symbolic, to which other scholars have recently added religious, and even spiritual capital. These forms of capital, Bourdieu insists, are only transformations of economic capital: 'economic capital is always at the root in the final analysis.'[51] For Bourdieu as for Becker, the dynamics of self-interest inevitably lurk behind all types of social actions.[52]

While this critique does not invalid the undeniable heuristic of parts of Bourdieu's work, it does question the effectiveness of his opposition to neoliberalism as of the mid-1990s.[53] Was Bourdieu not condemning a movement to which he contributed, albeit unwillingly? According to Alain Caillé, who has written an exhaustive analysis of Bourdieu's Becker-derived utilitarianism, he is only one example of the general adoption, within sociology and social sciences, but also in moral and political philosophy as well as in psychology, of the concepts and assumptions of neoclassical political economy. As authors assembled around Caillé in the loose networks of the MAUSS have shown in numerous publications, this utilitarian turn in social sciences in the 1970s and 1980s corresponds to an important epistemological shift—the rise of a 'self-interest-based axiomatic' (*axiomatique de l'intérêt*)—that is concomitant with and part of the neoliberal revolution.[54] In other words, neoliberal doctrines went from marginal to credible to dominant only as the emerged tip of a much wider and more profound utilitarian shift that significantly reshaped the very bases of Western thought.[55] It is important to note how this signifies a major change in the intellectual and academic division of labour: For two centuries prior, social sciences developed along the lines of the differentiated/-ing social spheres, with political economy mainly concerned about upholding its legitimacy over economic matters. With neoliberalism, neoclassical economic theory ventured to submit the whole scope of human interactions to its interpretative model, blurring the boundaries between the academic disciplines and successfully exporting its main assumptions and concepts, and therefore its worldview.

The rise of management and global financialised capitalism

It is important to replace the rise to dominance of neoliberal doctrines within a wider panorama. For, as secularisation *theories* appeared at the very moment when the assumptions of the secularisation paradigm had become self-evident and naturalised, so did neoliberal theories and policies come to

the fore when a more profound shift was already kipping the balance away from the Nation-State to the Global-Market. This involved a major change in society's self-perception, and was reflected in social sciences. It was also reflected in a realignment of the standard model around the precepts of the 'new political economy,' i.e. neoliberalism, in the universities, academies, schools of administration, and think thanks. Meanwhile, management, which did not even exist as a proper discipline in the early 1970s, rose to become an immensely popular and powerful academic discipline. Management has always shared neoclassical assumptions; yet, a major shift in the meaning, conceptions, and practices of management occurred at the turn of the 1980s as capitalism became increasingly globalised and financialised.

Three major factors contributed to remodel the workings of industrial capitalism at the end of the twentieth century: The financialisation of the economy, by which short-term, financial market pressures replaced those of the 'real' (industrial) economy; the de-territorialisation and deregulation of capital that challenged the nation-state's modes of regulation of the economy while increasing the effective power of financial markets and supranational organisations (IMF, WTO, etc.); the developments in telecommunications and computer technologies which combined to allow for an immediate and real-time response to market exigencies and demand.[56] These transformations put an end to the Taylorist-Keynesian relation between capital and work, as large national-based do-it-all corporations ceded to global-networked, outsource-coordinating multinationals.[57]

'Management science,' which emanates from the US to the entire globe, self-defines as pragmatic and non-ideological. Yet, its language, images, and symbols combine in a powerful set of representations that are at least as much prescriptive (model for) than they are descriptive (model of), shaping how managers, employees, administrators, and politics view the world.[58] Its conceptions have extended to the whole of society and have pervaded everyday language. It is now commonplace to hear that people manage pretty much everything including their emotions, love life, stress, time, family, work load, and reputation. Coincidentally, popular literature and cultural productions on how to do so have exploded, but not only in the West.[59]

Private business management has been widely adopted by public administrations under the heading New Public Management (NPM). Here again, we observe an inversion of the pre-eminence of the market and the state, as NPM is basically the transfer of the management techniques developed in the private sector to the entire public sector: Schools, hospitals and health care, national and sub-national administrations—a trend that now extends to all institutions and organisations, including religious ones. The underlying assumption behind NPM's penetration is the neoliberal belief in the superior efficiency of the private sector (and the Market) over the public sector (and the State), in a complete reversal of the beliefs of just a few decades prior. Another consequence of the spread of management is 'customer-orientation,' which consecrates the move away from Taylorist

production (produce then sell) to a consumption-based model (produce according to needs, or sell then produce) that significantly changes how public institutions consider their publics, which are now called users and consumers. The imperatives of customer orientation often introduce irresolvable tensions when neoliberal austerity measures target public services. All in all, the incredible destiny of NPM boldly illustrates how the private sector and the Market now serve as a theoretical and practical model in a whole array of social and societal domains.

The basis for management science is *homo economicus* rather than empirical subjects, and it follows the discipline of economics in its mathematising and formalising tendencies. Deeply embedded in the utilitarian paradigm, it considers competition to be a natural or given phenomenon rather than something constructed, and to which individuals must constantly adapt. The object of management is the optimisation of resources in order to achieve the most efficient results, and its strategies often rest on quantitative techniques of 'quality'[60] evaluation. What management calls the 'human factor' is devolved to a specific department: 'human resources.' Becker's notion of human capital is fundamental here, as it reconciles (in theory at least) the conflict between the imperatives of human development and those of the business development (profit) by submitting the accomplishment of the former to that of the latter. In other words, 'human resources' start from the idea that economic development is a finality which conditions human and social development.

Management ushers in a subtle change which reverses the rapports between public and individual utilities, as public utility, in other words economic growth, becomes an imperative. Far from being value-free, management 'constructs an interpretative system of the social world "that implies an order of values and a conception of action."'[61] In sum, management promotes a utilitarian worldview and a corresponding set of values that have gained traction in today's globalised world, once again well beyond the West: Mobility, adaptability, success, enrichment, utility, liberty, autonomy, responsibility, initiative, involvement, networking, fluidity, reactivity, flexibility, competitiveness, confidence, power, positivity, optimism, self-reliance, collegiality, efficiency, growth, action, maximisation, desire for progress, commitment, cost-effectiveness, leadership, creativity, trustworthiness, responsibility, trustfulness, enthusiasm, amiability, responsiveness, risk-taking, spontaneity, intuition (having a good radar), making and preserving relations, pragmatism, and, perhaps most importantly, commitment to self-realisation through professional self-improvement.[62] These values make up the core of Boltanski and Chiapello's 'new spirit of capitalism' and have been effectively disseminated through popular management literature worldwide.

The content of neoliberal doctrines and the difficulties of the Keynesian welfare state in the 1970s fall short in explaining 'the triumph of neoliberalism as the dominant political and ideological dogma throughout the

world.'[63] Indeed, the neoliberal celebration of the 'freedom to choose' cannot make debt reduction, financial austerity, privatisations, and financial deregulation desirable for the wider public. Considering the role of management reveals how the assumptions of neoclassical economic theory, which also found the neoliberal vision, are disseminated with positive overtones and with a feeling of self-evidence and inevitability within contemporary societies. Looking at neoliberalism solely from the perspective of ideas, doctrines, and policies (see infra) misses how it became a desirable *cultural ideology* that has promoted the acceptability of neoliberal reforms.

From doctrine and cultural ideology to policy

How did neoliberalism become implemented as a set of concrete policies all over the globe? According to some leading scholars, the 'first phase of global neoliberalism began with the Pinochet military coup in Chile and the "Chicago Boys" (a group of Chilean economists trained at the University of Chicago under a broadly 'Friedmanite' programme) project that followed'[64] and which contained the following measures: 'reorienting domestic production towards the export market, privatising state-owned companies, rolling back social expenditure and employment rights, abolishing taxes on wealth and capital gains, and embarking upon the systematic repression of the labour movement.'[65] A few years later, perhaps inspired by the capitalist success of South Asian authoritarian regimes such as South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan, China's new leader Deng Xiaoping, in the midst of the insecurity that followed Mao Zedong's death in 1976, steered his country onto a capitalist path, increasingly integrating neoliberal elements into his economic policy, 'interdigitated with authoritarian state control.'[66] China's isolation from the world market ceased as neoliberal policies on international trade, initiated by Margaret Thatcher in Britain in 1979 and the US Federal Reserve's sudden increase in interest rates the same year, 'opened the whole world to transformative market and financial forces.'[67] In its formative stage, neoliberalisation 'was neither programmatically integrated nor orchestrated from some superordinate institutional site. Instead, it assumed a predominantly disarticulated form, characterized by a proliferation of relatively unconnected, conjectural and contextually bound projects of market-oriented institutional creative destruction.'[68] Neoliberalism appeared in the context of the joint crisis of the Welfare state and the Bretton Woods agreements that had provided the frame for international trade after 1945. In fact, crisis is key to the implementation of neoliberal policies, which are crisis-induced, crisis-managing, and crisis-inducing.[69]

As Brenner, Peck, and Theodore write: 'In the most general sense, neoliberalization denotes a politically guided intensification of market rule and commodification.'[70] The formative stage of neoliberalisation, which roughly corresponds to the 1980s, was a 'roll-back,' Friedmanite phase,

'built on deregulation, liberalization, privatization and ever tighter global integration.'[71] The driver for this accelerated globalisation was the financialisation of the economy following deregulation, and the beginning of the negotiation processes leading to international free trade agreements. This marked an important shift in the very substance of capitalism, inverting the power dynamics between production and finance. The dismantling of the Keynesian welfare state realigned its focus on security (defence) and the provision of legal and economic infrastructure for the functioning of the market, including the mediation between social groups in order to preserve and expand market relations.[72]

The collapse of the Soviet bloc occurred when these trends were sharpening and solidifying. As a result, the 1990s saw the beginning of a new and still ongoing second phase of 'deep neoliberalism,'[73] characterised by a more proactive programme. Neoliberalisation can since be defined as a two-headed *process*: On the one hand, the destruction of Nation-State era institutionalisations, such as the dismantling of Keynesian artefacts (public housing, public space), policies (welfare, redistribution), institutions (labour unions), and agreements, or those of the Communist and post-colonial state. On the other, a creative process by which neoliberal policies establish new institutions and practices which produce and reproduce neoliberalism (government-business consortia, governance, workfare policies, contractualisation, decentralisation, etc.).[74] This second phase is contemporary to the abandonment of the last Marxist moorings of the traditional leftist and socialist parties worldwide and shares some of the features of the ordo-liberal and Beckerian programmes, as it accomplishes a profound reconstruction of the state rather than its implosion or reduction to a night-watchman role. Hence, the neoliberal state became more socially interventionist and more heavily involved in social regulation but under new guiding principles, and included profound welfare reforms, utilitarian penal policies, urban regeneration, and immigration laws. These reforms and implementations have had a significant impact on immigration and asylum regulation, for instance, and therefore on the contexts of cultural and religious pluralism.

A key factor in the implementation of neoliberal policies has been the devolution of regulative power over economic (and political) affairs to a set of even-minded supranational organisations which were reinvested with new missions or created anew, of which are the IMF, the World Bank, the European Commission, the European Central Bank, and the World Trade Organisation (WTO, whose tribunal replaced the former GATT[75]). The power of these structures is coextensive to the essentially economic international associations of states (G7, G8, G20, ASEAN, BRIC, Eurasian Customs Union, etc.) and has been effective through the regulation of international free trade agreements (NAFTA, European Economic Union, Mercosur, CETA, and so on). In addition to this, the financialisation of the world economy has signified an extraordinary devolution of power to

another set of non-political and non-democratic institutions, bond rating agencies (Moody's, Standard and Poor's, and Fitch). It is difficult to overstate the impact of these organs, which all share a more or less strictly neoliberal platform. In the early 1990s, the World Bank, IMF, and WTO along with the world's most powerful economic ministers and central bankers converged around the so-called 'Washington Consensus,' whose core consists in a menu of policies that include privatisation, free trade, export-led growth, financial capital mobility, deregulated domestic markets and finance, as well as macroeconomic austerity aimed at the erosion (or 'modernisation') of welfare provision. The lever for the implementation of these policies has generally been the national debt: As most countries developed significant public debts and/or needed to borrow on the global finance market, the IMF and the World Bank conceded loans in exchange for the implementation of 'structural adjustments,' in other words compliance with a mix or another of measures included in the Washington Consensus.[76] Since the 1990s, over one hundred poor countries have been compelled to such programmes.[77] The intentions behind these structural adjustments are good, of course, the idea being, in the words of WTO former director Mike Moore, that 'the surest way to do more to help the [world's] poor is to continue to open markets.'[78] Such a conviction rests on the neoclassical assumption that competition automatically benefits all parties, big and small alike (Smith's 'win-win' scenario), and that the market is superior and more efficient than the state in all areas. The state, from this perspective, is perceived mostly as an obstacle for development.

As a set of processes, neoliberalisation is inherently variegated, multiple, temporally discontinuous, spatially heterogeneous, patterned, interconnected, non-linear, locally specific, contested, and unstable rather than simply homogenising. These processes have unfolded in sometimes incremental fashion, sometimes 'through more dramatic ruptures.'[79] Yet for all this variegation, the overall pattern remains coherent within a given set of possibilities: 'The result is nevertheless a reshaping and reweaving of relations between civil society, state, market, the economy, and individuals, in a more and more global backdrop.'[80] Taken broadly, 'across all contexts in which they have been mobilized, neoliberalization processes have facilitated marketization and commodification while simultaneously *intensifying* the uneven development of regulatory forms across places, territories, and scales.'[81] The variegation of local pathways must therefore be understood with respect to a worldwide convergence of regulatory systems, in the form of increasing transnational market-oriented transfers.

Another important feature of neoliberalism is how it has affected all regions and all countries on the globe. The financialisation of the economy and its development in synch with real-time communication technologies have had a profoundly transnational and globalising effect. They have 'dramatically accelerated the integration of economic processes [and societies]

beyond national state boundaries, at once on a worldwide level,'[82] namely through the soft coercion of the aforementioned supranational regulatory institutions:

> While neoliberalism is not globally hegemonic in the technical sense of having fully integrated or co-opted oppositional social forces, it is considered dominant insofar as it exercises an encompassing form of control "over apparently fragmented populations" through a "market-based transnational free enterprise system."[83]

As such, it has framed 'the conditions for political transformation across the globe.'[84] If neoliberalisation necessarily occurs within the frame of nation-states, its institutionalisation occurs on a supranational—or global—scale. Similarly, this erosion of the centralised state's embedding functionality has resulted in the relative autonomy of lower levels of government. Jason Hackworth has shown, for instance, how neoliberalisation has greatly impacted the municipal level, a trend that started in the West and has since become globalised.[85]

The effects of neoliberalism have been in many cases starker in non-Western countries, which often lack the institutions, economic knowledge, and a political culture that could attenuate neoliberal policies.[86] This has been the case in many African, as well as in certain ex-Soviet countries. Cornell Ban has proposed to measure neoliberalisation according to three criteria: Compliance with the neoliberal macroeconomic creed and thus credibility with financial markets, the openness of trade and finance, and the safeguard of both internal and external competitiveness.[87] Based on the extension of the implementation of these policies in specific national contexts, Ban distinguishes between two varieties of neoliberal pathways: 'embedded neoliberalism,' in which the radicalism of neoliberal measures is buffered by inherited institutionalisations and correcting measures which effectively redistribute wealth to the lower classes, and 'disembedded neoliberalism,' where neoliberal radicalism has been allowed to express itself most fully, without decommodifying or downward redistribution measures. Ban argues that the empirical studies available show how 'the hallmarks of neoliberalism (trade liberalization, financial liberalization, and macroeconomic orthodoxy) can coexist alongside protectionist measures for local or new transnational industries.'[88]

The imposition of structural reforms on non-Western countries starting in the 1980s often introduced capitalism in local contexts which had known other forms of state-directed or traditional, non-market economies. In such cases, the cultural ideological aspect of neoliberalism was determining. As Max Weber is reported to have said: 'One does not create a capitalist economic mentality with an economic policy.'[89] In a book devoted to the spread of capitalism in regions such as Africa, China, India, Central Asia, Iran, and Russia, Jean-François Bayart argues that: 'The grafting of

capitalism in non-western societies is also that of an imaginary and of its social practices. A process that inevitably participates to their remodelling, according to the social forces present and their specific historical context.'[90] The integration of peripheral regions in the global time of capitalism is therefore not a linear process. Capitalism must compose with the temporalities, social structures, and mores of the neighbourhood, the bazaar, the slum, etc.[91] The reactions are often paradoxical, made of reservations but also enthusiasm. In the next chapter, I chart how consumerism provides a particularly powerful incentive that lacks neoliberal capitalism.

Raewyn Connell and Nour Dados are amongst the authors who have stressed how neoliberalisation processes did not simply originate in the developed North before spreading to the under-developed Global South. As the example of Chile shows, some of the first neoliberal experiments occurred in the Global South: 'By the time Reagan came to power in the United States, neoliberal moves were already proliferating around the global periphery. There were neoliberal currents in other authoritarian regimes in South America in the 1970s, including Brasil and Uruguay,' as well as in countries like Turkey.[92] The strong link between authoritarianism and neoliberalism that we see at work in the past as well as today is partly explained if one considers the latter as a development policy that was invested with the function of providing legitimation and a foundation for the former's political order through economic growth, in a similar fashion as in post-War West Germany.

In non-Western countries, where the modern bureaucratic state was in many cases inchoate, the effects of neoliberalisation have not been as intricate as in the West, where the introduction of competition and efficiency have been key factors in the dismantling of the Welfare model and the reformation of the state apparatus and social provisions on the Market model. In the 'Global South,' neoliberal policies were most effective in re-orienting national economies to international trade and capital by reversing post-colonial land (re)distribution policies that had favoured small familial ownerships. Integration within global flows has meant favouring large corporate land ownership and reshaping agricultural production towards exportation, 'impacting small-holder farmers and rural populations and contributing to large-scale social change,'[93] namely through forced and rapid urbanisation. Arguably, important changes in the social structure induce similarly important changes in religion—e.g. the rise of Pentecostalism amidst this rapid urbanisation in Africa and South America. It needs to be emphasised how profound the neoliberal revolution has been in terms of further enmeshing evermore human populations within the global capitalist economy. This effect has reached down into the everyday lives of countless people, as 'Market thinking penetrates communities and even families, changing the way people relate to each other and think about their everyday lives.'[94] As Amira Mittermaier phrases it: 'today capitalism is a social and material reality around the globe.'[95]

Neoliberal reforms have tended to deliver short-term macroeconomic growth, especially for middle-income countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, South Africa, South Korea, Indonesia, Pakistan, Malaysia, and Thailand. This is because investors and financial institutions reward reforms with investments, in a sort of self-fulfilling economic prophecy. In such countries, neoliberalisation has contributed to produce a new middle class. In low-income countries such as Bangladesh, Bolivia, Tanzania, Swaziland, and Ethiopia, which do not have the infrastructural capacity to absorb and convert foreign investments, the effects of neoliberalism have been the harshest, as it reduces state capacity to address social problems such as poverty, unemployment, and inequality.[96] Another effect linked to the profound shift in former social structures has been to fuel the 'massive growth of informal economies in the cities of the majority world.'[97] Everywhere, there has been a severe increase in inequalities, and neoliberalism-induced economic growth tends to dwindle in the longer run.

From government to governance

One remarkable consequence of the successful dissemination of neoliberal ideas has been the meteoric ascension of 'governance' in the place and stead of the concept of government.[98] More than a change in terminology, this illustrates a shift in the governmentality of modern societies. Neoliberalism is continuous with the liberal tradition in its preference for judicial and technical conceptions of regulation. Jules Duchastel argues that neoliberalism distinguishes between two spaces: That of the market, whose subterranean laws are said to ensure an optimal and just balance, and that of regulation, which should be as simple as possible.[99] First introduced by O.E. Williamson, the concept of governance was developed in the field of business administration, where it is adorned with the values of transparency, objectivity, and the democratic participation of shareholders in the process of management and decision-making.[100] The concept also evolved in the context of urban administration in order to differentiate between the exercise of government and the strategic action of various parties with vested interests. Governance introduces a punctual, networked, pluricentric, and multi-level type of regulation in which mutual trust and negotiation amongst interdependent actors are key. The ideal of governance is to avoid rigid institutionalisations in favour of relatively supple institutional frameworks with 'contingently articulated rules, norms, knowledge, and social imaginaries.'[101] Presented as a democratic, value-neutral, and optimising form of self-regulation, governance is clearly informed by the idea of the Market.

Governance embodies the shift towards a market-based governmentality that champions technical and judicial processes over the supposedly arbitrary political regulation. The introduction of governance 'substantially modifies the modalities of institutionalisation of modern society.'[102]

This mutation materialises a change in the teleology of regulation, which is no longer expressed in terms of the common good but rather in terms of efficiency (defined in economic terms of cost-effectiveness) and 'objective utility.' Governance therefore developed in the economic sphere before being transferred to the public and para-public sphere, and increasingly within religious organisations.

While governance openly favours the multiplication of the loci of norm production and seems to integrate more democracy than do institutionalised, vertical forms of government, it does so within the framework and language of the market and its utilitarian conception of humankind and social relations. Analysts also point out how governance favours the strong over the weak and tends towards a technocratic inflation of evaluation measures and procedures. Governance conveys an economic understanding of society and polity and attests that the state is no longer invested with overruling authority. Similarly, governance has contributed to naturalise the market, construct the self-evidence of an economic worldview, and discourage alternative modes of representation and regulation. It legitimises an ultra-liberal, de-historicised conception of society understood as the agglomeration of individual interests. Since governance is believed to have automatic public benefits (just like Adam Smith's market), actors are not encouraged to consciously aim the common good. Actors are depicted as shareholders, defined by interest and the size of their market share. Overall, governance promotes the idea of a contractual society that shuns moral concepts such as solidarity and community, and is thus far from being value-neutral.[103]

The case of France is interesting, since it remains highly centralised and has most invested the state with the functions of instituting and producing society.[104] The shift from a vertical exercise of power, contained by the national space and circulated from the centre towards the periphery, to a governance-type governmentality happened in the 1970s during the presidency of Valéry Giscard-d'Estaing (1974–1981) and continues today. Influenced by German ordo-liberals, Giscard aimed to disengage the state from its role of sole operator of change by delegating power to other constituencies, national and supranational, in order to adapt to the obligations of international competition. As French society was shifting away from a public morality valuing honour and duty to the promotion of subjective autonomy and personal realisation, Giscard sought to delegate power to the judicial as well as introduce more supple and horizontal modes of negotiation. This resulted in a triple delegation of power: Above, to supranational institutions (at the European level); below, to local authorities and other actors; and horizontally, to the judicial.[105] The same trends can be observed in the field of French cultural policies, where NPM and other imports from the world of finance have translated culture into a 'cost' and opened its regulation to quantitative technocratic evaluation. Thinking culture within a market paradigm means evaluating investments in terms of public success and thus with respect to an offer and demand index.[106]

The political effects of neoliberalism

Laurent Fleury argues that the rise of governance amounts to an 'axiological turnaround.' From every angle one looks at the neoliberal turn, what transpires is a major change in the functioning of the state and the ways in which societies institutionalise. Neoliberalism is more than the reactivation of classical liberalism: It is the triumph of the Market over the State and the submission of the former to the logics of the latter. Analysts converge around the idea that neoliberalism does not simply roll back the state: The state is restructured in such a way that the rapport between state and society is retranslated in market terms. Never did the market have such pull on modern societies than in the last decades. The affirmation that we live in 'market societies,' therefore, seems utterly warranted.[107] Yet, this only makes sense if we consider that the 'market' is not a technical term referring to an abstract plane in which demand and offer meet, but rather that it is a particular type of political regulation in which the idea of the Market and the market economy are invested with the functions of instituting and regulating the social. The shift from a National-Statist regime to a Global-Market one is a change in polity at the highest level.

This process has significantly modified state sovereignty. The rule according to which 'the modern world flows from the absolute sovereignty of the state over its national territory,'[108] which took centuries to materialise, has been made obsolete. As Saskia Sassen argues, neoliberal deregulation inaugurates an 'epochal shift'[109] that operates a decline in the significance of the state and points to new contents and new locations for sovereignty (including in the virtual world of financial markets and the Internet). Incidentally, the state has not only 'lost control' over the economy, but it has also submitted its sovereignty to economic imperatives. These movements have contributed to the denationalisation of national economies and territories. The nation no longer plays the role of natural container for political sovereignty and individual and collective identities. Yet, this decline of the nation is relative. As the state is reconfigured rather than relegated, so is the nation, which becomes available for new investments and a paradoxical renationalisation of politics that introduces the possibility for the new brands of nationalism and populism that have proliferated in recent years.[110] The unearthing of the national territory in economic, social, cultural, and religious affairs produces movements of popular reactions intending to reaffirm national sovereignty and national consistency. The case of Eastern Europe provides some valuable insights into how these dynamics unfold with respect to religion, the state, and the nation. More generally, this destabilisation changes the location of religion in society and the conditions for the political regulation of religion.

As we have seen, 'the emergence of national markets was in no way the result of the gradual and spontaneous emancipation of the economic sphere from government control':[111] They were actively created by the state as a

means of producing social order as much as wealth. The neoliberal revolution accomplishes the contrary: The reformation of the state and society through the Market against a global backdrop:

> The political arena of the nation-state is thus restructured and the old divide between "inside" the nation-state and "outside" is eroded. As the function of the state become [sic] reorganized to fit with the new global order, so the state begins to act even more clearly as a market "player" itself and not a "referee" as in the old national order of states. Regulation is seen as something carried out not on behalf of the common good but, rather, on behalf of the globalisation project itself[112]

Similarly, the neoliberal turn marks a 'direct inversion of historically entrenched national/global relations. The "global" is no longer seen as a derivative product of nationally steered institutionalizations, but rather a new level of institutionalization.'[113] While the nation-state produced the global through international relations in the National-Statist era, it is the global that is first institutionalised in the Global-Market era. The global becomes sui generis in a sense, as that from or against which the nation is constituted. Neoliberalisation has meant a profound remaking of the institutional relations between social spheres, with important consequences for their differentiation. As a result, neither the internal coherence of each sphere nor the relations between them can be taken for granted. In many cases, the frontiers between social spheres have been blurred or reshaped, and their connections to the other spheres have been reconfigured—a process that has been mostly ignored by the sociology of religion.

We have seen in the preceding chapter how the regulatory mechanism of Law is coextensive to that of the Market in Liberalism. In this sense, neoliberalism pursues and radicalises the classical liberal preference for technical and judicial mechanisms over the political mechanisms of the democratic state.[114] As a consequence, the state devolves significant areas of regulation to the judicial. While modern law was founded on a monist conception in which there was only one centre for the production of norms—the state—the neoliberal turn introduces a multiplication of the sources of law, namely on the supranational level. This produces, in turn, a multiplication of procedures regarding the production and implementation of rules, as well as a score of supposedly neutral evaluation techniques. This has also meant the extraction of law from the remit of the state and the privatisation of certain judicial processes.[115] These developments, once again, have had an enormous impact on the governance of religion, and even the production of religious norms, as in the case of halal.

Neoliberalism has a paradoxical rapport to democracy. On the one hand, neoliberal governance can be viewed as increasing democracy, particularly at the local level. On the other, though, governance has tended to subtract whole areas of regulation from democratic approbation, as illustrated by

the negotiation of free trade agreements and European-level regulations. In sum, analysts do tend to insist on the erosion of the democratic principles as a result of neoliberalisation. For instance, IMF-commanded structural adjustments have enforced the privatisation of public and social services, subtracting these areas from democratic control. The same goes for the insulation of property rights and economic matters.[116]

Another political effect of neoliberalism has been the flattening out of differences across the political spectrum as a consequence of the adoption of a broadly neoliberal platform by almost all political parties, including socialists and social-democrats.[117] This is the reason behind the ongoing debates over the usefulness of the categories of left and right in politics today. It is also a defining factor in the current crisis of 'traditional' political parties and the success of charismatic leaders, as well as anti-establishment and populist parties. In other words, the 'horizon of political possibilities has dramatically closed in'[118] as a result of neoliberalism. As illustrated earlier, the neoliberal promotion of economic freedom tolerates a high level of authoritarianism. Neoliberals are known to prefer the government of technocratic elites (as was the case recently in Italy), which are believed to provide a more stable framework for the market than the uncertainties of democratic alternation. The case of Greece shows how Eurozone officials and the European Central Bank can make it virtually impossible to adopt economic and social policies that are not neoliberal-compatible. A consequence of this has been the recent rise of extremist populist parties, especially on the right-wing of the political scale, in opposition to these ruling elites. Such political movements pledge to return political power to the people; yet, their instalment in countries like Poland, Hungary, and more recently in Italy, the US, and Brazil, has tended to lead to the dismantling of the rule of Law and the separation of powers, as well as the diminution of political pluralism and restraints on the free press. Meanwhile, the economic policies of these populist parties have remained conspicuously neoliberal and market-friendly, apart from some redistribution measures. In other words, populist oppositions to neoliberalism have had similar political effects as neoliberalism *stricto sensu*, without seriously challenging global economic integration and capitalist principles. As we will see in the chapters to come, the religious situation shares many similarities with what is happening in the field of politics.

Finally, neoliberalisation has changed the value and meaning of citizenship. The turn to judicial and procedural types of regulation has undermined the republican conception of the citizen as the one who finds meaning in a politicised public sphere (e.g. Habermas) in favour of a liberal, procedural one in which citizenship is essentially expressed when punctually voting in elections. The underlying message behind this diversion of the value of citizenship and the erosion of democracy is that one can better express one's identity through consumption,[119] something that is central to contemporary dynamics of identity production and belonging. Such a

change in the meaning of citizenship, which is tied to concomitant changes in the meaning of civil society,[120] opens new possibilities for personal and collective identities, including for the role and place of religion.

The neoliberal revolution

This chapter provides a synthesis of the meaning of neoliberalism as a set of ideas (doctrine), policies, and cultural ideology. Neoliberalism is best understood as the pivot around which a 'broad historical shift in ideology and practice'[121] has been under way since the late 1970s. Based on this discussion, I argue that the latest phase of globalisation cannot be detached from the underlying processes of neoliberalisation. In response to Immanuel Wallerstein's theories on the formation of world-system of capitalism, Roland Robertson proposed an essentially cultural definition of globalisation as 'the concrete structuration of the world as a whole' and the 'production and reproduction of the world as the most salient plausibility structure of our time.'[122] Yet, this must not hide the fact that the most recent wave of globalisation is intimately tied to the rise of neoliberalism, and that neoliberalism itself has an important cultural dimension. As Bourdieu argued, neoliberalism has been successful in 'making *itself true* and empirically verifiable.'[123] Similarly, Munck argues that: 'The struggle for hegemony waged by the neoliberal project was, at least in part, a struggle over meaning. […] Neoliberalism successfully articulated neoclassical economic theories with a liberal individualist conception of political freedom.'[124] It has also diverted and monopolised the meaning of terms such as reform, realism, revolution, modernisation, and progress, while disseminating the idea that 'economic laws' and the 'reality of the market' are ineluctable facts.[125] It is the naturalisation of such conceptions that lies behind the popular acceptance of austerity measures, 'structural adjustments,' and privatisations. In other words, neoliberalism has become the 'new "common sense" for the new post-socialist era,'[126] across the world.

The neoliberal revolution has affected inherited established institutionalisations and the rapports between the state and society. I have argued that the neoliberal state cannot be defined as an impotent, night-watchman state, but rather as the product of complex processes of restructuration. Hence, neoliberalism is not just another step in a linear process of modernisation and globalisation. Rather, the rise of neoliberalism is coextensive to major changes in the economy following the crisis of the Welfare state and of the Fordist–Taylorist brand of production-based capitalism, and the emergence of a financialised, intensely globalised, and consumption-driven capitalism. This important change in the nature of capitalism has operated a second, equally important change in the rapports between the political and the economic, by which the Market has overthrown the State as the preferred actor for social regulation, social progress, and social renovation. The neoliberal revolution has ushered in a new type of society: A full-fledged market society. As Bohle and Greskovits write about post-socialist

countries, neoliberalisation not only 'boosted the expansion of "markets within states" but squeezed "states within markets."'[127] The result has been the global transformation of the National-Statist regime into a Market one, in which the Market is invested with the function of ensuring social order and social optimum.

This diagnosis has been made possible through a multi-angle analysis that includes the realm of ideas as well as that of policy, management, and governance, which all attest to a major axiological shift in tune with the new political economy of neoliberalism. What is at stake is much more than an increase in the importance of the capitalist economy, fuelled by the advances in communication technologies and the fall of communism. It is a veritable change in the moorings and dynamics of modern societies worldwide. This project, the project of neoliberalism, is profoundly utopian behind its claims of realism, scientificness, and pragmatism. Such utopianism was championed by neoliberals such as Milton Friedman, but also by its main instigators in the political arena. Margaret Thatcher was very explicit about the fact that what was involved with her reform of British society was far more than economic deregulation when she declared: 'Economics are the method, but the object is to change the soul.'[128] As this quote demonstrates, neoliberalisation entails the remaking of the modern world.

It is therefore impossible to ignore neoliberalism (well-defined) in the analysis of contemporary social facts. No social sphere, however autonomous and differentiated it may seem to some, has been spared by the neoliberal revolution. More than a set of ideas and pro-market policies, neoliberalism is a culture that has allowed for the embedment of modern societies within the exigencies of the economic sphere.[129] The analysis of neoliberalism cannot be limited to the history of ideas and the concepts of political science. The extent to which the neoliberal cultural ideology has penetrated contemporary culture commands the idea that if such a 'transformation of the collective *ethos* cannot not have had an incidence on the arrangement of the political power,'[130] it cannot not have had an incidence on religion either.

Yet, the rise of neoliberalism and its model of formal rationality, hinged on the figure of the maximising and self-interested *homo economicus*, cannot alone explain the social, political, cultural, and religious transformations of the last decades. Prior to the neoliberal surge of the late 1970s and 1980s, another, essentially cultural and social revolution had taken place in the midst of the post-War economic boom in the West: The consumerist revolution of the 1960s and the inauguration of a 'new world,' whose unintended consequence has been the neoliberal surge considered in this chapter.

Notes

1 Ban (2016: 3). See also Connell and Dados (2014).
2 Brenner, Peck and Theodore (2009: 184).
3 Colàs (2005: 70).

4 Taylor (2003).
5 Munck (2005: 60).
6 Colàs (2005: 70). Emphasis added.
7 Colàs (2005: 70).
8 Audier (2012).
9 Audard (2009: 344).
10 Mirowski (2013: 42) quoted by Ban (2016: 11).
11 Lapavitsas (2005: 30).
12 Foucault (2004).
13 Hayek (1944).
14 Quoted in Horn (2009: 20). The letter was made public by Alfred Nobel's family as it eventually tried to have the prize stopped, without success. It is noteworthy that this information appears on the French page of Wikipedia on the 'Nobel in economics,' but not on the English page.
15 Audier (2012: 193).
16 In the sole 1990s, seven out of seventeen 'Nobel in economics' laureates were from the University of Chicago. See Nelson (2014).
17 Lapavitsas (2005: 34), Ruffini (1996). Implemented in the 1980s by the US Federal Reserve, Friedman's monetarism was proven false in the years that followed. As for the natural equilibrium theory, see the discussion later in the chapter.
18 See Lucas and Sargent (1981), Laffer and Seymour (1979). See the discussion in Gauchet (2017: 36–42).
19 Laval (2018: 47). See also Dardot and Laval (2010).
20 Foucault (2004: 33): '*quelque chose qui est comme une vérité*.' My translation.
21 Foucault (2004: 34).
22 Foucault (2004: 58–9).
23 As Foucault (2004: 120) argues, in order to better distinguish between liberalism and ordo-liberalism. In my view, the Foucauldian analysis that is popular in social sciences overly systematises his propositions. I think that Foucault himself did not intend to be systematic, and that his 'entrepreneur' thesis was only meant to apply to Becker-type Chicago neoliberalism, which is the only section in which he sketches out this interpretation. My impression is that he composed his séances without a grand strategy in mind and that his analyses of German ordo-liberalism and Chicago neoliberalism, for example, are to be understood as highlighting different paths and possibilities within the developments of liberal governmentality in the twentieth century. My references to Foucault aim to highlight the new rapports that neoliberal doctrines introduce with respect to the state and the market in particular, and politics and economics in general. For a good discussion on the latest debates within the English-language Foucauldian current, see Chandler and Reid (2016). For a good synthesis of the neoliberal subject analytic applied to religion, see Gray (2013).
24 Foucault (2004: 121).
25 Foucault (2004: 120–5). For an in-depth discussion on ordo-liberalism, see Audier (2012).
26 Loose translation of Foucault (2004: 125).
27 Foucault (2004: 137).
28 For an in-depth discussion on both, see Audier (2012). On Milton Friedman and American economics in general, see also Nelson (2014).
29 See namely Harvey (2005) as well as the contributions in Saad-Filho and Johnston (2005), including Deraniyagala (2005), Duménil and Lévy (2005), and Palley (2005).
30 Nelson (2014: 194).

31 Nelson (2014: 115).
32 Hayek is known to have stated that an authoritarian regime was better suited to ensure a stable frame for the expansion of the free market, while Friedman, for all of his calls for freedom, collaborated with US government officials and the Pinochet dictatorship in Chile to develop its economic policy. See Harvey (2005) and Colàs (2005).
33 Quoted in Nelson (2014: 147).
34 See Nelson (2014), Boltanski and Chiapello (1999), and Caillé (2005b).
35 To offer an example, the Faculty of Social and economic science at the University of Fribourg, Switzerland, was a Keynesian stronghold that traditionally distinguished itself from the purely orthodox and neoclassical-cum-neoliberal schools of Lausanne and Zürich. The last decade has seen a shift by which orthodox and neoclassical/neoliberal professors progressively became dominant in the Department of Political Economy, and henceforth hegemonic in the Faculty, as Keynesian professors retired. Today, the Department no longer teaches courses in the history of ideas nor about the history of the discipline, the cursus is almost entirely mathematised, and there are pressures for the Department's name to switch to the nobler positivistic 'Economics.' Housed in the Faculty of Arts, I am now the only one offering courses on the history of the idea of the market, which is shunned by political economy students.
36 See Nelson (2014), Caillé (2005b), Graeber (2011), Orléan (2011), Keen (2011), and Gaulejac (2005).
37 Becker (1976: 1) uses Lionel Robbins' definition of economics. See also Becker (1974).
38 Nelson (2014: 232).
39 Becker (1968: 41). Quoted in Nelson (2014: 172).
40 Nelson (2014: 177). See Becker (1981, 1992).
41 Foucault's (2004) famous insistence on neoliberalism as a regime based on generalised competition and the transformation of social life (including subjects) into an entrepreneurial form is fundamentally based on the part of Becker's work that was available to him in the late 1970s.
42 Coleman (1990). See Caillé (2006) and more generally Bevort and Lallement (2006).
43 See his seminal article Becker 'A Theory of Social Interactions' (1974).
44 Rawls (1971). For a discussion on Rawls' utilitarianism, see Dzimira (1998) and Chanial (2001).
45 For presentations and critical discussions of these currents, see namely Godbout (2007).
46 Caillé (1981).
47 Stark and Bainbridge (1980, 1987).
48 Caillé (2005a: 90). See also Caillé (1981).
49 On the anti-utilitarian stance at the heart of the ambition of classical sociology, see Laval (2001).
50 Bourdieu (1980). My emphasis.
51 Bourdieu (1980: 57). Quoted in Caillé (2005a: 90).
52 This is how Bourdieu reconciles his theory of action with his theory of social reproduction: the self-interest of those with most power accounts for class domination. The poor and marginalized are equally self-interested; they only lack the power to impose their tastes on the higher classes.
53 On Bourdieu and neoliberalism, see Laval (2018).
54 Caillé's (1981) article is foundational of this critique. Founded the same year, MAUSS stands for *Mouvement anti-utilitariste en science sociale* (anti-utilitarian movement in social science) and has developed a critique of utilitarianism and a counter-proposition based on Marcel Mauss' *Essay on the Gift*.

The MAUSS publishes one of the most influential scientific journals in France as well as a book collection.
55 See Caillé (2014).
56 Gaulejac (2005: 27).
57 See Wee (1986), Frieden (2006), Eichengreen (2006), and Gauchet (2017).
58 Gaulejac (2005: 45).
59 Illouz (2007, 2008).
60 Gaulejac (2005).
61 Gaulejac (2005: 46). Gaulejac quotes Raymond Aron's (1968) definition of ideology. My translation.
62 Boltanski and Chiapello (1999), Gaulejac (2005).
63 Ampuja and Koivisto (2014: 458).
64 Munck (2005: 62). On Milton Friedman's personal involvement as a policy advisor to Pinochet, see Nelson (2014: 159).
65 Colàs (2005: 76).
66 Harvey (2005: 120).
67 Harvey (2005: 121).
68 Brenner, Peck and Theodore (2009: 213–4).
69 Brenner, Peck and Theodore (2009: 210).
70 Brenner, Peck and Theodore (2009: 184).
71 Crotty (2003: 361), quoted in Brenner, Peck, and Theodore (2009: 190).
72 Saad-Filho (2005: 114).
73 Brenner, Peck and Theodore (2009: 215). See also Munck (2005).
74 Hackworth (2007: 11).
75 Munck (2005: 63). The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), born in 1947, was accompanied by a sort of secretariat. The WTO, created in 1994, is infinitely more powerful, and is now 'the main mechanism through which the global-market is effectively regulated and disputes are resolved through a formalized system' (Munck 2005: 62), with respect to contract law, patents, and arbitration procedures. Its creation was negotiated by powerful states, contrary to the neoliberal *doxa* which presents it as spontaneously emerging from the free will of all parties.
76 See Duchastel (2004).
77 Saad-Filho (2005: 115).
78 Quoted in Shaikh (2005: 41).
79 Brenner, Peck and Theodore (2009: 184).
80 Brenner, Peck and Theodore (2009: 184).
81 Brenner, Peck and Theodore (2009: 184). Emphasis in original.
82 Brenner, Peck and Theodore (2009: 192).
83 Brenner, Peck and Theodore (2009: 192). The authors quote Gill (1995: 400).
84 Munck (2005: 60).
85 Hackworth (2007). The main actors in this case are the bond rating agencies that can award or punish 'good' (i.e. neoliberal compatible) governmentality. Saskia Sassen (1995) has written on the new centrality of 'global cities' in this new neoliberalised and financialised environment.
86 Munck (2005: 64).
87 Ban (2016: 10).
88 Ban (2016: 15).
89 Rocca (1994: 47). My translation from the French.
90 Bayart (1994: 20).
91 Bayart (1994: 18).
92 Connell and Dados (2014: 122).
93 Connell and Dados (2014: 129).
94 Connell and Dados (2014: 118).

95 Mittermaier (2013: 275).
96 Saad-Filho (2005), Connell and Dados (2014).
97 Connell and Dados (2014: 133).
98 The following two paragraphs are reworked versions of a section initially published in Gauthier, Martikainen, and Woodhead (2013a: 16–7).
99 Duchastel (2004).
100 Duchastel (2004: 22).
101 Sorensen and Torfing (2005: 197). Quoted in Martikainen (2013a). See also Martikainen (2013b).
102 Duchastel (2004: 21).
103 Duchastel (2004: 43–4).
104 Rosanvallon (1989).
105 Portier (2008). See also Foucault (2004).
106 Fleury (2015).
107 Polanyi (2001). See also Slater and Tonkiss (2001).
108 Sassen (1995: 3).
109 Sassen (2014).
110 Sassen (1995).
111 Munck (2005: 61).
112 Munck (2005: 63).
113 Brenner, Peck, and Theodore (2009: 194).
114 Duchastel (2004: 39).
115 See Pech (2004).
116 Brenner, Peck, and Theodore (2009: 193).
117 Munck (2005: 66), Ampuja and Koivisto (2014: 458).
118 Munck (2005: 64).
119 Munck (2005: 66), Slater and Tonkiss (2001), Bauman (2007), Gauthier (2008b, 2012a, 2014b, 2015), Gauthier, Martikainen and Woodhead (2013b).
120 See Duchastel (2004).
121 Connell and Dados (2014: 118).
122 Robertson (1992: 53).
123 Bourdieu (1999: 2). Quoted in Munck (2005: 65). Emphasis in original.
124 Munck (2005: 65).
125 Brenner, Peck and Theodore (2009: 214).
126 Munck (2005: 65).
127 Bohle and Gerskovits (2012: 18).
128 Quoted in Harvey (2005: 23).
129 Rosanvallon (1989: vii).
130 Portier (2008: 181).

5 From consumption to consumerism

It seems obvious that we live in consumer societies, in the sense that consumption plays an important part in our daily lives.[1] Yet as ubiquitous as it may be, consumption has been a peculiarly neglected theme in social sciences.[2] While mass consumption and mass commodities were making their ascent in the formative phase of anthropology and sociology, the topic remained marginal in these disciplines. According to Miller, by the 1970s: 'Outside of the commercially oriented literature and some esoteric modelling in economics, almost nothing was written about consumption in any of the humanities or social sciences,' especially when set in contrast with 'the level of research on [...] production and labor.'[3] Social analysis has been shaped by a productivist bias that has contributed to downplay the importance of consumption:

> production is generally assumed to be socially, ethically and methodologically primary, as source of value, as providing the underlying structure of distribution of both goods and incomes and as historically prior to modern consumption (as in the idea that an industrial revolution preceded commercial and consumer ones). Hence, consumption is often seen as a derived or secondary phenomenon, with a low explanatory value.[4]

As with popular culture and mass media, consumption has been deemed trivial, superficial, and feminine, and therefore not a serious and worthy object of scientific interest.

How did modern consumption come to be, and what are its specificities? What is the importance and nature of consumption today, and what is its role and place within the logics of modern capitalism? What theoretical outlooks are better adjusted to understand this emergence and these dynamics? What does it mean to say that we now live in consumer societies? And finally, what is the relevance of consumption and consumerism in non-Western countries? In order to address these questions, this chapter starts by examining how political economy treats the issue of consumerism,

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as well as the major social scientific theories. By revisiting our conceptions of modernity and rehabilitating the importance of emotions in the Enlightenment, it appears that Romanticism provides the keys for understanding how modern consumption became emancipated from traditional and Christian morality and could develop in tune with the efflorescence of the ethic of authenticity. A brief history of modern consumption shows how post-war affluence led to the cultural revolution of the 1960s and the massification of this ethic of authenticity across all social classes. What follows then is a discussion on the suitable theoretical framework for understanding consumption and consumerism, in tune with the developments within the field of marketing.

Consumption in the perspective of political economy

It is pertinent to first see how the standard model of political economy understands consumption. In this tradition:

> The consumer is the hero of the ideal liberal relation between individual and society: consumers are private individuals rationally pursuing their self-defined interests through a mechanism (the market) that socially coordinates individuals' actions without compromising the autonomy of their choices.[5]

This scenario rests on the assumption that people are essentially *homo oeconomicus*—rational, maximising, and undetermined individuals pursuing their self-interests—who know what they want before they enter the market. The conflicting interests between buyers and sellers who want to get the most out of the transaction find a spontaneous and optimal form of harmonisation through the mechanism of the market. In the words of Slater:

> social coordination through the market is achieved when all individuals, with their disparate desires, rationally orient themselves to the common denominator of *price*. […] Price is not, for liberal economic thought, a reflection of the "value" of goods: this is regarded as a metaphysical concept. Price is simply a compromise between the agendas of wants followed by each private individual. […] All questions are levelled to that: what will it cost?[6]

Neoclassical theory supposes that individual preferences, privately formulated and dependent on insatiable need, are prior to the market and are as such unquestionable. Preferences aggregate as demand which is believed to automatically discipline the behaviour of firms who must 'march in close step with the marginal utility calculations of those individuals in order to

stay in business.'[7] As we have seen: 'Utility is defined simply as the capacity of an object to satisfy a desire. The nature of the desire is irrelevant: utility simply represents the abstract, empty desire-satisfying attribute of a good.'[8] Utility, then,

> is the core of formal concern with how we calculate in pursuing our interests rather than a substantive concern with what those interests are or how they came to be. The multiplicity and complexity of human desires is replaced by a single desire: that for utility; it replaces the variety of social motives with the single, and individual, self-interested motive of "maximizing utility." In a sense, it replaces "society" and "culture" (the substantive character of human wants in particular ways of life) with "reason," with abstract calculation and with quantification.[9]

Liberal economic theory therefore casts consumption as demand, while production and distribution make up offer within a purely formal model guided by instrumental rationality. What it has to say about consumer motivations is tautological: All acts of purchase are self-interested and rational, and individuals want something because they purchase it. Reversely, we know that something has utility because someone buys it. This theory says nothing about needs but simply infers the presence or absence of needs if people proceed to purchase.[10] While preferences and needs are the motors of this formal model, neoclassical theory has little to say about them. It simply presupposes that individuals are inherently able to hierarchise their preferences with respect to available resources.[11] While individual choice is at the centre of liberalism and political economy's moral and social world, 'it is something they can say very little about: we do not get to see individuals coming to formulate their desires and interests, only the way in which they calculatedly pursue them.'[12] This conception is coherent with Liberalism's main concern: Personal liberty as absolute sovereignty, privacy, and self-determination. Talking about what individuals want and why would mean impeding on individual liberty. As Slater puts it: 'Liberalism [...]*cannot* say much about actual consumption; but it also *will* not.'[13]

Political economy has therefore very little to say about the specificity of *modern* consumption because the standard model is assumed to be ahistorical and valid for all of mankind. Actual consumption, however, does not present itself according to a purely formal model of rationality but rather *substantively*—i.e. in given socially and culturally determined contexts. As consumers,

> we relate particular desires and acts to particular values and reasons. Substantive rationality is very much cultural thinking: in the case of consumer culture we think about needs and goods in terms of their meaning within a specific way of life, values and social relations.[14]

Political economy's dismissal of social determinations and cultural contexts, as well as subjective significations and motivations, makes its model of formal rationality unfit for thinking modern consumption. As a leading consumer research scholar writes: 'Anyone who has done the groceries at least once in his life intuitively understands the limits of this rational optimisation of utility approach.'[15] The formal rationality model, in the end, is fundamentally prescriptive rather than descriptive of actual consumption.

Classic theories of consumption and their limitations

Three broad theses have emerged in order to answer how capitalism managed to overrule the traditional laws of conservatism to unleash the insatiability of needs and lust for the new. The first, that of neoclassical political economy, assumes that needs and desires emerge independently and spontaneously since humans naturally desire goods if they are made available. In this understanding, the problem is scarcity, and the conditions for the take-off of modern consumption are entirely determined by the increase in productive capacities as a result of rationalisation and technological progress. Once the quantity of goods is increased and feeds the market of commodities, entirely sovereign subjects are 'free to choose' amongst the bounty according to their preferences and utility calculations (what will provide the most pleasure).

In sharp opposition, the Marx-inspired school of 'critical theory' and its postmodern forwarders (such as Baudrillard) have systematically denounced consumption as a vehicle for domination, alienation, and conformity. In this perspective, the modern subject is manipulated and alienated by capitalism's opium-like ideology, and lost in the void of consumerism's 'political economy of the sign.'[16] Capitalism is an autonomous system that imposes itself on individuals, fragments society, and obliterates the very possibility of meaning.

A third thesis, championed in different versions by Georg Simmel, Werner Sombart, and Thorsten Veblen, suggests that the motor of consumption is the emulation of aristocratic consumption by the bourgeoisie, followed, in turn, by the middle and lower classes.[17] Emulation is seen as a natural psycho-sociological mechanism responsible for the rise of consumption practices and its formation into a social value through a trickle-down effect that seeps through the sediments of a pyramidal society. For Veblen, emulation, 'conceived of as competition for status and as envy,' serves a game of 'social distinction and the reproduction of hierarchies of taste.'[18] It follows that only the highest social classes are empowered to create fashions.

All of these theses are problematic and insufficient. In a nutshell, neoclassical economic theory leaves the motivations and personal meanings of actors in the shadows, and completely dismisses social and cultural determinations. Political economy claims to be a-historical and universal,

and therefore fails to provide keys for understanding the rise of *modern* consumption and its undeniable specificities. Gains in productivity alone cannot explain levels of consumption in such a mechanical manner, or else over-production crises would be unheard of or extremely limited in time. Mainstream economics pretend to solve this issue by going around it and resorting to Hayek-style equilibrium models, according to which equilibrium is a process that tends towards equilibrium and will eventually get there if no one interferes (especially the state). Over-production crises are therefore adjustment phases at the end of which consumer demand and production inevitably harmonise. The problem with such a postulate is that it is unfalsifiable and unverifiable. It is constitutively tautological.[19] Furthermore, the unharnessed pursuit of satisfaction through the consumption of goods is far from being a universal anthropological law. In the West as elsewhere, prior to modernity, surpluses were neither invested to generate more profit, nor were they sought in order to acquire commodities.

The alienation thesis also fails to explain how consumption became a socially and culturally *desirable* activity, beyond totalising assumptions about manipulation, ignorance, and false conscience. The Marxian thesis inhibits any attempt at seizing consumption as a meaningful and desirable form of symbolic production since it is cast as inherently brutalising. Social actors' claims of finding meaning in and through consumption are automatically denounced as an illusion and a lure on the part of individuals that are unconscious of their automatisms and conditioning. In the end, the Marxian perspective is fraught with an a priori negative normative judgement that is symmetrical to the optimism of liberal theory.

The emulation thesis, meanwhile, 'has the limit of reducing consumption to one social logic alone.'[20] It coils consumption around a natural psychological disposition, mimesis, which cannot account for the historical specificity of the rise of consumption as a major social practice. It fails to account for the various symbolic significations and associations that are involved in consumption and connect goods and services to belonging and social groups. The importance of tastes and styles in the processes of fashion refers to more complex dynamics of identification and counter-identification—for instance, conformity to (obligation) *and* deviation from (liberty) social norms. Contrary to the emulation theory, the bourgeoisie did not challenge the aristocratic ethic by mimicking the latter's consumption habits: It rather opposed its own brand of consumption as of the eighteenth century.

In many respects, Pierre Bourdieu's theory of consumption presents a refined version of Veblen's, coupled with a Marxist influence.[21] In *La distinction*, Bourdieu argues that social differences are *reproduced* through consumption and taste, rather than *affirmed*, with the upper middle class (the bourgeoisie) now playing the role of the aristocracy in the trickle-down process. Yet, the processes of taste and fashion are more complex than this

purely descending dynamic. The valorisation of the worker's style in the early twentieth century, especially in the socialist and communist ranks and amongst intellectuals, contradicts this model. Consider also the emergence of subcultural fashions such as bikers, rockers, punks, and hip hop, which were born in variously inferior social strata and became fashionable in the upper classes and permeated *haute couture*. Bourdieu's theory does not allow us to seize the personal and potentially idiosyncratic dimensions of consumption, and its 'function as support for the formation of [...] identity'[22] beyond social reproduction. Finally, Bourdieu's theory gives a good picture of early twentieth-century French consumption (and France's rigid class system), but fails to acknowledge the diffraction of social classes into a more complex field of identity niches that no longer fits the working/middle/bourgeois class model.

A brief history of Western consumption

So much for the leading narratives about consumption, but how did it emerge as a dominant aspect of modern societies? The classic perspective on consumption is that the industrial revolution, and therefore the development of modern industrial production, preceded the consumer revolution. This view has been challenged, with some authors even insisting that modern consumption preceded the industrial revolution. I choose to side with Don Slater, who sees the productive and consumer revolutions coalescing somewhere in the eighteenth century, as part of a wider

> *commercial revolution* in which concepts of trade, money, new financial instruments and moveable property, contracts and orientation to commercial exploitation of ever more extensive and impersonal markets generated a vast range of new notions and activities which we deem modern.[23]

The roots of this transformation lie in the surge of trade and commerce in the sixteenth century. By the eighteenth century, exotic goods originating from the colonies were widespread, and new categories of goods appeared (curtains, mirrors, china, cups, clothing, new types of tables and chairs, etc.). Joyce Appleby describes how, already in the 1690s, the East India Company was involved in creating and sustaining new fads of 'epidemic proportion' for new, colourful Indian fabrics that 'slid quickly down the social ladder, placing workingmen and women in a new light as consumers.'[24] Such consumption reached down to the lower working and even peasant classes, as 'an impressive range of relatively cheap goods'[25] were made available. A new world of goods thus penetrated the everyday lives of people beyond the limits of the aristocratic elite and the bourgeoisie, and the infrastructures, networks, and organisations required for these new practices of shopping, advertising, and marketing were already in place.

The turnover of styles and the desire for 'the new' accompanied the important social transformations of the time: 'the appearance of fashion marks a moment in which the fixity of ranks and status [was] breaking down.'[26] In this new world of market-based exchange and consumption, it was no longer a traditional status that regulated the access to goods, but rather access to financial resources.[27]

Modern consumption is central to the dynamics of capitalism as much as production. The modern attitude towards consumption is the product of a rupture with the traditional Christian morality, which refrained its expansion outside of the sumptuous expenses of the aristocracy in the *Ancien régime*. In the same way that humans are not naturally inclined to seek profit and reinvest it in order to make more profit, as Weber aptly pointed out, the propensity to consume in order to satisfy theoretically insatiable needs is not a trans-historical and transcultural fact, despite political economy's claims to the contrary. It is a social and cultural trait or habitus that had to be learned:

> much evidence exists—from many different sectors of the population and many different periods up to the present—that a major struggle for and within capitalism focused on cajoling people not to stop working and enjoy free time independent of commodity consumption once their needs are satisfied, but rather to want more that they will continue working in order to buy more commodities.[28]

The dynamics of modern fashion, with its incessant craving for the new, collided with traditional society's resistance to change.

