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# Literature along the Lines of Flight

## D.H. Lawrence's Later Novels and Critical Theory

HIDENAGA ARAI

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## D.H. Lawrence's Later Novels and Critical Theory

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# INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this book is to present new readings of the later novels by D.H. Lawrence (1885-1930) in terms of established critical theory and contemporary thought and, thereby, set up a new impression of D.H. Lawrence. Lawrence has long been seen as an advocate of spontaneous desire, or as an organicist who espouses sexual liberation and a return to nature. This image may still prevail if we were to refer only to his philosophical essays or study in isolation the words and actions of some of the protagonists in his fiction. However, there are moments when this image of Lawrence is challenged or contradicted by another Lawrence. It is in the novels, especially in the later novels, that these moments can be found: spontaneous desire for what is organic is advocated and resisted at the same time. This self-resistance is important because the approbation of spontaneity or organicism can be easily incorporated into political ideas such as those that inspired Nazism or Fascism. While being faithful to one's own desire without worrying about the outside world is regarded as a Lawrentian virtue, I would like to show that there was another Lawrence who was sensitive enough to the outside world and to the social discourses of his time to use them in his novels, albeit subtly and with critical displacements.

F.R. Leavis, who included D.H. Lawrence as a novelist in "the great tradition of the English novel", had an enormous influence on the public image of Lawrence, portraying him as a writer of spontaneous creativity and intelligence.[1] To begin with, Leavis refuted the books written by two influential critics in the 1930s: J.M. Murry's *Son of Woman* (1931) and T.S. Eliot's *After Strange Gods* (1934). Leavis criticized Murry for treating Lawrence's artistic and creative writing as evidence of "Lawrence's personal case and inner history", and for concerning himself in particular with "the difficulties resulting for Lawrence throughout his life from the relation established with him in childhood by his mother".[2] Against Eliot, who pointed out Lawrence's lack of "the

[1] F.R. Leavis, *The Great Tradition: George Eliot, Henry James, Joseph Conrad* (1948), London: Chatto and Windus, 1960, 23-27.
[2] F.R. Leavis, *D.H. Lawrence: Novelist* (1955), Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1973,

critical faculties which education should give, and an incapacity for what we ordinarily call thinking",[3] Leavis maintained: "His thinking, in fact, is so much superior to what is ordinarily called thinking."[4] Although Eliot constructed an image of Lawrence as a man of "insights" or "intuition", for Leavis Lawrence was "the great creative genius of our age, and one of the greatest figures in English literature" because "genius in Lawrence was, among other things, supreme intelligence". [5] It is of great significance that Leavis salvaged Lawrence's reputation as a creative artist and a great novelist from the disparaging views submitted by Murry and Eliot, which held that in spite of his keen sensibilities Lawrence was a sexually morbid individual and an intellectually ignorant heretic.

Thereafter, from the late 1950s through the 1960s, Lawrence became very well known among common readers as well as literary scholars owing mainly to the trials related to *Lady Chatterley's Lover* (1928) that were underway in England, America, and Japan. Lawrence's popularity, however, went hand in hand with the notorious image of his being a pornographic writer. In addition, in the 1970s, Lawrence's reputation was seriously damaged by certain feminist critics, most notably Kate Millett, who denounced his phallocentrism.[6] Nevertheless, to this day, Lawrence's works captivate readers, including critics and scholars, who persist in trying to present new Lawrences through various critical theories and perspectives.

While there is no denying that F.R. Leavis played an important role in the present renown of Lawrence, his ranking of Lawrence's novels has not necessarily had a desirable effect on the successive studies of his novels. For apart from *The Rainbow* (1915) and *Women in Love* (1920), which, according to Leavis, are Lawrence's "two greatest works", the other "exploratory and experimental" novels that followed, such as *Aaron's Rod* (1922), *Kangaroo* (1923), and *The Plumed Serpent* (1926), were underestimated under the rubric of "the lesser novels".[7] In *The English Novel from Dickens to Lawrence*, Raymond Williams, who may be considered one of Leavis' critical successors,

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174-75.

[3] T.S. Eliot, *After Strange Gods: A Primer of Modern Heresy*, London: Faber and Faber, 1934, 58.

[4] Leavis, *D.H. Lawrence: Novelist*, 375.

[5] *Ibid*., 367, 374-75.

[6] Kate Millett, *Sexual Politics* (1970), London: Virago, 1977.

[7] Leavis, *D.H. Lawrence: Novelist*, 19, 32-33.

put more value on *Sons and Lovers* (1913) than on *The Rainbow* or *Women in Love*, but he was not so different from Leavis in that he ignored the "leadership novels" (*Aaron's Rod*, *Kangaroo*, and *The Plumed Serpent*), which were all set outside the shores of England.[8] Terry Eagleton, a critical successor of Raymond Williams, also valued highly *The Rainbow* and *Women in Love*. As for the leadership novels, he states in *Criticism and Ideology*: "After the war, Lawrence's near-total ideological collapse, articulated with the crisis of aesthetic signification, presents itself in a radical rupturing and diffusion of literary form: novels like *Aaron's Rod* and *Kangaroo* are signally incapable of evolving a narrative, ripped between fragmentary plot, spiritual autobiography and febrile didacticism." [9] Therefore Lawrence's later novels had been construed as inferior not only from the artistic or aesthetic point of view but also from the thematic or ideological perspective.

It was not until the 1980s that Lawrence's later novels began to be revaluated. One important motivation for dealing with Lawrence's later novels lies in the prospect of modifying the simplistic negative image of Lawrence as a phallocentric and Fascistic organicist. Judith Ruderman's *D.H. Lawrence and the Devouring Mother* (1984) was a pioneering, full-fledged study of Lawrence's leadership period.[10] Taking a psycho- analytical approach, she connected his pursuit of a patriarchal leader with his preoccupation with and fear of maternal domination. John B. Humma's *Metaphor and Meaning in D.H. Lawrence's Later Novels* (1990) was one of several conspicuous attempts to refute, by reiterating Lawrence's formal and artistic achievements, such views as those exemplified by Eliseo Vivas' *D.H. Lawrence: The Failure and the Triumph of Art* (1960).[11] Barbara Mensch's *D.H. Lawrence and the Authoritarian Personality* (1991), which can be designated as a rebuttal to Kate Millett's *Sexual Politics*,

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[8] Raymond Williams, *The English Novel from Dickens to Lawrence* (1970), London: Hogarth P, 1984.

[9] Terry Eagleton, *Criticism and Ideology: A Study in Marxist Literary Theory* (1976), London: Verso, 1978, 160.

[10] Judith Ruderman, *D.H. Lawrence and the Devouring Mother: The Search for a Patriarchal Ideal of Leadership*, Durham, NC: Duke UP, 1984.

