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DESIRE, EDUCATION AND TEACHING

A LACANIAN PERSPECTIVE

Håvard Åsvoll

Desire, Education and Teaching

Exploring the implications of a novel theory of educational desire on the prevailing modes of educational research and theory, this book contextualises the realm of education studies through the challenging philosophies and theories of Lacan, thereby providing a genuinely alternative approach to the study of education.

Structured into three main parts, the book provides a discussion of Lacanian ideas within educational research by setting out a description and analysis of how a theory of desire may work in educational settings and practice. Using vignettes and examples to drive the discussion, chapters explore the pivotal aspects of desire, which could be imaginary, symbolic, or real, elucidated by a mapping of discourses and exploring the reluctance of educational studies to engage with themes related to desire and psychoanalysis. Ultimately, the book argues for the need to disrupt the theoretical and practical logics and models that limit teacher practice, such as accountability, visible learning, competencies, pedagogical knowledge, and professional development, and how these can be better understood from a Lacanian perspective.

This book will be of use to scholars, researchers, and academics in the fields of the philosophy of education, the theory of education, and teachers and teacher education more broadly. Those specifically interested in Lacanian psychoanalysis and a Lacanian view on how the concept of desire may influence educational research and practice will also find the book of use.

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Preface

The idea for this book came to me during a visit to a friend who is a psychoanalyst. In his house, while relaxing on a replica of a famous Freudian couch, I noticed at a certain moment that I was lying horizontally. Immediately I received a response, in fact an injunction, coming from the "'other", as Lacan would put it, urging me to write something on education and psychoanalysis, an injunction that I finally complied with (after the idea had been floating around in my feet and head for some time), explaining that both practices have some very important features in common; both tend to combine "analysis" with "therapy", for example. Moreover, some strange ideas emerged, that is, that modern psychology, having "fathered" education and pedagogy, as it were, subsequently failed, at least in my opinion, to reach the stage of autonomy and identity, remaining too dependent on its parent, or being adopted without being consciously aware of it, as an "integral part of the educational establishment", a "handmaiden within the measurement-industrial complex", functioning as a "governance tool" rather than a truly critical voice. Being adopted without knowing it often comes with a big family, perhaps with an unconscious sense of being an outsider, and sometimes the older and more robust siblings, such as philosophy, sociology, and history, teach their younger siblings by "correcting" them. In this turn of phrase, care or caring is a surprisingly promiscuous concept: washing a younger sibling, feeding them, carrying them, punishing them, setting up a game, watching them, directing their work, and instructing them, to name just a handful of salient examples.

In other words, education and pedagogy could do with some self-analysis. My aim is to show how Lacanian psychoanalysis, as a form of philosophy, can help us to unravel the fascinating dynamics and paradoxes of educational discourse, but also the unease and dissatisfaction that this discourse(s) continues to evoke, among critics and among those who practice it, such as the teacher voices in this book. Indeed, experiences of ambivalence have accompanied education and teaching practice from the very beginning, both internally and externally, so that the signifier "teacher" refers to an exciting but also controversial, perhaps even "impossible" profession. In other words, I intend to show how Lacanian psychoanalysis allows us to reflect on educational

and teaching practice not only as a success story but also as an object of criticism and concern, even among authors who identify with it academically. Its controversial status and reputation are perhaps due to the fact that teacher practice is not a homogeneous discourse. Rather, four different modalities of educational discourse can be distinguished, each with specific weaknesses and strengths, opportunities and threats. The idea for writing this book has been fermenting for some time since it was "horizontally situated". I will not outline what can be expected and gained from such a book, but I will point out that both psychoanalysis and education are practices of language in a radical sense. Both stress the primacy of discourse and the responsiveness of moral subjects to the claims and imperatives of the other. Therefore, the royal road to bridging the gap or establishing a dialogue between psychoanalysis and education, or more specifically, teaching practice, is through language, or more precisely, through "teaching" discourses, which are often conducted unconsciously in relation to care, therapy, learning, knowledge, competences, or skills, as the hallmarks of an "impossible" teaching.

I would like to acknowledge the funding provided by the University of Inland Norway (INN University) for this research project. I would like to express my gratitude to INN University for its generous support in providing open-access funding. Furthermore, I would like to express my gratitude to the psychoanalyst Terje Johnsen, who emphasised the significance of being able to think on one's feet.

Part I

Introduction and theorising desire

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1 Introduction

There is a line from the great Chicago bluesman, Muddy Waters: "You can't lose what you ain't never had". Literally, this makes sense. But the secret of human experience, on J. Lacan's account, is that what one has never had is, in fact, precisely the thing whose lack and loss one is likely to feel most acutely and most decisively. Is it not the desire to restore this phantom-loss and its fantasy-object that will fuel most of one's life? Desire is genuine, the desire of the other. Perhaps, the Rolling Stones' lyric, "I can't get no satisfaction", best captures the Lacanian spirit, the desire to *continue* desiring, when the desire of indignation and frustration or the positive prospect of future education seems more prominent than ever before.

Teacher practice and education is intrinsically concerned with desire and imagination, what the present and future education could be like, both individually and socially, and how this can be made to come about. Behind the questions "What should I do?", "Where am I going?", "Who do I want to be?", "What am I?", and "How should I be educated?", which are often being asked by educational participants, more fundamental questions might be hidden, such as "What does the Other want?" and "How must I position myself with respect to (the desire) of the Other? What do they see in me? What am I for others?" What is the Other in me which I want?

These questions prompt an insight that may appear counterintuitive. It is often assumed that our desires are the most intimate expression of our individuality. However, according to Lacan (1998, p. 38), the human being's desire is actually "the desire of the other". This is a famously ambiguous formulation, but one of its meanings is that we desire what we imagine is desired by someone else. This serves to illustrate that social factors, such as the desire alluded to here, are not merely additional elements to some more fundamental core but are, in fact the very essence (although as a divided subject) of desire itself. This implies that there is no such thing as an "authentic" or "autonomous" desire (in the sense of uncontaminated by the social and symbolic order) for the teacher or educational researcher, or indeed that our most decisive individuality is heteronomous at its core.

This book will serve as a foundation for further enquiry into the concept and phenomena of desire as expressed by educational participants, with a

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particular focus on teachers. What does the term desire signify to them? In order to answer such questions, it is beneficial to have a clear understanding of the concept of desire itself. What, then, is the "theory"[1] of desire and the discourses of desire? What is the phenomenon of desire? And why is there a need for a theory of desire, particularly in the context of educational research and practice? These are significant enquiries that this book endeavours to elucidate. In order to do so, it is necessary to provide a context or background for how desire may exist, which will be further elaborated upon in Chapter 4. Given that desire exists, it can be argued that it is a phenomenon that is challenging to grasp and comprehend for those engaged in educational activities and research. I will now proceed to provide three illustrative examples from the teachers' practice.

Firstly, in education, we sometimes assess pupils' degree of understanding and learning outcome, for example, by working through a mathematical equation or proof. A proof is one in which the assumptions logically lead to the conclusion. It's not enough to simply arrive at the correct conclusion; in this case, you must also follow each of the steps in the right order. For instance, when you assess pupil X in maths four times a year, you find yourself in a specific mode as a teacher. This might be called a "qualificationalised", anaesthetic, and decision-making teacher practice or a university discourse in Lacanian terms (we'll be looking at discourses in more detail in the next chapter).

Secondly, it's more like an informal caregiving situation. To give you an example, another pupil's parents are divorced but live together for economic reasons. The atmosphere at home is pretty tense, and the pupil in question was pretty upset when she thought about an argument between her parents. The main issue for pupil Y was the breakdown of their family. As a teacher, I realised that there were no solutions to offer that could provide help. So, the best thing for a teacher to do is give the pupil a hug. This approach could be described as the caregiving, servant-teacher approach, or in Lacanian terms, the analyst discourse.

Thirdly, there's a lot of indecision. There's so much indecision when what's needed is decisiveness and accuracy. And what does it matter who pupil X is or whether pupil Y will make a good future despite poor grades? Your conscience is telling you that it seems important to make a decision. The consequences could be pretty serious. Your world seems to need an answer to keep going, because if you're wrong, it'll be a big deal for the pupil (and maybe even their parents, friends, etc.). And that might be a good thing if you're the one making the call. If you're right about the grades and assessments, you've put the world back together as it should be, at least for you as a teacher. However, you as a teacher are tired of the never-ending labour of these decisions. The work of either (scholarly) deciding or (socially) intervening (or both) is taking place as the dominant forces or discourses, and consequently, you are deciding which future educational possibilities and jobs pupils may pursue (and, implicitly, who deserves your sympathy and desire). You're always caught between making a decision and then changing your mind. You think about it, and then

you don't. You get excited about new ideas, but then you get scared. The educational discourse, or hysterical discourse, in Lacanian terms doesn't meet your demands, needs, and desires. Such tense situations may make you think about things in a different way (see Chapter 7 on Vignettes). For example, you might think about ways to improve your teaching practice, or you might realise that you have some blind spots in your personal life, such as being attracted to new job opportunities. Alternatively, you might feel discontented and angry, or you might feel like you've reached the end of your tether.

Such examples show how teacher desire helps us understand new possibilities for how we perceive the world and our place in it. The book also looks at different ways of understanding desire, including the idea of the divided subject, fantasy, discourses, the Real, and how the unspeakable can be made expressible. In Chapter 3, you'll find a more detailed and in-depth explanation of six key aspects of a "theory" of desire (indeterminateness, personal, embodiment, skills-based, fantasy-based, and lost and lack in discourse). The aim isn't to help you as a teacher or researcher do things better, but to help you think about your role in all this and where you're heading.

Psychoanalysis or Lacanian philosophy (a more appropriate term in this context) differs from many other bodies of thought in that, unlike fields such as education sciences and evidence-based research (e.g., Hargreaves, 1996; Hattie, 2009, 2012; Slavin, 2002, 2004), it does not primarily provide a positive agenda for social change or an explicit political programme that its followers might seek to implement and execute in order to realise "better" and more effective teacher practice, improved learning, and good schools. It is also important to clarify that the term "psychoanalysis" is not used in its primary therapeutic sense but rather as a social theory or radical theory of subjectivity. A significant distinction between a Lacanian perspective and those of educational sciences is that the former involves the imaginative, and potentially controversial, application of theories derived from the clinical psychoanalytic tradition, as well as a sensitivity or consciousness towards philosophical perspectives. The application of psychoanalytic theories, particularly Lacanian philosophy, can frequently appear metaphorical or highly abstract. This may necessitate a capacity for imaginative leaps and an ability to draw upon uncanny real experiences, both on the part of the researcher and the reader. This may be one of the reasons why psychoanalysis has been rarely employed in the field of educational sciences and pedagogy (in the German tradition).

Nevertheless, the leap of imagination is a crucial element of psychoanalysis, which is precisely about exploring the unconscious mind. In contrast, educational sciences appear to be more firmly rooted in the empirical, employing terminologies such as visible learning (cognition), knowledge (content), motivation (self-efficacy), and emotions (anxiety) in a descriptive manner that is largely devoid of theoretical speculation. These concepts are used in a manner that is similar to their everyday usage, without invoking the metaphoric or abstract concepts that are typical to psychoanalysis.

One noteworthy aspect of the book is its exploration of the reluctance of educational studies to engage with themes related to desire and psychoanalysis. This includes phenomena such as absence and presence, paradox and contradiction, fantasies, holes and gaps, lacks and losses, silences, impalpabilities, and insipidities. I believe this is a primary focus from the outset; it is discussed at length in Chapters 2 and 3, and its importance is emphasised throughout the book. Chapter 7 is particularly relevant in this context, as it explores the teacher's perspective on this issue in depth.

The text elucidates the rationale behind the prioritisation of psychoanalytical phenomena and insights in the pursuit of Lacanian subject knowledge, as opposed to its mere comprehension. It also illuminates the circumstances under which the teacher's understanding becomes apparent and the ways in which psychoanalytic insights defy the limitations of traditional conceptions of knowledge. From a Lacanian perspective, the subject and education are inextricably linked. To truly know, to truly understand, to truly learn, and to be de-centred, one must give up, or at least bracket, one's conventional notions of knowledge, the subject, and education. In sum, this book invites educators and scholars to engage with it in the pursuit of its own truth, in dialogue with Lacan, and to consider its central argument that even a limited familiarity with Lacan's ideas can be of value in a range of educational contexts and in the investigation of discourses, offering insights into some of the most challenging issues in education. The teacher and researcher are encouraged to embrace a stance of intellectual humility.

Furthermore, Jacques Lacan, who became the most renowned psychoanalyst to follow in Freud's footsteps, advocated a transition from a biological to a narrative approach to interpreting Freud's work. Lacan (1998) did not seek to eliminate perceived distortions in speech, as Sigmund and Anna Freud had done, but rather to understand speech better by studying it. Such speech was subjected to analysis in order to identify indications of what Lacan (1998) referred to as the "truth of desire". In a televised address, Lacan (1990) famously asserted, "I always speak the truth" (p. 1). In other words, the content of any utterance reveals aspects of the speaker's identity that may not be immediately apparent or consciously acknowledged. It would be more accurate to say that language is not distorted but shaped by experience and aspiration. By elucidating the manner in which emotional currents within a teacher's discourse are activated by Lacan's theoretical framework, it becomes possible to gain insight into the ways in which this framework shapes the teacher's actions and interactions with the larger social and cultural milieu. These discourses and actions, however, are not evaluated against a model that is presumed to be correct in advance.

In order to address the aforementioned issues, this book is structured into three parts. The initial section of the book presents an account of the ways in which a theory of desire in education and teaching can be developed. This comprises an introduction to Lacan and the philosophy of desire (Chapter 2).

The following terms are presented: the unconscious, the divided subject, the signifier and the signified, and the centrality of the Other. Subsequently, the theory of registers is presented comprising three interwoven concepts: the imaginary, the symbolic, and the Real. In conclusion, this chapter presents the four discourses of the master, the university, the analyst, and the hysteric. Chapter 3 presents a more detailed and narrowing scope, focusing on six aspects of desire: indeterminateness, personal, embodiment, skills-based, fantasy-based, and lost and lack in discourse. Chapter 4 presents an analysis of the manifestation of desire within the context of the European educational system. In Chapter 5, four potential responses to desire are presented. It is my contention that this book aligns with the fourth response. In Chapter 6, a concise overview of Lacanian-oriented literature on education is provided, with a comparison to this book project. Subsequently, in Part II, Chapter 7, vignettes of desire in the discourse of the teachers are presented on the basis of pivotal terms and aspects of desire, as outlined in Chapters 2 and 3 (i.e., the four discourses, the imaginary, the symbolic, and the Real). Furthermore, this comprehensive chapter is divided into four sections. Part III elucidates the implications of a theory of desire with regard to dominant educational theory and teaching (Chapters 8 and 9). At last, desire is conceptualised as a novel beginning or as a revitalising force in education and teacher practice (Chapter 10).

Note

1 There's a lot to say about the term "theory" (I'll go into more detail on this in Chapter 8). Here, "theory" means understanding the relationship between systematic and unique abstractions and living (unconscious) experiences. As Whitehead (1938, p. 124) explains the connection between abstractions and "living experience"; "The return may be misconceived. The abstraction may misdirect us as the real complexity from which it originates". Some of these "method-less" and "incommunicable" experiences are frequently the ones that, for various reasons, do not fit into the research project and dissertation's chapter on theory and methodology. These experiences only really come into their own once they're put into words. That's why they're often only understood and underscored once the methodology text is written, and not until the actual choices of methods and assessment criteria have been made. This is a kind of post-rationalisation that is indeed quite common because the rationale for methodological practice and (unconscious) choices emerges much more clearly after major portions of the research have been completed. To put it another way, as a researcher, you missed the boat. In a sense, it might be said that (qualitative) researchers always miss the boat.

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2 Towards a theory of desire in education and teaching

This chapter begins with an introduction to Lacan and the philosophy of desire. The introduction explains concepts such as the unconscious, the divided subject, the signifier and the signified, and the centrality of the Other. The theory of registers is then presented, which consists of three interwoven concepts: the imaginary, the symbolic, and the real. Finally, the four discourses of the master, the university, the analyst, and the hysteric are presented.

Introduction to Lacan on the philosophy of desire

Jacques Marie Émile Lacan (13 April 1901–9 September 1981) was a French psychoanalyst and psychiatrist who made significant contributions to the field of psychoanalysis in the 20th century. Born in 1901, Lacan reinterpreted and extended the theories of Sigmund Freud, emphasising in particular the role of language and linguistics in the formation of the psyche, or subject, as Lacan renamed it. Most importantly, Lacan's theories focus on the unconscious, claiming that it is structured like a language. He famously declared that "the unconscious is structured like a language" (Lacan, 1993, p. 119), emphasising the role of language and symbolism in shaping desires, fantasies, and behaviour. His understanding of the unconscious as structured by linguistic and symbolic systems or orders had a profound impact on psychoanalytic theory and practice. Most importantly, he developed the concept of the symbolic order, which refers to the realm of language, culture, and social structures that shape subjectivity. He argued that the acquisition of language, which unconsciously structures an individual's understanding of reality and place in society, marks the individual's entry into the symbolic order. Lacan's work has influenced not only psychoanalysis but also fields such as literary theory, cultural studies, and philosophy. Despite his complex and often controversial ideas, Lacan remains a major figure in the history of psychoanalysis, renowned for his innovative insights into the nature of subjectivity, language, and desire.

This chapter and the next, as a theoretical framework, are not an effort to *completely* translate the sublime and often very difficult philosophical thinking of Lacan into the realm of education studies or pedagogy or to enter into a difficult sorting out of the different periods and writings of Lacan's thinking.[1]

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Nor is it appropriate to go into detail about the various academic traditions and sources of inspiration Lacan draws on. However, where it is particularly relevant for understanding essential elements of the text and what I extract from Lacan's extensive terminology, perspectives from Saussure, Freud, Heidegger, and Peirce will be elaborated on somewhat. The relationship with the philosophy of Heidegger will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter in particular, as Lacan's basic assumption of, among other things, the divided subject and Heidegger's Being-Nothingness have striking similarities.

However, the intention is not to offer a grand and novel theory of education or teacher practice. Instead, I will lay the groundwork for showing how some forgotten aspects and (real) possibilities might emerge in divided teacher practice. Although I will speak of a "theory of desire", I do not claim to have such a theory in the traditional sense. The idea is to suggest that being, or the subject in Lacanian terms, shows something beyond theory and language. Desire is in fact beyond language, or to be more precise, it tries, but often fails, to transcend the limits of language. This is a kind of phenomenology in which the phenomena and the unconscious active passivity of human endeavour and teacher practice become more valued.

There are many concepts that can be introduced when presenting a Lacanian philosophy of desire. Let me return to a selection of these concepts shortly, but first to the core of what desire is in condensed form. Desire is unconscious and can never be fulfilled, but it guides the course of our lives. Furthermore, Lacan (1998, p. 235) in Seminar XI states that the desire of the subject is the desire of the other, that is, one's happiness comes from making the other happy. A major aim of Lacanian therapy is to help the patient discover his or her own (unconscious) desire. Translated into the practice of teaching, this means that the teacher helps himself and the pupil by revealing an often hidden desire. To give a personal example, if a pupil has not been to school for several days, I send him an e-mail or call him to let him know that the teacher is waiting for him and that I hope to see him soon: I want my desire to see the pupil to become the pupil's desire to be seen by me.

The unconscious

There are numerous challenges associated with the interpretation of the unconscious in a Lacanian framework. Lacan (1966, p. 495) posits that the unconscious is not the repository of pre-linguistic, uninhibited, animalistic, or egoistic "instincts", but rather structured as a language, the "discourse of the Other" (p. 524). Furthermore, Lacan offers three meticulously precise observations regarding the potential inheritance of the unconscious. Firstly, he posits that the unconscious is that which goes unnoticed; secondly, that there is no unconscious apart from the speaking being;[2] and, thirdly, that insofar as the unconscious speaks, it depends on language (Lacan, 1990).[3] Here it is possible to suggest an in-betweenness. This in-between, inspired in part by Freud, denotes a (real) gap between the language and the unconscious, or between the light and the dark

of the day. The unconscious, as defined by Lacan (1990) as a "world of shade", is sometimes illuminated by the gap. This illumination, akin to the recording of an image on a strip of film, reveals a vision of the hidden contents within the unconscious, leaving only a ghostly remnant in the conscious mind. This is the function of the gap. The Lacanian approach offers a valuable framework for understanding this phenomenon. It conceptualises teachers as subjects split between their unconscious desires and their conscious identifications, placing them within the symbolic world of culture and knowledge.

The divided subject

The term "divided or split subject" offers valuable insights into the dynamics of desire in teachers' practice. It is important to recognise that desire is inherent in the way teachers (and educational researchers) are constituted as divided subjects. The teacher's divided subjectivity can be understood as the split between the self-identified as "me" and the subject of language, the self-identified as "I". Desire can be conceptualised as the absence that inevitably occurs between the two (Lacan, 1977). The "subject of being", situated in the imaginary order (for further discussion of this register, see below), is incompatible with the "subject of speech", which is located in the Symbolic order. The Imaginary order, "the domain of images, projections and visual identifications", constitutes the subject with a (temporary) sense of wholeness (Usher & Edwards, 1994, p. 62). The sense of wholeness is therefore transient, as the ego is perpetually constructed and reconstructed in relation to others. Given that the "I" as the "subject of speech" is situated in the Symbolic order, the domain of language and culture (the "big Other" in Lacanian terms), it is incapable of representing the self as being. As Lacan (1977, p. 86) elucidates, "I identify myself in language, but only by losing myself in it like an object". This is due to the manner in which language functions as a system of signifiers. What is signified in language is identified only through a system of differentiations, through what it is not.

Signifier and signified

In the field of structural linguistics (i.e., Saussure, 1959), language is understood to convey meaning, which is derived from the interplay of signs. These are defined as combinations of signifiers and signifieds. The signifier represents the form that the sign takes, while the signified represents the concept, or the idea being illustrated. To illustrate this with a simple example, consider a driver navigating a particular street. They may observe the word "stop" on a sign. In this instance, the word "stop" is the signifier, representing the form of a word or its sound image. If we observe the word "stop" on a stop sign, it becomes a signified or concept. As drivers, we comprehend that we are obliged to apply the brakes and bring the vehicle to a halt. We interpret the signifier (word) and signified (concept) collectively as a sign. If the context of the situation alters,

our understanding of the sign may also change. To illustrate, if we encounter the word "stop" on an examination, it signifies that we should cease working on the examination. This representation has no bearing on the operation of a vehicle or its associated movements. Lacan posits that the meaning of a sign is "floating" until a sentence is completed. The sentence then represents the fundamental unit of meaning in language (Roseboro, 2008).

If we (as Lacan) accept the Saussurean perspective that signifiers are arbitrary and have no intrinsic connection to the real world. In other words, the signifier produces segregation, as evidenced by the existence of the categories of "male", "female", and "other" educational subjects, as well as the dichotomy between "healthy citizens" and "psychiatric patients". However, this is the typical mode of operation of the signifier, which structures the world by introducing dichotomies. This can be observed in the educational domain, where dichotomies are introduced between exemplary versus "troublesome" pupils/students, ethical versus unethical student/teacher behaviour, legal versus illegal school practice, compulsory versus voluntary student/pupil activities, virtuous versus vicious teaching, and so on. In other words, we are all connected through dichotomies and the Other.

The other and the other

In his 1955 seminar, The Ego in Freud's Theory and in the Technique of Psychoanalysis, Lacan (1991) makes a distinction between the "small other" and the "big Other" (or the "Other"). This distinction is a bit of a paradox, as it's not meant to clarify the notion of the "other" but to add to its complexity. In a nutshell, the "big Other" is all about the symbolic and the real, while the "little other" is all about the imaginary. The "small other" is all about transformation. It's about turning images into something new. The "small other" is actually not the other person at all, but a reflection or projection of the ego. The "big Other", according to Lacan, is quite different from the "small other". The "big Other" represents something that is totally different from the imaginary other. It's not something that can be easily understood or accepted. So to speak, Lacan's "big Other" is the symbolic order, which is the overarching "objective spirit" of trans-individual linguistic structures that shape the fields of intersubjective interactions. In the context of teacher practice, the concept of the "big Other" can be understood in a number of ways. It may refer to the curriculum, syllabus, textbooks, or the trend of being a relational or subject-oriented teacher. Within the symbolic order (see more in the next section), the "big Other" proclaims an eventual wholeness that can never be reached.

Register theory: Imaginary, symbolic, and the real

The theory of the three registers of the Imaginary, the Symbolic, and the Real[4] serves as the fundamental framework for the majority of Lacan's intellectual pursuits. Lacan (2005) proposed that the three interlocking rings from the

16th-century Borromean crest could be designated as the "RSI knot". Each ring represents a distinct register: the real, the symbolic, and the imaginary. These registers are mutually dependent for the knot to remain intact; if any one of the rings is removed, the other two will come apart. The design can be likened to a Venn diagram, with overlapping and separate surface areas. Furthermore, the equivalence between the three registers is suggested by this design.

The Imaginary, the Symbolic, and the Real can be considered the three fundamental aspects of subjectivity, as defined by Lacan. A subjectivity, that is, the reality of (Lacan borrows this concept from Freud's Wirklichkeit[5]) everyday experience or what we might call actuality, comes to be through the mediation of the symbolic and imaginary. He writes, "The world of words creates the world of things – things which at first run together in the hic et nunc of the all in the process of becoming – by giving its concrete being to their essence, and its ubiquity to what has always been" (Lacan, 1977, p. 7). We now turn our attention to the Imaginary.

In Lacan's (1977) analysis, the term "imaginary" is employed to designate that which is fictional, simulated, virtual, and the like. He postulated that the enfant's erroneous perception of self in the mirror is characteristic of one of the three so-called registers in which human beings experience the world. The first register, the "Imaginary" register, is related to the word image and not to "imagination" or "imagining". The "imaginary" register is the domain of sensations, encompassing visual, olfactory, auditory, and tactile perceptions. It is the register through which we compare ourselves to others. When a teacher encounters a pupil for the first time, or anyone else for that matter, the initial impression is formed in the "imaginary" register. We are indeed judging a book by its cover.

One crucial aspect, the Imaginary, is defined as "fantasy which is precisely an imaginary scenario occupying the place of the real" (Zizek, 2008, p. 3) (more on the subject of fantasy in the next chapter). It acknowledges the inclination of the symbolic to assume imaginary characteristics (to diverge from even being a veritable representation) due to its status as a representation that stands for the "Real" yet is not itself the "Real". Robert Durst's rejection of the veracity of his culpability in the brutal murder of his wife and several others, and his fabrication of a narrative in which their deaths were attributed to a mysterious "Other", exemplifies the Imaginary. This phenomenon was explored in the HBO true crime documentary, The Jinx. The documentary The Jinx: The Life and Deaths of Robert Durst, written by Andrew Jarecki, Marc Smerling, and Zac Stuart-Pontier, explores the life and deaths of Robert Durst.

As a companion to the Imaginary, Lacan (1977) developed the idea of the symbolic register, that part of human existence which includes language, culture, laws, traditions, rituals, religion, customs, institutions, mores, norms, practices, and rules, these things being in various ways intertwined with language. This symbolic register awaits us when we are born or thrown at birth (in the sense of Heidegger's (1978) Geworfenheit or thrownness). It is a pre-existing order that prepares places for us in advance and influences the

vicissitudes of our subsequent lives. For example, our parents have often already chosen a name for us, we learn the language of our family, we take part in the traditions and rituals of our family, and so on. Even a vision of our future has often been mapped out for us. It is no coincidence that the children of highly educated teachers, musicians, and even doctors more often than not follow in their parents' footsteps.

As such, subjects (or individuals in ordinary language) are what they are in and through the mediation of the socio-linguistic arrangements and constellations of the register of the symbolic. In other words, the symbolic order cannot exist for the isolated individual or the solipsistic woman, and more than language can develop for the singular, isolated subject, and since the symbolic register or order is required, according to Lacan (1977), to define selfhood or subjectivity, the isolated individual cannot exist as subject or self.

At the same time, by grounding the concept of order in the symbolic, Lacan uncompromisingly places us in the realm of language, among other terms understood as metonymy (meaning is always deferred or displaced within a signifying chain) and metaphor (a process of condensation, the construction of meaning in a discrete instance). The question of the self and the symbolic order is thus thrown into a discursive mode, which by definition requires interaction since the use of the symbol itself implies a common understanding of the language used.

The symbolic register becomes increasingly prominent alongside the imaginary register. To illustrate, a teacher instructs a pupil who is metaphorically placed in front of a mirror. The child is told that he has the same academic talent as his older sister and that he is the son of a distinguished university professor. The pupil will then identify with, rebel against, or a combination of both, the knowledge and ideas absorbed through the symbolic register. One way of using the insights offered by Lacan is to identify instances where the teacher moves from the imaginary register (fantasies about certain "privileged" pupils) to the symbolic register.

In principle, however, this grid or symbolic register (this network of signifiers) will be neither seamless nor completely consistent. There will always be something that we, and the teacher, cannot articulate or grasp, which gives rise to the uncanny and the uncomfortable, and which gives rise, for example, to symptoms of dissatisfaction in the teacher's practice. Lacan (1977) refers to this unspeakable remnant, this troublesome discursive recalcitrance, as the register of the Real, which is particularly revealed in moments of trauma, such as tragedy, or when one expresses doubt, pauses in speech, jokes, laughter, etc., when the gaps (the blind spots) in the symbolic web are suddenly (and quite painfully) exposed (more on this in Chapter 3).

Aware of this, Lacan identified this third register of human existence, the Real, as interwoven (Borromean knot). Whereas the imaginary is the world of immediate sensory perceptions and the symbolic is based on language and gives meaning to everything around us, the real is everything else that is without meaning. Lacan (1988) clearly states that "the real, or what is perceived

as such, is what resists symbolization absolutely" (p. 66). Lacan (1977) tends to speak of the real as an absolute fullness, a pure plenum, devoid of the negativities of absences, gaps, losses, lacks, and so on. Presented in this way, the symbolic is primarily responsible for injecting such negativities into the real. Whenever we speak, there is always much more left unsaid, and what is left unsaid and unsymbolised exists in the real. For teachers and pupils with an increasingly troubled way of being in the school, for whom words begin to lose their meaning, they increasingly live in the register of the Real.

The Real is inherently elusive, by its very nature resisting capture in the comprehensibly meaningful formulations of concatenations of imaginary-symbolic signs. It is, as Lacan (1988) repeatedly stresses, an "impossibility" vis-à-vis reality. The real is "captured" indirectly in opposition to the representations of the imaginary and the symbolic. For an important reminder: "For Lacan, the real, in its most radical form, must be completely de-substantialised. It is not an external thing that resists being caught up in the symbolic network, but the rupture within the symbolic network itself" (Zizek, 2006, p. 72). In other words, the unknowable "real" version of the representation of the world is the one we construct in our minds, so succinctly illustrated in Rene Magritte's painting of a pipe entitled "This is not a pipe".

To sum up, in more concrete Lacanian terms, the teacher's practice begins with imaginary objects, with a gestalt; a tense and volatile situation that triggers the imagination, involving a kind of struggle whose profile is bound to evoke specific reactions (of empathy, anger, indignation, etc.). In the teacher's world, the imaginary is contaminated and saturated by language (Zwart, 2014). Furthermore, in Lacanian terms, this refers to the subsequent and never-ending teaching practice as the "symbolisation" of the teacher's experience, replacing unwarranted and provocative images and fantasies with a network of ratified terms (the "symbolic order"), such as submission to discourses of curriculum, law, regulation, and so on. In this way, academics and politicians partly coin and refine the basic terms ("signifiers") that allow for systematic analysis and evaluation of teachers' subjective responses to complex teaching (problem) situations (i.e., impertinent principals, bullying pupil behaviour, poor grades, etc.). What is too often forgotten is that certain moments of symbolic rupture occur in teachers' practice and subjectivity by introducing the real and a jouissance after the ruling (master) letters (more on jouissance or pleasure in the next chapter). It is important to keep in mind the three registers when introducing four discourses.

The four discourses

In his seminar, *The Other Side of Psychoanalysis*, Lacan (2007) introduces the notion of discourse and four conceptualisations: the discourse of the master, the discourse of hysteria, the discourse of the university, and the discourse of the analyst. Lacan (2007) specifies discourse as an unconscious interdependence, based on *language*, between the ego (one who produces or receives) and

the other (one who receives or produces a message) within a social framework structured by power and desire. Furthermore, Lacan (2007) aims to demonstrate that each act is underpinned by a truth and produces a by-product or loss (less or excessive real enjoyment) that cannot really be accounted for, for example, by the teacher or researcher. To clarify, the place of discourse is between language (langue) and speech (parole), so the former is a necessary condition for discourse, but that discourse can exist without speech (Lacan, 2007). In an ontological sense, then, discourses are not occasional or arbitrary; they are always already there. Most importantly, by using the word discourse, Lacan (2007) emphasises the transindividual[6] nature of language in his "theory" of desire.

In short, the four discourses distinguished by Lacan (2007) give rise to, and are closely intertwined with, four (ideal types of) educational and teaching practices: governing and dominating (the discourse of the master), indoctrinating, educating and reproducing knowledge (the discourse of the university), doubting and protesting (the discourse of the hysteric), and analysis as the mindful passive presence or letting pupils be (the discourse of the analyst). In the following sections, these discourses are outlined in more detail, starting with the master's discourse. The four discourses are often illustrated by mathematical formulae (i.e., called mathemes) that describe the relationship between the agent of the discourse and the other, that is, the person to whom the discourse is addressed. These mathemes will not be used here, however, because I think there are good reasons not to do so.[7]

Before moving on to the specifics of the discourses and bearing in mind what was said earlier about the notion of discourse used here, it may be helpful to consider another way of thinking about what is common to each of them. The four discourses outline four different ways in which the subject can work out four different forms of social bonds around this impotence to achieve total satisfaction and desire. This is equivalent to saying that there are four ways of circling the Real where the symbolic fails (Verhaeghe, 2004, p. 117). Or, to put it another way, it is also crucial to keep in mind that what makes the discourses work, what animates them, is always real enjoyment (jouissance), and that the produced jouissance, the surplus jouissance, is always displaced (more on this in the next chapter).

Master discourse

The first discourse, the discourse of the master, is the foundation of the next three (the discourse of the university, the discourse of hysteria, and the discourse of the analyst). The master discourse is a kind of primary discourse because it points to the alienating function of the signifier to which we are all subject (Fink, 1995). In the master discourse, the master signifier[8] dictates all other signifiers. The master discourse is not concerned with recognition but only seeks recognition itself. Wouldn't it be a delight if Western pedagogy could culminate once and for all in Hegel's philosophical didacticism, that is,

in the Hegelian concept of "absolute knowledge"? Could absolute knowledge not be part of the dream of a "perfect" pedagogy without friction, or as Lacan clearly states: "What is at stake in absolute knowledge is the fact that discourse closes back upon itself, that it is entirely in agreement with itself" (Felman, 1982, p. 28). As an interesting parallel, Wittgenstein (2001) touches on this when he calls for everyday language to be taken seriously and not to be held captive by an image of language:

> The conflict becomes intolerable; the requirement is now in danger of becoming empty. We have to got on slippery ice where there is no friction and so in a certain sense the conditions are ideal, but also, just because of that, we are unable to walk: so we need friction. Back to the rough ground!
> (Wittgenstein, 2001, paragraph 107)

It may be worth pointing out that Wittgenstein's call here for "back to the rough ground" has its own mode of understanding, which cannot be fully seen through absolute knowledge and Cartesian eyes and cannot be reduced to mere representations of a master discourse. Is it not, in fact, what many currents within educational science, pedagogy, and perhaps educational practice have always aspired to as their ideal? Complete and fully appropriated knowledge becomes mastery in every sense of the word. In the Hegelian perspective, writes Lacan, "the completed discourse" is "an instrument of power, the sceptre and property of those who know" (Felman, 1982, p. 28).

Pedagogically, a master's discourse is not concerned with the voice or interests of students/pupils or the voice of teacher students and teachers. The unconscious desires of pupils and teachers are suppressed and excluded. The demand is for the exercise of the master's power and the ventriloquism of the master's knowledge. A pedagogical master discourse is concerned with maintaining power, control, and the valorisation of ideals and values embodied in certain ideas or in the teacher herself (Bracher, 2006). When the master discourse is applied in an educational setting, Herbert (2010, p. 58) explains, the teacher requires the student/pupil to work according to what is expected of the educational institution. The teacher/lecturer assumes a position of power and exercises the law, which includes following rules, doing homework, taking exams, and students have knowledge and must prove it by producing this work.

Perhaps today it is tempting and easy to dismiss such a discourse on ethical grounds. In fact, Lacan's (1998) "theory" of discourse implies different ethics than a simple dichotomy between good and bad: in a sense, this master discourse is the subject's (pupil, teacher) basic way of being in the world; it structures our world and makes it somehow bearable. Without this basic way of being, everyday life would be unbearable. In classrooms and lessons without the basic structures of everyday life (i.e., different subjects, planning of learning sessions, systematic teaching, regular breaks, meals), pupils and teachers may suffer from inexplicable anxiety (uncanny real enjoyment). In these

classrooms, the master discourse has not been constructed well enough to support pupils and teachers in their daily lives. As its name suggests, the master's discourse is based on power: behind or within the structured world, there is always power. We can easily see that master discourse and power are not in themselves good or bad. As indicated, Lacan's "theory" of discourse implies a different ethics than a simple dichotomy between good and bad. It is a question of ontology rather than ethics; to put it briefly, Lacan (1977) was concerned with evoke rather than inform, and you cannot have absolute control and knowledge of what you evoke.

To recall, in this discourse the hidden, repressed truth still lies as a frozen potential in the divided subject. There is always already the unacknowledged lack of the master, even if the plus-de-jouir or the desires and fantasies of the subject are excluded. The master discourse has no fantasy. In Western education and in our age of neoliberalism, individualism, and social media, it's fair to assume that the master discourse is perhaps more than ever challenged by (un)justified fantasies of the subject (i.e., teachers' demands for some kind of discipline in the classroom, or teachers' fantastic preference for some pupils and not others, parents' pressure on schools and teachers for better grades for their child, politicians' development of new reforms, the gaze of social media and mobile phones causing concentration problems for the pupil and teacher, etc.). In fact, the truth justified by authority and a master signifier is no longer so credible, whether we think that's good or bad. Thus, the master discourse has been increasingly supported by a kind of servant–master discourse, namely the university discourse. The main task of the university discourse is to support the master discourse.