Modernity gave way to full-fledged consumer cultures in the second half of the twentieth century, when consumption as an ethos and cultural ideology became dominant across Western societies. Yet, the most formidable developments took place amongst the nineteenth-century bourgeoisie, for whom patterns and practices of consumption were defining. The bourgeois world was indeed defined by consumption. As Hobsbawm writes:

> objects were more than merely utilitarian or symbols of status and achievement. They had value in themselves as expressions of personality, as both the programme and the reality of bourgeois life, even as *transformers* of man. In the home all of these were expressed and concentrated.[29]

Commodities expressed the higher and '*spiritual* aspirations' of life through their beauty, or 'represented these aspirations by their very existence, as did books and musical instruments.'[30] The late nineteenth century saw the emergence of a middle class made of prosperous peasants and skilled workers who could save money enough to purchase luxury items, for instance in the new department stores that burgeoned across Europe and America.[31]

Rapid urbanisation accompanied the prosperity of the 1890–1913 period, fuelling the development of consumerism. Urbanisation operates a rupture with the countryside and its traditional bonds, mores, and values. It also makes it impossible to produce first necessity foods and goods, which must be purchased. As Hobsbawm writes: 'cities turn citizens into consumers.'[32] In this period, real wages rose, pulling even the poorer segments of society into consuming more than the strict necessary. While the rise of the masses produced anguish amongst the political elites, salesmen, on the other hand, 'hailed it.'[33] Mass production systems of manufacture were redirected towards producing mass consumer goods for the household, versus machinery and infrastructural material. Consumption became a social norm and was 'assimilated into everyday life.'[34]

Moving forward, the

> 1920s was probably the first decade to proclaim a generalized ideology of affluence. Above all, it promoted a powerful link between everyday consumption and modernization. From the 1920s, the world was to be modernized partly *through* consumption; consumer culture itself was dominated by the idea that everyday life could and should be *modern* [...] The burgeoning advertising and marketing of this era were selling not just consumer goods, but consumerism itself as the shining path to modernity: they incited their publics to modernize themselves, modernize their homes, their means of transport.[35]

Everyday household life was mechanised through goods like washing machines, vacuum cleaners, fridges, telephones, and cars, acquired with the help of new consumer credit schemes. According to Slater:

> The 1920s was probably the first era in which modernity was widely held to be a state that *had already been reached* by the population in general [...] in the consuming activities of the middle class the ultra-modern future was already [...] beginning to happen.[36]

Massive amounts of affordable and standardised goods were sold through a geographically and socially ever-expanding market to a population that was 'increasingly *seen* as consumers'[37] rather than as belonging to a given class or gender. Mass production was geared towards mass consumption of standardised and anonymous goods distributed to 'relatively undifferentiated national and global markets and a mapping of consumers in terms of highly aggregated demographics.'[38] Coupled with Keynesian economic managerialism, intensive, rationalised, and increasingly automated Taylorist and Fordist modes of production brought a stable affluence that also carried 'the seeds of its own destruction,'[39] namely through the conformity that it involved and would be contested by the very individualistic trends that drove it and the ideology of modernisation.

Romanticism, or the spirit of consumerism

How did consumption grow to be a determining factor in modern life? In *The Romantic Ethic and the Spirit of Consumerism*, Colin Campbell provides a complement to Weber's famous thesis. Campbell argues that because Weber was concerned with the question of the origins of capitalist *production*, he neglected the Pietistic strand of Protestantism and its role in the emergence, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, of Sentimentalism and modern consumption in its wake.[40] The Protestant ethic described by Weber emphasises rationality, instrumentality, industry, efficiency, empiricism, success, and was suspicious of pleasure over comfort. Yet, another ethic developed in parallel that induced the rise of Sentimentalism, in which emotions were valued, thematised, categorised, narrated, cultivated, and regulated. This current was immensely popular and widely disseminated, and contributed to turn emotion into a moral value, in relation to notions such as Beauty and the Good.[41]

A quick look at modern political and moral philosophy attests how emotions were, alongside rationality, a major concern and a subject of philosophical enquiry. The most telling example in our context is that of Adam Smith, whose *Theory of Moral Sentiments* was published in 1759, well before his *Enquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Riches of Nations*. It also constituted, in the appreciation of its author, his most important life work. While *Riches of Nation* is dedicated to the investigation of formal rationality in the domain of economics, the *Theory of Moral Sentiments* contains a wider discussion on what in those days were called 'passions.' Smith argued that 'sympathy,' what we would today call empathy, meaning the capacity to feel what others feel, was, along with self-interest, the principle that intervened in the inner calculus that produces our moral judgements—save in economic affairs, where self-interest was believed to rule supreme.

Sentimentalism was largely relayed by the cultural production destined to the bourgeoisie; the market for novels, for example, literally exploded in this period. The cultivation of emotions and rationalism are therefore the two complementary ethical poles of modernity. They developed *côte à côte*, in the same social milieus, in the same families (think of Kant's parents), even in the same persons.[42] It is easy to find both reason and sentiment being celebrated by eighteenth-century authors, well beyond Protestant circles. French Encyclopaedist Denis Diderot (1813–1884), for instance, is mostly known for his celebration of the enlightening virtues of Reason against superstition and obscurantism, but his personal correspondence is filled with marvel over the beauty and power of the emotions he observes emerging within himself and others.[43]

These considerations oblige us to review our conceptions of modernity. The Great Century of the Enlightenment, the eighteenth century, was not only, as we are used to imagining, the century of Reason: It was also that of Sentiment.[44] Paradigmatically, if reason and order were called upon to reign

over politics, morality, and economics in the public sphere, sensitivity and sensibility were to reign in the private sphere and interpersonal relations.[45] Sentimentalism is a profoundly modern quality, and not some stubborn resilience of the Old World, nor an après-coup reaction against the perceived abuses of Reason, as it is often portrayed.[46] The dual cult of Passions and Reason developed in a bourgeoisie in full ascension, from whence it spread to the rest of society. Faith and spirituality also demanded the expression of emotions, and melancholy was abundantly seen as the exterior sign of an interior orientation towards the divine, something which J.S. Bach's (1685–1750) cantatas and oratorio so vividly illustrate. Faith and emotion became linked as religion was purified of its 'magical' elements (in a way, the valuation of emotion permitted this process). Meanwhile, belief in Hell and the Devil receded as the figure of God became increasingly Deist and cosmological.[47]

Seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Sentimentalism gave way to Romanticism at the turn of the nineteenth century. Romanticism is a cultural movement more than it is a unified system of ideas. It celebrated and explored impulses towards chaos, rebellion, disorder, creativity, and imagination, all of which were seen as means of expression and liberation from exogenous constraints. While Kant's (1724–1804) call for personal emancipation from external authorities, political and religious, entailed an introspection that made use of reason,[48] Romanticism kept the objective while modifying the means. Romanticism is the product of the modern invention of interiority and the valuation of emotion as an expression of this interiority. Yet, this exaltation of emotionality is *contemporary* to the expansion of instrumental rationality, as two faces of the same coin. To the utilitarian valorisation of comfort and calculating egotism, Romanticism opposes pleasure, *jouissance*, evasion, fantasy, melancholy, sadness, dissatisfaction with the world, irrationality, excess, strangeness, curiosity, reverie, and manifests interest for mysticism and exoticism. The Romantic divine is depersonalised; it is a supernatural force present in the natural world as well as in each person, in the form of a unique Self endowed with its own genius. Charles Taylor argues that this period gave rise to what he calls the 'ethic of authenticity,'[49] which he defines as

> the understanding of life that emerged with the Romantic expressivism of the late eighteenth century, that each of us has his or her own way of realizing one's own humanity, and that it is important to find and live out one's own, as against surrendering to conformity with a model imposed from outside, by society, or the previous generation, or religious or political authority.[50]

Parallel to these developments, the importance of self-image expressed by commodities, clothing, and other accessories grew amongst the bourgeoisie. The Romantic ethic inadvertently provided a moral justification for consumption as the satisfaction of desire and a means of self-expression

via fashion and style. As the Puritan ethic inadvertently favoured the systematic reinvestment of profits in order to boost production, the Romantic ethic served as a support for the development of a hedonist orientation that contributed to the rise of consumption as a support for self-expression. Romanticism and consumerism are not bound by historical causality inasmuch as by the manner that the Romantic ethic promoted the development of an expressive type of consumption by raising the moral barriers that impeded it from being justified and desirable. Hence, Campbell talks of an 'elective affinity' between the Romantic ethic and the spirit consumerism. Through the valuation of the new, of creation, and the expression of emotions, by opposing conventions as well as moral and social rules inherited from the past, Romanticism, and Sentimentalism before it, contributed to legitimate consumption as a desirable cultural practice, and eventually its rise to dominance as a defining trait of modern culture.[51]

The way that Campbell relates the rational and the emotional poles amongst the trend-setting bourgeoisie is very helpful for understanding the dynamics of capitalism and the ways in which each side of the production/consumption couple developed in tension, yet coextensively:

> The cultural logic of modernity is not merely that of rationality as expressed in the activities of calculation and experiment; it is also that of passion, and the creative dreaming born of longing. Yet, more crucial than either is the tension generated between them, for it is upon this that the dynamism of the West ultimately depends.[52]

This dynamism that emerges from the tension between 'dream and reality, pleasure and utility'[53] continues to irrigate capitalism today and is central to its dissemination and acculturation across the globe. All in all, 'modern individuals inhabit not just an "iron cage" of economic necessity [Weber], but a castle of romantic dreams, striving through their conduct to turn the one into the other.'[54]

The 1960s' cultural-consumerist revolution

The post-war years saw the acme of the state's hold on society, including in economic affairs. In Western countries, post-war reconstruction was also accompanied by a set of traditional values that included duty, sacrifice, patriotism, respect for authority and institutions, and liberty through the abnegation of the individual in favour of the collective. As Jean-Paul Willaime argues, life in the 1960s was steeped in nineteenth-century cultural values, institutions, and social realities in many respects. Western societies were industrialised and democratised; yet, the division of labour, the health, social service and education systems, religion, and perhaps especially the familial structure was still largely that of the nineteenth century.[55] The processes of industrialisation and urbanisation had profoundly shaken earlier institutionalisations and

social structures; yet, it is only as of the second half of the 'short twentieth century' that the modernisation of Western societies was consummated.[56] What started to emerge in the 1950s, and literally erupted in the 1960s, was a conflict over values, which in retrospect appears as 'a cathartic and tilting moment'[57] that ushered in hedonism and a libertarian conception of individual freedom into the mainstream. The driver for such a cultural revolution was a new social category, youth, which had been forming since the last quarter of the nineteenth century but only took on its historical significance with the Baby Boom generation's coming to maturity.[58]

A new phenomenon appeared in the late 1950s that changed the aesthetics of Western urban landscapes: Youth subcultures (e.g. Skinheads, Mods, Hippies, etc.), which 'provided an answer to the problem of alienation'[59] and the meaning of life, as well as rituals for the passage to adulthood. Although critical of mainstream consumer culture (as a rule, subcultural identities are constructed *against* the depreciated figure of the mainstream[60]), 'the very emergence of a generational youth identity in the mid-1950s was contingent on the new availability of consumer goods and new media technologies.'[61] Music, which is central to youth subcultures and is a powerful means of resonating emotions, was disseminated through radio and television, film and magazines, and penetrated evermore deeply into the intimacy of everyday life. From music to clothes, 'consumer goods were employed [by youth and subcultures] as a resource in the production of identities and forms of sociality that somehow resisted or evaded the code of value of "mass society".'[62] Consumer goods were at the heart of their cultural politics:

> What the nation, the party and the union had done for the politicized working class of the early years of the century, consumer goods did for their grandchildren: it gave a sense of coherence, of being part of a movement, a set of common rituals, the mean to perform a common identity.[63]

Yet as subcultures expressed rebellion and resistance,[64] their styles also inaugurated new market niches. With time, the music, entertainment, and clothing industry surveyed youth innovations, which provided lodes of authenticity, and acted upon them to segment and create markets.

The 1968 revolts 'articulated around a generational rupture'[65] that had a strong transnational aspect and pointed to 'the profound social and political contradictions that inhabited post-war industrial western societies.'[66] They introduced youth as a model of individual who intensifies the present. Expressive individualism was not only the cornerstone of the counterculture; it also penetrated deeply into the mainstream.[67] For those countries and regions that were lagging behind the metropolises and were still deeply rooted in conservatism, for example Switzerland, the 1960s wave was smaller; yet, its full effects were inevitably felt in the years or decade that followed.[68] A factor for this unprecedented penetration is media, namely

television. The cultural revolution was powerful because it was televised and relayed by radio, along with the music of the times. Youth especially learned that its revolt was not solitary: It was embedded in a new world time. Direct coverage catalysed the emotional dimension of the movement, made it into a spectacle and a drama, creating the irresistible feeling that 'something was happening.'

The 1960s relayed a critique of authority, duty, sacrifice, institutions, and reason that contributed to erode the foundations of the National-Statist regime and prepare the ground for the rise of the Global-Market one. In the words of sociologist Jean-Pierre Le Goff, the 1960s consecrated the death of the Old World and the birth of the New, and consumption was at the heart of these dynamics. Le Goff's account of the years leading to *Mai 68* in France[69] tells the story of a rapidly changing provincial life where traditional shops gave way to the enthusiasm of playing flipper in newly constructed shopping centres—the same process that keeps unrolling today in many parts of the world. The generation born after the Second World War was the first to live in a consumer culture and to ignore the privations that were the fate of many in past times.[70]

Charles Taylor stresses the importance of consumerism in the dynamics of the 'cultural revolution' of the 1960s and the penetration of the ethic of authenticity and expressivity in the social fabric:

> What is new is that this kind of [expressive] self-orientation seems to have become a mass phenomenon. Its most obvious external manifestation has perhaps been the consumer revolution. With post-war affluence, and the diffusion of what many had considered luxuries before, came a new concentration on private space, and the means to fill it, which began distending the relations of previously close-knit working-class or peasant communities, even of extended families. [...] People concentrated more on their own lives and those of their nuclear families. They moved to new towns or suburbs, lived more on their own, tried to make a life out of the ever-growing gamut of new goods and services on offer, from washing machines to packaged holidays, and the freer lifestyles they facilitated. The "pursuit of happiness" took on a new, more immediate meaning, with a growing range of easily available means. And in this newly individuated space, the customer was encouraged more and more to express her taste, furnishing her space according to her own needs and affinities, as only the rich had been able to do in previous eras.[71]

Marketing diffused a simplified expressivism, which, combined with management techniques, psychotherapies, and holistic spiritualities and therapies, urged every segment of society to 'find yourself,' 'realise yourself,' and 'develop your own unique potential.' Consumption resonates with expressive individualism as it proposes an indefinite array of goods and services

that serve as symbols and vehicles for the expression of the self. The development of consumer society increased the expressive value of objects to the detriment of their purely functional dimension (e.g. class distinction and social reproduction).[72]

The 1960s gave birth to a critique of Fordist–Taylorist capitalism as disenchanting, inauthentic, and alienating. Meanwhile, workers protested against brutish tasks, lack of recognition, misery, oppression, and inequality.[73] The countercultural critique set itself against mass, standardised consumption based on the reproduction of instituted social roles and social classes, and championed romantic and expressive values: Creativity, mobility, freedom, and the invention of a bohemian lifestyle. Yet, history shows how capitalism endogenised this critique and re-founded itself on an expressive basis, as consumption evolved into a subtler and more complex set of social categories ('segmentation variables') than the former gender and gross class distinctions.[74] Upgraded communication, management, and marketing technologies made it possible to coordinate outsourced production in real-time in response to consumption patterns. Meanwhile, the new global and financialised capitalist economy became tied to lifestyles and niche identities rather than broad-ranging cut-ups. In so doing, capitalism recuperated the romantic-expressivist critique and turned it into a powerful sales argument. Expressive individualism, along with its ethic of authenticity, was digested by consumer capitalism and infused into the mainstream. In this twilight, values of honour and duty eclipsed, while those of hedonism and expressivism rose.[75]

A society of identities: the politics of consumerism

The consumer revolution accomplished the 'massive subjective turn of modern culture' and introduced 'a new form of inwardness, in which we come to think of ourselves as beings with inner depths.'[76] While the nation had emerged as the 'natural,' preferred, and overarching identity over the course of modernity, the rise of consumerism coincides with its erosion as the basis for social solidarity, social unity, and common political projects, and the fragmentation of class and national identities into an array of particularistic identities.[77] This process of fragmentation has been noted by many scholars; yet, few have made the connection with the cultural politics of consumerism and the rise of the ethics of authenticity. Writing about the importance of fashion for the late nineteenth-century bourgeoisie, Hobsbawm argues that the 'most superficial phenomena are sometimes the most profound.'[78] Following this lead, Charles Taylor argues that the consumerist revolution of the second half of the twentieth century has had a determining impact on how the public sphere is constructed:

> I wear my own kind of hat, but in doing so I am displaying my style to all of you, and in this I am responding to your self-display, even as you

> will respond to mine. The space of fashion is one in which we sustain a language together of signs and meaning, which is constantly changing, but which at any moment is the background needed to give our gestures the sense they have.[79]

For Taylor, the massification of consumerism has shifted the constitution of the public sphere from one of 'common action' (organised in tension with a vertical expression of community embodied by the nation) into one of 'mutual display' and exhibition. In a consumer society, therefore, *visibility* becomes an imperative, and an objective in itself. It becomes a politic, and the grammar of the polity. To be visible is to exist, and to attract attention is to gain power.[80]

This explains why identity—personal and collective—becomes such a concern in consumer societies. Since it is no longer founded on inheritance or tradition, nor secured within the framework of the nation, identity becomes the object of an intense and continuous quest, as every outward sign becomes the means of its production. Yet, an expressive identity remains solipsistic and thus inefficient if it is not, in turn, *recognised* by one form or another of significant other(s) who become the 'co-determiners of the meanings of our actions.'[81] Cultural Studies have stressed the importance of style and fashion in the processes of identity construction and recognition.[82] Individual choices are not made in isolation, nor in relation to infinite possibilities, but rather in relation to a certain array of available and changing *styles*, according to a logic that some have called tribalism.[83] Styles constitute voluntary associations and symbolic communities which allow for recognition by those who share the same aesthetics, tastes, practices, worldviews, values, and beliefs, as well as by those who do not.

Expressive individualism cannot be understood as a form of narcissism, solipsism, or atomism. On the contrary, it comes with a heightened (almost frenetic) need for relationships and forms of community and belonging which provide recognition. Identity and belonging are two sides of a same coin, bound by the need for recognition.[84] One can immediately appreciate how media contributes to this cycle of expressivity and recognition within a social space constructed on mutual display.[85] Media becomes the main vehicle for the dissemination of styles and the expression of symbols of identity and adds an ever-expanding virtual social arena to the embodied space of everyday interaction.[86] Intensive mediatisation is therefore an integral feature of consumer societies and the *lifestylisation* of identities.[87]

Within classical sociology, lifestyles are seen as means of affirmation and differentiation of social status. Weber, for instance, writes about 'the distinctive style of life of specific status groups.'[88] This is also the basis for Bourdieu's stratified caption of lifestyles in *La Distinction*. Yet, Bourdieu did not apprehend the surge of the consumer revolution and the way that it

promotes 'individuality, self-expression, and a stylistic self-consciousness,' and not only class reproduction.[89] This shift in the meaning of lifestyle accompanied the expansion of the middle classes and the penetration of consumerism in the lower classes. According to Featherstone:

> The implication is that we are moving towards a society without fixed status groups in which the adoption of styles of life (manifest in choice of clothes, leisure activities, consumer goods, bodily dispositions) which are fixed to specific groups have been surpassed.[90]

Class identities have not vanished as much as they have been complexified in such a way as to elude rigid stratification models. Lifestyles continue to indicate social status, but 'it is clear that the game is more complex now.'[91] While the bourgeoisie was clearly the cultural initiator of the nineteenth century, innovations now emanate from the whole of society.[92] Lifestyles are even more important today since they are no longer class-based but the product of a more 'active stylization of life'[93] whose base materials are furnished by consumer culture.

Lifestyles materialise through consumer choices: 'The lifestyle is then the global result of an individual's value system, his attitudes and his modes of consumption.'[94] Lifestyle is both the means and the objective of self-realisation in consumer cultures: To find one's style, in tune with one's 'authentic self.' While they present themselves as the result of personal choice, lifestyles are not free from social determinations: They are the result of a *bricolage* within a determined set of possibilities that are socially and culturally shaped. They are modes of adhesions to collective identities made of values, tastes, and worldviews. Lifestyles compound ethical dimensions and social obligations, and are therefore not only expressions of free individual choices. They come with rules of conduct, a way of life, and an orientation for how one should behave. In sum, the concept of lifestyle shows how consumerism carries cultural politics that emphasise issues of identity, belonging, and ethics. Who I am? What is my tribe? And how do I behave?

Marketing: from standardised goods to selling authenticity

The history of marketing provides an interesting case from which to build an empirically grounded theory of consumption. Marketing was born at the turn of the twentieth century, when brand names became distributed nationwide, replacing the anonymous bulk goods of the local shopkeeper.[95] The personalised rapport between the consumer and the shopkeeper was then replaced by a direct rapport between the former and a branded product. Celia Lury distinguishes four periods in the history of marketing. In the first period, which extends to 1925, marketing emphasised the product's features (price, quality, function) within a functional frame in order to give *reasons* to consumers for buying certain products. This type of

product-bound advertisement catered to a utilitarian type of rationality, as proposed by neoclassical political economy. This period did not last long, though, as the following 1925–1945 period was characterised by a shift 'from the feature of a product to its benefits for the consumer.'[96] This included

> the non-practical aspects of use, as there was an increasing emphasis on what the product could *mean* for the consumers. The product itself became more abstract, representing a value achieved in use rather than a thing valued in its own right.[97]

The third period, which stretches from 1945 to 1965, was characterised by the personalisation of advertising and the representation of various motivations for consuming, 'including the desire for social approval, pride in ownership, guilt and anxiety. Social interaction was shown to flow though the products people have, and the product itself might be personified, taking on human characteristics,'[98] for example by becoming part of the family, or speaking directly to the potential consumer.

This personalisation period corresponds to the heights of mass production and mass consumption, according to the logics that the former ignites the latter. Yet, this period broke with what I call a Bourdieusian type of consumption, meaning largely structured by the distribution of economic and cultural resources, themselves determined by wage relation and social class. Marketers recognised that consumption does not automatically follow production (as the neoclassical model postulates) and that advertising is required to create new markets in the form of needs. Fordism was therefore not only a 'particular organization of production': It was 'combined with persuasion to spend and included policies to stimulate demand though a combination of low prices, high wages, advertising and the lifting of regulations to make consumer credit more easily available.'[99] In these heydays of the National-Statist era, patterns of production and consumption were heavily conditioned by the state, within the territories of national economies: 'Fordism was a combination of industry and state policies affecting both production and consumption in interrelated ways.'[100] Born in the US, these politics crossed the Atlantic and spread worldwide in industrialised countries after the Second World War. Consumption was more than ever a means of modernising every facet of life: One's home, one's travel, and perhaps especially, one's *self*. Yet, the model in this period was still largely linked to standardised products geared towards mass segments of the population according to genre and social class. The relatively high wages allowed for lowly skilled workers to access a bulging middle class, invalidating pyramidal representations of the social and challenging class identities. In the early 1970s though, it became evident that the system had attained its internal and external limits: Too much productivity, lowering prices, decline in growth, inflation, and saturating consumer markets.

These developments ushered in the fourth period identified by Lury: The current, post-Fordist and post-Taylorist phase, characterised by market segmentation and the development of lifestyle marketing. While Talcott Parsons could write 'in the 1940s that the consumer practices of American youth served to prepare them for adult (WASP, middle class) life, as youth culture replicated the values of adult society, this was no longer true in the 1970s.'[101] Rather, youth consumed to produce identities of their own, breaking with the cycles of tradition and linear social reproduction. As we saw earlier, the emerging counterculture voiced a vehement critique of Fordist mass consumption, dismissed as alienating and conformist. The Romantic ethic came to the fore in the form of a critique of capitalism, which reacted by absorbing it.[102] The so-called segment or niche marketing was no longer concerned with 'keeping up with the Joneses' but 'keeping different from the Joneses.'[103] These changes occurred while 'more global and more flexible techniques of production'[104] were found, linked to developments in computerisation and communication technologies, and the internationalisation of the market economy. Rather than producing large amounts of single, standardised products, companies could now react quickly to changes in demand. Large capital-owning companies started to outsource production, leading to an internationalised division of labour. Stuart Hall captures it as follows:

> more flexible, decentralized forms of labor process and work organization; decline of the old manufacturing base and the growth of the "sunrise," computer-based industries; the hiving off or contracting out of functions and services; a greater emphasis on *choice* and product differentiation, on marketing, packaging, and design, on *the "targeting" of consumers by lifestyle, taste and culture rather than by categories of social class*; a decline in the proportion of the skilled, male, manual working class, the rise of the service and white collar classes and the "feminization" of the work force; an economy dominated by the multinationals, with their own international division of labor and their *greater autonomy from nation-state control*; and the "globalization" of the new financial markets, linked by the communications revolution.[105]

In the post-Fordist capitalist system, 'the driving seat […] is no longer occupied by the engineers and production managers, by manufacturing or heavy industry, but rather by the marketing directors and design consultants, the retailers and the producers of "concepts".'[106] For Martyn Lee, the passage from Fordism to post-Fordism

> contributed to a change in the commodity form and a fluidization of consumption, with a diversification of individual consumption times and spaces and the freeing up of the previously static and relatively fixed spatial and temporal dimensions of social life.[107]

Sparked by marketers, manufacturers started to personalise consumption and consciously aim to relate products to experiences. They also shifted their focus from promoting ownership, which was a remnant of neoclassical political economy: Owning goods in order to satisfy needs. Rather, companies began to view their mission as providing *access* to a product, hence the development all sorts of leasing and credit schemes. At the heart of these developments lies the growing importance of the *brand* over that of the product, and the consequent efflorescence of *branding*. This evolution in marketing was matched by similar evolutions in management. While Taylorist management was based on discipline, another vision developed in the 1960s in which the goal was to work with the freedom of the employee, 'aligning his or her self-realization with the interests of the organization.'[108]

As early as the 1950s, marketing prophets inaugurated a—still ongoing—revolution within their discipline by indexing it to the new standard of self-realisation. As the bulk of society became middle class, market researcher Pierre Martineau was amongst the first to proclaim (in 1957) that social status was no longer as important as was the fact that 'small, insignificant everyday consumer decisions [...] function as a vehicle of this newfound desire for individuality.'[109] In 1949, psychoanalyst and marketer Ernest Dichter called for 'advertising to give products a tangible experiential component.'[110] In a 1965 article in the *Harvard Business Review*, Dichter heralded the new standard and stated that it was no longer 'how long the washer will last, but what it will do for your soul.'[111] In order to make this revolution happen, he wrote:

> marketing had to abandon the idea that consumers made rational decisions in relation to a socially given hierarchy of needs or values. Rather, in this new area of self-expression human desire was best regarded as plastic and open [as something to be *produced*]. Indeed people lived in a world of goods to which they were emotionally attached and to which they owed large parts of their own personality [...] It was to these unrecognized, irrational, emotional bonds that progressive market researchers now had to turn.[112]

Exit neoclassical political economy and theories of Rational Choice, consumption from now on 'should be understood as a constructive practice by means of which the consumer produces his or her self, through more or less intimate liaisons with different products.'[113] In an influential article entitled 'Symbolism and Life Style,' Sydney Levy wrote that 'a consumer's personality can be seen as the peculiar total of the products he consumes.'[114] Logically, marketing research was to seek to programme this consumerist self-production.[115]

A more than significant agent as of this period was television, which very rapidly became one of *the* most important consumer goods. Television ownership rates rose extremely rapidly in most industrialised countries to include almost every household. Television, which was in this period strictly

regulated by the state, with low numbers of channels and the importance of public broadcast, unified the whole of society with shared references. It was the first time that the nation was represented to itself in such a way. It was formative of the nations' self-conscience. It flattened out differences between regionalisms, including those of language, and acted as a unifier. It was also a powerful means for the penetration of consumer culture in the whole of society, in everyday life. Television presented goods (in shows as well as in commercials) 'as natural parts of social processes'[116] and environments: 'Television efficiently inserted goods to the signifying networks of media culture, and weaved those networks into the environment of everyday life.'[117]

The evolution of consumer culture followed that of television: Publicity according to broad segments in the early years, with increasing differentiation, until media deregulation and the ensuing multiplication of niche channels (according to lifestyles) in the 1980s to today, accompanied by the crisis of public broadcast and the rise of satellite transmission, digital media, and the Internet. Post-Fordist marketing disaggregates markets into niches and lifestyles by shifting the attention towards 'cultural meanings which link a range of goods and activities into a coherent image.'[118] In so doing, it not only identifies existing lifestyles (hence the importance of subcultures as producers of new styles and new authenticities) but also produces them, 'by organizing consumers according to meaningful patterns, constructed and distributed through design, advertising and the media.'[119] Post-Fordist marketing inaugurates the current era as it enacts a paradigm shift from product management to brand management. Brand management differs significantly from Fordist–Taylorist management:

> It is not about imposing ways of using goods, or behaving or thinking as a consumer. Rather, it is about proposing goods as tools, or building blocks whereby consumers can create their own meanings. What people pay for, the idea goes, is not so much the brand itself as what they can produce with it: what they can *become* with it. To quote one successful American pop-management book: "the power of any brand is simply how your associations with it make you feel."[120]

In accordance with Foucault's writings on advanced liberal governance, brands 'work with the freedom of consumers, they say not "You Must!" but "You May!"'[121]

Neoliberalism: the consumer-citizen and the branding of everyday life

Neoliberalism and neoliberal reforms had a direct impact on the development of branded capitalism in at least two ways. The first is linked to the neoliberal promotion of consumer sovereignty (the 'freedom to choose') as the highest expression of modern individual liberty, and 'the link between freedom and dynamism.'[122]

As Don Slater writes: 'The model of consumer choice came to be seen as the most adequate model for *all* forms of modern citizenship and social action, the market as the only means of social coordination that secured both freedom and progress.'[123] Neoliberalism means that political freedom is identified with consumer choice.[124] The collapse of the communist German Democratic Republic in 1989 and the ensuing reunification of Germany testify to the speed and depth of this ideology: In the aftermath of the fall of the Berlin Wall, 'civil society meant consumer society, civic freedom the freedom to shop freely.'[125] This was not limited to Germany: The lust for profuse consumption has been a remarkably powerful force behind the globalisation of consumerism in ex-communist countries and across the Global South.

The second has to do with the effects of neoliberal reforms. As the new post-Fordist era was ushered in, the state could no longer cope with its Taylorist–Fordist role and became exceeded by the costs of welfare management. The state's limitations with respect to the coordination of an increasingly de-territorialised global economy became manifest, legitimating neoliberal calls for retrenchment and deregulation in order to fight inflation.[126] Coincidentally, the focus of economic policies changed from production to consumption, and with it the very conception of the political society. As Slater writes, the rise of neoliberalism in the 1980s coincided with

> one of the most powerful rediscoveries of consumerism. The consumer was the hero of the hour, [...] as the provider of that buying power which would fuel economic growth ([...] encouraged through phenomenal credit expansion, deficit financing and income tax reductions) [...]. Exemplified in neo-liberalism—specifically in Reaganomics and Thatcherism—consumer choice became the obligatory pattern for all social relations and the template for civic dynamism and freedom. [...] The 1980s also heralded the subordination of production to consumption in the form of marketing: design, retailing, advertising and the product concept were ascendant, reflected in postmodern theory as the triumph of the sign and the aestheticization of everyday life.[127]

The roll-back of the state and the dismantling of welfare provision, cutbacks in public institutions, and privatisations of public companies, as well as the deregulation of media and public space resulted in an explosion of advertising in every nook and cranny of daily life, facilitating the omnipresence of brands in places like schools, museums, and across the cityscape in general. Corporate sponsorships replaced state subsidies in a wide array of sectors, opening welfare, health, and education missions to private competition, deemed naturally more efficient by the neoliberal ideology.[128] All of this resulted in the branding not only of politics and culture (now called the 'cultural industry'), but also of organisations that were extraneous to such logics, such as NGOs and Churches, who must now 'compete' for rarefied funds and publics, or seek to compensate the state's withdrawal.

Consumerism as the ethos of consumer society

From the 1960s onwards, consumption irresistibly spread to encompass all aspects of life to the extent that *consumerism* became the dominant desirable social and cultural *ethos*. For Weber, the term ethos refers to a 'system of dispositions that prints a given orientation to action, that structures it in a veritable conduct of life,'[129] thus shaping relations to the self, others, community, society, and the world. Consumerism, therefore, is the ethos and cultural ideology of modern consumption. It is the defining trait of a *consumer culture*, which, in turn, is the culture of a wider *market society*, in the sense that the various areas of social life are increasingly mediated by market relations in the form of the consumption of commodities.[130] A consumer culture is a culture of consumption, meaning that its 'dominant values' are not only 'organized through consumption practices but are also in some sense derived from them,'[131] for example, risk-taking, adventure, taste for the new, mobility ('being on the move'), being up-to-date and part of the flux, wellbeing, hedonism, happiness, personal satisfaction, choice, sovereignty, individuality, reflexivity, and autonomy. It is a culture in which marketisation, commoditisation, advertisement, fashion, and branding are fundamental processes. Consumption is not the only means of social and cultural (re)production today, but it is certainly one of the most salient and determining. As Roberta Sassatelli argues, consumer culture is 'constituted as a culture both *for* consumers and *of* consumers: both a set of commodities for people to consume, and a set of representations of people as consumers.'[132] Perhaps most profoundly, consumer culture is the means of expression and actualisation of the modern project of the individualised self, as it 'provides a very particular set of material circumstances in which individuals come to acquire a reflexive relation to identity.'[133]

Consumption is not new to human societies, but '"consumer culture"—a culture *of* consumption—is unique and specific.'[134] It is exemplary of the new world ushered in by modernity and is integral to its project of the free, autonomous individual.[135] As Slater argues: 'liberal society is geared to the inculcation of a self-managing and choosing self. The modern self is "institutionally required to construct a life through the exercise of choice from among alternatives",' and to be the kind of person who is capable of doing so, to conform to the

> norm of the autonomous, responsible subject, obliged to make its life meaningful through acts of choice. In this light, the consumer is the epitome of the liberal individual, and consumerism can be seen as a pre-eminent social training ground in its ethical production.[136]

Consumer culture is 'about continuous self-creation through the accessibility of things which are themselves presented as new, modish, faddish or

fashionable, always improved and improving.'[137] Consumer culture 'identifies freedom with private choice and private life.'[138] For liberal economic theory, consumption is supposed to be non-political and private. Yet, it is easy to see the political content of such an equation between freedom and choice within a consumerist arena. Even more so since consumption, as the preferred means for the exploration, expression, and recognition of the authentic self within a widened and mediatised public space makes the private political de facto if not de jure.

At the same time that consumerism is the epitome of liberal individualism, it therefore challenges the public/private dichotomy.[139] While this distinction was installed in order to preserve the private from the intrusions of the public (or vice versa), consumerism legitimates the outpouring of the private within the public—something which has great consequences for the political regulation of religion. While Liberalism posits that consumption is about increasing private pleasures and comfort, its true nature is to serve the project of the modern autonomous self by providing the cultural symbols by which one *must* produce what one is. In other words, behind the supposed pure freedom of the choosing individual lies an *imperative* to construct one's identity within the expressive episteme. As a result, the consumer has become a 'master category of collective and individual identity.'[140] Marketers have understood this quite well, as they consider that 'the market for identities is the biggest market of all.'[141]

It is important to stress once more that these dynamics concern everyone in a consumer culture, and not just the fashion-savvy, the affluent, or youth: 'consumer culture publicity suggests that we all have room for self-improvement and self-expression whatever our age or class origins.'[142] These dynamics are integral to the culture of self-realisation and the development of self-help techniques, the ascension of mind-body-spirit literature, the penetration of psychology in management and religious discourse, the immanentisation of salvation, and the rising importance of therapeutics and healing. Beyond the pervasiveness of advertising in everyday life and the experience of the world under the form of commodities, consumer culture 'infiltrates everyday life well beyond economic decision making, into the very experience of meaning.'[143] Through the 'organized interpenetration of economic and everyday life,'[144] consumer culture 'represents the increasing importance of culture in the modern exercise of power.'[145] Culture was certainly important in the National-Statist era, namely in the adjunction of social realities to the nation-building project. Yet, the arrival of television and other communication media, and the multiplication and trivialisation of cultural productions such as cinema, has contributed to overthrow the State as the primary locus of power and overarching social imaginary. Paying due attention to consumerism shows how 'the Market' as a social regulator has acquired important cultural dimensions that it lacked in prior phases of capitalism, namely through the massification of expressive individualism.

Types of modern individualism

The dynamics of capitalism provide an answer not only for the modern project of a new society, but also for that of a new individual. As Christian Laval has shown in his remarkable essay on the founders of sociology, Durkheim distinguished between two complementary types of individualism: First, 'utilitarian individualism,' promoted by authors stretching from Hobbes to Locke, which serves as a basis for neoclassical political economy. Second, idealist or 'moral individualism,' whose two great figures are Kant and Rousseau.[146] These two forms of individualism—moral individualism, which emerged namely through the categories of Natural Rights, and utilitarian individualism, captured by the figure of *homo oeconomicus*—are powerful collective representations that have contributed to shape modernity. While both of these types present themselves as descriptive, Durkheim argues that their true nature is prescriptive and normative and that they have been naturalised within the self-perception of modern societies. Both rest on and promote a specific brand of individualist metaphysics that are modern outgrowths of the two main epistemological currents of Western philosophy, idealism and realism, which, in turn, can be traced back to the foundational opposition between Plato and Aristotle.[147] For Durkheim, the 'individual' is the 'true content of the modern collective conscience.'[148] The individual is a modern sacred, and its representation forces itself onto individual consciences in the form of a double imperative: On the one hand, the Kantian imperative to *become yourself*, i.e. an 'autonomous' subject, freed of external determinations and able to find within himself the path to goodness. On the other hand, the utilitarian imperative to *follow your own interest and your own needs* so as to realise public utility and therefore, it is believed, the common good.[149]

Rousseau and Kant provided the bases for modern citizenship and the institutionalisation of moral individualism, whose core principle is the consideration for the other which became institutionalised in law and politics, from the US Declaration of Independence (1776) and the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of Citizens (1789) up to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948).[150] Cortois and Laermans note the 'symmetry and complementarity' which 'separates and unites' utilitarian and moral individualism. The first aggrandises the presupposed natural inclination to pursue self-interests as a prime motor of individual actions, while the second's focus on the other's intrinsic worth as an ethically commanding instance comes with the requirement not to treat her or him in a purely instrumental and strategic manner.[151] In sum, moral individualism, which retains something of the Christian ethos, tampers the consequences of utilitarianism within a rationalist framework.

Moral individualism was institutionalised and guaranteed by the state and state-like international institutions, and is central to the National-Statist social order. Yet, the erosion of that frame and the rise of the

Global-Market regime through the consumer revolution also displaced the moral accent contained in Kant's motto to 'become yourself.' Durkheim did not consider Romanticism in his analysis of modern individualism. If he had, he might have noted how Rousseau's impulse had divorced from the rationalist perspective of Kant because of the importance he awards to emotions and interiority. As Rousseau writes in the opening of his *Confessions*, 'being true to oneself' is the yardstick for *authenticity*[152] and 'the goal for expressive action.'[153] This conception was picked up by Herder, a renowned Romantic, for whom 'each of us has an original way of being human.'[154] In other words, the difference between human beings, each of whom is utterly singular, acquires a moral significance. This translates into a veritable life objective: To live my life in *my* way, and to discover what this way is.[155] This ideal of authenticity was heralded by Romanticism, and from then penetrated deeper into the social fabric via psychoanalysis, self-help, management, and consumption.[156]

Expressive individualism therefore constitutes a third type of modern individualism, which insists on the merge of private and public.[157] Contrary to moral individualism, the relays for expressive individualism have been cultural more than political, and were crystallised in the figure of the late nineteenth-century artist. Historically, expressive individualism was marginal, second to moral individualism, which could thrive as long as the state was the principle actor of social reformation and regulation. Moral individualism has little to do with capitalism, whether production or consumption. Expressive individualism, on the other hand, is almost inassimilable within the parameters of the state—and, as a consequence, by canonical sociology, as Talcott Parsons noted.[158] Parsons' analysis of the cultural revolution of the 1960s 'saw student culture as a symptom of a more general social movement away from the cognitive rationalism [moral individualism] and instrumentalism [utilitarian individualism] of early capitalism to an affective-expressive culture.'[159] In other words, the culture of the 1960s, and the counterculture in particular, was a powerful carrier of the ethic of authenticity and its expressive brand of individualism.

As Parsons contends, the diffusion of expressive individualism within the core of contemporary societies has not eclipsed moral individualism to the extent that it has disappeared. Rationalist, moral individualism has nonetheless been marginalised, if not in national and supranational organisations (the UN and UN-related administrations, the EU), at least in the cultural mainstream. As I have argued earlier, the dominance of expressive individualism is concurrent with the massification of consumerism since the post-war decades. The marginalisation of moral individualism goes a long way in explaining some of the political transformations and challenges of today, such as the erosion of the aura of democracy and the critique of the universality of human rights. Increasingly, Humanism and its underlying moral individualism are denounced for being particularistic rather than universal, as the product of a specific Western and

Christian-grounded development. This has important consequences for religion, as rationalist, moral individualism underlies the secularist worldview. This has led to a new situation in which the presence of religion in international organisations and international affairs is increasingly tolerated, even encouraged.

Contrary to Parsons though, I do not think that expressive individualism has marginalised instrumental or utilitarian individualism. In my view, utilitarian individualism remains an extremely powerful normative feature of contemporary global societies. We have seen in the previous chapter how neoliberalism reproduces neoclassical assumptions, to which it adds an emphasis on the individual as an entrepreneur and shifts the focus from compliance to the exigencies of Fordism and Taylorism and their standardised and routinised mode of production, to a focus that emphasises mobility, adaptability, self-realisation through work, creativity, and so on—i.e. values that can be assimilated with expressive individualism. As Durkheim argued, I think that modern individualism has two sides: A formal, and a substantive one. My contention is that utilitarian individualism (*homo oeconomicus*) serves as the formal basis for modern individualism, while its substantive dimension has shifted from moral individualism, which was dominant in the National-Statist era, to expressive individualism, which now dominates the Global-Market era.

An anthropology of consumerism

What emerges from this discussion is that consumption is a cultural process with deep implications. We can now get back to the subject of defining the lineaments of a theory of consumption and consumerism that is apt at seizing these phenomena in their complexity. In 1979, anthropologist Mary Douglas and economist Baron Isherwood published *The World of Goods*, in which they confronted political economy's theory of consumption with anthropological facts and analyses, founding the anthropology of consumption and its ramifications in Cultural Studies and Consumer Research.[160] Douglas and Isherwood understand consumer objects as the visible part of culture (material culture), whose essential function is to make cultural precepts concrete—identifying, materialising, and stabilising them, and thus giving them substance, authority, and inevitability.[161] Such an anthropological perspective highlights the short-sightedness of political economy and how context and culture are fundamental for understanding consumption understood as a set of meaningful practices. The authors therefore suggest to substitute the concept of meaning for that of price, and that of *poiesis* for utility. From an anthropological perspective, the utility of goods is always framed by a cultural context, and even the use of the most mundane and ordinary object in daily life has a cultural meaning. As Grant McCracken argues in Douglas' wake: 'Consumer goods have a significance that goes beyond their utilitarian character and commercial value.

This significance rests largely in their ability to carry and communicate cultural meaning.'[162] Political economy's standard model, which rests on the assumption that consumption can be extracted from wider social life and analysed within the confines of a differentiated and autonomous sphere, fails to account for these dynamics.

Consumption is an inextricably economic and cultural phenomenon.[163] Commenting on Douglas and Isherwood, Celia Lury writes that 'material goods are not only used to do things, [...] they also have a meaning, and act as meaningful markers of social relations. *It is by acquiring, using and exchanging things that individuals come to have social lives*.'[164] While political economy projects its utilitarian calculus in the past, assuming that tribal societies are collections of self-interested maximising individuals, Douglas and Isherwood do the exact opposite by arguing that indigenous societies show how consumption functions to circulate goods and create an ordinate structure and a system of classification that embodies social functions of power and communication. They also show how consumption is socially and culturally regulated, and therefore ritualised.[165] Goods express identities, values, and statuses; these meanings are therefore neither arbitrary nor dependent only on individual preferences and choices, even in modern capitalist societies. Goods are inscribed within a symbolic system, and express the social and *moral* order.[166]

The specificity of modern consumption lies elsewhere. Consumption has become 'a privileged medium for negotiating identity and status'[167] and producing 'new forms of sociality'[168] in post-traditional societies. It is also 'the dominant mode of cultural reproduction developed in the west over the course of modernity.'[169] As Slater argues:

> Consumer culture marks out a system in which consumption is dominated by the consumption of commodities, and in which cultural reproduction is largely understood to be carried out through the exercise of free personal choice in the private sphere of everyday life.[170]

Consumerism produces and reproduces the structure of capitalist societies, namely through the promotion of expressive individualism via the media: 'Goods are connected to the intertextual web of meanings, symbols, images and discourses diffused by (mostly commercial) media like television, magazines, film, radio, the internet, and, most importantly perhaps, advertising.'[171] As state-owned and state-regulated media played a key role in the dynamics of the Nation-State regime, so are deregulated and electronic media key to those of the Global-Market.[172]

The brand as person and gift theory

In neoclassic economic theory, market relations are impersonal, as markets are anonymous and open to all. Interestingly, this is also close to

Marx's conception, whose critique is precisely aimed at this impersonality. This perspective has been re-actualised by Baudrillard, who casts consumer society as the extending realm of formality, washing up subjects in vacuous non-sense. Contrary to this, marketing desires to move the conception of the brand beyond a simple recognisable sign by conceiving it as a '"personality" with emotional or even ethical dimensions.'[173] As Lury comments, casting the brand as a person 'is designed to transform a one-off exchange relation between producer and consumer into an ongoing relationship. It enables the brand to appear "to address, to recognize and thereby 'to love' the consumer".'[174] What happens in marketing signals an astonishing reversal with respect to the classic modern interpretation of market exchange as an impersonal and unbinding relation. The birth of capitalism and modern market exchange occurred precisely because it allowed for a tit-for-tat type of relation that freed individuals from the obligations contained in interpersonal relations. Market relations were cherished precisely because they were without residue: They produced no obligations, they did not bind the partners of exchange, and the terms of exchange were neither defined by hierarchy nor tradition. The modern market is coextensive to a post-status, post-traditional society. This is why Hegel could say that money is 'minted liberty.' Yet, what happens in the latest phase of capitalism, through consumerism, is the reinjection of a significant, even determining dose of personality in a theoretically formal and purely functional type of exchange. For it is not sufficient to insert goods (or brands) in networks of relations: The brand becomes, as a person, an actor in this relation, so that people can have a relation with a brand as they do with a person. In order to do so, advertising shows people in given social situations, in given atmospheres that characterise the brands' desired image. It also talks directly to the customer. Brands sponsor athletes and other hyper-mediatised people, as well as trend setters that are identified within given populations, according to the principles of viral marketing, in order to give personality to the brand. In the public sphere, everyone who sports a specific brand becomes associated with these enviable people and themselves become 'brand ambassadors,' to use marketing jargon.

From an anthropological perspective, I suggest that we take the metaphor of the brand as a person at face value, or at least seriously. In a way, this only follows on the substantive level what neoclassical theory has already institutionalised on the formal and legal level: The *incorporation* of companies as responsible legal entities, as persons *by right*. The purpose of making the brand into a person is to inscribe it ever more deeply into social relations, in compliance with the archaic logics of objects, and therefore to inscribe them in the logics of *the gift*.[175] Why? Because gift relations *oblige*. Marketers make no secret about the aims behind the availability of brands for experiences and subjective appropriation, and the insertion of brands in social relations and communities: It is to seek

to produce *brand loyalty* in a competitive environment in which choice is always a two-edged sword—the possibility for companies to make profits, and the risk of losing customers to competitors. Personifying brands, casting them as being able to give, turns the customer into the receiver of a gift, and thereby commands a gift in return. We have all experienced the discomfort in receiving an unwanted gift. This is because giving puts the receiver in a position of indebtedness, and places the donor in a situation of power. Mauss' *Essay on the Gift* is clear: Archaic gifts are a means of building alliances, but also of showing oneself (or one's tribe) superior through acts of generosity.[176]

Our discussion has highlighted what brands give: Meaning, identity, sociality, reassurance (on 'quality' for instance), values, emotions, experience, authenticity, dream, opportunities for expression, etc. Market research has shown how this produces empathy towards brands and strong identifications,[177] even for products apparently as trivial as soft drinks. As one marketing guru states: A good brand is the one that helps 'you become more you.'[178] The stronger the relation is between people and a brand, the more a brand is inserted into social relations, the more value the brand acquires. This is a worthwhile strategy, financially, as it is well-known that people are willing to pay much more for a branded good or service, often under the pretence that it is of 'better quality' (i.e. its qualitative or symbolic value is superior to its material, merchandise value). A gift relation further involves the recognition of both parties through the act of exchange, here the consumer and the brand.[179] This explains why a brand can 'address, recognize and even love' the consumer. This is no crazy inflation of language, or else it would not be repeated insatiably in marketing literature. It is a direct consequence of the construction of brands as persons and the re-inscription of consumption within the realm of personal relations, and therefore within the framework of the gift. A brand exceeds the good. It is made to be seen and recognised as part of a lifestyle, an identity.[180]

Personalisation contributes to the dematerialisation of economic exchange, and goes hand in hand with the development of payment by cards, Internet, and other credit schemes which constantly diminish the amount of real money being exchanged. This dematerialisation obscures the commodity aspect of consumption and reinforces its recasting within the social logics of the gift. The brand-as-relationship moves consumption even further from neoclassical economic theory. Consumption is no longer about ownership. It is about a *relation to a brand*, as car leasing schemes exemplify. What is being sold is an experience (a certain experience of driving, of freedom, of comfort, of security, of power, of speed, of control, etc.) and the participation in a certain lifestyle, the expression of certain values and worldviews, as well as status. Brands are what André Gorz calls 'crystallised knowledge'[181] in the informational age of capitalism. They participate in the increasing *abstraction* of the economy. As financialisation detaches capital from its moorings in a fund of real existing money and

the 'real economy,' branding abstracts consumption from the materiality of products. There is a profound process of *virtualisation* of the economy that is taking place, a transfer to an abstract, formal (finance) and symbolic (consumerism) plane that is coextensive to the development of a virtual space through the Internet and communication technologies—and to which scholars of religion, who, by definition, are specialists of human relations with the virtual, should be attentive to.

In trying to explain how the obligation to return gifts worked, Mauss noted how archaic societies hold gifts to be animated with a spirit, the *hau* or *mana*, according to indigenous terminology. Objects retain something of their former owners, a part of their soul that subsists once the exchange is over. As a result, the value of an object accrues with time, as it circulates from tribe to tribe, and from member of a tribe to other members of the tribe. The value of objects depends on the personality (i.e. the reputation, the status) of those who have 'owned' it. In archaic societies, goods never have a purely quantitative value: It is always qualitative. In a market economy, in principle, 'people experience exchange as the desire to appropriate goods, whereas in a gift-oriented economy people experience exchange as a desire to expand social relations (to be connected with more people).'[182] In light of this, there appears to be a strong tendency, within contemporary consumerism, to depart from market-type exchange and move towards the archaic dynamics of gift exchange. At the very least, this should lead us to question any radical distinction between gift exchange and commodity exchange,[183] and press us to consider how contemporary consumerism might be consonant with the anthropological logics of exchange in pre-capitalist societies. By actively seeking to integrate and even create social relations, brands replay archaic gift exchange since goods and services are more than merchandises or commodities: They are invested with something like *hau*, the 'spirit' of the brand. In a sense, then, the world of consumerism is a thoroughly 'enchanted' place. Far from being disenchanted and bathed in the sole icy waters of utilitarian reason, an anthropological perspective shows how consumer societies are traversed by an immanent type of transcendence. The difference between a traditional gift economy and that of contemporary consumerism is essentially that the brand is made to be subservient to profit-making objectives, and not the production of social bond and subjectivities, even if such bonds and subjectivities are created in the process.

The religious dimension of consumerism

Not all marketers have gone along with the expressive revolution and the construction of brands as persons. And not all goods or products are sold (and can be sold) as brands. A company selling paper clips or sewage drainage will find little profit in investing enormous portions of their budgets into brand marketing in the same way Nike, Coca Cola, Harley Davidson,

Apple, Samsung, and consorts do. Douglas Holt, L'Oréal Chair of Marketing at Oxford University, distinguishes between four branding models.[184] The first is *mind-share*. It is the most common, and rests on epistemological foundations that owe much to Maslow's pyramid of needs, behavioural (i.e. utilitarian) psychology, and remnants of neoclassical economics. The others are *cultural*, *emotional*, and *viral* branding; each of these corresponds to different dimensions of what I have exposed earlier. Holt explains the enduring popularity of mind-share branding amongst managers by its simplicity (the simplicity of the technique—repeating ad nauseam the same quality one wants associated with the brand: Gentleness, fights cavities—and of its theory), and because it is easy to control. Yet, the range of products for such a strategy, Holt argues, is limited. It is not what explains the success of brands, nor is it where the core of today's and future consumption lies. For Holt, mind-share is self-defeating because it is not in tune with the expressive revolution and cannot build what is the Holy Grail of marketers: An *iconic brand* at the centre of a 'religious cult.'

Holt is an outspoken advocate for cultural branding, which is based on a reading of religious anthropology. Indeed, cultural branding aims at producing 'myths' that are carried by the brand and which 'addresses acute contradictions in society'[185] and symbolically resolves them. These myths are qualified as identity myths, and address, on an imaginary/symbolic level, the desires as well as the anxieties of people. It is this anchoring in social realities which creates credibility and authenticity. The rise to iconic status is dependent on how well a brand and its constitutive myth 'fits a particular historical context.'[186] Consumers experience the symbolic solution personally and in an embodied manner 'via ritual action': Using the product, consumers experience a bit of the myth and participate in the symbolic resolution of life's contradictions.

Holt is far from being the only marketing guru to take inspiration from religious anthropology and religious studies. Douglas Atkin, director of strategy at Merkley and Partners, sports clients such as Mercedes, Pfizer, and Fila. In *The Culting of Brands*, Atkin writes that the 'same dynamics are at play behind the attraction to brands and cults [i.e. religion].'[187] The objective of marketers, he explains, is to create *cult brands*:

> a brand for which a group of customers exhibit a great devotion or dedication. Its ideology is distinctive and it has a well-defined and committed community. It enjoys exclusive devotion (that is, not shared with another brand in the same category), and its members often become voluntary advocates.[188]

Atkin insists on constructing brands into a 'belief system': 'brands are symbols' that operate in a 'symbolic' and 'spiritual economy'[189] and which provide foundational meaning for individuals and communities. The objective of marketing firms, in other words, is to create a religion out of a brand.

Social scientists like Adam Arvidsson share a similar analysis. For him, brands are modern relics, and branding aims at making an 'economic use of a religious element.'[190] Heilbrunn similarly argues that

> brands function as a utopian model whose aim is to propose to consumers a sort of road to paradise. [...] These utopian models are based on a series of inherent contradictions and paradoxes which brands are able to reconcile through a narrative programme.[191]

Heilbrunn continues by writing that the 'contemporary role of brands may be related to a historical move of ideological sources from the theological sphere to the political sphere and then recently to the economic sphere.'[192] In other words, the changes that have moved Fordist production-based capitalism, typical of the National-Statist era, to a financialised and consumption-based capitalism, typical of the Global-Market era, have propelled brands at the very heart of the religious and symbolic processes of modern societies.

Whatever one makes of these analyses (and the defendable claim that there is a religious dimension to consumerism), the aforementioned shows how far marketing has strayed from the consumer model of neoclassical political economy, and how it seems more interesting for many leading voices today in both the marketing and social scientific disciplines to understand branding and consumption in the terms of religious anthropology rather than rational choice theory. This has its importance in the face of those who propose to analyse religion with neoclassical economic theory. Seeing consumption and consumerism from the anthropological lens shows how both are linked to the macro structure of our societies and the dynamics of meaning, identity, and belonging. It is much clearer, from this perspective, how consumerism can shape religion, when itself is shown to be inherently partaking in the symbolic fabric of societies.

Conclusion

The story I have told in this chapter has been mostly Western. This was necessary in order to present a coherent and comprehensive discussion on the dynamics of consumerism, in particular as the result of the self-realisation and expressive cultural revolution that swept over Western and industrialised countries from the 1960s. In this perspective, the rise to dominance of consumerism as a social ethos is bound to the massification of the ethic of authenticity. Yet, how did/does consumerism develop in non-Western countries, and how did/does expressive individualism penetrate these regions, if at all? As I will try to show, consumerism has spread worldwide, especially in urban areas but not only, and is having an enormous impact on every dimension of social life, including religion. Expressive individualism emerged out of the specific context of Western modernity, but it is constitutive of global consumerism. The form that expressive individualism takes in

different cultural contexts can only be different in regions where traditional social bonds are still the norm. As was the case with the State, the dissemination of consumerism and expressive individualism occurs according to variegated pathways, which remain to be mapped.

Scholarly discussions on consumerism have been overwhelmingly about the West, while those concerned with 'developing countries have tended to portray consumer culture as "western," crass, decadent, hedonistic, harmful and corrupting of "traditional lifestyles".'[193] They also posit a unidirectional and unilateral process according to which Western-style consumption is simply copied or rejected by non-Western populations. Such accounts are of little help in understanding how consumerism penetrates non-Western cultures, and how it is desired, appropriated, critiqued, modulated, acculturated, and modified across cultures and social classes. These accounts are also reductive and naïve in postulating an 'indigenous innoculative tradition.'[194] As there are multiple modernities, there are varying responses to consumerism. The question as to how multiple the diversity of Global-Market pathways is, is an empirical one.

There is ample empirical evidence that consumerism has penetrated and has been appropriated in even the most remote regions of the planet, and amongst virtually all social classes. As Asef Bayat and Linda Herrera argue, the 'standard' globalised package to which youth especially aspire today includes 'acquiring consumer goods, being up to date on the latest youth trends, or being mobile.'[195] Those who do not have access to such practices still 'find ways to assert their youthful tastes by resorting to what Michael Mann called "cheap globalization," such as wearing fake goods of globally typical brands such as Nike baseball caps or listening to pirated international CDs.'[196] Two decades ago, Doreen Massey wrote that 'across the world, even the poorest of young people strive to buy into an international cultural reference system: the right trainers, a T-shirt with a western logo, a baseball cap with the right slogan.'[197] Similarly, populations all over the globe, and even more so young people, are massively and increasingly connected to the 'global time' through portable phones, Internet, social media, television, and radio.

In a classic work of sociology of religion, Yves Lambert mapped the changes that occurred in the small Breton town of Limerzel over the course of the twentieth century. Lambert showed how it was the expressive and consumerist revolution that loosened this otherwise traditional and tightly knit Catholic community, and 'turned people from their dense communal-ritual life to the vigorous pursuit of personal prosperity.'[198] Lambert quotes one villager: 'We don't have time to worry about that [religion] anymore, there's too much work. We need money, comfort and all that; everybody is into that now, and the rest, well, bah!'[199] The penetration of consumerism and its corresponding ethos in the remotest parts of the non-Western world has been occurring in a similar fashion as that described by Lambert for rural France. In the case of Limerzel, Lambert noted how electronic media, namely television, was a powerful driver for the radical changes he

consigned. In the Global South, the further development of communication technologies in the last decades, amplified by media deregulation, has had a similarly profound impact, brutally integrating non-developed regions and social classes into global time and global consumer culture. A significant difference between Lambert's description and what we see happening in non-Western and Global South regions is that, in the case of the former, these modernisation processes accelerated the decline of inherited Christian practices and beliefs. As the cases I have collected in this volume show, the trends that one observes in cultural geographies as diverse as post-Soviet Eastern Europe and Muslim majority countries tend to show that the penetration of consumerism goes hand in hand with a religious revival. Far from being the return to inherited forms, though, this revival amounts to a profound transformation in the very substance and location of religion in these societies. A remarkable feature of non-Western pathways is how religion is actually central to the acculturation of both neoliberalism and consumerism. In other words, it is namely through the conduits of religion that consumerism and neoliberalism become acculturated and desirable.