[11] John B. Humma, *Metaphor and Meaning in D.H. Lawrence's Later Novels*, Columbia, SC: U of Missouri P, 1990; Eliseo Vivas, *D.H. Lawrence: The Failure and the Triumph of Art*, Evanston, IL: Northwestern UP, 1960.

maintained that Lawrence demonstrated liberal rather than authoritarian characteristics.[12]

When revaluating Lawrence's later novels, it is essential to question the critical standards embraced by critics such as F.R. Leavis and his followers. This investigation can be refined and made more effective by bringing into play post-structural theories that became influential after Leavis. In this respect, *Radicalizing Lawrence* (2000) by Robert Burden is worthy of reference.[13] Although it does not focus on the later novels, Burden's work insists on the necessity of moving to a new interpretative paradigm created by the advent of post-structural theories.

Another important point is that unlike his early novels much of Lawrence's later fiction takes place not in England but in Italy, Australia, the United States and Mexico: they provide us with global perspectives. It seems possible indeed that problems pertaining to, for instance, the representations of cultures and societies of the circum-Pacific region can be understood using these novels as a starting point. In this sense, recent works such as Neil Roberts' *D.H. Lawrence, Travel and Cultural Difference* (2004) and Eunyoung Oh's *D.H. Lawrence's Border Crossing* (2007) are meaningful because they seek to evaluate Lawrence's later novels in the light of the theories of colonialism and post-colonialism.[14]

This book can be positioned as an attempt to develop on these studies by Burden, Roberts and Oh. While illuminative explanations of critical theory form a major part of Burden's work, I would like to focus on questioning some of his accepted interpretations and advancing another reading by applying critical theory. Roberts' highly evocative work discusses minutely the similarities and differences between Lawrence (Mexico), Joseph Conrad (Africa) and E.M. Forster (India). However, despite the fact that Roberts' main concern lies in the study of travel and cultural encounters, his work does not cover in any detail the American social discourse of Lawrence's time and the situation in Asia as part of the circum-Pacific region. Unlike Burden or Roberts, Oh

[12] Barbara Mensch, *D.H. Lawrence and the Authoritarian Personality*, Basingstoke: Macmillan Academic and Professional, 1991.
[13] Robert Burden, *Radicalizing Lawrence: Critical Interventions in the Reading and Reception of D.H. Lawrence's Narrative Fiction*, Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2000.
[14] Neil Roberts, *D.H. Lawrence, Travel and Cultural Difference*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004; Eunyoung Oh, *D.H. Lawrence's Border Crossing: Colonialism in His Travel Writings and "Leadership" Novels*, New York: Routledge, 2007.

concentrates on the leadership novels from the more explicit standpoint of colonialism and post-colonialism. The primary difference between her work and mine lies in that Oh deals with some later novels that I do not, whereas the critical theories I apply are not confined to colonialism or post-colonialism. There have been attempts since the 1980s and in the 2000s in particular to interpret Lawrence's novels in terms of post-structuralist critical theory or to revaluate his later novels from a global perspective. The difference in my book, which is an extension of this critical trend, is to be found above all in the way in which a particular critical theory or perspective is selected and applied to the individual novel in order to present concrete interpretations of each novel.

This book covers Lawrence's novels from *Women in Love* to *The Plumed Serpent*. Unlike the leadership novels, which tend to be fragmentary in form and address political themes explicitly, *Women in Love* has met with widespread critical acclaim. In this respect, it may not have been necessary to deal anew with *Women in Love*; but this novel is important for another reason – it is the point from which Lawrence's journey to Italy (*Aaron's Rod*), Australia (*Kangaroo*), and Mexico (*The Plumed Serpent*) unfolds.[15] *St Mawr* (1925), too, has been highly estimated by influential critics;[16] nevertheless, when this text is com- pared to other works set in the circum-Pacific region, a new reading of *St Mawr* is rendered possible. I consider it difficult for students of Lawrence to disregard *Women in Love* and *St Mawr* because of the ample hints offered by these works on the kind of desire that

[15] In many cases, both *Women in Love* and *The Rainbow* (1915) have been considered to belong to the middle period of Lawrence's career. But in "Drama and Mimicry", in *Lawrence and Comedy*, eds Paul Eggert and John Worthen, Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1996, John Worthen suggests that the "the crucial division" may lie between *The Rainbow* and *Women in Love*: "The great watershed of Lawrence's writing has, for years, been thought to lie between *Sons and Lovers* and *The Rainbow*. The more, however, we consider the kinds of undramatised narrative Lawrence employed in his early fiction, and the sophisticated uses he made of satire, mimicry, drama and comedy in his writing from 1916 onward, the more the crucial division may appear to lie instead between *The Rainbow* and Lawrence's subsequent writing, of which *Women in Love* is perhaps the beginning ... " (42). Meanwhile, in *Criticism and Ideology* Terry Eagleton also sees a break between the "diachronic rhythms" of *The Rainbow* and the "synchronic form", "fissuring of organic form" and the "'montage' techniques of symbolic juxtaposition" of *Women in Love* (160-61).

[16] Leavis, *D.H. Lawrence: Novelist*, 271-96; Frank Kermode, *Lawrence*, London: Fontana, 1973, 111-14; *The Oxford Anthology of English Literature: Volume II*, eds Frank Kermode and John Hollander, New York: Oxford UP, 1973, 1834-36.

drives characters in Lawrence's novels onward through their journey. Moreover, insights into the manner in which Lawrence represents desire are also available in these novels.

In Chapter 1, I deal with one of Lawrence's representative novels, *Women in Love*, and using René Girard's theory of desire, attempt to elucidate some ambiguities of the novel which can be unriddled neither by the interpretation that asserts the perfection of the married relationship of one couple nor by the rather hasty explanation that regards the love of a principal male character as a repressed homosexual impulse.

Chapter 2 insists that it is impossible to revaluate *Aaron's Rod* from the standpoint of the novel's organic construction and that the proto-fascistic and phallocentric inclination of the novel must and can be deconstructed by means of analysing the characteristics of the narrative, the various tropes, and the system of certain conceptual oppositions.

Continuing to treat *Aaron's Rod* and drawing on Deleuze and Guattari's concept of deterritorialization/reterritorialization, Chapter 3 tries to rearticulate the relationship between Aaron and Lilly, who have often been considered to be Lawrence's split selves. A new articulation shows that Aaron embodies the spirit of deterritorialization, whereas Lilly represents the concept of reterritorialization.

In Chapter 4, comparing *Kangaroo* to *Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War* by Wilfred Trotter, I clarify the meaning and function of the concept and representation of the crowd in Lawrence's novel. This reveals that the view of Lawrence with regard to the crowd in *Kangaroo* is similar to that of Freud, who was against a eugenic ordering of society.

In comparing *St Mawr* with *Kangaroo*, Chapter 5 discusses the disappearance of the crowd and vengeance in the former. The reflection on the war in *Kangaroo* allows the novel's discourse to disengage from the discourse of social Darwinism or the eugenics of Wilfred Trotter. On the other hand, in *St Mawr*, war is neither the cause nor the result of evil. The exclusion of war from the representation of evil appears to draw on another discourse of political activism: the discourse of pan-Mongolism or the Yellow Peril.

In Chapter 6, I re-examine the representations of evil and the concepts of nature and civilization in *St Mawr*, focusing on their shifting features. A close examination of the features of evil reveals that,

after it is ascribed to degraded civilizations and after the setting of the narrative shifts to America, the very notion of evil itself becomes marginalized. Meanwhile, the social Darwinistic or eugenistic vision of "the natural creation", which embodies nature as good, is dissociated from the story and characters.