University discourse

University discourse is a form of academic language, sometimes referred to as the language of schooling (Schleppegrell, 2001). Discourse in a school context refers to the oral and written language that students/pupils and teachers are expected to use in academic settings in order to engage with the content of a discipline in a meaningful way within the school and for the future. As an ideal type, this discourse represents an academic language that is highly formalised, decontextualised, and associated with language functions such as hypothesising, evaluating, inferring, generalising, predicting, and classifying (Gibbons, 2006). The typical characteristics of academic discourse for teachers may include the use of an authoritative voice, a high lexical density, metadiscursive markers, and the imposition of a consistent, distant third-person perspective.

The university discourse "produces knowledge as the ultimate object of desire over and against any question of the subject" (Lacan, 1982, p. 161). In other words, there is no place for the desires of the subject, or the teacher's unconscious, subjective knowledge, within the university discourse. The university discourse is remarkably powerful in that it establishes a knowledge system that

leaves no room for subjects to act in any way other than to use the signifiers made available to them by the system to continually reproduce the system.

In order to become teachers, pupils must become familiar with the system of knowledge that constitutes the discipline. This occurs primarily through the adoption of the university discourse during tertiary education. Upon graduation, these individuals then become responsible for reproducing, reinforcing, and applying this knowledge as novice teachers. It can therefore be reasonably proposed that novice teachers replicate the technical rationality of the university discourse as the primary mode of their teacher practice within the educational society.

The notion of technical "university" knowledge being dominant is reinforced where the teacher is perceived to be subordinate to a system of knowledge and belief, with the mastery of the system being regarded as an end in itself rather than as a means of benefiting either individual subjects or society in general (Bracher, 1993, p. 56). The more technocratic the knowledge received by teachers, the more they are estranged from their unconscious desires and non-professional spontaneous actions. In other words, in the discourse of the university, it is not the divided subject that leads the discourse (as is the case in the discourse of the Hysteric). Rather, it is a subject that is secured against uncertainty by referring to a master sign. In the teacher's practice, this may be a recognised teaching methodology, curricula, syllabus, consensus-based assessment criteria and grades, documentation of (undesirable) pupil behaviour, national tests, Pisa/Timms tests, etc.

For education and pedagogy researchers, the university discourse may invite them to satisfy requirements for scientificity based on the standards of the evidence hierarchy (cf. Nielsen & Malterud, 2019), perhaps in the desire to uncover evidence-based measures for better teaching. What this research discourse examines and attempts to do something about is the deficiency in existence/practice (object petit a, see more about object petit a in the next chapter). In this context, there are a number of challenges and "deficiencies" in teacher and educational practice that take cover under terms such as evidence-based, significant results, objective (science) research, research-as-prescriptive-for-practice, etc. What this discourse does not take into account, among other things, is the teacher and researcher as an unconsciously divided subject with its speaking being.

In conclusion, the discourses of the university and the master's degree are closely related discourses of control and authority. Both discourses allow for certain kinds of inclusion and recognition of subjects, but often at the cost of acquiescence to the already known and damage to the ability of individuals, teachers, and researchers to either critically engage with the subjective positions offered within the discourse or to embrace aspects of their subjectivity that exist outside the dominant discourse. Any form of success is defined exclusively in accordance with the dominant discourse, and any utterances that deviate from these discourses are perceived as both deviant and a failure on the part of the subject (Lacan, 1982).

The colonising power of the university discourse, while providing a sense of security and control over pedagogical practice and teacher subjectivity, has the potential effect of alienating the personal beliefs, values, resistances, and knowledge of the subject (i.e., teacher and pupil). However, because university discourse is presented as neutral or benign knowledge, its hegemonic function is rarely questioned (Lacan, 1982). As participation in this discourse often confers an increase in institutional recognition and status (i.e., who decides what is a "good teacher" or a "good pupil/student"), complicating this knowledge simultaneously disrupts professional identity and the stability of pedagogical ideology. As curriculum leaders and headteachers are often messengers of wider policies or school board directives, such discourses are in various ways informed, deformed, and transformed by the subjects whose practices and identities they are meant to describe.

One problem when the discourse of the school adopts the discourse of the university is that it is based on a rational subject. However, this does not work when the teacher, in the service of survival, is driven by irrational logic. In order to reach the teacher, the teacher must therefore be met in a different way than as a rational subject. This is the starting point for the analyst's discourse.

Analyst's discourse

In analyst's or teacher's discourse, the master and knowledge are not in the ruling position. In analysis, the analyst, as the not-defined object of desire, addresses the divided subject (pupil/student) (Lacan, 1977). It is crucial to bear in mind that the teacher as a Lacanian analyst does not respond until the hysteric has expressed her splitting. However, this therapeutic reserve is contingent upon the understanding that the analyst is already aware that the hysteric's predicament is rooted in her ambivalent relationship with the Signifier (cf. Lacan, 1977, p. 31). Her dilemma stems from a reluctance to make the "normal" compromises. On a positive note, the discourse of the analyst is characterised by a regime of listening to students without pre-empting their desires or immediately negating or recuperating their voices. However, the analyst is also commonly perceived as the master or the university in disguise. It is a common didactic strategy to rephrase a student's or pupil's utterance in "acceptable" terminology. This is evidently a recuperative practice, and when applied to the discourse of the hysteric, it can only serve to exacerbate her sense of alienation.

The act of operating the discourse of the analyst does not entail merely listening in order to provide a comprehensive reply. The discourse of the analyst is a relatively narrow one. The discourse of the analyst is one that deliberately withholds knowledge until a later point in time (Lacan, 1982). It awaits, yet during this period of anticipation, it undergoes a process of self-modification in order to facilitate the hearing of heterogeneous voices and to create an environment conducive to their comfort. The ethical teacher is prepared to make sacrifices and alter their mode of teaching and subject matter. They

respond to the courage of those who are willing to risk disagreeing with the teacher, text, or field. In summary, ethics can be defined as an intersubjective and pragmatic concern for subjective alterity and politico-relational equality. In a manner analogous to that of a master, the analyst is also situated outside the prevailing norms. The university or the academic school itself places certain demands that effectively curtail the potentially ethical dynamic between the hysteric and her ethical teacher. An analyst is always at risk of becoming an agent of the university discourse, just as they are always susceptible to lapsing into mastery (Lacan, 1977).

This pedagogical approach enables the student or pupil to maintain a state of emotional (hysteric) arousal for an extended period, allowing for the desired transformation to occur within the subject. The role of the teacher is not to replace the student/pupil who possesses the requisite knowledge but rather to act as a meticulous listener. This approach ensures that the teacher's agency remains with the pupil as the subject. In this context, the teacher is positioned as a receptive, non-reflexive presence, maintaining an attentive and asymmetrical relationship with the pupil.

Contrary to the traditional pedagogical dynamic in which the teacher's question and dominant agency are directed to a response from the other or the student/pupil. The student, who is the subject to (eventually) know and through reflection, is the main agent in the teacher's mode of attentive presence (analyst mode). The expectation and purpose is, according to Lacan (1991), "the true other … is the other who gives the answer one does not expect" (p. 288). Coming from the other or the student, knowledge from the *teacher's perspective* is that which comes as a surprise. Here, knowledge is understood in a different way than in the previous discourses (master and university), precisely because the surprising, unexpected, and fantastic answer appears as a genuine truth that is not regurgitated from leading and reproducing discourses.

Let me give an example inspired by a Peircian semiotic twist with an emphasis on abduction, or to put it briefly, how the teacher might make qualified guesses.[9]

I will exemplify this in a syllogism. A syllogism for the teacher with an abductive strategy would look as follows:

Premise: A phenomenon consisting of apparently multiple, positive, and promising learning activities in the classroom has been observed (×1).

Premise: Among the various explanatory hypotheses are: (a) the teacher's activity makes visible demands and challenges the pupils through dialogue and questions; (b) the pupils' own effort or individual work creates a decisive basis for learning activities; and (c) the pupils' dialogue among each other is decisive for the positive learning activities.

For the teacher, (a) is the hypothesis that can best explain ×1.

Conclusion: There is thus reason to pursue (a).

The syllogism example demonstrates the teacher's creative organisation of the empirical facts. According to Peirce (1960, p. 315), the teacher can reach this self-evident hypothesis in two creative ways or modes, either by the presence of genuine doubt or by musement. For Peirce (1960), doubt takes rise from surprise, or as he says, genuine doubt always has an external origin, usually from surprise; and it is as impossible for a man to create in himself a genuine doubt by such an act of the will as would suffice to imagine the condition of a mathematical theorem, as it would be for him to give himself a genuine surprise by a simple act of the will (Paragraph 5. 443). Peirce (1960) also recommends that the mind can wander with no specific purpose. This mental play without rules he calls musement, a game of meditation or daydreaming. How one achieves the condition of daydreaming may be seen in the following formulation of Peirce (1960): "Enter your skiff of musement, push off into the lake of thought, and leave the breath of heaven to swell your sail. With your eyes open, awake to what is about or within you, and open conversation with yourself: for such is all meditation! […] It is, however, not a conversation in words alone, but is illustrated, like a lecture, with diagrams and with experiments" (Paragraphs 6. 460–461). This mode requires freedom from an immediate pressure to act. Both these modes could have been used in this example, even though they apparently are contradictory. The contradiction is resolved if one looks for what is typical in the two abductive modes. In both cases, the self-evident hypothesis means that the consciously calculating mind, relying on logical rules, is not dominating. The detective allows for a minimum time for the calculating mind to busy itself with the solution to his problem, and the daydreamer does not use his power of logical judgement by lending himself to the "breath of heaven". In this way, both modes can contribute to a creative abductive judgement. This creativity is expressed in three concrete working hypotheses and in the selection of the preferred hypothesis (a). For the teacher, the abductively selected (a) hypothesis is the first stage in an interpretative inquiry. For Peirce (1960), abduction represents the first interpretative operation in any (scientific) inquiry. For a teacher located in the classroom, abduction is a question of a (preliminary) settlement of (presumed) relevant empirical data. The phase of abduction consists of unexplained or surprising phenomena. The process involves actively working with alternative explanations and constructions (Alvesson & Kärreman, 2007) as a form of (unconscious) attentive analyst presence.

The analyst's discourse is an ideal-typical frame of reference (in line with the other discourses) because it's hard to operate successfully in the long term without interfering or slipping into master/university discourses and being too much captured by countertransference and over-identification in the teaching-as-attentive-presence analyst mode of being (more about this in Chapters 3 and 7).

So let us introduce another Lacanian concept, the subject supposed to know. The subject supposed to know is, from beginning to end, in the teacher (of course, the pupil/student can also take on the feeling or role of the subject

supposed to know). Indeed, this is what Freud's (1955) concept of the unconscious implies, that somewhere within the subject or teacher is the knowledge needed for the (educational) cure. When a child goes to school, there is a subject that is presumed to know as well as the pupil. This assumption opens the space for the educational process and the fertile ground for transference. In Seminar XI, Lacan argued that whenever the subject who is supposed to know (SSK) exists, the transference will also exist. The typical neurotic patient will give his trust to the analyst and thus allow him to take this position. Translated into the practice of the teacher, once the teacher is positioned as the SSK, "he should also go in search of the unconscious desire" (Lacan, 1998, p. 235).

There's a feedback loop that drives teaching as analysis in the beginning, which also facilitates the development of transference (transference is intersubjective; see Lacan, 2005). The student/pupil comes into analysis-as-teaching assuming that the teacher has some kind of understanding of their symptoms. Of course, this is not true. The teachers aren't mediums. This belief of the student is exactly what drives the teaching as analysis. The student interprets everything the teacher says as information from the SSK, which he in turn reinterprets. This is the real way in which the teacher begins to develop an understanding of the student. The teacher listens to the student's discourse, looking for the small breaks and interpretations that can lead the teacher to the truth of the student's speech.

As such, transference can perhaps be best understood as the pupil assigning a role for the teacher to occupy, and in turn the pupil reacts to the role in which they have positioned themselves in the transferential matrix. Here's an example. A male student constantly experienced his previous teachers as being withholding or neglectful when he was a child. The student begins viewing his current teacher in this light. He often acts out in the classroom, and he is prone to throwing hysterical fits that often lead to prolonged sobbing. Repetition is a key element to transference. The student repeats previous experiences with his teacher, and if the teacher does not fall prey to assuming the role of caring teacher, then the student might accuse the teacher of being indifferent and neglectful. Of course, the student is not consciously repeating these same object relations; rather, these interactions arise spontaneously during the course of teaching. Many teachers likewise attempt to understand how they themselves re-experience their pupils/students based on their previous relationships (i.e., countertransference), but Lacan (2005) viewed countertransference as being nothing more than the sum total of prejudices and biases of the analyst as teacher. He would discourage all of those he trained to try and remain a blank slate and to only analyse their own reactions on their own time.

Ideally, the pupil comes to recognise that the teacher is not the Big Other, that is, she does not have the key to making sense of his symptoms. In fact, this may be a major goal of Lacanian teaching. The student must eventually come to realise that they are responsible for speaking their desires and understanding their speech and that nothing else can save them (i.e., God, better teachers, better peers, better grades, etc.). In this structure, the teacher is

reluctant not to permit the pupil to substitute another master signifier for the non-existent Big Other.

Rather, the objective is to facilitate the student's connection to their own desires as a subject worthy of consideration, rather than as an object to be fulfilled and discarded. This entails recognising the value of desires as a gift, rather than as a mere means to an end. In other words, through the lens of Lacanian psychoanalysis, the teacher could guide the pupil towards the traumatic 'gift of shit', the eternal return of a real that ungrounds the subject (further details on this topic will be provided in Chapter 7, cf. Lacan, 1992).

At the surface level, teachers deal with "pure", "objective" knowledge, which desubjectivises pupils/students and perhaps teachers themselves. However, beneath the surface, there are anxious, hystericised subjects who address the school and teachers as masters and ask for reassurance. Resistance by those affected by teachers' unconscious reactions and decisions (including teachers themselves) to the master's assertions and the supporting discourses of knowledge, which constitute these assertions, may be seen in the hysteric's discourse.

Hysterical discourse

The "hysterical" teachers' starting point is a situation of dissatisfaction situated as a split subject, of discontent with the tyranny of knowledge, directed towards the authorities and school management in charge. In contrast, those in situ management and those who are "remedy eager" pedagogical experts and educational bureaucrats may discard this dissatisfaction as "unfounded", "irrational", "subjective", "non-professional", and so forth. Lacan (2007) urges us to take a different stance, namely to listen attentively to what is being said and not being said, and to be aware of the symptoms, which may include apparent contradictions, exaggerations, pauses, gaps, protests, doubts, laughter, and jokes. There are numerous other instances of hysteric discourse, including "the plaintive anthems of slaves, the yearning lyrics of lovesick poets, and the iconoclastic rhetoric of revolutionaries" (Bracher, 1994, p. 120). Additionally, there are instances of teacher union strikes and single teachers' opposition to test or assessment regimes, utterances which fail to coincide with or cannot be satisfied by the dominant discourse. The hysteric's discourse can be described as an active formulation of complaints, with the expectation that an answer will be provided by an Other.

The hysteric's discourse revolves around a dominant, the teacher as a divided subject who acts as the agent or subject of speech and communication. The master signifier is seen as the object of speech, representing the hysteric's desire for plenitude. This potential new body of knowledge will provide the subject with a sense of stability, coherence, and meaning, which the hysteric craves.

> the discourse of the hysteric is at work when the discourse in use does not express, cannot embody, the underlying despair of the divided subject; at best, its symptoms are manifested; consequently, the truth of this

> discourse is the a, "its plus-de-jouir, which is both the source of desire and its product.. , the support for the dominant divided subject as well as its essential pas-tout character."
>
> (Milovanovic, 1993, p. 14)

The discourse of the hysteric as a specific type of social bond is characterised by a teacher acting as an agent who is lacking something, represented here as a subject who is divided or barred. This subject complains and challenges an other, positioned as a master (a master signifier). The truth of this teacher is something that causes them in a way that cannot be grasped and which they cannot let go of (the objet petit a; see more on objet petit a in the next chapter). The outcome of this process (or perhaps it would be more accurate to describe it as a state of passive engagement, as discussed in the following chapter) is the potential acquisition of knowledge.

What is masked in the discourse of the master (the divided subject) is now brought to the surface (Lacan, 2007). The surface is given to the divided subject as an "agent". It is a prolific type of discourse that generates avalanches of signifiers. The pedagogical adage to say anything and everything from various "self-proclaimed expert" positions, however irrational or trivial it may seem, results in a "hysterisation" of discourse, driven by an unrelenting desire to know the truth. The hysterical structure is at work whenever a discourse is dominated by a symptom. First of all, from the position of the hysterical subject, established knowledge itself (and the laws, knowledge, and politics based on it) is symptomatic, that is, fundamentally flawed and tainted by a sense of inadequacy, lack, and loss (Lacan, 2007). From the point of view of established knowledge, however, the discourse of the hysteric is seen as deficient and irrational, as tainted by epistemic obstacles. Nevertheless, hysterics will offer stubborn resistance, clinging to their version of truth, clinging to their symptom because, rather than seeing it as harmful, they see it as the subject's unique way of experiencing jouissance/enjoyment or some form of dissatisfaction in pleasure.

Without mercy, the hysteric raises the question of subjectivity (Lacan, 1977), but not necessarily in a direct way. The hysteric need not say: "Who am I?" or "What is Being?", but might ask another question or raise a silence that nevertheless has the effect of alienating the teacher from the certainties of knowledge and identity that they tend to buy into as they go about their daily teaching practice. Desire, for a hysteric, is in the form of a question that threatens the construct of subjectivity from below. As such, the hysteric's discourse could be seen as corresponding to the position imposed on the subject who has 'failed' under a commentary regime. You could say that the hysteric has a dysfunctional or maladaptive subjectivity (or "feel for the game", that is, being a teacher is not for me/you), but then you would be speaking the discourse of the university.

In Lacan's (2007) interpretation, it was this hysterical revolution that opened up space for psychoanalysis, and it's tempting to say that (a new) education is born in response to a hysterical initiative. Moreover, perhaps the task of those involved in education (i.e., teachers, students/pupils, principals,

politicians, parents, media, etc.) is not to silence this hysterical attack, but to keep this hysterical movement within the discourse. What complicates the picture in educational and teaching practice is that the teacher takes the position of the obscure object of desire that supports this hysterical and complaining questioning to the very end (this can be called "traversing the fantasies").

These include showing the relationship between interior and exterior spaces, between the inexpressible, the unspoken and the heard or spoken, and translating the unconscious in an attempt to uncover the understanding of the teacher as a subject of desire (see Chapter 7 on vignettes). They are mediators between the "civilised" professional and the "wild" innovative teacher, between the rigidly pre-structured and the confidently improvisational and seemingly unstructured teacher, and between the formal and the heterogeneous, which is why listening to a protesting (teacher) hysteric can be so thought-provoking and a fundamental condition for thinking and doing anew about education and teacher practice.

Although an almost never-ending and persistent protest pedagogy is perhaps an institutionally untenable position for a teacher to assume and certainly an uncanny way of being, I assert that the discourse of the Hysteric offers a means to address the significant resistance felt by many teachers who are so often reduced to "delivering someone else's mail", alienating them from their identity and practice in the assumption of the Other's master signifier (i.e., it can be subjectively perceived as either too much job time spent on caring and develop children's resilience or too many resources and spare-time used on demanding parents, pressure from rule-based authorities regarding protecting children's well-being, internal school organisational fights and turmoil and little trust in school strategy and culture, etc.). As the discourse of the Hysteric focuses on the issue of subjective self-division, the teacher's enjoyable speech is mobilised such that it effectively challenges the conditions of such alienation. This necessarily implicates the interruption of institutional mandates and strategic directions articulated at the level of *it is said* (master and university discourses, for example, saying "do your teacher job even though it's 70% social work-like and just 30% about actual teaching)". Further, the discourse of the Hysteric points to the inadequacy of Master discourses to address radical differences and the emergent particularities of classroom life and teacher practice. In turn, the Hysteric's discourse demands that the claim to universality articulated through master pedagogies be dispossessed through the formation of new signifiers that speak to local conditions, subjective fantasies, and awareness of institutionally oppressive forces. For example, in a positive way, the approach of a protest pedagogy might thus offer teachers an interpretation and possibly new ways of teaching, learning, and team/school culture more adequate to the particular conditions in which it is practiced.

If we translate the discourses into an educational setting, we could also put the teacher in the position of the other and the pupil in the position of the agent. The Master's discourse refers to the conditions for excellence; teachers have knowledge, and they are required to prove it. The hysteric's discourse

leads to a desire for knowledge in order to please her pupils; the university discourse drives the other as teacher to constantly "learn more" (i.e., to appropriate new curriculum, syllabus, teaching methods, etc.), and in the analyst's discourse, the production of knowledge takes place through the desire to understand what the pupils and other "others" know, need, and expect.

Lacanian psychoanalysis examines the social bond between the subject and the symbolic order in relation to the separation and alienation of desire. Lacan (2007) reflected on the various possibilities for discourse in the formation of the social bond between the subject and the Other in his Seminar XVII, entitled *On the Other Side of Psychoanalysis*. He also presented a formal typology for the analysis of the constitution of society and different practices through the symbolisation of desire. This perspective on Lacan's "theory" of discourses reveals that when the signifier and signified are not unified, the mode of discourse is inherently linked to the positions of power, knowledge, and subjects' desires. The aforementioned positions vary across different discourses. One aspect of the distinctive nature of psychoanalysis, and from my perspective, of teacher practice, can be elucidated by examining the positions of power, knowledge, the subject, and its desire within it.

Lacan (1977, 2007) posited that the capacity for discourse to emerge and for one discourse to give way to another is contingent upon a lack within the subject's structure. This is the locus from which change must be articulated. The concept of desire, particularly in its capacity as the object of desire, represents the primary locus of this lack, which regulates the relationship between the subject and the structure and acts as the driving force behind social change. The limitations and potential gaps in the symbolic discourses representing the teacher and the inherent alienation of enjoyment by the intervention of the signifier challenge the symbolic order, yet also reproduce it. In other words, the objective is to recognise the creative activity of teachers, which informs the way in which their lives unfold. The very imaginative aspect that allows for the loopholes of freedom that belong to human beings and teachers also carries the potential to ensnare them in imaginary traps of their own making.

This is the inversion of "The Master" in which the Other post de facto determines the true meaning of what has been said and attempts to evaluate whether it has been communicated effectively. Lacan's (1977, 2007) triad of the Real, imaginary, and symbolic and matrix of four discourses provide a framework for the analysis and discussion of teacher practice, both in terms of how it is produced by the subject and how that product is understood by others.

Notes

1 Books by Fink (1995), Milner (2020), and Stavrakakis (2007) can be recommended for a far more nuanced presentation of Lacan's writing.

2 Lacan posits that the unconscious is a system, a closed system of signifiers. In so describing the unconscious, Lacan (1998) means in part to demystify it. He states, "it is this linguistic structure that gives its status to the unconscious. It is this structure, in any case, that assures us that there is, beneath the term unconscious,

something definable, accessible, and objectifiable" (p. 21). Here, Lacan acknowledges the work of Levi-Strauss in structuring social systems and Saussure's structuralist theories about language at the turn of the 20th century. His intention is to demonstrate that the unconscious is neither metaphysical nor mystical, nor even entirely abstract theorisation. As psychologists have clearly demonstrated the effects of manipulation of the conscious thoughts, even if we have yet to see the thoughts themselves, Lacan hopes to show us how the unconscious can be studied, if not yet seen.

3 As Gasperoni (1996, p. 78) points out: "Lacan takes these propositions from Freud, and makes specific reference to three texts which allow him to demonstrate that Freud's practice and clinical theory were based in the deciphering of a pure signifying 'dit-mension', a portmanteau word of Lacan's which implies both a topologic sense and a sense of something said in the in between of words". These three texts are The "Interpretation of Dreams, The Psychopathology of Everyday Life, and Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious".

4 As outlined by Voruz and Wolf (2007), the seminars held between 1953 and 1963 are oriented around the Imaginary register. The seminars held between 1964 and 1972 are oriented around the Symbolic, while the seminars held between 1973 and 1980 are oriented around the Real. The initial period, as outlined by Voruz and Wolf, is concerned with the formation of the ego through the mirror stage, narcissism, and identification. The subsequent period is focused on the subjective positioning in the Other, which can be defined as the Symbolic order. In the third period, the focus shifts to the question of jouissance and its relationship to language.

5 *Wirklichkeit* is the reality of fantasy as more real than the actual Lacan also refers to this as the "real of the symbolic". Lacan (1977) also defines the real as the hypothetical "primordial stoff", which exists as a noumenal substrate, prior to and beyond the mediation of the symbolic.

6 This implies the premise that language is inherently transindividual, in that speech always implies another subject, an interlocutor. Thus, the celebrated Lacanian formula, "the unconscious is the discourse of the Other", designates the unconscious as the effects on the subject of speech that is addressed to him from elsewhere by another subject who has been forgotten. In 1969, Lacan began to utilise the term "discourse" in a slightly modified manner, although one that still emphasised intersubjectivity. From this point onwards, the term designated a social bond, founded in language (Evans, 1996).

7 Lacan's use of mathematical formulas renders his work more challenging to comprehend. It is evident that Lacan possessed a proclivity for mathematical concepts, which is evidenced by his incorporation of mathematical formulas into his theoretical framework. This is exemplified by his use of "mathemes", as coined by Miller (1996). For instance, in Seminar XIV, mathematical objects are not merely illustrative of his ideas; they serve as the very means of conceptualisation and innovation. The principal reason for not applying these mathemes in this book is that Lacan's symbols are designed to assume different meanings depending on the context, although they remain consistent within the same structure. Unlike mathematical symbols, they are not univocal; they do not have the same meaning in all contexts. Consequently, using them in the vignette in Chapter 7 would require a disproportionate and unnecessary effort in each individual vignette to navigate them effectively.

8 Master signifiers tell us and others who we are and what we believe, from simple adjectives such as fat or thin, to our gender, man, woman, they, etc., to our ideological or social identifications, such as "subject-oriented teacher", "self-oriented teacher", "academic teacher", "digitally oriented teacher", or "conservative authoritarian teacher". Sharing with others an identification with a master signifier, such as "carer", "social worker" or "psychologist", or "trade unionist", promotes a sense of group identity and solidarity.

9 The connection between Lacan and Peirce may at first seem strange and out of the blue. In an introduction to Lacan's "Ècrits" (cf. Miller, 1996), it is claimed that Lacan's understanding of subjectivity is inspired by Peirce's semiotic triad of sign, object, and interpreter, and by his ideas of signifying production as unlimited semiosis. I think there is much to be gained from a discussion of subjectivity based on the psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan's understanding of subjectivity as constructed in and through language and Charles Sanders Peirce's general ideas about the construction of meaning as an infinite process of sign exchange, but this is not the place for it (see, e.g., Nordtug, 2004).

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3 Narrowing the scope
The enjoyable desire

This chapter is based on Lacanian philosophy and tries to contribute to a perspective of how Desire may come into teacher Being (the symbolic) and existence (the Real),[1] and vice versa, in a constant being–desire interweaving. In theory and as a point of narrowing down, it is possible to outline six aspects that can be included in a theory of Desire.[2] In the following, these six aspects will be explained, namely (1) Indeterminateness; (2) Personal; (3) Embodiment; (4) Skills-based; (5) Fantasy-based; and (6) Lost and lack in discourse. The six aspects will be supplemented with significant terms such as passivity, discourse, tradition, Angst, the Real, the Imaginary, the Symbolic, nothing, enjoyment, (counter-)transference, speaking being, and narcissism. These six aspects may not, at first glance, be particularly faithful to a pure Lacanian terminology, but I hope that when Lacan is placed in interaction with parts of Heidegger and Gadamer's philosophy, among others, the meaning of the aspects becomes more accessible.

(1) ***Indeterminateness***: The indeterminate nature and always-already potential of enjoyable desire, which includes some form of passive compulsion, is exemplified by expressions such as 'We do not decide our desires ourselves!'. This concept can be understood as a form of passive compulsion, which is inherent to the nature of enjoyable desire. Desires exert a compelling influence upon us. As demonstrated in Desire Reserved (Chapter 7). It is precisely this passive component of indeterminateness as an aspect of desire that is frequently inadequately conveyed in discourse. I will now proceed to elucidate. The passive aspect of desire is not a prominent focus in the fields of education sciences or research on pedagogy. It is similarly under-represented in teacher or other educational practices. A phenomenological description of educational and teaching practice may demonstrate that this is an erroneous approach (for further details, please see Chapter 7). Nevertheless, when one initially considers the role of the teacher in the field of education, the same inhibitions that shape one's relationship with passivity in general emerge. Similarly, the term "passive" is often used in a pejorative manner. There is a common perception that active engagement is beneficial for educational and research purposes, as well as for the roles of teachers and students. The paradigmatic perspectives of active cognitive constructivism (both individual, as proposed

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by Piaget in 1953, and social, as inspired by Vygotsky in 1978), constructionism (as put forth by Papert in 1980), pragmatism (as outlined by Dewey in 1991), and more substantial theoretical terms such as skills in the 21st century, as Sahlberg (2011) has observed, the learning process and the outcome of learning (OECD, 2012) are of great importance. The concept of becoming, or Bildung, as it is known in German (Gustavsson, 2014), also merits consideration in this context. It is clear that the engaged and active educational participant is a key figure in this process. In Lacanian terminology, these can be designated as "master signifiers" or "adopted and ventriculated big Others". These are often unconscious forces that maintain order and surveillance, particularly in the roles of teacher, pupil, and researcher.

In the context of education, passivity (as the real-being) is often associated with failure. Indeed, it is frequently treated as some form of educational "black box", or non-educational (research) practice. In contrast, qualitative research on teaching and the teacher tends to adopt a perspective that treats the teacher as a "subject" rather than an "object", where the term "subject" is often understood in terms of autonomy and activity. The existential phenomenology of Real-Desire presented here places an emphasis on passivity, which counters the current research emphasis on activity in education. This is not to deny the significance of active education, but rather to supplement it with further insight. A few preliminary clarifications are in order. Firstly, it should be noted that the intention here is not to argue against the concept of "active education" or the "active teacher". Secondly, it should be noted that the objective of emphasising the importance of passivity is not to suggest that "doing desire" would be the optimal approach to adopt in an educational context. Rather, passivity constitutes an essential component of the experience of indeterminate desire. It is therefore beneficial to consider how to deal with passivity. It is crucial to understand that passivity is, in fact, a form of desire. However, it is not merely the absence of action; it is a state of receptivity and contemplation. The term "passivity" is not intended to imply that no action is taking place. Although it may appear to be externally passive, it is, in fact, internally active. The concept of passivity is complex and multifaceted, and responding to an experience of passivity may present a challenge. Passivity describes a general attitude of "letting-be" or "real-being", and it applies to education as a whole. However, there is a more concrete aspect of education that may require passivity but can also be prepared for more concretely by insights from phenomenology.

In order to adequately describe the passivity in question, it is necessary to gain a deeper understanding of a specific type of phenomenology. The terms "phenomenology" and "phenomenological" are frequently employed in a broad sense to describe and represent perspectives for how we (the teacher and researcher) immediately experience and perceive the world. The following section seeks to provide a more concrete understanding of the implications of a specifically phenomenological approach for educational practice. The starting point can be articulated in the form of the indeterminate aspect of desire. This can be understood as the beginning of a phenomenology that

seeks to maintain the notion of being-desire (real) in a pre-reflective and unpredictable practice. This practice is the foundation for the way hermeneutical interpretations occur. In a phenomenology concerned with the issue of a pre-reflective being (within the symbolic order) and existence (the Real, which resists being embraced by language), it is important to be aware that "phenomenology" cannot be characterised through questions about the content of the object (das sachhaltige Was), but rather through the why of research or of education (Heidegger, 1962, p. 27). In order to re-establish our relationship with the Thing (das Ding) beyond the Law, and to reconstruct the Real enjoyment, which is distorted and blurred in language, as postulated by Lacan (1992), it is necessary to adopt a phenomenological approach, which allows the researcher and the teacher to express their subjectivity or process as it develops, within the limits of language and by perception, behaviour, and repetition. This can be achieved by adopting the position of Heidegger (1962, p. 27), who suggests that we should "*let things show themselves*". This kind of phenomenology identifies the existence of an indeterminate unknown as the dissonance between representation (language) and the represented (the Real). Based on the concept of "die Sache selbst" or phenomena itself, this may include for Lacan such concepts as Otherness/discourse and Real/jouissance. It also includes the possibility of curing or unfreezing the symptomatic jouissance that freezes the existence of the subject in the circle of repetition and, subsequently, becoming a refugee formerly held captive by a certain discourse.

On this backdrop, an important question can be intimated concerning how the teacher's practice is understood in conjunction with the researcher's practice. The researcher's and teacher's self-understanding thus becomes a question of how, or as Heidegger (1960) puts it, a genuine methodical reflection: "*Echte methodische Besinnung – die von leeren Erörterungen der Technik wohl zu unterscheiden ist – gibt deshalb zugleich Aufschluss über die Seinart des thematischen Seienden*". (My translation; "*Genuine methodological reflection – which is to be distinguished from empty discussions of technique – therefore also provides information about the nature of the thematic being and existence*" (p. 302). The term "method" is used to describe the process of identifying specific contexts that shape the identity of the researcher or teacher and inform their self-understanding.

The tracking process is dependent on the implicit meaning and understanding derived from a practice that gives rise to hermeneutic situations and the inherent limitations and possibilities that are obscured within these situations (potentially by the remainder of the Real). The concealed situatedness of self-understanding allows for the consideration of how the researcher's research and the teacher's practice may be influenced by the subject's understanding of themselves. This type of ontological self or subject-understanding cannot be reduced to actions and everyday decisions, nor can it be reduced to the concrete possibilities that derive from such choices. The researcher's and teacher's daily practice and potential interpretations are always already based on one's

fundamental orientation and enjoyment in the world of discourses. It may be of interest to attempt to articulate such a fundamental orientation, or how we dwell in passivity. This could be regarded as a lifelong endeavour, within which research and teaching practice represent two aspects. Further details can be found in Chapters 7 and 8, which address the concepts of dwelling teachers and the gaze of theory, respectively. Similarly, Gadamer (2004) posits that phenomenology's pursuit of "die Sache selbst" is contingent upon an understanding of the world or a situation-specific determination of understanding. It is therefore possible that a hermeneutic may espouse a phenomenological perspective while, in my opinion, being "guided" by desire.

In the following section, I present hermeneutical terms that have been borrowed from the perspective of Gadamer. The starting point is that the researcher's interpretations must be based on an understanding of the discourses that already inform us, namely those of the master and the university. This implies that the truth precedes the Cartesian method, which could be described as a hysterical discourse in which the Real is at stake. This implies that Gadamer (2004) aims to discredit the notion of a researcher's a priori assumptions that are presumed to exist independently of a text, tradition, or discourse, which an objective interpreter claims to possess. In the most radical sense, this is a matter of preparedness that allows questions to be posed (and I would add that it allows for the expression of the Real-Desire), a willingness to question, with regard to one's own and others' prejudices and enjoyment. It is of the utmost importance to pose the appropriate questions in order to gain access to the relevant channels that facilitate comprehension. It is therefore essential that those engaged in the educational process are able to identify and utilise relevant channels, as conceptualised by Gadamer (2004) as tradition (Überlieferung). The concept of tradition can potentially exert undue influence on our interpretation of a text, effectively controlling the very process of understanding. The act of understanding is, in and of itself, subject to a form of "stimulation" that is not an act of subjectivity. This stimulation, as understood in a Lacanian sense, does not necessarily align with the conventional understanding of subjectivity. Rather, it draws upon tradition or discourse in a manner that may be perceived as more refined from a Lacanian perspective. In other words, it is not possible to adopt an external standpoint in relation to this kind of ontological and structural condition.

Education and teacher practice are situated in a process of "surrendering" to tradition and desire, whereby these elements engender potential ways of understanding. This perspective is articulated by Gadamer (2004), who emphasises the importance of this approach;

> Wir stehen vielmehr ständig in Überlieferung, und dieses Darinstehen ist kein vergegenständichendes Verhalten … eine grundlegende Voraussetzung, nämlich, sich von der Überlieferung angesprochen zu sehen" (my translation; Rather, we are constantly in tradition, and this standing in it is not objectifying behaviour … a fundamental prerequisite, namely to see

> oneself addressed by tradition» (p. 286–287, my translation). In order to claim relevance and truth, it is necessary to allow tradition, discourse and desire to speak to us in a passive mode. This is the sole method by which we can claim relevance and truth, and it goes beyond strategic choices and circular movements of understanding, as is evident in research. Indeed, it could be argued that truth challenges existing knowledge rather than simply validating it.

In essence, this form of passivity establishes the groundwork for the indeterminate and recurrent nature of desire and its associated truth. The indeterminate or "zu den Sachen selbst" or the enjoyable Real in such a context has a certain existential uncertainty, an inherently sublime status that, it must be acknowledged, sometimes requires the teacher's attention. Lacan (1992) posits that the concept of the "Real" represents that which is unspeakable, indeterminate, and unpredictable. It is that which constitutes desire through the processes of lack and absence. This implies that the teacher's attachment to their symbolic identity is susceptible to disruption and absence. This can be expressed in terms of the teacher's dissatisfaction with their role and the perception of themselves as a particular type of teacher. This can manifest as a sense of alienation, whereby the teacher feels unable to identify with that specific role fully within the context of the teaching profession. One might posit that the symbolic order and identity precede the teacher as a subject, albeit a divided one. In this way, it can be argued that there is a discrepancy between our self-perception and our actuality, and that our desire can be aroused by the immediate fulfilment of unsatisfied desire.

Lacan (1992) and numerous proponents of psychoanalysis cite dramatic episodes in literature as exemplars of this type of insight. One may cite, for example, the case of King Oedipus tearing out his eyes (which may be read as a metaphor for the teacher's burnout), Antigone hanging herself, Haimon throwing himself at his own sword (which may be read as a metaphor for the teacher's inability to continue in the role), and Medea killing her children (which may be read as a metaphor for the teacher who clings to academic discursive desire and imagination, creating mental illness and overly hysterical pupils, and perhaps vice versa). This represents a radical violation of both the principles of clinical psychoanalysis and the purpose of education. The latter is not complete until the analysand/student/pupil has become independent of the analyst/teacher as guarantor, given that the teacher is no longer available in the role of a teacher in the world. The potential for teachers to cease being teachers or to assume a different role represents the paradox and subjectivity inherent to the teaching profession. The teacher's paradox thus gives rise to what might be termed a pedagogical paradox, namely, the question of how the teacher can educate the student/pupil to independence. The pedagogical paradox, viewed from the standpoint of the subject from the teacher's perspective, can be further elucidated as the personal aspect.