The following chapters show how all of this affects religion, and not only because those who are excluded from participating in these by now 'normal modes of livelihood'[200] can turn to radical forms of religion in contestation and out of despair. Interestingly, religion is as neglected in consumer studies as consumerism is in the social scientific study of religion. As Loong Wong writes, religion

> receives, at best, a perfunctory mention in the subcultures section in most consumer behaviour texts and limited research attention. This is remarkable given that religion and religious affiliations have been significant, and at times decisive, in influencing economic and corporate strategic decisions and consumer practices.[201]

Consumerism has penetrated deeply into the fabric of developed as well as developing countries, with a significant impact on all aspects of life, including religion. Far from being a hazardous rapprochement, I argue that consumerism is a *passage obligé* for understanding the recent transformations of religion across the globe.

Notes

1 This chapter threads reflections that have been published in a series of articles and chapters while expanding on a significant number of points. See bibliography.

2 This neglect is relative when we consider the classic and more recent authors who have written on consumption: Sombart, Veblen, Simmel, Horkheimer, Adorno, Sartre, Baudrillard, Bourdieu, etc. Yet, the theme of consumption is far from having made it to the front stage of social scientific curricula, nor has it received remotely as much attention as production.

3 Miller (1995: 142).
4 Slater (2005: 174), Lury (2011: 10). Dictionary definitions of consumption tellingly equate 'to consume' with 'use up,' discard, destruct, and make away with—a conception that hardly begs scholarly enquiry.
5 Slater (1997: 42).
6 Slater (1997: 41–2). Emphasis in text.
7 Slater (1997: 42).
8 Slater (1997: 44).
9 Slater (1997: 44–5).
10 Slater (1997: 44).
11 Heilbrunn (2015: 13). Heilbrunn is France's top consumer research scholar. See Heilbrunn (2006, 2007, 2014).
12 Slater (1997: 43).
13 Slater (1997: 46). Emphasis in text.
14 Slater (1997: 43).
15 Heibrunn (2015: 13).
16 Baudrillard (1970, 1972).
17 Sassatelli (2007: 67). See also McCracken (1988: 93–103).
18 Bourdieu (1979). See Sassatelli (2007: 67).
19 In theory, equilibrium occurs on the full extent of the market (i.e. globally), and so some economists would argue that a crisis in a given place is compensated by sharp growth in consumption levels elsewhere; yet, this solution remains unverifiable and commands an act of faith.
20 Sassatelli (2007: 69). See also McCracken's discussion on trickle-down theories (1988: 93–103), and Campbell (1987: 50).
21 Bourdieu (1979).
22 Sassatelli (2007: 69), Slater (1997). See these authors for additional references.
23 Slater (1997: 20).
24 Appleby (2010: 103). Appleby corroborates the findings of McKendrick, Brewer, and Plumb (1982). See also McCracken (1988).
25 Slater (1997: 19).
26 Slater (1997: 19). See also Campbell (2005).
27 Slater (1997: 22).
28 Slater (1997: 18). See also Campbell (2005), Sahlins (1974: 1–40), and Appleby (2010: 6).
29 Hobsbawm (1975: 271).
30 Hobsbawm (1975: 271). Emphasis added.
31 Hobsbawm (1987: 29).
32 Hobsbawm (1987: 49).
33 Hobsbawm (1987: 49).
34 Slater (1997: 13).
35 Slater (1997: 12). Emphasis in text.
36 Slater (1997: 13). Emphasis in text.
37 Slater (1997: 14).
38 Slater (2005: 183).
39 Slater (1997: 12).
40 Campbell (2005: 99–137).
41 This has been meticulously demonstrated in a recent book by Pierre Prades (2014) devoted to Puritan America.
42 Campbell (2005: 137).
43 Campbell (2005: 140).
44 This argument of a dual nature of modernity, both rational and emotional, is at the core of Taylor's *Sources of the Self* (1989). See also the discussions on this issue in Laforest and de Lara (1998), and Gauthier (2014c).

45 As exemplified by Jane Austen's classic, *Sense and Sensibility*. See Campbell (2005: 142–8).
46 See Caillé, Lazzeri, and Senellart (2001). Appleby's (1984) investigation of American Republicanism in the 1790s shows how the prospect of comfort but also enjoyment derived from the acquisition of commodities, which were also tied to the expression of status, competed with the obligation to work relentlessly and reinvest resources. Moral barriers to the consumption of commodities, she writes, melted as fast as hopes of prosperity grew.
47 Campbell (2005: 75), Taylor (2007b).
48 I am referring, of course, to the famous interview in which Kant (1992) defines 'What is Enlightenment?', easily accessible on the Internet.
49 Taylor (1991).
50 Taylor (2002: 83). See also Taylor (2007b).
51 Campbell (2005: 210). See also Slater (1997).
52 Campbell (2005: 227).
53 Campbell (2005: 227).
54 Campbell (2005: 227).
55 Willaime (2006: 80).
56 Gauthier (2012a).
57 Le Goff (2018: 18).
58 Galland (1984, 1997), Savage (2007), Le Goff (2018).
59 Arvidsson (2006: 21).
60 Gauthier (2008b, 2018e), Thornton (1996).
61 Arvidsson (2006: 22). For a review of subcultures, see also Gauthier (2008b, 2018c).
62 Arvidsson (2006: 23).
63 Arvidsson (2006: 23).
64 Resistance through consumption is a founding theme of Cultural Studies devoted to subcultures in the wake of Dick Hebdige's (1979) classic *Subculture. The Meaning of Style*. On the importance of rebellion in today's consumer capitalism, see Heath and Potter (2005).
65 Le Goff (2018: 442).
66 Skenderovic and Späti (2012: 167). My translation.
67 Le Goff (2018: 448).
68 See for example Skenderovic and Späti (2012), Taylor (2007b: 473–504).
69 Le Goff (2018).
70 In some regions, Baby Boomers did grow up in difficult conditions. This was the case of my own parents, born in 1945 and 1950 in the Saguenay region in Quebec. Yet, this only prompted them to embrace the consumerist lifestyle with even more fervour. This same scenario is since being reproduced in many regions across the globe.
71 Taylor (2002: 80–1). See also Taylor (1991, 2007b: 473–504).
72 Heilbrunn (2015: 71).
73 Boltanski and Chiapello (1999).
74 Heilbrunn (2015: 63).
75 On the decline of duty and its consequences, see Lipovetsky (1992).
76 Taylor (1991: 26). Taylor's argument is made even more remarkable and perspicacious that he was seventy years old when he wrote this and isn't exactly someone who looks after the latest fashions! He recognises that the logics of fashion are those of our culture and that this touches everyone, not only those who are 'fashionable.'
77 See Beauchemin (2004).
78 Hobsbawm (1987: 270).
79 Taylor (2002: 85).

80 As the case of Donald Trump vividly illustrates: Hyper-visibility in the media translates into political power, without any support from institutionalised political parties.
81 Taylor (2002: 85).
82 For example, Hebdige (1979).
83 Maffesoli (1988), Le Breton (2002), Shouten and Alexander (1995), Heilbrunn (2015: 75–7).
84 Lury (2011: 206), Sassatelli (2005). On recognition, see namely Caillé and Lazzeri (2009).
85 'Media' in the singular refers to the ensemble of the social and cultural institutions, the whole of the 'media sphere,' while 'media' in the plural refers to particular mass-media institutions.
86 Featherstone (1991: 114–5).
87 Media are not, therefore, an autonomous sphere with its own logic that pushes itself on other social spheres, as the tenants of the mediatisation thesis believe: Media were integral to the dynamics of the National-Statist regime, and they were similarly integral to those of the Global-Market one. See Gauthier (2015).
88 Grossein (1996: 58). See Heilbrunn (2015: 72). The concept of lifestyle was introduced by psychologist Alfred Adler (1926) in the early twentieth century to describe the dynamics of the personality and how people construct systems of rules and behaviour.
89 Featherstone (1991: 83).
90 Featherstone (1991: 83).
91 Featherstone (1991: 110).
92 Consider, for example, the popularity of the 'gangsta rap' look amongst middle-class white kids.
93 Featherstone (1991: 95). In typical postmodernist fashion, Featherstone overplays the liberty of the individual as well as the formless result of this bricolage. I have intentionally scrapped these overtones off in the aforementioned quotes.
94 Heilbrunn (2015: 72). My translation.
95 Lury (2004: 19).
96 Lury (2011: 62).
97 Lury (2011: 62). Emphasis added.
98 Lury (2011: 62).
99 Lury (2011: 84–5).
100 Lury (2011: 85).
101 Arvidsson (2006: 21). See Parsons (1964 [1942]).
102 Boltanski and Chiapello (1999).
103 Arvidsson (2006: 10).
104 Lury (2011: 85).
105 Hall (1992: 58). The accuracy of this portrait is astounding, for something written at the turn of the 1990s. Emphasis added. See also Slater (2005).
106 Slater (1997: 174).
107 In the words of Lury (2011: 86). Lee remarkably synthetises both Fordist and post-Fordist production and consumption in a set of commendable tables (1993: 126–8).
108 Arvidsson (2006: 42). See also Boltanski and Chiapello (1999).
109 Arvidsson (2006: 57).
110 Dichter (1949), quoted in Arvidsson (2006: 58).
111 Formulation adapted from Dichter (1965: 157), quoted in Arvidsson (2006: 58).
112 Arvidsson (2006: 58).

113 Arvidsson (2006: 59).
114 Levy (1964: 149), quoted in Arvidsson (2006: 59). Levy was also a pioneer in the development of the brand in the 1950s. See Gardner and Levy (1955).
115 Arvidsson (2006: 59).
116 Arvidsson (2006: 26).
117 Arvidsson (2006: 27).
118 Slater (1997: 191).
119 Slater (1997: 191).
120 Travis (2000: 10), quoted in Arvidsson (2016: 68).
121 Arvidsson (2006: 8). See also Zizek (1999) and Foucault (2004).
122 Slater (1997: 37).
123 Slater (1997: 37).
124 Lury (2011: 6).
125 Slater (1997: 37).
126 Gauchet (2017).
127 Slater (1997: 10).
128 Arvidsson (2006: 3).
129 Willaime (2001a: 97). My translation. See also Grossein (1996).
130 Slater (1997: 25).
131 Slater (1997: 24–5). On the ensuing list, see also Featherstone (1991: 86), Baumann (2007: 99), Boltanski and Chiapello (1999), Lury (2011), and Sassatelli (2007).
132 Sassatelli (2007: 195). Emphasis in original.
133 Lury (2011: 29).
134 Slater (1997: 8).
135 Arvidsson (2006: 9).
136 Slater (1997: 61). The author quotes from a 1992 lecture from Nikolas Rose. In this paragraph, Slater discusses Foucault's works on liberal governmentality.
137 Arvidsson (2006: 10).
138 Slater (1997: 27).
139 See Weintraub (1997).
140 Lury (2011: 19).
141 Slater (1997: 85).
142 Featherstone (1991: 86).
143 Lury (2011: 193).
144 Lury (2011: 5).
145 Slater (1997: 31).
146 Laval (2001: 230). This typology is present in *La Division du travail social* (2013a [1893]) and *Le Suicide* (2013b [1897]), and is central to Durkheim's conclusion to *Les Formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse* (1990 [1912]).
147 This opposition between idealism and realism provides the frame for Durkheim's entire discussion in *Les Formes*, namely his critique of the then dominant theories of religion (Max Müller's idealism versus Tylor's realism). What lies behind this is Durkheim's claim to transcend this foundational opposition within philosophy (the truth lies in man or in the world) by the introduction of a third term: Society.
148 Laval (2002: 266). See, namely Durkheim (2013b).
149 According to Laval (2002: 236), Durkheim expresses the synthesis of the Kantian and utilitarian imperatives in *La Division du travail social* when he writes the following maxim: "Put yourself in such a state as to usefully fulfill a determined function" (Durkheim 2013a: 6, emphasis in original, my translation).
150 Cortois and Laermans (2017: 68). My thanks to Liza Cortois for pointing her text out.
151 Cortois and Laermans (2017: 67).

152 Rousseau (1965: 21). Taylor (1991) also recognises this shift from Kant to Rousseau.
153 Cortois and Laermans (2017: 70).
154 Taylor (1991: 28).
155 Taylor (1991: 28–9).
156 See Illouz (2008), Prades (2014).
157 Slater (1997: 95).
158 Parsons (2007). Quoted in Cortois and Laermans (2017: 73).
159 Turner (2011: 74). See Parsons and Platt (1973).
160 Before Douglas and Isherwood (1979), Marshall Sahlins (1974) had already dynamited a certain number of precepts of economic theory as well as those which, within anthropology, kept it from making consumption (in indigenous as well as in modern societies) a legitimate object of study. The reaction of economists, as usual, has been to ignore these works.
161 Heilbrunn (2014: 112).
162 McCracken (1986: 71). See also McCracken (1988).
163 Lee (1993: 49).
164 Lury (2011: 14). Emphasis in original.
165 Douglas and Isherwood (1979), Heilbrunn (2014). See also Lury (2011), Slater (1997: 149–53), and Sassatelli (2007: 98–101).
166 I have discussed these issues at greater length in Gauthier (2014b).
167 Slater (1997: 29).
168 Arvidsson (2006: 36).
169 Slater (1997: 8).
170 Slater (1997: 8).
171 Arvidsson (2006: 36).
172 This means that I refuse to see media as constituting an autonomous sphere with logics of its own that has structuring powers over other spheres. See Gauthier (2015a).
173 Arvidsson (2006: 67), Lury (2004).
174 Lury (2004: 92). Quote inside the quote is to Berlant (1993: 186).
175 This interpretation of consumerism and branding from the perspective of the gift was first published in Gauthier (2014d), with some lineaments figuring also in Gauthier (2013a). See also Vol. 44 of the *Revue du MAUSS semestrielle*, which I co-edited, on consumption and the gift paradigm, as well as Lury's (2011: 32–6) discussion on consumption and the gift.
176 Mauss (1950). See also Godbout and Caillé (1992), Godelier (1996), Caillé (2000), Hénaff (2002), and Godbout (2007, 2013).
177 See Heilbrunn (2007, Chapter 4).
178 Atkin (2004: 8). See the discussion on this author below. Another important branding guru is John Grant (1999).
179 Cova and Rémy (2014). The incidences of the gift on recognition have been the object of a series of publications by the MAUSS and debates with Axel Honneth and Nancy Fraser, amongst which Caillé and Lazzeri (2009), Caillé (2007) and Vol. 23 of the *Revue du MAUSS semestrielle* (2004).
180 For an excellent article on how this functions amongst youth, namely through social media, see Lachance (2014).
181 Gorz (2003). My translation.
182 Lury (2011: 35).
183 This is Foster's (2008) main argument.
184 Holt (2004).
185 Holt (2004: 6). The definition of myth used by Holt (the resolution of paradoxes), interestingly, is derived from Claude Lévi-Strauss, even though he doesn't refer to him. He does refer to Catherine Bell amongst other anthropologists of religion.

186 Holt (2004: 9).
187 Atkin (2004: xiii).
188 Atkin (2004: xix). Atkin defines a cult in the same way, except the devotion aims 'some person, idea, or thing' rather than a brand.
189 Atkin (2004: 111).
190 Arvidsson (2011).
191 Heilbrunn (2006: abstract).
192 Heilbrunn (2006: abstract).
193 Wong (2007: 452).
194 Wong (2007: 452).
195 Bayat and Herrera (2010a: 17). See the other contributions in Bayat and Herrera (2010b).
196 Bayat and Herrera (2010a: 17).
197 Massey (1997: 122).
198 Taylor (2007b: 490). See Lambert (1985).
199 Lambert (1985: 373). My translation.
200 Bayat and Herrera (2010a: 17).
201 Wong (2007: 453).

6 RCT, RIP! Rethinking marketisation

What I have tried to establish in the preceding chapters is how important the developments of capitalism in modernity are for the analysis of social facts. I have tried to show how capitalism is not the spontaneous or natural development of a natural tendency in humanity to truck and barter, but rather that it is tied to the very dynamics of modernity, and that the free market emerged as an answer to the fundamental questions of the Enlightenment: The project of an autonomous society (i.e. unmoored from theological groundings) and an autonomous individual (i.e. freed from inherited status and an overarching cosmological order rooted in God's will). Rather than being a purely technical, economic term, the market is a political (and perhaps religious) answer to the modern question of social order, and its implementation and development in modernity cannot be detached from these original functions. I have argued that, as important as capitalism was in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the market, and economics in general, remained embedded within the framework of the modern state and the container of the nation. Modernity can be characterised, in a first moment, as the shift from a theological-political regime to a political regime, in which politics provided the ideological source for thoughts and practice alike, and in which the State became institutionalised as the principal structuring agent, with respect to the imagined community of the Nation. I have argued that this National-Statist regime had important consequences for religion, whose social location and substance were shaped by the logics of the Nation-State.

I have then argued that, in a second moment, a double revolution occurred in the last half of the twentieth century that eroded the foundations of this Nation-State regime and shifted the centre of gravity, or the structuring framework of modern societies, from politics to economics, with the Market emerging as that in which all other social spheres have become embedded, against a new global backdrop. Capitalist economies themselves were transformed in the process, disembedding from a Nation-State bound Fordist–Taylorist, production-based model to a globalised, financialised, and consumption-based post-Fordist model, with the consequence that the state's mission has been profoundly modified, and that a new type of Market-based politics has emerged and been disseminated throughout the

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entirety of the social, affecting all societal institutions and social spheres. The first of these was the cultural revolution of the 1960s, which was also, at its deepest level, a consumerist revolution, by which consumerism became the dominant social ethos and the matrix within which social and cultural values were remixed and fashioned, with processes such as branding becoming crucial. A fundamental aspect of this process has been the massification of an expressive type of individualism and its ethics of authenticity, which has superseded the moral and idealist individualism typical of the earlier modern period. Parallel and correlative with this, the turn of the 1980s ushered in a neoliberal revolution which consisted in the spectacular revival of nineteenth-century market radicalism. Renewing with the liberal project of regulating society through the market while considerably extending its empire, neoliberalism has saturated the political arena and imposed itself as a cultural ideology and a new grammar for governmentality, from the supranational level to the state and all the way down to the individual. In the same way that the Nation-State provided the matrix for the shaping of social realities and social imaginaries, so now does the Market, backed by a new sentiment of the Global. The consequences of this shift, I argue, are enormous, and transform all social spheres, including religion. As the National-Statist regime both *statised* and *nationalised* religion, so does the Global-Market regime *marketise* and *globalise* religion. The present chapter is devoted to defining the main characteristics and lines of force of what I assemble under the concept of *marketisation*.

The content of the three preceding chapters, whether on the rise of the market as a social regulator, the neoliberal revolution, or consumerism, is probably new for social scientists of religion. Nothing or close to nothing I have consigned in these chapters has ever figured in any work by sociologists of religion or religious studies scholars.[1] My hope is that readers will now agree that political economy, neoliberalism, and consumerism are extremely important issues, and that they cannot be ignored if one desires to understand what is going on today. While an increasing number of authors have now started to talk of neoliberalism and branding for instance, few are aware of the history and nature of these phenomena. This causes many problems, as authors tend to make loose and metaphorical uses of these terms and, without much reflexivity, refer to the meanings these concepts have for orthodox economic theory. We have seen how the conceptions of mainstream political economy are problematic, as they assume a completely decontextualised, universal model of formal rationality as well as a utilitarian anthropology that functions in an isolated economic sphere. Yet, neither the market, neoliberalism, consumption, nor branding are purely economic phenomena in reality. On the contrary, we have seen how the market has important political and cultural dimensions, as does neoliberalism, and that consumption is more about cultural meaning, identity construction, and communitisation as it is about 'the relationship between ends and scarce means which have alternate uses.' This is why the discussion in the present

chapter must dissipate any uncertainty about the meaning that I give to the concept of marketisation. If anything, I do not suggest that we outsource the explanation and comprehension of religious change to economists and neoclassical economic theory. The contrary is closer to what is needed: The re-appropriation of 'economic' phenomena by sociology and anthropology.

Sociology of religion against political economy

The neglect of economic matters by sociologists of religion[2] could make one think that the relation between this discipline and political economy is tenuous. This might be true for more recent times, but it certainly was not for the founders of what we call the sociology of religion. All of sociology's founders were intimate with neoclassical political economy, utilitarianism, and their offshoots in social sciences. To keep to the classics amongst classics, it should be common knowledge that Karl Marx's entire work was written in relation to that of Adam Smith, Jean-Baptiste Say, and David Ricardo. Marx literally wrote *Das Kapital* with the *Riches of Nations* on his desk, and he agreed with liberal economic theory for the most part, including on the determining role of 'infrastructural' (read: Means of economic production) realities on the development of societies. Marx diverged with Smith when he insisted that economic theory concealed social relations behind the mechanisms of price, and that these relations were not characterised by the 'freedom to choose' but rather class-based domination. Marx also attacked the market's supposed tendency towards equilibrium, arguing that 'free markets' were inherently unstable and caused inequalities and cyclical crises. In order to provide a theoretical alternative to the simple mechanics of *homo oeconomicus*, Marx resorted to religion. For him, religion acted as the 'superstructural' legitimation of capitalist domination par excellence (religion as the 'opium of the people') with respect to production processes, while the 'fetishism of the merchandise' and its alienation did the same for consumption.

Max Weber's case is different and similar at the same time. Weber was trained in law and political economy, and his thesis on medieval corporations was essentially an economic one. His ensuing intellectual project can be read as a critique of political economy (in both Smith and Marx's variants) by showing that *homo oeconomicus* and the tendency for accumulation were by no means natural but contextual and historical, as a result of a formidable change in mentalities. At the core of his answer, as we all know, stands religion. Understood as 'a system of the regulation of life,'[3] religion provided the impetus for the development of capitalism (or not) and the necessary complement (and remedy) to the 'icy waters of instrumental rationality.' The whole of Weber's sociology—and his sociology of religion in particular—incidentally, can be read as an answer to the question 'What is missing in political economy?' in order to understand human behaviour and the functioning of societies.

Émile Durkheim, finally, 'provided the most frontal assault both on the concept of the liberal-utilitarian individual and on its adequacy for either understanding or producing social order.'[4] Not only did Durkheim have an excellent knowledge of political economy, his doctoral thesis was on the very same theme that animated Adam Smith's *Riches of Nation* and for which he attempted to provide an alternative theory.[5] In *The Division of labour*, Durkheim critiques the way that political economy isolated this fundamental question within the confines of a differentiated economic sphere. Rising against the validity of political economy and utilitarianism's formal model, their reduction to self-interest, and their methodological individualism, Durkheim sought to re-inscribe the question of the division of labour in complex societies within the project of a general social science called sociology that he believed could (and should) synthetise all other social sciences, including political economy. Durkheim and his collaborators at the French school of sociology developed their entire research programme *against* political economy and utilitarian sociologists like Herbert Spencer, Durkheim's *bête noire*. In the actualisation of this programme, the Durkheimian School challenged every concept and every assumption of what he called utilitarianism (and which includes neoclassical political economy), starting with *homo oeconomicus*. This is why the *Elementary Forms of Religious Life* starts by insisting that 'individuals' (i.e. the modern conception of the person as an undetermined monad) are the product of society and not the reverse, as Adam Smith argued that society is the secondary product of individual exchanges. The Durkheimians also insisted on the non-contractual (i.e. social) dimensions of the contract, thereby showing how economic phenomena are embedded in pre-existing social norms and can therefore not be isolated within an abstract plane. François Simiand and Maurice Halbwachs are amongst those who pursued the Durkheimian programme by critiquing political economy's lack of a theory of money and challenging the law of market equilibrium and the formation of price, for instance, and laid the foundations for a sociological theory of economic phenomena that remains pertinent to this day. Overall, the Durkheimians showed the limitations of political economy's epistemological and methodological foundations, backed with a radical critique of its anthropology, methodological individualism, lack of empirical groundings, pure formality, and obsessive mathematisation. For the Durkheimians, not only did political economy's pretensions to be a natural science appear largely unwarranted, they critiqued its pretension to be a science *tout court*. Political economy, authors like Simiand argued, is essentially *ideological*, as its methods refuse any connection to the empirical world in favour of a purely deductive approach.[6]

In 1895, as he was called to give a course on the history of religions in Bordeaux, Durkheim had a 'revelation' that changed the course of his intellectual project. In a letter, he writes that it was in that year that he 'understood the capital role played by religion in social life,' and that this course 'marks

a demarcation line in the development of my thought, to the extent that all of my previous research had to be resumed from the start in order to be harmonised with my new views.'[7] With the help of his nephew Marcel Mauss and other contributors such as Henri Hubert and Robert Hertz, Durkheim henceforth developed a second research programme, connected to the first, in which religion was to play a central part. Unsatisfied with the previous answers he and his colleagues had drawn up in response to the division of labour and how social bond and individualities are formed, Durkheim turned to religion. In other words, *Durkheim's interest in religion was aimed at answering Adam Smith and political economy.* In this second research programme, Durkheim proceeded to show how social categories—including economics—were born of religious categories. Property, for example, which since Locke had been at the centre of liberal doctrine as a natural right, was shown to be a late conception. The Durkheimians also argued that, rather than being the *right* to enjoy something (which is a proposition that starts from the assumption of a pre-social individual with natural rights), property is better understood as the *interdict* of use for others. This proposition therefore accomplishes a spectacular reversal of perspective: Property, which seems to belong to the 'profane,' is better understood as a type of socially warranted *sacralisation* in a legal robe.[8] Following Durkheim's death and the decimation of the Durkheimians, the second programme was heralded by Marcel Mauss, who drifted away from issues explicitly related to religion towards that of the gift and archaic forms of exchange.

Looking at Durkheim highlights how the *sociology of religion was founded against political economy and utilitarianism.* Such a perspective goes further than Talcott Parsons' interpretation of Durkheim's opposition to utilitarianism, which sealed the understanding of the latter's sociology, especially in the English-speaking world.[9] Yet, Durkheim was not the only one to conceive of sociology as being essentially against political economy. The cases of Marx and Weber show that the sociology of religion was erected if not against, at least in some kind of constitutional opposition to and critique of political economy and economic liberalism.[10] It is only with the post-war generation of sociologists of religion that this foundational orientation was lost. Similarly, while religion was at the core of the founding fathers' projects for a general social science, the post-war years saw the study of religion become specialised in an increasingly marginal sub-discipline. As it sank deeper and deeper into the secularisation paradigm, the sociology of religion isolated itself with its object in a neatly differentiated social sphere, losing contact with other fields of study, the original ambition of a general social science, and its critical rapport to political economy.

Critiques of political economy

How did political economists react to the charges of the Durkheimians? Simply put, they did not (react). Durkheim's thesis, even with its title and

subject, received scarce and peripheral attention, and by economists who avowedly did not understand what he was talking about, deeming it unduly complicated. It is true that sociology is by far more complicated than the very basic laws that circumscribe neoclassical theory. This caused Simiand to ask 'How can one fight ideology with facts?'[11] The non-reception of Durkheimian economic sociology is not an isolated case. The shunning of any debate with voices coming from without the strict delimitations of the discipline seems constitutive of political economy, then as now. It is remarkable that liberal economists have never truly engaged with Marx's theory of value, nor with his crisis model. A striking example is Seele and Zapf's 'economics' entry in the *Oxford Handbook for the Study of Religion*, already mentioned. In this article, Marx is dealt with in a small paragraph which says that he 'proposed' an alternative paradigm 'but failed' (!). Noting that his 'definition of value draws on the labor used to produce economic goods' without further discussion, the paragraph laconically concludes that 'With the end of Soviet Union, the political and practical implementation of this economic alternative ceased.'[12] Neoclassical theory and its 'axioms,' the authors suggest, must be correct since capitalism has outlived its communist rival. The authors, who have probably never read a line of Marx, let alone Durkheim, typically confuse Marxian theory with the Soviet experience, and do not seem to think that the repeated crises of free market capitalism, including the enormous 2008 shock, could perhaps benefit from Marxian insights, since neoclassical theory continues to state that market failures are theoretically impossible and due to external causes.

Scholars from many horizons have critiqued neoclassical political economy since the Durkheimians, often with similar arguments and a similar overall judgement: That it is less scientific than it is an ideology legitimated by its apparent self-evidence and common sense, draped in the legitimacy conferred by its association with physics and the increasing use of mathematics. Nonetheless, economic anthropology[13] and economic sociology are critically opposed to the standard model of political economy *in totto*. Economic sociology, for instance, is composed to a large extent of neoclassical dissenters who have been marginalised by 'orthodox' economists. Again, the dialogue is one-sided, and there is no chance that any of these scholars may one day become a 'Nobel of economics' laureate.

Political economy, between ideology and religion

The founding fathers of sociology are not the only ones to have critiqued the foundations of economic theory. There is a long list of scholars who have argued that orthodox political economy is inherently ideological—or even religious—rather than scientific. A fair share of these are Marx-inspired, and thus qualifying political economy as religious is pejorative. Market economics is the new 'opium of the people': a superstructural legitimation of the domination of the wealthy over the bulk of the population. Such a

perspective rests on normative assumptions and a materialist foundation that is perhaps better left aside. Yet, other voices converge on the diagnosis without participating in a Marxist framework.

This is the case of Karl Polanyi, whose analysis discredits the main assumptions of the standard model, for example the idea of a naturally of spontaneously self-regulating market. In order to explain political economy's resistance to critique, Polanyi talks of a 'liberal creed' based on the 'true faith in the salvation of mankind thanks to a self-regulating market,' promoted with 'fanatism' and 'evangelical fervour' by its adherents. Economic liberalism, in other words, forms the core of a 'secular religion' which has accompanied and legitimised the development of capitalism.[14] Authors like Philip Goodchild and André Gorz present a similar argument:

> When religious or moral certainties were shattered [...], calculation emerged as a privileged source of unquestionable certainties; what was demonstrable, susceptible to organization, predictable by virtue of a calculation, had no need of the guarantee of any authority to be true and universally valid.[15]

It is in this context that economic rationality, which claimed to act upon the same methods and principles as physics and mechanics, increasingly took on the role of a 'substitute for religious morality [...] The accumulation of wealth was only the proof of the accuracy of the calculations and this accuracy required indefinite confirmation through reinvestments of the profit.'[16] Starting from a functional perspective, authors have targeted the tautological and unprovable nature of neoclassical theory as proof of its mythological and/or soteriological underpinnings.[17] What these works converge around, notwithstanding their limitations, is the idea that there exists a share of belief, metaphysics, mythological, and soteriological dimension at the heart of political economy, contrary to its claims as to the objective and natural aspects of economic realities.[18]

Interestingly, these external critiques have been met by internal ones, including that of Robert Nelson, former economist at the US Department of Interior and now Professor of Public Policy at the University of Maryland. Nelson was trained in neoclassical political economy and remains a self-proclaimed believer in the virtues of the free market and a liberal economist, and so his critique is all the more striking. In his *Economics as Religion*, Nelson traces the history of American political economy from the 1940s until today, showing how Cambridge (MIT) professor Paul Samuelson's 'neo-progressivist' vision came to dominate the discipline with its brand of Keynesian-inspired 'scientific management' of society through market-guided principles until the 1960s, when the Milton Friedman-led Chicago school supplanted it with a more radical and libertarian neoliberal variant. While the basic tenets remained the same from one to the other, the shift highlights how the idea that the state is and must be an important

actor in the regulation of society and the administration of the economy tipped to one in which the state must serve the market, whose mechanisms are invested with the function of main social regulator.[19] Nelson attacks orthodox political economy's claim of scientificness and value-neutrality, arguing that the discipline promotes a 'powerful set of value distinctions'[20] as well as a worldview in which 'modern science,' economics, and 'industrial advance [can solve] the basic problems of the human condition.'[21] Analysing the main neoclassical precepts, Nelson argues to their normative rather than descriptive nature, for example in the determination of the costs that are valid for calculation (e.g. *not* environmental or social consequences),[22] and the idea that 'generating utility is a means in and of itself.'[23] According to Nelson, the idea that the market is self-regulating is tautological and utopian, and rests on a 'leap of faith' that 'simply assumes from the outset a perfect solution to the very problem that an economic system is supposed to solve.'[24] Whether in its static or dynamic variant, market equilibrium, Nelson continues, has never been proven (however advanced the maths). This is because it is impossible to prove and as such unfalsifiable. Similarly, the 'law of self-interest' which forms the core of the *homo economicus* conception of mankind is also an unquestioned, unfalsifiable, and tautological premise.[25]

Nelson notes how Chicago neoliberalism was born during the cultural revolution of the 1960s and its 'remarkable change in values'[26] away from 'ethical commitments to […] personal sacrifice, duty to country, civic participation, political involvement, and so forth'—all National-Statist values—'towards individual self-expression,'[27] 'disrespect for traditional authority and the promotion of a new individualism and libertarianism in many areas of American life.'[28] He argues that these cultural changes provided the ground for the plausibility of the idea that individuals 'can be expected to act to serve his or her own wishes and desires,'[29] i.e. uninhibited self-interest for individual gain. In this respect, Howard Becker's development of Rational Choice Theory to non-economic phenomena is the epitome of this prescriptive model, as it implicitly assumes that individuals *should* act as maximising, self-interested calculating *homo oeconomicus* in all areas of life, from partnerships to crime. This argument leads to the conclusion that Rational Choice in particular, and the neoliberal project in general, is not as much an explanation of social phenomena as it is an affirmation of the expressive-individualist revolution of the 1960s and the neoliberal normative project.[30]

In order to qualify the underlying nature of political economy, Nelson turns to the concept of religion. For him, political economy provides the solution—the free market—to the paradox of achieving the common good out of self-interested atoms, 'something only religion can do.'[31] It also provides a form of inner-worldly promise of salvation through infinite economic growth: 'The most vital religion of the modern age has been economic progress.'[32] Economists, Nelson argues, have mainly provided the

scientific, moral, and spiritual legitimacy for the development and globalisation of capitalism. Economists, he continues, are therefore less scientists than 'the priesthood of a powerful secular religion' that 'leaves God out of the picture.' They are the 'defenders of a core social ethic grounded in a religious truth,' and the promoters of a specific vision regarding 'ultimate values,' or 'ultimate reality' that has shaped 'the workings of history.'[33] In conclusion, Nelson urges the economics profession and discipline to shed its 'scientific hypocrisy,' drop its tautological assumptions, and come clean with its normative content. For him, orthodox economics must admit its 'theological' nature and surpass it by becoming a true science; i.e. recognise that it is a *social* science, and that it should take inspiration from sociology.

Such an endeavour is precisely what heterodox economists—or economic sociologists—such as Mark Granovetter and Robert Boyer, founders of the network and regulation schools respectively, have attempted to do.[34] In order to avoid the fatal trappings of neoclassical political economy, both have proposed a move away from mathematical models in favour of empirical methods and the consideration that economic relations and economic facts must be reintegrated within wider social relations, for example networks and institutional regulations, respectively. In other words, both currents founded by these researchers, which are dismissed by orthodox economists, stress the embeddedness of economics in the social and resent a differentiated approach that only legitimates the formal rationality model.

A final example in our brief tour of the critiques of neoclassical political economy is provided by Australian economist Steve Keen, who qualifies his training in orthodox economics as 'indoctrination.'[35] According to him, the discipline is guilty of presenting the assumptions of neoclassical political economy as being validated and indisputable facts. He also points to the lack of courses in epistemology, theory, the history of the discipline, the history of ideas, and history general in favour of technical training in mathematics and statistics.[36] Keen also points at the lack of confrontation of the standard model with reality (namely economic crises). He refrains from using religious terminology apart from qualifying as 'faith' the rapport that economists have regarding the fundamental assumptions of the neoclassical model. The originality here is that, recognising that economists are deaf to critiques coming from outside their clubhouse, he proceeds to critique economics by 'using economic theory itself'[37] and proving it wrong. Keen systematically denounces the 'rickety foundations' of the standard model and the problem underlying its universal teaching in economics curricula around the world. He emphasises the predictable nature of economic crises, and critiques the following: (1) the lack of a theory of consumer demand that accounts for the fall of demand as prices rise; (2) the falsity of the law of price fixation through supply and demand; (3) the falsity of the postulate that 'equating marginal cost and marginal revenue maximises revenue'; (4) that the theory of the firm is inconsistent because size matters, and because the same model cannot be applied

to small businesses and mega-corporations alike; (5) that economic theory cannot distinguish between competition and monopoly; (6) that the theory of supply requires conditions that can hardly exist in practice; (7) that macroeconomics cannot be deduced from aggregating microeconomics (i.e. individual selling and buying) but has its own consistency; (8) that wages do not reflect worker contribution and merit; (9) that the liberal theory of capital is logically inconsistent; (10) that assumptions are not neutral; (11) that they define in practice what is orthodox and what is rejected from the discipline's faculty and publications; (12) the inappropriateness of static models; (13) that the conditions needed for market efficiency cannot apply in the real world; (14) that finance markets are not efficient, and do affect the real economy (as the 2008 crisis indeed blatantly shows but orthodox theory dismisses); (15) that the fault for the 1929 crisis was not the Federal Reserve's nor the government's, but market deregulation, etc.[38] When one adds the elements of this long list, what remains of neoclassical theory is a 'field of smoking ruins,' as one commentator put it. I cannot go into the details of Keen's critique, but what is important at this stage is to acknowledge the convergence of the many critiques of the neoclassical model and the fact that they put into question its foundations and denounce its lack of confrontation with empirical methods. Whether one gives credence to these critiques or not, it is essential to at least record that the tools of orthodox political economy cannot be applied to economic phenomena (e.g. consumer decisions) without serious reservations, let alone be accepted as a general model for human behaviour.

Furthermore, this tour highlights how most if not all of these critiques can be traced back to the founders of sociology: Marx, Weber, and perhaps especially Durkheim and the Durkheimians. The fact that orthodox political economy has systematically refused to discuss these critiques (let alone understand them) and accept the challenge of submitting its deductive model to empirical verifications also supports Simiand's argument that political economy is inherently ideological (if not religious). So, now, what happens when this neoclassical model and its neoliberal outgrowth by the name of Rational Choice project to apply to religion? This question is crucial if we want to establish a fecund and workable definition of 'marketisation' that can be effectively and heuristically applied to religion. What should sociologists of religion do: Side with heterodox economists, sociology, and anthropology, or with orthodox economists?

RCT, RIP!

Rodney Stark and William Bainbridge launched their first missive in 1980; yet, the Rational Choice Approach to Religion (RCAR) only really took off in the late 1980s and early 1990s, when it became mainstream in American sociology of religion and disseminated worldwide, including in regions such as China.[39] Its view on marketisation is simply the transposition of

religion within the neoclassical framework and relies heavily, if not solely, on Gary Becker's work. It therefore rests on a small set of explicit assumptions that should be familiar to the reader at this point: 'maximizing behaviour, market equilibrium, and stable preferences, used relentlessly and unflinchingly.'[40] To these, we can add another set of either implicit or correlate assumptions: (1) social facts are to be analysed starting from the perspective of the individual (methodological individualism); (2) people have varying motivations for actions but these can either be bracketed or reduced to preference variations on self-interest; (3) social and cultural determinations can also be bracketed; (4) society and culture have no consistency ('there is no such thing as society, there are individual men and women and there are families'—Thatcher); (5) social actors appear as interchangeable 'individuals' which are cast as beings of incessant needs, who adopt maximising behaviours in their quest for satisfaction, understood as the pursuit of gratifications and the avoidance of pains;[41] (6) these individuals with their needs, preferences, and resources appear in 'markets' where they meet with an array of producers of religious goods; (7) religious organisations and institutions, however large and formal or small and informal, are presented as 'firms' who behave as individuals; (8) these 'goods' are called 'salvation goods';[42] (9) religious producers are 'also viewed as optimisers—maximising members, net resources, government support,'[43] etc.; (10) the space of the market is one of the competitions in which producers compete to be the best; (11) the market knows only winners and losers; (12) religious producers are believed to naturally pursue growth; (13) the overall market (national? local? global?) is believed to be in equilibrium, that is, religious demand and supply are optimally distributed; (14) the market is supposed to be unhindered by external interventions; and, finally, (15) the demand for religious products is an anthropological constant, what changes is supply (hence the appellation 'supply-side theory').

The founding argument of RCAR authors is to dismiss secularisation theories as an illusion, and their main proposition is that the more a 'religious market' is freed from state regulation, the more pluralism there is, as 'religious consumers' are faced with more variety and choice to meet their needs.[44] As in economic affairs, the translation of liberal economics to religion sees the state as an efficiency waster and an unwelcome regulator. State regulation leads to monopolies (of one particular religion or non-religion), while deregulation leads to religious vitality. By opening the religious market to competition, deregulation is also believed to 'improve the quality' of the religious offer, i.e. the adaptation of the supply to the demand. Since religious producers must compete for market shares according to the mechanisms of the market, they become more in tune with consumer needs and 'give the customer what he wants.' The model's emphasis on the positive effects of deregulation is presented as an explanation for the religious vitality one finds in the US in comparison to Europe, as well as for the ongoing religious revival in China.[45]

RCAR did not emerge as a theoretical proposition amongst others. Following in the steps of Gary Becker's takeover of sociology's traditional domain—social interactions—RCAR scholars marched in triumphantly and announced a self-proclaimed 'paradigm shift' that was to (finally!) move the sociology of religion from ideology (secularisation) to science.[46] Proceeding 'deductively' from a set of 'axioms,' RCAR authors 'immodestly'[47] proposed a universal theory of religion that was supposed to solve the issue once and for all. In the words of Iannaccone: 'Economic theory, or more precisely rational choice theory, offers a new paradigm in the sociology of religion, one that may eventually replace or encompass many of the generalizations and approaches now competing for researchers' attention.'[48] The aim of RCAR is not to simply add a heuristic avenue for understanding religion. What is sought is to replace sociological theory altogether by a 'conceptually clean and empirically fruitful'[49] economic approach that promises to *explain* (like natural sciences) social realities as the former cannot. Before continuing with the discussion, I ask this question: If anyone in sociology who was *not* an economist rose and claimed that he (for it would probably be a man, as RCAR scholars are entirely male) had found *the* solution to be applied to all domains of religious life, and that this theory was entirely formal and deductive (rather than inductive), based on a series of simple principles (rather than empirically grounded), what would have been the reaction of the discipline? In the light of today's emphasis on empirical methods and contextualisation, and the general turn away from grand theoretical enterprises, I imagine that the vast majority of scholars would dismiss this person a priori without the hint of an afterthought.

Reactions to RCT's hostile takeover, on the other hand, have been varied. Many have been seduced by the simplicity of the model and its 'cleanliness,' as well as by its apparent self-evidence (are people not self-interested?), and have attempted to develop its 'heuristic value' along different lines, with less or more critical distance, and with less than more convincing results.[50] In Europe, the attraction has been more measured than in the US, with the notable example of some ambiguous sympathisers,[51] while others, like Seele and Zapf,[52] have taken to celebrate it wholeheartedly. On the whole, RCAR has generated many critiques; yet, radical dismissals have been rare. Notable critiques include the following. For Beckford, RCAR's methodological individualism is problematic, as it evacuates the importance of social norms and structures. For him as well as van der Veer, RCAR's 'narrow and exclusively instrumental conception of *rationality*'[53] is problematic, as religion is obviously more a case of *Wertrationalität* (value-oriented rationality) than *Zweckrationalität* (instrumental rationality). Turner and Casanova argue that the 'assumption that a society with a state church gives that church a monopoly position is questionable and the assumption that monopoly is an imposition on a society is dubious,'[54] as the examples of Poland, Russia, and Serbia show. Turner and Bruce argue that the 'idea that competitive religious markets, like secular economic markets, automatically enhance

choice of services, quality of products and efficiency of services is questionable.'[55] For Demerath, 'while sociologists tend to seek out explanations inductively for independent testing, most economists then to build their constructs deductively and then seek out kindred applications.'[56] Furthermore, RCAR's 'lust for the measurable' loses 'sight of the meaningful,'[57] and Robertson joins in to declare RACR to be essentially normative. In addition, the analyses and results of RCAR authors regarding the 'positive' effect of pluralism on religious vitality are contestable, as methodological and calculation errors have been pointed out.[58] Chaves and Gorski have argued that the 'empirical evidence does not support the claim that religious pluralism is positively associated with religious participation in any general sense.'[59] Liliane Voyé, meanwhile, notes that RCAR posits a universal and unchanging market form and ignores changes in the economy, for instance Fordist–Taylorist to post-Fordist informational capitalism.[60] Finally, Spickard devised a computer program using the Rational Choice precepts in order to test the 'aggregate outcomes of individual choices in a religious marketplace,'[61] and which shows RCAR's predictions to be false. In another contribution, Spickard's examination of 'three key theoretical assumptions' of RCAR rejects two as being false, 'and the third to be so vague as to be useless.'[62] Considering these limitations, it is surprising to read that sociologists of religion still welcome the eruption of RCAR in their discipline. Beckford's judgement is symptomatic, as he considers that the 'potential benefit from analysing religious movements in terms of rational choice is high.'[63] Similarly, Dawson sees Brazil as a potential terrain for the application of RCAR.[64] For Robertson, 'the economic approach to religion cannot be entirely rejected.'[65] Finally but tellingly, even Spickard refuses to discard RCAR, arguing that his findings undercut 'neither the utility of the market-model itself nor of a rational-choice model of human behavior (as opposed to action).'[66]

What is striking in these debates is the apparent ignorance of these leading sociologists of religion regarding the content and history of neoclassical political economy, as well as of its critiques. Faced with RCT's triumphalism, scholars have not instinctively renewed with the anti-utilitarian and anti-economistic foundations of their discipline. Their critiques are certainly warranted, but sociologists of religion have tended to discuss RCAR on its own turf and in its own terms. Incidentally, it is as if they have rediscovered the wheel. The specialisation of the discipline and its hinging on the differentiation of social spheres theory has allowed sociologists of religion to leave economics to economists and therefore lose sight of how sociology was founded *against utilitarianism*,[67] and how their own (sub)discipline was constituted *against* the pretentions of political economy.

In my view, the response to RACR should be quite radical, and should flow from a critique of neoclassical political economy itself. The critiques made by the Durkheimian school as concerns the methodological, epistemological, and empirical shortcomings of neoclassical economic theory

are as valid now as they were over a century ago since the content of the standard theory has remained unchanged, behind its mathematisation. It should then appear as no surprise that the unfounded and essentially normative nature of neoclassical assumptions continues to be criticised by heterodox economists, economic anthropologists, and economic sociologists alike, from a variety of perspectives and methods. The fact that these critiques have failed to lead to a profound reassessment of the economics discipline and to a pluralisation of its theories is simply scandalous and should be denounced as covering up an essentially ideological function of which economists themselves seem largely unaware of. Rather than accepting that economists debark into other social scientific domains with their fatally flawed standard theory, social scientists should be the ones inviting themselves in the orthodox clubhouse. If sociologists of religion would take interest in what is happening in marketing departments for instance, they would notice that neoclassical theory has been abandoned in whole strands of market and consumer research in favour of sociological and anthropological theories, including religious anthropology, as I have shown in the preceding chapter. Similarly, it is no wonder if the UK-based 'Cultures of Consumption' research programme concluded that consumption was 'not about meeting needs' but the creation of meaning and practices, and that '[a]ttempts to apply an economic model of the rational, individual consumer are fraught with problems.'[68] As a consequence, if neoclassical theory is invalid for thinking the consumption of everyday goods, how could it have the slightest relevance for thinking religion? It is this type of ignorance that has plagued a large portion of the debates in the social scientific study or religion, especially in the US but not only, namely by creating a sterile Manichean polarisation between those for/against secularisation and those against/for RCAR.

In the meantime, this false debate has only deepened some of the ruts in which the secularisation paradigm had led the discipline, e.g. a quantitative focus on religious institutions, belief, exclusive belonging, measurable religious practice, and state–Church relations. RCAR has been completely inapt at bringing in fresh tools for understanding religious change. Because it is based on a supposedly universal formal model, it could not be otherwise. As some perspicacious authors have underlined, the focus on individual choice shows the profound embeddedness of RCAR in modern liberal ideology. While some have remarked on the ethnocentric—or US-centric—nature of RCAR (RCAR does not explain the US case as much as the US case makes the otherwise lofty claims of RCAR plausible), no author to date has contextualised the origins of RCT in Gary Becker's work. Had this been the case, it would have immediately appeared that RCAR, as RCT in general, *is* neoliberalism. The neoliberal project, as we have seen, includes the expansion of a neoclassical economic logic to the entirety of the social (and the natural world)—i.e. the translation of every social reality into neoclassical terminology. In other words, RCAR and RCT are first

and foremost conceptual expressions of capitalism, the naturalisation of its categories, and the legitimation of a capitalist worldview. This is why, in the end, this can only be a false route in order to try and understand the effects of neoliberalism and consumerism-drenched globalisation on religion, and vice-versa.

Because of its supposedly 'natural' and 'universal' applicability, RCAR is unable to feed an analysis of *religious change*. Contrary to what some scholars think, RCAR is not a set of neutral tools that one could simply make use of, no harm done. Mobilising neoclassical concepts *inherently* values individuals over collectives, the market over the state, deregulation over regulation, growth over 'stagnation' or decline, winners over losers, choice over socialisation, pluralism over homogeneity, competition over monopolies, etc. It is arguable that every theory has a normative dimension; yet, some theories are normative through and through, and this is the case of RCT. Such is also the case of related notions such as spiritual/religious capital and branding, which are increasingly being used (without any knowledge of where these notions originate and what they involve) and which mainly contribute to translate non-economic social realities in liberal economic terminology. If these 'tools' seem to 'fit' certain contemporary religious phenomena, it is only because they are *specular* to the changes that have been occurring in the last decades. They *mirror* but fail to *analyse, account for*, and *understand*. Sociologists (and economists) should think of why this theory appeared when and where it did. It should not take a long stroll amidst the history of ideas to see how thinking about religion in economic terms was unheard-of and simply impossible just a few decades ago, as religion and economics were intuitively held to belong to opposite sets of realities.

From RCT to postmodern fragmentation: the episteme of the Global-Market regime

I have argued in Chapter 2 that the Nation-State era produced an adjusted epistemology, namely the secularisation paradigm and its inherent methodological nationalism. While religion was statised and nationalised within the National-Statist regime, the secularisation narrative and methodological nationalism substituted a comprehensive explanation of religion for the naturalisation of its central characteristics. Following the wider evolutions within modern societies, we can appreciate how Gary Becker's putsch in sociology and the ramifications of RCT in the sociology of religion occurred at the very moment the Global-Market regime rose to dominance. As I have argued earlier, the success of RCT is only the tip of a larger iceberg that saw utilitarianism win over the bulk of social sciences as well as moral and political philosophy (Bourdieu, Crozier, Coleman, Rawls, etc.), unmooring whole continents of social sciences from their critical constitution with respect to utilitarianism. As a consequence, market theories

can do nothing to help us understand the religious changes that have occurred in the last decades *since they participate in the very movement that needs to be understood and analysed*. In order to understand the effects of the rise to dominance of neoliberalism and consumerism, therefore, we must de-compartmentalise our understanding of economics and seize its non-economic dimensions. We need to understand that economics is too important to leave to economists. The marketisation of religion, in other words, requires an *anti-utilitarian* theory—i.e. not limited to self-interest and neoclassical assumptions—of marketisation that builds on the preceding chapters on neoliberalism and consumerism.

It should be clear by now how RCAR contributes to naturalise and legitimise a libertarian, neoliberal brand of utilitarian individualism. We have seen that the Global-Market regime also consecrates the rise of expressive individualism, which is at the very crux of the dynamics of consumption. Yet, a second theoretical ensemble completes the episteme of the Global-Market regime: The 'postmodern' discourse that insists on fragmentation and the 'end of grand narratives.'[69] Here is not the place to embark on a thorough discussion, but suffice it to underline how postmodern claims emerged at the same time as RCT in social sciences. Rather than promoting utilitarianism, postmodernism has stressed the end of societies, increased individualism (with either pessimistic or optimistic evaluations), and the dissolution of pretty much anything and everything that was henceforth solid and institutionalised. In the study of religion, adherence to a form or another of this perspective is widespread, as the soft consensus seems to be that we are in some sort of transient and formless era—something that terminology like '*religion en miettes*'[70] (religion in bits and pieces), and uncertain concepts like quasi-/pseudo-/surrogate-/implicit religion convey. The expression 'à la carte religion,' however, which gives the impression of a freely (liberal!) choosing subject, does give us a clue as to the organising principle behind all of this fragmentation: Market economics. Because of its moorings in the same context-dependent epistemological structure, the postmodern fragmentation narrative has been loosely compatible with RCAR, as the success of market-inspired expressions like 'pick and choose religion,' 'spiritual marketplace,' and 'salvation goods' indicates.[71]

As much as the Nation-State requires compartmentalisation, clear boundaries, and institutions that are recognisable as such and which the state can manage, the Market, with its inherent globalising tendencies, thrives on the contrary on fluidity, de-territorialisation, adaptability, and feebly instituted organisations, as the aforementioned discussion on governance indicates. A capitalist market thrives on *flows*. In other words, fragmentation is the market's mode of organisation; it is a consequence and a sign of its very mode of regulation. This is why the postmodern analysis in terms of fragmentation and transience is as much a symptom of religion in the Global-Market regime as is the expansion of utilitarian epistemologies. By insisting on fragmentation, the postmodernist narrative turns its back

on an attempt to find the structuring logics that are at work in contemporary transformations, which thus appear to be incoherent and decomposed. This terminology has had enormous success amongst authors inscribed in the secularisation *paradigm*, once they started to distance themselves from outright secularisation *theses*. The fragmentation discourse fits nicely with a political and institutional perspective on religion, as it frames *what seems to be going on* in the terms of *where we were*.

The origin and success of the market metaphor

What is the marketisation of religion, then, once it is established that it is not, cannot, and must not mean the outsourcing of sociological analysis to neoclassical and neoliberal political economy? Religion has been traditionally understood as being of a completely different nature than the market.[72] Like oil and water, religion and the market have been mainly cast as indissoluble into one another. Market-type exchanges, along with the bureaucratic operations of the modern state apparatus, have been understood as partaking in functional types of relations, typical of modernity, in which individuals are interchangeable. In this type of sociality, social bond is not created or maintained, and hence it stands opposed to the traditional sociality of pre-modern societies, and is said to endure in close-knit familial and friendship relations. This distinction is captured by the classical opposition between *Gesellschaft* (society) and *Gemeinschaft* (community) proposed by Ferdinand Tönnies,[73] and which Alain Caillé has re-actualised in his opposition between gift-based 'primary sociality' and functional 'secondary sociality.'[74] From this perspective, the core of religion is something 'money can't buy.'[75] This classical casting of the religion and market couple has produced a large body of valuable scientific literature, and still does. Yet, the opposition has been progressively eroded, to the extent that RCT has integrated religion into its field of competence.

We can point to Peter Berger's Chapter 6 ('Secularization and the Problem of Plausibility') in his classic *The Sacred Canopy* (1967) as the inaugural moment of such a shift. Berger writes:

> As a result [of pluralisation, and therefore the end of religious monopolies in favour of voluntary adhesions], the religious tradition has to be *marketed*. It must be "sold" to a clientele that is no longer constrained to "buy." The pluralistic situation is, above all, a *market situation*. In it, the religious institutions become marketing agencies, and the religious tradition become consumer commodities. And at any rate a good deal of religious activity in this situation comes to be dominated by the logic of market economics.[76]

This passage has often been quoted; yet, it remains under-discussed. Put back in the flow of Berger's book, it appears today as both visionary

and dated. For Berger (as with Weber), market economics are the *summum* of rationalisation, and are therefore constitutively *secularising* in the sense that they erode the former social function of religion—providing an unquestionable 'sacred canopy' for pre-modern societies—and contribute to the privatisation of religion. While Berger's version of secularisation has been widely repudiated, including by himself, and while the terms in which he understood privatisation have been contested, he did highlight the ways in which religion was becoming reconfigured according to the moral and therapeutic 'needs' of modern individuals. While he overstated the disappearance of 'supernatural' elements in religion, he did foresee how religion would become increasingly voluntary and guided by the logics of 'choice.' Yet, what did Berger mean by 'marketing,' 'selling,' and 'buying' religion? Are these terms to be taken literally or metaphorically? The quotation marks applied by Berger to the last two terms seem to introduce a distance with respect to any literal interpretation, but if we read the chapter in its entirety, Berger is undoubtedly literal in his resort to free-market terminologies, such as when he discusses how 'consumer demand' impacts the product being supplied in the 'religious market.'

If we follow Berger's lead, we are brought into thinking that religion in pre-modern societies, as a monopolistic institution involved in the production of a sacred canopy, was not thinkable in economic terms. Secularisation, as a constitutive feature of modernisation, was meanwhile the result of various rationalisation processes, one of which is the development of capitalism. As a consequence, it is only once its social functions had been sufficiently eroded that religion *became* marketable. In Berger's view, casting religion in economic terms is the product of a historical process. Three decades later, another American sociologist of religion, Wade Clark Roof, made a similar argument when he defined the religious landscape of contemporary societies as a so-defined 'spiritual marketplace': 'An open, competitive religious economy makes possible an expanded spiritual marketplace which, like any marketplace, *must* be understood in terms both of "demand" and "supply".'[77] The only difference with Berger here is that an analysis in neoclassical terms has become so self-evident as to become a must. Marketisation therefore signifies that the divide between religion and market that existed in classical sociology has been blurred in favour of the market, and that religion has become a product in its own right. It may be a peculiar product, but in the end, one can apply a neoclassical calculus to the outcome of the encounter of individual religious 'needs' and suppliers' 'offers.'

The most radical offspring of Peter Berger's prophetic chapter is therefore, and paradoxically, RCAR. It is a paradox since Rational Choice authors have energetically contested secularisation theory (of which Berger was a tenor) and have sonorously beaten the drum of its death, self-appointing themselves as a 'new paradigm.' Yet, they have simply developed Berger's market argument to its full extent. The fact that religion is a 'product' here is anything but metaphorical, as we have seen, and the aim of such a theory

is even to extend to predictions, as in pure sciences. Incidentally, Rational Choice does not do away with the distinction between *Gesellschaft* and *Gemeinschaft per se*. By positing that non-functional—i.e. non-economic and non-bureaucratic—phenomena can be analysed with neoclassical economic theory, it rather stipulates that the distinctiveness of *Gemeinschaft* sociality is negligible in the end and that individuals behave in love, friendships, and religion much like they do in a supermarket and any other market-type exchange, i.e. as self-interested, pre-social, and rational agents seeking to maximise their utility—in other words their pleasure or profit. There is no longer anything that money can't buy.

Authors like Berger and Roof make references to the 'laws of the market' without actually mobilising neoclassical economic theory and Rational Choice, of which, contrary to Durkheim, Weber, and Simmel, they seem completely unaware. They write that religion could or should be analysed in market terms, yet do not resort to the arcana of utilitarian calculus themselves. Nor do they provide any substantial theoretical discussion on other market-related concepts, and how this may apply to a non-economic 'good' such as religion. The argument remains suggestive at best. The reference to neoclassical economic theory appears therefore more metaphorical or analogical than literal in the end.