I sketch two opposing readings in Chapter 7, one based on the evil from Asia and the other on problematizing such a core of evil. The dualistic tendency of *St Mawr* can be understood as having what Walter Benn Michaels calls "the structure of nativist modernism without the nativism". Michaels' argument about Lawrence's non-nationalistic tendency is astute and to the point, although it would be problematic to generalize Lawrence as simply primitivistic or universalistic. Soon after taking over the role of Lou's object from St Mawr, "the core of Asia" is replaced by "wild America". The "core of Asia" is therefore a vanishing mediator whose significance fades after it is invoked as the origin of evil.

Bringing Nazism and post-colonialism into view, Chapter 8 investigates representations of sexuality in *The Plumed Serpent* with Michel Foucault's citation from this novel as the point of departure. As a result, it is shown that the novel does not necessarily endorse sexuality without reservation because Lawrence's insight that people are enslaved by sexuality is consonant with Foucault's.

Each chapter of this book is meant to renovate the previous interpretations of Lawrence's novels. An examination of his later novels proves that Lawrence extends far beyond his image of an organicist who advocated sexual liberation and a return to nature, and that he is a novelist who pursued an ideal society and perfect relationships among people, responding to various discourses or thoughts of the time yet resisting or modifying them at the same time.

# CHAPTER 1

# THE MEDIATOR TRANSCENDED: THE STRUCTURE OF DESIRE IN *WOMEN IN LOVE*

## Murry or Leavis

Criticism of D.H. Lawrence's *Women in Love* has, on the whole, developed around the Murry's and Leavis' interpretations. J.M. Murry scathingly criticized the novel for defects of characterization and for the self-deception of Rupert Birkin, the Lawrence-figure, adding that the couple of Birkin and Ursula Brangwen cannot be differentiated from the Gerald and Gudrun pair.[1] However, F.R. Leavis, in *D.H. Lawrence: Novelist*, attempted to retrieve the status of Lawrence as a great artist through his own detailed analysis of the dramatically organized form and the objective representation of characters.[2] In spite of the great influence of Leavis, his criticism did not manage to entirely invalidate the standpoint of Murry. Some critics follow Murry's argument further and daringly accentuate the repressed homosexuality in Birkin, which, they think, underlies the complicated relationships among the main characters.[3] This viewpoint, it must be said, does seem persuasive, compared with the reading of Mark Spilka, which, laying strong emphasis on the ideal union or "star-equilibrium" between Birkin and Ursula, tends to overlook the unsatisfactoriness of their married relations.[4]

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[1] J.M. Murry, "J.M. Murry in *Nation and Athenaeum*: 13 August 1921, xxix, 713-14", reprinted in *D.H. Lawrence: The Critical Heritage*, ed. Ronald P. Draper, London: RKP, 1970, 168-72; *Son of Woman: The Story of D.H. Lawrence*, London: Jonathan Cape, 1931, 106-22.

[2] Leavis, *D.H. Lawrence: Novelist*, 174-236.

[3] Scott Sanders, *D.H. Lawrence: The World of the Major Novels*, London: Vision, 1973, 123-32; Jeffrey Meyers, *Homosexuality and Literature 1890-1930*, London: Athlone, 1977, 140-49. As for the controversy between Colin Clarke who follows Murry's standpoint and Mark Spilka, who belongs to the Leavis line, see Colin Clarke, *River of Dissolution: D.H. Lawrence and English Romanticism*, London: RKP, 1969, ix-xv, 70-110; and Mark Spilka, "Lawrence Up-Tight, or the Anal Phase Once Over", *Novel*, 4 (1971), 252-67.

[4] Mark Spilka, *The Love Ethic of D.H. Lawrence*, Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1955,

**The problematics of desire**

Despite the critical truism that *Women in Love* consists of two dramatically contrasted stories, the hesitant tone of the ending makes it difficult to conclude simply that one is a disastrous death and the other a happy marriage.[5] The mystic marriage, which is apparently achieved by Birkin and Ursula, eventually turns out to be problematical because of the abortive friendship between Birkin and Gerald Crich.[6] This relationship between the two men is indeed the problematic core of the novel and lends support to the charges of those who find in Birkin a symptom or proof of Lawrence's repressed homosexuality. Jeffrey Meyers, for example, interprets the narrative as a perverse, homosexual love story, presenting the ending as Birkin's choice of Gerald and refusal of the love of Ursula: the perverse desire "negates Birkin's commitment to female love" and "clarifies Birkin's final lament".[7]

One of the principal loci that leads some critics to this kind of reading is clearly the cancelled "Prologue" to the novel, which was not published until 1963. Certainly Birkin's affinity for man is narrated here conspicuously, as Birkin, seeing "a strange Cornish type of man", feels "the desire spring up in him, the desire to know this man, to have him, as it were to eat him, to take the very substance of him".[8] Yet it seems inadequate to attribute this critical situation of desire solely to Birkin's male and personal perversity, since the representation of

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121-47.

[5] For an interesting reading that investigates the dramatic and mythical construction of the novel, see Evelyn J. Hinz, "Hierogamy versus Wedlock: Types of Marriage Plots and Their Relationship to Genres of Prose Fiction", *PMLA*, 91 (1976), 900-13; and P.T. Whelan, *D.H. Lawrence: Myth and Metaphysic in* The Rainbow *and* Women in Love, Ann Arbor, MI: UMI Research P, 1988, 49-99.

[6] For the readings that question the happy marriage of the Birkin and Ursula pair or refer to the problematic friendship between Birkin and Gerald, see Raymond Williams, *Modern Tragedy: Essays on the Idea of Tragedy in Life and in the Drama, and on Modern Tragic Writing from Ibsen to Tennessee Williams*, Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 1966, 121-38; Leo Bersani, *A Future for Astyanax: Character and Desire in Literature*, Boston: Little, Brown, 1976, 156-85; John Worthen, *D.H. Lawrence and the Idea of the Novel*, London: Macmillan, 1979, 83-104; and Anne Wright, *Literature of Crisis, 1910-22:* Howards End, Heartbreak House, Women in Love *and* The Waste Land, New York: St Martin's, 1984, 113-57.

[7] Meyers, *Homosexuality and Literature*, 143.

[8] D.H. Lawrence, *Women in Love* (1920), eds David Farmer, Lindeth Vasey and John Worthen, Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1987, 505 (hereafter cited parenthetically as *WL*).

female desire in the novel also shows the same kind of symptoms. Ursula's desire to "have" Birkin, "utterly, finally to have him as her own, oh, so unspeakably, in intimacy", and to "drink him down – ah, like a life-draught" (*WL*, 264) is, clearly, not so very different from Birkin's.