(2) ***Personal***[3]**:** This aspect makes it possible to see the connection between desire, the Real, and the personal experience of angst or nothingness. Experience as an unpredictable journey and a dangerous, fantastic life project can inherit the openness of desire. The most important thing is that Lacan (1977), in parallel with Heidegger (1968), does not seek understanding or mere knowledge but a special kind of inner experience, which is the uncanny feeling of (misplaced) existence as the coming-to-be of the new. As shown in Chapter 7, section three.

More specifically, Heidegger's (1962, 1968) experience is the sense of being created ex nihilo. The "er-" of "erfahrung" is an etymological variant of the "ur-" of "ursprünglich". In *Contributions to Philosophy*, Heidegger (1968) uses the device of hyphenation to emphasise the connotation of pure origin, writing "er-fahren", "er-fährt" and "Er-fahrung" (cf. pp. 160, 391 and 483). "Fahren" means "to drive" or "to move", so "Er-fahren" explicitly connotes the feeling of being moved by the power of origination. Heidegger (1968) makes it clear that his experience is the feeling of the origin of new existence. In parallel, Lacan (1992) defines the conceptual field of desire but is aware that it is only a shield to mitigate, that is, to create "the feeling" or experience of uncanny enjoyment/desire outside the immediate control of symbolic order and language.

Here it is important to realise that personal experience and desire are nevertheless based on being-with (Mitsein, cf. Heidegger 1960), which is the character of being-there (Dasein/existence), whereby it is always already related to other Daseins (even when one is alone and others are physically absent), or as Lacan (1998b) says in seminar xi: "*Man's desire is the desire of the Other*" (p. 235).

To go further, it is possible to ask a question: Why are there beings rather than nothing? This is the question that Heidegger (1993) poses in his famous What is Metaphysics? According to Heidegger (1993), the way we encounter this question is essential. By encountering it, he does not mean merely hearing and reading about it as an interrogative formulation, but to ask the question, to bring it about, that is, to feel its inevitability. It is important to know that nothing, or nothingness, is not the emptiness produced by imagining that everything that exists has disappeared, nor is it the result of the logical act of universal negation. The question can be asked as a whole and also from the essential position of existence (Dasein).

For Lacan (1992), the creation of and within the divided subject can only be a symbolic creation ex nihilo. What is at stake here is the question of the simultaneity between the initial "formation of the signifier" and the introduction of a void, a nihil (the thing), into the primordial real. With the introduction of the first signifier, Lacan says, "*one already has the entire notion of creation ex nihilo*", which is itself "*coextensive with … the thing*" (Lacan, 1992, p. 120). The nihil is ontologically conditioned by the emptiness of the thing (das Ding), whose emergence accompanies that of the signifier, and not by the primordial Real, for which the notions of fullness and emptiness have no meaning as yet.

I will not go into this further here, except to emphasise that for both Lacan and Heidegger, it is important to emphasise that the subject and Being do not exist by virtue of themselves. In other words, Being and Nothingness are part of the divided subject, which in turn can be said to stand in the field of tension between the Real(-being) and the symbolic order, where enjoyment (jouissance) suggests that the subject cannot be fully contained within the symbolic structures of discourse, since it is crucially a subject of jouissance (sujet de la jouissance) (Lacan, 2007, seminar book xvii).

In this way, both Lacan (1998b) and Heidegger (1993) challenge the higher authority of theoretical knowledge and logic and its main representative, science. According to Heidegger (1993), science as technology, or the applied paradigm, deals only with something, and it accepts nothing of the nothing. Rhetorically, Heidegger asks, how can nothing be tested or verified? Science does not want to deal with nothing. Science, says Heidegger (1993, p. 84), "*wants to know nothing about nothing*". In a parallel way, Lacan (1998b) argues that science derives its power precisely from the fact that it wants to know nothing of truth as cause. In other words, science does not take into account how real enjoyment advances and reveals truth while at the same time distorting knowledge. The assumed fact that real enjoyment operates under cover and without being (ever) properly captured by the symbolic order resembles what Heidegger (1962) called the ontological difference, that is, there is a distinction between ontical and ontological, or between being as such and Being.

As Richard Polt (1999, p. 123) notes, Heidegger begins by emphasising *science's "submission to beings themselves"*. Good chemists, economists, or historians all have this in common: they want to know what is the case, what is true by confirmation, and only that. They are devoted to beings alone and nothing else. It is this assumption of science that Heidegger and Lacan (albeit in different ways) reject in their elaboration of the Nothing and the Real, and which ultimately gets the scientist into trouble. Science is incapable of describing the real-nothing, and science, in expressing its own essence, never calls on the nothing for help (Heidegger, 1993).

As Lacan (1965) presents it in Seminar XII, the scientific oblivion of Nothing is obvious; for example, Newton's achievement of constructing an entire system of knowledge on the basis of mathematicalised physics is conditioned by his residual religious beliefs. With his conception of a God and a divine sensorium, nothing and the subject as lack become paradoxically clear;

> That this subject is nothing, that he is the only one not to know it. And this indeed is precisely the sign that he is nothing. In other words, it is in the ambiguity of the relationship of a subject to knowledge, it is in the subject insofar as he still lacks knowledge, that there resides for us the nerve, the activity of the existence of a subject. This is indeed why it is not as a supposed support of a harmonious group of signifiers in this system that the subject is grounded, but insofar as somewhere there is a lack
>
> (Lacan, 1965, p. 4)

Lacan is eager to reveal an original relationship in modern subjectivity: the subject's relationship to a not-knowing, a lack, or nothing. Such subjectivity or understanding of the subject depends on not-knowing or a fundamental lack, and Lacan seems to reveal that there is a realm that can remain outside knowledge, that of Real-enjoyment. On this basis, as Lacan (2006, p. 856) puts it in "Science et la vérité", "*our experienced division as subjects should be formulated as a division between knowledge and truth*", and I might add as a division between the real-nothing enjoyment and the symbolic order as knowledge.

If we align Heidegger's and Lacan's notions of the Nothing/the Real and the World/Symbolic, with a limited degree of prescience, they are intertwined; they exist as shadows in the presence of light. The world and the symbolic order can be understood as the Nothing/Real. The world is the Nothing-Real, which originally (nihil originarium) temporalises itself and simply arises in and with temporalisation. We can call the world the original nothing (nihil originarium) or the primordial Real or creation ex nihilo.

Moreover, in What is Metaphysics? Heidegger develops another theme not seen in Being and Time, namely the relationship between Being and Nothing. He states that "*in the being of beings, the nihilation of nothing occurs*" (Heidegger, 1993, p. 91). Heidegger sees nothing as equivalent to being. This equation neatly captures the basic meaning of nothing in Heidegger's usage, namely as something experienced by the anxiety of being, equivalent to being, and functioning through negation and withdrawal. The most extensive discussion of nothing can be found in Heidegger's Being and Time.

The work illustrates how nothing is revealed and experienced in Angst (I use the German term Angst instead of the English translation "anxiety", because the concept of Angst refers more to a human condition than "anxiety" which may be more associated with a psychopathological disorder). How, then, can we approach the nothing? Heidegger (1962) opens the window to the nothing through Angst. He describes ways in which a person can encounter nothingness and thereby takes hold of his or her existence authentically. As the philosopher Critcley (2009, N.P.) put it, using maritime terms:

> I like to think about this in maritime terms. Inauthentic life in the world is completely bound up with things and other people in a kind of "groundless floating"—the phrase is Heidegger's. Everyday life in the world is like being immersed in the sea and drowned by the world's suffocating banality. Anxiety is the experience of the tide going out, the seawater draining away, revealing a self stranded on the strand, as it were. Anxiety is that basic mood when the self first distinguishes itself from the world and becomes self-aware.

Most of the time, perhaps unintentionally, the educational world (both teachers, pupils, and researchers) treats people as what Heidegger calls "equipment", or as if they were tools within the applied paradigm, rather than Beings or Reals in themselves. This contributes to the inability to be self-aware

through nothingness before the tide recedes. The "saving" for this lack of nothingness lies in the insights not only of poetry but perhaps of art.

Lacan (1992) illustrates the concept of "saving" through the example of a vase, which he presents as a counterpart to the jug discussed in Heidegger's (1971) well-known essay The Thing. Lacan (1992) distinguishes between the vase's role as a symbol and its practical function as a utensil. He argues that the symbolic essence of the vase lies solely in its function as a signifier of signification itself, devoid of any specific meaning. This absence of specific meaning characterises its symbolic function and is embodied in its physical emptiness. The void within the vase not only symbolises its status as an empty signifier but also serves as the basis for its creation. Like any work of art, the vase is structured around this emptiness at its core. However, Lacan (1992, p. 122) emphasises that the vase also "creates the void", suggesting that its essence is not merely a creation out of nothing but, more fundamentally, a creation of nothing. This notion underlines the allegorical nature of the vase, which reflects the process of signification itself.

Works of art have the ability to allow us to step back from ourselves and recognise the interconnected existence of other individuals and objects. Heidegger (2001) explores this concept in his work "The Origin of the Work of Art" through an analysis of Vincent Van Gogh's painting of a pair of peasant shoes. He suggests that in our daily lives we often overlook the significance of shoes, seeing them merely as utilitarian objects (equipment). However, when they are depicted in a painting, we are prompted to look at them in a new way, to appreciate their intrinsic value and their existence independent of their practical function.

The same could happen within the practice of teaching when we are confronted with other parts of the natural and man-made world (which cannot be determined a priori or by any predictable circumstances), represented not literally by great artists, but by considering the everyday language and discourses of teachers as not eternal and natural. Thanks to art, we might sense a new kind of "could be", a "dangerous maybe", or "impossible possibilities" for Being that lie beyond current educational thinking and (self-)understanding (see Chapter 7 on vignettes 12–15).

However, this is not achieved by simply doing a cognitive exercise. According to Heidegger (1993), it is (only) the feeling of Angst that really reveals nothingness, that is, the possible non-being of all that I am. Quoting Hamlet, the Lacanian subject can only say to itself, "*I do not think, or I am not'. There where I think, I don't recognize myself; there where I am not, is the unconscious; there where I am, it is only too clear that I stray from myself*" (Bracher, 1993, p. 41). Hence, this structures Desire to attain the missing part of one's own being.

This (Real) experience is always possible for Dasein (human understanding) and it does not need an unusual event to arouse it, because; "*its sway is as thorough going as its possible occasionings are trivial. It is always ready, though it only seldom springs, and we are snatched away and left hanging*"

(Heidegger, 1993, p. 93). This means that Angst does not require darkness, helplessness, and despair. It can arise in the most mundane situations: sitting in a café, distractedly reading a book and overhearing conversations, one is suddenly seized by a sense of meaninglessness, perhaps as an exaggerated enjoyment, by the radical distinction between oneself or Real being and the world or symbolic order in which one finds oneself.

With this experience of Angst, being there (with nothing) is individualised and becomes self-aware. Angst is not to be equated with a negative experience. Rather, it can be understood and embraced as a precondition for awakening and being-there. In ordinary everyday life, we tend to be locked into routine and specific discourses, and being preoccupied with practical tasks and their execution, we rarely question the sense of the whole system of cares, goals, and activities. Angst frees us from the dominant discourses and the automated world and enables us to make our own personal choices. Angst can be the means to become our own selves. By prompting us to become genuine beings or subjects, it can make our lives authentic and, in a sense, ethical. For example, the teacher is ethically and politically awakened (Real-enjoyed) when the personal expectation to be a subject expert is overshadowed by the demands of the symbolic order to be a caretaker teacher. This discrepancy and Angst is a way of turning the mind away from logic towards questions without answers, that is, what kind of teacher do I want to be (for the Other)? Moreover, it is not possible to pursue Angst and Nothing because neither can be grasped by conscious intention. For Heidegger (1962), this meditative and transformative step back can allow us to encounter the world in a genuinely new way and to become attuned to the openness or nothingness and Real enjoyment that pervades all things. As such, Nothing and the Real is a way of being in the world; even as we step back, or more precisely, it is possible to see the world and the life projects of teachers as places of dwelling.

(3) ***Embodiment***: The (em)bodied sense of sight is a central aspect of enjoyment, as shown in Chapter 7 and especially vignettes 21–23). The representation of the Lacanian subject, persistently motivated by the desire to renew the teacher's practice, eludes embodiment in discourse. However, as Žižek (1989) notes, "*the failure of its representation is its positive condition*" (p. 175). Therefore, the Lacanian teacher's subjectivity can flourish because of the inherent division between the physical reality of the Real and the discourses of a powerful symbolic order, such as the master and university discourses.

In short, Lacan's (1998b) conceptualisation refers to the disconnected and disorganised state of the psyche prior to the mirror stage. According to Lacan (1998b), children under the age of 18 months are not aware that their body is separate from their mother's body, nor that their body is a unified whole. The feeling of dissociation is remembered by the subject throughout life, buried in the unconscious, but constantly threatening to resurface and shatter the illusion of wholeness by which the subject or teacher lives.

To elaborate, philosophers throughout the 20th century have criticised the scientific understanding of the human body. Rather than presenting the body

as a meaningful entity or gestalt, it was seen as a complex mechanism and described in quasi-mechanistic terms. A phenomenological approach presents a more intimate experience of the body. However, Lacan challenges this approach. Lacan (1977) identifies three basic ways of experiencing the body: the symbolic (or scientific) body, the imaginary (or ideal) body, and the real body. Perhaps the symbolic body of the teacher is increasingly objectified and even digitised by educational science.

This forgets that phenomenological perception idealises the body and that the Real body cannot be perceived immediately. The emergence of the body takes place in the folds and margins of teachers' attempts to symbolise or idealise it, which are inevitably incomplete and fragile. Chapter 7 presents Lacan's conceptual distinction between the symbolic, the imaginary, and the real body in relation to the teachers' experiences.

This might lead us to suggest that the teacher as subject and her body don't fit together very well. The relationship of the subject to its body is also opaque and threatening because the teacher as subject experiences the real-jouissance arising from the body as an intrusion. Lacan's (1998b) concepts of the "subject" and the "'body" as an unfriendly and uncanny but inescapable symbiotic relationship are important if we are to try to structure teacher practice in a new way. The focus then needs to be on the fact that it is not only the teacher as subject who enjoys, but the body as well.

(4) ***Skills-based*:** Teachers need to be able to objectively examine their emotional involvement and enjoyment, which can interfere with reflection. They should also have the skills to balance emotional and cognitive involvement in teacher-pupil relationships. This includes dealing with countertransference as outlined in Chapter 7, section two. It is important to note that the term "skills" may be seen as part of academic jargon (university discourse), but it is necessary in this context (this will be further elaborated in Chapter 10). The concept of (counter)transference should be approached as a skill that requires conscious awareness, particularly within the university discourse. This approach can help to clarify and address important challenges in teachers' practice, such as how to deal with genuinely difficult relationships with pupils. It is important to note that while transference is often seen as a technique to be managed, it should also be seen as fertile ground for exploration.

Lacan's (1998b) concept of transference is linked to the idea of the subject who is supposed to know and often places the clinician or teacher in this position. However, it is the clinician's or teacher's unconscious that holds the key to unravelling the patient's or pupil's symptoms. As Lacan (1998b, p. 232) explains in Seminar XI, transference occurs when the patient puts the analyst in the position of the subject who is supposed to know. So what is it really about? Lacan (1998b) begins by saying something important, that "*the analyst (teacher) … occupies this place insofar as he is the object of the transference. Experience shows us that when the subject (pupil) enters the analysis, he is far from giving up this place to the analyst*" (p. 233, my parenthesis). So is it not the case that the teacher unconsciously situates herself as

the object of transference and that this situation presents opportunities and challenges? Lacan (1998b) and Freud (1955) see the site of transference as the most powerful space for the repetition of the patient, pupil, or teacher to come to life. That is, the transference comes both with its potential for renewed meaning from the Other and with being with disgust, fear, anger, hopelessness, arrogance, and other enjoyable modes of being. Translated into the teacher's discourse and from the teacher's perspective, this can be seen in Chapter 7, vignettes 12–24.

Desire, which is central to the action of the teacher or the subject, must be made symbolic in order to free the subject from the tyranny of repetition. It is in speaking and acting, through transference, that the subject discovers its true desires. However, desire, which is ultimately unconscious, cannot emerge merely through an act of will. It often comes to the surface only through action and interaction and appears in teaching as (counter)transference. Here it does not meet with literal satisfaction but with interpretation. It meets language through relating. This relating is not only to the pupil as other but also to the teacher's unconscious as Other.

The aspect of skill, however, is important when (counter)transference occurs. However, transference is a phenomenon in which both pupil and teacher are involved. According to Lacan (1998b), to divide it into transference and countertransference "*is never more than a way of avoiding the essence of the matter*" (p. 231). Lacan (1998b) argued that the division between transference and countertransference is misguided. Instead, we might consider how the teacher participates in the pupil's transference. Interestingly, Lacan (1998b) was critical of the ideal of the stoic analyst who functions as an automaton, emotionally apathetic to the patient. Lacan (1998b) believed that clinicians have emotional reactions to their patients, and the question is what the clinician should do with these feelings. Applied to teaching, being present in the "here and now" of teaching does not empty the teacher of all emotion but rather intensifies the teacher's capacity for desire. What if teacher practice and teacher education intensify the teacher's desire for good and bad, that is, the importance of the pupil's perspective (interest, understanding, and potential to learn) in teaching and as a condition for teaching?

This is also a question of ethics; Lacan (1992) insists that ethics is a question of responsibility. Lacan (1992) shows the condition for responsibility as enjoyment, not so much the enjoyment of responsibility but the responsibility for enjoyment. The sublime love of the teacher enjoys jouissance. It has the capacity to respond to the symbolic in such a way that it would no longer be opposed to the traumatic encounter with the Real in countertransference. Instead there would be joui-sense, an enjoyment of meaning. Applied to the teacher's practice, this could mean that there is a danger that the teacher's frustration will renew and reinforce the pupil's static state of undesirable behaviour and lack of progress in learning (Lacan's term for the use of empty speech) when they lose focus on the bodies involved in the here and now.

(5) ***Fantasy-based*:** This aspect could provide insight into the relationship between discourses and the experience of meaninglessness or a feeling of not being at home (the Real), as shown in Chapter 7. In other words, real-jouissance (enjoyment) always arises from the enjoyment that we do not achieve, that we have lost, that we are still searching for, or that is searching for us. Therefore, enjoyment is the cause of trouble or the way we get into trouble. This constant sense of lack, temporary loss, and gap allows for the emergence of what Lacan (1998b) calls fantasy. It is important to note that the realisation of the fantasy is impossible because the subject, as a subject of desire, only survives as long as its desire remains unsatisfied.

Furthermore, fantasy is closely linked to the imaginary order and the mirrored other. It is important to note that, according to Lacan (1998b), this imaginary realm continues to have an impact throughout adulthood and is not simply replaced when the child enters the symbolic order. In fact, the imaginary and the symbolic are intricately linked and operate in tension with the Real.

As far as fantasy is concerned, it is confined to the imaginary realm, much like the object petit a that Lacan attempted to separate in Encore Seminar XX. Lacan (1998a, p. 85) notes the "*affinity of a with its [imaginary] envelope*" and with meaning, and he speaks of the "*suspicion*" it arouses towards this object. It is therefore crucial to distinguish the Real, which is disconnected from meaning and linked to the limits of formalisation, from the object petit a, which has an affinity with the imaginary.

Fantasy promises to fill the lack of jouissance or real enjoyment. It is a construction that conceals the subject's lack by projecting an image of abundance. The term fantasy points to the illusory nature of the teacher's life project and practice. The teacher as subject identifies with a dominant discourse or mirrored other, and the role of lack can challenge each other. For example, a teacher's fantasy of "being an adult", "being a guide to proper values", or "being a subject-oriented teacher" may not always be secure or a permanent homecoming, as shown and discussed in the vignettes in Chapter 7. These fantasies are often challenged and hindered by their impossibility. Perhaps it is accurate to say that obstacles transform an impossibility into a mere difficulty, creating the impression that its realisation is potentially possible. The fantasy thus projects an image of abundance while exhibiting a constitutive lack. Similarly, a teacher who belongs to a discourse can never achieve complete closure, although he promises to do so. Even if the teacher can never theoretically achieve a guaranteed unity of discourse, enjoyable narcissistic projections inevitably follow.

Narcissism, according to Lacan (1991), is an inherent feature of human subjectivity, based on the (primary) narcissistic identifications characteristic of the mirror stage. After the mirror stage, the human subject continues to create fantasy images of both himself and his ideal object of desire. This is known as basic narcissism (Lacan, 1991). According to Lacan (1991),

the construction of desire relies heavily on the narcissism of the imaginary. The primary imaginary relationship provides the basic framework for all possible eroticism. The object of eros must always submit to and be inscribed within the narcissistic framework.

According to Lacan (1991), this is where love begins. However, in order to make it real and go beyond mere self-observation, the subject must integrate the narcissistic imaginary relationship into the laws of the symbolic order. Paraphrasing Lacan (1998b, p. 174), it could be said that a creature needs a connection to the beyond of language, a pact, a commitment that defines it as "other", a reference that is part of the general or, more precisely, the universal system of interhuman symbols. No love can be functionally realised in the human community except through a specific agreement. This agreement, whatever its form, always tends to be isolated into a specific function within and outside of language.

This is why our desires inevitably depend on lack and a sense of absence, since fantasy, by definition, corresponds to nothing in the Real (Lacan, 1998b). The object of our desire, which Lacan calls the "objet petit a", serves as a means for us to establish coordinates for our own desire. Desire is fundamentally based on a misperception of fullness, where there is in fact nothing but a screen for our own narcissistic projections. It is this sense of lack at the heart of desire that ensures our continued longing. If we get too close to our desired object, we risk revealing the lack that is necessary for our desire to continue. Therefore, desire is not primarily concerned with fully attaining the object of desire but with maintaining a distance that allows desire to continue. Since desire is expressed through fantasy, it is to some extent driven by its own impossibility (Lacan, 1998b).

(6) ***Lack and lost in discourse*:** Can the teacher break free of the fixation or "the lost in translation" of discourses? Here, the crucial point is how the "inexpressible" can be expressible, and vice versa. As an apparent double-bind paradox, this is further investigated in Chapter 10, focusing on the difference between embodied enjoyment (Jouissance) and being sayable as a discourse. Hence, symbolic discourse and Real enjoyment are two modes of Desire. As shown in the vignettes and category Desire-reserved in Chapter 7.

A distinction has to be introduced here between lack and loss/lost/hole. Here I think paraphrasing Zizek (https://www.lacan.com/zizliberal.htm#2x) makes sense. That is to say, lack designates a void within a space, while the loss or hole designates the point at which this spatial order itself breaks down (as in the "black hole" in physics). Therein resides the difference between desire and drive: desire is grounded in its ontological absence or constitutive lack, while drive circulates around a hole, an ontological presence as a loss in the order of being. In other words, the circular movement of drive obeys the weird logic of the curved space in which the shortest distance between two points is not a straight line but a curve: the drive "knows" that the shortest way to attain its aim is to circulate around its goal-object (Zizek, 2009).

At the immediate level of addressing participants in education, it may interpellate them as "lost" reproductive units or consumers of knowledge and competence, or as potentially excluded or lacking subjects, desiring more and more knowledge and qualification stamps (i.e., teachers' certification, pupils' grades, and diplomas), and in them it evokes ever new and excessive desires for which it offers better "qualifications" for work and life, that is, fantasies and bi-products (i.e., better health outcomes, higher income, etc.) to satisfy them.

Perhaps education as an applicable paradigm (cf. Chapter 4) also manipulates and contextualises the "desire to desire", celebrating the very desire to desire ever new objects and forms of enjoyment (i.e., the fantasies of life-cycle education and lifelong learning). But even if education (discourses) already manipulates desire in a way that takes into account the fact that the most elementary desire is the desire to reproduce itself as desire (and not to find satisfaction), at this level we do not yet reach the drive.

The drive inherent in education at a more fundamental, systemic level drives the whole technology of education (see Chapter 4); it is the impersonal compulsion to engage in the endless circular movement of expanded competence as symbolic (self-)reproduction, preparation, and qualification for a better life outside and after education. It is therefore erroneous to consider the educational drive as a phenomenon that can be reduced to a single individual. Rather, it is the collective action of individuals acting as agents of education (teachers, pupils, principals, parents, politicians, bureaucrats, etc.) that must be considered. The mode of the drive is entered when the circulation of qualifying knowledge, certified competence, and skills as education becomes an end in itself and a loss in the process. This is because the expansion of symbolic knowledge only occurs within a constantly renewed movement. The circulation of symbolic knowledge is therefore limitless and can only be distorted, renewed, and disturbed by the Real. There remains a significant indeterminacy in the common relation of the terms "education" and "knowledge" to Real enjoyment (jouissance) due to the symbolic grounding of their argumental and discoursive functions.

The concept of the Real can be understood as both a negation of signification and as an effect of symbolic identity. This is exemplified by the professional competence-based teacher. Concurrently, the concept of the Real can be conceptualised as a residual element that may also function as a mnemonic device, signifying the loss of authenticity that occurs when symbolic and linguistic systems are introduced. It may be possible to view this "loss" in terms of "a lost teacher paradise", a world that existed prior to the decline in respect and authority from pupils and society. This represents an idyllic but unattainable reunion and restoration with the teacher world as it was (see Chapter 7). This interpretation, or perhaps more accurately, this fantasy of a lost paradise, is perhaps too biblical. A more prosaic interpretation is that this is a "loss" in the form of a failure of meaning, brought about, paradoxically, by language itself and the discourses of the master/university nexus.

Lacan (1998b) refers to this "loss" as the objet petit a (the little other). It is first important to note that the objet petit a is not an actual object; rather, it is a constitutive lack. It is the absence that engenders the desiring teacher as a subject enmeshed in the interplay of signifiers and discourses. In other words, it is the loss of the object that initially instigates the desire. The objet petit a can be understood as the void where the teacher's jouissance previously resided. In Lacan's (1998b) Seminar 11 (*The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis*), an attempt is made to gain a deeper understanding of the concept of the "objet petit a" through an unusual formulation of the nature of love. This is expressed as follows: "*Je t'aime, mais, parce qu'inexplicablement j'aime en toi quelque chose plus que toi – l'objet petit a, je te mutile. I love you, but because I inexplicably love something in you more than you, the object a, I am compelled to destroy you*" (p. 263, my translation). This formulation is often used by the famous Lacanian interpreter Žižek[4] (albeit only to get closer to Hegel) to suggest that there is something destructive about love (precisely because I love you, I must destroy you).

It could be argued that there is an element of destructive behaviour inherent in teacher practice and teaching, which I have chosen to term the "x-factor". In other words, there is a potential and a type of x-factor in the pupil that the teacher must utilise in order to facilitate the pupil's full potential and to achieve a mutually satisfactory relationship. To illustrate, consider the case of a mathematics teacher who identifies a pupil with exceptional potential and the requisite "x-factor" to become a proficient mathematician. Over the course of several years in secondary school, the "special" pupil undergoes a process of refinement, akin to the polishing of a diamond that has remained hidden from the world's attention until it is discovered by a skilled teacher. It is noteworthy that the teacher's affection for the exceptional pupil is palpable, yet the attention given to the other pupils in the class is arguably less pronounced. The teacher may privately acknowledge the pupil's exceptional qualities, expressing admiration and affirming that the pupil represents a valuable find. It is important to highlight that the attention and refinement that occur during the years of mathematics teaching are characterised by a paradoxical sentiment: "I have to destroy you". This represents a process of transformation and nurturing of the pupil, driven by the teacher's desire and characterised by an unconscious expression of love and support for the potential that the pupil can develop. The teacher's narcissistic joy after the pupil has completed secondary school with the highest possible grades in mathematics is expressed as "Look what I have created!" The teacher may also proclaim to their colleagues, "This is my pupil". In other words, it is the result of the destructive process that is the embodiment of the teacher's love.

An examination of the work of Slavoj Žižek may elucidate the concept of objet petit a (the little other). In his 2009 work, Žižek (p. 15) posits that the objet a is associated with a "set of phantasmatic features", which represents its defining characteristic. This set of phantasmatic features imbues the constitutive lack with positive qualities, thereby constituting desire's formal frame of

consistency. Each teacher unconsciously associates certain empirical features with that missing "part" of themselves as a result of fantasy. If the appropriate object of desire can be identified, the resulting fulfilment will compensate for the existing lack. If we could identify the X-factor (to be clear, not the television programme of the same name), we would be complete. It is, of course, impossible to achieve this, yet the very impossibility of attaining it renders the desiring subjectivity a viable phenomenon.

Summarising

Moreover, the concept of desire, both in theory and in practice, provides a novel perspective on the interdependence of education and its discourses, as well as on the role of teachers as subjects with inherent divisions. The focus is on companions and aspects of desire, including indeterminateness, personal embodiment, skills-based fantasy, and lack and lost in discourse. Further investigation into the aforementioned aspects of desire, including discourse, passivity, fantasy, and the Real (the failure of meaning conditioned by the inherent limit to the symbolic capacities of language), the imaginary and symbolic, object petit a, transference, may also assist in reframing the discourse on education or the very notion of being educational. Such considerations may also prompt a re-evaluation of foundational assumptions in educational praxis, including theory and educational practice (see Chapters 8–10). In addition to providing an essential foundation and contribution to the final chapters of the book, this is also an important starting point and framework for Chapter 7, vignettes.

Notes

1 Lacan (1977) introduces the neologism "parlêtre", derived from the verbal noun "être" (to be) and the verb "parler" (to speak), to emphasise his argument that being is constituted in and through language. In this sense, a human being is first and foremost a speaking being. Similarly, Heidegger (1978) posits in *Letter on Humanism* that "The house of Being is language". Moreover, Lacan's (1977, p. 228) utilisation of the term "being" (être) introduces a metaphysical dimension to his discourse, thereby distinguishing it from other prominent schools of psychoanalytic theory, which eschew engagement with their metaphysical and philosophical foundations. Lacan posits that it is imperative for psychoanalysts to address these concerns, as the analyst's intervention has the potential to profoundly impact the analysand's being, and consequently, the analyst's own being, given that he cannot "remain alone outside the field of play" (Lacan, 1977, p. 228). This insight into the human condition bears resemblance to the views expressed by Heidegger (1960) and Gadamer (2004), namely that the concept of eternity and the notion of a neutral, non-judgemental perspective are not attainable by human beings. It can therefore be argued that the analyst must establish their operating level in relation to the concept of being (Lacan, 1977, p. 252). Lacan (1977) also posits that throughout the course of treatment, the analyst (teacher) undergoes a gradual loss of their own being, or désêtre, as they become increasingly objectified by the analysand (pupil). Furthermore, Being is situated within the symbolic order, as it is partially constituted by the relation to the Other in which Being finds its status

(Lacan 1977, p. 251). This relation, like the Other itself, is characterised by a lack (manque), and the subject is constituted by this lack of being (manque à être), which gives rise to desire, a want-to-be (manque-à-être). It can be argued that desire is essentially a desire for being. In his work, Lacan frequently contrasts the concept of being with that of existence. When he does so, he is typically referring to the latter in its Real, as opposed to symbolic, sense.

2 Why are Desire and the Real sometimes written with a capital D and R? It may seem like a logical violation to switch from the negative existential form to the noun. It may be argued that Lacan makes this alteration by simultaneously marking the noun with a capital first letter (*Desires*) and uses this difference in order to show that *Desires* is not a quantification over entities (i.e., a quantification that runs *over a range of beings*). The reason for this is that Being-Desire/Real is not related to beings according to a logical (quantifiable) relationship but is related to them through an ontological relationship. Hence, to foresee being is one thing, but Desire/Real/Jouissance is quite another (why beings are).

3 Lacan (1977) does not refer to the psychological (cartesian) subject or personality as the centre of being-in-the-world. Firstly, in ontological terms, comes the subject's openness, and, secondly, the "self-subsistence" of Ego, which, in turn, rests on the Real (decentering).

4 See, for example, Žižek (1999, 2003).

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4 What forms could this desire take in education?

It is argued that the desire for the edge or the grass is always greener on the other side; fantasy is dominant within education. Desires constituted by fantasies such as risk management, capitalism, neoliberalism, GERM (Global Education Reform Movement), and sustainable development, which are mentioned, are just some of the companions of fantasy within education and desire for education. It is argued that these different fantasies together can be called the applicable paradigm of desire. The following section will attempt to delineate the aforementioned characteristics of fantasy and desire from a Lacanian perspective.

If we adopt an analytical perspective and examine education in a social context, Giddens (1991) and Beck (1992) discuss the concept of a "risk society", which they define as a distinct practice of social order and governance. This is a society in which fear is a pervasive aspect of social unease. In the context of the risk society, as conceptualised by Giddens and Beck, it is within this social field that expert and scientific knowledge assumes a dominant position. Furthermore, it responds to and creates a desire for quantifying social conditions, from the individual's everyday lifestyle to community actions, state behaviour, and risks imposed by external phenomena such as natural disasters. By being aware of the potential risks, individuals or communities can make informed decisions that should, if not eliminate, at least mitigate the danger. Such decisions transformed political communities and their everyday lives, with the concept of "rational choice" emerging as the dominant paradigm in this process. Consequently, the concept of the "risk society" emerged as a means of addressing individual and collective anxieties. However, its emphasis on quantification and assessment gave rise to a new form of fear, centred on perceived threats that were not previously regarded as such. Despite its intention to regulate the practices of a state or a community, the logic of risk has permeated citizens' intimate and private lives. It has introduced a calculative framing into everyday life and institutionalised education, as evidenced by the proliferation of apps that monitor and evaluate pupils' learning, promoting an active digitalised learning and teaching style. The emphasis on "what one knows" in the guise of evidence- or knowledge-based framed education serves to perpetuate the status quo within the context of risk society. On the one

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hand, risk society offers a sense of comfort and reassurance; on the other, any political change is perceived as a potential threat to the maintenance and repetition of the status quo.

As the desire for risk management is probably stronger today than when Beck and Giddens proposed their perspective, it may well serve as a dominant overall horizon or discourse in society, which also invades education in various ways (more on this later). Perhaps Lacan can inform us and remind us that modern capitalism and education are intertwined. Lacan's idea is that the networked structures of power and desire are not only reflected but also constituted linguistically. The terms used to describe the privileged, discourse-constituting positions of semantic network structures vary (i.e., capitalism and education). Lacan (2006, pp. 681–682) likens them (i.e., risk management, capitalism, and education) to the dowels or buttoning-point that impart shape and firmness to sofa cushions. One of the challenges inherent in the study of language is that it is never merely a linguistic phenomenon. This is why Lacan (2006) employs a variety of illustrative devices to convey the manner in which language intersects with and transcends other realities. Such images include the notion that a signifying chain functions in a manner analogous to a fishing line cast to catch its prey. In other instances, language serves to unite disparate elements around a common focal point, akin to how a sewing needle and thread can be used to temporarily fasten together a fabric.

The desire for risk management is a unifying factor in both capitalism and education. This can be seen as a manifestation of the desire for the perceived advantage of a different, potentially superior option, which can be described as the fantasy of "the grass always being greener on the other side". It can be argued that modern capitalism and education have the effect of sustaining subjects in a constant state of this desire. The extant situation is inadequate. As subjects of capitalism, we are perpetually poised on the brink of actualising our desires, yet we remain perpetually unable to reach that point of realisation. The desire for a new car, better education, more qualified teachers, better pupils' grades, a more advanced mobile telephone, a partner with more resources, one more child, more money, a bigger house, and so on, is a pervasive phenomenon in modern capitalist society. This has the effect of producing a satisfaction that is not recognised as such. That is, capitalist subjects experience satisfaction itself as dissatisfying, which enables them to simultaneously enjoy themselves and believe wholeheartedly that a more complete satisfaction exists just around the corner, embodied in the newest commodity (for further discussion of this topic, see McGowan, 2013).

With regard to the field of education and teaching, it is evident that reform in the United States and Europe over several decades has been inextricably linked to policies that necessitate an increasing reliance on data-driven decision-making at the level of both student learning and teacher performance (Taubman, 2009). These policies have resulted in a sustained emphasis on transparency and accountability, as evidenced by the proliferation of data on students and teachers that is characterised by standardisation, quantification,

competition, and large-scale comparison (Koyama & Kania, 2014). It seems reasonable to suggest that the role of politics in education has been superseded by that of management (Strhan, 2010). Furthermore, it could be argued that management by objectives has led to an emphasis on instrumentally conceived knowledge and the promotion of values associated with effectiveness and efficiency. This has resulted in a focus on the quantity and quality of educational outcomes, often expressed as "more, higher, better!" (Ball et al., 2012, p. 74), which has resulted in a dearth of reflection on the underlying ethical and political purposes of education (Biesta, 2010). The managerialist conceptualisation of education, reflected in the neoliberal tropes of the "knowledge economy", "knowledge society", and "human capital", is predicated on Enlightenment notions of the autonomous agent capable of calculating and pursuing the teacher's rational interests in order to achieve the "good life", as well as on assumptions about the possibilities of limitless economic growth and better schools, which hinge on endless scientific progress.

Furthermore, teacher practice and teaching permit a variety of stakeholders to articulate their aspirations and desires regarding the future of education, striving to actualise these visions through a multitude of discursive and pedagogical approaches. However, there are instances when these aspirations fail to align with the expectations of key stakeholders, including citizens, parents, the media, political representatives, and development agents such as the OECD and researchers. Despite the potential of various forms of analysis, research, and technology (see Åsvoll, 2022, pp. 20–26) to expose and account for these frustrations and lack of progress, it is possible that teachers, policy decision-makers, and other actors participating in educational discourses may act and inherit desires in ways that are unaccountable by such competencies, models, and understandings of rationalised and accountable behaviour. In other words, I put forth the proposition that the inability of those engaged in the educational discourse to articulate their desires results in their behaving in a manner that may be perceived as radical when viewed through the lens of a Lacanian theoretical approach to discourse and desire analysis.

This perspective, dedicated to exploring the contributions that Lacanian theory can make to educational theory and teacher practice, allows us to "open up our reading towards the expression of unconscious desire, to the history of the psychical construction of the subject, to the identification with models and countermodels, the study of the process of transference in the pedagogical space, which is the way in which the subject transmits […] their desires, relation to knowledge, its conflicts and negations, […] a theory that includes the social in relationship to others and gives meaning to subjectivity, focusing on the subject rather than the individual, since it is a social construction of the subject's particular way of being in the world" (Souto, 2020, pp. 54–55).