Mara Einstein's *Brands of Faith* provides further material for our discussion, as it illustrates a tension that runs through much research on the marketisation and branding of religion.[78] Through a score of mostly American examples (again…), she brilliantly documents how religion is increasingly being marketed and branded in a very strict sense, and how religious organisations are now faced with the obligation to think about themselves in market terms. Like Roof, she talks of a religious market that can be understood in terms of neoclassical economics and Rational Choice theory (even if she also refrains from doing so). In the end, as Teemu Taira aptly notes, Einstein and Roof's works do 'not contain any theorization of the concept of the market, nor any type of deeper substantial theoretical discussion of other closely related concepts such as "economy," "product," or "consumer".' He therefore concludes that their 'engagement with economics and market theory really amounts to little more than a selective and rather shallow employment of its language and terminology.'[79]

Einstein does insist however on how branding is primarily concerned with creating *identity* and *meaning*. A former marketer herself, she argues that this is where marketing and religion meet rather than oppose themselves: In the creation of identity, meaning, and belonging/community. Einstein does not seem to be aware that she is opening a door onto another way of considering the market: Not as an abstract space for the encounter of rationalities, but rather as a social institution involved in the circulation of meaning. A symbolic space. One that is best approached from an anthropological rather than an economics perspective. We have seen how the marketing discipline tossed aside neoclassical theories in order to understand,

follow, and promote the expressive revolution carried by consumerism. Following Mary Douglas and Baron Isherwood's *World of Goods*, we also saw how the anthropology of consumption and Cultural Studies developed a rich theoretical framework for seizing the social and cultural dynamics of identity, transmission, community, normativity, belonging, and meaning that are involved in modern consumption. Unfortunately, once again, these currents have been all but ignored by scholars of religion.

Religion and economics as vampires

Instead of this, two sets of concurrent theories have attracted scholars' attention. Both proceed from the idea of strongly differentiated social spheres (here: Economics and religion) and maintain the opposition between market-type *Gesellschaft* and gift-based *Gemeinschaft* socialities, yet provide opposite interpretations of the recent impact of marketisation on religion. The first perspective denounces the instrumentalisation of the market by religious actors, and is relatively widespread in research concerned with the exponential development of halal and 'sharia-friendly' products worldwide. While this point of view is seldom expressed as bluntly, its narrative runs something like this: The 'halal explosion' is the result of a manipulation of the possibilities of the globalised markets by fundamentalist currents aiming to disseminate their fanatic and ideological project (e.g. Kepel 2012). The purity of the market (and of the secular in general), in other words, is co-opted and soiled by religion.

The second perspective worries about the reverse trend, meaning the dangers of 'commodification' for religion. This is the case of works that warn regarding the impact of consumer culture on Christianity and other religious traditions.[80] Others deal with various forms of alternative spiritualities, healing, and self-help techniques, as well as other holistic practices. Most are overtly critical, such as Jeremy Carrette and Richard King's symptomatic *Selling Spirituality*, which denounces the 'capitalist takeover' and sullying of religion and spirituality. The authors lament and denounce the dissemination of holistic spiritualities that claim to 'soothe away the angst of modern living' and 'the shallowness of materialism' (a 'fallacy') but which instead legitimate 'corporate interests.' In this narrative, religion and spirituality have been 'hijacked' and turned into an 'alienating addiction.'[81] Carrette and King's lament is nothing new, as it simply re-actualises the old Marxian idea of religion as the opium of the people and ideological superstructure serving the domination of capitalism, with the twist that somewhere under the surface lies not class warfare, but rather an authentic and unsullied spirituality with a potential for resistance. In *Brand Islam*, Faegheh Shirazi presents a variation on this theme, as she similarly denounces the instrumentalisation and 'exploitation' of Islam by morality-devoid profit-seeking market actors who promote 'false halal' products and '*hijabi* dolls.'[82] Here, it is the purity of religion that is threatened by the sullying potential of evil market forces.

It is hard to see what 'corporate takeover' refers to when talking about 'new spiritualities.' Where are the yoga and meditation chains in our city landscapes? Where is the McDonald's of qi-gong? Or is this supposed to refer to the fact that many multinational corporations have added tai-chi and Mindfulness meditation to their fitness offers on lunch breaks? As Taira remarks, this literature once again lacks any sort of serious theorising about capitalism and concepts like the market, commodification, and so on.[83] The reader might have noted how the two aforementioned perspectives are symmetrical. They are, in fact, specular: They are mirror images of one another. Both view economics and religion as exclusive social spheres, yet diverge in their interpretation. The first accuses religion's spoiling of the purity of the market, while the second points the finger at market opportunism and the way that it corrupts religion. Both these interpretations are normative more than they are analytic, as they define what the secular or religion (e.g. halal) *should* be. They therefore fail as heuristic frameworks for understanding marketisation, which is cast as being either a tool for manipulation or a vehicle for the corruption of 'authentic' religion. Besides the essentialism of such propositions, they convey the idea that the marketisation of religion can therefore only signify the external pressure of one on the other.

Towards a holistic approach to religion and economics

It is possible to oppose a holistic approach to the differentiation one contained in the perspectives listed earlier. Seen from another angle, the relation between religion and consumption appears much richer, complex, and two-ways than what the authors mentioned earlier lead us to think. In their edited book *Faith in the Market. Religion and the Rise of Urban Commercial Culture*, John Giggie and Diane Winston explore the 'interplay of religion, commercial culture and urbanization in North American cities since the 1880s' and challenge the idea that urbanisation and the 'rapid advance of industrial capitalism' fuelled 'a declension in religious devotion and practice, as many historians suggest, but rather a *profound transformation*, even flowering, of it.'[84] The authors note how, for instance, modern religious movements were often born in cities. In essence, they continue, 'commercial culture lies at the heart of the evolution of both urban religion and of urbanisation for people of different faiths,' and that to examine 'religion and commercial culture apart from one another is to risk losing insight into the historical development of religious traditions and cosmopolitan cities.'[85] It follows from this argument that there is nothing new about religion intermingling with commercialisation of a sort or another:

> It would not be unusual to see the faithful, acting with the full blessings of their leaders, purchase clothing that telegraphed their beliefs, buy household objects embodying their devotion, advertise their brand of salvation in newspapers, or use the airwaves to publicize their unique revelation.[86]

In *Pilgrimage in the Marketplace*, Ian Reader exposes a similar argument and challenges the opposition between pure, sacred, austere, and solemn 'real religion,' and base, noisy, tacky, and degrading consumption and market activities. Reader shows how pilgrimages are inextricably tied to the marketplace rather than being a welcomed rupture with it. While most definitions of pilgrimage revolve around the idea of a pre-given sacredness and of journeys, times, and places that are set apart from 'everyday routines and the mundane world,'[87] Reader provides significant data to support the idea that sacredness is constructed and continuously re-legitimated through market engagements and the pragmatic exigencies of comfort, accessibility, and proximity to services. Comparing Japanese material with an array of other pilgrimage sites including Knock (Ireland), Lourdes, Mecca, and Santiago de Compostella, Reader argues that consumerism and commercialism are not corrosive forces undermining true and authentic sacred experiences, but rather that they are constitutive of the rise, success, and maintenance of pilgrimages. Through various plunges into history, going back, namely, to the Middle Ages, Reader shows how pilgrimages wax, wane, and are made to transform and reinvent themselves across the ages, with worldly factors coming heavily into play and pragmatism winning out over idealism, orthopraxy, orthodoxy, and ideologies. Fun, tourism (travel), and entertainment practices such as brothels, sumo wrestling contests, hot springs, and bar frequentations were part of pilgrim motivations in Medieval Europe as in Tokugawa-era (1603–1868) Japan. Tacky souvenirs, t-shirts, CDs, and paying entries, in other words, are part of religion, of its experience and practices, and not signs of its degradation or corporate takeover. Seen in this (anthropological) light, the fact that the great majority of contemporary inner-life and holistic spiritualities' 'provisions and activities serve as consumer products'[88] does not appear as grounds for their dismissal nor evidences of their inauthenticity.

In another study, Leigh Eric Schmidt shows how modern consumer culture did not develop apart from religion, but intertwined with it.[89] Nothing illustrates this better than the evolution of holydays such as Valentine's Day, Christmas, and Easter, which all derived from Christian traditions before being transformed into 'consumer rites' over the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in the US, before exporting themselves elsewhere. In these examples, religious and commercial dimensions are interwoven, eroding the bases for denunciations of co-optation by any part. Claude Lévi-Strauss' short article on the transformations of Christmas celebrations in France at the turn of the 1950s indicates a similar process.[90] Lévi-Strauss writes about the 'holocaust' per hanging and burning of a stuffed Santa Claus in front of Dijon Cathedral, with the initial benevolence of Church officials. For the founder of structural anthropology, the transformations of Christmas from a Christian to a consumer ritual signified a profound social and cultural shift which he equates with a sort of resurgence of pagan religious forms in the crackling edifice of Western monotheistic culture. In this

case as with the aforementioned, it is useless to oppose an economic logic to a religious one. Such a perspective aligns itself well with the approach to consumerism developed in the preceding chapter in which the symbolic—and even religious—logics of consumption override the purely economic and rational ones.

Conclusion: redefining marketisation

In an interesting analysis of the applicability of market and marketing theory to religion, market and consumer researcher Jean-Claude Usunier defines commodification as

> based on an object-centered view of economic exchange whereby subjects exchange a wide range of tangible and intangible commodities (*latissimosensu*, i.e. products, services, rights, institutions, and social behaviors on markets. […] [Commodification] occurs when a previously non-market object (e.g. religion, blood, adoption, etc.) enters the market,[91]

itself defined in neoclassical terms. Usunier notes how this conception rests on a series of assumptions, namely that: (1) '*economy* = *market*,' i.e. that all exchanges occur according to the precepts of neoclassical theory; (2) people are only motivated by the maximisation of utility; (3) commodities are supposed interchangeable, and therefore 'identities' and irreducible qualities are obstacles to commodification; (4) only free markets are efficient in the allocation of resources, and so all 'non-market solutions should be changed to market-based solutions'; (5) commodification is non-ideological, neutral, and objective.[92] All of these assumptions, as we have seen, are problematic. Usunier therefore argues that the application of market vocabulary and techniques to otherwise 'orthogonal' social realities does not go without saying and requires theoretical justification: 'such oxymoron as "religious markets," "political markets," "healthcare suppliers," "competition in the global religious market," "consumption of spirituality," "brand loyalty and brand switching" for religious conversion,' for example, in order to become 'meaningful expressions,'[93] depend on the generalisation of market vocabulary within culture rather than actual compliance with neoclassical assumptions. In other words, the development of a religious market is the result of an ideological process, not its explanation. Indeed, we cannot understand the marketisation of religion without paying attention to the fact that these processes have been at work across societies and have affected all social institutions and social spheres, including medicine, politics, education, humanitarian organisations, and government services.[94]

Re-contextualising religion within wider social processes shows the need for a holistic and macro-social approach. Otherwise, talking of the marketisation of religion can only fall back on technical or metaphorical uses of neoclassical terminology that fail to provide what it pertains to produce: High-level explanations and predictions. In order to define marketisation

and how it can apply to religion (and to other non-economic social realities), a theory of marketisation must be related to the wider, socially, and historically situated notions of *market society* and *consumer culture*. Contrary to what Pattana Kitiarsa argues, while one could possibly admit that 'religious commodification is indeed a very old practice connoting the fact that religious leadership and community had to rely on socioeconomic power and other material support by engaging with or responding to religious demand of the mass,' it is false that there is 'nothing new' with today's commodification, apart from '"technology that can facilitate a global systematisation of this commodification".'[95] Certainly, communication technologies have been instrumental in the development of marketisation and in the dissemination of market terminology and market ideologies worldwide; yet, such a poorly materialistic interpretation (the same, by the way, as that of orthodox economists) misses the essential: The profound transformations that have been unravelling in the last half century in the wake of the consumerist and neoliberal revolutions and their globalisation. There is a qualitative difference, a 'change in the social order,'[96] between the consumption of prior eras and that of today's *consumer societies*.

Consumer societies are as much about the practice of consumption as they are about its *idea* and *ideal*. Objects and practices of consumption have been extricated from the logics of use and need and reinserted into those of desire, pleasure, and identity. This has extended the frontiers of the consumable to encompass traditionally non-commodified realities, such as societal institutions, cultural activities, and in a general way the whole of social life. With consumerism, consumption has been extended into a cultural system that has morphed the right to consume into an obligation, with choice, the pivot of consumerism, promoted as the ultimate cultural value and mode of affirmation of identities.[97] As commentators have remarked, consumerism has become inescapable. Paraphrasing Margaret Thatcher's TINA ('there is no alternative'), there is no choice today but to choose.

Such an encompassing acceptation can be found in Don Slater and Fran Tonkiss' *Market Society*, in which they define marketisation as 'the complex processes of commodification and monetarization through which diverse aspects of modern social life became integrated into market arrangements.'[98] Rather than handing over the concept of marketisation to economists, the authors insist that it assumes 'different forms in different contexts,' but rests on the 'introduction of market models into,' for example, 'the organization and conduct of the government.'[99] Furthermore, these different forms 'are only loosely related to any clear model of a market.'[100] Writing about public policy, they continue:

> Precisely because the conception of the market that underlies public sector reforms is always highly variable and often very weak—sometimes involving little more than a rhetoric of efficiency or added value—it translates into a number of different policy contexts, from transport to urban development and unemployment.[101]

Because the idea of the market presents itself as deregulatory by definition, it 'obscures the tight forms of economic and political regulation that have attended neoliberal reforms'[102] and serves to hide a type of regulation specific to marketisation.

As Marcus Moberg and Tuomas Martikainen write:

> The concept of marketization is thus most usefully taken to denote the historical, both ideational and actual, process whereby economistic thinking gradually comes to permeate society and culture on the whole, including in particular spheres traditionally considered non-economic such as the educational, healthcare, and religious spheres.[103]

Marketisation is therefore a set of *processes* by which the Global-Market regime comes to encompass, to varying degrees and with varying outcomes, the whole of contemporary societies, through the extension of both consumerism and neoliberalism. Marketisation therefore refers to the conditions which have made market metaphors and Rational Choice plausible interpretations of the religious landscape, as well as the way in which religious phenomena have been transformed in a world shaped by the idea of the 'Market' and the changes in means of production and practices of consumption. Incidentally, the term marketisation is preferable to 'commodification,' whose meaning entails the transformation of non-economic phenomena into material goods or services, and therefore invites a reduction to the satisfaction of utility. We have seen how consumerism functions on the circulation of symbols, and not on the appropriation of material goods. This perspective does not signify that marketisation affects social spheres (or sub-systems) in isolation from one another.[104] It is much more fruitful to understand this process as modifying the cultural and social environment as a whole, hence the proposition to define marketisation as *the underlying process by which social spheres embed in the 'economic,' via the idea and functioning of the 'Market,' against a global backdrop.*

The neoliberal revolution has impacted all levels of social organisation, and has profoundly affected all social institutions. At the same time, consumption has become all-pervasive, to the extent that it is inescapable. As Heilbrunn argues: 'the world of consumption is constitutive of a social organisation in which the subject depends on a constellation of merchandises and experiences that contributes in providing meaning, coherence, and emotion to his personal and social existence.'[105] This goes much deeper than the opportunity of designing the religious landscape in terms of a 'religious market.' The avenues of Rational Choice having been sealed off and some basic elements of the approach to marketisation I want to mobilise having been defined, we can now turn to the ways in which such an analytic sheds light on religious changes that have been occurring worldwide in this latest phase of globalisation.

Notes

1 Except mine, of course, as those of my collaborators and those I have commissioned. These questions were certainly not part of my academic cursus in religious studies, nor were they part of any cursus I know of. It is because I felt I needed to remedy this situation that my postdoctoral years were devoted to the study of political economy and wider social scientific theory, as well as political philosophy, under the supervision of economist and sociologist Alain Caillé at the Université de Nanterre and founder of the MAUSS network.
2 Countless works have discussed Weber's types of rationality, but I want to investigate another approach here, since instrumental rationality is only a small part of a much bigger issue, and because economics are also the playing ground of emotions, symbolism, meanings, and so on. For a typology of works on religion and economics, see Gauthier, Martikainen, and Woodhead (2013a).
3 Weber (1996: 331). My translation.
4 Slater and Tonkiss (2001: 82).
5 Durkheim (2013a).
6 See Steiner's (2005) remarkable book for an in-depth presentation and discussion.
7 Durkheim quoted in Fournier (2007: 257).
8 See Steiner (2005).
9 See, for instance, Bryan Turner's reading of Durkheim (Turner, 2011). Anne Warfield Rawls has been active in correcting the reading of Durkheim and resituating his critique of political economy.
10 Caillé (2014: 29–31). The same can be said of other major figures of social science such as Saint-Simon, Comte, Tocqueville, and Simmel. See Laval (2001).
11 Steiner (2005).
12 Seele and Zapf (2016: 117).
13 For a survey, see Hann and Hart (2011).
14 Polanyi (1983: 184). My translation back to English from this French edition.
15 Gorz (1989: 112–3), quoted in Goodchild (2002: 28). See also Gorz (2003).
16 Gorz (1989: 112–3), quoted in Goodchild (2002: 28). See my review of Goodchild (Gauthier, 2012b).
17 From a substantive perspective, a well-known example is Harvey Cox's (2016) *The Market as God*, which remains essentially polemic and anecdotal. For recent functional analyses in terms of religion or religion-related concepts, see Méda (2013), Michéa (2007), and Foucart (2018). See my synthetic critical analysis of this issue (Gauthier, 2009b).
18 An excellent discussion can be found in Caillé (2005b). I am leaving out considerations on the field of economics anthropology, but a similar case could be made. For a glimpse into this scholarship, see Hann and Hart (2011).
19 Nelson (2014). See my review under Gauthier (2017e).
20 Nelson (2014: 69).
21 Nelson (2014: 22).
22 Nelson (2014: 69).
23 Nelson (2014: 74).
24 Nelson (2014: 62). The tautological nature of market equilibrium was demonstrated by Bertrand Nogaro already in 1947 (Nogaro, 1947). See also Caillé (2005b).
25 Nelson (2014: 200). In his Nobel lecture, Becker (1992: 38) stated: 'The analysis assumes that individuals maximize welfare *as they conceive it*, whether they be selfish, altruistic, loyal, spiteful, or masochistic.' Emphasis in original. This amounts to saying that individuals are self-interested because they are self-interested.

26 Nelson (2014: 194).
27 Nelson (2014: 232).
28 Nelson (2014: 196).
29 Nelson (2014: 232).
30 Nelson (2014: 195, 232). This is therefore a way by which consumerism, with its expressive drive, is intertwined with neoliberalism, and can be said to have served as its catalyst and legitimation.
31 Nelson (2014: 266).
32 Nelson (2014: 329). Michéa (2007) and Méda (2013) make similar judgements.
33 Quotes, respectively, Nelson (2014: xxi, 14, 23, 200). I have critiqued Nelson's mobilisation of very loosely defined religious in my review (Gauthier, 2017e).
34 See, for example, Granovetter (2017) and Boyer (2004). We can also name James Galbraith as a very respectable 'heterodox' economist.
35 Keen (2011). After its initial publication in 2001, Keen has been busy answering at length to the critiques of orthodox economists. He publishes regular additions and updates on the website http://debunking.podbean.com and has been joined by other economists who also publish pieces on www.debtdeflation.com/blogs/. Another significant internal critique is that of American economist Michael Hudson (e.g. 2017).
36 See Mark Blaug's (2001) interesting article whose title—'No History of Ideas, Please, We're Economists'—is revealing of the mood of the bulk of economists. His argument is namely that paying attention to history reveals that many of the taken-for-granted theoretical postulates such as market equilibrium have never received any kind of satisfying solution within the discipline.
37 Keen (2011: 24).
38 Keen (2011: 30–3).
39 The main references for RCAR are well-known, amongst them Stark and Bainbridge (1980, 1987), Finke and Stark (1988), Iannaccone (1990, 1992, 1995), Warner (1993), Finke and Iannaccone (1993), and Finke and Schetile (2014). For an overview, see Mariano (2010) or Koch (2014). On the penetration of RCT amongst Chinese scholars, see Veer (2012).
40 Iannaccone (1995: 77), quoting Becker (1976: 5).
41 'Definition 3: *Rewards* are anything humans will incur costs to obtain. Definition 4: *Costs* are whatever humans attempt to avoid.' In Stark and Bainbridge (1980: 115).
42 Stolz (2008).
43 Iannaccone (1990).
44 One might have noticed how this 'finding' is contained and presupposed by the theory itself.
45 See Yang (2006).
46 Warner (1993), Stark (1999).
47 Stark and Bainbridge (1980: 114). The theory was expounded in Stark and Bainbridge (1987).
48 Iannaccone (1992: 123).
49 Iannaccone (1992: 123).
50 E.g. Ellison (1995), Stolz (2008), Blasi (2009), Simonnot (2014), and Patrikios and De Francesco (2018).
51 For instance, Obadia (2013).
52 Seele and Zapf (2016).
53 Beckford (2003: 169). Emphasis in original.
54 Turner (2011: 119). See also Casanova (2006: 9).
55 Turner (2011: 119), Bruce (1999, 2006).
56 Demerath (1995: 105).

57 Demerath (1995: 111).
58 See Mariano (2010).
59 Chaves and Gorski (2001: 261). See also Chaves (1995).
60 Voyé (1992).
61 Spickard (2007). Quoted from abstract.
62 Spickard (1998). Quoted from abstract.
63 Beckford (2003: 168).
64 Dawson (2007: 141–5). While listing a series of limitations of RCAR, Mariano (2010) argues along the same line for the case of Brazil.
65 Robertson (1992: 147).
66 Spickard (1998). Quoted from abstract.
67 See especially Laval (2001), as well as the numerous works published by members of the MAUSS, including articles in the *Revue du MAUSSsemestrielle* since 1981.
68 Trentmann (2007).
69 Lyotard (1979).
70 Hervieu-Léger (2001b).
71 It is understandable, then, that the expression '*à la carte*' originates in the French translation (1988) of Canadian sociologist Reginald Bibby's (who is both an Evangelical and a partisan of Rational Choice) book *Fragmented Gods* (1987), and was seamlessly incorporated by postmodernist authors like Guy Ménard (1999), stripped of any market connotation.
72 What follows has been adapted from Gauthier (2018a).
73 Tönnies (1940).
74 E.g. Caillé (2000).
75 Warburg (2018).
76 Berger (1980: 138). Emphasis in original.
77 Roof (1999: 78). Emphasis added.
78 Einstein (2008). See also Cimino and Lattin (1998).
79 Taira (2008: 242). See also Moberg and Martikainen (2018), Gauthier (2018a).
80 E.g. Budde and Brimlow (2002), and Stevenson (2007).
81 Carrette and King (2005, 2012). See also Lau (2000), York (2001), and Ezzy (2001).
82 Shirazi (2016).
83 Taira (2008).
84 Giggie and Winston (2002: 1). Emphasis added. For excellent work on more contemporary issues regarding urban religion, see Becci, Burchardt, and Casanova (2013). Unfortunately, yet symptomatically, the issue of consumerism is entirely absent from the contributions that make up this volume.
85 Giggie and Winston (2002: 2).
86 Giggie and Winston (2002: 1).
87 Reader (2014: 14). See my review under Gauthier (2017f).
88 Heelas (2008: 6).
89 Schmidt (1995). I am leaving aside a discussion of authors such as deChant (2002) and Lyon (2000), as well as those who have striven to highlight the sacred or sacralising dimensions of consumer culture (e.g. Belk, Wallendorf, and Sherry (1989), and Kozinets (2002); see also contributions in Rinallo, Scott, and Maclaran (2013)), simply because it would lead us astray and would necessitate an indefinite amount of parallel discussions on the meaning of concepts such as 'the sacred,' 'quasi-religion,' and 'spirituality.' Let us simply say that all of this is interesting but not essential for thinking contemporary religious change.
90 Lévi-Strauss (2013). I will come back in the conclusion on this hypothesis.

91 Usunier (2014: 29–30). See Jörg and Usunier (2014a, 2014b, 2018) more generally for a divergent view on marketisation which remains too close to RCT to my taste.
92 Usunier (2014: 30–2).
93 Usunier (2014: 33).
94 McAlexander, Dufault, Martin, and Schouten (2014).
95 Kitiarsa (2010: 566). The author quotes Ward (2006: 185).
96 Heilbrunn (2015: 8).
97 Heilbrunn (2015: 8–13).
98 Slater and Tonkiss (2001: 4).
99 Slater and Tonkiss (2001: 140).
100 Slater and Tonkiss (2001: 140).
101 Slater and Tonkiss (2001: 141).
102 Slater and Tonkiss (2001: 141).
103 Moberg and Martikainen (2018: 430).
104 See Moberg and Martikainen (2018), Gauthier (2018a).
105 Heilbrunn (2015: 8). My translation.

7 From mediatisation to hyper-mediatisation

This chapter addresses the role of media with respect to religious change and the rapports between media and the structuring powers of consumerism and market ideologies in the processes of globalisation.[1] The perspective in this book differs from former interpretations of religious change by insisting on the coherence and the systematic character of certain global reconfigurations affecting religion by recasting these against the backdrop of the globalisation of economic ideologies and consumer practices, which have gone hand in hand with the development, democratisation, and dissemination of communication technologies, especially digital media. The development of digital media has been more than instrumental in connecting financial markets worldwide and enabling real-time management of productivity across the globe. Similarly, modern communications media more broadly (radio, television, and more recently electronic and digital media) has been a major factor in the development, massification, and institutionalisation of consumerism and the naturalisation of the categories of market economics all over the world.

This chapter addresses the subject of media and discusses its place within the dynamics of marketisation. Is media an essential factor commanding social and religious changes, on par with consumerism and neoliberalism? Does 'media' constitute an autonomous social sphere shaping other social spheres from without, or is it connected to wider social and cultural processes which it participates in and amplifies? To address these questions, the chapter first discusses some of the perspectives developed within the field of media and religion studies, before turning to a critical discussion of Stig Hjarvard's 'mediatisation thesis.' Hjarvard, as most scholars in this field, considers media from the standpoint of the differentiation of social spheres thesis and as an autonomous social sphere in its own right, which shapes social phenomena from the outside. In consistency with my approach throughout this book, I challenge this perspective and argue that media, as a vehicle for communication, is better understood as something transversal to all social spheres. My overall argument is that media does not present a logic of its own as much as it is integral to both the National-Statist and Global-Market regimes.

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Before turning to the religion and media scholarship, it is useful to look at how media in general and electronic media in particular have been understood in social sciences. We can cut through decades of debate over the nature, function, and effect of (electronic) media by opposing three paradigmatic stances.[2] First, that media, as a technique, is neutral, a mere vessel for transporting and transmitting content. Second, in the line of the Marxian heritage in philosophy and social sciences, that media essentially serves an ideological function aiming at the reproduction and legitimisation of social structures and their underlying domination logics. Finally, an optimistic liberal perspective which considers that (electronic) media serves the modern project of individual expressivity and emancipation. All in all, media in general and the Internet in particular appear, in turn, as neutral, alienating, or liberating. In my view, all of these positions are value-based, biased, and incomplete.[3] Neither neutral instruments of communication nor ideological superstructures legitimising ideologically infrastructural domination, modern media, and electronic media and the Internet in particular are best understood as *shaping* culture, and therefore also religion. The main question then becomes how to interpret this 'shaping.'

Media, religion, and the importance of popular culture

Even though the twentieth century has been one of intense development for communication technologies and their penetration into everyday life, scholarship on media and religion is a field that has developed relatively recently. Media and religion studies have remained marginal with respect to the mainstream of the social scientific study of religion, as the works in this field rarely engage with theoretical reflections on overarching social and cultural changes. The contribution of this field in renewing the perspectives of the sociology of religion beyond secularisation has therefore not been very significant. There is a lack of theoretical and analytical ambition in most works in the field of media and religion, perhaps out of a concern for empirical grounding in opposition to the abstraction of earlier 'grand theories.' More attention has been given to historical accounts which stress how religion has always been tied to various forms of 'media.' Yet, the ways in which media is integral to everyday life in today's globalising societies acquire a specific significance as social relations are saturated in media, to the extent that not existing in the media sphere amounts to not existing at all. The 'virtual' space of media has now become integral to social relations and public space in an unprecedented manner. If all social life is mediated in some way, I argue that there is a qualitative difference in the way that life today expands from the 'real' to the 'virtual' and back, and how this happens against the backdrop of the global. To qualify this intensification and this expansion of the social into the 'virtual' realm opened by communication technologies, Linda Woodhead, Tuomas Martikainen, and myself have used the term 'hyper-mediatisation' to contrast the present digital age from the prior radio and television era.[4]

A further reason why media and religion scholarship has not renewed outlooks on religion is its continued enshrinement in the secularisation paradigm and its corresponding (and paradoxical) neglect of popular culture. Topics investigated usually involve given religious groups and their rapport with media (their reception or use of media, for instance), or variations on 'religious' content in media. This conservative stance presupposes the substance of religion and shies away from interrogating its potential mutations away from the churched type. It reproduces a substantive, common sense definition of religion that posits the idea that 'religious people' are in some way different from the mainstream of society, and refractory of modernity.[5] Media and religion scholarship would have more impact on the sociology of religion if it paid less attention to 'religious content' in print media and to the 'use' of media by given 'religious groups,' and more to how media today is involved in the new processes of sacralisation in our globalising cultures. As Peter Beyer argues, more interesting are the ways in which religious performances and symbols are not only transmitted through media but have come to *take on the very form and structure* of contemporary media.[6] This important shift has consequences well beyond the confines of religious congregations and minority denominations. Hence, mass-mediatisation—and increasingly: *multi*-mediatisation—is a *condition* for any type of religiosity to either emerge or perpetuate itself as a movement, a network, or any other social form. More than a (neutral) 'tool' or a stock of 'symbolic resources,' media is involved in the very definition of the *nature* of religion today and its reconfiguration outside the forms instituted in the National-Statist regime.

The following example highlights some of the ways religious change is being shaped by media, and vice versa. In her book on American superstar and uncontested media queen Oprah Winfrey, Kathryn Lofton demonstrates how a hugely popular television show-turned-multimedia-global-empire became a major factor in the 'spiritualisation' of religion in the US and beyond.[7] Oprah's daily television show began a highly successful transformation in the mid-nineties, by which it increasingly developed a spiritual accent alongside its celebration of good living, popular psychology, and consumerism. From then onwards, existential and 'spiritual' questions became an everyday focus. Winfrey refuses to label her show as 'religion,' while openly celebrating an inclusive brand of self-spirituality. The spiritual project she promotes stresses personal development, healing, confidence, and empowerment resulting in happiness, as well as emotional, relational, and material successes. Her spiritual all-star cast includes mega-church Evangelist superstars as well as 'alternative spirituality' and life coaching gurus. Yet, Oprah encompasses them all, providing an appealing synthesis headed by the leitmotiv of 'life change' and a soteriology aimed at 'living one's best life.' A pure product of mass media, Oprah is arguably one of today's most important religious figures. Through her show, basic notions and practices (such as meditation) stemming from Buddhism, Taoism, Zen, and other exotic religions have become household knowledge in

the remotest locations of mainstream America. Oprah does not only highlight the trend towards a personal and practical religiosity founded on personal experience and the catering of the self, but she is also a particularly powerful actor in the active *production* of this trend through the networks of her mass media empire.

This example is particular to the US and some would argue that Oprah Winfrey is relatively unknown in many European countries, not to mention elsewhere. They would also contest the global reach of the Oprah multimedia empire and relativise reports which claim that Oprah is popular amongst improbable audiences, like Saudi Arabian women.[8] Yet, her example illustrates a more general and globalising trend by which non-religiously trained media figures have become religious authorities, and whose enterprises have contributed to blur the boundaries between religion and entertainment, management, psychology, and consumerism. As such, Oprah Winfrey provides the most exuberant example of—and a veritable template for—a trend that can be observed in other parts of the world, including, increasingly, in the Global South. A striking example is the phenomenal rise of massively popular and influential neo-Islamic televangelists, such as the Egyptian Amr Khaled and the Indonesian Abdullah Gymnastiar.[9] Both started with daytime television talk shows and built multimedia empires through which they advocate a spiritualised, subjectivised, and consumerism-friendly entrepreneurial type of religiosity that has contributed to profoundly reshape Islam, especially for urbanised middle-class youth. These televangelists have been successful in adapting a template that shares formal and substantive traits with Oprah Winfrey to their local context, and similarly addresses a mainstream audience, especially women and youth.

The deceptive avenues of mediatisation

The aforementioned discussion stresses the importance of culture in the religion and media equation. If we turn back to the issue of understanding religious change with respect to the role of media, our discussion must acknowledge the avenues of the 'mediatisation thesis.' Knut Lundby defines mediatisation as the process through which media contributes to *shape* societal changes in late modern societies. Mediatisation is understood as a meta-process constitutive of modernisation alongside 'individualisation, globalisation, and commercialisation.'[10] It states that media is foremost in the making of the common culture today, and thus in the 'social construction of reality.'[11] Applying the mediatisation thesis to religion, Stig Hjarvard has argued that mediatisation transforms religion in three major ways.[12] First, media becomes the primary source of information on religion. Second, media shapes religious information and experiences in conformity with the demands of popular media genres. More than simply relaying content and experiences, media also increasingly contributes to the production of religious experiences and the definition of what constitutes

legitimate religion. Finally, media constitutes 'social and cultural environments that take over many of the functions of institutionalized religions such as providing moral and spiritual guidance and a sense of community.'[13] The mediatisation thesis therefore addresses the specificity of media today while linking religious developments to a wider set of modernisation processes. In addition, it shines light on the fact that religion—what religion *is*, socially and culturally—is changed through the mediatisation of globalising societies.

Furthermore, media challenges traditional, institutional relays and impacts the 'authority, position and function of religious institutions,' allowing for new relations, new contents, and new interpretations to emerge and circulate.[14] Media has become the channel through which experiences are shared, narratives are expressed and constructed, and legitimisation is produced. This weakens the position and power of traditional institutions which are no longer the privileged transmitters and relayers of the meaning of practices and symbols. Media also allows for the bypassing of hierarchies, authorities, and institutions at large, a trend sharply accentuated since the advent of Internet. New authorities have emerged, such as the already mentioned non-religiously trained media types that are Oprah Winfrey, Abdullah Gymnastiar, and Amr Khaled. Religious institutions, meanwhile, have been forced to react and made to play the media game. As the example of the Catholic Church examined in the last chapter illustrates, these trends favour a personalised rapport with the figures of authority, and therefore a charismatic type of authority over legal-rational and traditional types.

The mediatisation thesis provides probing insights into religious change and an alternative 'basis for analysing the interplay between media and religion'[15] by not focusing on the interplay between 'the media' and given religious groups and institutions, or 'religious' content in media. However, Hjarvard interprets the transformations linked to media as 'evidence of a strong connection between the mediatisation of religion and the secularisation of society.'[16] In this light, the mediatisation process is believed to break the strong social ties of traditional and early industrial society and erodes the powers and functions of religious institutions. By eroding these institutional moorings and traditional authorities, Hjarvard argues, it is religion itself that is being eroded, parcelled, privatised, and marginalised. Here, religious 'change' is cast as its gradual disappearance—a diagnosis that is debatable, to say the least.

The mediatisation thesis is therefore deployed within the secularisation paradigm and falls back on the secularisation thesis. As a result, religion is portrayed mainly as an institutional reality, with existing traditions providing the yardstick for measuring what is and what is not religion. As a consequence, dis-institutionalisation can only mean decline. Similarly, personalised religiosities signify the privatisation and individualisation of religion, rather than its subjectivisation linked to new social forms relayed

and produced namely through media. This is unfortunate, as it annuls the heuristic potential of the mediatisation thesis, which ends up completely overlooking cultural and non-institutional realities. The account of contemporary religiosity is partial, bypassing those areas where religion is flourishing the most. The perspective is also despairingly Western, even Scandinavian-centric, with hints of evolutionism.[17] A discussion on transnational multi-directional fluxes between Global South and North Atlantic countries, for instance, is entirely absent. Similarly, missing is a critical historical account of the transformations of media in modern societies, from the nineteenth-century telegraph to today's social media and Internet. Thirdly, a thorough discussion of globalisation and the construction by media of the global as a coherent structure of plausibility are also absent.[18] Hjarvard's version of the mediatisation thesis starts from the perspective of strong social differentiation. Media is understood as an autonomous social sphere, largely independent of other social and cultural processes, including politics and the economy. Mediatisation, therefore, refers to the process by which the sphere of media pushes themselves on other autonomous spheres such as religion. The question of how media came to occupy this position and how they are framed by social and cultural values and dynamics is left mostly unexamined.[19] Finally, also missing is a discussion on the specific rapports between media and market economics, and consumer capitalism in particular.

Media as a differentiated sphere

Social differentiation has been at the heart of modernisation narratives, as it has been at the very foundation of many social theories. It is also a pillar of the secularisation paradigm that often goes unquestioned in current debates on 'post-secularity.' As stated earlier, Hjarvard casts media as an independent sphere which evolves according to its own logics and shapes religion from without. Yet, recent diagnoses of boundary blurring across the social sciences should incite us to question these foundations and confront them with the complexities of social realities. In the sociology of religion, Birgit Meyer has critiqued this 'typically [Western and] modern vision of society as differentiated into separate compartments, one of them being religion.'[20] Like secularisation, the differentiation thesis is rooted in a modernist ideology and a philosophy of history that calls for a critical discussion.

In his thesis on the passage from a Westphalian to a post-Westphalian model of religion, Peter Beyer similarly argues that 'the most evident and important [forces] modelling' the sub-system of religion today are the 'economic and mass media systems, that is religion in terms of production and consumption and religion in terms of information and entertainment.'[21] Beyer's argument is interesting because it is more informed and coherent then Hjarvard's. Yet, what does it mean to say that media is autonomous,

or even differentiated? And what then does he mean by (mass) media? Beyer does not elaborate on what provides the functional cohesion of a media system, seen from a Luhmannian framework.[22] I argue that the differentiated nature of 'media,' as any other potential social sphere or sub-system, must be demonstrated rather than taken for granted. In order to be considered a differentiated social sphere, social phenomena must be coherent with respect to a certain number of principles or characteristics.[23] I see three theoretical possibilities here. The first is mediated 'communication.' Yet, is communication not intrinsically mediated and integral to the very fact of being human and interacting, from birth to death, with others, in a cultural and social system? In my view, communication is transversal to the whole of the social; it is involved in the very fabric of society. I argue that it is unfruitful to isolate it as a specialised sphere on these grounds.

The second possibility is to consider the 'media sphere' as being essentially that of communication *technologies*. In other words, the effects of media and the rise of media as a structuring force can be ultimately understood as resulting from the inherent logics and development of communication technologies. The third and last possibility that comes to mind is to focus on media actors, and thereby short-circuit perilous considerations about either communication or technology. In other words, the development of 'media' would largely be that of the media *industry*. This is perhaps what Beyer has in mind when he talks of 'mass media.' In the last two cases, media appears governed by external rather than internal logics, either technology or economics. If we consider media as being moved by the specific developments of its technologies, an overview of the past decades shows how this perspective fails to account for the important changes that have occurred following the 'digital revolution' of the 1990s.[24] There is a distinction to be made between the first days of radio and single channel television and the real-time integrated communication technologies of today. Internet culture has transformed media from being governed by the principles of emission and reception (with unified, nation-state bound offers) to those of participation and interactivity (with fragmented, often transnational audiences).

The case of information technologies (IT) is of particular interest here, as their penetration into everyday life over the past two or three decades has been as remarkable as it has been a worldwide phenomenon. The short history of IT shows how developments in this field have been largely unpredictable and user-led rather than the product of some inherent technological logic.[25] Companies and independents have continuously tried to predict future needs and develop technological innovations accordingly, with limited success. Most of the 'innovations' that have affected digital media have not been due to technological development but rather the unintended consequences of diverted uses. It is well-known that the Internet was not developed with the intention of its widespread and global household use. The technology had been available for some time, but it was its 'hijacking' by computer geeks that led to the development of an open-access mode of

communication. Similarly, the advent of social media (e.g. Facebook and related interfaces such as Twitter) was not the product of industry innovation, nor the end result of technological development, but rather the unimaginable success of the initiative of a couple of American college students. Facebook did not become a global phenomenon basically overnight because of the inner logic of an autonomous media sphere, but rather because existing social and cultural dynamics found in this new form of media a particularly efficient and expanded way of expression, just as the culture of authenticity found itself in 'elective affinity'[26] with consumerism in the 1960s. In other words, technology does not help to explain either the coherence or the development of 'media.'

Examining media from the angle of media actors leads to similar conclusions. To keep to the latest developments, it is clear that the 'media industry' has not been leading the parade. On the contrary, media industry actors have had to adapt to the 'digital revolution,' often with much (and ongoing) difficulty. Digital technologies continue to create enormous pressures on printed media (newspapers, books), television, radio, cinema, and popular art forms (the sharp decline in CD sales has radically altered the whole music industry). Incidentally, social, cultural, and economic logics seem to have been driving 'mediatisation' at least as much as 'media' has been pushing itself on social spheres such as religion and politics.

Media: from Nation-State to Market

To cast media as a differentiated social sphere is a self-defeating proposition. The developments of 'mass media' cannot be understood in isolation from the encompassing culture and society. The invention of printing in the fifteenth century was crucial for the development of the Reformation and the religious transformations that followed. We saw how the sharp increase in novels accompanied the rise and penetration of Sentimentalism and Romanticism within the bourgeoisie and the middle classes.[27] Similarly, the newspaper was critical in the formation of a public sphere and the spreading of modern ideas. Mass distribution of newspapers occurred late in the nineteenth century, and was instrumental in cultivating national sentiments and national connectivity. The press was instituted along political ideological lines, and was often owned by powerful business moguls or state-run offices. Again in the nineteenth century, the development of the telegraph and then the telephone was led by nationalised companies or state-protected monopolies, as part of a programme of modernisation and nation-building, with respect to international competition and imperial motives. While cinema proved a valuable propaganda vehicle in the age of nationalisms, the radio represented a revolution since it reached into the intimacy of the home, in the same way as the telephone operator brought with it the presence of the state. While the press introduced ideas, radio introduced emotions. Early radio was often publicly broadcasted, and the same

public institutions were trusted with the development of television. Radio and television were extremely powerful nation-builders, as they provided representations of the nation's people and provided common cultural references, as well as a common idiom that was due to replace regionalisms and dialects. Early audio-visual programming, which was composed of public broadcast and a very limited number of private channels, was instrumental in the homogenisation projected and enacted by the modern nation-state. All of this supports the argument that media did not develop according to its own, elusive logic, in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries; it rather did in concordance with the exigencies, dynamics, and functions of the nation-state in the Nation-State regime. Media was nationalised and nationalising, as well as strictly regulated by the state.

Radio, and especially television, with their emotional dimensions, contained the seeds of the eventual critique of this very Nation-State-led model. Meanwhile, the massification and democratisation of music and cinema genres expanded the reach and potency of popular culture starting in the post-war years. The development of these media forms is integral to that of consumerism: The explosion of musical forms is inseparable from that of fashions, magazines, and other consumables. The expansion of 'media' is equally inseparable from its content, which, from literature to television and music, was not only part of the wider transformations of the 1960s and their promotion of expressive individualism, but also their catalyser.

Another turning point that has gone unnoticed by mediatisation scholars as well as sociologists of religion writing on religion and media is the neoliberal revolution. Communications are a key domain of state intervention that figured explicitly in the aims of the neoliberal project of state reform. The fact that the state has no business in the media business is something that neoliberal-minded politics relayed in unison. Neoliberal roll-back policies and privatisation schemes disengaged the state not only from industry, transport, welfare, health, and education, but also telecommunications (telephone) and audio-visual. In fact, the liberalisation of audio-visual media was often the first step in a series of state reforms. The 1980–1990s marked the end of the domination of public broadcast and the beginning of the deregulation of radio and television airwaves. This trend occurred not only in North Atlantic countries, but throughout the world, in Latin America but also Asia and Africa, including under authoritarian regimes. Media deregulation, for instance, was important in Indonesia, well before the end of the Suharto regime. The 1990s saw the explosion of niche television and radio channels, while transnational satellite television invaded the planet, opening opportunities for religious broadcasts and the formation of multimedia religious empires of the type set up by Abdullah Gymnastiar (see Chapter 9). All of this occurred before the Internet and the cell phone revolution happened in developed and developing countries. From this angle, it is hard not to see how 'media' developed in synch with and as a part of the spread of consumerism and neoliberalism. Today, while most states preserve

some sort of media regulation (press, cinema, literature, audio-visual), it is obvious that the overarching logic is that of the Market. From being state-regulated, state-produced, and nation-building, media has been privatised and deregulated. Its current landscape is the result of the combined transnational processes of uniformisation and conglomeration (mass media mega-corporations) on the one hand, and its diffraction into lifestyle niches on the other. The arts, meanwhile, have been transformed into as many 'cultural industries,' and public audio-visual services are everywhere contested and made to transform according to the principles of the new political economy.

A case in point is the digital revolution and the dissemination of social media in the most remote locations on the planet. While the success of such interactive interfaces was unpredictable from the point of view of technological development and that of the media industry, it is understandable from the perspective of consumerism and its expressive type of individualism. What indeed are social media and related interfaces such as blogs if not means for the constant expression of oneself in a virtual social space made of interrelated 'social networks' that distil recognition? Interactive media, which have been integrated into computers, television, cinema, and telephones, act as community makers (and markers) supporting the ethics of authenticity and expressivity characteristic of contemporary consumer-driven expressive individualism. To be connected, moreover, is to be part of the fluxes that create the present and the global. It is to be part of 'something bigger,' a transcendent immanence that can be said to carry a religious dimension. Being connected means being 'modern' (actual) and to participate in the effervescence of de-territorialised forms of community typical of globalisation. These logics are modulated variably in different contexts in different regions and countries across the world; yet, they do share some common characteristics that shape social realities as much as the ideals of High Modernity and the Nation-State did for most of the twentieth century.

If we consider the most socially significant advances in mediatisation, we can see how they are not so much the development of some kind of internal logic of media, but rather that they are characteristic of the logics of consumerism. Theorists of mediatisation, unfortunately, have overlooked this link between media and consumerism. One of the most salient effects of today's extensive mediatisation is *branding*, a phenomenon which is recognised to have profoundly affected fields such as politics, the arts, social services, and humanitarian activities, as well as religion.[28] Branding is precisely that process through which media and consumerism reveal the complementary nature of their dynamics. It is particularly effective in creating, maintaining, and updating recognisable identities. Brands are symbols in a consumerised social and cultural space in which identities, meanings, authenticities, and communities are produced, expressed, and circulated. Brands appeal to emotions, convey a particular sensibility,

act as promises, and possess possibility. Brands constitute means for the production of meaning, identity, subjectivity, and even community in a globalising world. They are integral to the logics of television and digital visual culture.

Media has followed the evolution of twentieth-century capitalism and has changed from being production- to consumption-driven—from (more) 'passive' consumption to interactive 'prosumption.'[29] The Internet has created a sort of revolution in media as it has radicalised audience-orientation, niche logics, network-type organisation, real-time reactivity, transnational fluxes, the dis-embedment from national contexts in favour of transnational networks, and the construction of the global as a plausible backdrop. Internet is a prolongation of social life, a resonance chamber in which social bonds and values are circulated and produced rather than a part of an autonomous media sphere.[30] The Internet has not created network sociality and individualism: Both of these, rather, have resonated with and through the Internet, shaping the unravelling of its possibilities. Media has been more than simply a vehicle for culture in modernity: It is constitutive of the very processes of cultural production and reproduction. It is both the product of social interactions and the language in which much social interaction occurs.[31] Neither neutral instruments of communication nor ideological superstructures legitimising ideologically infrastructural domination, electronic media, and the Internet are integral to consumer cultures.

2.0 media effects

Media specialists Francis Jauréguiberry and Serge Proulx write that the post-war development of communication technologies followed a somewhat linear path of progressive innovations (within a National-Statist frame) until the late 1980s and 1990s, when portable phone technology and the burgeoning of Internet marked a qualitative shift that has affected the very organisation of industrial capitalism and its morphing into its present globalised, financialised variant.[32] This brand of connected capitalism 'destabilises individuals at the same time that it provides an answer to certain aspirations of contemporary individualism.'[33] While television and radio were important for the constitution of modern culture, digital communication technologies introduce new modes of social exchange which they contribute to structure. They give access to a new world in which distances are abolished and instant time superposes itself to 'normal' time. This has allowed the development of a delocalised, financialised, global capitalism, as well as real-time production management. At the same time, they considerably expand the outreach of the new modes of self-presentation typical of consumerism, allowing for new rapport to others, subtle role plays, and network construction. Contrary to former modes of communication, which were based on the transmission and reception of information and contents, electronic media opens onto an expanded social

space made of complex interactions.[34] These characteristics are the conditions for the expansion of financial capitalism and neoliberal practices and ideologies, as well as consumerism.

The developments of communication technologies, from satellite television to the Internet and cell phones, have played a determining part in the re-publicisation of religion. Yet, this feature has been barely mentioned in debates on the subject, until recently.[35] Recent controversies, namely around the place of Islam in Western societies, have contributed to renew the visibility of religion in the public sphere. There is a double movement at work: On the one hand, the voluntary increase in visibility of religious actors in public debates and in the media-scape, and on the other, the unwanted visibility caused by reactions to specific types of religion, namely conservative and fundamentalist strands. As David Herbert argues, this overall re-publicisation is due in part to the liberalisation and therefore multiplication of media sources, as well as their diversification due to the new possibilities opened by the Internet and social media.[36]

Another effect of hyper-mediatisation is to radicalise the critique of established authorities in favour of charismatic ones. Former authorities are thwarted as legitimacy is no longer cautioned by tradition but rather by public opinion at a given moment. Those with authority are no longer the depositors of knowledge or tradition: They have been supplanted by those who know how to work the techniques of communication in the globalised media-scape.[37] As the case of the Vatican website will show in the last chapter, institutions are made to brand themselves, which often means putting forward a personality that substitutes itself to the institution or tradition. In the provocative words of Tim Hutchings, digital media act as 'solvents for hierarchies' and 'antidotes to authority.'[38]

Mara Einstein has argued that the marketing of religion has reinforced the turn towards experiential and personal religiosity, but also that competition between faiths has tended to promote entertainment, thereby blurring the boundaries between religion and culture.[39] Websites tend to propose experiences more than content, which only intensifies the spectacle tendencies of consumer capitalism. Significant novelties include sacred text applications (e.g. Bible or Quran apps), which bring religion into the folds of everyday life and cater to practical issues. These innovations, which have become banal today, mobilise 'the language of individual convenience and personal choice.'[40] They are far from neutral platforms, as they come with reading plans, suggestions, pre-chosen themes, 'verses of the day' propositions, interactive possibilities, connections to artists and media stars, examples of life narratives and personal revelations, music suggestions, children versions, and so on. Such apps reinforce the trend already present in online forums, which almost exclusively revolve around practical issues of life ethics and orthopraxy rather than elaborated theological discussions and beliefs. They are also instrumental in shaking religion from its box and shaping it in the frame of holistic lifestyles.

Conclusion

This chapter argues that media is better understood as a transversal phenomenon rather than as an autonomous social sphere that interacts with other differentiated social spheres from the outside. Media does not have an irreducible coherence and a proper logic that could be invoked as a power shaping religion in modernity. The development of media since the nineteenth century, on the contrary, shows how we can divide it into two periods: In the first one, media, such as the telegraph, the telephone, written press, cinema, radio, and then television, evolved within a frame defined by the regulative institution and idea of the Nation-State. The advent of television, meanwhile, as well as the explosion of accessible music supports, did introduce new aesthetics and symbolic functions as well as social practices that concurred with the expressive and consumerist revolution of the 1960s. Yet, it is only with the media liberalisation of the 1980s, due to neoliberal pressures, that these logics spilled out of their former frame, anticipating the digital revolution. Religion and media scholars have tended to underplay the specific dynamics and significant novelty introduced by the development of the Internet, social media, and affordable and massified portable connected telephony. I prefer to argue that the digital revolution has been a condition for the spread and penetration of neoliberalism as well as consumerism further into the fabric of our globalising societies. I therefore argue that media is not the cause of these changes in itself, but rather that it is an integral part of consumerism and neoliberalism, whose dynamics it amplifies. Media provides the environment through which consumer culture disseminates and the means through which participation in its global flows is made possible. It is also a condition for the real-time delocalised management of global financial flows, as well as the coordination of production and distribution. It is in this respect that media can be shown to be the most influential in the reconfiguration of religion today regarding both form and substance, at some distance from the avenues of media and religion studies and mediatisation scholarship.

Notes

1 This chapter is adapted and expanded from Gauthier (2015) as well as Gauthier and Uhl (2012).
2 Hoover (2006), Jauréguiberry and Proulx (2011), and Campbell (2010).
3 Breton (2000), Mattelart (1999, 2001), Uhl (2002), and Mayer (2008).
4 Gauthier, Martikainen, and Woodhead (2013a, 2013b, 2013c).
5 For example, Campbell (2010) and Hoover (2006). Even if these studies end up arguing that 'religious' groups and individuals are like others, this characterisation remains the starting point. Not to mention that 'normality' is equated with irreligion, and what this means about the entrenchment of this scholarship in the shortcomings of the secularisation paradigm. Furthermore, this scholarship tends to be closed-in on itself and does not sufficiently engage with media and communication studies at large, hence a series of 'false problems.' See Jauréguiberry and Proulx (2011).

6 Beyer (2012: 125).
7 Lofton (2011), Einstein (2008), and Illouz (2003).
8 Lofton (2011: 100).
9 Ben Salem and Gauthier (2011), Haenni (2005), and Njoto-Faillard (2012).
10 Lundby (2009: 4).
11 Lundby (2009: 4).
12 Hjarvard (2008). See also Lövheim (2011), Lövheim and Lynch (2011), and Lövheim and Axner (2015). I am very grateful to Mia Lövheim for having brought this strand of research to my attention and directing me to her own publications.
13 Lövheim and Lynch (2011: 113).
14 Lövheim and Lynch (2011: 113).
15 Lövheim and Lynch (2011: 115).
16 Lövheim and Lynch (2011: 114).
17 Lövheim (2011).
18 Robertson (1992).
19 Lövheim and Lynch (2011: 112).
20 Meyer (2010: 115).
21 Beyer (2012: 122).
22 This is even more the case since Luhmann understands every social sphere as a specific type of communication.
23 Dumont (1977).
24 Lövheim (2011: 161).
25 I thank my colleague Professor Jacques Pasquier-Rocha, a pioneer of computer technologies in the early 1980s in the US, for the discussion we had on these issues.
26 Weber (2005).
27 Is popular literature art or media? How can we distinguish, as the differentiation thesis posits we must?
28 See Gauthier and Martikainen (2013).
29 Lury (2011).
30 Proulx and Bardini (2000).
31 Hoover (2006).
32 Jauréguiberry and Proulx (2011: 7–8).
33 Jauréguiberry and Proulx (2011: 8).
34 Jauréguiberry and Proulx (2011: 8).
35 See Lövheim and Axner (2015), Herbert (2015).
36 Herbert (2015: 67–8). I agree with Herbert's preference for the concept of 're-publicisation' over that of 'de-privatisation,' as it is more versatile (re-publicisation can mean return as well as the emergence of new forms) and sociological, rather than individual-centred.
37 Bunt (2000).
38 Hutchings (2015).
39 Einstein (2008).
40 Hutchings (2015: 145).

8 The marketisation of religion

As the Nation-State regime signified the nationalisation and statisation of religion according to an open set of pathways, the Global-Market regime signifies the globalisation and marketisation of religion. Just as the Nation-State regime proceeded to de-traditionalise, nationalise, and 'societise' former social bonds and institutions, which have important consequences for religion (namely its creation as a category), the Global-Market regime de-nationalises, transnationalises, de-territorialises, marketises, and sometimes re-ethnicises religion within a cultural environment framed by consumerism and market ideologies. The marketisation of religion signifies its transformation along (or against) the structures and dynamics of consumer and financial capitalism, in which the expression of choice is constitutive of subjectivities, identities, agencies, communities, and so forth. Marketisation thereby refers to a globalisation-specific type of rapport to the self, others, the world, and even nature. Marketisation transforms religion into lifestyles, practices, and voluntary adhesion rather than belief and belonging-oriented forms. Marketisation also profoundly modifies religious organisations and their rapport to tradition, whose former modes can be dismissed, challenged, and/or renewed. This chapter further expands on the concept of marketisation and charts the main religious transformations incurred by the shift to the Global-Market regime.

Neoliberalism and consumerism: the two heads of marketisation

The concept of marketisation as I conceive it encompasses two distinct yet intimately bound processes: *Consumerisation*, or its shaping into consumerism-friendly or consumerism-contesting forms on the one hand; and *neoliberalisation* on the other, in tune with the set of free-market ideologies and practices that have come to dominate the arena of world politics and management since the end of the 1970s. Neoliberalisation involves market formatting, although in ways different from consumerism. To make a short argument, neoliberalism marketises in the sense that it presents and shapes social realities (e.g. education, health, welfare, labour, subjectivities,

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etc.) in utilitarian terms and according to normative standards of valuation (cost-effectiveness, quantity, 'human resources,' 'human capital,' etc.). In a sense, marketisation in this aspect *does* format social realities in tune with a neoclassical understanding of market dynamics, although the idea of the market remains, in most cases, ill-defined and suggestive rather than effective. On the other hand, neoliberalism also purports a worldview as well as a set of values (e.g. mobility, transparency, self-realisation, individual responsibility, seeing difficulties as opportunities to grow, etc.) that provide meaning and direction, thereby exceeding any attempts at seizing it within a formal and computing model.

Neoliberalism and consumerism operate two different yet complementary sets of processes. I am building these as ideal-types in order to capture the complexity of the on-going processes of marketisation that result from the performative aspects of both consumerism and neoliberalism. On the one hand, neoliberal practices commoditise non-commodities: For example, Polanyi's identified land, labour, and money in classical modernity, a list that can be expanded today to include water, knowledge, and life itself (in the case of GMOs), as well as education, healthcare, and welfare more generally.[1] Neoliberalisation privileges economic efficiency in societal institutions, including religious ones. It encourages all organisations, big or small, to perceive themselves on an entrepreneurial model rather than on that provided by the state, and to perceive their actions as that of actors within market segments, with an obligation to brand and marketise themselves and their missions in order to 'survive in a competitive environment.' On the other, consumerism commodifies in the opposite direction so to speak, as the world of consumer goods is a world of meanings, authenticity, and identities competing for choice. Consumerism profoundly changes how social actors engage in religion, and how 'religious resources' become mobilised for producing and expressing identities and constructing meaningful lifestyles. In this sense, the Rational Choice approach to religion (RCAR) and 'religious market' metaphors (including the idea of 'pick and choose' and '*à la carte*' religion) actively participate in the normative processes of marketisation.