In order to clarify Birkin's and the others' predicaments it might be advisable to probe his impulses in terms not exclusively of homosexual or heterosexual but of "general desire".[9] René Girard's formula of mimetic or metaphysical desire in *Deceit, Desire, and the Novel* or *Things Hidden since the Foundation of the World* will be useful to elucidate this problem.[10] In Girard's scheme, desire is fundamentally mimetic or triangular, always mediated by the other, the mediator. The object of desire is made desirable by the desires of the others. All desire, in this formula, will be more or less mimetic and "metaphysical"; but, a particular form of the desire is termed "metaphysical desire" in certain historical contexts. According to Girard's analysis, the subject's mediator in a feudal society was either God or someone like a king who had a surpassing transcendency and functioned as the subject's model for conduct. Since it was distant from the subject, the mediator could not be confused with the object. An enormous burden, on the other hand, is placed on the subject of such desire in the modern age, who is vain of his or her own perfection and cannot admit the need for a model. Instead of imitating God at a distant point in a different universe, the subject, unable to realize the divine autonomy, in turn, imitates his or her neighbour in the same world; in the modern age, the mediator could be said to have "deviated" from the heights and drawn nearer to the individual.[11] Two variants of this desire can be derived from this

[9] T.H. Adamowski, "Being Perfect: Lawrence, Sartre, and *Women in Love*", *Critical Inquiry*, II/2 (Winter 1975), 345-68. Likewise, Bersani states in *A Future for Astyanax* that we can "think of Birkin's desire simply *as* a desire – that is, as a sign of Birkin's inability to be satisfied with nondesiring stillness" (182, emphasis in original).

[10] René Girard, *Deceit, Desire, and the Novel: Self and Other in Literary Structure*, 1961, trans. Yvonne Freccero, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins UP, 1965; *Things Hidden since the Foundation of the World*, 1978, trans. Stephen Bann and Michael Metteer, London: Athlone, 1987. Girard argues the parallelism of homosexuality and heterosexuality in *Things Hidden*: "Homosexuality corresponds to an 'advanced' stage of mimetic desire, but this stage can also correspond to a form of heterosexuality in which the partners play the roles of model and rival, as well as that of object, for one another. The metamorphosis of the heterosexual object into a rival brings about effects very similar to the metamorphosis of the rival into an object" (337).

[11] For this brief historical outline, I am indebted to Bruce Bassoff, "Metaphysical

formula: one is the subject's desire to become the mediator, and the other is to want the mediator as the object.[12] In the former type the mediator is confused with the subject, and in the latter with the object. In other words, it is the subject's desire to become, or want as the object, the "deviated" mediator who is neither so distant nor transcendent that the desiring subject has to resign himself or herself to the impossibility of reaching that mediator. This desire is distinguished from physical need such as appetite, which directly links the subject to the object without metaphysical intervention of the mediator. It is also distinguished from the worship of God or the king, who are so distant or transcendent that the desiring subject cannot become or want them as object but can only imitate them as a model for conduct.[13]

What is actually revealed in the "Prologue" is Birkin's metaphysical desire and the divided mediators that include Hermione Roddice, a friend of the Criches and baronet's daughter. To Birkin, Hermione is his mediator, the model who shows him his way of conduct. She appears to him to embody "social virtue" at the "centre" of his life (*WL*, 500); "her feelings" guide him so influentially that he has "too much deference" for them and "none of his own" (*WL*, 498). Birkin's "deference" for Hermione suggests his deification of her transcendent image; they experience "transcendent white ecstasy" in their "spiritual intimacy" (*WL*, 495). A conflict, however, occurs when he wants her as heterosexual object as well. Hermione turns from a model into a rival because she despises and cannot admit the sensuality of Birkin. As he cannot find his way out of this difficulty, any man who seems to be self-sufficient can become his mediator. While Hermione is his mediator in the interchange of "spiritual intimacy", men, it seems,

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Desire in *Women in Love*", *Revue des Langues Vivantes*, 42 (Summer 1976), 227-36, reprinted as "Mimetic Desire in *Women in Love*", in *The Secret Sharers: Studies in Contemporary Fictions*, New York: AMS, 1983, to which Girard writes a preface. Bassoff has also treated the novel adopting the theory of Girard in this article. In spite of his dexterous survey of the novel from the standpoint of Girard, Bassoff's analysis does not seem to differentiate Birkin from other characters. My purpose and approach are different from Bassoff's: I will focus my analysis on the main characters in order to present my reading in the context of a *Women in Love* criticism.

[12] This is my classification based on Girard's. The various cases of conflict which are caused by this metaphysical desire are presented in his *Deceit, Desire, and the Novel*.

[13] There is in *Women in Love* a wealth of references to the character's desire for the state of "perfection" or of "completion" that I am subsuming under the rubric of "self-sufficiency". This desirable state, in the eyes of the subject who has a metaphysical desire, seems to be obtained by the mediator.

might guide him in the sensual sphere. Various kinds of men attract him: a policeman, a soldier, a young man playing with children, friends of no great intelligence but of pleasant appearance. Among them is Gerald, "a hunter, a traveller, a soldier, always active, always moving vigorously, and giving orders to some subordinate" (*WL*, 490). Despite the outward differences of these men, their common attributes clarify their function as mediator to Birkin: "perfect and beautiful", which can be subsumed under the term self-sufficiency, and also, when wished to be absorbed and assimilated, apt to be the cause of further conflict.

**Gudrun's metaphysical desire to want the mediator as the object**

It is metaphysical desire that Birkin appears to have for Gerald when he feels as if he were absorbed into him in the wrestling scene, Chapter XX "Gladiatorial". But Birkin's perilous desire is momentary, and, on the whole, he is not obsessed with the being of the other. It is not Birkin who actually enters into rivalry with Gerald but Gudrun Brangwen, Birkin's *alter ego*.[14] Like Birkin, she is rootless and cynical; they have a similar artistic vision and disgust for humanity. The difference between them lies in Gudrun's being more enmeshed in metaphysical desire than Birkin. The problematical desire of Birkin in the "Prologue" could be said to be transferred to Gudrun in the novel. She, like Birkin in the "Prologue", breaks herself up into multiplicity. While London Bohemia at once attracts and disgusts Gudrun, the colliers in Beldover cause her the same ambivalent feeling. Changing mediators from the colliers to Gerald, from Gerald to the German sculptor, Herr Loerke, she seeks in vain a self-sufficient, complete state of existence.

Gudrun seeks in the colliers the self-sufficiency she lacks. Her object may be their physical power or the world they occupy, but it cannot be dissociated from their status as mediators. Gudrun has "a strange, nostalgic ache of desire" for the colliers and the world they inhabit (*WL*, 117). Walking in the streets of Beldover is a sensual delight to her, amidst "a resonance of physical man, a glamorous thickness of labour and maleness". She feels as if she were enveloped "in a laborer's caress": "through a wave of disruptive force", the colliers as the mediators, not only puzzle her but also awake "a fatal

[14] In *D.H. Lawrence: The World of the Major Novels*, Scott Sanders points out that Gudrun is Birkin's "alter ego, a female version of himself" (126). It is in his conclusion that his influential suggestion parts company with my argument. He urges that Birkin, "compounded with Gudrun" has homosexual impulses toward Gerald (128).

desire" within Gudrun. The fusion of human "voluptuousness" and inhuman "machinery" originate an incommunicable existence she craves for (*WL*, 115). Nevertheless, even if she had a collier as her lover, she would not achieve gratification of her metaphysical desire, and, as she senses, her "strange, nostalgic ache of desire" is "never to be fulfilled" (*WL*, 117).