A radical consequence of this perspective in the field of education is to question the fundamental assumptions that others are in fact clearly understandable, rational, and potentially transparent. For example, evidence from statistics,

as presented in the OECD (2012) report "Skills, Competencies and Learning Outcomes, Learning, Teaching Styles and Quality", suggests that the proposed tools could enhance the quality of education by providing a clear and objective basis for evaluating teaching methods and the characteristics of teachers. To extend this argument, it could be proposed that the issue is not simply one of understanding others. Rather, it may be that we are, to some extent, obscure, divided, and blurred, and perhaps even unknowable, in relation to our own selves.

It is crucial to highlight the questionable assumption of educational existence as an accumulation and transparency, an ideal of the autonomous agent and ready-made knowledge, in which human life is devoted to "the service of goods" (Lacan, 1992), presents a significant obstacle to identification with lack and loss as the paradoxical path to progress (McGowan, 2013). In this regard, Lacanian psychoanalysis proffers a counterintuitive mode of conceptualising the quandaries that teachers and other participants in the educational sphere are confronted with. This is because it espouses and endorses, rather than attempting to transcend, the tenets of lack, negativity, loss, and absence.

The educational sphere or discourses can also be viewed from a more macro-ideological level. For example, on empirically consistent sociological grounds, education is configured differently in the lives of different people, leading to the acquisition of different levels of educational capital, which is strongly reflected and correlated with the unequal distribution of wealth and economic and other forms of opportunity and social inequalities (e.g., Bowles & Gintis, 1976, 2002). In terms of radical consequences at an ideological societal level, Matthew Clarke (2019) points to the neoliberal framing of contemporary education. With the help of Lacan's four discourses, Clarke (2019) refers to a kind of boomerang policy: all these inequalities are produced by the very neoliberal policies, practices, and fantasies that they are supposed to address. This is a Lacanian analysis of how schools and education, despite their good intentions (see levelling social inequalities), contribute to reinforcing the very inequalities they seek to counter. As such, the neoliberal order refuses to accept these facts because to do so would violate its integrity, which only ensures that the process will be repeated. Here we can speak of a realisation within education of Freud's (1955) and Lacan's (1977) compulsion to repeat, born from the unconscious of the neoliberal symbolic order.

But more specifically, who asks the questions, that is, the symbolic mandate, for what it means to become and be a teacher and pupil? This may point to how Lacan (1977) distinguishes between imaginary and symbolic identification. The imaginary identification focuses on how a teacher and educational researchers want to be as a teacher and researcher, while the symbolic identification deals with the position from where we are observed (i.e., the gaze; see Chapter 8), from where we see ourselves as sympathetic.

Žižek (1989) writes about the decline in symbolic efficiency under neoliberalism. This signifies how we have seen a change in how the symbolic order functions. According to Žižek (1989), we have an imminent doubt

as to whether what we say will be understood by the other. In other words, what we can take for granted is becoming less and less. In short, neoliberalism does not offer sufficient symbolic identifications but primarily imaginary ideals. So, instead of symbolic identities (structured around various conventions), neoliberalism presents imaginary injunctions to develop ourselves as subjects and our individuality via education with the (ever-new) ephemeral experiences and privileges that modern capitalism has to offer. In my view, one particular fantasy seems to be reinforced today: we want to be and have it all at the same time or as quickly as possible: to be well equipped in the educational process and discourses, to have many interesting job opportunities, to obtain a good education (such as a master's degree) as the golden ticket to a good life, and so on.

And not only that, but we should also enjoy ourselves while we're doing it. This is where a problem we recognise in contemporary life comes to the fore with a negative slant. If you fail to create yourself, and not least to enjoy yourself in the process, then you also fail as a desiring on the edge being within an applicable paradigm. If this is roughly correct (it is only a working hypothesis that can only be suggested and not substantiated in this book), then it is reasonable to believe that the *boundlessly imaginary* can be overly anxiety-inducing and even life-destroying or anti-life-affirming. In other words, there is never enough education (cf. lifelong learning), the hunt for new skills is never-ending, and more and better skills are needed to do the job.

Think about how an excellent horror film can work. The most terrifying things are those that are only alluded to in fiction and fantasy, but which we never see, where the imaginary takes over. Take, for example, the 1999 horror film The Blair Witch Project, directed and edited by Daniel Myrick and Eduardo Sánchez. The film is about three young Americans who go into the woods with video cameras to explore and document the myth of a creature called "The Blair Witch". They get lost and linger in the forest for days. Increasingly terrified and starving, they experience terrifying things: they find mysterious symbolic figures and are kept awake by noises at night. We as viewers are told that the three have never been found, but that we are watching their film footage that was found by chance. The film is marketed as a real story from reality in a way that convinces quite a few people of the "authenticity" of the film even though it is fake news.

Another brief example of an "efficient horror" fantasy within education is what is termed GERM. GERM, or the Global Education Reform Movement, is named by Sahlberg (2016) and traces its origins to the will of many developed countries to "lead the way in the economic, technological and social transformations that were emerging globally" (Sahlberg, 2016, p. 128). Furthermore, Sahlberg (2016) identifies competition, choice, prescribed curricula, standardised testing, and privatisation as common tactics to address the shortcomings of ineffective education systems (Sahlberg, 2016). As such, these are common features identified by Sahlberg (2016) in the contemporary education policies of Western countries.

Another example of a dominant fantasy in education. In recent years, several international commissions and expert groups have reported on the need to transform the education sector to better enable it to realise its potential as a key means of achieving the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and putting humanity on a collective path towards a just and sustainable future for all (e.g., Fujii & Lee, 2024). International experts in the field of education for sustainable development and global citizenship education aim to promote dialogue on these important issues and challenges to create a new fantasy of the future of education and a desired common future for humanity. In other words, a new framing and new fantasy of the education sector is required to enable it to better realise its potential as an important means to achieve the SDGs and to set humanity on a collective path towards a just and sustainable future for all. Nothing less, that is. On a more general level, these SDGs can be called the desire for climate hysteria, which is also being introduced into curricula and teaching all over the world and is thus rasterised in an applicable paradigm of education.

It is crucial to acknowledge that desire, manifesting as a reality of fantasy and more real than reality, exists even in the absence of overt visualisation or verbalisation. It constitutes a fundamental aspect of our existence, exerting an influence on the development and transformation of our self-understanding. It could be argued that teachers can only be fully understood when viewed through the lens of their lived experience and underlying motivations. An educator's approach to life and the possibilities it presents can be seen as a reflection of their ethos. This indicates a theoretical approach that differs from those underlying an applicable rational paradigm or fantasy in education. The mere application of existing tools and techniques, such as analytical assessment methods, practical teaching techniques, formal procedures, and curriculum plans, results in their assimilation into an already established and familiar category (the applicable paradigm, which may be considered a major fantasy). To dwell in desire is to engage in a distinctive and unprecedented experience, to perform an extraordinary act for the first time.

One consequence is that the unconscious "effect" of fantasy, understood as what does not fit into the "applicability grip", the ready-to-use gaze, and the gridded toolbox, is not recognised as "usable", useful in the world of education and teachers. In other words, anything that cannot be used immediately and without friction has no value in this dominant educational fantasy that can be called an applicable paradigm. This boils down to the fact that educational phenomena such as risk management within modern capitalism, standardisation, accountability, responsibility, and policy "control" are fantasies that maintain today's educational reality. Perhaps all these fantasy phenomena can be reduced to one main fantasy called applicable on-the-edge paradigm of desire. An interesting question then becomes how such an applicable on-the-edge paradigm of desire appears to the teacher.

These features of fantasy, concentrated as they are on the marginal paradigm of desire, serve as the "material support" for fantasies about the Other. What,

then, is fantasy? One should always bear in mind that the desire "realised" (staged) in fantasy is not the subject's own desire but the other's. That is to say, fantasy, or fantasmatic formation, is an answer to the riddle of "Che vuoi?" ("What do you want?"), which is the original, constitutive position of the subject (Lacan 1977). The original question of desire is not directly "What do I want?" but "What do others want from me? What do they see in me? What am I for others?" The teacher is embedded in a complex network of relationships; she serves as a kind of catalyst and battleground for the desires of those around her; her pupils, parents, headmasters, fellow teachers, politicians, the media, and others (and certainly many have strong 'expert' opinions about education and teaching) fight their battles around her; the mother sends a message to the teacher through her overprotective care for her son as a pupil, etc. Although the teacher is well aware of this role, she cannot fathom what exactly it is; she cannot grasp the exact nature of the games they are playing with her. But surely fantasy provides an answer to this puzzle. At its most basic, fantasy tells me as a teacher what I am to others.

Once again, it is the enjoyment of "education is not good enough or the grass is always greener on the other side", the paranoia of education, that makes this radical otherness of fantasy visible; that is, fantasy as a social fantasy of education as a failure that should always be improved, is, in fact, an attempt to give an answer to the question "what does society want from me as a teacher", that is, to reveal the meaning of the vague events in which the teacher is forced to participate. For this reason, the standard theory of "projection", according to which the subject always complaining about education "projects" the disavowed part of itself onto the figure of education and the teacher, is not sufficient. The figure of "symbolic education" cannot be reduced to the externalisation of the "inner conflict" of the complaining subject. On the contrary, it testifies to and attempts to deal with the fact that I, as a teacher and researcher within society, educational science, or pedagogy, am originally decentred part of an opaque network whose meaning and logic elude my control.

Summary

The prevailing applicable paradigm continues to be shaped by the privileging in Descartes's philosophy of the mind over the body, active over passive, and thought over practical action. This has led to a tendency to view difficulties and problems as something to be solved through the application of rational thought and tools or ready-at-hand decision-making strategies provided by policymakers, teachers, and the educational systems. However, as Lacan (1977) suggests with the concept of the divided subject and the notion of the Real, and as Heidegger (1962) makes evident, our being-in-the-world (and the concept of Nothing) is frequently of a more practical nature than a theoretical one. It may be the case that educational practice and research are, on occasion, constrained by this Cartesian theoretical mode. If this is a beneficial phenomenon, it may result in

a rational blindness to educational practice and scientific methodology. In other words, it is possible that teachers and researchers are also aware of the existence of the Real and the potential for disorientation that arises from the preference for or desire for a specific form of knowledge, which may result in the exclusion of other forms of knowledge. It is possible that we have placed a greater emphasis on readily accessible, structured, theoretical knowledge while paying less attention to practical, emerging, and context-specific aspects of knowledge. It is conceivable that an image of a concealed order (reality as theory) underlying appearances (practice) has a restrictive effect on our thinking. It is similarly conceivable that educational research may serve to reproduce the very subjects (teachers and pupils) about which it is concerned.

Is it not so that we draw too much meaning and knowledge of educational practice and education sciences from the embeddedness within an already pre-established order? Here, researchers' normative preferences are, for example, prevalent regarding the reflective professional, the social cognitive creative constructivist, and the empiricist within education sciences as "discoverer" of evidence. Hence, the researcher and teacher are framed and held captive as a rational reflective man (i.e., Bengtsson, 1995; Boud & Walker, 1998; Boud et al., 1985; Erlandson, 2006; Fendler, 2003; Schön, 1983, 1987; Zeichner & Liston, 1996), as a social cognitive creator (i.e., Towsey & Macdonald, 2009; Vygotsky 1962, 1978), and as a sincere objective prescriptive agent (i.e., Hargreaves, 1996; Hattie, 2009).

With the normative preferences that exist for the subject as teacher and researcher, it is easy for a critical dimension to be left out; that is, the researcher and teacher as subject do not quite understand why this place in a concrete symbolic order is occupied and why certain fantasies seem to repeat themselves. The doubting and hysterical question "why am I what you say I am" opens the gap between what it is in the subject that is more than the subject (object petit a; see Chapters 2 and 3), and which can often resist this doubting question. It is in this that we can recognise defiance and resistance in their ability to simply say no to hysterical change and yes to keeping things mindfully on track. There is a defiance and a self-tuned desire to look away from all the other fantasies that are clamouring for your unconscious attention and hold on to "your own". Either way, some fantasy maintains the idea of a holistic singular big Other that can provide the teacher and researcher with a necessary (uncertain) security.

The Lacanian thesis posits that desire does not merely emanate from social discourses and fantasies that shape needs and demands; rather, it stems from a fundamental human longing for something beyond articulation. This unarticulated desire may be excessive, unfulfillable, and potentially destructive to social order, teachers, and researchers as subjects. Lacan (1977) termed this phenomenon "enjoyment" (jouissance), conceptualising it as a symbiotic relationship with desire. It can be seen as a close ally of desire. In other words, a change in fantasies will occur over time due to the introduction of new

symbolic orders and languages, which will provide a renewed source of material for the unconscious mind.

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5 How, then, does one respond to desire?

As I see it, four initial possibilities present themselves: First, one can refuse to see (the problem of) desire at all and continue as a pre- or post-desire researcher and teacher. You do not need to respond or are not capable; such is the temptation of both positivist science and educational sciences (perhaps one of the dominant temptations in all research). Research embraces an anti-metaphysical quietism that wants to delineate the limits of psychoanalysis from (educational) research in order to clear a space of more on (psychological) evidence, cognition, competencies, or skills, and "learning outcome" awaiting. Here, one can claim to have no metaphysical commitments[1] and not to be concerned by not having them (the positivist attitude). This view would refuse to see the problem of desire as an actual problem but see it simply as a symptom of a speculative psychoanalytical and philosophical practice. It is possible to reject the "articulation potential" of desire on logical grounds (based on Wittgenstein's Tractatus). This interpretation refutes the value and meaning of desire being "transferred" in a satisfactory manner to an articulated language and discourse. A central and controversial statement about the interpretation of the borders of language is found in the last paragraph of Wittgenstein's (2005, paragraph 7.2) Tractatus: "Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent". The main implication here is that the pre-symbolic Real must remain as tacit and silence in scientific/philosophic language, and in colloquial language, because Desire and the Real/enjoyment in art, music, literature, ethics, and aesthetics are subject to transcendental conditions. That means these aspects of life are impossible to formulate in words; they can only be indicated or shown in the ways we practice and live our lives. Lacan (1991/2007) seems to interpret this as a sort of language-psychosis; "Wittgenstein wasn't interested in saving the truth. Nothing can be said about it" (p. 55). That is why it is impossible to achieve any articulated knowledge of silence and Real/Nothingness in life. Such an interpretation leaves desire, the Real/enjoyment vocational practice, to the practice itself, without the Real having any meaning in any other context; for example, researching Real/desire within a teacher practice.

Second, one can react passively to the Real and desire, accepting it as a trait or feeling of being, knowing the world to be uncanny enjoyable, but also

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knowing that nothing one can do will change this. Such an experience of "enjoyable-Real recession" may be linked to one interpretation of Wittgenstein's philosophy. This interpretation is not as reserved as the first with respect to whether a (desire) practice can be expressed in other ways than simply through activities and the practice itself. One of the intentions of Wittgenstein's style of writing is to clarify misconceptions related to how language works. More specifically, he wants to draw the boundaries between an assertion's capacities and that which cannot be asserted, but which can only be demonstrated through such things as art and religion – and I may add through teacher's practice. Showing or proving something does not strictly imply an assertion or verbal description of what is being shown. Instead, it is something that is "intuited" – it is the absence of direct communication of significant insights. Examples and illustrations from everyday practice need to replace theories that aim to clarify, assert, and uncover reality. The reason the concept of Showing is important is that it gives a description of desire-in-practice and use, as language-is-use, an important empirical focus. It is essential to show a type of use that is not always suitable to assert but rather is shown and described.

Third, there is "active desire", a force of being potential which may evoke desire into emancipation and a revolution of everyday life. Such a longing for radical emancipation, history-making, and revolution can take many guises: apocalyptic Heideggerianism (there are other Heideggerianisms), the neo-Nietzschean obliteration of "Man", or the utopianism that one finds in terrorism. This version of active nihilism is best expressed in Vaneigem's slogan "creativity plus a machine gun is an unstoppable combination" (Critcley, 2007, p. 13).

This "active desire" is in tune with Henry Giroux's (1992, 1994) critical border pedagogy, a pedagogy concerning a relationship with ourselves and with others, where identity is not built with the other or with ourselves. Identity is instead defined in the context of the multiple literacies organised as critical and practical tools for cultural exchange. Teachers should be urged to break with ideological and political prejudices, thus allowing themselves and others to place themselves beyond the world they already know, challenging their own viewpoints, and discovering other ways of understanding the society into which they are inserted, as well as others they do not know.

Critical pedagogy stresses the importance of understanding what actually happens in educational settings by raising questions regarding what knowledge is of most worth, in what direction one should desire, and what it means to know something. Giroux (1983), as a representative of critical pedagogy, tries to prevent the technocratic tendency which reduces pedagogy to the teaching of practical methods, pre-established outcomes, and data-driven performance indicators that allegedly measure scholastic ability and improve student achievement. A focus on "practical" methods in order to prepare teachers and students for an "outcome-based" education system (which for Giroux, 1988, 1994, is code for pedagogical methods that are as anti-intellectual as they are politically conservative) is considered a serious threat to democratic

societies and ways of life; that is, to be engaged critical citizens willing to fight for a sustainable and just society means deepening the ideological and material conditions that make a democracy possible. That is, critical pedagogy is concerned with teaching students and teacher students how not only to think but also to come to grips with a sense of individual and social responsibility and what it means to be responsible for one's actions as part of a broader attempt to be an engaged citizen who can expand and deepen the possibilities of democratic public life (Giroux, 1994).

Another example, in *The Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, Paulo Freire (2010) tends to advocate this "active desire" view when he presents illuminating ways of educational history-making, emancipation, conscientisation, and radical revolution; hence, students cannot be liberated "with the instruments of domestication" (p. 65). In other words, education is not about the transmission of knowledge but is a practice of self-awakening via dialogic practice. Freire (2010) puts into question the authority, hierarchy, and knowledge nexus. The purpose is to make the political significance of education explicit through an egalitarian-dialogic approach to teaching that recuperates the lost humanity and dignity of students. This requires something deeper than merely inverting hierarchy and imposing a (banking) model for ready-made thinking onto students. Rather, it starts by rejecting the (enjoyable) discourse of neutrality and positivism as (educational) ideologies of the ruling class. However, the "desirable" revolution starts by rejecting any form of (Right or Left) fundamentalism, including hegemonic positivism, but it requires having faith in the people irrespective of their social class and previous conditions of physical and mental servitude. Freire (2010, p. 60) proclaims, "trusting the people … is the indispensable precondition for revolutionary change". But trusting people and being trusted (too much) by enjoyment is not the same. Perhaps Freire (2010) avoids the danger of excessive enjoyment when enjoyment escapes control and the revolution devours its children. Moreover, to explore revolutionary educational activities and skills embedded in an egalitarian-dialogical approach may be connected with central aspects and assumptions of desire (see more on this issue in Chapter 10 *Concluding Considerations: Desire as the Revitalising Education and Teacher Practice*).

Even though there may be important issues such as a restoration of everyday life ("a cathedral of your own") and the rejection of homo faber (the reduction of human life to economy) in active nihilism, it seems like a theoretical and practical dead end. The challenge is that if one rejects the first two responses to desire by either (a) rejecting the Real/desire as a pseudo-problem with a fallacious metaphysical philosophy or (b) failing to respond to the problem in passive acceptance, then the third response may appear too "revolutionary" or radical. The view of an (educational) revolution of everyday life or the framework of "desire" as a potential in revolutionary education may tell only half the story. Paradoxically, there is something too reactive in this sense about the very framing of active desire – it may be too negatively obsessed with what it

seeks to oppose and risks failing to comprehend the phenomenon of everyday life and being-in-the world in its challenge to overcome it.

I would like to try to delineate a fourth response to desire, one which I think borrows heavily from the second and third responses. With this fourth response, it is not only a question of overcoming and embracing desire in a border sphere and crossing pedagogy, because such an understanding could imprison us all the more firmly in the very logic I am trying to leave behind. Rather than overcoming desire, in history-making it is a question of sensitise it, dwell in "desire". That is to say, how teachers or researchers transform our background educational discourses through border crossing and history-making is not the pivotal question, but rather how educational participants dwell in everyday life and are (desired by) discourses. Lacan's work, when applied to processes of subjectivity in education, is valuable, I believe, because it illustrates the importance of the signifier (the Other). In breaking the link between a signifier and a pre-existing signified, we can begin to see how terms such as knowledge, teaching, learning, and assessment are signifiers that do not refer to pre-existing states (though this appears to be the case) but construct the subject within specific discourses. In other words, these signifiers represent the subject for other signifiers (Atkinson, 2002, p. 134). As such, this privileges the notion of structure rather than that of development, and, by emphasising human singularity, it stresses differences rather than similarities.

Here, desire does not need extraordinary intentions or radical situations. It can be intensified and arise in the most innocuous of situations: sitting on the train distractedly reading a book and overhearing conversations, one is suddenly seized by the feeling of doubt, meaninglessness, and the Real, by the radical distinction between yourself and the world in which you find yourself. The reason the concept of Showing[2] is important is that it gives a description of desire-in-practice and meaning, as language-is-use, an important empirical focus. It is essential to show a type of use which is not always suitable to assert and say (by logic) but rather is shown and described. However, it may be tempting to propose a main strategy, namely that desire should be made explicit through different mechanisms for exchanging knowledge (by using metaphors, analogies, models, theories, etc.). It is important to be aware that not all enjoyable Real/desire can be made explicit (conceptualised) and externalised in this manner. There is no doubt that the "externalisation" strategy is important, but it underestimates ways of showing the Real/desire aspects within educational discourses and practice. The desire perspective states that all our aspects of desire can potentially be shown in practice, but there will always be emerging and withdrawing new desires, fantasies, and "Reals". Hence, the objectification of the subject, Being (Dasein) and enjoyment is critical in the search for an objective understanding of Being itself facilitated by "being ahead of oneself" (Ricour, 2006, p. 347). This is because humans are aware first and foremost of being enjoyable alive, and then we attempt to make sense of (teacher's) life in thought and

language (both Heidegger (1962) and Lacan (1991) stress "being ahead" in different ways as projection and enjoyment). However, it is possible to show how the teacher retrospectively uses several aspects of desire. By conducting vignettes and examples, I illustrate some of the potential and possibilities in the Real, enjoyment, and Being (and certainly some of the limitations) in Chapter 7. While I am reliant on some retrospective data, which may influence the completeness of examples and lead to "rationalised" versions of data, I think it is still possible to show how desire might play a role in teacher's practice. Further, in Chapter 8, a model of desire is presented along the lines of an "externalisation" strategy, even though contemplating desire does not mean showing a full-fledged picture of the vitality of the aspects of desire. I do not think any of this (the four factors or aspects in the model) in principle cuts against more semantic and "epistemologised" approaches to desire because such views need not be conceived of to require a commitment to the priority of the (pre-)ontological project (I think Lacan would 100 per cent agree). In fact, it can be conceived in the opposite direction. Start with what might be called an accepted pluralism of desire to indicate the idea that there may be several knowledge relations resting on desire, a model designed to both capture and show the emergence and complexity of desire in educational discourses. Maybe what has been bugging me here is not that Lacan privileges addressing the ontological and linguistic issue over traditional epistemology or epistemological versions of desire but what sort of language and showing is adequate to justify the phenomenon of desire (i.e., whether or not algebraic expressions are a good way to approach desire?). This is a question of not only understanding desire (as links between discourses) but also understanding desire in many ways that make us educational and human. It is probably a good idea to consider the degree to which one ought to be an epistemological sceptic with regard to (pre)determined desire possibilities. However, on the basis of interwovenness and the relationship between discourses and desire, it may be helpful to refer to four different aspects that, as a whole, can describe vitality and complexity and enable the articulation-potential of desire.

At long last, we may advocate a gesture towards the problem of "the ethics of desire". Lacan (1991) has provided some crucial insights into the word, phenomena, and function of "fantasy" or the "subject of enjoyment". One of the main challenges of being a teacher is to come to terms with the fact that the world "outside" of teaching is what it is, so to speak. And while we may not always like that and would prefer to stay within our ideas about how we would want the world to be, it is the coming to terms with the reality or discourses of the world that may intensify our fantasies. Being and becoming a teacher, trying to live one's life in a professional and grown-up way, is therefore precisely about coming to terms with the fact that the world "outside" of us is often not how we would want it to be (i.e., troublesome colleagues, pupils, parents, principals, youth culture, etc.), hence we need fantasies and

discourses to bridge and (re)mind the gap between ourselves and the world. Foremost here is the idea of the subject and teacher as constitutively split, as ex-centric (as "outside" unto itself), as a void or as *subjectivized lack*, as Chiesa (2007) helpfully puts it. The ethic of desire explores what may lie within the ex-centric, for example, enjoyment and fantasies, which may be articulated as "the being-there teacher" (cf. Chapter 10).

Notes

1 Lacan's own scepticism and avoidance of philosophy and metaphysics is peculiar. However much he, and his followers, may reject these terms there's a recourse to metaphysics (via Hegelian and Heideggerean conceptuality) specifically surrounding "the identification of truth (as unveiling) and speech (logos)" and the related question of metalanguage (cf. Derrida, 1981, p. 111). I would also add that there's a striking resemblance between the Lacanian Real and Heideggerian Nothingness, that is, resistance of symbolisation, the privileged absence, etc. Moreover, Karl Popper (1968) considered psychoanalysis to be a pseudo-science because it has produced so many hypotheses that cannot be refuted empirically. Hence, it's reasonable to say that Lacanian analysis focuses on meaningful interpretations of phenomena, rather than on empirical testing of hypotheses and observations. Analysis could then be considered more in line with the hermeneutic mode of thought or interpretive phenomenology rather than in those that lead to science and scientific positivism. One can hardly miss that Lacan nevertheless remains one of the most philosophically sophisticated, as well as the most philosophically influential, of the analysts.
2 Wittgenstein's (2005) distinction between the Sayable and Showing seems to be of importance and an issue of struggle or wonder for Lacan (see Turner & Sharpe, 2022 for more details). Turner and Sharpe's (2022) message seems to be that far from a few scattered references over decades of lectures and writings, the importance of Wittgenstein's influence on the "logical" Lacan should not be understated. Perhaps a valuable source on this matter is one biography of Lacan written by Elisabeth Roudinesco (1997). She attributes the inventions of the matheme and lalangue, as well as the pathway from saying to showing, to this reading.

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6 Lacanian-oriented literature on teaching and education

The application of psychoanalytical theory to the field of education and teaching is not a novel phenomenon. However, it is reasonable to conclude that it remains a relatively limited field in terms of both scope and recognition. It seems fair to say that there is considerable scope for further research in this area. Presented below are some longer key research texts that are of crucial importance for understanding and exploring the relationship between psychoanalysis, Lacanian ideas, and educational and teaching perspectives. Unfortunately, due to the selection of longer research-based texts, a number of very good and short articles and chapters have been omitted from this overview. The purpose of this relatively short chapter is therefore not to provide a complete picture of all relevant books, articles, and other research literature, but to provide a descriptive outline of how a Lacanian-inspired perspective is brought into play in educational and pedagogical research.

In her work, Deborah Britzman (1998, 2003) draws upon the theories of Anna Freud and Melanie Klein to examine the challenging and ambivalent aspects of teaching. This work is of particular interest to those engaged in the study of Lacanian philosophy and its material applications in contexts beyond the clinic.

In *A Psychoanalyst in the Classroom* (Britzman, 2015), the author provides detailed descriptions of the unexpected ways individuals or subjects respond to matters of love and hate as transference when engaged in reading and writing activities within the classroom setting. In her work, Britzman (2015) advocates for and develops themes related to the handling of technique in psychoanalysis and pedagogy, the uses of theory, regression to adolescence, the inner life of gender, the unwritten history of the writing block, and everyday mistakes in teaching and learning. Additionally, she examines the relationship between mental health and experiences of teaching and learning. As her works offer a long-awaited new perspective on pedagogical practices to psychoanalysts interested in pedagogy, this book presents a more philosophical (Lacanian) approach to education for educational professionals (i.e., teachers, teachers of education, researchers of education, and pedagogy), as well as a more concrete analysis of teacher practice or discourses. In light of the aforementioned, this book shares the overarching aspirations

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and purpose put forth by Britzman and Pitt (1996, p. 756) as they argue that the emphasis on concepts such as the unconscious, fantasy, affect, and sexuality has sought "to unseat the authorial capabilities of expression to account exhaustively for qualities of experience, to view history as a causal process, and to separate reality from phantasy".

Similarly, Tamara Bibby's (2010) book, *Education – An Impossible Profession*, examines various facets of psychoanalysis in the context of education and the classroom. The key insight is that in educational settings, we not only gain knowledge about academic subjects but also about ourselves, our peers, and the dynamics of human interaction. This constitutes a significant reappraisal of pivotal educational experiences, including those of being evaluated and assessed, both formally and informally; adapting to disparate groups for disparate purposes; grappling with the challenge of critical thinking under duress; and learning to discern and adapt to the expectations of others. In her book, Bibby employs psychoanalytic concepts drawn from a variety of schools of thought, including Lacanian, Freudian, and Winnicottian, to examine the educational context. She considers the classroom environment, including policy demands and professional pressures, as well as the intricate dynamics of peer and pedagogical relationships and interactions. She explores how these experiences are perceived and what implications they may have for learners and teachers. In contrast, my book focuses more closely on the experiences and discourses of teachers, primarily through a Lacanian lens, but also incorporating, for instance, a Heideggerian perspective on teaching.

In his book, *Psychopedagogy,* Daniel Cho (2009) presents a compelling argument that challenges the notion that the relevance of psychoanalysis in education is limited to mere application. He posits that psychoanalysis should not be viewed as an add-on or an external influence in education, but rather as an integral aspect that can transform the very nature of education itself. At these sites, psychoanalysis and pedagogy are inextricably linked, with the two concepts mutually reinforcing each other. In other words, psychoanalysis draws upon and relies on pedagogy to develop its theoretical framework and concepts. Accordingly, the analyst-analysand relationship is conceptualised as a distinct pedagogical relationship, whereby the latter gains insight into the unconscious. In contrast to this book, I diverge from Cho (2009) in that I do not insist that Lacan should (always) be discussed within his (proper) Freudian context. For instance, I believe that the Heidegger-Lacan "relationship" is underestimated. Furthermore, I do not agree that the most important Lacanian insight is of a pedagogical technique tool-like nature. However, I recognise that this is a somewhat harsh statement, given the explicit didactic reservations. As a result, the importance of rebellious, joyful, and painful desire is somewhat diminished.

In the anthology Pedagogical Desire: Authority, Seduction, Transference, and the Question of Ethics (Jagodzinski, 2002), a number of significant questions are posed. What is the appropriate role of the teacher in relation to a student's desire? From an ethical standpoint, how should the dialectic

between desire and the drive be understood? Is there an obligation to assist students in mourning the knowledge that they must relinquish certain forms of knowledge? It is pertinent to enquire whether ignorance can be pedagogically advantageous insofar as it pertains to that which is unspoken and repressed. In the event of the pedagogical distance being eroded and seduction occurring, can such behaviour be justified? A key issue is how educators can take the concept of the unconscious seriously into account. These are just some of the pivotal questions that are raised throughout this collection by the authors (i.e., Alcorn, Aoki, Bracher, Briton, Campbell, Coutore, Garfinkle, Guerra, Lenzi, Samuels, and Schlender). The argument put forth is that Lacanian psychoanalysis presents a challenge to the conventional understanding of the subject as formulated by ego psychology and the discursive subject of postmodernism. The authors of this collection engage with such arguments and questioning, in some cases examining their own practices and in other cases developing possible strategies with a view to understanding the psychic life of teaching. My book is aligned with these ideas, emphasising the significance of desire, transference, and authority in education and teaching. However, I do not delve deeply into ego psychology, postmodernism, and self-examination.

In his publication, *Radical Pedagogy*, Bracher (2006) presents a compelling argument for a transformative approach to education. The subsequent titles, Identity, Generativity, and Social Transformation, align with Jagodzinski's anthology (2002) in terms of both content and conceptual framework. However, Radical Pedagogy presents a novel theory of identity, one that is informed by recent research in psychoanalysis, social psychology, and cognitive science. It elucidates the manner in which the formation of identity is a necessary precursor to the development of intelligence, personal well-being, and the improvement of social issues, including violence, prejudice, and substance abuse.

More concretely, Bracher (2006) addresses a particularly interesting topic, namely how teacher and student identities are challenged, acquired, and expressed, as well as how student and teacher identities sometimes war against each other, collapse, and are seduced by each other. The various purposes of education, such as qualification and subjectivisation, are linked to identity as a core concept. Using concepts such as transference, desire, and object petit a, opportunities and challenges in the teacher's practice are explored in the form of authoritarian, establishment, and resistance pedagogy (corresponding to the Lacanian master, university, and hysterical discourse, respectively). Similarly, and somewhat as an extension of Bracher (2006), Chapter 7 of this book on the teacher's hysterical discourse and not least section two shows how the teacher's subjectivity (identity) is in danger of being eaten up by the pupil's (rights-based) desire, which rests on an analyst discourse and transference ground that requires emotional (over)labour.

The anthology, edited by Claudia Lapping (2018), presents an intriguing collection of essays. The collection, named *Freud, Lacan, Zizek and*

Education – Exploring Unconscious Investments in Policy and Practice, offers insights into the unconscious aspects of education. It presents empirical studies employing diverse methodological approaches, including practice-based theoretical speculation, policy analysis, ethnography, interviews, free-associative methods, and ideological critique of critical educational practice and research. In this regard, the contributions of various authors, including Garret and Walsh, are particularly noteworthy. Lysgaard, Simovska, Straehler-Pohl, Pais, Costa, Moore, Glynos, and Clarke emphasise the political and unconscious dimensions of investments in the fields of education and educational research. The book's primary focus is on three key figures in the field of psychoanalysis: Sigmund Freud, Jacques Lacan, and Slavoj Žižek. It explores their respective accounts of resistance and repetition, the role of language and desire as theorised by Lacan, and Žižek's elaboration of these ideas in a theory of ideology and enjoyment. These concepts collectively offer tools for examining the often overlooked, uncomfortable, and surprising aspects of education. This includes the hidden, unconscious, and unspoken desires that individuals invest in educational institutions, policies, research, and practices. In contrast to my own work, which employs only interviews as a means of exemplifying the phenomenological aspects of teachers' desires, this book demonstrates the value of a diverse range of methodological approaches, despite their shared objective of exploring the unarticulated and unacknowledged desires that shape educational practices.

In his book, *Lacan and Education Policy*, Matthew Clarke (2019) draws on the conceptual resources of Lacanian psychoanalysis. In employing Lacan's four discourses, Clarke presents a comprehensive and well-founded critique of contemporary education policy and the neoliberal model of political economy. Clarke (2019) puts forth a novel approach to conceptualising education and education policy that transcends the prevailing discourse of neoliberalism as an alternative to education. Furthermore, as with Clarke (2019), this book employs the Lacanian four discourses and offers a critique of the neoliberal trope embedded in education. However, in contrast to Clarke (2019), these discourses are primarily focused on the level of the teacher and teaching, rather than on the level of dominant policy.

In the book, *Lacan and Education – The Other Side of Education*, Donyell Roseboro (2008) employs Lacan's concepts to evaluate and transform the practices and objectives of education. The book presents a compelling argument for a radical rethink of the current public educational system in the United States. It challenges the status quo and demands a recognition of the inexcusable failure of the system to adequately serve the needs of many children. It also offers a vision of an alternative educational approach that could transform the system into one that is truly fit for purpose. To provide a more concrete example, the book serves three distinct purposes: (1) to translate Lacan's primary ideas into language appropriate for introductory-level college students, (2) to examine identity in ways that are relevant across disciplines,

(3) to reframe Lacan's work with post-structuralist and postmodern theories, thereby developing a unique perspective on the self as a predefined yet evolving entity. Finally, the author contrasts Lacan's work with post-formal thinking and explores its implications for public education. The author employs the South African Truth and Reconciliation process as a framework, concluding with the construction of a model for public education that is grounded in "truth-telling" in public spaces and "witnessing" as a political practice. A post-formal curriculum, inspired by a Lacanian view, is proposed as a means of seeking and creating truths and of working towards becoming integrated beings by hearing the unconscious. Roseboro (2008) emphasises the necessity and methods for social and collective transformation through the truth as a kind of "goodness" revolution (in my perhaps unfounded view, a Lacanian insight suggests that advocating for radical meaningful social change is insufficient). Despite this, we share a common need to demonstrate the significance of speaking being(s) and the unconscious Other.

The only work to provide a detailed account of the century-long relationship between education and psychoanalysis is Taubman's (2011) book, entitled *Disavowed Knowledge: Psychoanalysis, Education and Teaching*. The book provides not only a historical context but also a psychoanalytically informed analysis. In considering the implications of adopting a psychoanalytic perspective on teaching and in reviewing the various approaches to and theories about teaching and curriculum that have been informed by psychoanalysis in the 20th century, he employs the concept of disavowal and focuses on the effects of disavowed knowledge within both psychoanalysis and education and on the relationship between them. He emphasises that the potential benefits of embracing "knowledge of and from the unconscious" as the Other (Taubman, 2011, p. 9) in education have been overlooked. The book traces three historical periods of the waxing and waning of the medical/therapeutic and emancipatory projects of psychoanalysis and education. It argues that psychoanalysis and education should be brought together as an emancipatory project. It is evident that Taubman's (2011) comprehensive historical analysis of the relationship between psychoanalysis and education, and his proposal for a joint emancipatory approach, are of significant value. It is not difficult to concur with this assessment; however, it appears to be a rather hasty and unreflective conclusion, particularly in light of the fourth response presented in Chapter 5.

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Part II
Desire in teaching

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7 Vignettes of desire in teaching

This chapter presents an account of teachers' practice[1] as an ongoing attempt to define themselves differently through the unfolding of discourse. This attempt is related to the discursive functions of the master, the university, the hysteric, and the analyst, which focus the teacher's desire differently on (educational) experiences and understandings. In order to provide a more comprehensive view and understanding of the conceptual and empirical field of desire illustrated by the vignettes, I will draw extensively on the theoretical framework presented in Chapters 2 and 3.

The overarching objective of this chapter is to demonstrate that the (immediate) experiences of teachers inevitably traverse processes of resistance, interpretation, and a pre-existing imbued discourse and the Other. Consequently, a sort of narrative emerges when one offers an account of oneself as a teacher. The objective of the vignettes is to contribute to a more nuanced understanding of the desire and limitations of discourses, exploring the factors that render some discourses more tenacious and persuasive than others. It is crucial to recognise that these vignettes transcend the boundaries of language. Consequently, in order to fully comprehend their significance, it is essential to contextualise them within the realm of language.