Moving further, neoliberalisation and consumerisation are two paradigmatically coextensive yet theoretically distinct processes, the first affecting religion mostly via the political and the societal (i.e. on the institutional and organisational levels), and the second through culture and the social (i.e. on the ethos level, that of cultural ideologies and practices). Or, in a more imaged fashion, the first impacts and shapes religion from 'above,' while the second acts from 'below.' These processes are bound to the two dominating types of individualism identified in a preceding chapter: *Utilitarian individualism* (carried by neoliberalism), and *expressive individualism* (carried by consumerism). On the level of social actors, two imperatives combine as a consequence: Behave as an entrepreneur in all things, act rationally in a way that maximises your utility on the one hand (the Adam Smith imperative), and dare to be yourself (and express it via consumption choices) on the other

(the Rousseau imperative). This double imperative has a formal, utilitarian side, and a substantive, expressive one. In other words, individuals are pushed towards being neoliberal in production and Romantic in consumption.

Marketisation is thus a double-sided complex of normative processes through which societal realities at large are made to conform to a vague neoclassical market model, while social imaginaries are geared to think according to a market idea and ideal. Approaching the study of religion through marketisation signifies that the Market is identified as the most salient and defining feature of contemporary societies: Both the market as a social and societal institution (the actual market), and the market as idea and ideal (Durkheim: A moral ideal) of optimal social regulation and production of meaning. Such an approach to marketisation distances itself from that of Berger and Roof on many counts, the main one being that it does not outsource its analysis to neoclassical economic theory but rather *reintegrates economic phenomena into the folds of history and socio-anthropology*. Furthermore, it is clear for Berger that the marketisation of religion is part of the secularisation process, and that free-market economies are coextensive to the spread of democracy. The approach I am adopting, on the contrary, does not at all entail secularisation (be it privatisation, the loss of social function of religion, religious decline, or differentiation of social spheres) nor any essential connection between marketisation and democratisation—it might even be the contrary. If anything, the trends that it highlights are renewed visibility, new political and social functions for religion, profound religious transformation, and the blurring and interpenetration of social spheres. In fact, the marketisation approach is completely independent not only from secularisation *theories* but also from the *secularisation paradigm* that has been constitutive of modern social sciences.

Starting from a holistic point of view made operational through the concept of embeddedness inspired by Polanyi as well as Mauss' total social fact approach, my argument significantly differs from that of other scholars who maintain the differentiation of social spheres as their core principle. Up until now, views relative to a form or another of marketisation of religion have essentially portrayed economics strictly speaking as forcing itself on religion, thereby denaturing or 'co-opting'[2] it in a way. I argue, on the contrary, that what we are facing is a new situation in which emerging phenomena are original combinations of economics and religion that are inassimilable within a differentiated social sphere perspective.

The vanities of differentiation

A few recent works do command our attention. Bryan Turner has recently argued that

> modern religious formations are profoundly influenced by the commodification of everyday life. Religion becomes part of the global economic

> system in terms of the circulation of religious commodities (amulets, prayer books, pilgrimages and so forth), by the creation and promotion of religious lifestyles (often associated with body management, veiling, diet and dining), by the adoption of modern communication technologies[3] and so on.

Turner is pointing at something very important. Yet, while he repeatedly calls for understanding religious change in relation to the effects of economics-led globalisation, he only superficially engages with the issue. What he means by economics and commodification is unclear and non-thematised, but there are hints that his understanding is quite literal, somewhat in the line of Berger and Roof. His thesis according to which religion expands in tune with consumerism while 'the sacred' (defined following Rudolf Otto's 'the Numinous') is 'destroyed' and 'shrinks before the secular world of modern science and industrialisation' amounts to a curious (and disappointing) fall-back onto a narrative of disenchanting commodification.[4]

Peter Beyer's thesis on the passage from a Westphalian to a Post-Westphalian model of religion similarly points to 'the economic and mass media systems' as being 'the most evident and important' in the remodelling of religion.[5] In Beyer's Luhmannian framework, this signifies that the institutionalised sub-system of religion is engaged in a 'mutual modelling' process with those of economics and mass media. Beyer aptly remarks that the rise of 'religious market' terminology and RCAR is linked to a shift in the way religion presents itself and how we think of it: 'We begin seriously to observe religion like economy when it starts to behave more like economy and less like state.'[6] Yet, what Beyer has in mind when he talks about the economy is uncertain. The only reference given is to Immanuel Wallerstein,[7] whose world economic system theory adjusts nicely to Beyer's own sub-systems approach. Yet, Wallerstein's view of economics is in line with Marx's, and therefore materialistic and close to Adam Smith's. This insight is confirmed when we look at the passage where Beyer comments on 'religion modelled on economy,' i.e. 'religion in terms of production and consumption.'[8] What he finds salient is how 'some' religious movements and organisations are 'explicitly doing religion, to a significant extent, in terms of production and consumption of goods/services, in terms of cost/price and exchange, and in terms of market,' in other words as 'something that must be produced and marketed.'[9] Beyer also signals how an increasing number of individuals 'are treating religion as a source of goods to be tried out and consumed as the need and mood strikes.'[10] Beyer's view of economics is thus quite literal, and he only describes trends that are developing explicitly along economic conceptions.[11]

What Beyer's interpretation is missing is the market's inception as a means of producing social order, which we have seen is of the utmost importance, and without which neoliberalism can simply not be understood. Beyer's thesis leaves out neoliberalism altogether, and seriously underestimates the

nature and the consequences of its rise to dominance in global society. It also lacks an informed view of consumption, which, as we have seen, is far more complex than its reduction to cost/price calculations. Consumption is profoundly enmeshed in the social fabric and in the dynamics of identity, belonging, and meaning, all which cannot be reduced to strictly economic dimensions. Because of his differentiation-bound Luhmannian theoretical framework, Beyer cannot explain why the state was so influential over such a long period of time, why this is no longer so, and how and why religion now 'behaves like economy.' What falls on the side of the road is how the trends that are developing now have affected all social spheres in the same direction, and not just religion. The lack of a more transversal and holistic perspective accounts for how the Post-Westphalian condition remains of very limited pertinence in Beyer's own analyses, as it remains profoundly Western-centric and unable to provide an understanding of what is going on in the Global South.[12] As a result, Beyer can only judge the actual situation as transitional and indeterminate, in other words as the one 'in which the "old forms" are still very much with us, but have lost the dominance that they once had; and yet the "new forms" are not yet sufficiently institutionalized for a corresponding semantics to have solidified.'[13]

The new world…

Indeterminate and transitional, I argue, it is not. At least not in Beyer's sense. Everything is transitional, of course, but as the Westphalian/National-Statist era was assignable, so is the current Global-Market one. As a doctoral student in the early 2000s, I was struck by the fact that sociologists of religion had been diagnosing a 'transitional phase' for decades. Observing the situation in the West at the time, and not yet oriented along a global perspective, it struck me that the characteristics of religion were more or less always the same from author to author, and that these characteristics had only been solidifying and disseminating across an ever-larger portion of society since the 1960s. Amongst these: The immanentisation of salvation (the inner-worldly meaning of life); the immanentisation of the representations of God and the divine (in favour of cosmic, energetic, or karmic terminologies); the uncoupling of representations and religious institutions; the uncoupling of belief and belonging; the importance of practice over belief; relativism, indeterminism, and probabilism (a 'why not?' attitude rather than firm conviction of truth claims); pragmatism; criticism with respect to religious institutions, materialised by the rise of 'spiritual not religious claims,' and so on.[14] How could sociologists show stability and argue transience? The answer lies in the equation that scholars have been making between the loss of the regulatory power of religious institutions and the deregulation of religion *per se*. In other words, that something else than well-identified and differentiated religious institutions could be providing a form of regulation did/could not emerge as a possibility. In my

view, this has to do with the resilience of the implicit assumptions of the secularisation paradigm.

As far as religion is concerned, things started to change—away from the National-Statist regime of religion—in the 1960s, namely with the coming to age of the post-war Baby Boomer generation, and changes have only unfolded accordingly since, first in the West, then elsewhere. It is in the 1960s that all of the elements that constitute today's religious landscape appeared or started to massify, namely through the emergence of a vibrant and multifaceted counterculture (and the conservative reaction to the counterculture, which has only become stronger) and the developments of consumer culture. This is when 'Eastern Spiritualities' and other exotic practices and beliefs started circulating, amongst other trends that have continually eroded institutionalised religion and National-Statist forms.[15] In a study of youth religion in Quebec, Jean-Philippe Perreault and I showed how today's youth did not rebel against the type of religion introduced by the Baby Boomer generation like the latter did against the religion of their parents. Youth religion, empirical research shows, did innovate; yet, they lived for the larger part in a Boomer-born religious world. The Boomer generation and the 1960s' cultural revolution, in other words, were an exception and not a rule.[16] This is also the conclusion of Wade Clark Roof's important research in the US, as well as that of Linda Woodhead and Rebecca Catto for Great Britain, of Roland Campiche, Yves Lambert, and Guy Michelat for Europe, etc. It is something for which I believe there is little ground for contestation.[17]

… and its globalisation

The West is not the only place where profound social change, including religious change, has taken place since the 1960s. The trends that have transformed religion in the West have also been at work in the non-Western world, only with different starting points and different emphases, depending on the moment when consumerism and neoliberalism became implanted and the State lost its sacred aura. If the Global-Market regime is indeed a global affair, it is because the Nation-State regime was already, as we have seen, inherently global. The globalisation of the Nation-State form, which was disseminated through direct or indirect colonialism, imperialism, and cultural hegemony, was essentially the Westernisation of the world, with variegated pathways depending on the manner in which the modern programme was enforced, appropriated, contested, and acculturated. The story is slightly different with the Global-Market regime. With the dis-embedment of the nation-state in favour of supra-national economic regulatory agencies and multinational corporations which de-territorialised alongside neoliberal financial deregulation, it is no longer possible to argue that the installation and spread of the Global-Market regime is simply another step in an inevitable process of Westernisation (or Americanisation).

Of course, capitalism is a Western invention, and one can only understand the specifics of neoliberalism and consumerism when cast against historical developments in the West. Capitalism has globalised as a key part of Western imperialism and hegemony. But this new era introduces a process of de-territorialisation that also contains elements suggesting the erosion of Western influence.[18]

Overall, and *in most parts of the world*, types of religion that remain closest to the former National-Statist model are those experiencing decline and facing the greatest pressures for reform. On the other hand, those which espouse an entrepreneurial type and cater to the culture of authenticity and expressivity in one way or another are experiencing vitality and growth. Amongst these, from a global perspective, the spectacular boom of charismatic religion, including, of course, within Christianity, such as Evangelicalism and (neo-)Pentecostal movements, is paradigmatic. It can also hardly be assimilated within the secularisation paradigm. Similarly, the massive changes within Islam exemplify how World religions have been transformed into a multifaceted marketised nebula, at the core of which we find Islamic fashion, Islamic finance, and the market for halal goods and services (including sharia-friendly packaged vacations and five-star Mecca pilgrimages), amidst a widespread Islamic revival and the development of a new entrepreneurial 'Muslim pride.' The self-realisation tropes of New Age-derived 'holistic spiritualties,' which Casanova dismissed as insignificant to all extents and purposes,[19] have become totally embedded in popular as well as managerial cultures worldwide, and are a major influence contributing to the reshaping of an unsuspected array of religious phenomena. Formerly oppressed and dismissed popular and mystical religious expressions have also found new legitimacy, sometimes in tune with global countercultural manifestations. Across the globe, there has been a spectacular revival of shamanism, which is in many cases inseparable from Western-originated neo-shamanic and neo-pagan movements (consider the explosion of the ritual use of *ayahuasca*, *iboga*, *peyotl*, and other psychoactive substances) in indigenous and non-indigenous settings, with an intense and constitutive transnational dimension. Also noteworthy is the development of virtual practices in and without traditional religions, as well as the way in which the virtual realm of Internet contributes to renew pre-modern traditions (e.g. indigenous peoples of the Americas). The much-mediatised fundamentalist movements, especially within Islam, have also emerged in entirely new garbs and a resolutely post-national and post-statist imaginary. Meanwhile, most ex-communist countries are witnessing the combined trend of high religiosity (Catholicism, Orthodox Christianity, Islam), ethnic nationalism, and 'illiberal' authoritarian political regimes. In China, economic deregulation has coincided with an astonishing religious revival. In India, yoga is being branded by the highest government officials amidst a development strategy that combines computer technologies, capitalism, and (neo-)Hinduism. Everywhere or almost, scholars and media report signs

of religious revivals, from the Fiji Islands to the Inuit of the Arctic. Every day, global religious leaders, healers, pastors, gurus, shamans, and spiritual masters circle the globe, attracting masses in a dizzying array of festivals, pilgrimages, conferences, retreats, workshops, and rituals. While religion was believed to be on the decline and held an insignificant place in world politics only two decades ago (remember how Kissinger's 1994 *Diplomacy* treatise had no entry for religion), it has risen to play a key part in today's global world, and is definitely at the top of international political agendas.

Those who remain entrenched in the political-institutional paradigm barely consider most of these manifestations to be worthy of attention. They consider these to be marginal, at best. They are wrong. If they would take notice of the obvious importance of economics in the foundation and dynamics of our societies, and conceive of the 'market' as anthropologists rather than neoclassical economists, they would understand that these trends are not marginal developments but rather the very core of what religion is becoming before our very eyes. This importance is confirmed by the way that National-Statist religious institutions and organisations are made to change in accordance to the logics of these 'marginal phenomena,' and not the other way around. In other words, Pentecostalism is having much more impact on the Catholic Church than the contrary: It is the former that provides the template for understanding the developments of the latter. This signals an important transformation of the very nature and location of religion in global societies.

From national to glocal

The most important shift is the decrease in the power of the state as a normative principle of social order. This is made even more important since the Nation-State (again, the actual political institution and the idea) was the structure within which modern societies were embedded. We have shifted from an international order of nation-states to a world or global society, in the sense of 'a single global connectivity with a multitude of overlapping social spaces being continuously constructed and reconstructed.'[20] Or, in other words, as an 'encompassing system and [...] an emergent reality'[21] created by the interactions, negotiations, agencies, struggles, conflicts, and coalitions of social actors, whether at the macro, *meso*, or micro level. National frontiers, which were naturalised by methodological nationalism, no longer function as containers, thereby opening the way for a myriad of criss-crossing relations on the global, transnational, and all the way down to the local levels. It is not that there are no longer any frontiers, as free-market ideologues would have it, but rather that the frontiers are being redrawn in a web of overlapping levels and in multiple directions. Religious actors themselves become both globalisers and producers of new frontiers, which are necessary for identities.[22] A salient novelty in this respect is the—often important, even determining—role of diaspora in relation to

their homelands, facilitated by communication technologies and affordable transport. Similarly, religion becomes de-territorialised, while the virtual allows for strong bonds to remain active between remote locations. On the one hand, the nationalist or pan-nationalist political constitutions of religious movements (e.g. Palestinian nationalism) have shifted to global ones (e.g. global jihad).[23] On the other hand, the attrition of the national frame, national sovereignty, and national identity has made the nation available for new symbolic investments, including new, essentially reactionary nationalistic claims, often with an ethnic component (e.g. ex-Soviet bloc, the rise of populist-nationalist movements, Brexit).

Pentecostalism, which has literally exploded under Global-Market conditions, illustrates how the global has become foundational to the imaginary within which marketised religion evolves. As the subtitle of David Martin's excellent book—*The World Their Parish*—makes plain, Pentecostalism evolves on a resolutely global plane. This does not mean that Pentecostal churches are not nationally implanted; charismatic Churches have become increasingly active in national politics, be it in South America, sub-Saharan Africa, or South-East Asia. Yet, their legitimacy comes from their global pretentions (often made explicit in their names[24]) and inclusion in transnational networks. Roland Robertson's 'glocal' and 'glocalise' concepts,[25] meaning how the global takes root in the local and how the local is bound to the global, is helpful for understanding how such dynamics unfold in a way that complexifies the former Nation-State-embedded relations between the micro and the macro. What is more is that these networks extend in directions that were heretofore unthinkable, with examples such as the Nigerian pastor leading a congregation in Kiev becoming widespread. Reviewing such 'transnational localisms' as seen from the standpoint of sub-Saharan Africa and African diaspora, Afe Adogame and Jim Spickard have identified several patterns of transnationalism, including religious bi-localism (people involved in two localities at the same time: Their community of origin and their host country), reverse missions (Global South missionaries in the West), South–South religious trade (connections between Global South locations that leave the West out of the equation), and transnational imagined communities ('made up of deterritorialized migrants, united by their religious identities').[26] All of these scenarios can be extended well beyond Africa.

Transnational imagined communities do not confine themselves to migration-linked communities. The global Muslim *Ummah* and the global Jihad are cases in point, but they are far from being an isolated case. The global community of Catholics (including the Catholic youth of the World Youth Day manifestations), of Anglicans, of First Nations, the international Hindutva, the Global Family of the Rainbow of the Living Light (a New-Age religious event-culture), as well as many others all portray themselves in such a global imaginary. Another notable phenomenon is the relation that diaspora now entertain with their homelands. While emigration

implied an important rupture in a not so distant past, '[c]heap, swift travel, multiple communication technologies, and an interconnected world financial system have figuratively shrunk our networked globe,'[27] with the result that diaspora now remain tied to their countries and communities of origin like never before. In many cases, these diaspora are very influential in the developments in their homelands. They bring with them financial resources but also an entrepreneurial mind-set, networks, experience, and know-how. In a country like China, where diaspora were particularly cut off and negatively perceived, they are now courted and sought after in order to fuel economic development, with important consequences for the on-going religious revival. Similar scenarios are reported in India as well as elsewhere. Within Islam, Western diaspora have been key to the development of global trends such as the booming halal market. All of these imagined communities are profoundly modern utopias, and have an important de-territorialised component, as they tend to move away from their historic lands, cultures, traditions, and customs.[28] Finally, the world is not only the new parish; it is also often conceived in market terms, as a competing ground.

The blurring of boundaries and the de-differentiation of social spheres

The 'modern myths'[29] that under-stood the National-Statist regime have eroded, amongst which are universalism, reason, and progress, with important consequences all-around. Along with this erosion, it is the pull of a certain conception of Western Enlightenment (e.g. moral individualism) that fades, in favour of a capitalist and utilitarian version. This particularly affects modern institutions, which tend to lose their regulative power as they lose their monopoly and legitimacy, whether it be in the medical, scientific, political, or religious domain. In the case of the latter, this opens the door to the re-legitimation of certain religious forms that had been tossed aside, such as therapeutic and healing techniques, martial arts and embodied practices, mystical currents, emotional and event-based phenomena such as festivals and processions, as well as a score of techniques, beliefs, and practices that were filed under superstition and magic in the National-Statist era. In the National-Statist regime, religion was (mostly) confined within a well-differentiated social sphere, with regulating institutions, and hence was isolated (in part) from the inextricable maze of practices and beliefs that existed prior. Religion was put into a box, so to speak, shaped in the format of post-Reformation Christianity, starting with the very definition of religion and the exportation of this category to the non-Western world, resulting in major transformations as to the location and substance of religion as a result. This boxing had the effect of marginalising a series of phenomena which had been core to religious life prior to modern times in favour of belief and exclusive belonging.[30] In the Global-Market regime,

religion comes out of this box: It spills out of its neatly differentiated social sphere, and ceases to model itself on post-Reformation Christianity (including Christianity itself), which has more or less dissolved, or has at the very least been marginalised in its Western homeland. The picture that comes from reading what is going on in different parts of the world is how strong an effect Christianity had in non-Western parts of the world during this modern reshaping of religion, as it was tied to Western superiority in the eyes of the indigenous populations. This is no longer true, as the West itself has lost much of its gloss and appears, in the eyes of many Global South actors, as irreligious, materialistic, and immoral—a narrative on which fundamentalists are not the only ones to thrive.

It is not as if popular religion and other religious phenomena had completely disappeared during the National-Statist era. Many managed to survive in the margins; yet, they were empirically and conceptually negligible, at least for some time. Social sciences could go on focusing on men, institutions, state–Church relations, and falling service attendance rates; yet, change was brewing in the margins and under the radar of religious institutions and state alike, led by 'new' actors such as women and minorities.[31] In the wake of the so-called New Age-derived and Eastern-inspired holistic spiritualities, new religious phenomena took on novel, non-institutionalised, and marketised forms, and grew in the space open by the critique of modern institutions, such as medicine. They eventually constituted a landmass—or 'nebula'[32]—of practices labelled 'alternative and holistic medicine,' and are in the process of being increasingly recognised by private and public health insurance systems rather than by the 'normal' channels of the state's regulation of religion. Many sociologists continue nonetheless to deem these developments marginal rather than central, focused as they are on National-Statist regime religion. One implicit assumption carried by the secularisation paradigm which crystallised under National-Statist conditions is that religion could wane or rise, but within National-Statist forms, and within a differentiation framework.

As Casanova writes: 'the understanding of secularization as a single process of functional differentiation of the various institutional spheres or sub-systems of modern societies remains relatively uncontested in the social sciences, particularly within European sociology.'[33] Uncontested, until now. Coming out of its box, religion becomes mixed with manifestations that originate from or blend with other social spheres. One of the most important characteristics of the Global-Market regime, I argue, is precisely the de-differentiation of social spheres and the emergence of mixed phenomena. Most scholars would probably agree that, prior to modern times, societies, Western and otherwise, were un-differentiated, or at least that differentiation was inchoative and partial. The underlying assumption, within social sciences, is that this process of differentiation and institutionalisation—since institutional regulation is seen as both the proof and the product of differentiation—was in some way irreversible and once and for good. It did,

indeed, take millennia for politics to become differentiated from religion in Christian Europe. How could such a long-winded process towards 'autonomy' be anything else than guided by a profound telos within the history of mankind and thereby be irreversible? Such thinking is central and explicit (with variations) in the theses of Marcel Gauchet and Charles Taylor;[34] yet, it also exists as an implicit assumption for the bulk of social sciences. However, this differentiation process has arguably been exaggerated, taken to be reality rather than a convenient, and for a time heuristic, methodological lever. However, a quick stroll across the production of social sciences in other sub-disciplines than the study of religion (something which sociologists of religion should do more often) reveals a very common diagnosis: The boundaries between social spheres have become blurred. The differentiation between social spheres is not so evident anymore. What if strong differentiation was not a one-way process? What if the Global-Market regime re-introduces what has possibly been normality since the beginnings of mankind: An intermeshed web of variously (un)differentiated social dimensions? What if what grew in the margins of such institutional differentiation were now, as a consequence, the most probing phenomena?

Recent works, including that of Ian Reader, have shown how the differentiation between pilgrimage and tourism was more a *vue de l'esprit* than a fact, something largely constructed by a post-Reformation view of what religion is (and should be).[35] As we move away from the National-Statist era, such intimations start to crumble and become contested by leading scholars. Yet, this is far from being the only boundary that is dissolving. In economic matters, we have seen how a differentiated approach was largely counterproductive, and how market and consumer research have turned away from such neoclassical political economic theory in order to understand consumption as a social fact rather than the manifestation of some natural tendency to barter along some natural law of offer and demand. Within such strands of marketing, it is the very distinction between consumption and production that is questioned by contemporary consumer culture (some talk of 'prosumption' to capture this), with marketers even attempting to create religious cults around brands.

The public/private divide has been the object of much reconsideration, as the instituted differentiations of modernity are challenged by Market-fuelled blurring processes. This division, which is foundational to both Liberal and Republican political arrangements and their models for the regulation of religion, is attacked on two fronts. The first has to do with the effects of consumerism. We have seen how Romanticism valued an expressive type of individualism, and how this is at the core of the dynamics of today's consumer culture. Expressing one's self signifies breaking down the frontier between the public and the private by publicising the intimate sphere. This is not only at work within fashion, i.e. the outward expression of lifestyled identities, but also on the Internet, and social media especially. The very logic of platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, WhatsApp, and so

on is the constant publicisation of the self, including dimensions that would have been considered inviolably private not long ago. What is also striking is how these platforms have met an incredible success worldwide, including in non-Western 'developing' countries, where they are powerfully disseminating forms of expressive individualism. The consequences for religion are immense, as the differentiation of religion in the National-Statist regime rested on the distinction between the private (where religion belonged) and the public (where religion could express itself on certain conditions). Religion at the level of social actors (religiosity) now becomes constitutively publicised, transformed into a lifestyle format that must be expressed in an outward fashion, as the case of the so-called 'return' of the Muslim veil illustrates so well. These cultural dynamics bring important challenges for both Republican and Liberal regulation models: For French-styled republicanism, it is vain to vigorously hammer the idea that religion must stay in the realm of the private sphere when consumerism is about the publicisation of the intimate. For liberal multiculturalism, it is also vain to make religious expression into a purely individual affair and a matter of personal choice when expressivity is at the core of the cultural *politics* of consumerism. In other words, the private is political, and one can no longer separate individual actors from communitarian and global politics. The meaning of the veil is not a solely subjective affair. Wearing a fashion veil or a burqa in London's East End has resonances in Gulf countries and elsewhere, and this has political implications, whether we want it or not.

Neoliberalism also impacts the public/private division by seriously eroding the social and welfare mission of the nation-state.[36] Disengagement from the national economy, transport, infrastructures, communications, education, health, social services, and so on has opened as many areas to the non-profit and entrepreneurial sectors. This has opened new possibilities for religious institutions, movements, and organisations, as in the well-known example of Faith-Based Initiatives (FBI) in the provision of education, health, and welfare, a phenomenon that is by no means a solely American affair. Furthermore, religious institutions are also under pressure to become visible, to 'brand' themselves. Scholars like Casanova and Willaime have turned our attention to the ways that religions (read: Religious institutions such as the Catholic and other Christian Churches) have resisted privatisation and how they have become re-publicised 'throughout the world.'[37] In the words of Casanova:

> de-privatization [...] is the process whereby religion abandons its assigned place in the private sphere and enters the undifferentiated public sphere of civil society to take part in the ongoing process of contestation, discursive legitimation, and redrawing of the boundaries.[38]

What is remarkable in hindsight about Casanova's analysis is that he makes no significant attempt to shed light on the *causes* of this sudden

re-publicisation of religion in the 1980s. There is not the least indication on the synchronicity between this and the neoliberal revolution which was by then gathering momentum. Religion did not suddenly decide to shed its gag, out of the blue. Put in perspective, the re-publicisation of religion is part of a much wider ensemble of changes by which the very grammar of governmentality was in the process of being transformed, as was the state's mission, in favour of Market-inspired modes of regulation. I argue that the re-publicisation (de-privatisation) of religion diagnosed by Casanova over two decades ago is a consequence of this greater shift from a National-Statist to a Global-Market regime. What this also illustrates is how a country like Poland, which was at this point part of the Soviet-led communist bloc, was not completely isolated from global developments. The position of the Catholic Church in Poland was made possible through a loosening of the state's grip on civil society, and the Eastern bloc collapsed mainly due to economic reasons—the failure of the all-powerful state to deliver the goods and keep up with Western capitalism in a globalising world.[39] The communist state could rival capitalist welfare states, but not the sirens of the global market. Coming back to my main argument, the public/private divide was tenable under National-Statist conditions, in the sense that its prerequisite was a firm embedment within a regulative state and a national container. With the arrival of the Global-Market era, the public/private divide dissolves within the frontiers of the nation, with social actors participating in expressive individualism, and without, as the public sphere becomes putatively extended to the entire globe.[40] In his study of religion in Nordic countries, Anders Bäckström argues 'that religion becomes public in several ways and emerges as an arena that connects the private and the public beyond conventional distinctions.'[41] The public/private divide therefore becomes (at least partly) non-operational, and certainly problematic as a framework for thinking religion today.

Correlative with the de-differentiation of social spheres is the process of de-institutionalisation which Beyer sees affecting 'churched religion' under what he calls Post-Westphalian conditions.[42] Central to this process is the decline of nationally dominant religious organisations in favour of smaller and more numerous, transnational, local, and national organisations which increase religious diversity. De-institutionalisation is also at work in the trend towards 'spiritual not religious' forms, which Beyer doubts is as important as some want to imagine, in reference to Paul Heelas and Linda Woodhead's work.[43] What Beyer means by de-institutionalisation, he insists, remains disconnected from any process of de-differentiation, which he denies.[44] This, however, is precisely what I mean: De-institutionalisation and de-differentiation are two correlated processes. This is not to say that religious institutions, which were at the core of the 'differentiated subsystem of religion' in the National-Statist regime, have declined into insignificance. They are, in many respects, quite significant. Yet, they are no longer at the centre of what deserves to be called religion. They are behind

religious change, and must adapt in ways that are no longer organised by the state and which they do not control yet affects their very nature. In my view, Beyer's analysis (much like Casanova's) rests on a differentiation hypothesis that needs to be questioned and which underplays the extent of the on-going transformations of religion.

The religious manifestations I want to draw attention to and consider significant are in many cases examples of mixed phenomena, blending, for instance, management and religion, entertainment and religion, tourism and religion, fashion and religion, politics and religion, consumption and religion, marketing and religion, finance and religion, and so forth. My argument is that they are not to be understood as assimilations of one pole by the other or reversely, but that their novelty and symbolic efficacy resides specifically in this interbreeding, which, in turn, can better be understood from a holistic rather than a differentiated perspective. In addition, and to push the heresy of my stance a notch further, if such a proposition is heuristic, if it indeed makes better sense of contemporary religious manifestations, one can wonder if it is not the very concept of 'the secular' that is invalidated in terms of much of its analytical potential for the present period. I have critiqued this concept and the focus of the sociology of religion on the religion/secular couple in the introduction. I can now substantiate this critique a little more. For if it is true that we are attending to a movement of de-differentiation, then the category of 'the secular' loses much of its substance. The very idea of the secular requires sharp differentiation for it to be anywhere close to operative. For this reason, the whole current of research devoted to 'multiple secularities' can be said to have relevance only in a historical comparative perspective for the earlier, National-Statist modern period. It fails however to provide a heuristic standpoint for analysing contemporary religion otherwise than in an undecidable way.

The neoliberalisation of religion

If we understand neoliberalism as more than a strict set of economic doctrines and policies but also as an encompassing and pervasive cultural ideology centred around the idea of the Market, the first and foremost effect of neoliberalisation is an ideational and ideological one, by which religious institutions, religious actors, and religion in general become perceived by the public and themselves (and by social scientists) in economic and market terms, namely through notions such as competition, market shares, enterprise, utility, choice, demand, offer, profitability, efficiency, cost/benefit ratio, service provision, brand, marketing and communication strategy, etc. While this feature is integral to Global-Market-born religious phenomena, whether in explicit (e.g. Pentecostalism) or implicit (New Age and holistic spiritualities) ways, existing religious institutions such as Churches and movements are increasingly being forced to adopt such self-conceptions, terminologies, and practices, for instance by adopting neoliberal-type

management (e.g. New Public Management), specialising administrative functions, becoming accountable towards donors and financiers, outsourcing accounting, developing strategies and objectives, becoming inclined to pursue growth, creating marketing and communication departments, and having to learn the art of logo and brand management.[45]

On the whole, we can say that the marketisation of religion enacts a change from an institution-type of management and governmentality to an organisation-type. Not only do religious organisations such as Churches are made to adopt principles of governance, their rapports with the state are increasingly framed within its principles. Tuomas Martikainen has shown how the overall liberalisation of the inherited models of political regulation of religion involves a change from a vertical type of state rule towards state-civil society 'partnerships' cooperating within various 'projects.'[46] Parallel to this, dealings with the state have also been impacted by the neoliberal reconfiguration of the state around concerns for 'security.' In the case of many Muslim and immigrant-related religious organisations, the theme of security has had important effects on the ability to collect and manage financial resources as well as real estate, namely because of terrorist prevention policies.[47] Linked to this focus on security, neoliberalisation also involves an increase in administrative procedures (internal and external), and the development of evaluation practices (of 'quality,' 'efficiency,' etc.), as has been the case for NGOs more generally. All of this has had an impact on community life within and around these organisations, as the informal trust and gift-based social relations that used to preside over the accomplishment of administrative and management tasks are replaced by functional, professionalised relations, with quantifiable objectives and a general attitude of mistrust regarding non-contractual relations.

Far from being neutral, then, these changes promote a specific normative model in which accountability, growth, success, and visibility become guiding principles. The extent to which these logics have penetrated even the longest-established religious institutions is remarkable. The imperatives of visibility, readability, and of a clearly definable identity, i.e. the pillars of a branding strategy, are perhaps some of the most powerful logics at work in the Global-Market remodelling of religious organisations. The imperative to exist in the media and in the virtual landscape in order to exist tout court integrates religious organisations into a public of mutual exposure. Religious organisations-cum-providers are drawn into a politics of visibility in which they must identify a corresponding niche, and gear their 'offer' towards a specific set of lifestyles. This makes life hard for long-established universal religious institutions and movements which could formerly solve paradoxes, contradictions, and tensions internally through their organisational structures. Today, the crisis touching all societal and social institutions involves a profound change in the modes of authority which challenges such institutions more than others by promoting the passage from rational-legal types of authority to charismatic types.

A characteristic of neoliberalism, as we have seen, is to de-politicise. With respect to religion, this is observable in at least two trends. The first, which concerns Western democracies especially, consists of the devolution of the political regulation of religion to the judicial. In liberal countries of make-ups like Canada and the US, this trend can be quite extreme, with the Supreme Courts becoming the principle actors in the regulation of religion.[48] In republican countries such as France, meanwhile, where the state has a stronger mandate for social regulation, the same trend has been observable.[49] Overall, neoliberalisation coincides with a general liberalisation of the various institutionalised models of the political regulation of religion.[50] A second type of de-politicisation consists in the rise of authoritarian regimes and their breaches of the rule of law and the separation of powers. In many cases, as in Eastern European countries and Russia, these regimes instrumentalise majority religions; yet, in other countries, authoritarian tendencies have coincided with a relative deregulation of religion, as in China. In all cases though, authoritarian trends (such as the 'illiberal' movement in Eastern Europe) have signified a move away from *political* liberalism (separation of powers, political pluralism, liberty of opinion), but not from *economic* liberalism and free-market policies. Neither has this meant resistance to the implantation of consumerism as a desirable ethos. What is seriously questioned is the liberal equation of market capitalism with democracy. As I have argued in an earlier chapter, democracy was not quintessential for classical liberalism, on the contrary, and neoliberalism's renewal of classical liberalism in the twentieth century pledged everything on the market while being accommodating of authoritarianism.

The ideational character of the marketisation of religion has very tangible effects. Formatting within the Global-Market regime comes with an array of very effective, yet surprising, legal measures. Such is the case with the '9591' category regarding 'religious products and services' in the Central Product Classification of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), one of the most powerful supra-national regulatory body, as part of the 1995 General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). A milestone in the process of economic globalisation, Usunier explains how GATS 'paved the way for the commoditisation of virtually every service, including those delivered by religion through Churches and Congregations (which are considered "Membership Organizations" by CPC code 95).'[51] These services make up an open-ended list that includes baptismal services, marriages, funerals, meditation retreats, yoga, Ayurveda products, and so on. Through the implementation of such a measure, 'religious products and services' now benefit from free-trade protection under international trade regulations. For Usunier, these dispositions act to transform religious market metaphors into self-fulfilling prophecies.[52] This inscription of religion within the charters of the marketable is not limited to the WTO. As we will see with the case of halal, religious certification has erupted as a hot theme in international (and often un-democratic) agencies such as the European Commission and

the European Union, while certain religious movements, including Muslim fundamentalists, have mobilised to use these new possibilities to forward their agendas.

The rise of charismatic authorities

Another major trend underlying the transformations of religion is the extraordinary rise of charismatic types of authority to the detriment of former institutional or traditional forms of authority. This is tied to a corollary trend which has made personal experience the measure of truth and authenticity. Everywhere in the world, traditional religious expressions and formerly powerful religious institutions and organisations are being contested as legitimate sources of religious authority, as new sources of authority arise, often from the business and media world. This has been reported within Islam for instance, where figures like Egypt-born Amr Khaled or the Indonesian Abdullah Gymnastiar have supplanted traditional religious authorities through the incredible outreach of their respective multi-media empires. Meanwhile, the past decades have also seen the Roman Catholic Church shift towards an increasingly charismatic *mise en scène* of its papal function, namely by embracing the possibilities of the digital age. This is, of course, central to the rapid development of Pentecostal-type ministries, as well as personality-based American style Megachurches. The emergence of global gurus such as the Dalai Lama and Mata Amritanandamayi, as well as the importance of personalities such as Oprah Winfrey, Deepak Chopra, Eckhart Tolle, and many others foreshadows the ways in which orientalised and holistic spiritualities, as well as coaching and self-help psychology-based spiritualities are all based on charismatic types of authority.

Max Weber's classic typology of modes of authority (traditional, rational-legal, and charismatic) is an unavoidable yet insightful port of entry into this discussion.[53] Traditional authority is based on the belief in the sacred character of the reproduction of the past and the legitimacy of those entrusted with its faithful transmission. Legal-rational authority rests on the belief in the legitimacy of those exercising power based on legal dispositions. The authority of someone derives from his position in a legally defined institutional frame, and not from personal qualities. It is therefore the legal framework itself—the institution—that one obeys, and not as such the person exercising this type of power. Weber derived this ideal-type from his depiction of modern, stately bureaucratic administration. In the domain of religion, rational-legal authority is exercised by religious institutions of which the Catholic Church is the most obvious example. The priest (and even more so the pope himself) has authority because of the function that is attributed to him by the Church as an institution, which Weber called a 'bureaucratic enterprise.'[54] The emergence of this type of authority is rooted in the long historical process of rationalisation described by

Weber, starting with the differentiation of politics and religion. It is this type of authority, based on instrumental rationality, that came to dominate in the National-Statist era, evincing traditional and charismatic authorities. In this regime, other institutions, including religious institutions like the Church but also religious movements like the Muslim Modernist organisations, modelled themselves on the bureaucratic state and thereby derived their own legitimacy as a result of their institutionalisation.

Charismatic authority, finally, is personal and singular, contrary to traditional and rational-legal authority. It derives from extraordinary personal qualities ('superhuman or supernatural forces and characteristics'[55]), a revelation, a particular grace or, in other words, particular *gifts*. As any gift, it is given, received, and must be rendered.[56] The charismatic personality is therefore *obliged* by his gifts to give in return: To lead a mission. Yet, charismatic authority only becomes effective if it recognised by free-willed individuals who warrant the supernatural source of these gifts.[57] By associating the figure of the prophet to this type of authority, Weber stresses the revolutionary potential of charisma. Tied to a person rather than tradition or an institution, charismatic authority can be as powerful as it is fragile and unstable. The obvious challenge for a charismatic type of authority is its perpetuation, especially when the leader passes away. If charisma is not successfully transferred into an institutionalised form or to another charismatic personality, it is bound to wane.

Contrary to Weber's expectation, the reign of rational-legal authority did not continue to expand but has been countered by the rise of a new brand of charismatic authority as we have moved into the Global-Market regime. In a culture that is inherently critical vis-à-vis any type of institution and institutionalisation, and that is geared towards an aggrandisement of the present, the Achilles' heel of charismatic authority (its long-term fragility) is no longer as detrimental and exceptional. The title of Joyce Appleby's history of capitalism, *The Relentless Revolution*, shows how capitalism has been made of cycles of booms and crashes from the outset, and how it is driven by a revolutionary thrust that eats at traditional cultural systems and institutions by promoting progress in the guise of perpetual change. This revolutionary nature of capitalism can be linked to the rise of charismatic types of authority. To the perpetuation of the past (tradition) and the long-winded soteriological promises of the state (legal-rational), charismatic authority opposes the magnification and sacredness of the present and the imminence (and sometimes immanence) of salvation.

Weber, who was writing at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century, considered charismatic authority to be antithetical to economic behaviour.[58] Typical of 'primitive' societies which gave an important place to supernatural forces, charismatic authority, he wrote, tended to diminish with the complexification of societies and the birth of societal institutions, which carried the seed of rational-legal authority. For Weber, capitalism was entirely based on utilitarian calculus and

instrumental rationality. With hindsight, this might be true of capitalism as regards production, for which rational accumulation and reinvestment in the pursuit of higher profits has been and remains a golden rule; yet, Weber has forgotten how capitalist entrepreneurs, from Benjamin Franklyn to Andrew Carnegie and all the way to Steve Jobs, are ideal-typically charismatic types. We have also seen how consumption obeys a very different set of principles in which hedonism and emotions are key. An overview of branding has similarly revealed how marketing and branding work at constructing brands as personalities and building their charisma. Charismatic authority, therefore, is definitely integral to the capitalist system. With the globalisation of brand-based capitalism and its inscription within cultures, it is not so surprising if charismatic authority characterises today's most important new religious phenomena and challenges former rational-legal modes. From this perspective, the emergence of charismatic figures which function as religious authorities can even be *expected*: Beyond the personal qualities of contemporary charismatic authorities, whether Pope Francis, Oprah Winfrey, the Dalai Lama, or Abdullah Gymnastiar, their multiplication is a *structural characteristic* of globalised capitalism, and not due to a sudden and coincidental worldwide demographic rise in outstanding personalities.

It is therefore no surprise if new religious authorities have a tendency to emanate from the world of entertainment, media, and business, for it is in these environments that they acquire the desired qualifications to become charismatic religious authorities. To paraphrase Malcolm McLuhan's famous formula, it is the medium, and not institutionally approved theological intricacies, that is the message in the Global-Market era. Pentecostal ministers and Megachurch pastors construct their aura specifically by using the possibilities of communication technologies, from satellite television to the Internet, social media, CDs, DVDs, and so on. What is remarkable is how the branded, media-savvy Televangelist model has spread all over the world and affected non-Christian religion worldwide, for example within Islam. The same logics are at work within the holistic spiritualities nebula. It is because of their photogenic character and their media omnipresence that figures such as the Dalai Lama have become one of the most influential global religious leaders. For more local spiritual entrepreneurs such as the neighbourhood yoga studio, it is essential to have a nicely designed logo and website in order to arouse confidence. Media charisma precedes religious authority: One can become a religious authority without proper religious training if one is successfully mediatised, but one cannot become a well-known religious authority with religious training but no media potential (or a good communication team and strategy—e.g. ISIS). This is the same process that has profoundly affected politics, and which accounts for the otherwise incomprehensible success of populist leaders from Sergio Berlusconi to Roberto Duterte and Donald Trump.

Consumerism and the lifestylisation of religion

Shifts in regimes of authority are not superficial happenings. They incur changes in the rapport that societies and cultures have with respect to truth and authenticity. As Max Weber has shown, the rise of rational-legal authority was correlative with a very long process of rationalisation in the West and beyond, and its overruling by charismatic types of authority is not to be taken lightly. It points to a major historical rupture. Modernity and modernisation have altered every aspect of life on earth, human or otherwise. How could it not be?

The question of authenticity is at the heart of consumerism. Consumer capitalism requires constant influxes of authenticity, which it then circulates. As with authority, authenticity no longer tends to derive from the attestation of institutions. Coincidentally, the question of authenticity has emerged as a major religious issue, and affects every type of religion.[59] Two main types of authenticity claims have emerged within the Global-Market. The first is authenticity derived from personal experience: Experience as the measure of truth. It is common to read that inherited religion is considered worthless by individuals until it is appropriated and lived: 'My faith was my mother's before, it wasn't worth much.'[60] This characteristic can be generalised to a large extent. It is built in the many varieties of born-again and conversion religious movements, including in world religions such as Islam and, of course, charismatic Christianity. It is correlative with charismatic authority, as a leader will be respected for his or her experience because he or she has lived and lives what he preaches. In the same vein, there is a tendency towards a more horizontal type of leadership, with religious authorities gaining respect for being more of a big brother (or sister) than a father or mother—a facilitator rather than a father-like authority. Similarly, beliefs tend to be second with respect to the symbolic efficacy of practices: How 'it works for me.'

Religion often becomes unhinged, partly when not completely, from afterlife soteriologies. Equally or more important are the pragmatics, the effects within life, here and now. As Eva Illouz and Pierre Prades have shown, salvation has become equal to health, relational and professional success, self-discovery, and even prosperity.[61] It would be a mistake to identify the effects of marketisation to prosperity gospels alone. Prosperity—or Health and Wealth—gospels are only a portion of a wider movement towards inner-worldly versions of salvation. They make the embedment within a Market imaginary very explicit, and have multiplied worldwide in a wild fashion. David Lehmann has remarked how prosperity gospels have become dominant in Pentecostalism and Charismatic Christianity, and how this emphasis on worldly and material success is a key factor to their own success.[62] Prosperity gospels have even emerged in unsuspecting places. It has become a major element in the Islamic revival, for instance. According to anthropologist Sipke Shaughnessy, a form of prosperity gospel has even

emerged amongst the Kenyan Maasai.[63] While still living a traditional nomadic herder life, Shaughnessy reports how young Maasai self-define along two categories: 'analogue' and 'digital.' Those who identify with the latter category sport cell phones and are keen on using social media platforms, and have reviewed their religious system in tune with the basics of a prosperity gospel. They present themselves as businessmen in the bush, obviously deriving pleasure and pride out of this status. This example shows how deeply these trends have penetrated the most remote places, and not just the new urban middle classes of our metropolises.

The phenomenal reconfiguration of religion along therapeutic lines and healing tropes participates in the same overall trend. Practices such as the imposition of hands, which were banned and depreciated by Christian Churches, have made a big comeback in the West as elsewhere. Even Salafism has reintegrated popular therapeutic techniques known as *roqya*.[64] There is no need to insist on how healing is at the very core of Pentecostalism and the whole strands of Eastern, exotic, New Age, neo-pagan, and neo-shamanic religion, as well as in the indigenous shamanic revival. This demonstrates a heightened concern for the self in which the body is inseparable of the soul.

As consumer culture tends towards lifestyles, so is religion formatted into that mould. Religion is made to cater to the need for identity construction, belonging, and life ethics, in other words, to provide signposts on how to live and pragmatic/practical solutions for overcoming or conquering obstacles. This is an individualist twist, and as these trends solidify, what diminishes in importance are social issues and grand religious-political projects. As Lehmann remarks, the construction of a lifestyle, of a way of life in which religion is part, is first with respect to the acceptation of religious doctrine.[65] What is involved in the lifestyling of religion is its reshaping in the service of the reform of personal life, whether it is on the born-again or the quest and self-perfection model. As consumerism is about 'being on the move,'[66] quest religion is about continuous learning and the feeling of being on the right path (the path to oneself, or to God, or to a conflation of both). In this sense, nothing is worse than walking in circles, or being static, i.e. not *progressing*.[67] The belief in progress on a collective or universal scale, which was constitutive of classical modernity and the National-Statist era, has been replaced by the belief in the possibility (and obligation) of individual progress. All of this, not by coincidence, aligns all too well with neoliberal values such as adaptability, personal responsibility, seeing obstacles as opportunities to better oneself, self-reliance, mobility, and so on.

Lifestylisation signifies public expression and visibility. It should come as no surprise, from this perspective, that sporting recognisable religious signs and adopting public and visible practices have become a defining characteristic of contemporary religion. Religion no longer tends to be invisible and privatised. The case of the return of the Muslim veil is paradigmatic, whether in its fashionable or integral version. Research almost unanimously

reports the importance of personal choice and the importance of publicly expressing a Muslim identity and a personal rapport with Allah and the Prophet, whether it is in London, Paris, Cairo, or Kuala Lumpur. Nothing expresses the value of choice more visibly than fashion. Again, this trend is not limited to Islam, whether amongst the Tablighi Jama'at or urban fashion hijabis. Pentecostalism and conservative Christians, amongst other religious movements, similarly insist on the importance of clothing as a way to express values, success, and to try and provoke self-fulfilling prophecies (by dressing richer or more pious than one is for instance).

Lifestyles are encompassing. They are holistic constructs that combine different dimensions, including aesthetics, politics, and religion within a visible affirmation of identity. They are constitutively expressive, and therefore the lifestylisation of religion goes hand in hand with its alleged de-privatisation at the level of individual religiosities. The lifestylisation of religion participates in the de-differentiation of religion, and is largely inassimilable within the secularisation paradigm. Trends such as Muslim fashions appear superficial from the secularisation standpoint. Yet with the lifestylisation brought on by consumerism, the superficial is in fact revelatory of profound social dynamics. This is also what social actors openly confide to whoever wants to hear: There is nothing superficial about manifesting one's identity through the possibilities opened up by personal choice in the symbolic market of consumerism. The blurring of the boundaries between the secular and religion which lifestylisation/marketisation carries explains why successful religious movements have integrated social services (day-care, counselling, etc.), easy access, music and entertainment, and even shopping within their provisions. Coming out of its box, religion becomes mixed with all these other dimensions. Social actors seek to integrate religion in their daily lives, and seek to give meaning to their existence within this immanent existential frame.[68]

A similar diagnosis applies to holistic and self-spiritualities, which have become the implicit majority religion in many Western countries according to a growing range of scholars.[69] They also influence religion worldwide in all sorts of ways in the form of new diffused popular religion and a resource for religious reconfigurations, for example within Islam. In the words of Hubert Knoblauch, they are 'disseminated into and communicated by the general culture in such a way as to dissolve the boundaries between religious and non-religious communication,' and break down the boundaries between private and public.[70] Feebly institutionalised and overtly shunning institutionalisation, they participate in totalising lifestyles that are compounds of symbols, practices, aesthetics, politics, and ethics that are intertwined together with a priori non-religious components such as food, clothing, music, and everything part of everyday life. Fundamentalisms have fitted themselves remarkably well within the lifestyle model and present themselves as the ultimate—and most integrated and holistic—lifestyle. They also propose what is at the heart of consumer culture: Authenticity.

I want to draw attention to the way that this lifestylisation and personalisation (vs. individualisation) of religion does not mean its explosion into as many idiosyncratic styles. Identities are expressed in order to be recognised by significant others. It might be fruitful to recall how Max Weber insisted on the fact that individuals don't act in isolation but rather in 'constellations.'[71] This remains absolutely true in today's market societies, however individualistic they appear. This is why personal choice is anything but unlimited, un-determined, and free, whatever economists say. These constellations produce their own normativities.

The lifestylisation of religion also accompanies the shift from a religiosity inscribed in the world of indefinitely repeated observances and sustained through habit and social conformity to one centred around intense and extraordinary moments where social actors can discover and express themselves in (sometimes effervescent) ritual frames that ensure feelings of community and togetherness while providing recognition. Global-Market era mobility requires secure community niches and affinity groups, actual or virtual, founded on the communalisation of practices, beliefs, values, and references, which provide the social confirmation indispensable to the constitution of individual meaning systems.[72] This similarly implies the 'spectacle-isation' of religion, and the return, all over the world, of religious festivals and other mass events. The localised and routinised congregation, which became globalised in the National-Statist era, cedes to the return of traditional, neo-traditional, and novel forms such as mass gatherings and intimate settings which cater to the need for experiences, self-expression, and self-exploration.[73]

The standardisation of Global-Market religion

Contrary to the idea of transience and fragmentation, religion in the Global-Market regime is contained within a certain spectrum of possibilities. Lehmann argues that, for all their diversity and the infinite number of groups, organisations, and Churches, Pentecostalism are significantly standardised.[74] If one looks only at the size of these congregations, from Megachurches to multinational networks down to tin-roof shacks with a handful of members, the portrait seems wildly variable, but if one looks at the message and the ethos, then things are much more homogeneous. Danièle Hervieu-Léger similarly remarks that the movement towards individualisation and personalisation is accompanied by a certain homogenisation of religion, at the condition that one removes one's gaze from the face value of practices and contents of beliefs to view things from a wider and deeper perspective.[75] As New Age-inspired holistic spiritualities illustrate, the wild variety of techniques and sources hides a remarkably coherent and simple modus operandi of the seeker who aims at exploring, healing, and developing the self. The argument of homogenisation can be expanded to mainline Christianity, in which the former abyss that divided Catholics, Protestants, but also Orthodox, seems to have waned, becoming something

like differences in lifestyles rather than differences between truth and damnation. One could argue that Sunni and Chia Islam contradicts such an analysis; yet, one must not forget that Islam is divided into a multitude of currents (Hanbalism, Malikism, Hanafism, Chafeism, Sufism, etc.) that seem to have dissolved in favour of this simpler, dual divide.

There is arguably no longer much difference between Megachurches and spiritual seekers, which appear jointly on the Oprah Winfrey show, relaying their messages for 'life change.'[76] Life change is an overriding theme, to the extent that we might question the sharp distinction that Heelas and Woodhead draw between traditional, heteronomous, 'life as' religion (Christianity, Islam, etc.), and New Age-derived holistic spiritualities 'self' religion. The boundary seems to be significantly blurred, with Pentecostal preachers also emphasising life change. Heelas and Woodhead's 'spiritual revolution,' in the sense of the dissemination, within the mainstream, of expressive individualism and the ethics of authenticity, is significantly strengthened by such an analysis, as the concern for the self is by far not limited to New Age circles.[77] David Martin is the one to underline the 'consonance between Pentecostalism and the simultaneous (indeed, related) advance of global liberal capitalism and "the expressive revolution." Pentecostals work hard and let go; they give satisfaction to the customer and sway to guitars and synthesizers.'[78] From this angle, Martin continues, the 'seeming opposition' between holistic spiritualities and charismatic Christianity 'easily becomes practical symbioses.'[79] As a result:

> new Pentecostalism is more than a passive adaptation to the massive economic changes which have swept Latin America since the 1960s; it is a creative and active response, a seizing of opportunities and not merely a spiritual consolation for the hapless victims of social change.[80]

The same goes for Islamic revivalism, which Martin aptly sees as the Islamic equivalent to Pentecostalism.

Conclusion

Standardisation as a result of the neoliberalisation of religion is also one of the main arguments of Adam Possamai's latest book.[81] It is perhaps no coincidence, as Possamai has been one of the rare sociologists of religion to take the consumer revolution seriously and integrate the study of popular culture in his own analysis of religion.[82] One consequence of the pull of consumerism is the tremendous importance of popular culture, media, and cultural productions in shaping social imaginaries, social practices, shared knowledge, and references, all of which contribute to feed and shape religion. As Martin writes: 'We are in a new phase of global capitalism in which culture is increasingly recognized as a key variable.'[83] This importance started as a result of the developments within media, and erupted

with particular intensity within post-war youth subcultures. The demand for lifestyle has become a major issue for youth all over the world, as the sign of integration in global consumer society. It has also become a criterion for exclusion. It is arguably the political meaning of the apparent a-political luting during the 2011 London riots, but also of protests that have occurred in Iran and elsewhere. Desire for participating in consumerism was certainly a motivator as strong as that for democracy in the social media-fed Arab Spring protests of the same year, as well as those who are agitating Sudan and Algeria today.

As Anghel, Gerharz, Rescher, and Salzbrunn argue, globalisation decreases diversity while increasing interconnectedness and complexity.[84] The standardisation at work appears significantly different than the one to which we were accustomed, as it is no longer regulated by powerful institutions such as the state. It is a new type of regulation for who wants to see it, linked to the latest phase of economic globalisation and its multifaceted processes of marketisation that I have underlined in this chapter. These are tendencies, which unroll following a myriad of factors, leading to a variegated landscape. Religious changes in many cases do not have a single and shared starting point. The distinction between consumerism and neoliberalism serves in part to accommodate the different pathways into the Global-Market regime. One constant is that the generalisation and globalisation of this regime follow the one that preceded, i.e. the National-Statist regime. Shifts from a regime to the next are not instantaneous: Both regimes overlap, and continue to, for a certain time. Yet, I would argue that by now, we have reached the tipping point where the Global-Market regime is dominant pretty much everywhere in the world (notable exceptions being North Korea and the unreachable depths of the Amazonian forest). As a hypothesis, then, I suggest that the forms that the National-Statist regime took are a major factor in explaining how the Global-Market one unfolds. Finally, it is important to stress that the idea of a regime involves an encompassing structure. As some of the examples in the following chapters illustrate, this Global-Market reshaping can be positive or negative, in the sense that it can fit the mould perfectly (Health and Wealth gospel), or form itself against its overt characteristics while incorporating some of its elements and even structure (anti-globalisation currents, Orthodox Christianity).

Notes

1 Polanyi (2001).
2 Turner (2011: 94).
3 Turner (2011: 279).
4 Turner (2011: 278). I fail to see how Otto's metaphysical and Protestantism-drenched notion of 'the sacred' (*der Heilige*, literally: the Holy) can be of any help in the analysis of contemporary religious phenomena.
5 Beyer (2012: 123).
6 Beyer (2012: 124).

7 Wallerstein (1974).
8 Beyer (2012: 123).
9 Beyer (2012: 124).
10 Beyer (2012: 124). See also Beyer (2011, 2013).
11 Beyer's treatment of mass media is similarly superficial and under-theorised. As I have argued in Gauthier (2015), there are major objections to be made to the understanding of media as an autonomous social sphere, rather than as a transversal phenomenon.
12 Recall that Beyer (2013) saw problems in fitting the cases of Canada and India in his model, not to mention other Asian and African countries.
13 Beyer (2012: 122).
14 See Gauthier and Perreault (2008) for a discussion. Amongst notable references, see Campiche (1996), Lambert and Michelat (1992), Hervieu-Léger (1993, 1999), and Davie (1994).
15 See, for example, Oliver (2014), Campbell (2007), and Partridge (2004, 2005).
16 Gauthier and Perreault (2013, 2008), Meunier (2008), Meunier and Wilkins-Laflamme (2011), Meunier, Laniel, and Demers (2010), and Lemieux, Montminy, Bouchard, and Meunier (1993).
17 Roof (1999), Woodhead and Catto (2012), Campiche (1996), and Lambert and Michelat (1992).
18 As argued in Chapter 2 and as shown by scholars such as Peter van der Veer (e.g. 2001), the colonial relation changed both parties. Yet, the dominating ideas, values, and practices were by far mostly Western-originated, and the colonial/imperial relation was obviously the result of Western will. What I mean here is that there is a significant intensification of the relations not only between Western and non-Western countries, but also in other new multilateral directions, without Western coordination or origination.
19 Casanova (1994).
20 Anghel, Gerharz, Rescher, and Salzbrunn (2008: 14). The authors critique Luhmann's notion of world society in favour of Nina Glick Schiller's (e.g. 2005): 'a myriad of cultural, social, political and economic processes that integrate the world into a single system of relationships and values' (Anghel et al. 2008: 14).
21 Anghel, Gerharz, Rescher, and Salzbrunn (2008: 14).
22 Lehmann (2009).
23 Lehmann (2009).
24 Anthropologist Robert Crépeau (Université de Montréal) has told me how even the smallest of Pentecostal Churches amongst Brazil's Kaingang (we are talking about a wood and tin roof shed with a self-proclaimed pastor amongst many in a single village) have such a global-referring name (private conversation).
25 Robertson (1992: 173–4). It seems to have passed under the radar that Robertson derived this term from the Japanese *dochakuka* ('global localization'), a term born in the field of *marketing*. Robertson remarks how it was 'one of the main marketing buzzwords' in the 1990s, according to the *Oxford Dictionary of New Words*.
26 Spickard and Adogame (2010b). See also Levitt (2001, 2006).
27 Spickard and Adogame (2010: 8).
28 Lehmann (2009: 421).
29 Ellul (1958, 2003).
30 McGuire (2007).
31 Woodhead (2012: 1).
32 Champion (1993).
33 Casanova (2006: 9).
34 Gauchet (1985, 2017), Taylor (2007).
35 Reader (2014).