Switching from the colliers to Gerald makes Gudrun's desire more fervent. Gerald more profoundly attracts her because his social status as mine-owner and colliers' master inspires her pride. Her acute wish for his world and powerfulness is described when she watches him swimming in the water:

> From his separate element he saw them, and he exulted to himself because of his own advantage, his possession of a world to himself. He was immune and perfect. He loved his own vigorous, thrusting motion, and the violent impulse of the very cold water against his limbs, buoying him up. (*WL*, 47)

Gudrun envies him painfully: "Even this momentary possession of pure isolation and fluidity seemed to her so terribly desirable, that she felt herself as if damned, out there on the high-road" (*WL*, 47). "The freedom, the liberty, the mobility", cries Gudrun to Ursula, her sister, "You're a man, you want to do a thing, you do it. You haven't the thousand obstacles a woman has in front of her" (*WL*, 48). The desirable state of being "immune" and "perfect" manifests Gudrun's object, which cannot be separated from the being of Gerald as the mediator. As with her desire for the underworld, the object of Gudrun is not so much what Gerald possesses in reality as something metaphysical, including his status as master, that he appears to have with his vigorousness and perfectness.

Girard presents the dialectic of master and slave that "appears in the post-Napoleonic universe" as "the novelistic dialectic", which is similar to but greatly different from "the Hegelian dialectic":

> The Hegelian dialectic rested on physical courage. Whoever has no fear will be the master, whoever is afraid will be the slave. The novelistic dialectic rests on hypocrisy. Violence, far from serving the interests of whoever exerts it, reveals the intensity of his desire; thus it is a sign of slavery.

The struggle between Gudrun and Gerald is novelistic in that it is basically "the struggle of consciousness" rather than the violent struggle.[15] Yet if it is taken into consideration that Gudrun thinks of Gerald who achieved the modernization of his coal mine as "a Napoleon of peace" (*WL*, 417), *Women in Love* seems to thematize the transition from "the Hegelian dialectic" to "the novelistic dialectic", or the novelistic (metaphysical) tragedy caused by a Napoleonic (physical) programme in the modern world.

At any rate, in order to attain the self-sufficiency or completeness that he seems to assume, Gudrun plunges herself into a master-slave struggle. What is necessary in her erotic plan is a strategy to let Gerald himself yield to her so that she can accomplish her purpose, which is to induce him to desire her. In the first half of Chapter XXIV "Death and Love", Gudrun approaches nearest to Gerald and almost fulfils her desire. When she hears Gerald say that she is everything to him, she imagines that she has gained her victory: "This was the thing she wanted to hear, only this" (*WL*, 329). Embracing Gerald, the master of the colliers, beneath the bridge where they embrace their sweethearts, she seems to satisfy her desire for both of them. She can "relax" and seems "to melt, to flow into him, as if she were some infinitely warm and precious suffusion filling into his veins, like an intoxicant" (*WL*, 331). Passages such as these with their image of absorption and assimilation are more than mere representation of her sexual desire; they represent, across the body, the metaphysical desire to become the mediator who embodies perfection or self-sufficiency.

At the end of the chapter, Gudrun's strategy finally tips the scales in her favour; the previous quasi-equilibrium established under the bridge falls to pieces. Though Gudrun has "stayed away lest Gerald should think her too easy of winning" (*WL*, 335), Gerald creeps to her bedroom after his father's death, unable to bear the sense of void and nothingness: "Into her he poured all his pent-up darkness and corrosive death, and he was whole again" (*WL*, 344). This violent union, as a result, turns Gerald into a "child and man" and Gudrun into a master and God: "He was infinitely grateful, as to God, or as an infant is at its mother's breast" (*WL*, 345). The whole situation is changed: Gudrun as a godlike mother attains complete predominance over Gerald. If Gerald admits her mastery over him, he as a desirable object is no longer able to fascinate Gudrun. She rather feels "a dark understirring of jealous

[15] Girard, *Deceit, Desire, and the Novel*, 110, 112.

hatred, that he should lie so perfect and immune, in an otherworld", because she is "tormented with violent wakefulness, cast out in the outer darkness" (*WL*, 346). Gudrun, thus, bears an intense hatred of Gerald, because, degrading himself, he ceases to be her desirable object. Gerald seems to have shown the gate of the "immune and perfect" world, but her entry is blocked by himself. When Gerald goes out "in a grateful self-sufficiency" in the morning, Gudrun tries to imagine in vain Gerald as "a workman getting up to go to work", and herself as "a workman's wife" (*WL*, 348-49). The failure of the idea contrasts harshly with the satisfaction she had before, imagining herself with the colliers' lover.

Gudrun experiences the contradictory feelings of hatred and love in her master-slave struggle with Gerald. They are fundamentally derived from her attempt to fulfil her metaphysical desire for Gerald through her mastery over him. The fight, the "eternal see-saw" between the two is terminated by the death of Gerald (*WL*, 445), which is brought about by the intervention of Loerke, Gudrun's new mediator.

**Gerald's metaphysical desire to become the mediator**

Birkin is different from Gudrun in his attitude toward Gerald; he does not have the illusion that to dominate Gerald will bring about his own completeness. It is true that he has the impulse to absorb the Cornish man in the "Prologue", yet his action in the novel, by comparison, is secure from the illusion of dominance. It could be said that there is a gap in the characterization of Birkin between the "Prologue" and the novel. He is neither divided nor ruled by mediators as before.

Birkin, on the contrary, may appear to behave himself like a mediator in the narrative. As is evident from his attitude toward other characters, Birkin will yield to nobody. Even in his relationship with Gerald, it seems that Birkin, in his preaching, persuades Gerald to obey him. Gerald, of course, will not admit that Birkin is his model whose ideas he must accept. For, in his social programme of modernizing his coal mine, it is Gerald himself who has the ambition to become a godlike being, the mediator by whom everything should be subjugated.[16] While Birkin does not essentially attempt to become the

[16] Gerald actually is associated with *Wille zur Macht* in the text by Ursula. For the theme of Nietzschean will and Lawrentian desire, see Kingsley Widmer, *Defiant Desire: Some Dialectical Legacies of D.H. Lawrence*, Carbondale: Southern Illinois UP, 1992, 40-69. John Burt Foster, Jr. also discusses the influence of Nietzsche on *Women in Love* in *Heirs to Dionysus: A Nietzschean Current in Literary Modernism*,

mediator, Gerald clings to the pursuit of his own deification. What they wish is fundamentally different from each other in the structure of desire.

In his social plan, Gerald refuses to follow any model. He is different, in this respect, from his father, Thomas Crich, whose philanthropy has produced a conflict in his mine management.[17] Mr Crich's case is contrasted with his son's, providing quite an opposite instance of mediation. The mediator of Mr Crich has always been Christ, in whom he is "one with his workmen". It is according to philanthropic charity, therefore, that his mine must be run. The equality of all men, however, is contradictory to the system of the mining industry, which rests on material inequality; hence his "unacknowledged belief" that "it was his workmen, the miners, who held in their hands the means of salvation". In order to "move nearer to God, he must move toward his miners". Christ is thus "deviated" from the transcendent point into the colliers; confused with Him, in the eyes of Mr Crich, they are the model he must obey. His charity is nothing more than the means of attaining this "idol, his God made manifest", an illusion which is only to be destroyed by their riots (*WL*, 215).