Against this background, three key questions are posed: How is desire constructed through narratives and discourses of teaching? How is the Other constituted through teachers' desire? And finally, how are teachers' being or "teacher-ness" and well-being intertwined with ideological and ethical issues of "otherness"? I will attempt to answer these three questions through the following fourfold chapter structure (Sections 1–4). Firstly, the analysis will be presented in the form of an assessment of the dynamics of teacher discourse, with the help of Lacan's theorem of the four discourses combined with the "topology" of the teacher landscape as illustrated with the help of Lacan's three dimensions: the imaginary, the symbolic, and the real. Secondly, two pivotal categories will be presented, namely the "fixation of the Other" and "the appearances of disruptive The Real" in teacher practice. Thirdly, the author makes observations on the vignettes and presents a preliminary thematic analysis. Fourthly, the author provides a summary and reflection.

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Section 1: The dynamics of teachers discourse

In this initial section, the vignettes will be structured in accordance with the four discourses, namely the master, university, hysteric, and analyst discourse, in that order. These will be combined with the "topology" of the teacher landscape, as illustrated with the help of Lacan's three dimensions: the imaginary, the symbolic, and the real.

Master discourse

According to Lacan (2007), we are completely dependent on the primary or fundamental discourse called the master discourse to structure our lives. This discourse is therefore first and foremost not necessarily only either good or bad, either dominant or weak, either stable or arbitrary, either active or passive, but it is there and exists in principle independently of the will and interests of the individual, the teacher, and the pupil. This does not mean, of course, that the teacher or for that matter the pupil does not target, represent, and even embody a master discourse. The following illustrates such a master discourse and how it is ventriculated in teaching practice by highlighting vignettes such as "the system", "language usage", "cadaver discipline", "correction of assistants", "regular teaching", and "transition meeting".

VIGNETTE 1: The system

Three primary school teachers have a conversation about the challenges associated with the necessary calmness when starting and carrying out pupil activities and what "rules of the road" a teacher or the teachers together can have on it:

Teacher 1: We have a system that suits us, but which may not suit the child completely. But at the same time, we're really dependent on getting this one on the list. And in order to avoid shouting, it's a bit like 'sit quietly', so we endeavour to do that. But then you have to turn up, some turn up early, others take a while and suddenly realise they're going to the toilet and they've got a wet sock, and that's how it goes. And then you have to make sure you don't have this cup full, and that's not so easy, because it depends on what you've experienced and what the day is like and what your day is like. And we're all so different. So, yes, a glossy picture would be nice, but to have many different ones like that, and then we have to interpret this, how the rules should be and how you want to do it, how I want to do it, how Per wants to do it … wants

to do it, that's another thing, and it's a dilemma and a challenge, I think.

Teacher 2: Yes, if we're going to manage to meet them, in a way, with care, empathy, and charity, then we have a lot to think about.

Teacher 1: Yes, isn't it? But then you kind of have to. Then we have to work a bit on that table, maybe, the adult sitting there may have to work a bit on that table.

Teacher 3: Mm, because you can see that not everyone is completely on the same page either, and then it's more uneasy. Yes, it's not a shame to say that, but I'm not perfect myself, that's not why I say it.

Teacher 1: And then it can happen that it affects the adult and, because suddenly they have to leave the table, there are seven- or eight-year-olds sitting there, or, yes.

Teacher 3: Yes, because when I have physical education, I have to write down who's going to physical education, and I have to do that at the same time as I'm sitting around the table watching. So it's terribly stupid because then it becomes more restless.

Teacher 1: Yes, and you can do it. Even though we're ladies, we can't do two things at once. We're not built that way, actually. Even if we want to be.

An interesting point emerges when teacher 1 says at the very beginning that there is "a system that suits us, but which may not suit the child completely". This could mean that the need for a minimum of calm, not to create unrest, takes precedence over more "noisy" activities, which in turn may be a better starting point for some of the pupils' learning. It also seems clear that agreement or a common understanding between the teachers in the same classroom with regard to "disturbance" attention is not always present, as evidenced by teacher 3's statement that "not everyone is completely on the same page either". The expressed notion and master discourse of necessary calm when a lot is happening at the same time creates challenges and it is a matter of "you don't have this cup full" for the intention to "meet them with care, empathy and charity" in the midst of chaos can be exercised in a perceived adequate way (i.e., without the teacher too often acting as a divided subject where the distance between intention and reality becomes too great and where the Real can begin to live in an unfortunate and sinister way in the form of irritation, frustration, anger, guilt, etc., see more on this issue in Section 2).

Although the above-mentioned concern is that the "system" may suit the teachers better than the pupils, the "system" also creates a certain room for interpretation and possible friction between the teachers. Teacher 1 symptomatically says so we're going "to interpret this, how the

rules should be and how you want to do it, how I want to do it". Although the subjective experience and tolerance may differ from teacher to teacher, the main point here is that the system, understood as a kind of organised calm, constitutes a master discourse, that is, an absolutely necessary structuring of the pupil's and not least the teacher's working day. Another significant structure in the teacher's practice concerns how teachers relate to their pupils' use of language.

VIGNETTE 2: Language usage

When asked how values can be concretely expressed in teaching practice, two teachers say the following:

Teacher 1: We have to try to instil the right attitudes, in other words. We think carefully… Perhaps not among the youngest children, but from middle school upwards. So, with the little ones, we talk about it, so we don't go around accepting that they say nasty things. In relation to, well, gay. They don't know what that is either, as far as I'm concerned… No, that too. So it's included as a topic in science and social studies, for example. So there's no 'this has happened, so we have to talk about it', as it were. It comes up as themes in the subjects.

Teacher 2: We bring up situations. We show examples of how we talk, for example (laughter) On social media, for example, where a lot of things are commented on. We showed him, what's his name. Bernt Hulsker (a former Norwegian football player), who was arrested for racism here, we showed examples from him where we emphasised how serious it is. Because there has been a lot of racism too. It doesn't seem like everyone knows. What it's like to bully? Or sending looks or … is it cool, you know? But they don't realise how serious it is. So we try to show them the seriousness of it, and we often take out individual students who we know have done things. We have proof that they've sent this or that message, right? Yes, it's a bit difficult … A lot of focus on that.

The two teachers say that they work hard to "instil the right attitudes" and how we talk both in light of individual cases that arise and as part of ordinary teaching "in subjects such as science and social studies". There are for example racist and homophobic pupil utterances that deviate from a master discourse as accepted terminology, and hence are perceived as both deviant and a failure on the part of the subject (Lacan, 1982). When

it comes to an issue and pupil challenges related to racism, teachers pick up examples from social media to show what serious consequences this can have. In other words, a pedagogical master discourse is concerned with maintaining power, control, and the valorisation of values embodied in certain ideas or in the teacher herself (Bracher, 2006), pronounced here as "imprinting the right attitudes". Another variant of the master discourse's focus on an authoritative and possibly authoritarian teacher's voice, rule-following, discipline, and nurturing teaching is expressed in the next vignette.

VIGNETTE 3: Cadaver discipline

Here, two teachers talk about the challenges and unfortunate consequences associated with a dominant master discourse in the form of a type of strict rule-following and discipline.

Teacher 1: Sometimes I think we have a bit of cadaver discipline without really needing it. For example, it's fine for them to have their hands in their laps, right, and sit still, but someone who might be about to scratch their nose says "hands in your lap!" right away. We can sort of calm down a bit with that, I've thought, but I haven't dared to say it before then, but…

Teacher 2: But this is something about who has the meeting and who gets the info and is in a way a substitute, and there are many…

Teacher 1: Fair enough, some may need to have their hands in their laps to be able to stay calm, while others don't. So I think if we had relaxed the rules a bit? Perhaps, perhaps things would have gone more smoothly actually. Because the more cadaver discipline you have, the worse it gets, I think, if you're with me now?

Teacher 2: Some people want to challenge.

Teacher 1 points out that there is sometimes too much cadaver discipline and nitpicking on details, without the teacher having the courage to take this consideration further. At the same time, Teacher 1 expresses doubt as to whether cadaver discipline is the right thing to do and whether 'we had relaxed the rules' can actually lead to a better situation. Although teacher 1 in the interview as speaking being expresses a cautious doubt and suggestive protest regarding how effective the cadaver discipline really is, this cadaver discipline is still a common invariable master discourse in the teaching staff. In light of the master discourse, here the unconscious desires of both pupils and teachers are suppressed and excluded (Lacan, 1982)

by body discipline. In other words, there's no room for doubt, and hence there's a lack of fantasy present. The teachers therefore appear to be rationally steady, autonomous, and attentive in their professional practice by virtue of the legitimacy provided by the master discourse.

VIGNETTE 4: Correction of assistants

Another way in which the master discourse becomes visible is when the teachers ventriculate her "boss speech" to assistants in the classroom:

Teacher 1: Now I'm into a thought here … But about equality then, in relation to … Yes, it's fine and here it works fine. And then there's a bit of a difference between … But what I can say a little bit about maybe isn't so positive is all the substitutes who come in as assistants. Don't they get the same treatment as you? Because they only stop by for an hour and don't have time to talk to them, plan with them. I have the routine that we're used to, and then I quickly realise that I can become, then feel that I become that person? Yes, so you do this and this and this. And then I do this. So I put on a bit more weight. I don't get to share my thoughts with those who drop by for a trip, who are there for a week or two, or, then there's no equality. Or then there will be a divide.

Interviewee: How, that you become more like that?

Teacher 1: Then I'll be the one, who I'm fooling a bit by giving me … Now I'll tell you what to do because it's your job, while because I want, know how I want it in the classroom then. And you've created a structure together with the people you usually have in the classroom. If a new person shows up who may not have been in the classroom for very long, then you feel that you're just slacking off.

Interviewer: How often is this then?

Teacher 1: It can often be that new people arrive. Yes, if there's an illness… Then new and young people arrive.

Teacher 2: If there's an assistant. An educator is missing. And then an assistant arrives to take over. And then maybe the assistant substitute comes who hasn't been to school very often. And then here. Now you're going to have a lesson here alone with these pupils, and they have an expectation that they can do it. You've been hired to take a lesson, you should be able to do it.

Teacher 1: And then it's a bit top-down, talking in a different way … Yes, yes … Feel that you have to be a bit more of a boss then … But it's not something you like to do.
Teacher 2: No no.
Teacher 1: It's not something you want to do. If you want to make it work, that's how we do it in the classroom. Listen!
Teacher 2: Yes, but controlling other adults.
Teacher 1: Yes, that's what we'll do (shared laughter).

Here, experienced teachers describe what often happens when an assistant and inexperienced substitute enters the classroom and the teacher is transformed into or "I become that person" and "I'll be the one" as created in an image of the discourse of the master. For Lacan (1982), this discourse is characterised by the tyranny of the all-knowing and exclusion of fantasy or, as it may be expressed more mildly here, "a bit top-down". It is as if the teacher is saying to the inexperienced assistant "you must follow my word, it is my word that counts" in the classroom. Here it is clear that the master discourse is embodied as part of these experienced teachers' professionalism, but at the same time, there is no doubt that such a structuring teacher-being-in-discourse also brings to life a kind of discomfort in "controlling other adults". This is because the experienced teacher is familiar with how to make it work with the pupils. This is trumped by the fact that assistants appear randomly and sporadically so that "I don't get to share my thoughts with those who drop by for a trip". This also illustrates a type of enjoyment/jouissance, that is, there is a form of satisfaction in the unsatisfied and unpleasant (also expressed in a shared laughter at the end) that can eventually threaten an established stable symbolic master order (Lacan, 1982). Put differently, the other as the "little other" is in fact not the other person at all, in this case the assistant, but a reflection or projection of the experienced teacher being or ego speaking of making it work or getting things mindfully on track. The next vignette presents a more collective form of narcissistic projection in the form of a teacher's resistance to alternative types of teaching.

VIGNETTE 5: Regular teaching

Two teachers discuss both the more dominant and preferred forms of teaching in the teaching staff, as well as practical matters related to the possibility of different ways of facilitating teaching:

Teacher 1: That's the kind of thing the school should have had more of. I don't have anything to draw on here, then. But there's often a resistance to doing anything other than regular teaching.

Because that's what we're here to do. I have to show my PowerPoint, so we can't go out and play today, or do activities outside. So it's very divided here in the house, of that kind of thing. Because we are, there are several people who want to initiate interdisciplinary projects and other activities and put individual subjects to one side. There are also some who think that's completely wrong, because we run a school.

Teacher 2: I think it's a …

Teacher 1: No, I was just going to cream.

Teacher 2: …it's five per cent, it's five per cent flexibility on hours in school. You can flex us down and then you could take time to do whatever you want. But then organise the timetable so that interdisciplinarity is easy. It's not like 'yes, I can attend the whole day except for fifth period, because then I have to run up to science in tenth grade. Then I can come down to sixth period again. By the way, where are you going, and that assistant and …' It often turns out like that. And then it doesn't work.

Both practical and (unconsciously) normative elements of what a school and teaching should emerge. This can lead to the Other being positioned to submit to the One's desire for confirmation and recognition in the form of "correct" traditional communication-based teaching practices called the scholastic (i.e., regular teaching). What maintains this unequal relationship, the subtext, is what is not often talked about enough in the discourse. More concretely, alternative multidisciplinary teaching projects are hardly recognised as fantasies and a subtext that can be concretely translated into a teaching context.

In this context, the teacher is positioned as the primary authority in the production of knowledge, asserting their autonomy at the expense of the opposing views of other educators who advocate for interdisciplinary teaching. It seems reasonable to suggest that the teachers at this school are expected to reproduce the discourse of the Master, that is to say, the usual teacher-led and communicative teaching style. Consequently, there is a complete disregard for teachers who fail to admire the Master or that specific approach to teaching. This may increase the uncanny potential of the Real and render it disconnected from the legitimised symbolic order of "correct" teaching.

Another example of the scholastic regular discourse is many statements from teachers who say that too many of today's pupils are different than before in the sense of not behaving disciplined and scholastic enough. For example, statements from several different teachers of the type:

We are put in situations where we are offended by pupils.

The respect is no longer there.

> But we can't go against them and say that what you believe and what you stand for is wrong because, well … in their lives, it's right, it's what they've been taught, even if it clashes a little with what we think and believe.

This may be indicative of a decline in pupils' respect for teachers and a growing disconnect between pupils and the educational system as a whole. Some educators have even proposed that certain pupils should have been placed in paid employment at the earliest opportunity when the microphone was turned off. The candid observations of seasoned educators, though they may mirror a challenging reality, are crucial to address, even if they are deemed politically incorrect and diverge from the conventional standards expected of educators and educational leaders.

In general there are also many implicit and explicit teacher opinions about the general fall in standards and the unsuitability of some pupils in particular. In other words, a clear if not negative then very challenging picture emerges and possibly the teacher ventriculates a more negative destructiveness by a little other (object petit a) in the sense of "in you dear pupil there is no X-factor that I can manipulate so that you can become as academic as me, and thus you are not worth taking care of within the school framework". This is in contrast to a more positive destructiveness that can be found in this Lacan quote:

> I love you, but because I inexplicably love something in you more than you, little object a, I must destroy you
>
> (Lacan, 1998, p. 263)

Be that as it may, the educational process, according to one Master, involves an initiation through pain as a part of enjoyment, thereby "civilising" the desire of teachers who would otherwise remain savage. Perhaps the Master takes it upon himself to rescue the enjoyment of the educated or teacher from brute gratification. The mark of a professional and "civilised" teacher is that he respects the Master and the body of knowledge that belongs to him and offers an elevated and "negative" enjoyment, perhaps at the expense of genuine devotion and a more positive enjoyment.

The inscribing process is thus legitimised under a somewhat commentary-based regime; that is, the utterance "the respect is no longer there" (where Masters are particularly at home), education is seen as the necessary effect of teachers' and pupils' (mandatory) painful enjoyment with the discourse. In general, we might say that Masters, especially when operating in a commentary-master discourse, typically place great emphasis on their own expertise and argue from their own experience as teachers to general principles for education (i.e., pure communication-based and consistent teacher-led teaching). For example, we might imagine the

teacher as master being found in the staff room complaining about pupils who do not meet the standards of behaviour and academic performance in teacher-led lessons because the pupils make a lot of "noise" when they often try to help each other unjustifiably.

Even the requirements of the academy particularly "modern" academies that are now attempting to prescribe "progressive" practices (i.e., Montessori and Waldorf education), are likely to be seen by a Master as thorns in the flesh. A real Master is even quite likely to be contemptuous of the state of affairs that dominates his own field (or where it is heading) and will cling instead to his "own" reactive understanding of how the discipline should be. The Master is always "out of step" with the status quo and can see himself as the champion of tradition "as it used to be".

VIGNETTE 6: Transition meeting

In this vignette, a so-called transition meeting is presented, that is, the pupils, who in this case number 55, are to be assessed in a very short time (45 minutes). The assessment and information sharing takes place because the pupils are moving up a grade and the new (contact) teachers need to get information from the previous teachers. As we will see, the transition meeting functions as a sorting and management tool that also brings with it strong discomfort:

Teacher 1: And it was absolutely awful. But it was also terrible as a contact teacher because I've never been through that transition before. And then we learnt at a terribly late stage that we were going to contact teachers. And I live here in the village, so I'd already heard everything about the village. I knew who had the red flag with them in the village. And then there were so many of us, and we had such a ridiculously short time. We had to go through 55 of them in 45 minutes. And then they had time to spit out what was negative, and then we had to move on to the next one.

Teacher 2: Yes, that's right. That's what it's all about.

Teacher 3: It wasn't a pleasant setting at all.

Teacher 2: No, it's not. Actually, it's completely pointless.

Teacher 1: Well, it hasn't been solved like that before, I think. Completely. Not when I've been involved.

Teacher 2: Then maybe it was a bit extreme then, now.

Teacher 1: Yes, I'm sure it was. At least, I hope so, because it wasn't a straightforward solution. But at the same time, I think

> that to a certain extent, you have to have such a transition. Because even if, yes, we find out that it might have these challenges … Firstly, we need to know about the type of dyslexia, i.e., diagnoses. We need to know about that, don't we? And at the same time, we need to know about behaviour, because we have to take new combinations into account. So we're trying, I think we've managed quite well with this cohort right now, that yes, we have it in hand. But at the same time, they should be given a second chance. So we were very clear about that, at least one pupil that we knew had a lot of behavioural challenges and was very negative towards other pupils. And then we had a chat with the pupil and it was like, 'We already know this, but that's how it is here. Now you get one chance to show it, otherwise, we'll have to initiate measures pretty quickly.' And then, he had grown on it, so it worked. And it's a bit like that, not a blank sheet of paper, but at the same time not the framework that they came up with.

In the teacher's world, the imaginary in terms of past perceived pupil performance and behaviour can be contaminated, saturated, and captured by language, that is, the focus on "to spit out what was negative" as a mechanism of selection and power. Furthermore, in Lacanian (1977) terms, this refers to the subsequent teaching practice as a "symbolisation" of the teacher's experience, replacing provocative and uncanny images and fantasies about "unjustified" pupils with a network of ratified terms (the symbolic order), such as submission to a discourse of "transition" in the form of a "transition meeting". A transition that is considered necessary according to "to a certain extent you have to have such a transition", and which has the stated purpose of the pupils "getting a second chance" without being too stuck with "the framework that they came with". But if the pupil doesn't take care of "a second chance" then "we have to initiate measures pretty quickly", that is, the teacher moves from the imaginary register (fantasies about certain "underprivileged" pupils) to the symbolic register of perhaps special needs education.

That said, this discourse causes some discomfort for teachers in the "transition meeting". The discourse in question, expressed as a moment of doubt by the utterance "it's completely pointless", is characterised by an obfuscated and uncanny truth. This obfuscation manifests as a crisis that trembles the teacher as (divided) subject. Consequently, this Master's discourse is presented as autonomous and inherently convincing and necessary. However, there are potentially vulnerable moments in this vignette, which reveal the Real as a phenomenon that can be questioned and challenged. Furthermore, the teacher experiences a sense of disquieting

enjoyment alongside the pain and unproductivity associated with this changeover meeting. The primary objective of the university discourse is to reinforce the master discourse.

Discourse of university

This discourse is illustrated with the help of various elements of the teachers' experiences of the curriculum, timetables, time and open-ended tasks, textbook-centred education, testing, theory, and assessment and the way in which these elements are gridded and frame the teacher's everyday life. In the next vignette, two teachers express quite clearly the role of the curriculum in their teaching practice:

VIGNETTE 7: Curriculum

Teacher 1: Yes, in relation to the new curriculum, right, we've been through it and introductions to everything, and now you're going to discuss this, and we'll have feedback. But then, good girl, we'll do it.

Teacher 2: …. yes, because we have to make the best of it, I think. Smile nicely and swallow 100,000 camels.

Teacher 1: It is evident that we are constrained by the curriculum and the requirements that must be met within a ten-year timeframe. There are numerous avenues for achieving this goal, yet we are constrained by the resources, personnel, and opportunities available to us. Additionally, time is a crucial factor in all aspects of this endeavour. It must be carefully planned and implemented.

There seems to be an incongruence between what the teachers' initially desires to practice and how the curriculum is perceived, in accordance with "Smile nicely and swallow 100,000 camels" (the term is used to describe accepting something you are actually against in order to achieve something else) and "good girl, we'll do it". Being faithful to and bound by the requirements of the curriculum is a tool that provides a picture of what knowledge should be reproduced. In other words, at the outset, there may be limited scope for the subject's or the teacher's unconscious, subjective professional knowledge to be expressed within the university discourse. Nevertheless, it is acknowledged that "there are numerous avenues for achieving this goal". In the next vignette, restrictions related to the discourse also emerge.

VIGNETTE 8: Timetables, time, and open-ended tasks

One teacher elaborates that:

Teacher 1: I think we're being stopped a bit by timetables this year. It's like all the staff have been thrown up in the air and swept into a whole heap and then you have twelve people in 8th grade and then they're supposed to have a conversation when they have time together, and they never do. So you're stopped by, the good sharing is stopped a bit by these types of factors. So it's clear that we had a great dialogue at that meeting, but there was a time set aside for the subject group to talk together. So it had to be facilitated for the good sharing. Because you see, when we have a team meeting, an hour and a half, we don't have time to go through much in that time, because we have lots of other things burning. So we have to put out fires before we can do anything positive.

In this case, established timetables and the allocation of 12 eighth-grade teachers create a (time) structure that places practical limitations on good conversations about challenges and coordination of teaching. The time set aside for a subject group or teacher team meeting of one and a half hours is also too often perceived as too little, as the time spent "putting out fires" instead of emphasising "doing something about the positive". Another form of structure and dependency in terms of teaching is also recognised as important. Structure in the form of what degrees of freedom the pupils' tasks can and should have:

Interviewer: You mentioned that it might not be as possible for you. Can you say a bit more about that?

Teacher 1: To start the lesson with an open task and start wherever you want (laughter).

Teacher 2: Let's go outside.

Teacher 1: We need to have a bit more structure than that in secondary school.

Teacher 2: It's on the basics, learning the basics and what you're doing now in both maths and Norwegian and the basic lessons that are a bit more like strict tasks, I feel. … We learn a bit about what multiplication is before we just get started.

The need for structure offered by a university discourse in the form of "strict tasks" animates the teacher and legitimises the teaching practice. While some teachers are preoccupied with or caught up in the university discourse's demand for reproductive knowledge and "strict tasks" or

"on the basics … in maths and Norwegian", another experienced teacher expresses a completely different approach:

Teacher 1: I think I've had, I've worked as a teacher since 1997, and then you've had all kinds of pupils. I've had pupils who have struggled to achieve their learning goals, but they've still had an awful lot of good human qualities. And being able to tell the parents, who are very worried, that he or she will do very well because he is a very good person. I think it's essential that you have good values. Not everyone can be equally good. If you have good values, things will go well. Of course, you should try to learn everything there is to learn, but … Well, I think my experience is that many of us are … well, far too bad. I think. This understanding of the curriculum is interesting because you think like this and – how high do the competence goals hang? I'm not going to hide the fact that I think it's less important than the purpose of the curriculum and the purpose of the subject. But it's a real hot potato up here in any case.

What this discussion is about is more clearly expressed when teacher 2 says:

Teacher 2: We're probably better at making them aware of it now that we can add competence goals, as it were. This is actually what we're assessing because it's either a personal appearance. But this is what we're considering, i.e., emphasising that they're given some responsibility for their own learning, but the fact is that things are happening all the time. We're like, that's why we're a bit like this, that things should happen as quickly as possible or it gets boring.

Teacher 1 does not allow the university discourse's master sign in the form of curriculum, knowledge goals, or competence goals to be dominant in the understanding and assessment of the pupil and themselves, but emphasises that inherent "good human qualities" will compensate for a "lack" of achievement of the academically oriented university discourse. Teacher 2 believes that anything other than a focus on competence goals will lead to pupil assessments that are left to "personal appearance" (in Norwegian terms, "trynefaktor"). More specifically, this means that there are different voices and opinions revolving around a university discourse, that is, very different tones from speaking beings about how enjoyable the university discourse should be, which leads to discussions exemplified between teachers 1 and 2 and cf. "it's a real hot potato up here in any case". How enjoyable or how uncanny real appears in teaching practice is also evident in the use of textbooks.

VIGNETTE 9: Textbook-centred education

Three teachers discuss the challenges of textbook-based teaching:

Teacher 1: But what do we do then? We've got a type of textbook, for example, multi in maths, but if we don't race, if we don't get through the first book, it becomes very difficult if they get a new teacher and a new book in the second class. If you don't follow it, and that's it, that's fine, that's how you finish it, then I continue to build on it. And if it's kind of lost its way in the multi again, then it's difficult to reconnect with the previous one. So it's difficult if you're going to follow, and then you get to the older stages, which also have the same type of books.

Interviewer: So it's the textbooks that rule?

Teacher 1: Yes, it shouldn't be like that. But it is, and we go, we follow the textbooks we have. Because now it's multi, it's been updated after the subject renewal, so they say something about the goals we should be able to reach, so we use them. We use other things if we see that there is a need. I feel it's a bit difficult when it's required of them, and they know these things. And then when they come back in fifth grade or junior high that it should be a …

Teacher 2: I kind of see what you're saying about it being called a two, three, four, five, six. And I see, I've been a special needs teacher for a few years and there, it's like this, you might have pupils at third-grade level, then they come, Yess. Then you get the book for third grade, so it says third grade very clearly then. I think that's where a lot of the problem lies, instead of, I'm copying it up, instead of you seeing that now you have a third-grade book.

Teacher 3: Put on book papers, you know.

Teacher 1: Yes. That's the master number then. This isn't about whether you're in first grade, have a third-grade book. Shouldn't really matter, or if you're in seventh grade? We're at the level we're at. But that printed grade level then. … third graders who just race off are actually ready for fourth grade. … Then you get that distinction again and take away that label.

At the beginning of the vignette, the teacher says that "if we don't get through the first book, it becomes very difficult". In other words, the textbooks control the teaching and its progression rather than the pupil' actual level. The textbook as the constituent Other can become a dominant marker and authoritative voice for both the pupil and the teacher,

which neither takes care of the pupils who are far behind nor far ahead of the textbook's academic level, but which is nevertheless a structuring and enjoyable tool for the teacher. However, as Lacan (1982) points out, because university discourse is presented as neutral or benign knowledge, its hegemonic function is rarely questioned.

Teachers, so to speak, no longer feel at ease in a dominant textbook-technological environment as a symbolic order, but rather experience chronic real dissatisfaction cf. "it shouldn't be like that", as they themselves are increasingly targeted by an enframing force (Gestell) that turns teacher and textbook into a standing reserve of human resources, the raw material of a teaching technological system currently unfolding (Heidegger, 1978). Furthermore, in a Heideggerian vein, the teacher is inescapably thrown out of a familiar dwelling into textbook existence, as a vulnerable and fragile being, saved by but also irrevocably infected by the technology of textbooks (I think it's fair to say that the same analysis could apply to the use of, for example, digital gadgets and I-pads in schools). Perhaps the uncanny lurks in the teacher's discourse as a potentially removable material, a part of the textbook that becomes too Real, and in this way, the enjoyment gets into trouble.

The Real emerges in the teacher's mind as a dissatisfaction and concern expressed as "but that printed grade level". Pupils at different academic levels in the same class create challenges for the teacher when the textbook signals a specific academic level that not everyone shares. Statements such as "shouldn't really matter'" point to an unresolved dilemma. The fact that not all pupils follow the textbook's subject level and progression creates real waves, and the ideal of a direct correspondence between subject and object over pedagogical discourse and practice seems to fail.

VIGNETTE 10: Testing and theory

This vignette draws attention to a university discourse characterised by a theoretical school with too much emphasis on testing. This is expressed in the following way by these two teachers:

Teacher 1: I think we had more time for these things before; I think the academic pressure has become so much stronger. Both testing, national tests, all the test requirements, right, where we ask why is it not at the top blablabla. We had more freedom to work with other types of people, homes that were struggling and had a slightly different approach during school hours than just sitting in the classroom. And we could have

used our own groups, out to work a bit more practically and so on. That's almost disappeared.

Teacher 2: Now it's all about inclusion, and …

Teacher 1: Yes, that's exactly it. And we're on our own most of the time. And if someone runs away, do you have to pick them up or should you stay in the class? Right? And it's, it wasn't that clear before, really. I have to admit that. And I think theoretical school has become far too theoretical. We need to go back to a slightly different way of thinking, that it's possible to have electives in secondary school without having to have the grades, for example? Can you have a subject that you can enjoy and where you feel that you can contribute something without having to be measured on something? And that's what I'm thinking about. You're measured on everything you do. There's pressure there and then. Can't we have one, be able to relax a little, give other types of…? I think that … in secondary school is fantastically important, and I see how important it is for those who enjoy it and love it to be able to use themselves in a completely different way. They may not be terribly good at maths, but they're really good at it. But that has to be measured as well.

These include worrying or negative statements about being a teacher in today's schools, such as that school is too theoretical and characterised by too much testing "*and all the test requirements*", and that there is therefore too little time for practical approaches. Against this backdrop, it's not hard to understand that not all pupils (and teachers) fit in when, for example, it's said that "*and if someone runs away, you have to, should you pick them up who runs away or should you stay in class? Right?*".

For the Master, his signature is a mark of authority, whereas, for the university, all signatures must be acquired as marks of assent. Paradoxically, the well-meaning teacher who feels the weight of the test and theoretical regime may often feel a responsibility to regulate the discourse of the classroom and teaching so as to guarantee sound and inclusive-based education, that is, pick up the pupil who runs away or.

In other words, the discourse of *the University demands that time must not be wasted*. The most straightforward method of achieving this is to control the pace of progression (time schedules, textbooks, strict pupil tasks, etc.) and potentially the space(s) allocated for the teacher's speech. When the university discourse demands effective and theoretical-testing practices, and does so without revising its assessment protocols to allow for deviant forms of practical activity (i.e., optional subjects without grading), the teacher finds herself in a double bind. This can only be resolved by "faith" in the ultimate "effectiveness" of well-established university

teaching practices. Consequently, this university regime typically demands such faith by advancing a utilitarian discourse based on the unconsciously chosen, cultivated teaching practice endorsed by those currently in control. These unconsciously chosen, cultivated teaching practices invariably rely on the value of performativity that accommodates the discourse of the university, rather than on truth as such (Lacan, 1982). Consequently, it can be reasonably argued that the university discourse "*produces knowledge as the ultimate object of desire over and against any question of the subject*" (Lacan, 1982, p. 161). Another way of producing symbolic knowledge is shown in the next vignette.

VIGNETTE 11: Assessment

In this passage, it appears that students are being assessed far too much. Two teachers are discussing:

Teacher 1:	But you don't have to measure absolutely everything they do, even if a term grade is set.
Teacher 2:	I know that, but still. Do we have to have a grade, or do we have to, like, on everything? Can't we just be who we are (laughs)?
Interviewer:	But we don't have a grade in primary school.
Teacher 2:	No, we don't. We have assessments, it's a grade as well. It's just that it's not so strict, isn't it, but it's assessed based on goal attainment. Low or high as it's called then. I think it's a bit early.
Teacher 1:	But we've been doing self-assessment with smileys and young people are supposed to assess … when my boys were little, they sat and ticked. Yes, how did you manage this? Yes, sour face. If they do it, week after week after week, it does something to them.
Teacher 2:	That's not good.
Teacher 1:	No, it's not.
Teacher 2:	No, that's what I mean. I think it's unfortunate. Does everything have to be measured and followed up?

As evidenced by the two preceding vignettes, educators are not merely reliant on a symbolic order as textbooks represent; they are also infected with a language of goal attainment. Furthermore, the theoretical approach to teaching is perceived as too dominant, and pupil assessments begin as early as primary school. These factors may

collectively act as an incubation centre of disease or the beginning of sickness in teacher practice. From a Lacanian perspective, textbook-based governance, theoretical teaching and assessment as a language is a commanding mechanism that cleaves and infects subjects, relentlessly colonising their world, that is to say, both pupils' and teachers' life world. This results in one teacher stating that must "everything be measured and followed up".

It could be argued that teachers as subjects derive enjoyment (joissance) from attempting to gain satisfaction in dissatisfaction, to enjoy their symptoms. Desire may be characterised as seeking satisfaction in the Other, for example through explicit signs (such as a syllabus, curriculum, timetables, and competence goals), people (such as assistants, colleagues, parents, and pupils), or objects (such as new electives and "practical" courses, new teaching methods and tools). This represents an attempt to trace the aspect of the Real that embodies the joissance, which compensates for what has been lost in the teacher's discourse. It is important to remember that the Real (what is lost to it) always exceeds symbolisation, as the crack which lets the light in; the Real lurks (this will become more apparent in the next discourse).

Discourse of the hysteric

Vignettes are presented in the form of "meta-hysterical reservation", "producing failing pupils", "paragraph 9a", and "the desire not to be that teacher".

VIGNETTE 12: "Meta-hysterical reservation"

Two teachers express a type of apprehension regarding the type of pupil they would like to have after finishing school:

Teacher 1: I also think that you shouldn't limit yourself so much that you don't realise that there is learning in everything because there is learning in everything.

Teacher 2: That's exactly it, and it's also a bit like what are we actually going to teach them? What's important – that they know how to quote so-and-so, or is it important that they actually manage to …

Teacher 1: That's actually a really interesting question – what are they supposed to know when they graduate? It's quite like that, really, in relation to what they have the opportunity to manage with later in life. I think that, personally, I think

> basic skills. And these values here (refers to the values in the Norwegian objects clause[2]). If you've got that, then I think you'll go a long way.

Teacher 1 expresses a kind of meta-hysterical reservation and opening with "must not limit themselves so much" with regard to what is absolutely most important for the pupil's learning (or Bildung/formation) and "in relation to what they have the opportunity to cope with later in life" Teacher 2 follows up these statements by saying "what exactly are we supposed to teach them?". These are considerations and open general warnings from experienced teachers about opening up rather than closing down what should be regarded as the pupil's learning. Too often, according to Lacan (2006), the therapist jumps to conclusions, relying on given interpretations, and we might say that the same applies to the teacher's discourses (i.e., vignettes on master and university discourses calling for correct competence-based teacher and pupil behaviour). This happens despite the fact that the therapist and the teacher should perhaps know better than anyone else that the pupil must sometimes be the leading actor in the discourse of teaching and learning, and this temporary leading actor way of being might be more value-based (i.e., "if you've got that, then I think you'll go a long way") than based on techniques and characteristics within specific courses. However, everyday teacher life without such value awareness (albeit rooted in the objects clause) can be far more frustrating:

Teacher: So it's that time. And then there's probably a lot of frustration, I think. At least I can say for myself that there's a lot of frustration in knowing that, leaving a lesson, the lesson may have been fine, but you know that I haven't spoken to those two and I don't know what I've done because I've had to sit and focus 100 per cent on that, or I've had to go between and hold someone's ear. It sounds a bit harsh, but that's not what happens then.

The teacher articulates a sense of frustration that appears to emerge from the intersection of academic instruction and disciplinary practices. This frustration is often accompanied by a perception of deficiency and, potentially, a sense of meaninglessness or alienation. This latter sentiment may be seen as antithetical to the intrinsic enjoyment and alignment that the teacher seeks to achieve in their role as an educator. In other words, Real-jouissance (enjoyment) always arises from the enjoyment that the teacher fails to achieve, that is, not being there and "saving" every pupil in every lesson. This is more explored in the next vignette.

VIGNETTE 13: Producing "failing" pupils

A teacher who has been away from her teaching job for a period of time has now returned with a different perspective, asking more critical and probing questions about the school's practices:

> There are two things. One is that we've got a lot of pupils who have decisions. It's a bit like, why do we have that? That's one thing. How has it come to this? Has the concept of normality become so narrow here? That we're producing pupils who don't fit in, if you know what I mean? And then there's the issue of looking into the classroom, when you know that there are pupils sitting there who may not be able to follow normal and ordinary teaching… Why don't you do something about it? That's right. If you see … if I see that you're not keeping up, that's fine. Maybe I simply screwed up as a teacher that lesson, but I have the next lesson I can do something different. Why isn't that happening? That's when I start to wonder about these things, the basics… like, we're fellow human beings here. Yes, they're our pupils. But there's something about seeing them where they are and dealing with it. Which I'm wondering about.

The returning teacher draws attention to two main questions: firstly, why are there so many more pupils than before who have a decision in favour of some form of special needs education (i.e., an individual decision triggers a right for the individual and a corresponding obligation for the person making the decision. For example, the school has a corresponding obligation to provide special needs education if a pupil is entitled to special needs education), and secondly, why you or that nothing is being done with those pupils who are still unable to follow the progression in ordinary education? These "why" questions seem to involve a systematic (and possibly organisational) repetition in teachers' practice of key "conscientious" issues that are almost inextricably linked to "our pupils", without any new measures being taken for this reason. But (real) questions like "why don't you do something about it?" and "why isn't that happening?" are being asked, and these raise their own teacher protests and doubts about how professional teaching takes place. In other words, it hysterically dwells on an existential turmoil and a lack that can testify to a teacher as a divided subject who may no longer be able to stand up for his or her professional identity. Another extract from an interview emphasises a prototypical meaning of a "lack" discourse:

Teacher: On resources, resources that too. I can feel that a bit. Maybe it's more painful. It's harder to leave behind. I can kneel down and say that I don't have the time to … And then

I ask myself, how visible should you make it? Because I don't know either … Yes, I can see you're in a lot of pain … I find it difficult.

The concept of enjoyment/jouissance describes the paradoxical satisfaction in the dissatisfaction that teachers as subjects procure from repeatedly failing (too much), partly because of the lack of time to fill the constitutive lack at the heart of their identities, that is, "I find it difficult", to obtain the enjoyment that the hegemonic and master and university discourses promise. This will be the subject of further discussion between teachers:

Teacher 1: And perhaps if there is a child who is very calm or has challenging behaviour, we might be able to dig and find the reason behind it. Don't just say that now you have to sit down calmly, and now you have to stop or?
Teacher 2: We have a lot of people who demand their behaviour.
Teacher 1: In a way, you first have to look a little behind the action and behaviour.