36 It is often overlooked that liberal and republican political philosophies have a very different conception of both public and private: The public is large in republicanism, and encompasses much more than the state apparatus, as in liberalism. See Weintraub (1997).
37 Casanova (1994: 66), Willaime (2008).
38 Casanova (1994: 65–6).
39 On re-publicisation in Poland, see also Herbert (2015). The shift to the Global-Market regime can be mobilised as an explanation for Casanova's case studies in a rather direct fashion, apart from Poland. I am not saying that the neoliberal revolution is the cause of the public intervention of the Catholic Church (although it did side with capitalism during the Cold War). Rather, the 1980s in Poland do converge with global trends as concerns the erosion of the National-Statist regime.
40 For a discussion on the public/private divide and the constitution of a global civil society, see Gauthier (2013b).
41 Bäckström (2014: 61).
42 Beyer (2013).
43 Heelas and Woodhead (2005).
44 Beyer (2012: 119–21).
45 Lehmann (2009: 420).
46 Martikainen (2013a, 2013b).
47 See Chong (2013).
48 For Canada, see Beaman and Sullivan (2013), and Chagnon and Gauthier (2013).
49 See Portier (2016).
50 Apart from the link with neoliberalism, this is the demonstration that Portier (2010a, 2010b) makes for the last three or four decades.
51 Usunier (2014: 27).
52 Usunier (2014: 28–9).
53 The body of literature relating to these categories is potentially enormous, and I therefore base my own discussion on Weber's work itself and an extremely limited choice of secondary sources, mostly in French. Weber's sociology conflates authority (power whose legitimacy is recognised: *Herrschaft*) with domination (imposed power: *Macht*), and I will follow the lead of scholars who distinguish these as representing positive (authority as the empowering exercise of power) and negative poles (domination as alienating exercise of power). See Bobineau and Tank-Storper (2007), and Caillé (2016). This distinction solves most of the problems raised by Malogne-Fer and Fer (2015) in their introduction.
54 Weber (1995b: 172–89). See also Bobineau and Tank-Storper (2007: 30–3).
55 Weber (1995a: 320), (1995a: 289–301).
56 Mauss (1950). I am borrowing this crossing of Weber with Mauss from Alain Caillé and Philippe Chanial. See e.g. Caillé and Chanial (2010).
57 Weber (1995a: 320–5).
58 Weber (1995a: 324), Colliot-Thélène (1990).
59 See Gauthier and Meintel (forthcoming).
60 Perreault (2008). See also Lambert et Michelat (1992).
61 Illouz (2008), Prades (2014).
62 Lehmann (2009: 418).
63 Shaughnessy (2017).
64 Touag (2014).
65 Lehmann (2010). Unfortunately, Lehmann does not connect this lifestylisation with consumerism.
66 Bauman (2012).
67 Lemieux and Milot (1992), and Lemieux (2002).

68 I do not subscribe to Charles Taylor's (2007) immanent frame theory though. What Taylor (and Marcel Gauchet) are missing is the transition that modernity operates from a vertical-transcendent framework to an immanent-transcendent one.
69 See Adler (2006), Salomonsen (2002), Blain (2002), Blain and Wallis (2007), Magliocco (2004), Blain, Ezzy, and Harvey (2004), Berger and Ezzy (2007), Clifton (2006), St John (2009, 2012), Pike (2004), Partridge (2005), Possamai (2005, 2012, 2018), Taylor (2010), Gauthier (2012a), and Fedele (2013).
70 Knoblauch (2008: 140).
71 Weber (1956).
72 Hervieu-Léger, Bogensberger, Davie, Frybès, Garelli and Piette (1996), Hervieu-Léger (2001a), and Gauthier (2012a).
73 See Gauthier (2014a).
74 Lehmann (2009: 417).
75 Hervieu-Léger (2001a).
76 Heelas and Woodhead (2005). In a graduate seminar I led on popular spiritual literature, we realised that most popular authors with worldwide bestselling credentials were regulars on the Oprah Winfrey show. Analysing the contents of their books, preaches, websites, conferences, from Megachurch pastors Joel Osteen to Deepak Chopra and Eckhart Tolle, we realised that there was much more in common than differences. The overarching theme, as relayed emphatically by Oprah herself, being 'life change.'
77 The 'proof' of such a 'spiritual revolution,' in my view, is not to be found by counting yoga practitioners or participants in New Age forums, but rather by recognising how much self-spirituality and self-help themes have penetrated popular culture, management literature, and practically every religious movement.
78 Martin (2002: 15).
79 Martin (2002: 15).
80 Martin (2002: 75).
81 Possamai (2018). I cannot do justice to this book, as it came out while I was well advanced in writing my own, but there is no doubt that the author is looking in the same direction as I am.
82 Possamai (2005, 2007, 2009).
83 Martin (2002: 71).
84 Anghel, Gerharz, Rescher, and Salzbrunn (2008). See also Ritzer (1992), Possamai (2018), and Michel, Possamai, and Turner (2017a).

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Part 2
First analyses

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9 Indonesia
From *ratio* to Market Islam

This chapter synthetises and illustrates the essence of my thesis with a description of religious change in Indonesia, from the early twentieth century to the present. Why Indonesia? First of all, because it is neither North Atlantic nor excessively close to the Western model of modernity (as most of the Latin America would be). The sociology of religion has had a very strong Western focus, and its concepts have been devised for use in Western countries *and then* exported to the rest of the world (by Western or non-Western scholars). Indonesia provides an exemplary side step that allows us to interrogate social, political, cultural, and religious transformations afresh. Neither well known nor unknown, Indonesia is an answer to the post-colonialist challenge, as I think one can better understand religious change in North Atlantic countries by comparing them with Indonesia than the contrary. This corresponds to my own experience, as the model I propose, while being born from observing Western realities, has been significantly changed and deepened by the contact, over the last decade, with scholarship devoted to non-Western realities.

Second, Indonesia is the world's largest Muslim majority country in the world, with an estimated 90% of a 240 million population (the fourth largest in the world and the 16th in terms of GDP). It also houses an institutionalised pluralism, with recognised Hindu, Confucian, Buddhist, and Christian minorities, not to mention vibrant tribal traditions. Yet, Indonesia does not have the same trappings as Middle Eastern countries do for a perspective such as mine, with endlessly polemical scholarship and a heavy political focus, with omnipresent themes such as Islam's compatibility with democracy and so on. I will deal with those countries, and the case of Islam in particular, in a further volume. Third, Indonesia has been relatively under-studied by sociologists of religion, religious studies scholars, and political scientists; yet, it has received sustained attention by anthropologists, perhaps due to Clifford Geertz's legacy. Here as often in this book, relief, if not salvation, comes from anthropologists, who are not as much embedded in the secularisation paradigm and therefore tend to see social realities with a different gaze. They are more attentive to what is important for the local population, including otherwise superficial things like popular culture, television, fashions, and the pull of consumerism.

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Nation-State regime formation

Indonesia was a Dutch colony until 1945 (recognised in 1949), and part of what Benedict Anderson, himself a specialist of the region, called the last wave of Nation-State formation.[1] Indonesia was the theatre of a Japanese style of Westernisation which was pursued in the inter-war period (1918–1939). Through standardised Western-style education disseminated by a highly centralised organisation, the formation of an invented language, and the categorisation-invention of ethnicities/religions/races in national censuses, Sumatrans came to consider themselves and the far away (culturally and geographically) Ambonese as Indonesian kin, and the neighbouring (and culturally very close) Malays as foreigners.

Sukarno took power with the declaration of independence and installed a regime of 'directed democracy' whose aims were to establish a modern nation-state and recover the economy. Due to the influence of Western High Modern Ideals, the constitution did not recognise Islam but rather 'belief in One Supreme God' as the first of the five founding principles of the constitution (Pancasila), sparking decades of debate as to what should be regarded as proper religion (*agama*), i.e. religion appropriate for a modern state. In this frame, a true religion needed to include 'sober congregational worship on a transcendent deity' as well as 'a prophet, a holy book and places of regular worship.'[2] This model was actively enforced by the state's Department of Religion and in some periods by a special police force, and led to the recognition, in a 1965 government decision, of Islam, Catholicism, Protestantism, Hinduism, Buddhism, and Confucianism (whose status was later revoked) as religions. Citizens of the Indonesian nation-state eventually had to register in one of these categories, which figured on national identity cards. Under Sukarno, Sufism, Islam's widespread mystical current which was intermeshed with Indonesian culture, was actively repressed, including 'long-established orthodox Sufi orders.'[3] Religion, authorities insisted, 'should promote the country's advancement as a modern nation'[4] and Enlightenment/High Modern values. The essence of this was made clear when president Sukarno declared: 'Religion is not only concerned with feelings [as in the Sufi orders], but also with [...] *ratio* [reason], *ratio* and once again *ratio*!'[5]

Hinduism, Buddhism, and for a time Confucianism, conformed to this monotheistic model. Scripturalism was brought to the fore in a reconstruction process guided by principles of rationalisation which downplayed and repressed experiential and mystical aspects and practices which are central to these traditions. As Julia Howell writes:

> both official Hinduism and Buddhism [were] obliged to foreground a transcendent deity (at least in publications subsidised by the Department of Religion and in state-school-based religious education programs). At the same time, they [...] theologically reconstructed

> popular folk rituals that used to address a multifarious spirit world and down-played mediation practices aimed at experiencing an immanent Otherness.[6]

All of this involved a good deal of theological creativity in order to conform with the requirement of the belief in One Supreme God, and obscure texts, images, and doctrines were dug out of dusty closets in support of these gymnastics (which were especially difficult for non-theist Theravada Buddhism). In addition, Sunday worship was established, in support of the new idea that religion is made of exclusive religious belonging in the form of congregations. The same processes affected the myriad of smaller mystical groups, which either managed to conform to the *agama* model or were repressed and in many cases shut down.

An emblematic movement of this era is the Muhammadiyah (Muhammad's Path), an 'organizationally modern (i.e. formally constituted and bureaucratic) Muslim Modernist voluntary organization'[7] founded in 1912 by Ahmad Dahlan. Inspired by Muslim reformists in the Near East, the Muhammadiyah aimed to purify, rationalise, and modernise local Islam, which was deeply imprinted with Hindu-Buddhist and mystical traditions. Attacked by the Muhammadiyah, traditionalist *ulemas* reacted by uniting in the Nahdlatul Ulama, which, in turn, engaged in renewing Islam in the same general direction, although in a less radical fashion. At the time of independence and in the first years of the Republican period, the Muhammadiyah was the country's most powerful Muslim Modernist organisation, and continued to grow as a 'particularly imposing organisation, characterised by a complex arrangement of representations and semi-autonomous institutions,'[8] vertically integrated, and comprising thousands of local branches all over the national territory, with over thirty million members in 2005. While the Muhammadiyah refrained from direct political implication, it promoted Islam as a 'complete and total system' and envisioned the Islamisation of society through the state, from above, in a way similar to the Muslim Brotherhood, from which it also took inspiration.[9] From its inception, it established an education system parallel to that of the state which recruited amongst the urbanised bureaucratic elite, in the hope of Islamising the country's future.

Sufi orders (*tarekat*, Arabic *tariqa*), meanwhile, were the target of a 'particularly scathing criticism' from such Modernists: 'They were accused of tolerating (or even, through their ignorance, actually encouraging) lax attitudes towards local spirit beliefs (*shirk*) and customs (*adat*) that contradicted Islamic law (*shari'a*).'[10] They were also accused of 'promoting adulation of the principals of their orders (their *syekh*, Arabic *shaykh*) as virtually "second to God".'[11] Such attitudes were so widespread that scholars such as Geertz and Gellner believed that Sufism was 'doomed to fade as modernizing social changes increasingly facilitated the displacement of emotive Sufi rituals and mystical practices by the sober scripturalism of

city-based legal scholars and exegetes (*ulama*).'[12] Other practices such as *zikir* (devotional litanies) and meditation similarly appeared 'embarrassingly superstitious'[13] and destined to fade out as the Nation-State developed and Reason progressed.

These secularist measures continued in the early rule of Suharto (1967–1998), while the remaining mystical groups, who had 'sufficiently adapted to the prevailing requirements for religion,'[14] won the right to be recognised as 'faiths,' a category equal to in principle but inferior in practice to religion. As Julia Howell concludes, the normative standard of rationalised and scripturalised religion

> struck a balance between the broad public affirmation of religiosity as a core feature of the national identity and the versions of modernization theory then current among secular elites, according to which religions were not really compatible with modernity and, in their "traditional" forms, were suspected of being "obstacles to progress."[15]

Religion, in other words, was nationalised and statised, and forced into a box. This brief description shows how a country like Indonesia completely endogenised Western High Modern and institutionalises, in a dramatic fashion, the characteristics of religion in the National-Statist regime.

The New Order and faith in development

While Sukarno's 'endless revolution'[16] policy was inspired by communist ideas and contacts with Soviet powers, President Suharto took over by instituting a New Order programme centred on accelerated economic development and an authoritarian rule that gained him American benevolence. For Suharto, modernisation meant industrialisation, and 'faith in development'[17] became the country's ideological basis. He put economists that had been trained in the US, and namely in Milton Friedman's neoliberal school in Chicago, at the head of the economy, opening up 'the country to unprecedented levels of foreign investments and exchange.'[18] The economic model chosen was nevertheless state-led development, with crucial sectors defined by the state and in many cases led by state-owned companies. An example is the state-owned Krakatau Steel Company, which, as Damir Rudnyckyj explains, 'became central to the project of modernization'[19] and received regular visits by the President and other official dignitaries. An icon in the national imaginary, companies like Krakatau Steel provided lifetime well-paid jobs with generous social benefits, showing how 'state-led modernization was as much a social project as a commercial one.'[20]

Indonesia experienced sustained economic growth starting in the early 1970s, a trend that continued for almost three decades as it did under similar conditions in neighbouring Malaysia and Singapore. This development produced ultra-rapid urbanisation and the radical transformation of the

'patterns of social stratification that had prevailed in the colonial and early postcolonial period.'[21] Wage labour became the dominant form of income, supporting the rise of a substantial working class and a range of middle classes. These transformations, which reached out even to remote villages formerly considered by scholars as premodern preserves, were accompanied by the growth in size and outreach of the modern Indonesian nation-state and its modernising mission. As the bureaucratic state and its various apparatuses penetrated and shaped Indonesian society, so did the 'personalized and localized political hierarchies of the earlier period'[22] decline. The New Order period was also characterised by important geographical and social mobility, fuelled by education policies which raised the literacy rate from 40% in 1970 to 90% in 1990. The tertiary sector expanded in the late 1980s and increased access to secular education and technology. These developments, in turn, 'stimulated the spread of cosmopolitan life-ways and attitudes among the expanded Indonesian middle and upper classes.'[23]

Suharto's programme for economic development had significant and unforeseen cultural and religious impacts. Changes in the social make-up brought by the disruption of traditional bonds provided the context for renewed interest in Islam and religion in general. Trained in religious education at school, the children of families who had downplayed Muslim piety in order to be modern were inspired by events such as the Iranian revolution to deepen their faith. Already in the 1970s, 'the distinguished Islamicist and Muslim Modernist Hamka moved into television broadcasting and began reaching a much broader audience' with his rehabilitation of Sufism as a form of 'personal ethical cultivation and philosophical reflection' that could be approached and domesticated without long periods of training in Sufi orders and could 'enable urbanites, fully engaged with work and family, to cultivate ethical discernment and enjoy spiritually enriching devotions that would enliven the otherwise flat Modernist regimen of minimalist ritual and compliance with religious law.'[24] A broad trend of Islamic revival started taking shape, from Islamic greeting cards to veil wearing and religious observances within major companies. Suharto himself accompanied this shift over the course of the 1980s, publicising his family's religious activities, including his performance of the hajj. Religion exploded as a theme in a score of books, magazines, pamphlets, television programmes, newspapers, and later Internet sites.

The 1990s were the apogee of Suharto's authoritarian New Order economic development plan. This is also when the Islamic revival consolidated itself. The national economy was increasingly opened to foreign investments and foreign trade, as the state loosened its grip on the economy and gave in to globalising pressures. The Indonesian government was steered by the IMF into conducting 'structural reforms,' diversifying its sources of income away from oil dependency, and sealing its orientation towards export industries, in conformity with the neoliberal programme examined in Chapter 4. The 1997 pan-East-Asian economic crash precipitated bank

closures as well as Suharto's fall and the instauration of democracy in 1998. The IMF and other supranational economic institutions imposed their conditions in exchange for a substantial loan in order to stabilise the national debt; these included the usual menu of deregulations, privatisations, and roll-back of social welfare provisions. At the same time, the Islamic revival continued, even accelerated, yet in forms that were increasingly distant from political Islamism.

Televangelism, Sufi revivalism, and Islamic management

Religious transformations in Indonesia cannot be understood without taking into account popular culture. Popular culture 'really started impacting in a significant way upon the lives of most Indonesian'[25] with New Order industrialisation, as 'printed media shifted form an ideological tool for political groups to an industry producing goods for the market.'[26] Freedom of expression was limited under Suharto's dictatorship; yet, Western and Asian popular culture did penetrate Indonesian popular culture via television, magazines, books, and music. As Hariyadi writes: 'The New Order's economic development was not only bringing about foreign capital, experts and technicians, but also worldviews and life styles from outside the everyday life of Indonesian people.'[27] With the fall of Suharto regime, audio-visual was liberalised, passing from five private television channels (many of them owned by the Suharto family) to twelve free-to-air channels, and over fifty if one includes pay channels.

The immediate effect of media deregulation was a stark rise in Islamic content and the emergence of a new phenomenon: Mass-media Islamic lay preachers. The most influent of the first generation of Islamic televangelist is Abdullah Gymnastiar, or Aa Gym ('brother Gym'), the son of a military with a technical training who built a multi-media empire in the early 2000s, making him a figure more popular than any film star.[28] As Amr Khaled in the Middle East, Aa Gym does not have a religious training apart from short stays in Islamic schools (*pesantren*); he is rather presented as having a supernatural power deriving directly from God. After more intransigent beginnings, Aa Gym rose to fame by preaching a tolerant, Sufi-inspired Islam that promotes personal integrity, generosity, as well as entrepreneurship, a good business sense, and a positive attitude towards money and success. Gymnastiar broke with the style of classic predication by using humour and self-criticism, and limiting textual references to a minimum that is digestible for the masses. Aa Gym therefore promotes a 'pious materialism' that borrows at least as much from popular American management literature (e.g. Steven Covey's *The Seven Habits of Highly Successful People*), pop psychology, and megachurch-type preaching techniques than it does from classic Koranic exegesis.[29]

Gymnastiar founded a holding called MQ ('management of the heart' in Indonesian) that covers over twenty sectors of activity, including hajj pilgrimages, TV and radio production, a telephone message system, and

management training programmes. As his star rose, he was invited to broadcast from the country's most important mosques. In other words, his recognition as a religious authority by the institutionalised relays of Islam followed his success as a media figure. Aa Gym inaugurated a style and a content that was rapidly copied by other preachers like Arifin Ilham, and which stresses 'personal ritual observance rather than the politics of public religion.'[30] Moving away from the imperatives of *ratio*, Gymnastiar aims to produce experiences and calls onto the emotions of his public. As Howell writes: He 'famously [moves his congregation or audience] to tears of remorse mixed with relief and wonder at the mercy of God and the beauty of his creation.'[31] Gymnastiar similarly introduces important theological innovations. His God is merciful and loving, for instance, and not a vengeful one. He and other media preachers have also rehabilitated *zikir* in the form of vibrantly intense sung prayers accompanied by New Age or pop-sounding music. Gymnastiar insists on projecting an image of someone who is close to people and centred on their needs. His programmes therefore always include a question and answer segment, centred on every day, practical, and ethical issues (how to behave). Teachings are summed up in easy to remember, pop management, and coaching-type slogans (the '3Ms,' the '5Ss').

As Watson argues, the influence of figures like Aa Gym on Indonesian religion can hardly be overstated: 'His appeal, then, is not limited to the rural or urban poor or to the lower urban middle classes but ranges across the whole economic and political spectrum, even crossing religious boundaries.'[32] Such a spectacular phenomenon has been made possible by the democratisation and development of communication technologies and media, as well as by the penetration of consumerism within almost all social classes. While Gymnastiar's appeal is most important in the middle-aged adult population, a new generation of preachers has emerged that caters specifically to youth and young adults, such as Jefry Al Bukhori and Yusuf Mansur, who 'mix [Oprah Winfrey style] talk-show or soap-opera style entertainment with messages conveying Muslim values.'[33] Emotions and a focus on the self are at the core of these novel religious forms, with rituals such as *zikir* creating strong senses of belonging and effervescence which ballast individual religiosity.[34] The production of intense religious emotions serves to 'motivate more diligent observance of the *syariah* [Islamic law]'[35] and appears therefore resolutely morally and theologically conservative (e.g. women are strongly encouraged to wear the veil).[36] These emotions are supposed to engage a 'personal moral reform' and a path of self-improvement whose aims are to allow adherents to develop well-being as well as their capacities to '[get] ahead in competitive education and business environments.'[37] Islamic televangelists have emerged as extremely influential novel types of religious authorities that are at some distance from *pesantren*-trained *ulamas*. Their predication revolves around new market friendly themes, and promotes an orientation on the self rather than social issues, as well as a rehabilitation of mystical, emotional, and experiential religiosity.

Developing faith in the neoliberal age

Let's get back to Krakatau Steel. As the after-effects of the 1997 economic crisis and 1998 change of regime started to resonate throughout the nation, state companies such as Krakatau Steel came under fire for being inefficient, uncompetitive, and insufficiently adapted to market and consumer demands. The monopoly that the company had enjoyed was revoked in 2004, as tariffs on imported steel were abolished as a consequence of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) free trade agreement. This led to a drastic change in how the company was directed. As Damir Rudnyckyj, who conducted an ethnographic study of Krakatau Steel in these years, writes: 'the abstract notion of the free market presented a very practical problem: how to elicit labour practices that would ensure the company's long-term viability given increasing transnational competition?'[38] Krakatau Steel 'chose to address [these challenges] through particularly high-profile means, by enhancing the Islamic practice of company employees.'[39] In order to do so, '[m]anagers contracted a Jakarta-based company, the ESQ Leadership Center, to implement a programme of moderate Islamic spiritual and leadership training for employees and thus to make the company more competitive in a globalizing steel market.'[40] Parallel to the training, the company has also posted huge banners in its mills, claiming in capital letters that 'HARD WORK IS PART OF OUR WORSHIP.'[41]

Islamic management was born in the 1970s as a marginal current and went through important transformations over the course of the years, until the end of the 1990s. From a tool for political militancy, it evolved into a commercial object, with 'the apparition of training institutes and predication entrepreneurs.'[42] The pioneers of this shift believed that it was time to develop an Islamic version of trends that were well implanted in Anglo-Saxon countries; it was time to give Islam its own version of a book like *Jesus, CEO*.[43] The most prominent figure in the rise of new Islamic management is the creator of ESQ, Ary Ginanjar, a 'charismatic businessman-turned-spiritual reformer'[44] whose influence rivals that of Aa Gym. ESQ stands for Emotional and Spiritual Quotient, and its training fuses 'business management, life-coaching, and self-help principles with Islamic history and examples from the life of the Prophet Muhammad,' a mix that is deemed 'conducive to success in an increasingly competitive economy.'[45] Training sessions, which last three full days, blend 'zealous religious oratory and fervent motivation speaking' in a talk-show-like format, supported by extensive audio-visual support, including Harvard Business School power-point slides, images, hi-tech film animations, collective prayers, and enacted simulations of Muslim rituals such as the three main rituals that take place during the *hajj* pilgrimage to Mecca (circling the Kaaba, stoning demonic icons, and the *sa'i*, by which pilgrims run seven times back and forth between the hills of Safa and Marwah).[46] ESQ participates in the global trend of prosperity movements, yet emphasises a Puritan ethic

rather than a belief in miracles. Values promoted are hard work, personal responsibility, self-reliance, and accountability as means by which to succeed in securing public utility and personal well-being. Enhancing Islamic piety and developing Indonesia's human resources are brought together in a single programme that stresses how the five pillars of Islam and the six pillars of Muslim faith (*iman*) form a life ethic to be applied in everyday life, including at work. The Prophet is presented as a successful corporate entrepreneur, 'and participants are encouraged to emulate his example in business and trade.'[47]

The growth of ESQ has been spectacular, and over one million people were said to have completed the training programme in 2012. Since then, Ginanjar has diversified the palette of his trainings, adding shorter teen and children programmes, as well as refresher courses and longer in-depth ones. As Rudnyckyj writes:

> Although Krakatau Steel was one of the first companies to embrace it, the program has now spread across Indonesia to some of the country's most prominent governmental institutions and state-owned firms including Pertamina (the national oil company), Telkom (the country's largest telephone company), and Garuda (the nation's flag air carrier). Current and former military generals are also avid participants in ESQ [...] Recently ESQ has met its goal of becoming a national movement, establishing branches in 30 out of 33 Indonesian provinces.[48]

Another anthropologist, Gwenaël Njoto-Feillard, notes how ESQ books, CDs, and DVDs can be found in public and *pesantren* libraries even in the most remote Javanese countryside. Much like Western megachurches, ESQ inaugurated a twenty-five-storey building with a large parking, situated at a highway crossroad that serves as a headquarter for their operations and hosts a convention centre for training with services, a hotel, a rental space for rituals such as marriages and weddings, and a mosque. ESQ has also globalised its training, with substantial activities in Malaysia (where former Prime Minister Mahatir Mohamed endorsed the programme), and operations in Singapore, the Netherlands, Australia, Brunei, and the United States.[49]

According to Rudnyckyj, Ginanjar heralds a 'new type of Muslim practice which [acts] to reconcile the ethical, economic, and moral predicaments of middle- and upper-middle class Indonesians.'[50] ESQ is a prime example of what he calls 'Market Islam,' a term which 'refers to how Islamic practices are mobilized to facilitate the transition from an authoritarian regime of state-fostered development to organizing labour and commercial activity according to market principles.'[51] Market Islam addresses the challenges brought on by the erosion of the Nation-State container and the integration of Indonesia into the global economy. The resort to compulsory ESQ training programmes in the more than one hundred state-owned companies has served to prepare employees for important changes in governance

and corporate culture, as well as for privatisation. Economic globalisation is presented as bringing forth 'divine challenges'[52] that can be met through enhanced Islamic practice. Market Islam is also a striking example of how 'the market enables new forms of Islamic practice.'[53] In the words of Rudnyckyj, faith in development has been superseded by an imperative to develop one's faith as a tool to face the challenges of globalisation.[54]

Scholars have compared Ary Ginanjar and Abdullah Gymnastiar, insisting on the convergence of their brand of Islam beyond the superficial differences.[55] Both have emerged as powerful new religious authorities from without the *ulama*, either from business or technical backgrounds, and have constructed multi-media empires in which Islamic renewal is divorced from social issues and political projects of Islamicisation and reconfigured through blending self-help, management, and Islamic-Sufi principles. Islamisation is held to be desirable on ethical rather than political grounds:

> Market Islam does not reject *syariah* law out of a fear of protecting religion from the state, but rather on the grounds that religious practice is a matter of individual initiative. Thus, adherents of ESQ resolutely affirmed the notion that individuals must choose Islam, not have it imposed on them,

even if these examples show how Islamic practice has become a powerful social standard and imperative. In a way that is more than reminiscent of Foucault's analysis of the neoliberal entrepreneurial self, Market Islam seeks 'to create a responsible, accountable, self-managing subject who [acts] according to the norms of the free market.'[56] As Howell continues:

> The individualisation that underlies such autonomy of religious choice making also generates familiar social pressures to which the providers of Indonesia's Muslim personal development products respond: the need to create a marketable persona viable in their liberalised late capitalist economy.[57]

Overall, both Gymnastiar and Ginanjar promote a born-again type of capitalist-compatible Islam that partakes in a 'broader Islamic piety movement'[58] that can hardly be assimilated within the secularisation paradigm and cannot be understood without being related to wider processes of marketisation. In addition, this discussion shows how religion is a powerful and major factor in the acculturation and legitimation of neoliberalism and consumerism.

Muslim Modernists in the midst of the Market

According to authors like Howell, the Muhammadiyah formerly participated in what Beyer and other authors have called the differentiation of

religion as a sub-system, within the frame of the Nation-State. Examples such as Ginanjar and Gymnastiar, on the other hand, show a novel and opposing trend that 'appears as de-differentiation' through 'the comingling of religious communications and secular culture,' including personal development, managerial culture, science, and media. It is therefore interesting to see how the Muhammadiyah has coped with the new global, free market situation. Njoto-Feillard's study reveals how the Muhammadiyah remains an important organisation and a powerful voice in Indonesian civil society, yet that is on the decline and faces important challenges for which it seems ill-constituted to provide adapted answers. History shows how the Muhammadiyah has attempted to develop economic initiatives in earlier times, including the founding of its own bank, in order to fuel Islam-compatible enterprises. Most of these have been failures, and the Muhammadiyah has not been a leading actor in the making of an Islamic business ethic. Njoto-Feillard recounts how the 1990s were a turn for the organisation, as it attempted to rationalise its finances and centralise capital in order to profit from its enormous potential in terms of development. Such initiatives have been met with resistance within the movement by those who wish to maintain the organisation's social orientation. In the end, Njoto-Feillard argues that the difficulties the organisation faces under global conditions are due to its organisational structure: A lowly integrated yet centralised and bureaucratic constitution that corresponds to a government type of governmentality typical of the National-Statist regime. At the turn of the millennium, the organisation's direction tried to legitimise the development of for-profit activities by recalling how Islam was born in a commercial context; yet, it failed to produce a workable business ethic.

This discussion illustrates how institutions that emerged in the Nation-State period are seriously challenged by the present situation in which market logics are imposing themselves on all areas of society. The Muhammadiyah and the idea of social and political Islam that it carried are no longer the determining force. Rather, it is the Market Islam promoted by Aa Gym and Ary Ginanjar that now saturates Indonesian society. Other smaller institutions have been able to negotiate the turn with more ease, as the case of Al-Zaytun, an Islamic education institution directed by Panji Gumilang, illustrates. Gumilang was formerly a part of the Muslim Modernist movement Darul Islam, which, as of the late 1940s, projected to take over the country through violent means and found an Islamic state. As this dream faded, Gumilang converted Al-Zaytun into the very profitable education sector, providing Islamic education for the emerging middle classes in rural West Java and self-promoting the organisation as 'a brand.'[59] His preaches in the early 2000s diagnose a globalised situation in which market capitalism and competition are the rules, and he exhorts Indonesians to take up the challenge through re-investing Islam as a means to prosperity.

Revitalised Sufism

Denigrated, criticised, and repressed under National-Statist conditions, Sufism has made a remarkable comeback over the course of the New Order, as the Global-Market regime became installed. Containing a mystical dimension stressing the possibility of the experience of the divine at its heart as well as an emphasis on 'God's loving immanence'[60] and roots in traditional Indonesian culture, Sufism had found itself in the mire of the programme to shape religion into rationalised, scripturalised, and transcendent forms compatible with the High Modern Ideals that supported the Nation-State. Yet, as social transformations due to industrialisation took place and a new middle class emerged, Sufism re-emerged as an attractive religious form compatible with cosmopolitan lifestyles.

Howell distinguishes three forms of ongoing Sufi revitalisation in Indonesia in addition to Ginanjar and Gymnastiar's blend of management, coaching, self-help, and Sufi-inspired, TV-compatible Islam. The first of these is Neo-Sufism, which is associated with the 'highly influential neo-modernist Muslim intellectual Nurcholish Madjid, who began popularising the term in the 1990s.'[61] Through the Paramadina foundation, Madjid developed a network of university-style lectures, courses, workshops, seminars, and loosely structured programmes that were met with much success amongst the urban well-educated upper middle classes, with guest lecturers often pursuing side-careers in the media. Madjid calls for a 'whole of life engagement in contributing to society using all of a person's skills and knowledge,'[62] and insists on individual responsibility and autonomy. Madjid renews Hamka's ideal of a personalised form of Modern Sufism (*Tasauf Moderen*) outside Sufi orders. The Paramadina therefore provides an 'institutional support for a self-directed spiritual improvement'[63] that echoes similar New Age-derived self-spiritualities in the West.

The second trend involves the adaptations and reconfigurations amongst the traditional Sufi orders (*tarekat*). Some of such orders have opened their doors to the middle-class urbanites who, starting in the 1980s, initiated a change in social perception regarding Sufism. One notable change has been the relaxation of certain rules and the accommodation 'of Muslim spiritual *seeker* from a variety of social backgrounds,'[64] as the appeal of Sufism expanded beyond the middle classes. Habib Luthfi, a leading figure of the Nahdlatul Ulama organisation, is part of this trend, which has won him significant media exposure. He plays Western music in his *pesantren* and stresses how youth can 'selectively participate in the wider youth culture while remaining attached to their *pesantren*.'[65] In order to refrain Muslims from relying on Internet sources and doing without proper supervision and initiation from an authorised Sufi master, Luthfi has 'worked on using simpler language to introduce otherwise arcane Sufi metaphysics.'[66] These efforts also aim to thwart the threat of radicalisation and the appeal of jihadism (which is a marginal yet real phenomenon in Indonesia), by

opposing an easily assimilated, non-violent brand of Islam whose transmission, it is believed, can be traced back to the Prophet. The renewed interest for new legitimation of Sufi orders has been significant enough that media have talked of 'rush to the *tarekat*.'[67]

The saturation of the mediascape by figures such as Aa Gym, Arifin Ilham, Yusuf Mansur, and many others has catalysed the revitalisation of Sufi ideas and practices and their dissemination across social classes; yet, the tropes of self-cultivation and self-realisation suppose a degree of education, cosmopolitanism, financial resources, and 'cultural capital' (to use a Bourdieusian concept: Once is not a habit) that are those of the middle classes. It is interesting in this respect that Rudnyckyj notes that the ESQ promotion of expressive individualism and self-realisation were elements that were foreign and hard to integrate by the Krakatau Steel workers who held manual and less qualified functions within the company. According to available figures, an estimated 18% of Indonesians belong to the category of the 'consuming middle class,' a number that is predicted to double by the beginning of the 2020s.[68]

The Indonesian capital, Jakarta, is notorious for being one of the most connected cities in the world on social media platforms. How is economic globalisation, then, and consumerism especially (along with communication technologies) affecting the lives of the working and lower classes, as well as more remote and rural areas? In an article published in 2001, anthropologist Joel Kahn reported, in the case of neighbouring Malaysia, how a 'highly commodified "lifestyle" Islam' had penetrated even the countryside, following the links created by urbanisation, migration, bureaucratisation, and modern media, and which, although affecting mostly the middle classes, had nevertheless resulted in the 'virtual disappearance of the ruralized Islamic beliefs [...] that prevailed in the first decade after independence.'[69] The

> impact of the changes, he continues, has apparently been less dramatic in places like Sumatra or supposedly more "remote" parts of Malaysia [...] However, one does not have to look too far beneath the surface even in supposedly "remote" areas to discover the transformative effects on village life of commodification, land alienation, bureaucratization, and religious rationalization.[70]

In other words, remote locations were not spared by the general and profound recomposition of religion along National-Statist lines, and no more protected from those incurred in the Global-Market era. What seems to be certain is that, for those who are not (yet) part of the consuming class, there is an ardent *desire* for accession to this status. What Khan describes for Malaysia can be reasonably extended to include Indonesia.

Significantly, Howell's third type of Sufi revitalisation is specific to the lower classes. In addition to the highly popular televised *zikir* programmes within this social stratum, the emergence of novel *Majelisshalawat* and *zikir* manifestations has 'taken Sufism to the streets' in a format that is

attractive for lower-class audiences. *Majelis* are loose religious associations or assemblies that can form around a charismatic preacher, and which meet around *zikir* litanies and *shalawat* prayers, which are 'instrumentally accompanied praise songs and prayers for the Prophet Muhammad and his family.'[71] These emotionally rousing and effervescent rituals combine with vibrant sermons performed in spectacular open-air urban settings. They attract thousands and even tens of thousands in the streets of Jakarta and other cities, from wide sections of the population, including a mass of less-privileged. These street rallies, which are promoted on large billboards, in mosques and on the Internet, attract a noisy crowd that assemble amidst the roar of motorcycles and the fires of food concessions and other mobile retailers. The ambiance is that of a fair, with a high concentration of religious products on offer in the temporary stalls, such as devotional images, CDs, DVDs, clothing, and other branded paraphernalia.[72] Giant screens and stacks of speakers line the sides of the road for up to half a dozen blocks. The ceremonies are led by charismatic and media-savvy *habaib* (preachers) and can last several hours, for example on a Saturday night. The *habaib*, who are believed to be descendants of the Prophet, bring the crowd into the presence of the latter through *shalawat* and sermon:

> rather than reaching spiritual intimacy through a meditative turn inward, in meetings of the *majelis* participants are drawn out on a wave of song, along with enormous crowds around them, and into a closeness with God worked through the emotions and the imagination.[73]

Amongst the pioneers of such meetings are formerly scripturalist and piety renewal figures like Habib Hasan and Habib Munsir, who have since distanced themselves from a 'rule-oriented kind of religious learning'[74] because of its lack of appeal for the masses. Instead, they have brought the 'musical *shalawat* and easy-to-memorize zikir litanies'[75] to the fore, in the hope to generate popular taste for pious lives. The success of these initiatives, once again, has been massive and has inspired similar events across the country.

Majelis, as well as the extensive organisation surrounding these events, are constituted into loose networks made of family, friends, and gift-based voluntary socialities, apart from a core crew of paid executives and technical staff. There is no membership, no official belonging, and no attempt at exclusivity. *Majelis* religiosity is punctual, event-based, and voluntary, and extends from these effervescent rallies into smaller and weekly prayer groups which are sometimes but not always tied to a local mosque. While the *habaib* 'see themselves as spiritual directors for those who seek their guidance, [...]they offer no initiations,'[76] and clearly break with both traditional and National-Statist religious forms. Somewhat like Pentecostalism[77] and megachurches, outdoor *majelis* cater to the working and lower classes by offering outward- rather than inward-oriented emotional and cathartic religious experiences in spectacular mass settings.

Indonesian New Age, Islamic consumption, and the veil

Three more trends require a discussion. The first is the development of what can be called an Indonesian brand of New Age. While marginal and, here again, typical of the urban middle classes and those participating in the modern sectors of the economy, the phenomenon is important enough to receive the attention of the other religious leaders we have talked about and who warn against the dissolution of Islam and Sufism into the formless vortex of New Age syncretism and bricolage. Howell has mapped the contours of this largely informal movement, linking it to the development of 'new spiritualities' and 'seeker religiosity' in the West. Howell notes how 'Asia's spreading consumer society has "rejuvenated the meaning of the self" and promotes selves sensitive to infringements of their autonomy and rights.'[78] While the West is said to be prone to a process of 'Easternization,' the East has fed off some of these offshoots and developed a brand of self-defined 'spirituality' that is distinct from the legal category of faith and which is contrasted by its proponents against proper religion.[79] These spiritualities are, as in the West, compounds of techniques and movements which include Reiki, the Brahma Kumaris, Celestine Prophecy, Emotional Intelligence, Kundalini Yoga, Zen, and the likes, which Indonesians identify as non-Islamic, but which can be combined with Sufi ideas and practices and are presented as 'scientifically proven' and universally acceptable means for attaining well-being and improving relationships as well as work performance. These are just some examples that show how Sufi piety has spilled out of the religious box into an array of comingled 'spiritual' and self-help phenomena. It further shows how the category of religion, which was successful in defining and regulation religion in Sukarno's regime and the early years of Suharto's New Order, appears today as something like a cracked dike which cannot even contain the transformations within Indonesian Islam. Furthermore, all of these influences and movements emanate from the possibilities opened by the circulation of ideas, products, and services in the globalised marketplace (Indonesian libraries often have New Age sections) and through the Internet, and appeal widely to 'Self-confident middle-class Indonesians, including Muslims.'[80]

A second phenomenon that is rapidly gaining in speed and outreach is the consumption of Islam-certified products and services. The consumption of halal food, which used to be taken for granted and was not an important issue in a Muslim majority country, despite the presence of important non-Muslim minorities, has become the object of daily concern and orients conscious consumer choices. All of this has enormous cultural, religious, social, and political consequences, not to mention extraordinary economic repercussions on a global scale. Initially confined to meat, halal consumption has extended to embrace an ever-expanding ensemble of products and services, from body care products to refrigerators.[81] Parallel

to this, Islamic finance and products such as Islamic insurance have become a multi-billion global industry whose hub has for a long time been situated in neighbouring Malaysia. Research has very recently started to pay attention to phenomena such as the rise of Islamic real-estate, Islamic gated communities, and Islamic multi-level relational marketing.[82] As elsewhere, these developments have tended to favour conservative moralities as well as the dissemination of fundamentalist, Gulf country emanating theologies (e.g. Wahhabism, Salafism), with the effect that formerly peaceful and integrated multi-religious communities are seeing segments closing themselves off within consumption-derived niches. The expansion of global capitalism does not mechanically produce open-mindedness, democracy, and happy multiculturalism, as other examples I have collected in this book show.

Thirdly and finally, one of the most visible signs of the Islamic resurgence in Indonesia (as elsewhere) is the sporting of the Muslim veil, even in a country where this practice is 'neither deeply rooted in local tradition nor encouraged by a majority of the population.'[83] Prior to recent times, the only veiled women were very devout Muslims; yet, veils started to be a familiar site by the end of the 1980s, in tune with the general trends I have discussed earlier. The most popular veil type is called the *jilbab*, and is 'typically accompanied [by] a tightly wrapped batik sarong and a close-fitting blouse' that accentuates rather than hides 'the shape of a woman's body.'[84] The practice, which was initiated by university students and is typical amongst lower-middle-class to middle-class women, is claimed to be a highly personal and voluntary *choice* that results from the process of 'becoming aware' and the outward sign of a 'deepening of religiosity.' In Indonesia, veiling does not, contrary to some Middle-Eastern countries, have the social function of making it easier for women to circulate in the public sphere and access the workplace while retaining respect. On the contrary, veil wearing has tended to complicate the professional paths of the women who have chosen to veil, even if the ongoing Islamisation is rapidly changing things in this respect. As Suzanne Brenner has found in her fieldwork, religious doctrine and beliefs are not key to the decision to veil. Brenner notes how, in the face of the important socio-economic changes that occurred during the New Order, Islam has appeared as a way of 'maintaining an ethical and disciplined society.'[85] It is interesting to note how attempts to ban the wearing of *jilbab* in public schools in 1990 were successfully downturned following 'months of stormy protests.'[86] Here, the progressive legitimation in terms of 'personal choice' met with conservative, moralising, and fundamentalist currents to defeat the ban, which, in retrospect, appears like the swan song of the secularist ideology in Indonesia.

Women who choose to veil do so because they have the time and resources to inform themselves about Islam through books, magazines, and,

of course, the Internet,[87] as well as through participation in the numerous religious education classes and workshops on offer. Brenner writes:

> As the daughters of teachers, small businesspeople, and low-ranked civil servants, they represented a class of people who have been fully drawn into the state-sponsored process of 'development,' but without reaping its spoils. The wave of consumerism that has swept up the monied elites in the New Order has merely washed over the members of this class, leaving them adrift in its wake.[88]

The most common type of veiling in Indonesia is personalised and variably fashionable, and in this sense it appears to be a consumerist response to a deficit to the 'full' integration within consumer society in Brenner's analysis. She adds that veiled women confess feeling as part of a 'vast extended community and powerful international movement through television and print media.'[89] They thereby 'validate their sense of being part of the modern world without the need to adopt a Westernized way of life.'[90] Still, women who wear the *jilbab* speak of their desire 'to actualize their potential and of their motivation and ambition for veiling,' thereby rehashing Western self-help and management discourse. The fashionable *jilbab* is a way to present Islam 'in a way that is sophisticated, fresh, and challenging,'[91] which is a way to position it as an alternative amongst the choice of modern, forward-looking lifestyles. These women pursue the modernist critique of traditional Islam (deemed sullied by superstition) while significantly diverging from the scripturalist, social, and political Islam of Muslim Modernists and similarly from the secularist view of Sukarno and other post-independence Indonesian elites and their emphasis on religion as *ratio*. Incidentally, the young women choosing to wear the *jilbab* are unsatisfied with the 'older reformist program of Muhammadiyah and similar organizations,' which have not 'brought about the changes in society' that they and other Muslim activists seek.[92]

The political content of such practices is 'a self-conscious move toward personal and social change,'[93]a bottom-up versus top-down approach that starts from the individual and is manifested through visible signs and a religiously and ethically informed consumption. Veiling 'suggests a new way of being in the world and a new subjectivity' produced by the exercise of *choice* and which stresses individual responsibility and autonomy with respect to tradition as well as external moral and political authorities. Of course, the Islamist discourse and mounting social pressures do produce strong normative incentives that infer on women's decision, but it is clear that the value of the veil, its authenticity, is guaranteed by the narrative of personal choice. This choice often follows a period of anxiety or a personal crisis, to which the decision to veil provides an answer and signifies a rebirth, and thus the expansion of born-again types of Islam. Veiling in Indonesia, as in Muslim

diaspora in the West, becomes a first step from which to 'develop' and 'grow' through self-discipline and self-consciousness. Faith in development and utopian social projects, here again, have ceded to self-development and personalised religiosities.

Conclusion

This chapter provides an overview of religious change over the course of the last century in Indonesia. The first part confirms the diagnoses of sociologists of religion according to which religion was differentiated into a specific institutionalised sub-system, and integrated within a largely post-Reformation Christianity model defined by direct or indirect Western influences. Rather than resorting to the language of secularisation, I have striven to show how the salient characteristics of religion in the early Republican period can be alternatively read as having been made to conform to the requisites of the burgeoning Indonesian Nation-State, and therefore that the most accurate description of these processes is the statisation (i.e. institutionalised within well-defined and manageable forms) and nationalisation (i.e. subordination to the national project) of religion, according to Western High Modern Ideals (of which Reason), and not as much as its secularisation, even though the normative and political importance of the category of religion implied the definition of clear religion/secular boundaries.

What came next, and constitutes our present, appears like a significant, although coherent shift towards an entirely novel model for religion. Resorting to the fieldwork of anthropologists has allowed the observation of a range of religious phenomena that challenge not only the secularisation thesis, but the very secularisation framework. Rather than considering political issues such as democratisation, the threats of radicalism, and the revival of past religious forms, it is the effects of economic globalisation that have come to the fore as the matrix from which to understand and organise the most salient religious transformations since the emergence of development-born working and middle classes, starting in the late 1970s until today. Whether the re-legitimation of Sufism and its multiple avatars, the emergence of halal consumption or that of veiling, the manifestations that characterise the religious landscape today can hardly be dissociated from the impact of consumerism and neoliberal reforms on Indonesian society. Similarly, the religious institutions that ruled over the former period are challenged in a multiplicity of ways, including by their adaptation to the conditions of the global market, their obligated structural changes and changes in governance, as well as the erosion of their influence, especially amongst the youth. Meanwhile, new religious authorities have emerged from without the traditional relays, namely from the business and media world, as a new blend of management and self-help-infused Market Islam has saturated the public sphere and made its way into the state's strategy for answering the challenges of globalisation.

The picture painted here shows how starting with religious institutions fails to grasp the extent, nature, and internal dynamics of the ongoing transformations. Paying due attention to religion-as-lived as well as culture, and namely popular culture, on the other hand, allows for a more comprehensive understanding of the now fluid, complex, and intermeshed situation we now face. Turning the focus back on such institutions as the Muhammadiyah helps to show this perspective sheds light on the erosion of their authority and influence in the Indonesian public and political spheres.

Notes

1 Anderson (2016).
2 Howell (2007: 221, 222). Howell's synthetic piece has been a revelation for me. She clearly shows how religion in Indonesia over the course of the last century can be divided into two periods which corresponds to the National-Statist and Global-Market regimes. This analysis is also supported by Njoto-Feillard's (2012) historical account.
3 Howell (2007: 224).
4 Howell (2007: 224).
5 Quoted in Howell (2007: 224).
6 Howell (2007: 225).
7 Howell (2007: 217–8). On the Muhammadiyah, see also Njoto-Feillard's (2012) extensive study.
8 Njoto-Feillard (2012: 147).
9 Njoto-Feillard (2012: 236–7).
10 Howell (2007: 217).
11 Howell (2007: 217).
12 Howell (2007: 218).
13 Howell (2007: 221).
14 Howell (2007: 227).
15 Howell (2007: 229).
16 Hariyadi (2010: 2).
17 Rudnyckyj (2010).
18 Howell (2007: 229). See also Rudnyckyj (2010, 2013a), Njoto-Feillard (2012).
19 Rudnyckyj (2013a: 45).
20 Rudnyckyj (2013a: 46).
21 Kahn (2001: 653). Kahn's article is a most remarkable piece that provides the best account of modern transformations, from the 1970s to the commodified contemporary. Although he writes about Malaysia, his point is precisely that processes such as those experienced in the West were also experienced elsewhere. His account is corroborated by the sources gathered as references for the Indonesian case.
22 Kahn (2001: 653). See preceding note.
23 Howell (2007: 230).
24 Howell (2007: 219).
25 Hariyadi (2010: 2). See Fealy (2009), Pamungkas (forthcoming).
26 Hariyadi (2010: 3). See also Sen and Hill (2000), Pamungkas (forthcoming).
27 Hariyadi (2010: 3).
28 Watson (2005: 776). See also Haenni (2005), Howell (2007, 2008, 2010, 2014a), Hasan (2009), Njoto-Feillard (2012).
29 The logics of Megachurch digital televangelism were already discernible in the US's 1980s television televangelism. See Frankl's (1988) classic book on the subject.

30 Howell (2008: 41).
31 Howell (2008: 41).
32 Watson (2005: 776). See also Njoto-Feillard (2012: 264).
33 Howell (2008: 231).
34 Howell (2014b: 245). See also Hasan (2009), Howell (2014a).
35 Howell (2015: 286).
36 Pamungkas (forthcoming).
37 Howell (2015: 286).
38 Rudnyckyj (2009: 188). See also Rudnyckyj (2010, 2013).
39 Rudnyckyj (2009: 188).
40 Rudnyckyj (2009: 189).
41 Rudnyckyj (2013a: 48).
42 Njoto-Feillard (2012: 259). My translation.
43 The title of the book by Laura Beth Jones (1996). See Njoto-Feillard (2012: 259).
44 Rudnyckyj (2009: 185).
45 Rudnyckyj (2009: 185). ESQ is based on Daniel Goleman's famous 'emotional intelligence' concept, to which it adds a non-specific and universal yet Islam-based 'spiritual' component.
46 Rudnyckyj (2013a: 47).
47 Rudnyckyj (2013a: 47). See also Howell (2014a).
48 Rudnyckyj (2013a: 48).
49 Rudnyckyj (2013a: 48). See also Howell (2014a). The list of countries has grown since.
50 Rudnyckyj (2009: 185).
51 Rudnyckyj (2009: 185).
52 Rudnyckyj (2009: 192–3).
53 Rudnyckyj (2009: 195).
54 Rudnyckyj (2010).
55 Rudnyckyj (2009, 2010), Howell (2014a), Njoto-Feillard (2012).
56 Rudnyckyj (2009: 197).
57 Howell (2014a: 413).
58 Howell (2014a: 413).
59 Njoto-Feillard (2012: 11–2). Not all radicals have taken such a route. A significant yet marginal development in the post-Suharto years has been the emergence of radical neo-Islamist movements (see e.g. van Bruinessen 2002).
60 Howell (2008: 45).
61 Howell (2015: 280). On Sufism and neo-Sufism, see also Howell (2012).
62 Howell (2015: 281). See also Hasan (2009).
63 Howell (2015: 282).
64 Howell (2015: 284). My emphasis.
65 Howell (2015: 284).
66 Howell (2015: 284).
67 Howell (2015: 283).
68 Njoto-Feillard (2016: 140).
69 Kahn (2001: 653–4).
70 Kahn (2001: 654).
71 Howell (2015: 287). See also Zamhari and Howell (2012), Howell (2014a).
72 Zamhari and Howell (2012).
73 Howell (2015: 287).
74 Howell (2015: 288).
75 Howell (2015: 288).
76 Howell (2015: 288).
77 As elsewhere in South East Asia, charismatic Christianity in the form of Pentecostal churches has blossomed in Indonesia, particularly amongst the

business-savvy and ethnic minority Chinese. See e.g. Koning and Dahles (2009), Hoon (2013).
78 Howell (2010: 280). The author quotes Lee (2003: 365). See also Howell (2005).
79 Howell (2010: 280).
80 Howell (2005: 489).
81 Mufti (2018), Efendi (2018).
82 See e.g. Njoto-Feillard (2016), Madinier (2016).
83 Brenner (1996: 673). See also Hasan (2009), as well as sociologist of religion Jenn Lindsay's (2011) documentary film about Indonesian veil wearers.
84 Brenner (1996: 674).
85 Brenner (1996: 677).
86 Brenner (1996: 678).
87 For a review of Islamic content on Indonesian websites and magazines, see Hasan (2009).
88 Brenner (1996: 678).
89 Brenner (1996: 678).
90 Brenner (1996: 678).
91 Brenner (1996: 680).
92 Brenner (1996: 681).
93 Brenner (1996: 681).

10 From pope to coach

Marketed institutions, re-invented traditions

This synthetic chapter pans over a series of ideal-typical examples that shed light on the type of transformations that are involved in the passage from a National-Statist regime of religion to a Global-Market one. Overall, types of religion that remain closest to the former National-Statist model are those experiencing decline and facing the greatest pressure for reform. On the other hand, those which espouse an entrepreneurial type and cater to the culture of authenticity and expressivity in one way or another are experiencing vitality and growth. This general picture is, of course, not satisfactory, and so this chapter is intended on illustrating what is meant, concretely, by marketisation, and on providing elements for further analysis and model-building. The transnational and global yet locally embedded nature of religion today commands that we attach ourselves only loosely to national frontiers and pay attention to dynamics that are transversal both culturally and geographically. The examples threaded in this chapter show how neoliberalisation and consumerisation shape religion in a variety of pathways, yet within distinctive and coherent template.[1]

Positive structuring: Latin American Pentecostalism

Relations between religion, consumerism, and neoliberalism are far from unidirectional, and no one-sided impact theory can account for the transformations of the last decades. Analyses need to be contextualised, as the global dissemination of neoliberalism and consumerism did not occur in a single, homogenising manner, and neither did the impacts on and responses from the various levels of religious organisations, institutions, movements, and actors. Let us start this overview in Latin America, where Joanildo Burity distinguishes between two Christian discursive formations in reaction to marketisation: *Pentecostalism* on the one hand, and '*ecumenical organizations* and networks acting as mobilizers in the *alterglobalist movement*'[2] on the other. As Burity writes: 'Both discourses operate within a local/global nexus, as their articulatory character involves a non-territorial focus based on their understandings of mission and religious mobilization, but is also firmly rooted in territorial experiences of community and individualization.'[3] Latin America has largely been in step with developments in Europe and North America as

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concerns consumerism, and neoliberalism similarly arrived in the 1980s as an answer to grievances regarding 'the immodest power of the state in a continent plagued by military dictatorships and a tradition of interventionist, modernizing state policies.'[4] In this context, neoliberalism has provided a 'grammar of discourse'[5] for making state reforms and globalisation irresistible, while coupling promises of democratisation with '"market freedom," competition, decentralization, deregulation, consumer-oriented economic practices, [and] openness to foreign capital and global markets.'[6] The neoliberal revolution was not a one-time sway but a complex of processes and shifts, yet:

> It is clear that the spread of neoliberalism was carried forth through a relentless subjective reworking so as to foster the image of a competition-driven agent, bent on disseminating both the logic of the market and its acquisitive, consumerist values.[7]

This has entailed the production of a new subjectivity that is 'coeval with the institutional re-engineering which neoliberals set out to promote as a condition for both the achievement and the free development of market sovereignty.'[8] The result, in Latin America as elsewhere, has been a profound redrawing of the private/public and religion/politics distinctions.

Neo-Pentecostalism, a branch of Pentecostalism that emerged outside of modern denominationalism in Latin America in the late 1970s, can readily be understood as 'an organic expression of a spirituality and organizational framework which is in tune with the neoliberal ideology and mode of governance.'[9] Traversed by a 'Health and Wealth' prosperity gospel, neo-Pentecostalism values pragmatism, resorts to business management techniques for running churches, makes abundant use of media for mass proselytising, religious advertising, and the production of 'total' religious experiences, backed by a theology that emphasises an ongoing spiritual battle against the forces of evil immanent in the world.[10] Neo-Pentecostalism originated amongst the poorer classes, ensuring the penetration of neoliberal discourse deep into the Latin American social fabric. As in the white middle-class prosperity gospel churches, lower-class Churches function on the franchise model, and the most successful, such as the Brazilian Universal Church of the Kingdom of God (BCKOG), have branched out to the United States, Europe (e.g. through Portugal, moving upstream along the old colonial routes), and the whole world (160 countries for the BCKOG). Neo-Pentecostal religiosity is utterly utilitarian: Transactional, calculating, bent on minimising 'suffering' at all costs and maximising the enjoyment of material blessings, modelled on capitalist speculative investment and thereby 'aiming at the highest returns with the least effort.'[11] As Burity writes:

> God owns all riches and the extension of his blessings is unlimited; therefore, every believer may lay claim to this superabundant wealth *through giving* and *putting God to the test* as a faithful and hyper-competent *broker* of each offering received.[12]

Celebrations often involve mass gatherings, and clearly aim the individual rather than the production and maintenance of social bonds and a collective subjectivity. Community is effervescent, and functions to 'provide evidence—through endless testimonies—of the efficacy of giving and trusting God to receive individual blessings within a kind of instrumental community of ritual.'[13] In addition to selling a maze of by-products including CDs, DVDs, books, and t-shirts, Churches provide a score of non-strictly religious services, such as business consulting, financial training, and start-up know-how. The entrepreneurial model is stretched to include widely publicised charities, while political brokering has become a constant since the mid-1980s across the whole of Latin America, breaking with the principles of separation of religion and politics and of the privatisation of the former. In this case, the rapport between neoliberalism and the republicisation of religion is quite explicit. Political involvement complements 'their mission: exercising pressure and influence to secure unrestrained religious freedom and public visibility (particularly in competition with the majority Catholic Church), and to promote traditional religious morality against more liberal gender, sexual, bio-technological agendas.'[14] In the case of neo-Pentecostalism, outright economic liberalism goes hand in hand with political and cultural illiberalism.