Gerald's desire is, unlike his father's, to become the transcendent mediator himself. He identifies himself with the mediator in the triangular structure of desire, which inevitably breaks this triangle into a linear structure, and, therefore, brings about the conflict of the subject. In modernizing the mine, he only seeks to assert his own will and power. He cares about neither "money" nor "social position". What he wants is "the pure fulfilment of his own will in the struggle with the natural conditions" (*WL*, 223-24). As the result of the struggle, Gerald seems to have attained the state of perfection:

> He, the man, could interpose a perfect, changeless, godlike medium between himself and the Matter he had to subjugate. There were two opposites, his will and the resistant Matter of the earth. And between these he could establish the very expression of his will, the incarnation of his power, a great and perfect machine, a system, an activity of pure order, pure mechanical repetition, repetition ad infinitum, hence eternal and infinite …. And Gerald was the God of the Machine, Deus ex Machina. And the whole productive will of man was the Godhead ….

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Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1981, 180-229.

[17] Graham Holderness, *D.H. Lawrence: History, Ideology and Fiction*, Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1982, 190-219.

> there was perfection attained, the will of the highest was perfectly fulfilled, the will of mankind was perfectly enacted; for was not mankind mystically contradistinguished against inanimate Matter, was not the history of mankind just the history of the conquest of the one by the other? (*WL*, 228)

The metaphor of divinity suggests that in establishing himself as a godlike being who embodies perfection, he does not have to obey any mediator other than himself. The outward perfections, however, contrast strikingly with his inner sense of "vacuum" (*WL*, 233). The failure of his deification is attributable, in this case as well, to his metaphysical desire. Unable to carry the heavy burden of his own autonomy, Gerald finds his master in Gudrun, "Mother and substance of all life", who seems to Gerald to be self-sufficient and to give him the assurance of his existence.

**Birkin's Deleuzian as well as Girardian scheme of mediator**

There is a fundamental difference between Gerald and Birkin in terms of their attitudes toward mediators. The former has the will to make himself a transcendent mediator, but the latter has no such ambition. As evinced by the instance of Gerald, the desire to be a ruler is as destructive as one to imitate the deviated mediator as an object. Birkin could be regarded as a character who recognizes the structure of this perilous desire. This recognition makes possible his thoroughgoing attacks both on contemporary society and people. His criticism is aimed at all kinds of what he might call degraded desire.

Birkin severely judges a collier's desire for a pianoforte, telling Gerald that:

> It makes him so much higher in his neighbouring colliers' eyes. He sees himself reflected in the neighbouring opinion, like in a Brocken mist, several feet taller on the strength of the pianoforte, and he is satisfied. He lives for the sake of that Brocken spectre, the reflection of himself in the human opinion. (*WL*, 55)

The above sketches the theory of the "spirit of emulation" which works in what Birkin thinks of as the world covered with foulness. The collier wants a pianoforte regardless of its real use value; what he really wants is the recognition of the neighbours. If the pianoforte has a value, it is unreal because the value is produced by the metaphysical desire of the

neighbours. Since the neighbours are assumed to want the pianoforte, the collier tries to possess it before them in order to show his superiority over them. Some critics might regard Birkin's attack on these colliers as silly,[18] but this theory of the "spirit of emulation" is crucial, for it is connected with his judgment of other people and notions.[19] The "spirit of emulation" or rivalry is, in fact, in line with the principles of capitalism and industrialism.[20] It is natural then for Gerald, who adopts the individualist type of industrialism, to be unable to escape Birkin's criticism as far as he considers this spirit "one of the necessary incentives to production and improvement" (*WL*, 28). The keenness of Birkin's recognition of desire, in addition, turns out to be clear, when he imputes to sex the agony of man. He wants sex to be regarded as "a functional process", among the appetites: "Desire and aspiration should find their object without all this torture, as now, in a world of plenty of water, simple thirst is inconsiderable, satisfied almost unconsciously" (*WL*, 200). His speculation means not that promiscuity should be promoted, but that elements supplementary to the needs of the body cause him torture and men and women conflicts.

What forces Birkin into this meditation is his own personal conflict with Ursula, the object whom he wants as his lover. Unlike the cases of Gudrun or Gerald, however, the mediator is found neither in Ursula nor in Birkin himself but in the transcendental. It must be noted that this mediator is transcendental not in the same way as God or Christ in previous societies, but in the sense that it is distinguished from both Ursula and Birkin and placed beyond their "common sel[ves]" (*WL*, 147). In the "Mino" chapter, Birkin refers to the transcendental mediator as "the immediate bond" between man and woman (*WL*, 152). His insistence on the need of this norm may contradict his preceding speech, for he hints there at the possibility of the union dependent on "no obligation". The point about his apparently contradictory scheme in which freedom and norm exist concurrently is that the mediator should be elevated beyond the self in order to preclude domination or possession of the other. Birkin persuades Ursula to abandon her "common self" and recognize the existence of "a final you" whom he

[18] Kermode, *Lawrence*, 66.

[19] Jay Clayton, *Romantic Vision and the Novel*, Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1987, 1-26, 175-94, especially 185-87.

[20] Girard, in *Things Hidden*, mentions that all that "capitalism, or rather the liberal society that allows capitalism to flourish, does, is to give mimetic phenomena a freer rein and to direct them into economic and technological channels" (295).

wants to approach as "a final me". The place they would meet is "there beyond, where there is no speech", "no standard for action", and "no calling to book, in any form whatsoever" (*WL*, 146).[21]

In so far as the "immediate bond" is proposed instead of all kinds of given mediators such as books, or even speech, this bond may presuppose spontaneous desire. In that case, unlike Girard, Birkin does not relinquish the possibility of physical desire; the transcendental place Birkin aspires for may resemble what Gilles Deleuze terms "a transcendental field":

> What is a transcendental field? It can be distinguished from experience, to the extent that it does not refer to any object nor belong to any subject (empirical representation). It is thus given as pure a-subjective stream of consciousness, as pre-reflexive impersonal consciousness, or as the qualitative duration of consciousness without a self. One may find it odd that the transcendental be defined by such immediate givens, but transcendental empiricism is the term I will use to distinguish it from everything that makes up the world of subject and object .... The transcendental field cannot be defined by consciousness any more than the plane of immanence can be defined by a Subject or an Object that is able to contain it.[22]

The "transcendental field" is defined by "a plane of immanence" and the "plane of immanence" is defined by "a life", which is "impersonal", and yet "singular"[23] because it is distinguished from the Subject or the Object. This "transcendental field" seems to correspond to the unconscious or impersonal field, which Birkin recognizes as a third term that mediates him and Ursula. This field does not exclude physical and impersonal desire but is expected to function as a norm, for Birkin grasps "the immediate bond" as "the pledge" (*WL*, 147). It is clear also that Birkin, who regards Ursula's idea of free love as "chaos" (*WL*, 152), does not believe in the infallibility of "the primal desire" (*WL*, 146). Birkin's paradoxical view of desire, therefore, can be interpreted as follows: Birkin counterposes "the primal desire" to the existing standard of the "old way of love", while he insists on the necessity of a

[21] For "bookish imitation", see René Girard, *"To Double Business Bound": Essays on Literature, Mimesis, and Anthropology*, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins UP, 1978, 1-8.
[22] Gilles Deleuze, "Immanence: a Life", in *Two Regimes of Madness: Texts and Interviews 1975-1995*, ed. David Lapoujade, trans. Ames Hodges and Mike Taormina, New York: Semiotext(e), 2006, 384-85.
[23] *Ibid*., 386.

new standard against the existing understanding of love as freedom. In other words, hearkening back to "the primal desire" that has been ignored in the name of love, Birkin is seeking a new mediator that supplants the customary norm.