Having the resources (time) and being able to see and assess the pupil's behaviour and the underlying factors is highlighted as important in a symbolic order (presupposes and belongs to an analyst discourse with attentive presence and transference). This is elaborated on when a teacher is asked about bullying and the importance of the new Section 9a:

VIGNETTE 14: Paragraph 9a

Teacher: But that's also where the new Section 9a comes in, where it's the child's experience of the day that, for the action and all that, is supposed to form the basis of everything. I think it's a bit scary because children are closest to themselves. And many children are sort of, they don't really see behind what's going on all the time, and I have children myself, like that. Where, especially among the younger ones, you know, they can go around throwing things, and then they get something in return. And think it's really awful and sad, right, and come home and "oh, it's mean to me, and it does this and that", right. Then you don't quite manage to unravel what this child has done or said in the first place, because it wasn't that relevant, we didn't think too hard about it, and then it becomes a 9a case. So I think that it, well no, is perhaps not quite right all the time.

Section 9a of the Education Act for primary and secondary education was introduced in the Norwegian school system in 2017 as an attempt to reinforce and emphasise pupils' rights.[3] Although the intention behind the section, which is enforced by lawyers at the state administrator's office, can be said to be good, the teacher here is aware of the unintended negative consequences of this legal fixation on schools and education. This may be the first stage of the process, preparing the ground for subsequent steps, that is, promoting teacher decentralisation, professional and authoritative disruption and fragmentation, and perhaps a truly sinister alienation of teacher practice. But the (real) is lurking and may appear when the teacher says "well, no, is perhaps not quite right all the time". The next vignette shows a teacher who has taken a real-subject round a few steps further in the form of a search for a desire not to be that teacher, not explicitly because of Section 9a, but because of other demanding discourses:

VIGNETTE 15: The desire to not be that teacher

Teacher: What I felt before I went on leave was that measurement has now taken off. That everything should be measured and assessed. It's also become more … I thought about that when I was on leave, what will I do differently when I come back? What have I actually missed as a teacher? What was it that I liked? Because I was thinking about whether I really wanted to be a teacher when I came back, or should I use these years to become something completely different? And what I missed for myself was getting to know the pupils and having time for other things. When I worked at the primary school, I was a teacher who loved being outside with the pupils. We had a lot of outdoor school, regular days out, right. And then you get to secondary school, and everyone has to go through the same thing – exams … We're so concerned with learning objectives here. And then there's this thing where the lesson has to start and everyone has to have the same template for how the lesson starts, we have to go through the objectives, then we go through what we have to do in the lesson, then we summarise, and then send them on to the next subject. And I was familiar with that. It was difficult to stay on over time because you lose the relationship with the students. You just have to produce the material they do.

A dominant university discourse is expressed by the teacher as "taken off with measurement", "everything should be measured", "competency

goals", "goal review", "produce the material", which is experienced as being at the expense of "getting to know the pupils" and "the relationship with the pupils", the very desire (rooted in an analyst discourse) to be a teacher at all is jeopardised, that is, "I was thinking about whether I really wanted to be a teacher when I came back". This is an insufficiently appropriated university discourse that cannot be said to ventriculate the teacher's genuine speaking being. A hysterical, doubting discourse asserts itself as "what will I do differently when I come back". That is, desire is not linked with positive enjoyment to the prevailing university and schooling discourse.

For the teacher, such dark clouds hang over the sentence "whether I really wanted to be a teacher when I came back", a kind of uncanny dasein or lack of subjecthood as "I am uncanny there", that the obligation to continue with positive additions can only seem like an excessive demand and a path to an enjoyable loss of identity. Under these conditions, perhaps the acceptance of one's thereness and subjecthood amounts to the affirmation of a catastrophe. From such an existential position of teacher desire, a transition to the affirmative symbolic order can only be carried out cynically. Perhaps it's fair to say and speculate that educational discourses and teacher practices do indeed articulate a cynicism that moves from the existential proposition to the heroic stance of "'I embrace the catastrophe of my being" or the hysterical revelation of "I celebrate the catastrophe that I am" and the imperfect or unfulfilled desires of control and domination of the discourses of appearance and dress. More about "oversized clothes" and a discourse on dressing in the next sequence:

Teacher: I think so, but that's how we should talk about recognition and. That it should be a theme at X-place, so I have a bit like "recognition"? It's not a word I normally use in that way. There's something about the mission statement and plans and things like that that are … We know they're there, you bring them into your practice, but I don't think we necessarily put it into words. It's part of the package you have when you become a teacher.

Here it is clear that the master discourse in the form of recognition and the Norwegian purpose clause and its six values (respect, solidarity, forgiveness, spiritual freedom, charity, and equality) belong to a symbolic order and a language that does not always resonate as well with the teacher's local practice but which is "part of the package … when you become a teacher" or understood as a discourse that paves the way for a satisfying dissatisfaction that excites and characterises the teacher's desire and can lead to a protesting hysterical discourse when such a more (abstract) master discourse is to be discretionarily determined and exercised in concrete situations. The Norwegian purpose clause is a starting point for what

should be at the core of the pupil's educational (bildung) process, an education that seems to be challenged from many sides:

> *Teacher:* Obviously, a lot of education also takes place through the programme. Yes, no, I think it's a bit difficult, quite simply. Because I feel the school has been given a very big responsibility. For example, the data… or the figures from the youth data survey show that there was so much bullying. It also says that most bullying happens on mobile phones – we have a mobile-free school. Bullying is … yes, it's dragged into school, but it has its roots and it often happens at home. So there's that friction there. I realise that society is changing, but I find it difficult.

As such, the desire of the teacher is eternal and can only be postponed and not finally satisfied. Desire is sought but never fully realised (Lacan, 1982), perhaps partly because "the school has been given a very big responsibility". Like the habit of picking at a scab, or the repetitive "failures" the teacher perceives in teaching, that is, "I find it difficult", jouissance is thus somewhat painful and unproductive, but there is also something disturbingly enjoyable about it (perhaps in so far as the teacher remains in the profession).

In the discourse of hysteria, the dominant position is occupied by the hysterical subject, which is the exemplary divided subject, wrapped in doubt, (silenced) protest, and questioning (i.e., the vignette of hysterical discourse). The cause of hysterical desire (object little a) occupies the position of truth, inaccessible to the subject. It manifests itself in the form of a demand addressed to someone about this truth to which the hysteric has no access: Who am I as a teacher? What do I want as a teacher from the other? What kind of teacher do I want? The other of the discourse corresponds to the teacher who is being questioned. With his questioning, the teacher as hysteric urges the master to produce knowledge. This knowledge attempts to explain the cause of hysterical desire, the others little object (object petit a). The most obvious examples of the function of the object petit a as a projection are shown in the analyst's discourse.

Discourse of the analyst as teacher

To illustrate this discourse, four vignettes are presented in the form of time and resources, listening and putting it behind us, language usage, and finally the tutor. These four vignettes are about opportunities and challenges related to analyst as teacher's attentive presence and transference in the teacher-pupil relationship. As a start, transference is to be understood as "the sum total of the analyst's biases, passions, and difficulties" (Lacan, 2006, p. 183). This means that we could consider how the teacher participates in the pupil's transference.

VIGNETTE 16: Time and resources

A skilled worker might say something about the limitations or challenges associated with a general lack of resources in the school which become apparent when the intention that all pupils should be seen in the classroom is to be realised:

> Yes, you don't get to know the young people so well, the other young people in the school compared to the ones you go to. So it's very often the case that the race is still on. I think that today, I haven't seen more than maybe four others in the class. Saying hello, we say hello when we arrive, it's not something we do together, it's for each individual in a way. I don't want to believe that everyone in the class feels seen if I come in and just say hello, a general hello. ……. It can be a bit difficult in everyday life … It's an example of how we need more skilled workers, assistants in school, at every stage. It's like that when we have the inspections, always make sure to talk to the others as well.

Here, the focus is on the practical limitations and a pronounced lack of resources/personnel regarding the possibility of transference for all pupils. Transference requires a present (being-there) "here and now" teacher, assistant, or skilled worker, and a fairly stable (time) relationship between pupil and teacher. This is about the teachers and other skilled workers perceived possibilities for attentive presence as a condition for caring and "healing" transference. In this context, the teacher's listening is important, as indicated by the next vignette.

VIGNETTE 17: Listening and putting it behind us

As a representative of several teachers, this teacher emphasises what it is like to be involved in a transference between pupil and teacher. It's important to remember that Lacan (1977, 2015) sees the site of transference as the most powerful space for the repetition of the pupil to come to life:

> It's all about enjoying yourself and being able to start again from scratch. Now it's recess, and we should put this behind us, and then we have to try an hour and then put this behind us. Then there's the matter of having the time and actually listening …. The challenges are that many times, it's the same thing that loops over and over again. It's just as important to listen to it every time … There may well have been an episode or situation, and we're done with it when we're done … we adults can't carry this with us all day, you have to

> remind kids that, remember earlier, it was like this and like that. But we kind of have to be done and in a way accept the kid anyway, show them that we like the kid anyway, now it's done.

The meaning of pupil-teacher transference is indicated here and interpreted by the teacher with the help of utterances such as "have to be done" and "accept the kid anyway", perhaps characterised by a suppressed irritation with a subsequent interpretation of the type requiring "to try an hour and then put this behind us". Or as Lacan (1977) affirms that "it is natural to interpret the transference" (p. 271) but at the same time neither the teacher nor Lacan harbours any illusions about the power of such interpretations to dissolve the transference (i.e., "it's the same thing that loops over and over again". Furthermore, yet another teacher emphasises the importance of transference and the repetitive:

> No, we tell them that this isn't okay and that trying to get away can happen. But it's … It's often the case that things like this happen, and some children have to get out of their own way in order to get … up with their window again to get close … As an adult, you know that the children here have big challenges, and we have to try to be very open to this happening to us. It's not always easy.

The posture of the teacher as analyst favours the emergence of the pupil in the position of the other as a hystericised subject that has barred access to his symptoms, but has the ability to direct her questions and complaints to the teacher (i.e., "children here have big challenges … some children have to get out of their own way". It is perhaps the repressed master signifier (standard of conduct and performance) that is revealed in the "caring listening" teaching as a sort of analysis, the manifest content, encrypted, and the interpretation they receive (i.e., "try to be very open to this happening to us". That is to say, the transference does come with its enjoyable modes of being, as it might also include disgust, anguish, anger, hopelessness, and arrogance as other enjoyments (more on this in Section 2). In a way, this is the knowledge of caring and listening never fully told, which the pupil may presume in the teacher as analyst. In the next sequence, there is some elaboration with regard to conditions for teaching:

> But there's also the fact that I've spent, what was it I said to one of my colleagues, a lot more time being a carer – well, maybe carer is a nice word – at this stage to get to know them and then start teaching them science. In the past, it's been a bit more 'smack, smack, smack', and then we were off and running. But here it's been very much a case of finding out who you really are, what makes you want to rip my head off in class, but then you come and put your head on my shoulder and want a hug? That's not true. So it's very different.

A perceived lack of time and a perceived lack of focus on subject-orientated teaching places other and higher demands on the teacher's ability and opportunities to build relationships and to appear as a subject supposed to know, as Lacan (2015) puts it. The teacher spends a lot of time as a speaking subject on questions such as "who you really are" in relation to the pupil, which in a Lacanian sense means that it is the teacher's unconscious that holds the key to unravelling the pupil's symptoms. More concretely, it means that:

Teacher 1: …they come back to us anyway. And then I think where they dare to take out that kind of aggression when they get angry, so I think … I feel that they're safe with me, or else they wouldn't dare to do it. There's something about daring to go straight to the heart of someone you're … but they're happy to take it out on someone they trust.

Teacher 2: Then they dare to show emotions. So in a way, the fact that some people can get a bit annoyed should almost be taken as a small vote of confidence, if you know what I mean? … Because, well, I've stood in them a few times. It's like, that's when they dare to express their feelings (joint confirmation from all four in the focus group interview).

Teacher 1 expresses a school day with a high degree of transference, for example, in the sense that "they're happy to take it out on someone they trust". This also indicates that the teacher is placed in the unconscious position of the subject supposed to be known by the pupil as a fertile ground of transference. In the discourse of the analyst, the teacher is in the position of agent, being represented by the object in the little other (object petit a); as such, the teacher is the cause of the desire of the pupil to know the meaning of their own symptoms (i.e., "aggression", "dare to show emotions"). In the continuation of the group interview, the teachers talk about how transference and its symptomisation can work in teaching in terms of pupils' use of everyday words, expressions, and language.

VIGNETTE 18: Language usage

Teacher 1: We had a dialogue game today about language use, and then they were divided into groups. And then they drew words, and then they had to place that word under acceptable, unacceptable, or if there is division within the group. And it was fascinating to see how different their opinions were, and how willing they were to listen to each other about why it's

not okay, in relation to when I stand there and use myself to my advantage. So there were some good reflections on that, when they could talk to each other. But it's difficult … because there's a huge divide. But it was. It has lifted us up.

Teacher 2: Yeah, we've started. We've had it in other grades as well … And it was like, there were some really good discussions around poo and monkey around some of them. We had slightly different words … (six-second pause).

Teacher 2: And there were much nicer words and the kind ones, there weren't so many kind words (shared laughter). But because we had some people who are darker in colour than the rest of us. And for them this was very negative, and they explained it in a good way, while the others said but I call my brother a poo and it's not meant as a bad thing. But it wasn't just those words. They were very good at listening to each other … Some were supposed to be cool and thought everything was fine … oh yeah, I'm cool, but. But when it came to things like cerebral palsy in relation to developmental disabilities in relation to colours. There were a lot of good discussions about those words. All the ugliest words you can think of in English and Norwegian that refer to everything perverse. That was something else. There were a lot of cool ones, but the ones that referred to discrimination. Because of someone.

Teacher 1: We and got it on more. It was a bit funny when they started to pick their notes away from acceptable, also more. As the discussion went on, like … is it allowed to swear here, after we had a very discussion about the word cunt for it, they think it's perfectly fine to use. And you can call someone that. That's not an insult? No, I say, then you pick up the phone. Then you call your mum's house and ask; Cunt, what's for dinner? No, you're crazy. Why don't you, no, it was about respect for others? And then we turned it into, Yes, but you shouldn't just respect your mum, we're the ones in the class with exactly the same feeling as mum would have had … and then they got some good ones, at least some of them.

Teachers talk about a dialogue game that aims to listen to the pupils' use of language before the pupils themselves sort out what is inside or outside in terms of words and expressions. This "pedagogical" game of dialogue as a group-based transference can serve two functions: (1) the repetition of the past and (2) the distortion of reality and the evocation of the uncanny real in both pupils and teachers.

Although Lacan (2015) argues that transference often manifests itself in the form of particularly strong effects, such as love and hate (which is

unlikely to be the case in the vignette above, and we hope it is not), it does not consist of such (real) emotions, but in the structure of an intersubjective relationship. This structural "intersubjective" understanding of transference makes us aware that we locate the essence of transference in the symbolic and not in the imaginary (Lacan, 2015), although it clearly has powerful imaginative effects.

Transference is implicit in the speech act that is actualised in the pupil-peer groups, which involves an exchange of signs that can transform the speaker (pupil) and the listener (pupil). Every time a pupil speaks to another in an authentic and full way, even if or because the words are "perverse", there is a transference, a symbolic transference, something that changes the nature of the beings present (i.e., "when they started to pick their notes away from acceptable"). With regard to this lengthy vignette, it can be observed that transference manifests itself in the guise of love. Primarily, it is the love of knowledge, manifested in the real-castrated and "correct" symbolic usage.

You've probably asked yourself whether this is really an analyst discourse, and it raises a very timely question. Is not the analyst "listening" discourse just the master or the university discourse in disguise? That is, is not this vignette just a commonplace (didactic) strategy to rephrase a pupil's utterance in 'acceptable' terminology"? The teacher occasionally seems to play an active modelling role in terms of the standard of acceptable language use (e.g., "then you call your mum's house and ask; Cunt, what's for dinner?").

In its purest intention, the analyst's discourse places the little other, the objet a (the object of desire), that is, the symptoms produced by listening (i.e., vignette "Listening and leaving it behind"), as prime over the meaning-making systems. The product of the analyst's discourse is the pupil as a divided subject over the structure of other discourses. Also, ideally, the desires of the pupil take precedence over the signifiers and demands of the master, even if they are anti-productive. In the end, this does not seem to be the case, or the whole "truth", because the university discourse of the teacher eventually intervenes. Then it seems a little unfair to quote and fully embrace Lacan's analyst discourse and then suggest that the analyst's discourse is the regime of the teacher who listens to the pupils without pre-empting their desires. We can question the dictum of the analyst's discourse to "teach without knowing what is being thought" because it's hard to see how it could work in an educational context without the discourses of the master and the university.

These vignettes of teaching discourse illustrate the real tensions of enjoyment inherent in the profession. The aim is to navigate between the personal, or subjects, and the systemic, or discourses, while at the same time satisfying the needs of both teachers and pupils, and meeting the demands of accountability and normativity. Ultimately, the aim is to achieve personal liberation while adhering to the established norms and discourses of the university and wider teaching community. The next

sequence shows one teacher's experience of the limitations of continuous "outreach" teacher education within a university discourse:

> Dangerous to get bored. It's dangerous if you don't sit down, if I tell you to start working on that task, so I come back. Then I blink or turn round and then I'm back and it's like, 'Yes, you were gone.' But I want to, well, maybe be a little more conscious of the fact that actually … then you won't. I've got a bit better at that now. If you don't want my help, I'll go and help someone else, and you can let me know when you're ready.

The teacher expresses that some of the pupils just say, "I don't want to do anything, leave me alone". If it seems more difficult from the teacher's point of view to draw them out, then leave them alone. What's striking is that the teacher doesn't always jump in with correction or instruction but lets them sit there and perhaps talk through it themselves. In other words, the teacher uses the analyst's discourse in a more conscientious and deliberate way (what Lacan (2015) might have called a constituted desire analyst who does not jump into too many uncanny countertransferences). More generally, perhaps, it could be argued that the teacher should reveal his or her desire for the pupil to continue with the learning activity (i.e., "and you can let me know when you are ready") because the teacher's desire encourages the pupil's engagement and can help the pupil to overcome ambivalence. In the next vignette, we move from "when ready for help" to pupil cooperation and hence the need for a different teacher approach, but still within the analyst discourse.

VIGNETTE 19: Tutor

As said by a teacher with over five years of experience:

> I've started teaching less and less. I've realised that they're a bit important (laughter) I've been working on this a bit over the last school year, or this year here, with the pupils using each other more. Because there are a lot of pupils with a lot of knowledge who don't come forward, or pupils who are very weak but who have a lot of knowledge. So I have more open assignments with practical tasks and then they have to help each other. So I've become that tutor. I don't present the topics as much as I used to, neither do I go through big assignments. Here it is. Here you have tasks. Choose which task you want to work on? Ask a friend or another student in the class before you come and ask me. And then I've seen that a lot of people have started to share themselves. And a lot of knowledge

> has emerged that I've never seen before. So I think it makes you feel like you're being accepted socially… It makes you flourish.

The teacher as analyst lets the pupils take the lead. In other words, the teacher is no longer the dominant actor as a university discourse would allow. The *statement* "I have started teaching less and less" and "I have become that tutor" testifies to a shift in discourse, from university discourse to analyst discourse. From a teacher role characterised by a lot of time spent introducing topics to a focus on attentive presence and transference. With the help of pupil-to-pupil collaboration, it facilitates how to teach, which can't be learnt directly by the teacher? This is perceived positively from the teacher's perspective (i.e., "a lot of knowledge has emerged that I have never seen before"). One speculation is that perhaps too many teachers experience their limits as a teacher within a university discourse, which is to struggle with the impulse to correct pupils. Like thinking, "just do that, because it would be the easier way to go, to do it for them". But perhaps the most important thing here is the "discovery" or a consciousness-raising teacher's desire that does not equate good one-way mediation (and exaggerated narcisistic projections) with the pupil's positive learning, and that the teacher's desire is exclusively limited to the pupil's learning and not towards the question "is this one-way mediation as teaching really good enough"? Perhaps it's possible to understand the relationship between teaching and learning more in-depth by applying Heidegger's (1968) account of teaching and learning:

> Teaching is even more difficult than learning. We know that; but we rarely think about it. And why is teaching more difficult than learning? Not because the teacher must have a larger store of information, and have it always ready. Teaching is more difficult than learning because what teaching calls for is this: to let learn … His conduct, therefore, often produces the impression that we properly learn nothing from him, if by "learning" we now suddenly understand merely the procurement of useful information. The teacher is ahead of his apprentices in this alone, that he has still far more to learn than they – he has to learn to let them learn.
>
> (p. 15)

This may seem like a blurred or confusing statement, the meaning of which initially appears difficult to decipher. But consider that teaching is more difficult than learning because what teaching calls for is this: to let learn. Intuitively we think about teaching and learning as different domains partly because language lets us do so (also because of our assumptions about authority and knowledge). If we look at the German language, teaching means Lehren and learning means Lernen, and hence it is easier to see them intertwined (teaching to let learn) because of their

common etymological origin. In other words, the attention and emphasis are on the pupil's possibilities, as they grope their way towards personal understanding and knowledge through de-centring of the subject. An unsettling question arises: What is the nature of teaching that allows learning and possibilities to occur? How might we establish conditions conducive to letting learning occur and possibilities to emerge? One way into the complex issues raised by these questions is to explore more of the teaching challenges of transfer. In the next section, the aim is to sharpen the focus on when transference turns into countertransference in teacher discourse, as well as to show what potential (Real) challenges this entails.

Section 2: The "fixation of the other" and "the appearances of disruptive real" in teacher practice

This section shows and emphasises the importance of how different discourses shape and help us to understand more of the complexity of teacher practice. The purpose is twofold and complex: firstly, to emphasise the structured dependency that can sometimes become overly fixed in a teaching practice by means of the master, university, and analyst discourses, and secondly, to show that there is always already something in the background (the Real) that can put the teacher in play or out of play when the discourses begin to make the teaching practice uncomfortable, annoying, guilt-ridden, "questionable", and tending towards the (existential) meaninglessness of being a teacher. This means, among other things, when the teacher as a speaking being closed in on himself and splits from within, on the way to suffocation without contact and oxygen from the Other, and ventriculates a language that no longer resonates with and appears empty to the teacher as a subject. There are interesting examples of how this countertransference occurs. The following are five vignettes of countertransference in teaching practice, namely (20) wanting to "save" pupils; (21) getting frustrated with pupils; (22) expressing anger; (23) expressing guilt; and (24) pushing pupils to take action before ready.

VIGNETTE 20: Wanting to "save" pupils

This vignette begins with two teachers and an interviewer focusing on the role of the teacher itself, or what functions the teacher role can and should have:

Teacher 1: I'm also wondering where my boundaries lie as … what should I do in my teaching profession? What other professions could be brought into the school system? It's a bit like, should we have had, well, health or environmental workers. Who should define what the teaching profession is?

Teacher 2: Yes, because we're not psychologists.
Teacher 1: No, I have … well, yes. I have a degree in something.
Interviewer: Therapy is one thing, but you can meet children in such a way that they don't need a psychologist, can't you?
Teacher 1: I can see that this is not okay for you, it's kind of an expression from a psychologist to say that, I think.
Teacher 2: And it probably makes a big difference for a child to hear that.
Teacher 1: I hope so. I work with recognition and emotions with children aged three and five myself, so I think that I can do that to a large extent with my pupils aged 13–16.

Particularly interesting in this context is teacher 1 expressing a concern about "Who should define what the teaching profession is?" and what the teacher thinks is an acceptable caring teaching practice (cf. "where is my limit"), while at the same time recognising pupils as an important part of teaching practice. In the next sequence, another teacher expresses a similar concern about "where do I draw the line" as a teacher in light of a desire and challenges related to looking after all pupils in a sufficiently caring way:

> But what I'm thinking about is kind of controlled from above. Because I'm given a framework for what I'm supposed to do, how much time I'm supposed to spend at work and plan teaching, carry out teaching, if I take extra time … Of course I should see all my pupils, that's not what I mean. But there's a limit to how far I can stretch my profession, then.

It is clear that this teacher articulates a (time) dilemma between doing the lesson and the relational response inherent in the statement "see all my pupils". Furthermore, another teacher elaborates that

> Because we already have our different boundaries and our inner compass that says something about what's okay for us. But to step out of that role a little and take on a slightly bigger role in terms of how much care and how much empathy I should show when I'm at work. That professional bit. And it's a balancing act for many and completely natural for others.

The teacher talks here about how much care and empathy for the pupil one can have and tolerate is different and up to the individual teacher. It is important to emphasise that it is not the desire to "save", "see all my pupils" and care for all pupils in a caring way that in itself can become an overly challenging and entrenched problematic countertransference (because it is, among other things, a normative principle and a cultivated practice within the teaching profession in most democratic countries),

but whether this type of countertransference takes over completely and dominates a secondary school teacher's pedagogical practice. In the next vignette, the personal challenges of dealing with countertransference become more apparent.

VIGNETTE 21: Getting frustrated with pupils

Here is an extract from a conversation between two teachers expressing negative feelings about teaching and pupils.

Teacher 1: It's going really well actually. I catch myself doing it once in a while, and that's what you do. You get a bit petty and irritated.

Teacher 2: So that's the time. And then there's probably a lot of frustration, I think. At least I can say for myself that there's a lot of frustration in knowing that, leaving a lesson, the lesson may have been fine, but you know that I haven't spoken to those two and I don't know what they've done because I've had to sit and focus 100 per cent on that, or I've had to go between and hold someone's ear. It sounds a bit violent, that's not what (literally) happens then.

It is not unnatural that the professional teacher relatively often has to deal with feelings of frustration and irritation, and it seems that teacher 2 is more than hinting that frustration as a countertransference can get the upper hand. Of course, there are several potential negative consequences of this. One is, there is a danger that the teacher's frustration will renew and reinforce the pupil's static state of learning performance (Lacan's term for the use of empty speech) when they lose focus on the bodies involved in the here and now. As the next vignette shows, the transition from annoyance and frustration to anger and resentment doesn't have to be long.

VIGNETTE 22: Expressing anger

In this vignette, three teachers share their thoughts on how often anger is aroused and whether it's possible to react differently:

Teacher 1: But I think in general, when we walk around here, there's so much going on, so it's easy for us to shout at each other

and slap each other, and I hear 'oh my God, now we're really angry', and then I'm not at all happy with myself. But sometimes that's just the way it has to be, and something has to be done about it. Because then we don't really show that much charity, young people feel. When you're sitting down to eat, and we're shouting and controlling, how are we going to change that?

Teacher 2: But I think there are an awful lot of kids who don't want to listen. They should have their way. But no matter how much we yell, they don't listen.

Teacher 3: No, how are we going to do that? We've got to do it in a different way than by shouting.

It is clear that the teachers are involved in a counter-transference where they yell, slap, and control because many of the pupils do not listen. It is also stated that this leads to dissatisfaction on their own behalf and that "we've got to do it in a different way than by shouting". Here, anger can be understood as a symptom of an unregulated and out-of-control "anger" discourse, that is, a counter-transference that dominates too much so that teachers are not satisfied with their everyday practice.

Although this vignette can be seen as a silent protest, attempting to redress the inductive effect of the established master signifiers, the discourse of the hysteric may potentially, albeit indirectly, produce a new master signifier in the name of the other, further alienating the teacher as the subject it was supposed to liberate (e.g., by introducing a harsh, sanction-based and authoritarian teaching regime). But it could also be said that within the analyst's discourse, there does not seem to be enough (ethical) and collective effort to approach countertransference in a way that helps the analysand as teacher to produce healthy and better new master signifiers. Another example of a potential unhealthy countertransference is presented in the next vignette.

VIGNETTE 23: Expressing guilt

A statement from an experienced teacher with ten years of professional practice says that speaking being this about a significant perceived change:

> As I said, I have my ten years. It has developed a lot in those ten years. When I started, it was… and I wasn't answered back either. So, if you say 'yes, but now, now you've done it. Then the consequence is this.' Then there's a facial appearance factor straight away, so you get it. In other words, you get an answer back that wasn't like that

> before at all. You kind of get the idea that it's your fault, and we're teachers, we should be programmed, and I think a lot of people are, unfortunately maybe a little too much. Some people take it home with them, a little bit into their hearts and a little bit up in the air all the time. A bit like, okay, yes, yes, what could I have done differently then? To reach that one? You may have achieved quite a lot, but how could I have achieved those two when I had that, or when it happened, or? You kind of get a guilty conscience then- Constant consistency. I woke up last night at 4 am. Pling. It's been a long time since I've spoken to it. How's it going there? I've done a bad job there, oh, how am I going to get this right? And you, it becomes a kind of, what can I say? A disease, eventually. And unfortunately, because you really want to leave here with your head held high and think that today I have, I think everyone knows that I have seen them. So things have changed a lot. You used to do teaching. …
>
> The first time I started studying English, we got through the entire syllabus in three years plus a recap, i.e., we went through the entire syllabus in the last two months before the exam. Now it's like, we just have to skip that stuff, because now we just have to, what, where are we? We don't have time for everything because you have to take Per, Pål and Espen Askeladd into account. Well, it doesn't matter. And we will. But there's no room, no time, no opportunity.

The teacher describes a development that has gone from "you used to teach" to now "there's a personal face factor straight away", where the disciplined, passive, and servile pupil is no longer dominant. Without using just one teacher as a witness to the truth, an ominous consequence could be that perhaps too many teachers find themselves in an irreversible or fixed counter-transference or, as the teacher observes and says more cautiously, that "some people take it home with them, a little bit into their hearts and a little bit up in the air all the time". This is further emphasised by statements such as "you kind of get a guilty conscience then" in such a way that it has become "a disease, eventually"'. As can be seen in the next sequence, the path from a constant guilty conscience to guilt is not long:

Teacher 1:	I might think that they get a bit threatened, that it became physical, to hold on to the fact that it's their (the pupil's) fault that he gets a kind of guilty feeling.
Interviewer:	Do you get a sense of guilt?
Teacher 2:	Yeah, I would say so. The job comes home with me at least in my head … I sit with thoughts at home about what you could have done differently and like … should I have seen it before. I should have taken two steps forward before.

Teacher 1: It's not always possible to predict things or. Or sometimes it can happen at half past eight in the morning. The school bell has rung, and then there may be things in advance that we haven't realised. Something on the home front, something on the way to school, things like that that we haven't realised and that we can't predict. And then events like that happen. And then you're left with a kind of guilt.

It is clearly something about the Real-body, that is, from the first sequence, "I woke up last night at 4 am. Pling", a signal from the Other that evokes anxiety, is, in Lacanian (1977) terms, anxiety (which is universally seen as a barrier to enjoyment) and is, in fact, a way of sustaining desire and repetition. As well as linking anxiety with the Real, Lacan (1977) also locates it in the imaginary and contrasts it with guilt, which he situates in the symbolic. One thing that is constant is that anxiety is always connected with loss (Lacan, 1977), in this vignette something the teacher can't face without vertigo. (If you have seen the Hitchcock film of the same name, you will know what vertigo is, a terror that renders the subject paralysed.)

As such, anxiety tends to paralyse the teacher as subject; like depression, it encourages relentless, circular "thinking" that isn't thinking at all, but churning. Desire can be a remedy for this when, as in the case of anxiety, the object of desire is absent and nothingness is maintained. Therefore, an unconsciously purposeful desire becomes something easier to bear than anxiety (Lacan, 1977). However, from a Lacanian point of view (Lacan, 1977), which I think is worth considering, it is clear that guilt should not be ignored, nor should anyone try to convince the teacher as analysand that she is not really guilty. If the teacher feels guilt, acts in ways that indicate unconscious guilt, or plans to be punished and lose what is precious, then it is because she is guilty, but of what? Guilt is not irrational from a Lacanian perspective, but refers to something real, ethically. The analysis tries to find out what this violation refers to. What is the analysand guilty of? The teacher may be fixated or perplexed by guilt but can't see that he has done anything wrong (i.e., "to hold on to the fact that it is his (the pupil's) fault that he (the teacher) feels a kind of guilt"). Interestingly, scrutinising actions in the present does little to alleviate guilt and self-punishing actions, as events in the present are occasions for satisfying guilt, not causes of it. In terms of a kind of "awareness therapy" (to be elaborated in Chapter 10), the lost, sacrificed ("enjoyable") jouissance leads the teacher as subject to blame Otherness (i.e., for stealing the subject's enjoyment), and the key question is how to deal with this. One way of dealing with this is shown in the next vignette, which deals with an unconscious countertransference that pushes forward the pupil's potential for social and academic development.

VIGNETTE 24: Pushing pupils to take action before ready

Here is a statement that clarifies a perceived sharper focus and a more demanding task than before on the educator's role and regarding pupils' "missing" social skills:

> So it's clear that we should be a contributor, but sometimes I feel there's a bit too much on us. A lot is left to the school. We also want to have fun at home and not have to fight a lot of battles, I feel.

More concretely, this can involve the following in teaching:

> I think role-playing becomes a form of modelling for the kids. We've done it quite a lot before, we haven't been so good at it lately. But when we have social goals, we have 'what can we do?', for example social goals that they help each other. 'Now the three of you are going to show a role play about how to help each other.' And then we've always tried to guide them into showing how to do it and how not to do it. That it should have a positive angle. And they think that's fun, but I've tried it now with mine, who I haven't done it with before, and they can't do it. So you have to teach it to them somehow. And then it can be the simplest thing, that you come in with your books and someone opens the door for you. That was one example.

There is no doubt that this requires a lot of repetition and that sometimes the role-play does not have the desired effect, "they can't do it", perhaps because the teacher is pushing pupils to take action before ready. The underlying premise seems to be that teaching as education is preferred to subject-specific teaching when the subject-oriented teacher discourse is experienced as too challenging to implement or as it is expressed:

> … We can't make 'Einsteins' out of everyone, so in a way it's about making them a good person. Who have to fend for themselves.

In trying to maximise the potential of the pupil through education or upbringing, the teacher desires the object or x-factor in the little other (object petit a); that is, the "little other" is not really the other person or pupil at all, but a reflection or projection of the teacher's ego.

As previously stated, Lacan (2015) posits that the site of transference represents the most potent arena for the repetition to evoke a state of awakening in the person (analysand) under examination. It is also possible that the teachers in these vignettes, whether consciously or unconsciously, perceive the phenomenon of countertransference and its inherent drive for repetition as a potent space for the pupils and

themselves to flourish. As illustrated in the vignettes from 20 to 24, transference can manifest as a desire to "save" the pupil or the other, which is sometimes or perhaps too often accompanied by enjoyable modes of being or emotional states such as anger, frustration, guilt, doubt, protest, and hopelessness. The point is that the 'natural' transfer turns into an unfortunate counter-transfer when such (passive) emotional states of being begin to take on a life of their own.

Perhaps this statement from an experienced teacher sums up something of the essence of being a teacher as an increasingly divided subject, namely an ever-increasing experience of insufficiency.

Teacher: Yes, they really do. Not everything is quite right. Because we repeatedly experience, not defeat, but that you don't go far enough, you feel then, it does something to you as a person. And I think that starts much earlier than it did before. I must honestly say that.

The Real happens insofar as something vacillates in the fantasy, allows its components to appear, allows them to appear and be received as something that manifests itself in the symptoms as what may be the beginning of an experience of depersonalisation (i.e., vignette of expressing quilt of the utterance "you don't go far enough"), and which is that by which the imaginary limits between the subject and the object find there to be changed, in the proper sense of the term, the order of what is called the phantastical.

One possible interpretation of the phrase "you don't go far enough" as representing a common collective voice is that it signifies a "loss" in the form of a failure of meaning. This loss is paradoxically brought about by language itself and discourses themselves. Lacan (1998) refers to this "'loss" as the objet petit a (the others little object). It is first important to note that the objet petit a is not an actual object; rather, it is a constitutive lack. It is the lack that produces the desiring teacher as a subject caught up in the play of signifiers and discourses. In other words, it is the loss of the "object" that causes the teacher to desire in the first place. For example, the vignettes of "wanting to 'save' pupils", "expressing anger", and "expressing guilt" indicate that the image of the pupil as the other gives a body to the teacher's innermost split, to what is in them more than themselves, and thus prevents them (ever) from achieving full identity with themselves.

In essence, this is a series of 20–24 vignettes that illustrate the phenomenon of a "'desire avalanche", or more accurately, the phenomenon of "feelings going astray". This raises the question of how to resolve the issue. It would be beneficial to ascertain whether a rapid solution exists. Indeed, this is a theoretically viable proposition. In theory, according to a Lacanian perspective, the analyst should refrain from acting or speaking on the basis of these feelings alone. It is important to accept that teachers have

feelings towards their pupils. Furthermore, it is possible that the teacher as analyst may be able to direct the teaching process more effectively by reflecting on these feelings. The key is that the teacher must be aware of the necessity to refrain from yielding to these sentiments with undue frequency and to maintain their appropriate place in the pedagogical landscape. Additionally, it is essential to ascertain how to effectively harness these sentiments in the teaching process. This is to say that it is not because experience and current subjectivity have drained away the teacher's passions, but because it has given them a desire which is even stronger than those passions, a desire which Lacan (1998) calls the desire of the analyst. The implications of this for teacher education will be discussed in Chapter 10. As a preliminary matter, it can be argued that these countertransference fantasies should be subjected to analysis in order to prevent them from unduly influencing the teacher's interventions. In conclusion, it can be proposed that educators should utilise countertransference as a tool to facilitate self-awareness and therapy. From a Lacanian perspective, it is hoped that in the future the desire of the analyst will prevail over the irritation, anger, guilt, and other forms of enjoyment experienced by the teacher, allowing them to maintain control of the situation.

To develop this further, the vignettes may indicate and demonstrate, but they also give rise to feelings of jealousy. In this emotion, the teacher as subject creates or imagines a utopian environment (a place of complete fulfilment) from which they feel excluded. This phenomenon may be termed "educational jealousy". It encompasses the fantasies of teachers who adopt an authoritarian and discipline-based approach, who fantasise about the excessive enjoyment of their pupils, and those who adopt a fundamental safety-embracing and care-oriented approach, who fantasise about not pushing their pupils to progress before they are ready. Such fantasies may appear exaggerated and extreme, yet they exemplify a spectrum of narcissistic tendencies commonly observed in teachers. Lacan (1991) posits that narcissism is an inherent aspect of subjectivity, a necessary phenomenon to avoid the formation of a divided subjectivity.