For all its growth, neo-Pentecostalism remains a minority compared with what Burity calls 'traditional Pentecostalism.' While being less blatantly imprinted by neoliberalism, it still shares a 'family resemblance' with it, namely through the entrepreneurial component of its 'spirituality of self-assertion, community and prosperity.'[15] Traditional Pentecostalism's entrepreneurialism is 'more attuned to the encouragement to fend for oneself' and promotes personal responsibility, self-trust, and perseverance rather than reliance on state intervention. Success has less religious value than in neo-Pentecostal movements, and divine Providence is seen as a guiding and helping presence in everyday life and difficult situations. Traditional Pentecostalism fosters strong communal bonds (and therefore security and solidarity, but also obligation) rather than a more purely individualist 'spirituality of acquisition and consumption.'[16] Yet, traditional Pentecostalism does disengage from the national level, which was the focus of Liberation Theology, in favour of more localised, networked, and subcultural types of solidarities that are no longer unconditional and universal.

This analysis of Pentecostalism and neo-Pentecostalism is also valid for African, South-Asian, North American, European, and post-Soviet Pentecostalism, which share the same characteristics and the same socio-demographic appeal. Africa is an exception, as it is a well-implanted middle-class phenomenon. Starting this overview in Latin America rather than focusing on Megachurches in the US and other Western countries supports the argument that this phenomenon is inherently global and that it cannot be reduced to a form of Westernisation or Americanisation. Developments in Latin America, as elsewhere, have been organic at the same time that they have been profoundly transnational. The distinction between

Pentecostalism and neo-Pentecostalism also highlights the variegated degrees and modalities of marketisation. While neo-Pentecostalism overtly espouses aspects of neoliberalism, traditional Pentecostalism shows how religious forms can be shaped by it while retaining their own consistency.

Negative structuring: ecumenical Christian alterglobalisation

If Pentecostalism provides an example of positive structuring within the marketisation model, it is only part of the picture.[17] I mean positive here not in the normative sense, but rather as a sculpture which is the positive impression of a mould. As an episteme, or grammar, a regime also shapes in what I am calling here a negative fashion, just like a mould is the negative of a sculpture. Following Burity, ecumenical Christian alterglobalism is an ideal-typical example of negative structuring, as it is openly critical of neoliberal globalisation while espousing a Global-Market form.

The religious left in Latin America was composed of liberation theology and mainline Christian ecumenism before the neoliberal shift of the 1980s. These currents have since undergone a process of 'NGO-isation' as well as a profound recasting of their social and political engagements within the global justice movement that arose over the course of the 1990s and coalesced in the alterglobalist movement. Also known as the anti-globalisation movement, actors self-identify as *alter*-globalist, i.e. not against globalisation per se, but against a purely economic brand of globalisation. This is expressed in the movement's slogan: 'Another World is Possible.' Born out of the contestation of the GATT accords and the institutionalisation of supranational legal frames that enable economic globalisation, the alterglobalist movement coalesced in the early 2000s around the World Social Forum meetings held in the citizenship laboratory of Porto Alegre, Brazil, from 2000 to 2003, before moving to Mumbai (2004), Nairobi (2007), etc. Installed as a counterpart to the yearly World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, in which the planet's most powerful leaders meet with the most powerful economic actors behind closed doors, the alterglobalist movement aims to reclaim the meaning of globalisation in the name of a global civil society.[18] Along with David Graeber, I argue that the emergence of alterglobalism in the wake of the latest phase of economic globalisation driven by neoliberal reforms and the financialisation of the economy marks an important shift in the world political landscape and political imaginaries: 'The geography of the current anti-globalization protests signals a new world-political landscape for the Left. […]They point towards an entirely new ideological, political and geographical design,'[19] away from the state-centred Marxist-Liberal matrix typical of the National-Statist era.

NGOs associated with Ecumenical Churches such as the Lutheran World Federation, the Ecumenical Alliance for World Action, Methodist groups, and the Latin American Council of Churches were involved in the emergence

of the alterglobalist movement and have been increasingly visible in World Social Forums, especially since 2003. In so doing, 'religious alterglobalism speaks with a "secular" voice, combining academic theology and appropriations of social scientific discourse to produce a second order religious reflection on world affairs and social struggles.'[20] During my own fieldwork at the 2003 World Social Forum, I met a score of young activists involved in organisations such as Oxfam who downplayed the religious nature of their NGOs, and were admittedly not believing Christians themselves.[21] Analysing this from a secularisation perspective is misleading, as it tends to understand the coincidental immanentisation *and* republicisation of religion as a paradox. Ecumenical alterglobalism is turned towards everyday life and issues of 'economic justice, environmental protection, sustainable livelihoods, cultural and religious pluralism and global governance based on empowered civil society participation.'[22] They weave together a new configuration and situate their mission on a global and local more than national level. They are also deeply integrated within transnational networks of NGOs and run their own communication and branding strategies, in relative autonomy from their official Churches. While being wildly different from Pentecostalism, ecumenical alterglobalism partakes in a common immanentisation process—salvation in this world, here and now—in which neoliberalism and consumerism are a central, defining focus. In both cases, religious identities are totalising rather than compartmentalised: Encompassing all other dimensions in the case of Pentecostalism, absorbed within worldly concerns (social justice, environmentalism, etc.) in the case of alterglobalism. Both movements also have opposing views as concerns the state: In line with neoliberalism, Pentecostalism does away with the state in favour of individual investments in the market, while religious alterglobalism critiques the erosion of the state's sovereignty by market forces and attempts to defend it as the legitimate depositary of democratic governmentality and societal regulation.

Neoliberalism, religion, and welfare provision

As we have seen, Western democracies developed three models of welfare capitalism: Liberal (United States, Canada, Australia), corporatist (Austria, France, Germany, Italy), and social-democratic (Scandinavian countries).[23] Reviving classical liberalism through the radicalisation of its free-market economic core, neoliberalism has produced the liberalisation of all three models, with an overall erosion of welfare provision as a result. Guided by what Per Pettersson calls an 'uncritical, almost religious faith in the market'[24] for which state intervention in virtually all sectors of society is deemed less 'efficient' than profit-seeking private actors, whole sectors of welfare provision have been deregulated, privatised, and opened to competition as cutbacks in public funding and tax reductions diminished the state's capacity. This has had important consequences for religion at large and religious institutions like Churches in particular.

In the US, with its 'freedom to religion' separation regime and specific congregational rather than denominational situation, the independence of Churches from state regulation goes hand in hand with an extremely plural landscape and a generally positive attitude towards religion. In 1996, President Bill Clinton passed the *Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act* whose neoliberal inclinations are evident in the title and which abolished lifetime welfare in favour of temporary and work-oriented relief. This bill has signalled the end of the welfare model in favour of a market-bound one, as citizens are no longer taken care of 'from cradle to grave.' The Act also opened welfare provision to private and religious organisations through a 'Charitable Choice' clause that officially aimed at redressing the supposed discrimination suffered by churches when betting for public funding.[25] As the state renounced its salvific mission by handing it over to the market, a new space opened up for religious organisations. This shift incurred important organisational changes, as the so-called Faith-based organisations (FBO) no longer had to administratively separate their religious mission from their secular involvement. Here again, the boundaries between 'religious' and 'secular' have been blurred, making the latter term difficult to handle. This initiative did not have an immediate impact on the ratio of FBOs involved in welfare provision; yet, it did change perceptions regarding faith-based welfare.[26] The years of George W. Bush's presidency did see a significant increase in public funding to FBOs, including in the field of job training. Furthermore, more conservative FBOs were favoured for the distribution of humanitarian and foreign aid, adding the promotion of abstinence and marriage, as well as the condemnation of preservatives and homosexuality to their list of charitable interventions. As Ashley and Sandefer note, these policies were perpetuated by President Obama,[27] and there has been no sign that this aspect of his politics has been overturned by Donald Trump, on the contrary.

For Jason Hackworth, the case of US religious welfare illustrates the tensions between the conservative religious right and neoliberalism.[28] Neoliberalism *stricto sensu* (i.e. the neoliberal doctrine) is not particularly religious-friendly, neither does it have a particularly positive accompanying mythology or soteriology. Rather than promoting a golden era as did the rising nation-state, neoliberalism is fatalist, suggesting that 'there is no alternative' but to conform to an unexamined faith in market efficiency. It is this apparently down-to-earth, realist pragmatism that has proved to be a powerful selling proposition. Yet, Hackworth also notes how faith-based welfare discussions have acted to legitimise welfare cutbacks by providing a theological legitimation for neoliberal policies. It has also been effective in attracting the votes of evangelical Christians which have massively turned to prosperity theologies (three of the four largest congregations in the US are led by prosperity ministers) while breaking with the tradition of electoral abstinence of this electorate and the more general separation of religion and politics.[29]

This type of religious legitimation of neoliberal policies is a challenge for Churches that are critical of the neoliberal agenda, as they are forced—or at least highly incited—to provide welfare services and compete in this new welfare market, or risk becoming invisible and criticised for not being socially relevant. The US case, with its so-called Faith-Based Initiatives (FBIs), is well known, but it is far from being an isolated case. The same trend is observable in the other two Welfare State types. In a substantial comparative research project entitled *Welfare and Religion in a European Perspective*, Anders Bäckström, Grace Davie, and their team examined the cases of Sweden, Finland, Norway, England, Germany, France, Italy, and Greece.[30] As Per Pettersson synthesises:

> The results showed a common pattern emerging in several of these countries: namely that the majority churches are playing an *increasing* social role in the public sphere through their involvement in various social activities and in welfare service provision, while simultaneously they are playing a *diminishing* role in the private spheres of individuals when it comes to participation in Sunday services, adherence to traditional Christian beliefs and individual membership.[31]

Interestingly, Pettersson is the only one to make the connection between these developments and neoliberalism. His study of the Lutheran Church of Sweden, a prototypical social-democratic country, is exemplary. Pettersson recalls how the Swedish welfare model was constituted by gradually transferring social responsibilities from the Church, but also the family, business, and the voluntary sector to the state and the public sector over the course of the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The Church of Sweden

> was integrated into the framework of the Swedish welfare model, although with a specialised role in line with the ongoing differentiation of society at large. The Church was regarded as a provider of public welfare within the spiritual sphere, with clear and legally defined boundaries in relation to the social welfare responsibility of the State.[32]

In this Nation-State-directed division of labour, the state was responsible for welfare 'from cradle to grave,' while the Church was to provide spiritual welfare 'from cradle to grave.'

While Sweden is still perceived as a social-democratic country with a generous welfare system, the reality is that, as in other Scandinavian countries like Finland, the neoliberal wave has had a severe impact, as liberal and right-wing critiques of the Scandinavian model converged with IMF and EU pressures for reforms and cuts in public deficits. Starting in the late 1980s, intense privatisation and deregulation took place, while New Public Management (NPM) principles were introduced across state and para-state

administrations. The financial recession of the 1990s only accelerated the process, as social welfare—including lower education, geriatric care, care for the disabled, child care, medical care, etc.—was opened to private sector actors competing for funding under contract, thereby operating within market logics. To the extent that, according to Pettersson: 'Sweden today is one of the European countries whose public services are to the greatest extent deregulated and market-oriented.'[33] Parallel to this, the long-winded separation process between the state and the Swedish Lutheran Church was completed in the year 2000, amidst general neoliberal deregulation. A new division of labour therefore took form, with the Church no longer acting under the umbrella of the state with a purely 'spiritual' mission. As a self-governing social agent and the largest voluntary institution in the country, the Church of Sweden has become 'visible as a potential social resource and possible social service provider.'[34] The ensuing question has been to the extent to which the Church should become contractually involved as a welfare entrepreneur with the state, or if it should protest against the erosion of the state's welfare mission. According to Pettersson, the Church itself is not as aware as it could be of the 'the long-term consequences and [...] how its core identity will be affected by this development.'[35] In this case, the long and seemingly linear process of differentiation of the Lutheran Church of Sweden from the state hides the fact that the Church has shifted from being embedded in the state in the form of a state-like institution (and participant as such of a government type of governmentality and an inscription within a national programme) to being an important yet relative NGO/FBO amongst others (and thereby engaged in governance-type relations with the 'partner' state) in civil society, animated by a mission understood in terms of service provision.

The fact that such a shift may occur in (formerly) social-democratic welfare states and not only in liberal ones is indicative of the depth and uniformity of the general orientation of the changes from the National-Statist to the Global-Market regime. Observing corporate welfare states only confirms Pettersson's diagnosis. Breda Gray's study of Ireland shows a similar translation of the Catholic Church into a civil society actor, namely with respect to Muslim immigration integration, a subject which Tuomas Martikainen has shown to be particularly revelatory of the new institutionalisation of neoliberal network governance.[36] Since the 1990s, the still very traditional make-up of Ireland has been profoundly shaken, and the embedment of the Church within the state as well as the former's central role in education and to a lesser extent in the domains of health and welfare has been questioned. In another study, anthropologist Isabelle Matte has painted a vivid portrait of the seismic transformations that have characterised Ireland in the 1990s, which moved from a largely rural and traditional make-up to becoming a full-blown consumer society.[37] Clerical sexual abuse scandals have erupted in the wake of these transformations and affected the authority and legitimacy of the Church, contributing to

the change in social and cultural ethos. As if in a replay of Quebec's Quiet Revolution, the 1970–1980 Irish baby boom generation came to adulthood, while EU integration and support coupled with neoliberal policies to propel an economic boom that earned Ireland the name 'Celtic Tiger.' As Ireland deregulated its economy, becoming a fiscal paradise at the edge of the European market, Catholic practice declined while yoga studios appeared on the High Street. The 2008 economic crash did burst the bubble of neoliberal optimism in Ireland, but did not push the cultural changes that had occurred in such a short time into reverse.

It is in this context that one can understand how, in Gray's words, the 'displacement of pastoral power from state welfare apparatuses to a marketized civil society has facilitated the reappearance of the Catholic Church, despite a depletion in its personnel and capital in recent decades.'[38] Again, the republicisation of religion appears directly tied to neoliberalism. As Gray argues, these developments have reconfigured state and Church relations in ways that are inassimilable within the secularisation framework but rather 'as the effect of neoliberal governmental technologies.'[39] Faced with its disembedment from the nation-state, the Catholic Church is now sited in civil society amongst other FBOs. Gray notes how it has carved itself a new role (has rebranded itself) as an '"expert in humanity" and in migrant integration.'[40] Similar developments have also been reported in Italy, another country where the Catholic Church remains sheltered in part from strong disaffiliation, as the home of the Holy See. Here as well, 'over the course of the last twenty years, the growth of the non-profit third sector has contributed in an important fashion to the opening of new spaces for Catholic organisations' interventions.'[41]

Churches as service providers

European majority Churches remain densely bureaucratised institutions. Their transformation into the equivalent of NGOs in many countries and on the international scene has not resulted in major organisational reforms; yet, a closer look shows signs of marketisation. Marketing and communication strategies, branding, market research, and management techniques such as NPM are now integral to many contemporary religious organisations. This phenomenon has been well documented in the case of the US, from Evangelical and Megachurches to seeker spiritualities and small charismatic groups, the Mormons, the Methodist Church, the Church of Scientology, the United Church of Christ, the Presbytarian Church, the Evangelical Lutheran Church, or the Kabbalah Centre, and there is little need to insist.[42] Much more revealing of deeper trends are the mainline European Churches.

In his study of the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Finland (ELCF), Marcus Moberg has documented how it has recently turned to marketing and management professionals in order to draw up communication strategies

and NPM techniques, values, and imperatives.[43] Moberg insists on how 'changing discursive practices [...] are not arbitrary, nor are they without their practical implications and consequences.'[44] Not only do they permeate the ELCF's internal and external communication, they 'have also started to become operationalized, that is, "put into practice" [...]in the form of the creation of new organizational routines.'[45] The ELCF thereby views its fate as depending on 'its own perceived ability to adapt to (presumed) new organizational-cultural demands and criteria of organizational effectivity.'[46] ELCF strategic documents note how, in a consumerist environment, 'individuals increasingly expect products and services to be tailored according to individual needs and preferences,' and therefore of 'high quality,' as well as 'enjoyable and entertaining. Perhaps most importantly, individuals increasingly expect to be able to exercise choice, or at least expect that their choices will not be too restricted or limited.'[47] As many other religious organisations, the ELCF has responded by

> engaging in different types of market research in order to be able to identify core publics and "customers," to gear services to niche audiences, to improve their "quality" and increase their entertainment appeal, and to reduce the demands put on (potential) customers in terms of lifestyle, belief, commitment, etc.[48]

An example of this has been the diminution of the length of services and allowing for increased lay participation, namely through social media. The mobilisation of techniques such as market research is not neutral, as they serve

> to spur a gradual shift from a civil society and community-building oriented approach [...] toward a service oriented approach in which members and potential members are increasingly viewed as customers and the services offered are designed to fit presumed customer needs and demands.[49]

Parallel to this, marketisation entails a change in the ways the Church perceives its relation to its members: Less as an institution that has authority on them than as a 'partner' on equal footing. Finally, the 'professional ethos and identity of church personnel' has shifted from a 'pastoral- and community-focused identity to a management- and administration focused one.'[50] As a whole, the ELCF has come to perceive itself as an enterprise, with professionalised administrative and management duties.

A good question is how much this changes churched religion from the lived point of view, that of religiosity. Research shows how these marketisation processes do indeed affect lived-religion, as well as how they produce new challenges for which the Churches are ill-equipped to deal with. Considering the Church of Sweden, Pettersson notes how it still considers

Sunday service as being 'the central and most important activity of a Christian congregation,'[51] and therefore the core of its identity. This situation 'leads to potential identity conflicts within church organisations,'[52] as the Church converts itself into a service provider. Continuing to focus on Sunday mass only risks alienating more and more people, and does not appear to be a 'winning strategy.' The forces of marketisation seem set to win. An abundant body of research has shown how the demand for *life rituals* (baptism, marriages, funerals) has remained steady across denominations. These 'special events' are efficient markers that make sense from an inner-worldly perspective. They give meaning to life here and now, and allow for the narrativisation of personal identities and their inscription in (temporary) communities. Following the characteristics of marketed religion, it should come as no surprise that the types of 'offers' that are the most popular amongst mainline churches are event-based and life ritualising. This situation (focus on Sunday service while marketising and being forced to become service providers) can have derelict effects, as Pettersson argues:

> Church personnel find themselves often responding to these new demands to meet different social needs [...] Consequently Church personnel spend an increasing portion of their working time in other activities than the Sunday service. At the same time, they are evaluated [remember how neoliberal governance stresses constant objective-oriented evaluation] as if they are failing in their mission, since they do not succeed in achieving high attendance rates' at Sunday mass.

This leads to feelings of failure and high levels 'of sick leave and increased incidence of burnout symptoms among Church employees [!].'[53]

A further example is found in Jens Schlamelcher's study of the German Evangelical Church (GEC). Self-perceived as an 'island of community in this sea of the neoliberal free market,'[54] a closer analysis reveals how customer orientation, 'total quality management, management by objectives and temporary contracts of employment'[55] imposed by the state to the education and health institutions run by the Church have affected the religious institution as a whole. Diminishing financial resources derived from the state-collected Church-tax (due to an ageing population) along with welfare cuts have added to a stark decline in church attendance in the last two or three decades, forcing the GEC to 'downsize and economize.'[56] As Schlamelcher writes:

> These organizational (as opposed to theological) imperatives have sparked an explosion of neoliberal discourses within the Church. Often drawing on theological reasoning, it is argued that the Church, especially in the period of the flourishing Early Church, has always functioned like an enterprise. As such, it is advisable and appropriate to adopt instruments such as marketing strategies and processes of enhancing customer orientation.[57]

While such discourse has been resisted from the base (the GEC is an essentially democratic structure), responses to financial austerity have affected the Church right down to the local, parish level, by transforming the integrated parish-as-community increasingly into an organisation separated from its public. For example, administrative work has been outsourced instead of being performed by the church secretary or volunteers. As a result, many parishes have closed their offices, with the result that informal relations that used to infuse parish life have been curtailed, affecting the parishes' communal bonds. Similarly, the Church has reduced its number of priests, who now serve many parishes and can no longer maintain proximity relations with the community and perform house visits to the elderly and the sick.

Downsizing measures have also led to parish fusions.[58] Rather than resulting in the effective fusion of two communities, the

> unintentional effect of the fusions on the parishes is the production of winners and losers. The winners are the parish communities whose buildings will be maintained and often renovated. The losers are ripped away from "their" church and community hall; often, they do not feel "at home" in the buildings they attribute to the "other" parish. The integration of communities in the context of fusions is likely to fail, which leads to diminishing degrees of participation among the losers.[59]

In the end, rather than allowing churches to 'grow against the trend,' in line with Church objectives, such measures have accelerated church decline.

In the face of this decline, the Church's strategy has been to develop what it calls 'low threshold offers' designed to match 'customer needs' and reach out to the general public. High thresholds are identified as creeds, dogmas, morality, doctrines, religious truths, and anything that foils individual autonomy. An example of such low-threshold offers has been the conversion of urban centre churches (often amongst the most ancient and beautiful buildings owned by the Church) into the so-called City Churches. These churches are renovated in modern style and transformed into multifunctional spaces while conserving their 'sacred' feel, as the shrine, the stained-glass windows, and religious artefacts are preserved. Rather than being focused on providing Sunday service, City Churches offer a range of activities: 'feminist worships (a monthly event which is led by a musician), chants of healing and power (a monthly event), dance meditations, tango dance classes and tango worships (less than monthly), contemplation sessions, healing touch sessions, religious lectures etc.'[60] To call onto my own research, the city of Basel in neighbouring Switzerland houses such a converted, downtown Church. This 'free church' holds ecumenical Christian services, but most of its activities are of another type, including women's prayer circles and sacred dance rituals, amongst the most popular. In this former Lutheran Church, one can buy 'Jesus Saves' bandages and candles, sip a beer and eat an organic soup and sandwich combo in the café (either on the sidewalk terrace or *in* the church where the pews used to be) while

waiting for one's turn for a session of healing by touch. Remarkable about all this is how these 'offers' are completely in tune with New Age 'spiritualities,' as well as how they defy any attempt at distinguishing between the 'religious' and 'secular.'

While the hopes of the Church are to attract newcomers, who would then become involved in its normal activities, this has not turned out to be the case. The true effect has rather been to shift the very substance of Western Christianity along the lines of expressive individualism and a consumerist type of religiosity. As Schlamelcher argues, City Churches offer sometimes intense, yet temporary communities, intimate settings that clash with the Church's desire to resuscitate old-styled, territorialised, lasting parish communities. They also contribute to bring the mystical tradition of Christianity (e.g. that of the 'Desert Fathers') and monastic meditation techniques to the forefront, and hence emphasise *experience* and *healing* rather than belief and morality as core elements of religion. The tendency, furthermore, once one opens the mystical box and democratises its practices, is towards syncretism and crossing Christian references and techniques with non-Christian ones. Notions of doctrine and dogma disappear, and 'Jesus, if mentioned at all, is referred to as *exemplum*,' a friend, a model, a guide, or a guru, 'but never as *mysterium*,'[61] as the resurrected Son of God. City Church offers also mark a tendency towards an inner-worldly, immanent transcendence, rather than the traditional radical, vertical, other-worldly transcendence of Lutheran Protestantism. Religion becomes 'a means of coping with everyday life, not a way in which to relocate the individual into a better world to come.'[62] These semantics completely evacuate references to 'revelation or salvation, as defined historically in Christianity.'[63] Finally, these tendencies converge with New Age's democratisation of religious virtuosity.

In sum, if the GEC's official discourse is critical of neoliberalism and consumerism, the reality is that both the Church's organisation and the type of religiosity that it promotes are deeply marketised: Service-oriented, and catering to the ethics of authenticity and expressive individualism rather than parish-based community and other-worldly salvation. As Schlamelcher concludes:

> Thus, a process of isomorphism is taking place in which the Church becomes a reflection of its social environment. The Church is not [...] an island of community resisting the sea of neoliberalism. Rather, it has become part of the sea itself.[64]

Referring to the Swedish case, Pettersson similarly concludes that churched religion, by shifting from 'standardised offers to consumer adaptation,' is transformed by changes in the 'dominant socio-economic logics,' from 'industrial to service society,'[65] more than it provides effective resistance. These examples show how marketisation affects religion both in form and substance, and in a way that has nothing superficial about it.

From Catholicism to 'Cathodicism'

The Catholic Church is by far the most hierarchical and bureaucratised religious institution in the world, and is therefore an interesting case study. Over the course of the twentieth century, an important demographic shift in the global distribution of Catholics has meant that a majority now resides outside Europe, as about 59% live in Latin America and Africa.[66] Once lands of evangelisation, the Global South now provides priests for North Atlantic parishes suffering from the decline of vocations, including in the heart of Rome. While these processes have occurred mostly independently of the Church, it has had to proceed to a series of organisational and structural adjustments. Amongst these, the appointment of bishops by the pope rather than by local powers has meant that the bishops now constitute a uniform 'corps of officials [...] who act in accordance with, and under the surveillance of, the pope. This centralization has allowed for a global political agenda orchestrated by the Holy See,'[67] especially as concerns moral issues such as abortion and reproductive rights. As for the College of Cardinals, it now holds 43% of Latin American, Asian, and African cardinals, a portion that is bound to increase. As this occurs, it is a part of the Western influence over the rest of the world that erodes and can even become reversed, as Global South cardinals push for their own issues. In consistency with Global-Market trends, the importance of Catholic NGOs and FBOs has grown since the Second Vatican Council (1962–1965), shifting initiatives from religious congregations and parishes to the laity, who act relatively freely from the Church's authority at the same time that the pope's grip on his institution has strengthened.[68] In the words of Isacco Turina, the Catholic Church presents an example of 'centralized globalization,' in which the pope appears to play the role of a hyper-mediatised CEO.

As religion under Global-Market conditions shifts towards issues of morality and life ethics, the Holy See's critiques directed at conservative and racist reactions towards migrants appear less audible than its refusal to open itself to women, accept homosexuality, and promote contraception in AIDS-ridden countries.[69] Regarding economic issues, the Church's position over the nineteenth and twentieth centuries has been to seek a middle ground between communism and free-market liberalism. John Paul II, whose Polish origins led him to critique communism and whose papacy covered the years of the neoliberal revolution, shifted this position in favour of a positive inclination towards entrepreneurialism and capitalism. With Benedict XVI and Francis at its head, the Holy See has been amongst the rare religious voices to critique the inequalities created by neoliberal capitalism, and it has recently endorsed an entirely novel discourse on environmental issues such as climate change.[70]

The last decades have seen the Church's relation to media and communication technologies evolve considerably, from dismissal to domestication

and promotional usage. John Paul II was the first 'celebrity' pope, using his numerous travels as occasions for an elaborate *mise en scène* in the service of Catholic visibility. It is interesting that, under John Paul II, the Church was quick to show interest in computer technologies (1989) and the Internet, and it inaugurated its first website in 1997 (www.vatican.va, relocated since at w2.vatican.va) after years of almost pioneer experimentation. The Holy See considers Internet to be a neutral vehicle with ambivalent possibilities: Facilitating communications, dialogue, education, and cultural enrichment on the one hand, while allowing further corruption, manipulation, and domination on the other. Vatican documents suggest reluctances towards tossing aside the possibilities of Internet, arguing that fear of technology is unacceptable when weighed against the opportunities it offers for both internal and external communication.[71] Faced with many scandals, namely those involving the sexual abuse of minors in a growing list of countries, the Vatican made relations with the media a priority and instituted a Secretariat for Communications, whose importance has significantly grown under Pope Francis. The Church's communication now develops through its website which coalesces its innumerable television and radio channels, as well as its social media platforms. The Holy See seems to have recorded how, in a Global-Market society, to exist on the Internet and social networks is to exist, period. Not creating and maintaining a website amounts to invisibility and thereby non-existence. Religion is no exception to a generalised trend. A Pew Research Center study found that almost two-thirds of 'wired Americans have used the Internet for spiritual or religious purposes,'[72] and there are reasons to believe that this trend can be extended well beyond Western frontiers. My own research amongst youth shows that they are very active with respect to religious (or 'spiritual') issues and are keen to explore the Internet.[73] In the age of spiritual seekers, presence on the Internet is vital, especially for youth.

As any other organisation, the Vatican has had to give in to the logics of marketisation and develop a communication strategy which, on a closer look, has far from neutral consequences. Simply existing on the World Wide Web imposes a format that foregrounds aesthetic and sensual dimensions[74] and favours convenience, accessibility, visibility, up-to-dateness, attractiveness, factuality, pragmatism, and effectiveness—all values that cannot be said to belong to the Catholic Church's traditional make-up. Communication, Internet, and social media mean branding and brand image management, as well as market segment research. To enter the World Wide Web is to enter a world of competition where players are levelled. In randomised searches, a single person-led spiritual workshop may gain as much visibility as a millennial religious institution, either because of its name or some particularity of configuration, or because of content that catches the eye, triggering a snowball effect amongst Internet users.[75] The Vatican has no advantage on the Web with respect to religious and spiritual affairs. It must *compete* for visibility and interest as much as anyone else. Website designs

must be attractive and audience-oriented, which means selecting which aesthetics are to be highlighted, which mood conveyed, which information made readily available, and which relegated to second rank. The Internet is all about defining perceptions. It forces perennial religious institutions such as the Catholic Church into practising branding, a marketing technique that consists of creating a strong and readily recognisable institutional identity.

A short visit to the Vatican's website shows how the figure of the Pope has become central since John Paul II. The omnipresence of the Pope across the main pages of the website is a determining feature (be it Francis, Benedict XVI, or the former John Paul II). On the home page, Francis is smiling and waving, clad entirely in white with a white cap.[76] For the non-specialist of Catholic affairs, the website emphasises the Vatican as a City-State—i.e. as a material place with historic and cultural importance one can visit, and as the home of the Catholic Church's government—while Catholicism as a religion is underplayed. All of these meanings are subsumed in the figure of the Pope, whose person becomes a multi-layered living symbol. The solar aesthetic of the Vatican website's homepage presents a religion with a human face, freed from the constraints of morality, bureaucracy, hierarchy, and dogma. The Vatican Online confirms the charismatic turn of Catholicism in the *cathodic* (electronic media) era initiated by John Paul II. Such emphasis on the charismatic figure of the Pope is an important concession to contemporary globalised trends. The emphasis is no longer on the Catholic Church as the only institution allowed to mediate between believers and God, salvation, Tradition, and Truth. The website rather forges a *personalised* rapport between the individual visitor and the Pope. Jesus and God, meanwhile, are virtually absent from the entire website, as are theological content and references to the resurrection or the Holy Trinity. On the website, though, one can make 'virtual pilgrimages' to Vatican hallmarks such as the Sistine Chapel or Saint Peter's Tomb, which seem more akin to entertainment than belief-centred.[77] This focus on the Pope means that all of his public activities can be viewed live or in replay mode, with techniques such as zoom-ins being used to stimulate emotional rather than intellectual responses.

What the Vatican Online illustrates is how the Church as an institution whose mission is to embody the community of true believers (the meaning of Catholic) and mediate between the Holy Trinity and the individual is short-circuited in favour of an unmediated, personal relation between the Pope and the individual. This introduces a charismatic type of authority that is a novelty, to say the least, in the Catholic Church's modern history. This turn is not only confined to the Internet: It is also the logic of social media that are increasingly used by the Church. Significantly, it is also the type of religiosity that is promoted by the World Youth Day (WYD) celebrations and the International Eucharistic Congress (IEC), which have emerged as some of the most important operations of the Church. Research on the WYD and IEC has shown how the Pope is popular amongst youth as a model much more than an authority one should obey. It also shows

how such mass gatherings are more important for their Durkheimian effervescence and temporary-yet-intense Turnerian *communitas* than for their theological, intellectual, and moral content. WYDs are modelled on youth subcultures such as raves, with their share of transgressive religiosity—namely the take-over of a public space and the open demonstration of religious fervour and belonging.[78]

WYDs and IECs are very far from Sunday mass at the local parish, but much more efficient in building a supranational Catholic identity that is 'not bound to the Westphalian systems of frontiers, territorial jurisdiction and national citizenship.'[79] They also differ wildly from celebrations such as the Feast of Corpus Christi, the most important public ritual of the Church in the Nation-State era, in which local clergy and local officials walked solemnly in procession, thereby stressing the Church's hierarchy and function as a mediator with the sacred in a locally embedded ritual. Rather, WYDs and IECs bring together Catholics from around the world, including the Global South, and participate in a de-territorialisation that extracts social relations from local interaction contexts and restructures them in spatial-temporal frames that are indefinite and event-based. They are built on immoderation and excess, with an elaborate *mise en scène*, and the massive crowds produce intense and powerful feelings of unity and community. As Jean-Philippe Perreault writes, they are *instituant* rather than reproductive of an instituted religiosity: They found Catholic identities on a subcultural mode, through a religion of the extraordinary and exhilaration. As a participant exclaims:

> At that moment, I raised my gaze on the thousands of people around me. I realised that, what I was I living with God, this personal and unique relation, all of these people had the chance to live this same bond, only in their own way.[80]

Apart from the reference to God, this excerpt could have been collected in a score of phenomena, including in a rave party (where the reference would have been to 'the vibe,' the cosmos, or some other signifier). Far from constituting a traditional haven preserving a type of religion based on 'chains of memory,'[81] Catholicism partakes in a general trend within consumer societies towards the 'festivalisation of culture.'[82] Furthermore, the media aspect of these events is constitutive and of the highest importance. Participants continuously photograph themselves and publish images and comments on social media. The omnipresence of mainstream media also confers a powerful dimension for participants who can thereby feel attested and recognised as living an important and extraordinary moment, to be fully in the here and now. If such events are efficient at generating emotion and fervour in ephemeral contexts, less certain is their capacity to fill the pews and bring the flocks back to a parish-based, routine religiosity. It seems highly improbable that the youth that assemble at such global events

will eventually 'mature' and revert to past forms of religiosity. As Perreault concludes, such developments rather point towards the constitution of what he calls a 'Market Catholicism.'[83]

Seemingly consistent with this analysis is the brevity of the papacy of Benedict XVI who, as Cardinal Ratzinger, had been Prefect of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith. Benedict represents the ideal-typical legal-rational authority as he was a pure product of the Church as a hierarchical institution. Lacking in personal charisma, he was known to be uneasy with public appearances, media and communication management, and events such as the WYD, and there are reasons to believe that this had to do with his exceptional and premature relinquishment (some media commentators evoked a burnout, *the* neoliberal age pathology par excellence). The College of Cardinals seem to have learned their lesson and have since elected the very charismatic and media-savvy Francis at the head of the Church, thereby renewing with the *cathodic* trend initiated by John Paul II. If Benedict XVI was much closer to John Paul II than Francis is as far as doctrine is concerned, these events suggest that charisma, in the Global-Market era, might be more important than doctrine, even for the Catholic Church.[84]

The Holy See's website is the main Internet outpost of the Catholic Church and Vatican City-State whose history is intimately tied to that of the West. It shows how even the most traditional and Modernity-sceptical religious institution is practically obligated into digital existence. If the Vatican's official publications on the Internet consider it to be a neutral vehicle, the present analysis suggests that this is wishful thinking. Simply existing on the World Wide Web imposes a format that foregrounds aesthetic and sensual dimensions and favours convenience, accessibility, visibility, up-to-dateness, attractiveness, factuality, pragmatism, and effectiveness, all values that cannot be said to belong to the Catholic Church's traditional make-up. If presence on the Internet privileges the branding of religions, it does not create this trend from scratch but rather accelerates the innovations Pope John Paul II introduced in his highly mediatised and global-sensitive reign. This can be interpreted as a form of agreement to Modernity and modernisation on the part of the Church; yet, this adaptation takes place on a very different level than that of the Second Vatican Council, which marked a progressivist turn for the Church. Both John Paul II and Benedict XVI's papacies rather mark a conservative reflux with regard to dogma and morality—in the same way that is observable in almost, if not all, other World Religions. It is significant that technical adaptation to the Internet and the global age does not imply moral and theological progressivism, on the contrary.

Paradoxically, religious conservatism today seems to accommodate the mutations and re-compositions that have affected religion since the advent of consumer society. The Vatican Online shows how the form and content of Catholicism are moved in the ways of individualistic, charismatic,

emotional, and experiential religion, and towards de-territorialisation, globalisation, inner-worldly salvation, chosen versus given community, etc. The interactive content of the website (such as the various virtual tours and videos) also suggests how a tradition such as Catholicism can be made to promote a sensory-oriented and aesthetic approach to religion to the detriment of creed, local-based communities, and respect of hierarchical and traditional authority. While ontological dualism, for instance the opposition of sacred and profane, of the Celestial and Terrestrial spheres, has been structural for the transcendent regime of Christianity, recent developments contribute to blur such boundaries. As a consequence, the Vatican Online appears much more like a tourist pitch for the mythical City-State than a promotion of faith in the resurrected Son of God.

These examples show the extent to which Catholicism is being transformed in the Global-Market era within marketised forms. An important comparative international research project on European Catholicism coordinated by Alfonso Pérez-Agote, and which includes Belgium, France, Spain, Portugal, and Italy, highlights many trends that can be attributed to the inscription within the Global-Market regime. Although proceeding from a thoroughly conventional, secularisation-embedded perspective, the research cannot avoid showing how Internet, for instance, has become 'the new field of communication'[85] for the myriad of institutional and non-institutional Catholic organisations alike, resulting in 'a loss of authority [for ecclesiastical authorities] as concerns the definition of the orthodox contents of the Christian message.'[86] Internet has helped established Catholic magazines reach new audiences, but it has also and at the same time given significant exposure to popular Christian communities who are critical of the hierarchy. It has also expanded the 'market'[87] of the national Churches well beyond national frontiers (to the global Hispanic community in the case of the Spanish Church, for instance), within which it was formerly contained. Another transversal characteristic is the decline in the belief in the dogmatic content while the Church is solicited primarily as a service provider, for life rituals and extraordinary events, even amongst publics self-defined as having no religion or being 'culturally' Catholic. Rituals are mobilised for their 'festive and solemn character of certain moments with strong symbolic meaning,' and are less concerned with the mediation with a well-defined Other world than with the 'emotional expression' of those gathered in the here and now.[88] Similarly, pilgrimages are universally attracting increasing numbers, as are papal visits. The popularity of such phenomena by no means signals a return to institutional religion. Research on the wildly popular Santiago-de-Compostella and Mary Magdalene pilgrimage routes shows how pilgrims are often motivated by self-realisation, (self-)exploration, and personal meaning quests much more than they are by religious fervour in a sense that could be recognised by Catholic orthodoxy.[89] The Church, here as elsewhere, has significantly lost its regulatory power, even as concerns the hallmarks of its own millennial tradition.

As a final example, Catholic monasticism has not been cloistered from the ambient cultural changes brought about by the consumerist and expressivist revolution. New Monasticism, which is widespread in Italy, France, Spain, and the US, is born out of the Second Vatican Council in order to modernise and renew monastic life, delegate power to the laity, and favour interreligious dialogue.[90] Consisting in mixed communities that include married couples and their children, New Monastic Communities (NMCs) have undergone significant changes since their inception. The meaning of asceticism, for instance, has shifted from penance and privation to partaking in an ethos of simplicity that accommodates a certain level of comfort and material possessions (such as smartphones). Becoming involved in these communities is also no longer considered an end in itself but a technique for getting closer to God and a 'means to access spiritual self-fulfilment.'[91] Rigorous fasting has been replaced by the omission of certain foods and the adoption of a balanced diet, as fasting is seen as producing irritation and pride and therefore an inflated ego (note the psychology-infused discourse). Such modifications in the practices and signification of nourishment are also recast with respect to radically new environmental and animal care concerns. Liturgy has been simplified, and the number of offices reduced from seven to three, while practices such as Transcendental Meditation and yoga, as well as other non-Catholic sources and practices (Jewish, Pentecostal, or Orthodox Christian) are integrated whilst 'neglecting the theological dissonance'[92] of such bricolage. As Stephania Palmisano writes: 'This bricolage [is] orchestrated by the goal of self-expression or, as the NMCs' founders would say, by virtue of the distinctiveness of their "charisma".'[93] Exit 'shame, guilt, remorse, and duty—which today are considered to be unacceptable, a source of embarrassment and emotional contradictions,'[94] enter pleasure, happiness, wellbeing, and the 'importance of personal regeneration understood as healing *here and now*.'[95] Here again, the degree of penetration of the New Age ethos within NMCs confirms the importance of the 'spiritual revolution,'[96] well beyond the number of actual participants at yoga and meditation retreats. While preserving the form of traditional monasticism through the importance of the 'Rule of Life,' scratching the surface shows how the very substance of monasticism is being transformed, for example by the recalibration of 'the relationship between community and individuals in favour of the latter.'[97] It also shows a shift in the modes of authority: By legitimising these changes by saying that the 'spirit of the law is more important than the letter of the law,' NMCs integrate self-realisation as their governing principle, rather than compliance to tradition and obedience to the institution.

In order to secure their financial survival and autonomy, NMCs, as most monastic communities today,[98] propose a variety of products and services that are advertised on their websites, through agencies as well as small shops. This trend has grown in importance and participates in what

Palmisano calls 'monastic commodification.'[99] Located in beautiful, natural settings and historic buildings, tourism is by far the most profitable activity for NMCs. They offer visits and stays that are included in tour operators' monastic and heritage routes, as well as day retreats, bible courses, meditation circles, and meals. Their shop also sells self-produced goods such as edibles, health products, herbs, clothing, books, candles, souvenirs of all sorts, and other religious-spiritual paraphernalia, which are branded with the community's logo. Their opposition to materialism, mass consumption, and industrial production is expressed through organic, local, hand-made, and crafted products, i.e. through the proposition of an *alternative* and *ethical consumption*. In other words, the NMCs identity and difference from 'mainstream consumer culture' is expressed via a specific type of consumption rather than through a social gospel or a political or theological discourse. It is furthermore useless to try and sort between religious pilgrims and secular tourists in such locations: As Ian Reader has shown in his remarkable book *Pilgrimage in the Marketplace*,[100] those who visit NMCs are more often indissociably both. They participate in new configurations that blur such boundaries while blending consumerism and religion, and by actualising religion through modes of consumption.

Orthodox versus Buddhist Judaism

David Ben Gourion (1886–1973), founding father of Israel and prime minister from 1948 to 1953 and 1955 to 1963, was a Zionist with strong Marxist inclinations, and was known to have been a sympathiser of Bolshevism. His project to build a secular Israeli (versus Jewish and religious) nation-state convincingly won out over those who promoted a religious Zionism founded on Judaism, a current which then became marginalised. In Ben Gourion's opinion, Orthodox Jews were a curiosity bound to disappear due to the forces of modernisation. In fact, it was religion itself, and not only the Men in Black, that was bound to disappear. Seventy years after the foundation of Israel, recalling these basic historical facts allows us to measure the distance that has been covered since the heydays of the National-Statist era. As the socialist consensus shattered and free-market liberalism rose in Israeli politics as elsewhere over the course of the 1980s and 1990s, so did the secularist majority cede to a growing messianic neo-Zionism with strong conservative and religious overtones. The establishment of the nation's capital in Tel Aviv was a symbol of the separation between Church and State, and it is this separation that is being seriously questioned today as Jerusalem is hailed by a majority of Israelis and the right-wing Israeli government today as the country's religious and *therefore* political and cultural capital. Today, a majority consider themselves to be Jewish before being Israeli, or rather Israeli because they are Jewish. This, of course, raises serious questions of citizenship and civic rights for those Israelis who are not Jewish but rather Arab Muslims (Palestinians),

Christians, or agnostics. Here again, we can only notice how the irresistible rise of neoliberalism and religious conservatism are coincidental, how they have risen in symphony, and form a system.

Judaism has the particularity of being an 'ethnic religion,' in the sense that one is born into it and that it is made difficult to convert into it. This characteristic, with the impossibility of proselytising and attracting new members that it entails, makes for a particular situation in the age of voluntary and born-again expressive religiosity. While orthodox and ultra-orthodox currents are visibly on the rise in Israel, the situation in Western diaspora is different. There, and particularly in the US which holds the most important and most influential Jewish minority, the trend has been towards disaffiliation and the turn towards a cultural Jewish identity, as well as assimilation through exogamic marriages (50% of Jewish marriages in the US in 2000).[101] This situation presents the risk of extinguishing Jewish lineages, and therefore 'maintaining "religiously Jewish" Jews is a priority for Jewish religious institutions.'[102]

The 1960s' counterculture was noteworthy for attracting many Western and American Jews. According to Mira Niculescu, these Jews 'were not only rejecting, like their Christian counterparts, the negative image of a paternalist, coercive and materialistic ethos of Western culture. They were also reacting to a post-traumatic, post-Shoah Jewish culture' and its victimising status as a 'religion of survival.'[103] The romantic and exotic appeal of Eastern spiritualities resided in the insistence 'on intuition rather than theology, compassion rather than guilt, and the experience of the body and feelings rather than their repression.'[104] Jews were disproportionately active in the blossoming neo-Buddhist, neo-Hindu, and neo-pagan movements, and practices such as yoga and meditation are commonly performed by the mainstream of middle-class American Jews today, as well as in Israel.[105] Buddhism in particular, and Eastern and holistic spiritualities in general therefore represent the biggest challenge to Jewish orthodoxy. In response to the Jewish Buddhist phenomenon, Jewish institutional responses have included the development of Buddhist or New Age Judaism. In the 1970s, the foundation of the Jewish Renewal Movement explicitly aimed to 'bring back' those who had flocked to Buddhism by making Judaism inspiring and meaningful for everyday life in modern consumer societies. This renewal movement has since expanded, and has been at the forefront in developing 'new hybrid trends such as "New Age Judaism," "Jewish shamanism," "Jewish mindfulness," and "Jewish yoga",'[106] as well as '"kosher" versions of "wellbeing," "spirituality," and "entertainment".'[107] Today, a score of authors and synagogues propose a 'Judaism for the mind, body and spirit,' geared towards self-actualisation and developing a refreshed Jewish identity through Jewish mystical chant, Jewish prayer dances, and musical Shabbat services, even in more traditional and conservative denominations. 'Practical Judaism' books thrive, and courses, seminars, websites, and workshops of all types abound. While self-identified Jewish New Agers represent a

minority amongst the Israeli middle classes, they are only the tip of the iceberg of a 'turn from nationalised to a spiritualised version of Judaism'[108] that values emotions, wellbeing, experience, and healing.

Amidst these transformations, the popularity of Kabbalah-based Jewish mysticism is a well-known yet notable case, as it traverses the entire spectrum of Jewish responses to the Global-Market regime, apart from the ultra-orthodox. Unsurprisingly popular amongst progressive and New Age imbued currents, Jewish mysticism also forms the core of the controversial Kabbalah Centre's personal growth and self-help psychology-infused Judaism-for-all—including non-Jews (and celebrities such as Madonna).[109] Less known is how the Kabbalah is at the centre of orthodox strategies to 'prevent Jews from crossing over to Eastern mysticism.'[110] As Niculescu argues:

> In contemporary orthodox discourses, Kabbalah is presented as the "legitimate" version of spirituality [...] Hence, what was once reserved for 40-year-olds and above *Halakha*-observant scholars and patriarchs in an exclusive context of oral transmission from master to disciple is today unearthed, democratised, and translated beyond recognition.[111]

Formerly the 'most elitist and exclusive of practices,' the last step in the path towards God, Kabbalah 'has become a way *in* to Judaism.'[112] Incidentally, the same trends affect orthodox Judaism as other religions, with experiential religiosity coming to the fore and 'refashioned as a tool for self-actualisation.'[113] Again, these transformations, which remain hidden from view from the secularisation perspective, are far from insignificant and superficial.

From counterculture to coaching

The examples listed earlier show how powerful the tropes of personal growth and self-realisation are. As direct consequences of the expressive turn brought about by the consumerist revolution, they are dominant in the religious reconfigurations of the middle class;[114] not only, as we have seen, within the fuzzy confines of the holistic or alternative spiritualities or New Age nebula, but also within institutionalised religions such as Christianity and Judaism. The ethos of authenticity and expressivity finds a massive echo within popular culture, reaching deeper and deeper into the lower classes. The extent to which this is the case, as well as the ways in which lower-class religion is transformed within this framework, is an important question that needs to be answered with empirical data. The same goes for how the ethos of authenticity and expressivity has penetrated the social fabric in developing countries. This is an issue that finds some answers in the preceding chapter and in further publications, but a probable hypothesis is that lower classes are as significantly affected by these global trends, only differently.[115] Pentecostalism has developed wildly in such social

strata in a number of developing countries, and it is clear that it promotes a specific brand of consumerism-friendly and, perhaps more importantly, consumerism-aspiring religiosity. Fundamentalist currents within Islam obey a similar logic, as the case of Indonesia shows. The revival and new legitimacy of popular religious forms, mass rallies, festivals, pilgrimages, and processions worldwide offer another possibility.

For the time being, though, I would like to stress how Eastern, New Age, and holistic spiritualities are no longer 'new' nor 'alternative' but completely infused within the mainstream, well beyond countercultural circles and progressive publics. While adepts of such 'spiritualities' (I continue to use this term in a strictly emic sense) were initially constitutively critical of consumerism and capitalism as a whole, some important changes have since taken place. On the one hand, holistic spiritualities have been absorbed by capitalist-friendly circles, sometimes through their rebranding and institutionalisation within existing legitimising and regulatory frameworks. On the other hand, adepts of holistic spiritualities began to find it legitimate and acceptable to be both spiritually minded, committed to self-improvement, *and* successful. My own observation of the holistic milieu in Montreal, Canada, has remarked such a change occurring over the course of the 1990s. Paul Heelas has similarly noted a positive attitude towards material wealth in certain strands of New Age, made evident by the developments within two large New Age centres, Findhorn in Scotland and Esalen in California.[116] In so doing, the 'milieu' significantly opened itself to the mainstream, and transactions started to occur that made it less and less a closed, esoteric, and exclusive one. At the same time, evolutions in the wider society, and the development and institutionalisation of a score of therapeutic practices grounded in holistic spiritualities, made such practices commonplace.

Lars Ahlins has shown how, in the case of Sweden, neoliberal *and* New Age ideas were introduced and circulated within the pages of a single newspaper, the *Svenska Dagbladet* (*SvD*), one of the country's largest newspapers, during the 1980s.[117] Close to the liberal-conservative party and the business world, *SvD* was the 'principal mouthpiece' in the promotion of the neoliberal ideology and its critique of the Swedish welfare model. At the same time, *SvD*'s daily *women's* page published more articles on the topic of religion and spirituality with a New Age focus than on any other subject, in addition to articles on psychology which promoted similar themes, to the extent that the newspaper earned a prize for its contribution in advancing New Age ideas. New Age and neoliberalism especially converge in their emphasis on the unique value of the individual, the importance of developing one's potential, seeing difficulties as opportunities, self-reliance, and individual responsibility. As we have seen, New Age and neoliberalism, while resting on different types of individualism, romanticism-grounded expressive individualism for holistic spiritualities, and utilitarian individualism for neoliberalism, they are complementary and function as a couple.

Since the 1990s, a plethora of books, seminars, workshops, courses, and DVDs emerged which argued that the 'previous incompatibility between the outer and the inner had been suspended' and contended 'that the internal search could have a positive impact on how the external world, not least work,'[118] unfolded. As a result, some New Agers joined the mainstream while the mainstream became increasingly imbued with New Age ideas and practices. As Christine Hornborg notes once again in the case of Sweden, while certain esoteric practices linked to New Age such as Tarot card reading or crystal healing still seem 'flaky' to many, the

> idea of a universal spirituality, often marketed as a way to bring "flow" and prosperity to life, is found to be more attractive [...] than the "old" New Age, which was introduced in the 1960s and was embedded in the counter-culture movement.[119]

New Age is far from being a fixed entity, and some have even suggested that the term be replaced by the 'Next Age.' One important development is how many 'alternative' healing therapies and medicines such as Reiki, Ayurveda, Acupuncture (Chinese medicine), Shiatsu, and so on are now recognised by public and private health insurance systems, and that they now represent a significant share of health costs and a booming market in its own right.

It is interesting to note how these alternatives to 'modern' medicine put into question the principles of modern medicine and the anthropology on which it is based. Modern medicine, one of Western modernity's most powerful institutions at the forefront of the battle of Reason against superstition, is being increasingly challenged by these healing techniques. The medical profession has reacted in various ways, but the actual tendency is towards a paradigm shift, from a differentiated one (in which organs are understood in isolation, and body and psyche are separate) towards a holistic paradigm that in some cases even leaves a door open to spiritual dimensions.[120] It is important to stress how alternative therapies, which are integral to holistic spiritualities, have imposed themselves 'from below.' This nebula emerged from society itself, and developed on the market model, with spiritual and healing entrepreneurs proposing their (paid) services through a variety of means, and with a tendency for syntheses, combinations, and personal appropriations, with personalisation and symbolic efficiency as governing principles. The state had no choice but to recognise and legitimise these practices long after their emergence, après-coup.

A related development is the success of 'Mindfulness,' a modular and synthetic programme put together by Jon Kabat-Zinn and now disseminated across the world in a form or another. Based at the University of Massachusetts, Kabat-Zinn has given a scientific grounding to Eastern spiritual techniques such as yoga and Vipassana meditation especially, and has packaged them in a way to be assimilated by even the most doubtful public.

Mindfulness proposes a remedy to the neoliberal age's pathologies par excellence: Stress, depression, and burnout. In essence, though, it is a form of 'Buddhism-not-religion.' While the metaphysical content is reduced to a minimal in Mindfulness books and its programmes, religion is implicit, there in the background: The idea that 'energy' flows between the cosmos and the body, that 'Life' is a built-in learning curve and has meaning for each and every one, that one can 'grow' and heal, etc.[121] In the early 1990s, Raymond Lemieux's research team found that mainstream beliefs were shifting away from personal representations of God towards transcendent-immanent cosmic representations (e.g. God as energy), even amongst declared Christians.[122] For many contemporaries, then, Mindfulness is a port of entry into holistic spiritualities. For others who may already have other religious inclinations or are agnostic, declared atheists, or just sceptical, the effectiveness of bringing attention to one's thought processes and bodily sensations is recognised and integrated in a way or another. Mindfulness programmes are now recognised by health insurance schemes, and even has become widely promoted within mainstream professional fields.

Mindfulness breaches across holistic spiritualities, psychology, medicine, and management. Another domain of penetration of holistic tropes is therefore the business world, a trend which the recent development of 'coaching' also illustrates. Freed from the legal and administrative constraints of the psychiatric and psychological disciplines, coaching initially emerged as a brand of professional counselling that integrates the basics of psychology and holistic spiritualities in a diluted and neoliberalised form aimed at individual happiness, self-development, and prosperity/professional success. Other overarching themes are self-confidence, the search and development of one's inner potential and living in the present (made explicit by Kabat-Zinn's bestselling book *Wherever You Go, There You Are*[123]), finding balance in order to best manage one's life, and tune in with one's 'true self,' deepest aspirations, and personal gifts. Coaching has since exploded into an array of practices and therapies, from the more overtly spiritual to the more utilitarian-materialistic variants. Yet, all present a holistic worldview in which the individual is an interdependent and unified whole that includes a 'spiritual dimension.' Coaches now provide 'para-psychological' counselling to individuals and organisations alike, be they multinationals, NGOs, or public services (especially in health and education). In addition, coaching literature intersects with an array of other fields, including marketing and management gurus, psychologists and psychiatrists, theologians, Buddhists, scientists, medical doctors, university professors (from cognitive sciences to maths and physics), politicians from both right and left of the political spectrum, media gurus (such as Oprah Winfrey, Google, and Facebook founders and their high ranked professionals), and new-New Age international mega-stars like Ekhart Tolle and Deepak Chopra.[124] This amazing range attests how holistic spiritualities have become completely mainstreamed, to the extent that they can be argued to be the dominant form of religiosity in

many countries today.[125] Again, this nebula emerged from below, outside of any control or initiative on the part of the state, which is now brought to try to regulate a field which it neither understands nor has a hold on.

Conclusion

Coaching and Mindfulness show how diffuse religion is today within culture, and how much former boundaries have become blurred. A typical reaction by sociologists with respect to these phenomena has been to try and reinstate the religion and secular division, for example by grading their 'religiousness' on a scale from 'low' to 'high.'[126] This approach is misguided in my view, as it basically judges the present with the categories of the past—i.e. churched religion. I argue that interpreting religion today with respect to categories such as religious/secular simply misses the point of what is actually going on. What this chapter has shown, amongst other things, is how the supposedly 'fully religious' core (churched religion within world religions) is in fact being shaped in the image of holistic spiritualities and marketised forms such as Pentecostalism. If we look at the empirical data rather than insisting on preserving our categories, what we see is that New Age *lato sensu* and charismatic religion are the natural forms of the Global-Market regime, and that it is they that are reshaping the forms that were instituted in the Nation-State regime. In other words, one can understand the transformations within Catholicism from the standpoint of New Age, but not the reverse. We need to constantly remind ourselves that the common definition of what constitutes 'real religion,' as was crystallised in Weber's substantive approach, is a late nineteenth-century construction, and that if religion was undifferentiated before its National-Statisation, there is nothing that prevents it from returning to a form or another of un-differentiation today and in the future. This is where I disagree with someone like Talal Asad.[127] For him, the fact that our concept of religion dates back to the nineteenth century (with its colonial and imperial legacy) leads him to reject the category altogether in order to focus on 'traditions.' In the end, Asad's deconstruction leads to a stalemate where the conservative definition he critiques is reinstated (religion is to be found in recognised traditions—i.e. World religions). This purely deconstructive approach fails to provide tools for understanding today's emerging forms and transformations. New Age, for instance, is shovelled back into the realm of insignificance, while Pentecostalism is isolated as a peculiar offshoot of mainline Protestantism (which I argue is a very bad way to seize it). Asad and others seem to forget that *all* Western concepts are born from Western history and its political contexts, not only religion, and that if one decides to do away with the latter, one must also discard concepts like politics and power (not to mention economics and concepts like 'the market'), which form the core of their analyses. What is more ethnocentric and imperial than Western concepts of power, domination, and politics, one might ask? What is left of Asad's work if one takes away the concept of power, on the grounds that it is so intimately tied to Western imperialism?[128]

Whether in mainline Protestantism, Catholicism, or Judaism, we have seen how neoliberalism and consumerism function in distinct yet reinforcing manners by imposing a marketisation framework through the remodelling of religious organisations' governmentality (on the governance rather than government type) and their self-perception as service providers within a 'religious market.' In addition, we have seen how this necessity to respond to 'consumers' needs introduces a significant shift in religion-as-lived. In tune with the exigencies of expressive individualism, religion is made to cater to the dynamics of subjectivation and communitisation, providing meaningful experiences anchored in everyday life concerns and experiences of community, for instance in intimate settings or mass gatherings.[129]

Most of what I presented in this chapter remains in the margins, if not in the blindspot, of conventional, secularisation-informed perspectives. Examining church attendance rates and statistics regarding the belief in 'God' leaves the essential changes that are occurring in the very substance of religion outside of the analysis. Similarly, diagnoses of religious revival fail to show how it is not the same type of religion that is experiencing vitality, but novel forms that are often combinations of religious and other dimensions. Demand for life rituals hides the fact that these rituals do not have the same meaning and the same functions they did in prior times. I have already stressed how holistic spiritualities and phenomena such as coaching are dismissed by authors like José Casanova as largely irrelevant, and therefore relegated to the margins of sociological investigation. I argue that they are important, if not central, to religion today, and that their understanding goes a long way in shedding light on the transformations that are reshaping instituted forms of religion—in the West, but also all over the world.