What Birkin calls "the pledge" seems analogous to the "imperative 'be free!'", implications of which are discussed by Kojin Karatani in his exploration of Immanuel Kant. Being faithful to "the primal desire" seems to correspond to being "free", and "the pledge" that they "will both cast off everything" to the "imperative" to be free. Karatani maintains:

> Kant thought that freedom lay in the duty to obey (or command). This is a tricky point where logic tends to falter, because obeying commands seems to be the opposite of freedom .... But it is clear that Kant did not identify duty with that which is imposed by the community's code. If the command of duty is of community, to obey it is a heteronomous act, and not free. In order to be free, then, what kind of command does one have to obey? That is no other than the command: "be free!" There is no contradiction here ....
>
> Where does this imperative come from? It comes neither from community nor from God; it originates from Kant's transcendental attitude itself ...
>
> This imperative "be free!" ultimately contains the imperative to treat others as free agents.[24]

In fact, although Birkin may appear to be a model who forces the disciple Ursula to imitate him, no intention to dominate Ursula is implied in his preaching. His true purpose is to let her relinquish her inclination to attend on him as her master.

Since F.R. Leavis partially based his claims for Lawrence's art on an objective characterization of Birkin, the role Ursula plays in their conversation rather than the importance of Birkin's scheme seems to have been emphasized in the criticism of this novel. Leavis argues that Birkin is "far from being coextensive with the 'spontaneous-creative fulness of being' out of which *Women in Love* comes". It may be true, as Leavis points out, that "a tentative or kind of experiment process" is created by the author in the representation of the relations between

[24] Kojin Karatani, *Transcritique on Kant and Marx*, trans. Sabu Kohso, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003, 118-19.

Birkin and Ursula.[25] Nevertheless, it would be inappropriate to disregard the core of Birkin's scheme, which is crucial to the development of their relations.[26]

It is above all the transcendental bond that makes possible what Birkin calls "an equilibrium" which is not "meeting and mingling" but "a pure balance of two single beings" (*WL*, 148). The transcendental mediator produces in the ideal relationship between Birkin and Ursula "the third, unrealised wonder ... a new, paradisal unit regained from the duality". In this state of "a new One" into which the lovers are "transcended", there is "no I and you" nor "speech" but "perfect silence of bliss" (*WL*, 369). In this utopian representation, indeed, the word "third" seems significant. The third wonder described here is both the effect and the cause which will function as transcendental mediator. It indicates the standard for their conduct from a point unattainable for the subjects.

**The dissociation of Ursula's and Birkin's vision**

Ursula appears momentarily to establish a perfect relationship with Birkin, surrendering herself not to Birkin but to the transcendental mediator, the bond which brings about the "star-equilibrium". Yet, even if their "mystic marriage" is irrevocably accomplished, the later chapter "Snow" discloses Birkin's dissatisfaction with the incompleteness of their relationship and prefigures the ambiguous ending:

> She knew that, in spite of his joy when she abandoned herself, he was a little bit saddened too. She could give herself up to his activity. But she could not be herself, she *dared* not come forth quite nakedly to his nakedness, abandoning all adjustment, lapsing in pure faith with him.

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[25] Leavis, *D.H. Lawrence: Novelist*, 211.

[26] In his famous letter of 1914, Lawrence indicates that although the "ordinary novel would trace the history of the diamond" ("the old stable ego of the character"), "my theme is carbon" (the impersonal ego). Birkin is the (anti-)character who, as the voice of Lawrence, is supposed to realize the relations based upon this carbon theory. This is not to deny that Birkin is under the influence of the dynamics of polyphony, when he enters into dialogical relationships with other characters, Ursula in particular. See *The Letters of D.H. Lawrence*: *Volume II: June 1913-October 1916*, eds George J. Zytaruk and James T. Boulton, Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1981, 183. For the philosophical discussion in reference to this letter and *Women in Love*, see T.H. Adamowski, "Character and Consciousness: D.H. Lawrence, Wilhelm Reich, and Jean-Paul Sartre", *University of Toronto Quarterly*, XLIII/4 (Summer 1974), 311-34.

> She abandoned herself to *him*, or she took hold of him and gathered her joy of him. And she enjoyed him fully. (*WL*, 435, emphases in original)

Ursula, abandoning herself to him like a "slave", still worships Birkin, and, gathering "her joy of him" like a "master", she possesses him as an object. Ursula does not entirely escape from metaphysical desire for Birkin.

In the final passage also, it is discernable that Ursula retains her possessive attitude toward Birkin. She cannot endure that her lover should need someone else besides herself. The "mystic marriage" is not enough to transform the structure of Ursula's desire and, hence, does not sufficiently assure him that their relationship is ideal. The latent failure of their matrimony motivates Birkin's desire for an additional relationship with Gerald at the ending of the narrative.

As Meyers suggests, Birkin's need for union with a man might be interpreted as a hidden homosexual impulse, the result of a repulsion from Ursula. In regard to the structure of desire, however, what Birkin generally wants is the same kind of relationships with men as with women; it is the relation that is mediated by the third term such as "the bond of pure trust and love with the other man" (*WL*, 353). This bond is intended to work generally in all human relationships.

As early as when Birkin mentioned "the immediate bond" between man and woman, another additional relationship which must also be supported by the bond has been implied. "I do think", he tells Ursula there, "that the world is only held together by the mystic conjunction, the ultimate unison between people – a bond. And the immediate bond is between man and woman" (*WL*, 152). Other people besides Ursula, thus, are taken into consideration. The mystic marriage is primarily meant to function on a large scale between people. There is a scene, in the chapter "A Chair", where Birkin and Ursula, repulsed by the atmosphere of the old market place, discuss how they will spend their future lives:

> "I don't want to inherit the earth," she said. "I don't want to inherit anything."
>
> He closed his hand over hers.
>
> "Neither do I. I want to be disinherited."
>
> She clasped his fingers closely.
>
> "We won't care about *anything*," she said.
>
> He sat still, and laughed.

> "And we'll be married, and have done with them," she added.
> – Again he laughed.
> "It's one way of getting rid of everything," she said, "to get married."
> "And one way of accepting the whole world," he added.
> "A whole other world, yes," she said happily.
> "Perhaps there's Gerald – and Gudrun –" he said.
> (*WL*, 362, emphasis in original)

In this passage, the ideal relationships between people, which correspond to those Birkin envisages in the ending, are narrated. It is the community that includes both men and women: the world, as Birkin says, where Gerald and even Gudrun are included and no one or nothing is excluded.