Furthermore, it is not uncommon to encounter teachers who express a desire to "save" their pupils, as illustrated in vignette 20. These teachers adopt this position as a subject, driven by the fantastical belief that they are improving their pupils' lives. In this sense, a certain narcissistic enjoyment may be at play, even if or because of it is in allowing the Other to unconsciously capitalise on one's desire. It could be argued that desire is fundamentally based on a misrecognition of fullness (as evidenced by the various manifestations of the Real in the vignettes), where there is actually nothing but a screen for the teachers' own narcissistic projections. It is this sense of lack at the core of desire that ensures the teacher's continued longing. This may appear to be merely another account of unending anguish. However, the notion of the teacher as a divided subject indicates that the possibility for transformation exists within the very failure

of discourse itself, in those instances of Real impossibility that mark the presence of the teacher as subject. It may be posited that the potential for change and transformation from within the subject is indeterminate and a function of the discourse's unforeseen by-products, as evidenced by the vignettes of countertransference.

Section 3: Remarks on vignettes

In light of the fact that the teachers' comprehension is thus perpetually dislodged from the Real and redirected towards symbolisation, castration (elimination of "bi-products"), and "proper" professional discourses of language and practice (most evidently exemplified in Vignettes 1–11 and potentially 16–19), the enjoyable movement or aspects of the Real desire may be characterised in disparate ways. It may therefore be pertinent to enquire whether discernible patterns can be identified in the experiences of desire. The vignettes indicate that teachers are engaged in diverse real experiences, encompassing a spectrum from the avoidance practice (maintaining the status quo) to the profound loss of the taken-for-granted roles of speaking and anxiety (Angst and nothingness in Heideggerian terms). This may result in the emergence of a novel teacher desire and subjectivity. In light of the aforementioned material, four distinct modes of engagement with the Real experience may be identified among teachers: (1) Desire-reserved, (2) Desire-slow, (3) Desire-blank, and (4) Desire-ecstatic.

1 ***Desire-reserved*:** The aforementioned master signifiers, as illustrated in the teachers' discourses (i.e., "cadaver discipline", "regular teaching", "curriculum", "testing and theory", and all the vignettes from 1 to 11), exemplify a mode of Desire-reserved, wherein the value of ignorance and the excess of signs are upheld. It is crucial to recognise that ignorance is no longer in opposition to knowledge; rather, it is an inherent aspect of the very structure of knowledge (cf. Felman, 1982). Although hermeneutic in principle and inherently open to possibilities and truths, the master discourse has the potential to occlude alternative effective forms of understanding, education, and pedagogies. Despite its capacity to reveal historical unfoldings, desire is characterised by an inherent ignorance that can be equated with the totality of the unconscious (a phenomenon that Heidegger (1962) sought to explore as Seinvergessenheit). Consequently, educational practice has remained unable to fully actualise the potential disclosures within the epochs of history. It can be argued that there is always a hitherto undisclosed "real reserve" that has not yet been revealed in its totality. The phenomena associated with this form of repression, concealment, or ignorance are always present in a somewhat indistinct manner. In a sense, the teacher as a subject within a master and university discourse is perpetually in a state of radical retreat, which I refer to as Desire-reserved.

2 ***Desire-slow*:** The Desire-slow modality entails a deceleration of activity on the part of the teachers. This is achieved by maintaining a state of positive enjoyment, ensuring that the process remains mindful and on track, while also developing countertransference skills. This approach ultimately leads to a suspension of activity, creating an environment conducive to remote uncanniness and potential real encounters. Such a phenomenon may be observed in section two vignettes 20–24. For example, the vignettes "Expressing Anger" and "Expressing Quilt" illustrate this phenomenon. This disclosure of desire as a sense is revealed to be a gradual phenomenon in teachers' experiences when confronted with negative enjoyment in relation to conventional teaching methods, curricula, testing procedures, and theoretical frameworks (as illustrated in Vignettes 5, 7, and 10). It seems reasonable to posit that this forgetfulness (Vergessenheit) may become the subject matter of a potential real teacher. This desire is revealed as a contemporary phenomenon within the context of the wider historical and social milieu, even though it may not yet be manifestly or thematically evident as an educational phenomenon in its own right.
3 ***Desire-blank (Real)*:** It appears that Desire-blank may have two effects:

   i On occasion, explicit Real-Anxiety diverts the teacher from the familiar and reveals the state of Being-there (Dasein) and its surrounding world. This suggests that Lacan reverts to the concept of the Real-subject. Explicit anxiety serves the teacher in two ways. Firstly, it reveals the subject in its divided state. Secondly, the teacher's own angst detaches her from worldly concerns and prejudices, thereby facilitating the possibility of education and a new life project. Such aspects of desire-blank are illustrated in hysterical vignettes 12–15, which may be understood as instances of the desire to not be that teacher. In conclusion, in the context of Real as anxiety, teachers experience the entirety of being as a unified entity, yet this experience also evades any definitive grasp. Therefore, the result is the residual structure of being there within the subject, a bare world, and a net-split subject as teacher-in-the-world devoid of the typical accompaniments.
   ii Anxiety and the uncanny provide teachers with an opportunity to flee from themselves and take refuge in, or "fall into", familiar intraworldly master and university discourses. This can be seen as a kind of castrated, yet familiar, being (Vignettes 1–11). The stability of teaching discourses appears to act as a barrier to the Real. It would appear that when the stability and conventional methods of teaching and the role of the teacher are no longer effective, existential realities emerge. The most rudimentary experiences of the Real manifest as a sense of estrangement and uncanniness. It could be argued that the promise of guidance from superiors in the academic and therapeutic fields is not primarily about achieving a successful career as an educator, but rather about perpetuating the misconception that scrutiny and the Real can be kept at bay.

4 ***Desire-ecstatic*:** The concept of desire-ecstasy may be perceived as a challenge by those who prioritise the role of educators (or other educational participants) at the centre of the educational process, without fully acknowledging that centring these educators or pupils at the centre of the educational process raises the fundamental issue of how to achieve genuine enjoyment of the educational experience. The following considerations may prove beneficial in this context: For the sake of argument, we may concede that teachers occupy a central position. In light of the argument that teachers are the source of enjoyment, it can be concluded that the centre is, in fact, the source of reality. Consequently, the subject that is divided must be characterised as either ecstatic or eccentric. Given that the "excentric" is that which is off-centre or external to the structure, it follows that the ontological way of being assigned to an educational substantial centre must shift to the periphery (off-centre). Therefore, the Real is revealed to be "centred" not in some conscious cognitive activity or internal psychological processes (as postulated by learning theories such as those of J. Piaget (1953) and L. S. Vygotsky (1978)), but rather in the former periphery, namely the shared symbolic world or (unconscious) masterly or questioning discourses.

This "excentric" character is precisely what Lacan (1998) indicates when he states that pure jouissance/enjoyment is a bare embodied subject in Being-in-the-world/discourses. Furthermore, this implies that the concept of the centre should be re-conceptualised as that of the Real-enjoyment, which is ecstatic or "excentric". This has the effect of overturning the traditional understanding of teachers as subjects. This potential shift in perspective may be most clearly observed in vignettes 5, 6, and 19.

One consequence of the teachers' eccentric sense of lack is a pervasive experience of alienation, whereby their educational lives and the world are felt to be somewhat out of joint and where their positive enjoyment (jouissance) has been lost. One consequence of this experience is an ongoing engagement with fantasy, prompted by a desire to recapture the full and harmonious state, along with the enjoyment that is believed to have been lost and from which alienation has resulted. Such fantasies may be of a positive or negative nature. The "positive" variety of fantasy posits that investing significant effort in tutoring a particular group of pupils will result in a tangible improvement in the teacher's own well-being. However, fantasies may also assume a negative form, in which the failure to attain a desired outcome is perceived as a harbinger of impending misfortune. Such fantasies typically revolve around an object that is perceived as the source of disruption or obstruction to enjoyment or its realisation. In the process of education for desire, problematic pupils, incompatible co-teachers, dysfunctional teacher teams, and authoritarian principals are often conceptualised as such objects.

Section 4: Summary and reflection

The institution of the symbolic order and the assignment of a place for the teacher subject can be considered instances of alienation or a sense of not being at home. However, they also serve as the site of eccentric subjectivation. The designation of the subject as "teacher", which is determined prior to the individual's engagement in teaching practice and is not indicative of the subject's identity, inscribes the subject within the symbolic order. The teacher subject assumes its place in the symbolic order through the name it assumes, as demonstrated in university vignettes 1–11. The subject is effectively obscured by the master signifier, to a greater or lesser extent, and submerged by language.

This chapter presents an account of teacher practice as a continuous attempt to define themselves differently through the unfolding and potential shifting of discourse. This attempt was referenced to the discursive functions of the master, university, hysteric, and analyst, which serve to orient the teacher's desire towards (educative) experiences and understandings in different ways. It is proposed that teachers are driven by a desire for certainty (as evidenced in master and university discourse) and repetition (as illustrated in vignettes 16–19). This impulse fuels their enjoyment and engagement with positive and negative fantasies and educative experiences. This is further conceptualised as a fixation on the Other (see Section 2 on countertransference) as an expression of desire. As teachers engaged in teaching, it is possible to identify the significance of genuine uncertainty within the practice of teaching (hysteric, analyst). In other words, a successful teacher can establish a productive relationship with doubt and protest by analysing their own teaching practice and identifying areas for possible improvement (vignettes 12–19).

Lacan (1998) outlines four discourses: the Master, the University, the Hysteric, and the Analyst. In summary, the discourse of the master is essentially authoritarian and characterised by the establishment of a dominant position. The discourse of the university is "disciplinary" and regulatory, with an emphasis on education and the act of calling forth. The discourse of the hysteric is that of an obsessive inquirer, protester, and resister. Finally, the discourse of the analyst is that of an ethical listener, facilitating change and potential revolution for the pupil. The master teacher is driven by the repression of their divided nature, the hysteric teacher by the Real in the form of the object (petit a), the university teacher by the ghostly and ineradicable superegoic imperative of the master to keep on knowing more and more, and the analyst teacher by (unconscious) knowledge itself as it emerges in the analytic encounter.

In a Lacanian conception of discourse structure, the teachers are persistently responding to an impossibly complex demand, staged, and enacted by herself, in the vicissitudes of her own desire. It is like the teacher says, "What do you as the Other really want from me?" or "What do I want from the Other?" These are inevitable questions that, in one way or another, in an ontological sense, are unconsciously answered beyond the teachers as subjects of free will. This inevitable (surplus-)enjoyment complicates the problem of

responsibility as an ethical issue (the third question posed in the introduction). The teacher as subject can exonerate himself of responsibility with regard to the symbolic network of tradition which overdetermines his speech (cf. on passivity Chapter 3). As such, is he justified in claiming that "I am not the true author of my statements, since I merely repeat the performative patterns I'm socialised, trained, and customised to believe in"?

One might remain unconvinced that the Lacanian unconscious subject can be held responsible for its actions, or even capable of radically reorienting its way of being in the world. It may still be challenging to explain change from a Lacanian perspective. In essence, Lacan (1998) defines the unconscious subject, the linguistic unconscious, as that which makes each of us an effect of the signifier. Despite Lacan's assertion that the slightest alteration in an individual's or teacher's structuration of the symbolic order has a profound impact, the question remains as to the extent to which the teacher is responsible for their actions.

In other words, it is the discourses and the "big Other" which effectively speak through the teacher. To illustrate, the teacher in vignettes 3, "cadaver discipline", and 5, "regular teaching", can consistently invoke the network of historical sedimentations, such as "the respect is no longer there", in which his speaking being is embedded. To illustrate this point further, if the teacher were to hypothetically evoke indirect arguments justifying "getting frustrated with pupils" or "expressing anger" (as demonstrated in the vignettes in Section 2), a particular group of pupils, due to their status as vulnerable and perceived as potential school failures, may be even more inclined to engage in disruptive behaviour within this teaching discourse. Nevertheless, the teacher as subject bears full responsibility for the enjoyment derived from this aggressive and narcissistic outburst.

Nevertheless, it is important to note that these discourses rarely manifest in their ideal or "pure" forms (Sarup, 1992, p. 41). The fact that these positions within discourse are both "smaller" and "bigger" than the teacher means that we are not discussing specific individuals, as though one is automatically confined to the roles of a "Master" or a "Hysteric". Nevertheless, in practice, due to the tendency to teach in a manner consistent with one's own pedagogical experiences, individual teachers frequently exhibit a predisposition towards a specific approach, which often manifests as a fluctuating alternation between "masterly" and "disciplinary" discourses and arguments. However, it can be argued that these four modes of (unconscious) voices or discourses are more akin to roles or personae that specific teachers may adopt intermittently. This does not imply that the discourses merge to such an extent that their characteristics are lost. It is often possible to discern the precise moment when an individual ceases to speak in the manner of a Master and begins to speak on behalf of the Analyst, or when the discourse of Hysteria gives way to the voice of "reason".

However, the teacher's encounters with the Real are not always disrupted, affected, or disrupted by the symbolic, which necessarily constructs the teacher.

This is not a paradoxical situation, given that the Real is simply present; it does not function as a demonstrative but rather represents the unrepresentable beyond systems of designation and signification. In essence, the Real remains an unknowable entity, an impossible, inexpressible space that exists beyond the boundaries of language. It can only be glimpsed and accessed indirectly through language and the symbolic.

Notes

1 The empirical data used in this book comes from an ongoing research project called Values in Schools, conducted by Arne Jordet, Stian Torjussen, Harald Løken, and Håvard Åsvoll. As representatives of the research group DaVeKu (Education, Values, and Cultural Heritage) at the Inland University, Norway, we have conducted eight individual interviews with teachers and 12 focus group interviews, and have produced about 60 reflective notes over a period of 1.5 years. The starting point for the research project and the interview guides is how the teacher perceives and practices values in the classroom. All empirical data is generated from one primary and secondary school in Norway. This book uses empirical data in the form of interviews with these teachers. Special care has been taken to anonymise the teachers and their utterances as much as possible; as the teachers show how a potentially "vulnerable", personal and action-requiring, and therefore "fallible", professional practice is perceived and exercised (the way the empirical data is presented in this book is, however, entirely at the author's own expense). The accounts of teacher interviews are used as illustrative examples and should not be taken as representative samples, although the interweaving of empirical and Lacanian terminology may enable the reader to see the universal in the particular in an analytical description, or at best, as Lacan puts it, to think with one's feet.

2 Education should be based on the fundamental values of Christian and humanist heritage and tradition, such as respect for human dignity and nature, spiritual peace, charity, forgiveness, equality and solidarity, values that are also expressed in different religions and beliefs and that are rooted in human rights (https://www.udir.no/lk20/overordnet-del/formalet-med-opplaringen/?lang=nob, downloaded 07.07.2024, my translation).

3 Here is an extract from paragraph 9 A-4. *Duty of activity to ensure that pupils have a safe and good psychosocial school environment:*

Everyone who works at the school must monitor whether the pupils have a safe and good school environment and intervene against offences such as bullying, violence, discrimination, and harassment if possible. Everyone working at the school must notify the head teacher if they suspect or know that a pupil does not have a safe and good school environment. The principal must notify the school owner in serious cases. If the school suspects or learns that a student does not have a safe and good school environment, the school must investigate the matter as soon as possible. When a pupil says that the school environment is not safe and good, the school must ensure that the pupil has a safe and good school environment as much as possible. The same applies when an investigation shows that a student does not have a safe and good school environment. The school must ensure that the pupils involved are heard. What is best for the pupils must be a fundamental consideration in the school's work. The school must draw up a written plan when measures are to be taken in a case (https://lovdata.no/nav/lov/1998-07-17-61/kap9a, downloaded 09.07.2024).

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Part III

Implications and reflections on desire for educational theory and practice

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8 Implications for theory

Theory as different modes of the gaze

There are a number of different understandings, traditions, perspectives, and theories about what theory is and how it might be expected to unfold in the field of education sciences and in the research of pedagogy. In essence, the term "theory" has its roots in the Greek words "theorein" (verb) and "theoria" (noun). In its original context, it signified the act of closely observing the outward form of a subject matter (cf. Heidegger's lecture "Science and Reflection", in which Heidegger (1977) traces the intellectual history of "theory"). An additional perspective on theory is presented by Tellings (2001, p. 9), who asserts that theory "describes reality, explains reality, and, if possible, indicates how reality can be changed". Consequently, it provides direction for our empirical research and our interventions in practice. Theory guides by means of an attentive observation of the outward appearance of a phenomenon; thus, theory and the researcher are not an intrinsic part of the phenomenon. The Lacanian gaze may provide a radically different perspective on theory and theory-in-use. To be frank, there is a distinction to be made between viewing a theory and being subjected to the gaze of a theory, or what might be termed "theory gazing" into the researcher's vision. These implications and interpretations at the level of theory as gaze are often overlooked and ignored.

The following interpretation and gaze departure form must aim at the void of the first absence of the lost object, which can be defined as an "anything". It is accompanied by a specific mark derived from the subject's lived experience and denotes the location of a non-object, which Lacan (1977) refers to as the "object a". This assertion is predicated upon an understanding of the contemporary concept of theory that extends beyond the confines of a strict logical deductive system. The broader definition indicates the extent to which a researcher's personal experience, unacknowledged biases, and disciplinary location influence interpretation and the potential for theory to be shaped by the researcher's perspective.

Lacan's (1998) most comprehensive examination of vision is presented in his Seminar XI. This is made up of four seminars that were originally given in 1964, published in French in 1973, and collectively called, in its later English translation, "Of the Gaze as Objet Petit a". The four seminars are not straightforward to comprehend, and thus I do not claim to fully elucidate the intricate

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dialectic of the eye and the gaze. Nevertheless, the interpretative power of Lacan's discourse on the gaze should not preclude its consideration as a focus of interest in the role of theory in educational sciences and pedagogy.

In Lacan's (1977, 1998) seminars on vision, the meaning of the gaze appears to undergo a constant shift. Several authors (e.g., Feldstein, 1995; Jay, 1993; Ragland, 1995) posit that the gaze occupies four distinct positions in these seminars, corresponding to four different interpretations of Lacan's notoriously elusive object a.[1] I will provide a brief overview of these four theoretical perspectives on the gaze: (1) the gaze as a lost object, (2) the gaze as a substitute object, (3) the gaze as a cause of attraction, and (4) the gaze as a cause of separation. The latter two will be discussed in greater detail before finally examining the transition between the four positions within the context of the drive and desire circuit.

(1) ***Theory as the gaze as lost object*:** In one interpretation of the seminars on vision, the gaze represents a fundamental loss to what Lacan (1998) terms the geometrical vision of the eye. Similarly, the unconscious and the gaze can only be discerned through an indirect approach. In Lacan's analysis of Hans Holbein's 1533 painting, The Ambassadors,[2] the gaze is identified in the distorted shape in the foreground of the painting. This gaze is inaccessible to distinct vision, yet it is sufficiently registered by the viewer that it provokes a return gaze as the viewer leaves the room. This enables the viewer to perceive the angled skull for the first time.

In the words of Lacan (1998, p. 102), there is no coincidence between the eye and the gaze, but rather a lure. To illustrate, the gaze as the lost object is evidenced in the academic aspirations of many novice researchers. Achievement in academia and universities is frequently associated with the prospect of a more rewarding future, a fulfilling career, social mobility, or personal fulfilment. These future aspirations serve as the objet petit a, with researchers persistently pursuing this ideal, yet it remains elusive and undefined. Despite their achievements in academia, whether in terms of the number of high-quality published texts or other indicators, there is a persistent sense that something is lacking or that they have not yet attained the anticipated future.

To illustrate further, a pedagogy researcher may invest significant effort into pursuing a tenure-track position, with the aspiration of securing a permanent role at a renowned academic institution. This is often driven by the belief that such a position will ultimately lead to personal fulfilment and success. Upon attaining this objective, however, they discover that the anticipated gratification has merely been relocated to the subsequent unattainable objective: excelling in research towards a full professorship, securing the optimal position, and so forth. The desired future is perpetually deferred, functioning as the lost object that shapes the academic trajectory but is never fully actualised.

In terms of the gaze as a theoretical framework for researchers, it is important to consider the potential for researcher bias in studies that involve interviewing teachers about their experiences with educational reform. While

a researcher may initially strive to present the teachers' narratives faithfully, the process of analysing and writing up the data may reveal that their own theoretical framework has unduly shaped the way these voices are represented. It is crucial to recognise that the ideal of perfect, unmediated representation is unattainable and that the pursuit of true authenticity continues to drive the researcher's efforts.

An additional example is provided herewith. In the academic world, there is frequently a demand for the creation of innovative and transformative research that is distinct from existing work. This pursuit of originality can result in a lack of clarity (because of object petit a) regarding the relationship between new research and existing knowledge. The educational research field is built upon previous studies with established theoretical frameworks, and most new research must acknowledge existing knowledge and build on established theories. The aspiration for radical innovation remains unattainable, compelling the researcher to persistently innovate but never attaining a state of complete originality. In other words, a researcher developing a new theoretical model for understanding student, pupil, or teacher desire may feel compelled to frame their work as entirely novel and distinct from previous models. Nevertheless, it is possible that their ideas will prove to be similar to or based on earlier theories. The unattainable ideal of complete innovation and novelty provides motivation for their work, but it remains elusive, given the cumulative and interconnected nature of academic knowledge.

In a sense, the appointment is always missed, as Lacan (1998, p. 128) states in reference to the relation to the Real. Lacan (1998) draws attention to the discordance between the eye and the gaze with the observation that "what I look at is never what I wish to see" (p. 103). The initial "moment of seeing" (Lacan 1998, p. 103) is the moment of losing the gaze. This may be exemplified by the moment of perceiving the skull in Holbein's painting or the lost object that shapes and (temporarily) matches the researcher's theoretical trajectory with empirical evidence or representative examples, but is never fully actualised. This represents the closest the subject can come to an awareness of the gaze, given that while the gaze is present to that subject, the ego is not. In other words, the gaze is irretrievably lost to the eye and thus to the subject as researcher or student of education. This interpretation of the gaze as the element that is fundamentally absent from vision is aligned with Lacan's (1998) characterisation of the object a in the context of Seminar XI. In a sense, therefore, theoretical concepts, perspectives, traditions, and models cannot provide a guarantee of optimal or good educational research, despite their potential to offer fulfilment and perfection.

(2) ***Theory as the gaze as substitute object*:** Lacan's (1998) seminar on the gaze reveals a second strand of meaning: it is not the actual lack of the eye that matters, but the imagined object that comes to fill that lack. It is the substitute object, not the lost object. Lacan (1998) reinvents the idea of a fantasised gaze located on the far side of appearances. However, the fantasised

presence of the gaze is nothing new. In the past, it was often God's gaze that was imagined, with religious icons serving as "a go-between with the divinity". In short, "There always was a gaze behind" (Lacan 1998, p. 113). In the historical perspective of (social) science, there are several examples of the gaze as a substitute object.

There are many great theories and perspectives that seek to reveal once and for all what reality really is. In the 19th and 20th centuries, there are several examples of such theoretical and speculative disclosure strategies; Marx illuminated the economy behind the spirit, Schopenhauer found the will behind reason, Freud revealed the drive behind culture, Darwin discovered the evolution behind history, Husserl saw the pure consciousness behind reality, etc. In other words, there is nothing in our world that appears as it is. Just think of the Marxist who has to break with the indifferent and comfortable existence of middle-class culture in order to discover the working class as the breakthrough of truth. For him, it is crucial to put himself at the service of reality and truth. He will use Marxism as a revolutionary means to transcend inauthentic, false, and oppressive capitalist forms of society. And think of the Freudian who finds universal human experiences in repressed experiences from childhood. He wants to get behind the scenes, to the reality of the unconscious, in order to be able to bring out the repressed and traumatic that inhibits reason and characterises behaviour. For the Freudian, the main thing is to reveal hysterical, neurotic, and other emotional reactions through an awareness (catharsis) that transforms the real (bodily energy/libido/enjoyment) into acceptable cultural forms of expression. Think also of the Darwinist who reveals that man is fundamentally related to the other animals. He is only concerned that the evolution of animals and humans (species-wise) can be explained using a simple conceptual system that emphasises the laws of natural selection, while at the same time claiming that he finds the real mechanisms in the way of being human.

The notion that the researcher's gaze is reflected in the text is linked by them to the more hermeneutic-phenomenological modern perspectives (e.g., Gadamer, 1960; Heidegger, 1962), where the educational researcher is seen as a Lacanian subject, shaped and influenced by the object. As Lacan (1998) observed in the seminars on the gaze, the fantasised gaze effectively transforms the subject into an object. The gaze is not necessarily directed at the face of another individual. It could just as easily be directed at the window behind which we assume the other person is lurking. It is an X, the object, when confronted with which the subject becomes the object (paraphrased, Lacan, 1998, p. 220). As this paraphrase suggests, the fantasy of an invisible, external gaze is not always reassuring, despite its ability to provide the researcher with a sense of symbolic security within a dominant discourse.

To illustrate, a classroom researcher who identifies as a sociocultural-oriented subject within the field of education and desire would serve as a symbol of the lost object. This object is lost at the primordial level and is substituted with a predetermined theory. This theory is then used to frame and understand empirical material. Examples of this predetermined theory include the concept of

mediating tools, the zone of potential development, the law of cultural development, and higher psychological functions. In other words, the theoretical and metatheoretical assumptions, for example, those inspired by Vygotskian sociocultural theory (such as an emphasis on process over product/outcome, relation over the individual, and learning potentiality over factual skills), determine empirical reality (pupil learning, teaching, and the classroom learning environment). As a researcher, one seeks to replace this loss.

(3) ***Theory as the gaze as cause of attraction and falling in love*:** In a third version of the gaze, as presented in Lacan's (1998) seminars on the gaze, it is a cause of visual fascination and a kind of falling and staying in love. This gaze magnetises the eye and causes a suspension of the subject's self-control. Lacan (1998), for example, describes the gaze as exerting a dominant influence over the dreaming or hallucinating subject: "The subject does not see where it is leading, he follows … When one dreams of a butterfly, one is, effectively, a butterfly" (p. 75). The division between subject and object, so to speak, no longer applies when one is under the gaze. Theory in the broad sense can lead us to a kind of metatheoretical and methodological fixation, castration, and falling in educational science and research. With the emergence and strong expansion of the (empirical) sciences of education, the discussion may progress through metatheoretical perspectives such as behaviourism (empiricism) and the scientific approach to teaching; cognitivism and its pedagogical implications; constructivism and social constructivism in education; and contemporary critical theories of education, and perhaps to the new common sense.

These metatheoretical perspectives or paradigms are central to educational science and educational research, even if the researcher uses them more or less explicitly or is unknowingly used by them. I suppose they can function as subcategories of what Lacan (1977) calls a university discourse whose primary aim is to discipline and reproduce knowledge without asking too many questions in a hysterical mode of being. For such educational researchers as Lacanian subjects, the division between themselves and fantastic objects is absent or blurred, such as social constructivism (perhaps inspired by Vygotsky) within qualitative research and quantitative empiricist (behaviourist) approaches, both of which are captured and manipulated by the allure of psychology through method and theory (for more on the allure of psychology and the marriage between education and psychology, see Smeyers & Dapaepe, 2013).

The viewer of a painting (i.e., The Ambassador) and the educational researcher are placed under the influence of this gaze; that is, the effect of painting and research is one of captivation. The subject's gaze becomes so attached to an image that they are no longer distinct from the image (i.e., how social constructivism and empiricism work in educational research). Lacan (1998) points to the fascination of Holbein's painting as an illustration of the fact that the subject of the gaze is "caught, manipulated, captured, in the field of vision" (p. 92). For example, many researchers and strong research traditions in education and pedagogy rarely avoid the gaze of either sociocultural theories and are captured by social constructivism's eye for the contextual or, more

empirically, use quantifiable variables to achieve representative certainty and probability without necessarily taking sufficient account of the particular.

Following Lacan (1998), the painter and the educational researcher, whether social constructivist or empiricist, do not represent a visible scene but respond to something in that scene. According to Lacan (1998), the object can be described as being at the heart of both painting and creative educational research and as the thing with which the subject enters into dialogue. The cause of painting and research is therefore the gaze as object a. According to Lacan (1998), the gaze that causes a bird to shed its feathers, a snake to shed its scales, and a tree to shed its caterpillars and its leaves is also the thing that causes a painter to let colours fall from her brush or a researcher to partially understand how theory works for you and how the empirical world appears. It is important to remember that "the subject is not fully aware of it – he operates by remote control" (Lacan, 1998, p. 115). The researcher as an artist voluntarily loses his will in the same way, allowing himself to be captured by the gaze, becoming temporarily like the "butterfly" dreamer.

This kind of fascination and what I like to call falling in love involves a loss of ego and control: "The subject in question is not that of reflexive consciousness, but that of desire" (Lacan 1998, p. 89). Under this gaze, according to Lacan (1998, p. 106), "I am photographed". Then it seems reasonable to ask whether the educational researcher, whether the photographed social constructivist or the hardcore (logical) empiricist chasing evidence, is too aware of his reflexive activity and less aware of his desire (i.e., the structure of desire and passion for re-research is not often described in mainstream journals, dissertations, and articles, perhaps because you won't get published with such "obscurantism"). However, the stasis produced by fascination and staying in love is associated by Lacan (1992, p. 119) with the pleasure principle, which acts as a barrier to the Real, keeping the researcher and painter as subject on the side of the symbolic and thus ensuring that the educational researcher takes no risks other than to keep things mindfully on track.

(4) ***Theory as the gaze as cause of separation*:** Despite the potential for researchers to become distracted by the allure of a new fascination, which could result in the adoption of a different dominant paradigm in education, such as behaviourism between 1930 and 1960, cognitivism as exemplified by Piaget between 1950 and 1970, or pragmatism as exemplified by Dewey, the moment of stasis is, for Lacan (1988, p. 50), a formative one. An example of this is the progressivism that emerged in the 1970s and 1980s, which Vygotsky inspired the social constructivism that emerged from 1990 onwards. It should be noted that these periodisations are merely indicative and highly debatable. For Lacan (1988), the moment of stasis is a formative one, "fascination is indispensable to the formation of the ego" (p. 50). The ego is absent during the period of captivation; however, this state is nevertheless a crucial step in the formation of the researcher's ego. Similarly, it is tempting to suggest that the formation of a researcher ego within the field of pedagogy

or education sciences is contingent upon the methodological, theoretical, and philosophical perspectives that are selected, adapted, and internalised. It seems evident that there is a strong tendency to unconsciously adopt pivotal assumptions of a philosophical nature (e.g., those pertaining to ontology, epistemology, praxeology, and ethics) in a way that serves to shape and conserve paradigms or research streams and communities. This phenomenon may be further investigated by what Valsiner (2003, 2012) terms "functional forgetfulness" or a kind of collective unconsciousness. However, in a fourth modality of the gaze, the phenomenon under discussion is not, it should be noted, one of fascination, but rather of the subject's separation from such. This phenomenon is characterised by the subject's "fading" or "aphanisis", which can be understood as its disappearance or petrification into the signifier (Lacan, 1998, p. 207).

To illustrate further, consider the following example: A qualitative researcher engaged in fieldwork in an educational setting may experience a sense of ambivalence between their aspiration to investigate novel and intricate issues (both empirical and theoretical) and the institutional pressure to generate quantifiable and publishable outcomes. The gaze of the academic institution, which values certain methodologies, outcomes, or theoretical frameworks over others (e.g., there are many more researchers within the field of pedagogy who appear to prefer Vygotskian and Bandura-inspired frameworks than Piagetian or Skinnerian symbolic approaches), may cause the researcher to distance themselves from their original research question, which is always informed by theory.[3] The necessity to comply with institutional standards and preferred theoretical frameworks may result in a divergence between the researcher's personal academic identity and the roles they are expected to fulfil within the institution.

In this interpretation of the gaze as a theoretical concept, it can be seen as a means of accessing a more profound level of comprehension that transcends the conventional limitations of research. It provides a means of transcending the constraints of the dualistic perspective, enabling the researcher to progress from a state of absorption to one of active engagement with the subject matter. The gaze can be viewed as a symbol of "the lack that constitutes castration anxiety" (Lacan, 1998, p. 72). This indicates that those engaged in pedagogical research may be reluctant to wholly adopt a specific theory, which could result in a state of indifference with regard to considering alternative perspectives. Such a perspective allows for a certain degree of detachment from the alluring image. It is important to acknowledge that both painters and researchers, as subjects, have the potential to influence the direction of the gaze. In summary, it can be proposed that the theory of the gaze as a cause of separation may facilitate the process of desiring research or research by desire. In the process of seeking academic acceptance or prestige, researchers may find that they have become somewhat detached from their original theoretical intentions, which could potentially impact the effectiveness of their desire to

pursue research by desire. The gaze of academic journals, tenure committees, or disciplinary conventions can occasionally prompt researchers to contemplate alternative methodologies for their ideas, which may result in a slight deviation from their original intellectual objectives.

To illustrate, a researcher who begins developing a theory of a more unified pedagogy of science education may, over time, perceive their work to be open to challenge and to have been diluted to fit into the narrow confines of academic discourse.

Peer review may occasionally result in researchers focusing unduly on the publishability of their work, rather than on the radical potential of their original theoretical ideas and research. This is because it tends to favour certain types of evidence, theoretical frameworks, or argumentation. Such a divergence from their original intellectual objectives may engender feelings of discontent and a perception that their theory has been subsumed by the academic establishment.

Moreover, a researcher engaged in developing a novel theory of teacher desire may feel obliged to contextualise their work in relation to established theories or even contemporary fashion perspectives, despite significant discrepancies in their theoretical approach. The influence of prevailing theoretical perspectives can sometimes result in a discrepancy between the researcher's original conceptual objectives and the necessity to contextualise their work within the dominant discourse. This can result in a theory that is shaped more by external expectations than by the researcher's original insights.

It is conceivable that the subject, in their capacity as a researcher or as the subject of desire, may become wholly enmeshed in this imaginary and fantastical theoretical capture. It could be argued that researchers project themselves into the theoretical framework to the extent that they disassociate the function of the screen and engage with it in a playful manner. The pedagogical researcher is aware of the potential for theoretical play, recognising that there is a gaze that extends beyond the theoretical mask. This insight enables researchers in the field of pedagogy to recognise that their work is not limited by a single theoretical or methodological perspective. It may be proposed that the screen represents the locus of mediation (Lacan, 1998, p. 107).

It may therefore be possible to speak of a form of real meditation. As Rajchman (1991) notes, given the significance of representing the Real in psychoanalysis, there is a notable affinity between analytic and aesthetic experiences. Lacan (1977) suggests that aesthetic beauty plays an ethical role in that it offers an ideal, a "beyond", to which one can aspire. In a succinct and apt manner, Rajchman (1991) paraphrases Lacan's view as follows: "In painting, we would love what remains 'invisible' in the visions it offers us; in architecture, what is 'uninhabitable' in the habitations it makes for us; in literature, what is 'unsayable' in what it says to us. Each art would then find a way of recreate the vide of our amours" (p. 75). Furthermore, it could be argued that those engaged in the field of pedagogy or education may also find themselves drawn to the unsayable or inexpressible visions presented

in (phenomenological) theory, as these may offer insights into the ways in which the unconscious "speaks".

Lacan (1977) poses "the question of the meaning of beauty as both formative and erogenous" (p. 57). Lacan describes the effect of beauty on desire as a phenomenon whereby the former temporarily suspends our subjection to the latter. This means that the beauty in question stops us from being controlled by our desires, which are always based on what we think other people want. In our mute fascination with the beautiful object, we become subject to the scopic drive. We get what the drive wants by saying we don't have a relationship with the object. Then we can start again with the symbolic by taking on the Other's desire as our own. It can therefore be argued that the subject is most genuine or truthful when it transitions from an attachment to a detachment. This is in accordance with Lacan's (1998, p. 192) assertion that the subject emerges as a signifier, having previously existed as a subject, but before it solidifies into a signifier.

It appears that each of these four readings of the gaze has been demonstrated to correspond to a mode of the subject's relation to the object, as postulated by Lacan (1977, 1998). It is conceivable that the fourfold structure delineated here may be interpreted as corresponding to the object a as one of "envelopment-development-conjunction-disjunction" (Lacan 1977, p. 542). It looks like the group of four is a common topic in Seminar XI. This seminar is all about the four main ideas of psychoanalysis, the four basic drives, the four parts that make up the drive mix, and the four "ups and downs" of the drive. Indeed, Lacan (1998) draws attention to the pattern by suggesting that it may be "curious that there are four vicissitudes as there are four elements of the drive" (p. 165).

Moreover, while Freud posited that the drive could manifest in active, passive, and reflexive modes, Lacan (1998) introduces a fourth mode in Seminar XI, which encompasses the Other and the other. It is possible that Lacan's seminars on the gaze may correspond to the various versions of the object a in a way that could prove confusing to the reader. It could be said that their logic resembles the visual anamorphosis, which they believe to symbolise the workings of the gaze. It seems plausible to suggest that the phenomena and concept of the gaze outlined in Seminar XI may be resistant to a clear-cut understanding precisely because it obeys laws similar to those governing the gaze itself.

This insight, which emphasises the importance of context, is reminiscent of the observation made by Aristotle (1963) that "it is the mark of an educated man to look for precision in each class of things just so as the nature of the subject admits" (p. 1095). It could be said that Lacan's logic of the gaze may operate to captivate us through its elusiveness. This elusiveness may ultimately be frustrating enough to force us to always already give up our search for it and symbolise our failure. It might be helpful for educational researchers who are constrained by the "comfortably safe" gaze to consider the advice offered by Samuel Beckett in his 1983 story, Worstward Ho: "Ever tried. Ever failed. No matter. Try again. Fail again. Fail better."

Notes

1 This chapter is largely based on the logical structure presented in the text *Deciphering the Gaze in Lacan's 'Of the Gaze as Objet Petit a'* by Maria Scott (2015). I also paraphrased and borrowed some sentence structure and phrasing originally from English translations of Lacan's original French texts in order to provide a good framework for my examples.

2 Hans Holbein the Younger, *The Ambassadors, Jean de Dinteville and Georges de Selve ('The Ambassadors')*, 1533, oil on oak, 207 × 209.5 cm, The National Gallery London. ©The National Gallery, London. https://www.nationalgallery.org.uk/paintings/hans-holbein-the-younger-the-ambassadors.