Notes

1 Most sources in this chapter have been commissioned by Tuomas Martikainen, Linda Woodhead, and myself for the various published and forthcoming volumes we have edited. It is interesting that in many cases, significant editorial work was needed to help authors free themselves from the assumptions of the secularisation framework. In other cases, authors have confided being finally able to put forward empirical data and analyses that were otherwise ill-received by the discipline and peer-review procedures.
2 Burity (2013: 22). Emphasis in original.
3 Burity (2013: 22).
4 Burity (2013: 24).
5 Burity (2013: 24).
6 Burity (2013: 24).
7 Burity (2013: 26).
8 Burity (2013: 26).
9 Burity (2013: 27).
10 Gonçalves da Silva (2007: 2), Burity (2013: 28). See also Lehmann (1996), Corten and Marshall-Fratani (2000), Willaime (2001b), and Martin (2002).
11 Burity (2013: 30).
12 Burity (2013: 30). Emphasis in original.
13 Burity (2013: 30).

14 Burity (2013: 30).
15 Burity (2013: 29).
16 Burity (2013: 30).
17 For convenience, I will use the term Pentecostalism in the remainder of this chapter rather than weigh the text down with 'neos' and redundant nuances.
18 On alterglobalism, see namely Sommier (2001), Graeber (2002), Sader (2002), Dupuis-Déri (2004, 2009), Sommier, Filieule and Agrikoliansky (2008), and Gauthier (2018c).
19 Graeber (2002: 87). For further discussion, see Gauthier (2018c).
20 Burity (2013: 34).
21 As part of my PhD research, I accompanied young political activists from Quebec to the WSF to study the new festive and carnivalesque means of contestation that characterise these movements. See Gauthier (2018c).
22 Burity (2013: 35).
23 Esping-Andersen (1990).
24 Pettersson (2015: 160).
25 Ashley and Sandefer (2013: 109). See also Hackworth (2013).
26 Hackworth (2013: 99).
27 Ashley and Sandefer (2013). The same policies were implemented in Canada during Stephen Harper's rule at the head of the Conservative Party (2006–2015).
28 Hackworth (2013).
29 Hackworth (2013: 91).
30 See Bäckström, Davie et al. (2010, 2011).
31 Pettersson (2015: 158–9). Emphasis in original. See also Pettersson's remarkable contribution in Bäckström, Davie et al. (2011).
32 Pettersson (2015: 155).
33 Pettersson (2015: 156).
34 Pettersson (2015: 157).
35 Pettersson (2015: 159).
36 Gray (2013), Martikainen (2013a, 2013b).
37 Matte (2011).
38 Gray (2013: 89).
39 Gray (2013: 90).
40 Gray (2013: 90) quotes Hervieu-Léger (1996: 296).
41 Garelli, Pace, and Frisina (2012: 194). My translation.
42 Cimino and Lattin (1998), Einstein (2008, 2011), Moberg (2017). On the Mormons, see McAlexander, Dufault, Martin, and Schouten (2014).
43 Moberg (2017). Moberg's book also investigates the Church of Sweden and the Anglican Church in England, as well as a few mainline American Churches.
44 Moberg (2017: 133).
45 Moberg (2017: 133).
46 Moberg (2017: 134).
47 Moberg (2017: 134).
48 Moberg (2017: 134).
49 Moberg (2017: 135).
50 Moberg (2017: 135).
51 Pettersson (2015: 159). See also Pettersson (2013).
52 Pettersson (2015: 159).
53 Pettersson (2013: 49).
54 Schlamelcher (2013: 53).
55 Schlamelcher (2013: 53).
56 Schlamelcher (2013: 54).
57 Schlamelcher (2013: 54).

58 Rasmussen (2018) has analysed the discourse surrounding church closures in the case of the Danish Church and has found similar evidence of marketisation discourse, while Erik Sengers (2009), who unfortunately has RCT affinities, has studied Dutch mainline congregations' resort to marketing strategies and specialists.
59 Schlamelcher (2013: 60–1).
60 Schlamelcher (2013: 63).
61 Schlamelcher (2013: 66). For the same conclusion in the case of Catholicism, see Perreault (2008).
62 Schlamelcher (2013: 66).
63 Schlamelcher (2013: 66).
64 Schlamelcher (2013: 67).
65 Pettersson (2013).
66 Secretaria status ecclesiae (2016: 43).
67 Turina (2015, forthcoming).
68 For this paragraph and the next, see Turina (forthcoming).
69 See Béraud and Portier (2015).
70 On neoliberalism and religious critiques, see Spickard (2013, 2017).
71 Pontifical Council for Social Communication (2002a, 2002b). See Campbell (2010: 36–8) and Mayer (2008: 39–43). For a thorough discussion and references, see Gauthier and Uhl (2012).
72 Hoover, Schofield, Clark, and Rainie (2004).
73 Gauthier and Perreault (2008), Gauthier (2005, 2008, 2018f). See also Bunt (2000: 2–3) and Meintel (forthcoming).
74 Gauthier (2018d), Grieser and Johnston (2018).
75 Proulx (2011).
76 The same was true for his predecessor, Benedict XVI. See Gauthier and Uhl (2012).
77 These features have since disappeared from the website. See Gauthier and Uhl (2012) for a description and analysis.
78 See Hervieu-Léger, Bogensberger, Davie, Frybès, Garelli, and Piette (1996), Hervieu-Léger (1999), and Perreault (2006a, 2006b, 2008, 2012).
79 Turina (forthcoming).
80 Quoted in excerpt in Perreault (2006a: 193). My translation.
81 Hervieu-Léger (1993).
82 Bennett, Taylor and Woodward (2014).
83 Perreault (2012).
84 This is not to say that this was a conscious criterion for the assembly of Cardinals who elected the current Pope.
85 Pérez-Agote (2012: 86).
86 Pérez-Agote (2012: 86–7).
87 Pérez-Agote (2012: 87).
88 Pérez-Agote (2012: 114). My translation.
89 E.g. Zapponi (2011), Fedele (2013), Reader (2014).
90 Palmisano (2013).
91 Palmisano (2013: 80).
92 Palmisano (2013: 88).
93 Palmisano (2013: 88).
94 Palmisano (2013: 88).
95 Palmisano (2013: 88). Emphasis in text.
96 Heelas and Woodhead (2005).
97 Palmisano (2013: 89).
98 See Jonveaux (2011). Jonveaux's study illustrates how most of the logics described in the case of NMCs are also to be found in 'old' monastic communities.

99 Palmisano (2013: 89).
100 Reader (2014).
101 Niculescu (2013: 98).
102 Niculescu (2013: 91).
103 Niculescu (2013: 97).
104 Niculescu (2013: 96).
105 See the contributions in Rothenberg and Vallely (2008).
106 Niculescu (2013: 101).
107 Niculescu (2013: 100).
108 Kaplan and Werczberger (2015). See also Werczberger (forthcoming).
109 On the Kabbalah Centre, see Altglas (2014), Einstein (2008).
110 Niculescu (2013: 105).
111 Niculescu (2013: 105).
112 Niculescu (2013: 106). Emphasis added.
113 Niculescu (2013: 105). See also Altglas (2014), Gauthier (2012a).
114 Dawson (2011, 2013).
115 This issue will be treated at greater length in a follow-up book, as well as in the forthcoming *Routledge Handbook of Religion in Global Society*.
116 Heelas (1996). On Esalen, see Kripal (2007).
117 Ahlins (2013).
118 Ahlins (2013: 187).
119 Hornborg (2013: 192).
120 This is not without echoing the National-Statist to Global-Market shift and the blurring of boundaries between once more differentiated social spheres.
121 This section is based on fieldwork I conducted at the Mindfulness Based Stress Reduction (MBSR) eight-week programme in the spring of 2016. See also Garnoussi (2011). Mindfulness is the object of a growing amount of scholarship.
122 Lemieux and Milot (1992).
123 Kabat-Zinn (1994). See also Kabat-Zinn (2013), which highlights another common idea—living an *extraordinary* life.
124 This diversity is visible in the endorsements of such literature. The list given here is based on a recent reprint of Kabat-Zinn's first book (2013 [1991]), and is confirmed by a quick review of such literature.
125 There are national or regional differences, of course, amidst this dominance. For example, the landscape in France is more in tune with its conception of *laïcité* and therefore presents itself as more 'scientific' than esoteric. On France, see Garnoussi (2005, 2013). For international (European) comparisons, see Pilgrim, Champion, Hutschemaekers, Garnoussi, and Van Dijk (2012), Champion, Garnoussi, Pilgrim, and Hutschemaekers (2014), and Demailly and Garnoussi (2015).
126 For example, Stolz and Usunier (2014). This method is substantive, or Weberian, and uses a 'family air' approach: What looks the most like religion (i.e. churched religion) is de facto the most religious. This essentialises the content of real religion in what is really a historically contingent and very particular, if not peculiar, form: National-Statist-era churched religion.
127 Asad (1993). This is probably the most quoted and most influential source in scholarly production in the last two decades.
128 Not to mention that Asad, as well as most scholars in the Post-Colonial current completely ignore the neoliberal revolution and its consequences. He remains focused on a critique of the state and its totalising ambitions and is therefore one regime late. Neoliberalism has been much more successful in critiquing the all-powerful state than Post-Colonialism, and it is perhaps neoliberalism itself that should attract the attention of deconstructivists. See Gauthier (2018b).
129 See Gauthier (2014a).

11 Conclusion
Thinking a changing world

The 1970s saw the rise of new social forms which sociologists identified as 'social movements.'[1] Their novelty was their distinction from the 'usual' political and labour movements, and their rapport to the state. The latter had either aimed political power or were instituted by the state as intermediates between itself and society. Social movements, on the other hand, were particularistic, centred around specific issues, often with an identity component, such as the women's, blacks, anti-nuclear, and gay movements, and later the environmental one. While the classic strategy had been to transform society within a more or less explicit revolutionary framework, a global transformation that required the taking over of the levers of the state, social movements aimed to transform society without taking power. Rather, social movements attempted to gain concessions from the state, whichever the party in power. They, thus, refuse, through their very constitution, to behave like intermediate bodies and relate particular interests to the common good, or to participate in framing society and integrating its parts within the whole.[2] The important change they embody is the implicit claim that the most significant social changes emanate from below rather than from orders coming from above. The rise of social movements, therefore, which have been accompanied by a veritable explosion in various non-governmental organisations and associations (which the term NGO is meant to capture) gave unprecedented coherence and autonomy to the Enlightenment's notion of 'civil society.'[3]

The sociology of social movements has nevertheless remained largely focused on the rapports with the state and busied with the deconstruction of concepts like that of society (e.g. Touraine). It has perhaps overlooked what I believe to be their most significant aspect: Their consummation of a growing disenchantment with respect to the State's soteriological capacities and general sacrality, and the profound consequences of this. The rise of social movements occurred at the same time as the oil crisis opened the door to a serious critique of the Welfare state, which itself led to the formidable reversal of fortune of neoclassical economic theory in the likes of neoliberalism. The rise of social movements and the constitution of civil society as an important political actor therefore signalled the erosion in the state's

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capacity to perform what was its foundational and regulative function in the Nation-State regime: To totalise and govern society from above. As I have shown throughout this book, this changed the state's very function and rapport to society.

From a holistic perspective, the disruption of the State's instituant and totalising function can only mean that it has been transferred to another agent. As we have seen, it is the Market, as normative idea and ideal, and as an actual mechanism, that stepped in to fill the State's shoes. As Marcel Gauchet argues, the formation of an autonomous and consistent civil society 'accompanied the diffusion and extension of the market as a general model for social interactions,'[4] and is behind the success of a notion like 'governance.' The dislocation of the state's vertical and hierarchical regulation, itself inherited from Western Christianity's vertical, transcendent rapport to God, opened the way for a radically new type of regulation which functions according to an ideal of self-organisation and self-regulation: The horizontal and supposedly immanent and spontaneous regulation of the Market, for which liberal political economy's free market provides the model, the imaginary, and, in some instances, the means. What is peculiar with this new mode of regulation, i.e. the free market ideal applied to the whole of society, is that it shuns and denies its own regulative function. In political economy's standard model, as we have seen, the market is supposedly natural, non-instituted, organically occurring, value-neutral, and self-regulating. We have also seen how this characterisation has no empirical ground, and that it is anything but what it presents itself to be. In other words, markets are context-dependent, instituted, value-laden, producers of inequality, and have a tendency to be unstable, rather than 'natural' producers of social order, social optimum, harmony, and a magical solution for producing the common good out of conflicting interests.[5] There is nothing natural about the free market, and the Market is as much a mythological construct as was and is the State. Furthermore, the effectiveness of both of these agents in producing and enacting social order relies at least as much on collective beliefs than on actual capacitation.

All of this remains hidden from view from a differentiation of social spheres approach, which is massively dominant in the social scientific study of religion. I have tried to show that the very idea of a differentiated social sphere of 'religion' depended in fact on its embedment within the sphere of politics, and its shaping within a National-Statist mould. This dominant approach identifies National-Statist religious forms as essential or core to 'religion,' and therefore fails to fully acknowledge that this supposed 'essence' is in fact a historical construction and, especially, that if religion has changed significantly in the past, there is no reason why it may not significantly change before our very eyes and take forms that are very different than 'churched religion.'

The passage from a Nation-State to a Global-Market regime of religion means that the very substance and social location of religion change. This

is what the aforementioned discussion on social movements is intended to shed light on. In the Nation-State regime, religion was channelled into well-defined institutions, i.e. Churches, which, like political movements and labour unions, were made to occupy a mediating function between the ruling state and the 'society,' while religion was 'privatised,' i.e. relegated within the private sphere and the authorised public sphere regulated by the Churches. With the shift to the Global-Market regime, religious institutions, including majority and national Churches, have been unhinged from their former medial position in society and made to occupy the rank of social movements and NGOs. We have seen how this process has considerably transformed religion not only in the West, but also in the Global South, in a country like Indonesia. As 'religion' is no longer contained in religious institutions modelled on the state (i.e. Churches), it spills out of: First, the enclosures of the private (which becomes publicised through consumerism and social media) and second, from the Churches and other Church-like religious institutions. These institutions, in turn, become reconfigured as a particularistic interest group within civil society, with the Market as an encompassing environment and normative horizon. The changes in the rapports between the state and society entail important changes in relations between the state and religion(s), the latter being both downgraded from its former medial position and upgraded within the dynamics of governance, where it is considered as a partner. As a consequence, formerly cardinal distinctions such as private and public, religious and secular, become largely inoperative.

I have made a point throughout this book, along with my critique of social differentiation, to critique the categories linked to the secularisation paradigm and have avoided the concept of 'the secular.' I can now substantiate my position a little bit more by specifying that this concept is operative only within the confines of the Nation-State regime as a result of the processes I have described. As for the current Global-Market period, the category of 'the secular,' as with the maxims forming the secularisation paradigm, only produces undecidable analyses ('both secular and religious'[6]) and, in the end, more confusion than insight. As a consequence, then, 'multiple secularity' scholarship only really makes within the period running from the late nineteenth century to the 1980s roughly, as in Peter van der Veer's remarkable study of India and China.[7] As for the more recent period, other perspectives are required to avoid drowning our comprehension in essentially normative obstinacy.

There are four other points I would like to make before closing. The first is that regionalising the West and investigating religious changes in the Global South draw our attention to a process that I believe to be capital. I have insisted on the ways in which consumerism and neoliberalism are the backgrounds against which to think religious change, and how processes of marketisation (neoliberalisation and consumerisation) shape religion. What the case of Indonesia shows, and this is corroborated by other cases I will bring to the fore in a forthcoming volume, is how religion is at the very

centre of the dynamics which have seen market ideologies and consumerism become enculturated, acculturated, legitimised, and contested outside the West. Incidentally, the relations between the forces of marketisation and religion are not unidirectional. Islam has contributed to shape capitalism in Indonesia as much as capitalism has reshaped the former National-Statist Islam. Consumerism has penetrated whole segments of the population through the development of Islamic consumption, and neoliberal reforms have been made acceptable, even inescapable, through the promotion of work as a means to please God. This aspect of recent transformations remains otherwise hidden from view in a purely Western perspective. Yet, the Indonesian case allows us to see certain Western developments in a different light. For instance, the function of Pentecostalism in lower and working classes in the West, as well as for immigrant populations; or the success of programmes and techniques such as Mindfulness, as a capitalist-friendly version of New Age for well-integrated publics. All of these phenomena are marginal from the standard perspective in the sociology of religion; yet, they are central from mine, as I believe they are central in our societies.

Second, the shift from a Nation-State to a Global-Market regime does not mean that the state and the nation have been made irrelevant, nor atrophied. I believe I have been clear enough in establishing that the Global-Market regime reconfigures the state, e.g. in its rapport to society and religious institutions, as well as the nation, which ceases to be the taken-for-granted backdrop for identities, personal and collective. What this situation allows for are therefore new investments of the nation and political power in the face of this dis-embedment, for example as conservative and protective reactions that wish to reinstate a strong state and a homogenous nation. These are the dynamics underlying the current rise of populist and nationalist political movements and their often close ties with religion, all over the world. The populist and nationalist trend is therefore not an aftermath of the neoliberal revolution, but one of its core results and main characteristics. I will provide more substance to this analysis in a future volume, namely through an extensive analysis of post-communist Eastern European countries.

Third, the shift from Nation-State to Global-Market is considerable, perhaps the equivalent of a sort of 'Axial shift.' Why do I believe this is so? First of all, modernity has transformed the world, human and natural, to an extent never seen in the long history of mankind, and the contrary would be almost incredible. More profoundly though, as the Axial Age consecrated the dominance of a vertical conception of religion and politics marked by increasingly more radical figures of the transcendent and overarching rulers with an increasing hold on their societies, the present shift abolishes this regime in favour of a more horizontal conception of both religion and politics, with more immanent forms of transcendence and less hierarchical, overt, and overarching forms of power. In her remarkable book *Why We Play*, anthropologist and shamanism specialist Roberte Hamayon distinguishes

between 'Spirit' religion, in which the rapports with the invisible are horizontal and performed through play-type activities, and 'God' religion, which combines vertical politics and vertical forms of transcendence, and which have prescribed and ritual forms of practices.[8] Hamayon is amongst those who have noticed the return of shamanic and other spirit types of religion across the world, as well as the return and new legitimacy of formerly repressed popular and vernacular religious forms. Hamayon links this phenomenon with the latest wave of globalisation and the spread of capitalism and its immanent-transcendent type of imaginary.[9] What I will be able to show in more detail in a following volume is how the transcendent mould was forced upon resilient religious traditions across the world (through the action of the Nation-State), and how this frame is breaking with extraordinary speed in favour of immanent-transcendent types of representations and related practices, even in the purest monotheistic traditions.

For Max Weber, the rise of bureaucracy and capitalism signified the rarefication of sources of meaning and the triumph of the 'icy waters of utilitarian rationality.'[10] According to him, the radicalisation of transcendence on the vertical axis as a result of the internal movement within Protestantism (for which the absent God of Calvinism represents the apogee) left an immanent world without transcendence, as capitalism was believed to reproduce itself without external legitimation. With hindsight, we can say that he was wrong. For one, he underestimated the sacrality invested in both the State and the Nation (he did not live to see another triumph, that of Hitler) in the place and stead of the absence of God. In other words, the transcendence of Christianity was translated to the modern State (as Carl Shmitt aptly diagnosed). The rule of capital that has fully developed in the recent decades has similarly not resulted in the—celebrated or feared—self-sufficing world of immanence.[11] It may be useful to recall, in line with Hamayon and most of classic anthropology, that religion in the history of humankind has been mostly of the Spirit type and less of the God type. Even in Ancient Greece, our fantasied Origin, there were not only Gods and Goddesses, but also the Divine, which was some sort of cosmic order: An immanent transcendence. What we are witnessing is perhaps the tilt in a return to such a regime of immanent-transcendence of the cosmic type. We have not entered 'the immanent frame' nor have we 'exited from religion'; we have simply exited what we had been used to for many centuries: Christianity and its vertical-transcendent order.[12] Such a thesis goes beyond what one can read in the data I have collected here, and it is by no means a necessary conclusion, in the sense that the heuristic of the Nation-State to Global-Market thesis for understanding religion in modernity does not need that one agrees with the speculations in this paragraph. But I do think that there is something to this, and that it can help explain the forms religion has been taking, why (neo-)shamanism has made a return in traditional shamanic lands, from Siberia to South Korea to the Americas, and why Pentecostalism thrives where and how it does.

Fourth and finally, the West will probably not be providing the structure for what is to come next, whether we regionalise social sciences or not. What I have described in this book has been the exportation of the dynamics of Western modernity to the rest of the world, through the mechanisms of the Nation-State and the free market and their associated ideologies and mythologies. Both are born as answers to the modern question of ensuring social order and the common good out of atomised individuals, outside of a Christian, theological-political regime. This is why understanding religion in Indonesia in the last century or so requires that we understand how the Nation-State and the Market were born as ideas and ideals in the West. There was no teleology involved, only historical and contextual contingencies at work. Where this will lead us next, though, is up for grabs, and probably won't be driven by the West. There are signs that the contradictions of the third and present brand of financialised and consumption-driven capitalism are exceeding the soothing powers of its 'spirit,' or mythology.[13] But it is too late to embark on this reflection for the time being. I leave this to the next volume.

Notes

1 Classic references are Touraine (1978) and Melucci (1980).
2 Gauchet (2017: 326).
3 I am drawing heavily on Gauchet's discussion (2017: 320–30), although I vigorously resist his variation on the 'disenchantment of the world' thesis. See also Beauchemin (2004).
4 Gauchet (2017: 325).
5 I hope to have demonstrated with sufficient clarity that the Rational Choice approach to religion is therefore purely ideological, as are unthematized resorts to concepts like 'religious market,' 'religious brand,' and so on.
6 This sort of diagnosis is repeated in a score of analyses. See, for example, Woodhead (2012), and Woodhead and Catto (2012).
7 Veer (2014).
8 Hamayon (2016).
9 See her conclusion. I have also had the chance to talk this over with Roberte, who is a good friend and contributor to the MAUSS. The original French version of *Why We Play* was published in the MAUSS's collection.
10 This phrase is actually from Marx but was picked up by Weber as well as the Durkheimian school to characterise utilitarianism and liberal political economy.
11 Here, I am critiquing both the Republican narrative of disenchantment of Marcel Gauchet (1985, 2017) and the Liberal one of Charles Taylor (2007). Both understand the immanent/transcendent couple in an exclusive, Christian-hinged manner that ignores the possibility of an immanent-transcendence. I will get back to this issue one day.
12 Ferry and Gauchet (2004).
13 Boltanski and Chiapello (1999).

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Index

Note: Page numbers followed by "n" denote endnotes.

Acupuncture (Chinese medicine) 278
Adogame, Afe 209
advertising 1, 43, 123, 134, 136–8, 140, 144–5, 255
'Age of Empire' (1875–1914) 41
Ahlins, Lars 277
alterglobalist movement 254, 257–8
alternative consumption 274
Al-Zaytun (Islamic education institution) 243
American Declaration of Independence 69
American Jews 275
Anderson, Benedict 33, 38, 40, 47, 48, 234
Anghel, Remus Gabriel 226, 227n20
Anglicans 209
animism 14
anthropology of consumerism 143–4
Appleby, Joyce 68, 80, 123, 219
Aquinas, Thomas 28
Arab Muslims 274
Arab Spring protests 226
aristocracy 29, 122, 124
Aristotle 30, 63, 66, 87n23, 141
Arvidsson, Adam 149
Ashley, David 259
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 103, 240
Atkin, Douglas 148, 157n188
Athenian democracy 30
Audier, Serge 92–3
authoritarianism 106, 111, 217
Axial Age (800–200 BC) 27
Ayurveda 217, 278

Baby Boomer generation 206
Bach, J.S. 127
Bäckström, Anders 214, 260
Bainbridge, William 167, 184n39
Ban, Cornell 105
Baudrillard, J. 121, 145, 151n2
Bourdieu, Pierre 59n71, 98–9, 112, 115n52, 122–3, 132, 134, 172
Bauman, Zygmunt 7
Bayart, Jean-François 105
Bayat, Asef 150
Becker, Gary 17, 95, 97; on American values; on neoclassical economic theory 17; and the putsch 97–9
Benedict XVI 267, 269, 271
Ben Gourion, David 274
Bentham, Jeremy 34, 69, 74
Benveniste, Emile 66
Berger, Peter 174–6, 175, 203–4
Berlin Wall, fall of 11
Berlusconi, Sergio 220
Beyer, Peter 28, 29, 46, 47, 54, 189, 192, 193, 204, 205, 214, 215, 227n11, 242; *see also* Westphalian; Post-Westphalian model
Bible 30, 198
blurring of boundaries, social spheres 5, 7, 14, 16, 210–15, 243, 284n120; *see also* de-differentiation
Bohle, Dorothee 112
Bolshevism 44
Boltanski, Luc 85–6, 101
Bourdieu, Pierre 59n71, 98–9, 112, 115n52, 122–3, 132, 134, 151n2, 172
Boyer, Robert 166, 184n34
Brahma Kumaris 247
brand-based capitalism 220
branding 136; Catholic Church and 269; consumer-citizen and 137–8;

cultural 148; Einstein on 176–7; emotional 148; and gift theory 144–7; mediatisation of 196; mind-share 148; neoliberalism and 137–8; as person 144–7; social media and 268; viral 148; *see also* marketing
Brand Islam (Shirazi) 177
brand loyalty 146, 180
Brands of Faith (Einstein) 176
Braudel, Fernand 65
Brazilian Universal Church of the Kingdom of God (BCKOG) 255
Brenner, Suzanne 102, 248
Bretton Woods agreements 102
Brexit 209
British National Health Service (NHS) 45
Buddhism 13, 47, 234, 275
Buddhist Judaism 275; Orthodox *versus* 274–6
Buddhists 233
bureaucracy 44, 269, 289
'bureaucratic enterprise' 218
Burity, Joanildo 254–7
Bush, George W. 259

Caillé, Alain 99, 153n46, 156n179, 174, 183n1, 183n18, 228n53
Campbell, Colin 126, 128, 199n5
Campiche, Roland 206
capitalism: brief history of early 79–85; consumer 3, 131, 192, 198, 201, 221; corporate 43, 82; and democracy 74; first-wave 82; Fordist-Taylorist 131; globalised 220, 225, 248; industrial 20, 39, 100, 178, 197; informational and financialised 63; Marxian (and Marxist) analysis 89n92; modern 10, 118; modern consumption and 124; post-industrial 3; rise of management and global financialised 99–102; state-planned 43; Taylorist–Fordist brand of production-based 83–5, 112, 131, 149; Welfare 20, 44; Western 214
Capitalism and Freedom (Friedman) 95
Cardinal Ratzinger 271
Carnegie, Andrew 220
Carrette, Jeremy 177
Casanova, José 5, 14, 17, 51, 53, 169, 207, 211, 213, 214, 228n39, 281
'Cathodicism' 267–74
Catholic Church 39, 208, 214, 218, 261
Catholic FBOs 267
Catholicism 207, 234, 267–74, 269
Catholic monasticism 273
Catholic NGOs 267
Catholics 8, 48, 209, 224, 267, 270
Catto, Rebecca 206
Celestine Prophecy 247
'Celtic Tiger' 262
Certeau, Michel de 27–8
Chafeism 225
charismatic authorities 219; rise of 218–20
charismatic Christianity 221
charismatic movements 2
charismatic religion 207, 280
Chaves, Mark 170
"cheap globalization" 150
Chia Islam 225
Chiapello, Eve 85–6
"Chicago Boys" 102
Chopra, Deepak 218, 279
Christian God 31
Christianity 13, 14, 16, 27–9, 46–7, 50, 57n10, 177, 207, 210, 211, 221, 223–6, 250, 252n77, 266, 272, 276, 286, 289
Christian minorities 233
Christian morality 124
Christian Orthodox community 8
Churches, as service providers 262–6
Church-like religious institutions 287
Church of Scientology 262
City Churches 265–6
classical liberalism 67, 86, 94, 109, 217, 258
classical republicanism 30
Clinton, Bill 259
coaching 280; from counterculture to 276–80
Cold War 11, 45, 84
Coleman, James 98
College of Cardinals 267, 271
colonialism 1, 206
commerce 1, 66, 69, 123
'commercial society' 62–3
communism 30, 45, 267
computer technologies 207
Comte, Auguste 40, 99
Confessions (Rousseau) 142
Confucianism 47, 234
Confucians 233
Connell, Raewyn 106
conservative republicanism 30

consumer capitalism 3, 201
consumer-citizen: and branding of everyday life 137–8
consumer culture 9, 21, 129, 133, 137, 139–40, 144, 150–1, 177
consumerisation 201, 202, 254, 287
consumerism 1; anthropology of consumerism 143–4; brand as person and gift theory 144–7; brief history of Western consumption 123–5; classic theories of consumption and their limitations 121–3; consumer-citizen and the branding of everyday life 137–8; consumerism as ethos of consumer society 139–40; consumption in perspective of political economy 119–21; from consumption to 118–51; cultural-consumerist revolution of 1960s 128–31; as head of marketisation 201–3; and lifestylisation of religion 221–4; marketing 133–7; neoliberalism 137–8; politics of consumerism 131–3; religious dimension of consumerism 147–9; Romanticism, or the spirit of consumerism 126–8; society of identities 131–3; from standardised goods to selling authenticity 133–7; types of modern individualism 141–3
consumer societies 1, 118, 131–2, 138, 181; Baudrillard on 145; Catholicism and 270; consumerism as the ethos of 139–40; global 226; modern 275
consumption: classic theories, and their limitations 121–3; in perspective of political economy 119–21; Western 123–5
corporate capitalism 43, 82
corporate sponsorships 138
'corporate takeover' 178
Cortois, Liza 141, 155n150
counterculture: from, to coaching 276–80
Covey, Steven 238
cult brands 148
The Culting of Brands (Atkin) 148
cultural branding 148
cultural-consumerist revolution of 1960s 128–31
cultural hegemony 206
'cultural industry' 138
cultural liberalism 9, 73
'Cultures of Consumption' research programme 171

Dados, Nour 106
Dahlan, Ahmad 235
Dalai Lama 218, 220
Darul Islam (Muslim Modernist movement) 243
Das Kapital (Marx) 79, 160
Davie, Grace 260
deceptive avenues, of mediatisation 190–2
Declaration of the Rights of Man and of Citizens 141
de-differentiation of social spheres 5, 7, 14, 16, 210–15, 243; *see also* blurring of boundaries
deep neoliberalism 103
de-institutionalisation 14, 214
Deng Xiaoping 102
Der Moderne Kapitalismus (Sombart) 79
development: New Order and faith in 236–8
Dichter, Ernest 136
Diderot, Denis 126
Differentiation, of social spheres 5, 6, 7, 14, 15, 16, 54, 62, 73, 79, 170, 187, 192; vanities of 203–5
digital media 4, 9, 137, 183, 197–8
Diplomacy (Kissinger) 208
disembedded neoliberalism 105
Dissenters 48, 163
La distinction (Bourdieu) 122, 132
The Division of labour (Durkheim) 161
doctrines of neoliberalism 92–7
Douglas, Mary 21, 143, 144, 148, 177
Duchastel, Jules 107
Dumont, Louis 7, 68
Durkheim, Emile 20, 79, 99, 203; Weberian interpretations of 6
Durkheimian school 63; Durkheimians 161–3, 167
Duterte, Roberto 220

Eastern mysticism 276
Eastern Orthodox Church 12
'Eastern Spiritualities' 206, 275
Eastern spiritual techniques 278
East Indian Company 74, 123
Eckhart, Meister 28
economic anthropology 63
economic capital 98–9

economic liberalism 9, 73, 74
Economics as Religion (Nelson) 164
economics: towards a holistic approach to 178–80; laissez-faire in 30, 34, 42–3, 70, 82, 86, 93–6; market 3; as vampire 177–8
economic sociology 63, 163
Economic Table (Quesnay) 68
economy: industrial-capitalist 11; 'market-based social economy' 95; nation-state and 42–5; *see also* political economy
Ecumenical Alliance for World Action 257
ecumenical Christian alterglobalisation 257–8
Ecumenical Churches 257
ecumenical organizations 254
Einstein, Mara 176, 198
Eisenstadt, Shmuel 39, 55–6, 73
The Elementary Forms of Religious Life (Durkheim) 6, 24n19, 161
embedded neoliberalism 105
emotional branding 148
Emotional Intelligence 247
English Civil War 29
Enlightenment 30, 62, 64, 66–9, 74, 119, 158, 234, 285
Enquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Riches of Nations (Smith) 42, 126, 161
entrepreneurialism 256, 267
Essay on the Gift (Mauss) 146
Esping-Andersen, Gosta 44
ESQ Leadership Center 240
ethical consumption 274
Eurasian Customs Union 103
European Catholicism 272
European Central Bank 103, 111
European Churches 262
European Commission 103, 217
European Orientalism 47
European Union (EU) 218, 260
Evangelicalism 207
Evangelical Lutheran Church of Finland (ELCF) 262–3
expressive individualism 129–32, 142–4, 149–50, 195, 202, 213–14, 225, 245, 266, 277

The Fable of Bees: Or, Private Vices, Public Benefits (Mandeville) 69
Facebook 212, 279
faith: developing, in neoliberal age (Indonesia) 240–2
Faith-Based Initiatives (FBIs) 7, 213, 260
faith-based organisations (FBO) 259
Faith in the Market. Religion and the Rise of Urban Commercial Culture (Giggie and Winston) 178
Family of the Rainbow of the Living Light 209
Feast of Corpus Christi 270
Featherstone, Mike 133
Ferguson, Adam 67
financial capitalism 201
First Nations 8, 209
First World War 27, 41
Fitch's credit notation agency 104
Fleury, Laurent 109
Ford, Henry 82
'Fordism' 83, 134, 135, 143
Fordist–Taylorist capitalism 83–5, 112, 131, 149
Foucault, Michel 28, 34, 93–4
Franklyn, Benjamin 220
'freedom to religion' 259
free-market capitalist ideologies 1
free-market liberalism 267, 274
free-market reforms 9
Free to Choose (Friedmann) 78
French Physiocrats 10
French Revolution 32
French-styled republicanism 213
Friedman, Milton 77–8, 92, 93, 236
functional systems theory 6
fundamentalisms 2, 223

GATT 103, 257
Gauchet, Marcel 212, 286
Geertz, Clifford 50, 233, 235
Geist 79
Gellner, Ernest 32, 235
Gemeinschaft (community) 174, 176–7
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) 217
General Theory (Keynes) 83
George, Lloyd 43
Gerharz, Eva 226, 227n20
German Evangelical Church (GEC) 264–5
German neoliberalism 95
German ordo-liberalism 94, 96, 114n23
Gesellschaft (society) 174, 176–7
gift theory 144–7

Giggie, John 178
Ginanjar, Ary 240, 242
Giscard-d'Estaing, Valéry 107
global standardized capitalism 99–102; rise of management and 99–102
Global-Market regime 5; episteme of 172–4; life in 7–10; from Nation-State to 4–5; from RCT to postmodern fragmentation 172–4
Global-Market religion, standardized on of 224–5
Global Pentecostalism 23
Global South, 1, 53, 106, 138, 151, 190, 192, 205, 209, 211, 267, 270, 287
Goodchild, Philip 164
goods: anonymous 125; consumer 125, 129, 133, 136, 143, 150, 202; salvation 168, 173; standardized 133–7
Gorski, Philip 170
Gorz, André 146, 164
governance: from government to 107–8; neoliberalism and 107–8
Graeber, David 63, 257
Granovetter, Mark 63, 166
Gray, Breda 261
The Great Century of the Enlightenment 126
'Great Chain of Beings' 31
Great Civilisations 14
Great Depression 43, 83
'Great Slump' 81–2
Great World Religions 14
Greskovits, Béla 112
Gumilang, Panji 243
Gymnastiar, Abdullah 218, 220, 238, 242

Habsburg Empire 37
Hackworth, Jason 105, 259
Halbwachs, Maurice 161
Halevy, Elie 71, 75
Hall, Stuart 135
Hamayon, Roberte 288
Hanafism 225
Hanbalism 225
Hariyadi, Saja 238
Harvard Business Review 136
Harvard Business School 240
Hasan, Habib 246
Hayek, Friedrich von 92, 95
Heelas, Paul 214, 277
Helvetius, Claude-Adrien 70
Herbert, David 198, 200n36
Herrera, Linda 150
Hertz, Robert 162
Hervieu-Léger, Danièle 224
'High Modernity' 10
Hinduism 13, 47, 233, 234
Hindutva 8
Hitler, Adolf 289
Hjarvard, Stig 187, 190–2
Hobbes, Thomas 29, 32, 37
Hobsbawm, Eric 35, 41
Holistic spiritualities; 2, 24n22, 130, 177, 179, 207, 211, 215, 218, 220, 224–5, 275, 277–81; *see also* New Age
Holt, Douglas 148
Holy Trinity 269
homo economicus 6, 17, 65, 76, 97–8, 101
Hornborg, Christine 278
Howell, Julia 234, 236, 239, 242, 244, 245, 247,
Hubert, Henri 162
'human capital' 97, 99
Humanism 142
Human Rights 56
Hume 30, 67
Hutcheson 30, 67
Hutchings, Tim 198
hyper-mediatisation: media and 188–90; media as differentiated sphere 192–4; from mediatisation to 187–99; from Nation-State to Market 194–7; popular culture and 188–90; religion and 188–90

Ilham, Arifin 239, 245
Illouz, Eva 221
immigration 2, 40, 82, 103
imperialism 1, 39–40, 47, 82, 206, 207
individualism: expressive 129–32, 142–4, 149–50, 195, 202, 213–14, 225, 245, 266, 277; methodological 97; modern 141–3; moral 141–3, 210; utilitarian 141–3, 173, 202, 277
individual religiosity 15
Indo-European languages 66
Indonesia: developing faith in neoliberal age 240–2; Indonesian New Age, Islamic consumption, and the veil 247–50; Islamic management 238–9; Muslim Modernists in midst of the

Market 242–3; Nation-State regime formation 234–6; New Order and faith in development 236–8; overview 233; revitalised Sufism 244–6; Sufi revivalism 238–9; Televangelism 238–9
Indonesian New Age: and Islamic consumption 247–50; and the veil 247–50
industrial-capitalist economy 11
'Industrial Revolution' 81
Instagram 212
institutionalised pluralism 233
institutions: marketed 254–81; *see also specific institutions*
International Eucharistic Congress (IEC) 269–70
international Hindutva 209
International Monetary Fund (IMF) 96, 100, 103, 237–8, 260
ISIS 8, 220
Isherwood, Baron 143, 144, 156n60, 177
Islam 13, 47, 207, 234
Islamic consumption: Indonesian New Age and 247–50; veil and 247–50
Islamic finance 13
Islamic management 238–9, 240

Jainism 47
Jansenists 68
Jefry Al Bukhori 239
Jesuits 14
Jesus, CEO (Jones) 240
Jauréguiberry, Francis 197
Jevons, Stanley 76
Jewish marriages 275
Jewish mindfulness 275
Jewish New Agers 275
Jewish Renewal Movement 275
"Jewish shamanism" 275
"Jewish yoga" 275
Jews 31, 37, 48, 274–6
jilbab 248
Jobs, Steve 220
John Paul II 267–9
Judaism 13, 47, 274

Kabat-Zinn, Jon 278
Kabbalah-based Jewish mysticism 276
Kabbalah Centre 262
Kahn, Joel 245
Kant, Emmanuel 32, 127
Keynes, John Maynard 44, 83
Keynesianism 92, 96
Khaled, Amr 190–1, 218, 238
King, Richard 177
Kissinger, Henry 208
Kitiarsa, Pattana 181
Knoblauch, Hubert 223
Koenig, Mathias 56
Krakatau Steel Company 236, 245
Kundalini Yoga 247

Laermans, Rudi 141
Laffer, Arthur 93
Lambert, Yves 150, 206
Latin American Council of Churches 257
Latin American Pentecostalism 254–7
Laval, Christian 141, 155n149
Laws of Nature 31
Lee, Martyn 135
legal-rational authority 218
Le Goff, Jean-Pierre 130
Lehmann, David 221
Lemieux, Raymond 279
L'esprit des lois (Montesquieu) 69
Leviathan (Hobbes) 29–30, 32
Levy, Sydney 136
liberalism 30, 57n12, 67; classical 67; crisis of 92; classical 94; cultural 9, 73; economic 9, 68, 73, 74, 76, 78, 81, 89n92, 95, 217; market and 30; political 73, 95; positive 74; Republicanism and 67; utopian 74
liberal multiculturalism 213
liberals 30, 33, 34, 73, 74
Liberation Theology 256
Life, in the Global-Market regime 7–10
'liquid modernity' 7
Locke, John 32, 37, 67
Lofton, Kathryn 189
Louis XV 68
Lucas, Robert 93, 95
Lundby, Knut 190
Lury, Celia 133, 135, 144–5, 152n4,
Lutheran Church of Sweden 260
Lutheran Protestantism 266
Lutheran World Federation 257
Luthfi, Habib 244

Maasai, Kenyan 222
McCracken, Grant 143
McDonald's 178
McGuire, Meredith 50

McLuhan, Malcolm 220
Madjid, Nurcholish 244
Majelis 246
Majelisshalawat 245
Mai 68 130
Market Society (Slater and Tonkiss) 181
Martikainen, Tuomas 23, 24n2, 182, 183n2, 188, 216, 261, 281n
Malikism 225
management: rise of 99–102; and global financialised capitalism 99–102; science 100
Mandeville, Bernard de 30, 69
Manent, Pierre 73
Mann, Michael 150
Mansur, Yusuf 239
Mao Zedong 102
market: brief history of early capitalism, 79–85; as an economic model, 86; emergence of, as social regulator, 66–74; Global-Market regime defining, 10; media and, 194–7; Muslim Modernists in midst of, 242–3; neoclassical, and problem of social order, 78–9; neoclassical market and problem of social order, 78–9; neoliberalism and, 109–12; origin and success of market metaphor, 174–7; and the problem of social order, 62–87; rise of, 5; utilitarian and neoclassical adjunct, 74–7
'market-based social economy' 95
'Market Catholicism' 271
market economy: as modern phenomenon 64–6; market society and 66
marketed institutions 254–81
marketing: expressivism and 130–1; from standardised goods to selling authenticity 133–7; niche 135; segment 135; viral 145
marketisation: defined 201; neoliberalism and consumerism as two heads of 201–3; origin and success of the market metaphor 174–7; redefining 180–2; religion and economics as vampire 177–8; towards holistic approach to religion and economics 178–80
marketisation of religion 201–26; blurring of boundaries and de-differentiation of social spheres 210–15; consumerism and lifestylisation of religion 221–4; globalisation and 206–8; from national to glocal 208–10; neoliberalisation of religion 215–18; neoliberalism and consumerism as two heads of marketisation 201–3; new world 205–6; rise of charismatic authorities 218–20; standardisation of Global-Market religion 224–5; vanities of differentiation 203–5
'Market Islam' 241–2
market regime: neoliberalism and the rise of 91–113
market society 139
Martikainen, Tuomas 216, 261
Martin, David 209, 225
Martineau, Pierre 136
Marx, Karl 35, 68, 71, 79, 83, 99, 204
Marxian economics 63, 85
Marx-inspired materialism 3
Marxism 42
Mary Magdalene pilgrimage route 272
mass education 36, 38
Massey, Doreen 150
Mata Amritanandamayi 218
materialism: Marx-inspired 3; Western 47
Matte, Isabelle 261
Mauss, Marcel 6, 15, 99
media: as differentiated sphere 192–4; and importance of popular culture 188–90; from Nation-State to Market 194–7
mediatisation: 2.0 media effects 197–8; deceptive avenues of 190–2; from, to hyper-mediatisation 187–99; media, religion, and importance of popular culture 188–90; media as a differentiated sphere 192–4; media: from Nation-State to Market 194–7
Megachurches 218, 224
Menger, Carl 76
Mercantilists 68
Methodist Church 262
Methodist groups 257
methodological nationalism 51
Meyer, Birgit 192
Michel, Patrick 40
Michelat, Guy 206
Middle Ages 179
Middle East 22, 238
migration-linked communities 209
Mill, James 34, 74

Mill, John Stuart 30, 67, 73–4
Mindfulness 278–9, 280, 288
Mises, Ludwig von 92
Mittermaier, Amira 106
Moberg, Marcus 182, 262–3
modern capitalism 10
modern individualism: types of 141–3
modernity 2; as a double project 31–2; *see also specic types*
modern republicanism 30
modern societies 6; as embedded and integrated wholes 5–7
Modern Sufism (*Tasauf Moderen*) 244
Mohamed, Mahatir 241
'monastic commodification' 274
Montchrestien 66, 67
Montesquieu 69
Moody's notation agency 104
Moore, Mike (WTO director) 104
moral individualism 141
moral liberalism 73
Mormons 262
Mount Pelerin Society 92, 93
Muhammadiyah (Muhammad's Path) 49, 235
multiculturalism 30, 213, 248
'multiple secularities' 215
Munck, Ronaldo 112, 116n75
Munsir, Habib 246
Muslim Brotherhood 235
Muslim fashions 13
Muslim fundamentalists 218
Muslim Modernist Hamka 237
Muslim Modernists: in midst of the Market 242–3; organisations 219; voluntary organization 235
'Muslim pride' 207
Muslim *Ummah* 8

Nahdlatul Ulama organisation 235, 244
nation: as community of reference 5; formation 36–8; territorialised 10
nationalism: birth and rise of 48; ethnic 207; methodological 18, 51, 172; as mobilising social force 38; modern 255; Palestinian 209; as paradoxical result of colonialism 40–1; World Wars and 41–2
nation-state: from container to welfare 42–5; and the economy 42–5; erosion of 55–7; formation 234–6; as a globalised form 39–42; media and 194–7; modernity as a double project 31–2; nation formation 36–8; nation-state and the economy 42–5; nation-state as a globalised form 39–42; nineteenth-century state formation 32–6; religion in 45–50; secularisation as the naturalisation of 50–4; the State, the Market, and social order in the absence of God 27–31; Westphalian or National-Statist? 54–5
Nation-State regime: from container to welfare 42–5; erosion of 55–7; formation 234–6; modernity as a double project 31–2; nation formation 36–8; nation-state and the economy 42–5; nation-state as a globalised form 39–42; nineteenth-century state formation 32–6; religion in 45–50; secularisation as the naturalisation of 50–4; the State, the Market, and social order in the absence of God 27–31; Westphalian or National-Statist? 54–5
negative structuring: ecumenical Christian alterglobalisation 257–8
Nelson, Robert 89n76, 164–7
neoclassical economic theory 78–9, 82
neoclassical market: and problem of social order 78–9
'neoclassical synthesis' 83
neo-fascist movements 12
neo-fundamentalist movements 8
neoliberal age: developing faith in 240–2
neoliberalisation 201; of religion 215–18
neoliberalism 1; consumer-citizen and branding of everyday life 137–8; deep 103; disembedded 105; from doctrine and cultural ideology to policy 102–7; doctrines of 92–7; embedded 105; Gary Becker and the putsch 97–9; from government to governance 107–8; as a head of marketisation 201–3; neoliberal revolution 112–13; political effects of neoliberalism 109–12; religion, and welfare provision 258–62; rise of management and global financialised capitalism 99–102; and rise of the Market regime 91–113
neoliberal revolution 112–13

neo-nationalist movements 9
neo-pagan movements 207
neo-Pentecostalism 255, 256
(neo-)Pentecostal movements 207
neo-shamanic movements 207
Neo-Sufism 244
New Age centres 277
New Age-derived holistic spiritualities 225
New Age Judaism 275
New Monastic Communities (NMCs) 273–4
New Monasticism 273
New Order and faith in development (Indonesia) 236–8
New Public Management (NPM) 100–1, 216, 260, 262
New Spirit of Capitalism (Boltanski and Chiapello) 85
Newton, Isaac 31
'New World Order' 11
niche marketing 135
Niculescu, Mira 275
nineteenth-century state formation 32–6
Njoto-Feillard, Gwenael 241
Nobel, Alfred 93
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) 216, 257–8, 286–7

ontological dualism 272
Orthodox Christianity 207
Orthodox Jews 274
Orthodox *versus* Buddhist Judaism 274–6
Otto, Rudolf 204
Ottoman Empire 37
Oxfam 258
Oxford Handbook for the Study of Religion 63, 163

Palmisano 274
Panopticon penitentiary 34
Paramadina foundation 244
Pareto, Vilfredo 76
Parliamentarians 30
Parsons, Talcott 6–7, 135, 142–3
Pasteur, Louis 34
Peace of Westphalia 28–9, 32, 44
Peck, Jamie 102
Pentecostal family 8
Pentecostalism 208, 221
Pérez-Agote, Alfonso 272
Perreault, Jean-Philippe 206, 270–1
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act 259
Pettersson, Per 258
Pew Research Center 268
Physiocrats 20, 30, 68
Pilgrimage in the Marketplace (Reader) 179, 274
Pinochet military coup, Chile 102
Plato 30, 141
Poland 214
Polanyi, Karl 6, 10, 65
political economy: consumption in perspective of 119–21; critiques of 162–3; between ideology and religion 163–7; sociology of religion against 160–2
political effects of neoliberalism 109–12
political liberalism 9, 73
politics of consumerism 131–3
Pope Francis 220, 267–8, 267–9, 271
popular culture: media and importance of 188–90; religion and importance of 188–90
populist-nationalist movements 8
Portier, Philippe 49
positive structuring 254–7
Possamai, Adam 40, 225
post-industrial capitalism 3
'postmodern' epistemologies 3
postmodern fragmentation: from RCT to 172–4
post-Reformation Christianity 46, 210
Post-Reformation Western Christianity 13
post-Westphalian model of religion 54–5, 204
'Practical Judaism' 275
Prades, Pierre 221
Presbytarian Church 262
Principles of Political Economy and Taxation (Ricardo) 75–6
problem of social order: neoclassical market and 78–9
Prophet Muhammad 8, 240, 246
The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (Weber) 66, 85
Protestantism 85, 126, 234
Protestant schism 28
Proulx, Serge 197
Puritan ethic 128
Puritan Protestantism 85
'pursuit of Happiness' 69

Quantity Theory of Money 93
Quebec's Quiet Revolution 262
Quesnay, François 68–9

Rational Choice Approach to Religion (RCAR) 167–70, 202
Rational Choice theory (RCT) 3, 17, 21, 97, 167–72; postmodern fragmentation 172–4; 'rational expectations theory' 93; as science-clad ideology 25
Reader, Ian 212, 274
Reagan, Ronald 93
regime of authenticity 5
Reiki 247, 278
re-invented traditions 254–81
The Relentless Revolution (Appleby) 219
religion(s) 2, 12–15; consumerism and lifestylisation of 221–4; dimension of consumerism 147–9; Global-Market 224–5; and importance of popular culture 188–90; lifestylisation of 221–4; marketisation of 201–26; in the National-Statist regime 45–50; neoliberalisation of 215–18; and neoliberalism 258–62; sociology of, against political economy 160–2; towards a holistic approach to 178–80; as vampires 177–8; and welfare provision 258–62
Religion in the Neoliberal Age and Religion Consumer Society 4
religiosity 12–15; defined 15
'religious market' 204
religious organisations 9
religious radicalism 8
Renan, Ernest 37
Republicanism 67
Republicans 30
Rescher, Gilberto 226, 227n20
Ricardo, David 42, 63, 75
Riches of Nations (Marx) 160
Robertson, Roland 39, 82, 112, 170
Roman Catholic Church 28, 218
Romantic ethic 127
The Romantic Ethic and the Spirit of Consumerism (Campbell) 126
Romanticism 20, 212; or the spirit of consumerism 126–8
Roof, Wade Clark 175–6, 203–4, 206
roqya 222
Rosanvallon, Pierre 33, 34, 35, 44, 58n23, 58n29, 58n36, 60n103, 68, 72, 74
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques 30, 37, 203
Royalists 30
Royaume de France 68
Rudnyckyj, Damir 236, 240

The Sacred Canopy (Berger) 174
The SAGE Handbook of Sociology 52
St Augustine 27
Saint Peter's Tomb 269
Salafism 8, 222
Salzbrunn, Monika 226, 227n20
salvation goods 168, 173
Samuelson, Paul 83, 164
Sandefer, Ryan 259
Santiago-de-Compostella pilgrimage route 272
Sassatelli, Roberta 139
Sassen, Saskia 109
Say, Jean-Baptiste 75, 93
Schaftesbury 67
Schlamelcher, Jens 264
Schmidt, Leigh Eric 179, 185n89
Schumpeter, Joseph 68, 92
Scottish Enlightenment 30
Second Vatican Council 267, 271
Second World War 20, 44, 51, 83, 130, 134
secularisation: beyond 15–18; as naturalisation of National-Statist regime 50–4
Seele, Peter 163, 169
segment marketing 135
Selling Spirituality (Carrette and King) 177
Sennett, Richard 44
Sentimentalism 20, 126–8, 194
Serrano-Cornelio, Jayeel 23
The Seven Habits of Highly Successful People (Covey) 238
shalawat prayers 246
shamanism 14, 207
Shaughnessy, Sipke 221
Shiatsu 278
Shintoism 47
Shirazi, Faegheh 177
Shmitt, Carl 289
Siberian shamanism 13
Sikhism 47
Simiand, François 161
Simmel, Georg 99, 121, 151n2

Sistine Chapel 269
Slater, Don 72, 119, 120, 123, 125, 138, 139, 144, 152n4, 155n136, 181,
Smith, Adam 10, 20, 30, 62, 67, 202
social networks 196, 268
social order: market and the problem of 62–87
social regulator: emergence of the Market as 66–74
social utopianism 12
society of identities 131–3
sociology of religion against political economy 160–2
Sombart, Werner 79, 121
South Asian authoritarian regimes 102
Soviet bloc: collapse of 1, 11
Spanish Church 272
Spanish Empire 31
Spencer, Herbert 92, 161
Spickard, James V. 170, 209
Spirit of Capitalism and the Protestant Ethic (Weber) 79
spiritual marketplace 173, 175
'spiritual tourism' 57
Stalin, Josef 37
Standard and Poor's notation agency 104
standardisation of Global-Market religion 224–5
standardised goods and selling authenticity 133–7
standardized: standardized of religion and 206–8; radical wave of 1; re-examining 10–12
standardized capitalism 220
Stark, Rodney 167
state: the market 27–31; as natural modern political institution and political form 5; and social order in absence of God 27–31
state formation: nineteenth-century 32–6
Stiglitz, Joseph 96
Sufi metaphysics 244
Sufi revivalism 238–9
Sufism 225; and Indonesia 244–6; revitalised 244–6
Suharto regime 195, 236–8
Sukarno regime 234, 249
Sunni Islam 225
supranational Catholic identity 270
Svenska Dagbladet (*SvD*) 277
Swedish Lutheran Church 261
Tablighi Jama'at 223
Taira, Teemu 176, 178
'tax curve' 93
Taylor, Charles 20, 127, 130–2, 153n76, 212
Taylor, Frederick Winslow 82
'Taylorism' 83
televangelism 238–9
territorialised Nation 10
Thatcher, Margaret 93, 102
Theodore, Nik 102
Theory of Moral Sentiments (Smith) 71, 126
Theravada Buddhism 235
Third World nations 42
Thirty Years' War 28
Tocqueville, Alexis de 35, 99
Tolle, Eckhart 218, 279
Tönnies, Ferdinand 174
Tonkiss, Fran 72, 181
traditional authority 218–19
'traditional Pentecostalism' 256
'traditional' religious institutions 2
traditions, re-invented 254–81
Traité d'économie politique (Montchrestien) 66
transnational imagined communities 209
'transnational localisms' 209
Treatise on the Family (Becker) 97
Trump, Donald 8, 220, 259
Turina, Isacco 267
Turner, Bryan 40, 52, 203–4
Twitter 212
2.0 media effects 197–8

United Church of Christ 262
United Nations 42, 56
Universal Declaration of Human Rights 141
University of Massachusetts 278
US Declaration of Independence 141
US Federal Reserve 102
Usunier, Jean-Claude 180, 217, 284n126
utilitarian and neoclassical adjunct 74–7
utilitarian individualism 141–3, 173, 202, 277
utilitarianism 34, 74–6, 92, 99, 141, 160–2, 170–3, 290n10
utility 32, 69, 74–7, 120
'utopian liberalism' 74

Vatican hallmarks 269
Vatican Online 269
Veblen, Thorsten 121, 151n2
Veer, Peter van der 33, 46, 48, 169, 227n18, 287
veil: Indonesian New Age and 247–50; Islamic consumption and 247–50
Vipassana meditation 278
viral branding 148
'virtual pilgrimages' 269
voluntary carbon emission markets 30
Voyé, Liliane 170

Wallerstein, Immanuel 6, 112, 204
Walras, Léon 76
Walter Lippmann Colloquium, Paris 92
Wars of Religion 32
Washington Consensus 104
Watson, Conrad William 239
Wealth of Nations (Smith) 62, 64, 68
Weber, Max 6, 15, 79, 99, 218, 221; 'legal-rational' mode of authority 5; "polytheistic" conception of modern, disenchanted societies 6
welfare: from container to 42–5
Welfare and Religion in a European Perspective (Bäckström) 260
welfare capitalism 20, 258
Welfare state 1, 17, 20, 44
Wertrationalität (value-oriented rationality) 169
Western Christian Empire 28
Western Christianity 266, 286
Western Christian mysticism 27
Western consumption: brief history of 123–5
Western culture 275
Western democracies 217, 258
Western Enlightenment 210
Western hegemony 207
Western High Modern Ideals 234, 250
Western imperialism 207, 280
Western Jews 275
Western materialism 47
Western modernity 39, 278
Western monotheistic culture 179
Western-style education 234
Westphalian model of religion 54–5, 204
Westphalian or National-Statist? 54–5
WhatsApp 212
Wherever You Go, There You Are (Kabat-Zinn) 279
Why We Play (Hamayon) 288
Willaime, Jean-Paul 128, 213
Williamson, O.E. 107
Winfrey, Oprah 189, 190, 191, 218, 220, 225
Winston, Diane 178
Wong, Loong 151
Woodhead, Linda 23, 44, 188, 206, 214, 225
World Bank 103
World Economic Forum 257
The World of Goods (Douglas and Isherwood) 143, 177
World religions 207
World Social Forums 257, 258
The World Their Parish (Martin) 209
World Trade Organisation (WTO) 100, 103, 217
World Wide Web 268, 271
World Youth Day (WYD) 8, 269–70

Zapf, Lucas 163, 169
Zen 247
zikir (devotional litanies) 236, 245–6
Zionism 274
Zweckrationalität (instrumental rationality) 169