3 It is evident that this statement requires some form of elucidation. I will now proceed to provide some clarification. Hanson's (1958, p. 7) aphorism, "There's more to seeing than meets the eyeball", underscores the necessity for researchers to consider the full range of (sensory) experiences before attempting to interpret them systematically. In the context of classroom interactions between students and teachers, students become the subject of the researcher's observation and interpretation. One might posit that a researcher with a social constructivist orientation perceives the significance of learning relations and dialogues in a manner distinct from that of other research perspectives. If we assume that the classroom researcher adheres to psychological social constructivism, it is plausible to hypothesise a connection between their preconceived pedagogical premises (their social constructivistic focus on relations and dialogue) and the choice of hypotheses. It may be the case that this connection can shed light on the process behind the generation of first-hand inferences.

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9 Implications for teaching

This chapter examines the implications of discourses such as the hysterical and the university, the "impossibility" of teaching and being a teacher, and the necessity of teachers' desires, which may manifest as sublimation, letting-be, and reflective awareness, in teacher practice.

On discourses

The four discourses, as outlined by Lacan (2007), encompass the discourses of the Master, the University, the Hysteric, and the Analyst. These discourses hold significant implications for pedagogical practices and the role of the teacher as a subject within these practices. In summary, the discourse of the master is essentially commanding, structuring, and "despotic"; the discourse of the university is characterised by an authoritative knowledge voice or regime, "disciplinary" and regulative; the discourse of the hysteric is that of the obsessive questioner and protester; and the discourse of the analyst is that of the ethical, compassionate listener, and transfer anchor. Furthermore, this discussion will examine the implications of the hysterical and university discourses.

The Lacanian "matrix of the four discourses" indicates that an approach to teaching based on a single discourse or pole is inherently flawed. This results in an imbalance that diverts the attention of both the teacher and the reader from the consideration of alternative perspectives. Such an approach, which is characterised by a narrow focus on a single discourse or polarity, can result in the marginalisation of other discourses or polarities. This can lead to the concealment of hidden motives and agendas. However, despite the tendency for an approach to teaching to become increasingly focused on a single discourse over time, the potential for engagement with alternative discourses remains inherent in the role of the teacher as a subject and speaking being.

To illustrate, a teacher operating within a discourse characterised by hysteria, doubt, and protest would experience the act of teaching as occurring on the margins of their identity, as if on the brink of dissolution. This would entail encountering aspects of their practice as part of their very being, with this encounter giving rise to new motives. These could include a sense of renewal, or alternatively, the experience of burnout or the pursuit of new life

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projects in the form of another role or occupation. It can be hypothesised that when teachers and student teachers are referencing their own actions in a hysterical mode, they are persistently torn between a sense of being themselves and a need to realign with the specifications of discourse (the language of the Other). This phenomenon is especially apparent in a hysterical discourse, as illustrated in Chapter 7, vignettes 12–15. It is crucial to acknowledge that the genuine and satisfying surplus also exists in discourses beyond the hysterical one. This concept has been elucidated in the 24 vignettes presented in Chapter 7.

A further illustration of the difficulties inherent in the university discourse is provided by the following example. It is evident that the aspiration to be perceived as an educator is a considerably intricate issue, particularly for those who are inexperienced or at the early stages of their teaching career. For these educators, it appears that their perceived deficiency, or lack of recognition as a teacher, will be addressed through the acquisition of expertise and skills from an experienced mentor. Such an expectation does not appear unreasonable to them. As Britzman (2000, 2003) and others have observed, teaching is a profession that is subject to a high degree of public scrutiny. The general public has a high degree of familiarity with the teaching profession, which has accumulated over many years of observation in educational settings and interaction with teachers. As a result of this familiarity, students are able to effectively interpret the actions and behaviours of teachers. Given that students have already achieved the ability to interpret the actions of teachers, learning to perform similar actions themselves appears to be a matter of acquiring the specific skills that teachers possess, namely the ability to engage in university discourse. Consequently, for student teachers, who lack experience in facing a classroom of pupils as actual teachers, it appears that if they can merely acquire the requisite skills, they will become effective teachers. Naturally, an experienced teacher is aware that while it is important to master the requisite skills, it is equally crucial to understand when and where to apply a specific technique.

In Gadamer's (2004) terms, the student teachers lack an understanding of the distinction between practice as techne and phronesis in modern education. A techne is applicable in situations where a defined objective exists within a relatively straightforward context (as illustrated in vignettes 1–11). However, the potential for the unexpected and the possibility of misinterpretation remain, which could lead to difficulties for the teacher. In principle, the application of a deficient means for reaching a known goal represents a potential issue in such cases. Phronesis is concerned with the lack of a priori knowledge regarding the ends to be achieved. In this context, the term "application" is used to describe the specific characteristics of a given situation. Those with experience in the field recognise that the majority of decisions are typically informed by phronesis, rather than techne. It remains unclear whether experienced teachers consistently feel at ease with phronesis. Vignettes 12–15 on the hysterical discourse provide clear evidence to the contrary. It is therefore possible to

revitalise teachers' phronesis by first de-centring the teacher (through the implementation of Real Continuing Programmes) as a subject, thereby creating an opportunity for the more effective utilisation of intuitive skills within the context of university discourse.

The analysis of the vignettes (cf. 1–24) shows how discourses enable, decentre, and at the same time restrict the teacher's room for manoeuvre by positioning her as an object of the textbook's desire, the pupil's desire, the timetable's desire, the curriculum's desire, etc. The teacher's desire is (displaced) and seeks an outlet by showing herself to be different from what is resisted in the master, university, and the listening (analytical) discourse. In other words, the teacher's occasional strong dissatisfaction with being "trapped" in the master, university, analytical, and hysterical discourse emerges in the form of the discomfort of desire. The fantasies offered in the discourses can contribute to the teacher's ongoing discomfort and self-destructive practices; that is, enjoyment gets you into trouble. For teachers, this happens through symptoms such as excessive conscientication, guilt, anger, possible burnout (see vignettes 20–24 in Chapter 7), a Real-enjoyment that too rarely finds a domestic place and remains too gnawing and perhaps burns up the teacher's body.

The "impossibility" of teaching and being a teacher

It is inherently difficult to recapture the essence of reality, as it resists being captured in the comprehensively meaningful formulations of imaginary-symbolic signs (such as a curriculum, syllabus, and formal and informal requirements for competencies and skills). As Lacan (1977) repeatedly emphasises, this is an "impossibility" in relation to reality. The Real is captured indirectly in opposition to the representations of the Imaginary and the Symbolic. It is my contention, which I will attempt to elucidate here, that precisely by elucidating the "impossibility" of teaching, Lacanian insights may open up unprecedented teaching possibilities and renew both the pivotal questions and the practice of teaching. It is therefore reasonable to enquire whether teaching and thus the role of the teacher, is in fact impossible. Which educational professionals consider the role of teaching to be unfeasible? Indeed, their radical enunciation of the impossibility of teaching itself can be seen as an active engagement with teaching, constituting a key element of the lesson they impart. If this is indeed the case, what can be learned from the fact that teaching is considered to be an impossible task? What can be learned from the concept of the "impossibility" of teaching?

Moreover, in a Lacanian (2007) context, teaching is inherently unstable, resisting complete and ubiquitous domination of the act. This signifies the impossibility of a perfect correlation between the role of a speaking teacher, situated within a teaching purpose and learning outcomes, syllabus, claims and curriculum, and other expectations from guardians and parents. I believe that the vignettes 1–24, in Chapter 7, are illustrative of this "no perfect correlation"

view. What, then, are the consequences of this impossibility for teachers? This question can be distilled into two categories:

1 One may choose to disregard the void and lack, thereby allowing teachers to engage with university discourse and the more knowledgeable other.
2 Alternatively, one may choose to embrace the void, lack, and loss, which may evoke a sense of existential thrill, whether positive or negative. This may also lead to a state of being-exstatic-improvisation.

In order to illustrate how this might be practically implemented within teacher education, it is possible to present a series of hypothetical examples. To illustrate, in the context of teacher education, a training setting is employed which focuses on the virtual simulation of dialogues between parents, pupils, and the teacher. In this virtual reality data program, the teacher student is the only non-programmed actor, despite the computer-generated environment comprising scenes, objects, and choices that appear to be real. Students select and discuss critical incidents in their recorded dialogue, and then write and discuss their observing and dialogical experiences, work with different uncanny moments and engage in a colloquial viewing and shared response process. In the development of such a hypothetical pedagogical approach, it is possible to take into account research on critical incidents in teaching (Korthagen & Vasalos, 2005), a curriculum approach (Pinar, 2004), and curriculum theorising (Yates & Grumet, 2011). Additionally, Robertson's (2004) "screenplay pedagogy" is a further option, which calls on viewers or teachers to note and work with deeply felt enjoyable emotional or somatic moments experienced during the screening of these dialogues.

Robertson (2004) posits that the utilisation of transferential provocations within the context of teacher education can facilitate the process of digestion, whereby learners become attuned to the act of meaning-making and develop analytical skills in relation to these processes. One assumption is that encouraging teacher students to reflect on challenging or uncomfortable experiences related to the screenplay process will enhance their comprehension of the aspects that resist symbolic representation, namely, what it entails to be and cope with an authentic teacher. Consequently, there is a possibility that the underlying lack that constitutes desire may be embraced rather than dismissed through the use of existential "secure" and commanding discourses.

Screenplay pedagogy and other similar on-the-spot training sessions are there to support you as you think about your identifications, resistances, and exhilarations. It also creates a lovely context for chatting about the teacher/student/pupil dynamic within a specific discourse. For example, we can explore whether it's the confident, university-bound "I have the answer" from the discourse of higher rationality, or the emotional, hysterical discourse of "I do not know the way". We can also delve into the meaning-making and non-meaning-making processes we engage in with others.

As they go through the different parts of the project, the students get to experience the ups and downs, the back and forth, of working through their own unresolved conflicts (Britzman & Pitt, 1996, p. 118). This can lead to something really meaningful, something that affects them personally and socially, and that has implications for themselves, for others, and for teaching and learning.

What follows from a possible interpretation of what happens in training sessions is about transferential provocations; crucial here is the apparent[1] shift from subjectivisation (i.e., as proclaimed by Biesta (2022), for example, as the freedom to act in and with the world in an "grown-up" way through a gesture that offers interruption, suspension, and sustenance) to subjective destitution/destruction or a kind of de-centring when embedded in critical teaching moments. Insofar as the status of the subject as such involves a certain guilt and/or indebtedness, the philosophical topos from Kierkegaard to Heidegger readily accepted by Lacan, the gesture of "subjectivisation" at the end of the "transferential provocation" cure means that the subject must fully assume its constitutive anger, irritation, failure of meaning, guilt, etc., which is obscured in the supposedly "inauthentic" everyday existence of the teacher and the teacher's students. Conversely, a Lacanian "subjective destitution and de-centring" at the end of the cure means that the subject can dispose of or become more immersed in his or her guilt (of not saving students), anger, guilt, irritation (as shown in Chapter 7, Section 2), etc., with the outcome perhaps depending on the scaffolding and mentoring in teacher training.

In the everyday pedagogical life of teachers, teachers constantly fall prey to imaginary lures that promise to heal the constitutive wound of symbolisation, to the teacher with whom full subject-oriented teaching is more desirable and possible within the political ideal of a knowledge society as a master discourse (without too much care) as a fully realised community, or to the dominant care-oriented teacher who perhaps enjoys more in an analytic discourse of teaching.

The need of the teachers desire

Lacan (1998) suggests that transference is an essential phenomenon, inextricably linked to desire as the defining phenomenon of the human condition. Transference can be defined as a fictional form of love based on the notion of a subject who is presumed to possess knowledge. The phenomenon of transference is of particular interest in the context of teaching because it involves the subject, whether teacher or student, imagining the other and being prompted to ask questions and seek knowledge. This is driven by fictive love and other such motivating factors. Therefore, I focus here on the impossibilities inherent in teaching as interpersonal caring with love. There are several working hypotheses where the desire of the teacher is highly relevant, here I will mention two.

1 The Lacanian view provides the insight that if the teacher gets it wrong and tries to provide care that is not needed for the students, then she may be rejected, which in turn contradicts the response the teacher expects and

confronts her with her apparent failure to care. This contradicts her ideal ego and leads to real damage to the subject, potentially leading to aggression, exhaustion, and burnout.

2 From a Lacanian perspective, the teacher may engage in transference that the student/pupil receives, needs, and benefits from, but the teacher herself goes into an excessive (counter-)transference mode over a long period of time with 24/7 emotional care that leads to the destruction of a stable subject, that is, guilt, anger, irritation, and, in the worst case, burnout.

The two working hypotheses shed light on the teacher's potential depersonalisation, which may result in a lack of inhibition and enjoyment at the expense of the pupil. These working hypotheses, which may reflect the reality of teacher practice and discourse, can be described as a generalised perversion. This is because the "subjective flaw", or failure to achieve a sense of self, is believed to be correctible. This is because the teacher believes they are the sole person who can make up for the sense deficit and excess of enjoyment. Lacan (2003, p. 265) posits that the subject takes care to compensate for the flaw of the Other. Within this structure, the actions may be driven by an insatiable lack of sense of, and for, the self, which Lacan termed surplus jouissance/enjoyment (Lacan, 1977). These actions are driven by a conviction that the next act will provide a solution to the intolerable sensation of surplus jouissance resulting from this subjective flaw. However, each subsequent action serves only to reinforce the lack of sense, resulting in further discomfort or surplus jouissance and prompting further action.

In this context, the term "perversion" is used to describe a situation in which the symbolic "authority" in question fails to provide sufficient sense or coherence for the teacher's awareness of desire and sense of subjectivity. This may result in the teacher becoming their own authority, which, perhaps counterintuitively, has the effect of destabilising the teacher and their capacity to make sense of themselves. This results in a subjective flaw or subjective destitution (Žižek, 1989, p. 105), whereby the subject is compelled to strive to resolve the lack of certainty that the next act of "care" will be the solution; and this leads to a compulsion to act and care for the sake of the act (of care) only, without love, to act at the expense of the Other, by fetishising and objectivising or depersonalising the other (the pupil as other and the other in the teacher's subjectivity).

In other words, the teacher is inclined to reach hasty conclusions, relying on preconceived interpretations. For instance, the teacher may assume that testing pupils serves as a form of "correction" in teaching plans, or that it facilitates new framing or explicit shared understanding of the forthcoming teaching hours. Additionally, the teacher may believe that testing pupils leads to a slowing down or increased learning outcome progression. This occurs despite the teacher's awareness that the pupil is the primary agent in the analyst discourse of listening or attentive presence. It may be advisable for the teacher, in a state of awareness or in the process of constructing a desire for the

construction of the discourse of listening or attentive presence, to exercise restraint and focus on the present with the pupil. Lacan (2003) posits that there is a distinction between understanding and reaching conclusions.

It is possible that this hasty desire, or "jump to conclusions" desire, is reflected in the subject's castration, which is primordial. The lost, sacrificed jouissance (enjoyment) leads the teacher as subject to blame Otherness (i.e., for stealing the subject's enjoyment, as shown in vignettes 20–24 in Chapter 7). It may therefore be surmised that teachers are perverse and unhappy, who derive enjoyment from their own experiences but are reluctant to express them. They are, in effect, stunted creatures from the very outset, "divided", craving and tormented subjects, suffering from a chronic misfit between their own desires and the expectations placed upon them. Rather than providing solutions to the issues faced by teachers, the desire that has been reserved (as demonstrated in Chapter 7) will, when unleashed, reveal and amplify the radical imbalance and primal discord that exist at the core of the teacher's existence.

If this is the case, then the teacher must simply allow desire to persist in its unsatisfied state. If this is a reasonable assumption, might it not be described as a kind of heroism of the lack? The objective may be to encourage the teacher as a subject to assume and embrace their constitutive lack, to endure the splitting which propels desire, in a manner that could be considered heroic. One potential avenue for resolution is the possibility of sublimation, letting-be, and reflective awareness. The concept of sublimation will be addressed first. When an empirical, positive object is selected and "*elevated to the dignity of the Thing*" (Lacan, 1992, p. 133), it is transformed into a substitute for the Thing, which is otherwise unattainable. This process allows for the maintenance of fidelity to one's desire without succumbing to the destructive pull of the Thing. To illustrate, the teacher's desire may be sublimated in a creative manner. This involves repeatedly circling the object of desire, thereby elevating it to the status of the idealised lost object, or "*the dignity of the Thing*" (Lacan, 1992, p. 133).

From the lake a fish jumps An idea of a fish jumps A fish jumps, carved wooden fish with dots painted on the sides, no, antlered fish thing drawn in red on cliffstone, protecting spirit. It hangs in the air suspended, flesh turned to icon, he has changed again, returned to the water. How many shapes can he take. I watch it for an hour or so; then it drops and softens, the circles widen, it becomes an ordinary fish again (Lacan, 1992, p. 243).

The process of creative transformation, the loving investment of an object with meaning, and the inexhaustible potential of sublimation (as indicated in vignettes 1–11 in Chapter 7) are all evident in this example. Firstly, in accordance with the Lacanian primacy of the signifier over the signified, the narrating instance provides us with a signifier, namely, "a fish", and then transforms it, "fashioning the signifier" (Lacan, 1992, p. 149) into a signified, an "idea of a fish"; and then, as the fish jumps, and jumps again, circling the air around the empty space from which desire emerges, the potential meanings begin to multiply like the miraculous fish in the account of Jesus feeding the thousands,

or for example, curriculum, timetables, textbook, assessment (cf. vignettes 7–9 and 11). Once the path of the teacher's desire has been re-established, the possibility of living differently with their disillusionment becomes a viable option. This can be achieved through creative sublimations or, as the vision of the fish, textbook, or curriculum suggests, by rekindling one's love for the world in a genuine and authentic manner. It could be argued that, as Leonard Cohen suggests in his song "Democracy", we may be content with a certain degree of dissatisfaction. It is sufficient to say that I love teaching, but I am still haunted by these sublimations.

Let's go from sublimation to Letting-be. Where sublimation is about dressing and camouflage that is not too uncomfortable, letting-be focuses on listening to be awake to what life wants, or as Freud (1953) and Heidegger (1982) say, respectively, "wo es war, soll is werden (where It/Id was, shall I/Ego be)" and "to be who we are" in much the same way that I am, I shall become in an always already mode.

In his work, *"Discourse on Thinking"*, Heidegger (1966) posits the concept of letting be as a form of receptivity, which he terms Gelassenheit. The crucial point is that, precisely in our attending to something as it emerges within us, we become free of our preconceptions and expectations, allowing things to reveal themselves as they truly are. This is a form of meditative thinking that requires effort, commitment, determination, care, and practice. However, it must also be able to wait and allow things to unfold, as the farmer does with a seed, for example (Heidegger, 1966, p. 37).

Despite Lacan's (1977) reservations about Freud's assertion and his own interpretation of Heidegger's citations, the crux of the matter is that entities exist independently before we can perceive them. This notion is arguably more effectively articulated by Heidegger than by Lacan. The existence of entities precedes any formulation of statements about them. What exists as an integrated whole before we can discern its constituent parts and details according to our convenience?

Nevertheless, in order to be considered as a near-being, it is not sufficient to simply add something to the concept of being or letting-be. Any intended addition would result in the displacement of being. By refraining from action and inaction, one allows being to emerge freely and unmasked, that is to say, by attentively listening to the words and the world that are already present. Any act of questioning, whether in the form of a prayer, a procedure or systematic theory, or a fixed professional speech genre (such as vignettes 1–6 in Chapter 7), has the potential to alienate the very essence of being. Such formulations of pre-established "faiths" would be deleterious to the state of being and the subject. This is a Heideggerian "uncanny" logic that was adopted by Lacan (1977) and his interest in "the thing" (Das Ding or die Sache).

It can be argued that the antidote to excessive transference, feelings that are incongruent with the teacher's desire, or an excessive focus on the teacher as the subject, and the potential for unhealthy outcomes associated with this approach (see Section 2, Chapter 7), is to adopt a stance of openness and

acceptance. Such an approach may facilitate the emergence of a more authentic desire for teaching.

Letting beings be, which is an attuning, a bringing into accord, prevails throughout and anticipates all the open comportment that flourishes in it. From a Heideggerian perspective, the teacher's conduct is aligned with the openness of beings in their totality. However, from the perspective of everyday calculations and preoccupations, this "whole" appears to be immeasurable and incomprehensible. It is not possible to comprehend this phenomenon on the basis of the beings that are opened up in any given case. These beings may belong to either psychological categories, such as those related to learning and motivation, or to sociological categories, such as those related to class or socioeconomic levels and their impact on individuals. Despite its ability to continuously establish a state of definite accord, it nevertheless retains an inherent quality of indefiniteness and indeterminability (for further insight, see aspect one on indeterminateness in Chapter 3). It is therefore largely in alignment with the most transient and the most unconsidered aspects. However, it should be noted that bringing into accord is not nothing but rather the concealment of beings in their entirety. It is precisely because letting be always allows beings to exist in a specific manner, which relates to them and thus reveals them, that it conceals beings as a whole. The act of letting-be is, in its intrinsic nature, a form of concealment. In the context of the existential freedom of Da-sein, a process of concealment of beings as a whole emerges.

As previously stated, the teacher is oriented towards the most accessible beings in the discourses of mastery and university. However, it could be argued that the teacher's insistence is contingent upon their pre-existing status as a standard within the context of potential alienating discourses. However, in adopting this standard, the teacher is effectively alienated from the potential for revitalising the subjectivity of both the teacher and the act of teaching itself.

This represents the compromise in the autonomy of the teacher. In other words, any standard, measure, or discourse immediately eliminates the possibility of freedom and the sensation of being at home, which is inherently resistant to them without exception. One must either address the beings in question (including the self) or address the concept of being itself. In conclusion, when one deals with being, one experiences mystery and letting-be. When one engages with the subject matter, one risks losing the capacity for mystery and becoming vulnerable to the influence of uncanny discourses and a sense of dislocation.

A mystery is a phenomenon in which we are inextricably involved, as opposed to a problem which is external to us and can be solved with a generalisable approach or technique. For example, to solve the problem of low pupil/student engagement, teachers may try more pupil/student-centred teaching. To "stimulate" the teachers' desire necessitates an active willingness to respond to the fundamental aspects of their being that have consistently engaged with

them, that have persistently claimed their attention. In this way, it becomes possible to consider that which has not been thought, or, in other words, that which has not been thought about at all. This is, in fact, the greatest gift that thinking can bestow (Heidegger, 1968, p. 76).

Were Lacan to return today, it is possible that he would assert that teachers in schools are grappling with identity crises or an overwhelming sense of de-centring or significant internal discord. These crises, which manifest as a speaking of unconscious fantasies and desires, represent a fundamental challenge to the traditional notion of the teacher as a stable, unified subject. From a Lacanian perspective, educators could engage in discourse on the processes of identity formation and the concept of letting-be. In other words, how might we, in our pedagogical practice, attend to the unutterable and the act of letting be? Or, alternatively, how might we articulate the unutterable? The symbolic order and articulated language appear to be inadequate in grasping or avoiding the uncanny real-unspeakable (see vignettes 1–11 in Chapter 7 for further details). It is evident that there are no straightforward answers to these pivotal questions. However, the mere act of posing them serves to highlight the extent to which we are truly capable of educating, teaching, and learning. It is tempting to immediately identify the thing in letting-be and provide a definitive response, such as a stamp or a warning. However, such a pedagogical tactic may inadvertently cause more harm than good, particularly in the context of multiversity, where the potential for single teachers' desires to diverge significantly is high.

As we await further developments, it would be prudent to adopt a more cognitive and reflective approach to address the concerns raised by the teacher. This entails a focus on the pitfalls and challenges associated with transference and the always already interpretation, as well as the tendency to "jump to conclusions".

Therefore, the presumed inability of the teacher as analyst to maintain an authentic praxis and sense of existence, as is arguably the case with teachers and teaching (cf. vignettes 1–24), results in the exercise of power and "jump to conclusions" that is grounded in university and master discourse. As with any other form of interpretation, the teacher as analyst must consider all available knowledge when determining whether and when to interpret the transference (Lacan, 1998) in teaching. It is of particular importance to avoid focusing interpretations exclusively on the transference. It is also important for the teacher to be clear about their objective in offering such an interpretation. Rather than attempting to rectify the pupil's relationship with reality (see Section 2, Chapter 7 on "negative" transference), the aim should be to maintain a state of active listening and attentive presence.

In light of the above, what is meant by the term "interpreting the transference"? It is about addressing the uncanny lack and void that characterises this deadlock, but it comes with a real lure (Lacan, 1977). However, while this may appear to be a misleading concept, the real lure serves a purpose by initiating the repetition process anew. Ultimately, it may be the case that human

beings and teachers are more inclined to persist in a repetitive manner with a modicum of uncanny lure than to allow themselves to descend into a state of severe estrangement (cf. Desire blank in Chapter 7).

It may be posited that the more emotionally trained and reflective the teacher is, the more likely they are to exhibit a transference of love or repulsion towards their pupils. Concurrently, there are impediments and resistance to the act of teaching, as well as the motivations that propel teaching and the role of the teacher forward. From a symbolic perspective, this process may facilitate the advancement of teaching by elucidating the principal signifiers of repetition embedded in the subject's history. Conversely, from an imaginary standpoint, the dynamics of love and aggression/hate may serve as a form of resistance. It is therefore crucial to note that the teacher as an analyst, whether in the context of initial teacher training or continuing professional development, does not frequently act on the basis of these passions and feelings. It is not that experience and current subjectivity have drained away these passions; rather, it is that they give rise to a desire that is even stronger than those passions. Lacan (1998) refers to this as the desire of the analyst, which may also be termed the desire of the teacher.

Summary

If teaching and education in a sense are "impossible", and attempts at teaching can be considered, pejoratively, an unavoidable structuring master's discourse, one might become extremely cynical and wonder what the point of teaching and education is at all, is it wrong to instil ideas in others?

It is imperative that we provide guidance for children, pupils, and students if we wish to facilitate their growth and development. The objective of contrasting Lacanian philosophy and insights into dominant fantasies within education (see Chapter 4 on the forms desire might take) and focusing on un-knowing and hysterical de-centring is not to adopt a nihilistic approach or to foster chaotic uncontrolled encounters. Rather, it is to acknowledge the hegemonic ideas that insist (and have many believe) that we are unified rational individuals, that we know ourselves, that others can be known, that what I teach is exactly what others will learn and that relations (i.e., the primacy of teacher-pupil relations for optimal learning, as evidenced by Hattie (2009), are always regarded as a necessary aspect rather than as a defining characteristic of the subject.

It is also important to emphasise that the transfer of knowledge frequently occurs within the context of teaching. This is a crucial aspect of education, as it facilitates the dissemination of ideas, practices, and ways of living that enable a fulfilling and dignified life for all stakeholders, including teachers and students. This necessitates the utilisation of persuasive discourse, which serves the purpose of disseminating knowledge and instilling beliefs. It is crucial to acknowledge that, at their core, these commanding discourses are merely collective fantasies and aspirations, rather than rational, impartial mechanisms

that are instilled as a form of "sub specie aeternitatis" (from the perspective of eternity, as referenced in Spinoza's 1991 work).

It is interesting to consider the notion of the autonomous rational teacher and to contrast it with the teacher as a subject. However, this approach may lead to harsh criticism in terms of knowledge and value relativism. Consequently, there is a risk that the lack of objective standards will result in the right corresponding truth (veritas) being overlooked. Instead, the truth as both unconcealment and concealment may prevail. This implies that, by exposing some of the liberal ideals and discourses pertaining to the roles of teachers at the university and analyst discourses, the concept of the individual as a unified, transparent, and self-sufficient entity, and the assumption that teachers' actions are solely driven by rationality and intentions (rather than by enjoyable affects, unconscious drives, and desires), the notion of a teacher's desire and authoritative teacher as a subject may not be dismissed, but rather expanded upon.

In summary, in our efforts to standardise the curriculum, we have placed significant emphasis on redefining content in the curriculum and syllabus, improving teaching effectiveness and efficiency. However, we have not placed a similar emphasis on understanding the teacher's desires. It is not this author's intention to propose the creation of a singular conceptualisation of the teacher that would enable us to anticipate the reactions of every teacher to specific circumstances. However, it is this author's contention that we should acknowledge the teacher as an implicit desire-driven social subject, one who is and should be the object of study. How can we educate without studying, understanding, and taking seriously the inherent desires and their implications of both forthcoming and experienced teachers?

Note

1 I say 'apparently' here, because it is quite possible that there is a potential Real-twist in Biesta's (2022) interpretation of subjectivation as interruption, suspension, and sustenance.

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10 Concluding considerations

Desire as the revitalising education and teacher practice

Teachers demonstrate tendencies towards what Lacan (1998) identifies as the inherent and preliminary (interpretive) nature of being. This can be defined as the manner in which teachers encounter desire and how they grasp it and are unconsciously owned and transformed by the desire in discourses (cf. Chapter 7). This can be described as the "theory", phenomenon, or attitude of desire in practice. It is imperative to recognise that this hermeneutical and phenomenological phenomenon highlights the limitations of our and the teachers' (in)ability to adopt a de-centred perspective, grasp meaning, and comprehend each other. When the education of enjoyment and desire is situated within the teacher as a subject, it must be acknowledged that this process is not terminated in a systematic manner from within. Rather, it is initiated anew each time. It thus follows that it is impossible to develop a systematic, prescriptive, comprehensive, unquestionable, and fully coherent education and practice for the teacher.

The concept of education, the role of the speaking teacher and teaching, the nature of desire, and the discourses of desire are all open-ended, indeterminate, and ongoing processes (cf. aspect one in Chapter 3 on indeterminateness). Adopting a Lacanian philosophy of desire, it can be argued that established theoretical positions become either supplementary or are set aside (cf. aspect six in Chapter 3 on lost and lack in discourse). The ability to enjoy both life and teaching is fundamental to responding effectively to one's own unique circumstances. In response to the desire inherent in the situation, one might posit a withdrawal from the real world, whether naive or solipsistic. This withdrawal, whether or not it has an ontological justification, gives rise to the formulation of critical questions concerning the ethical implications of Lacan's philosophy for teaching and the role of the teacher.

Similar to the positions taken by Heidegger (1962) and Lacan (1977), Habermas (1984) also emphasises the importance of reclaiming and enhancing opportunities and "truths" for communicative action. However, there is a discrepancy between the two perspectives regarding the possibility of establishing a normative foundation for such actions. Habermas (1984) asserts that Heidegger (1962) and Lacan (1977) may be accused of abstracting away from societal and normative validity requirements. The criticism is based on

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the assertion that key terms such as Being-there (Dasein), truth, the subject, and the Unconscious prevent the necessary illumination of intersubjective and communicative factors in human activities. In Habermas's (1984) view, the concept of Dasein is absent from both society and the historical record. Consequently, it is unable to assume responsibility for preventing a new Holocaust. In other words, from Habermas's perspective, the question of what it means to be a thinking self does not necessarily arise, which can result in an overestimation of one's own capabilities and an exaggerated sense of self-importance.

For Heidegger (1962) and Lacan (1977), it appears unfeasible to formulate a priori normative and political perspectives, as this would contravene the fundamental essence (becoming) of being and the subject. There is thus an absence of activity and initiative in an interpretation of Lacan's (1977) account of desire, which is also elaborated in the book (cf. The aspect of "indeterminateness" Chapter 3). If all participants in education are "equal" in relation to desire, that is, desire is the subject and the teacher is the object, what is it that regulates human relationships in education and teaching practice? A timely question might be how is practical life possible without the decision and initiative of the acting teacher or person? The question can also be turned on its head: how is desire possible if a providence (i.e., a master, university, and analyst discourse that captures the practice of teaching and education) has already determined the outcome in advance? The ethical "big thing" may not always be to blindly follow and be followed by dominant discourses (cf. the desire of the textbook, the curriculum, or the competence goals), but it is unconsciously possible to change discourse, to desire the other's discourse, to act because of the subject's "own" desire, that is, the desire of the teacher.

In accordance with Heidegger (1962), the intention is distinct from establishing a normative foundation for a political critique. As he states, "We shall not and cannot fixate what at any given moment and in each individual case, in an existential sense, is called inside and within Dasein. The aforementioned point is further elaborated as follows: The situation is the 'there' that in each case is opened in determination" (pp. 261 and 280). The insight of "Being-there" constitutes the situation, rather than merely a fleeting observation of the situation. It is only when Being-there is introduced into the situation that the potential and veracity can be identified and subsequently "discovered". It can also be observed that the content of the situation is not of particular consequence; rather, it is the manner in which one relates to it that is of significance. It is therefore only the person's decisive glance of Being-there that can be certain of its content.

This "general" emptiness or void of content is open to criticism for failing to indicate a direction or object of focus. It would appear that Heidegger (1962) and Lacan (1977) are reluctant to propose an objectifying content or a predetermined object for the concept of "Being-there/existence" or the subject's "Real-enjoyment". This may be because the objectivism-relativism dichotomy is

considered false from a phenomenological perspective, which typically seeks to return to the phenomenon itself. The question of objectivism versus relativism does not affect the core tenets of Heidegger (1962) and Lacan (1977). These are the aspects that are present before us or the actual (unconscious) life.

This can be interpreted as an educational appeal, encouraging individuals to engage in reflexive self-awareness and embrace their authentic identity within their lived experiences. Consequently, the responsibility for education and teaching is placed upon its own principles and objectives, which are firmly established within the context of domestic terminology. This serves as the foundation upon which participants engage in the processes of thinking and experiencing. The significance of "Being-there" in one's actual life is inextricably linked to the concepts of meaning, oblivion, and the potential for existence and truth.

The following serves to illustrate this point. The example is drawn from the Taoist parable of Chuang-Tzu (paraphrased from Rojecewicz, 2006, p. 230),[1] in which Tzu-Kung engages in discourse with an aged sage who is engaged in the cultivation of a garden. The text then goes on to describe the actions of the old man in greater detail. The elderly gentleman proceeds to excavate ditches within the irrigated garden, subsequently utilising a pitcher to transfer water from the source wellspring into the aforementioned ditches. The exertion required is considerable, and the process is protracted for the elderly individual. Tzu-Kung proceeds to inform the old man of a device that could greatly enhance the efficacy and reduce the fatigue of the task. He then proceeds to inform the old man of the advantages of constructing an artificial wooden device that can carry two buckets of water (lever principle), which would greatly enhance the ease and efficiency of the work. The elderly sage responded with a degree of sarcasm, stating that he would be disinclined to utilise the wooden arm apparatus due to the fact that those who employ artificial devices and machinery tend to perform their tasks in a manner that is somewhat mechanical and unnatural. Therefore, the argument can be made that work that is overly mechanised may result in individuals becoming devoid of emotional sensitivity and unable to maintain a sense of simplicity. Those who lack this simplicity are insecure in their exuberance and spirit or soul, which in turn is not aligned with the path of truth.

It is erroneous to assume that the utilisation of machinery inevitably results in the dehumanisation of the individual. This erroneous assumption is exemplified by the notion that the absence of machinery and modern technology guarantees the realisation of possibilities and the de-centring of the subject. Even when presented with the aid of modern technology and machine-like contrivances (advanced analysis and testing regimes of schools, teachers, and pupils, viewing pupils/students/parents as customers, and competence/skill-based teaching enframed in a professional result-oriented practice), an education and teaching practice remains, in principle, open to the realisations of real-existence and the enlightenment of being. In this regard, Heidegger's (1962) perspective can inform discussions about the modernity of education

and teaching. Specifically, it can be posed whether any system or practice that is so sophisticated and well-developed that it fails to recognise its own limitations, transcending its own logic, can truly be considered modern. This can be understood as an appeal for an alternative approach to education and teaching that is not modern, with a progressive finality and a focus on technology/tools that never loses sight of the use of tools. This is a modern practice that is overly concerned with the aftermath, the result, and where nothing happens "there" after the tools are used and one forgets the question concerning the meaning of being. The entire matter hinges on one's receptivity to the question of being, that is, one's willingness to make a self-sacrifice for the open locus of being. To be "there", situated in a clearing, perceiving oneself as being in a place where the world/practice takes note of one's presence amidst the currents of technology, signifies the inherent ambiguity and expansive potentiality inherent in the question.

Safranski (1998) provides an illustrative example of this phenomenon: "With the issue of Being, most people meet the same fate as the student in a Zen anecdote. He had long pondered the problem of how one could get the grown goose out of the thin-necked bottle without killing the bird or breaking the bottle. The pupil, who had speculated with all his might about this, went to his master and asked for the solution to the problem. The master turned away for a moment, then clapped his hands and called the pupil by his name. 'Here am I, master!', the pupil replied. 'Do you see', said the master, 'the goose is out!' So much for the question of the meaning of being" (p. 453). It could be argued that such an "awakening" or "truth event" denotes an opening and challenge to self-understanding within the teacher as a subject.

One might enquire whether an educational practice or discourse (this also applies to researchers) frequently neglects the significance of situating oneself in relation to self-understanding, to position oneself in relation to one's own existence and genuine enjoyment. This is also a question of remaining open to the mystery of Being and the de-centring of the subject. For the teacher, this entails realising existence anew, which can be a nascent and revitalising aspect of education and teaching in general. In other words, an education and teaching is required that is based on a Heideggerian concept of nothingness and the uncanny Real-enjoyment. The key is to situate the teacher and other educational participants at the centre of a world from which the participants have become estranged, thus allowing them to regain a sense of self-awareness.

Lacan's concept of desire similarly functions to (impossible to achieve) destroy the transcendental condition of possibility, the objet petit a. The designation of the object of desire as the object-cause of desire suggests that desire seeks its own condition of possibility. Desire aims to negate that which makes it possible. Therefore, there is no ethics of the Real; hence, we are left with embracing the teacher's desire.

The concept of jouissance, or real enjoyment, which is presumed to be lost by the teacher as a speaking subject, returns only in the form of what might

be labelled "limit experiences". These experiences can be described as encounters with that which is annihilating, inassimilable, overwhelming, traumatic, or unbearable (cf. Desire-blank in section three, Chapter 7). Similarly, jouissance is related to transgressive violations, such as the breaching of boundaries and the breaking of barriers, or the act of maintaining focus and awareness. It is challenging, if not arguably impossible, for the speaking subject to accommodate, tolerate, and fully digest (cf. Desire-reserved in Chapter 7). The speaking being is compelled to coexist with its inherently problematic jouissance in a state of unease. It is my hope that this book will prove an engaging and thought-provoking read, offering a unique Lacanian perspective on education, teaching, and desire. The objective is not to provide an understanding of Lacanian philosophy but rather to engage with it in a way that challenges and extends our own subjectivity in the context of teaching and education.

Note

1 Parts of the following text are a reworked version from a previous publication, i.e., (Åsvoll, 2019) Heidegger and Entrepreneurship. A Phenomenological Approach.

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