Free from the nation-state, this community or world postulates the relationships among singular persons. In this sense, Birkin's vision seems resonant with what Karatani refers to as "universality". Karatani explicates Deleuze's distinction of universality from generality:

> Gilles Deleuze drew a lucid distinction between universality and generality in *Difference and Repetition* (1968) while touching upon Kierkegaardian repetition: "Generality, as generality of the particular, thus stands opposed to repetition as universality of the singular." His point is that while the connection between particularity and generality requires a mediation or a movement, that between singularity and universality is direct and unmediated. Which is to say, sensu stricto, that while generality and individuality are mediated by particularity, the latter pair can never be mediated. Universality in the sense of Romanticism is the equivalent of generality in our context. For instance, while for Hegel individuality is connected to universality (in his case, universality equals generality for this precise reason) by way of particularity (qua the nation-state), for Kant there is no such mediation. What exists in between the terms is only incessant ethical determination (or, for Deleuze, *repetition*). This latter way of being individual is precisely the way of being singular.[27]

What Birkin calls "the bond" or "the pledge" cannot be anything but "incessant ethical determination" or "*repetition*" without the mediation of "particularity (qua the nation-state)". Thus, his vision is oriented toward not "the connection between particularity and generality" but

[27] Karatani, *Transcritique*, 101-102 (emphasis in original).

"that between singularity and universality". It may sound paradoxical, but I term the "the bond" or "the pledge" as "incessant ethical determination" the transcendental mediator along the lines of Girard and Deleuze.

Birkin's idea, however, is rejected by Ursula here as in the ending. It would be worth noting in the dialogue of "A Chair", indeed, that it is Ursula rather than Birkin who is willing to cut themselves off from the present world. Marriage is for her, as she affirms, "one way of getting rid of everything". Certainly, she gives her consent to approve the world, yet it is not the same as what Birkin imagines. What she dreams of is the "other" world, where she could enjoy her renewed life, liberated from the present degraded earth.

As Frank Kermode argues, Birkin's doctrine may be tamed by Ursula: "Ursula takes over the role of Birkin's critic; she cuts the metaphysic down to novelistic size ... she instinctively rejects the apocalyptic excesses of Birkin."[28] It is true that early in the narrative, when Birkin yearns for a new world empty of people, Ursula, who knows humanity "could not disappear so cleanly and conveniently", rejects his notion. Yet Ursula does not absolutely refuse his apocalyptic myth which promises the renewal of the present, corrupted world. Modifying the pessimistic aspects of his myth, she forms her own optimistic vision. Even if she insists against Birkin that "man will never be gone" (*WL*, 128), obviously imitating his speech, she believes in her new existence which is completely different from that of others.

When she persuades Gudrun to "hop off" because one has "a sort of other self, that belongs to a new planet, not to this" (*WL*, 438), it is difficult to clearly distinguish between Birkin's and Ursula's ideas. Rather, it is Birkin, at least later in the narrative, who is sceptical of that idea. Here in the chapter "A Chair", it seems as if Birkin were bewildered by, and were hesitating to restrain, Ursula's recklessness, because the apocalyptic plan has been Birkin's own. After Ursula's "We won't care about *anything*" and "we'll be married, and have done with them", Birkin only laughs, keeping silence. Behind the seeming connivance can be glimpsed his scepticism and the dissociation of their vision of the future.

By his "eternal union with a man" in the ending, Birkin does not envisage a mere homosexual relation; nor is he satisfied with the equally exclusive marriage with Ursula. Although Ursula opposes him,

[28] Kermode, *Lawrence*, 67.

saying that "You can't have it, because it's false, impossible", Birkin projects, by his "I don't believe that", his ultimate vision of the relationships in terms of the transcendental mediator (*WL*, 481). The community is actually absent; it is an ideal and impossible synthesis of incompatible friendship and marriage which the narrative could not concretely generate. The significance, however, lies in Birkin's adherence to this impossibility and insistence to the end on the incompleteness of his relations not only with Gerald but with Ursula as well, that is, on everything problematical about the given mediation that might include the narrative represented.

**Lawrence and Girard**

In the case of D.H. Lawrence's *Women in Love*, the distinction Girard makes between artists with novelistic insight and others with romantic deceit seems to be exclusive. Girard privileges that tradition of novelists who, like Dostoevsky, deconstruct the illusion of a spontaneous desire that links, in a straight line, the subject to the object. According to this scheme, Lawrence, who is regarded as the advocate of spontaneous desire, would belong to the deceptive. Paul Dumouchel, in fact, asserts that Lawrence, among others in English literature, should be excluded from the list of the great authors.[29] Nevertheless, Lawrence cannot be repudiated as a writer simply for having an illusion of spontaneous desire; it could he said, on the contrary, that Lawrence recognizes and reveals the structure of metaphysical desire in this novel.

Apart from this kind of classification of novelists, an inquiry into the structure of desire within the framework of Girard's theory can, as I have discussed, assist in unriddling the ambiguity of the ending. The tentative tone of the final dialogue cannot negate the importance of Birkin's vision of ideal relationships. If his vision is disregarded, neither the optimistic reading that asserts the perfection of the relationship between Birkin and Ursula nor the hasty interpretation that regards Birkin's love for Gerald as a repressed homosexual impulse can disentangle the equivocal ending. Considerable attention, therefore, should be paid to this projection of Birkin in order to interpret not only the ending but the entire narrative of *Women in Love*.

[29] Paul Dumouchel, "Introduction", in *Violence and Truth: On the Work of René Girard*, ed. Paul Dumouchel, London: Athlone, 1988, 3. However, Girard's silence about Lawrence seems significant in his "Preface" to Bruce Bassoff's *The Secret Sharers: Studies in Contemporary Fictions* in which Bassoff includes "Mimetic Desire in *Women in Love*".

# CHAPTER 2

# THE INVISIBLE CORE OF RESISTANCE: THE ANTI-AESTHETIC AND ANTI-ORGANIC TENDENCY IN *AARON'S ROD*

## A novel of various ruptures

D.H. Lawrence's *Aaron's Rod* (1922) has been considered an unsuccessful novel for its lack of organic form and objective representation of characters and events.[1] In addition, the thematic advocacy of a strong leader introduced by Rawdon Lilly, a protagonist seen as Lawrence's mouthpiece, has been condemned for its implicit conspiracy with proto-Fascism and its phallocentricity.[2] Against these negative criticisms, some critics have tried to revaluate the novel mainly from the artistic standpoint. Paul G. Baker's detailed study finds the novel's remarkable management of aesthetic, biblical, and historical materials the equal of Lawrence's other major novels.[3] Yet, the anti-aesthetic and anti-organic peculiarity of the work seems to remain marginalized. Baker's insights into that ironic tendency to digress from organic construction are overturned by his general conclusion that *Aaron's Rod* is "a highly complex and skillfully organized work of art".[4]

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[1] Vivas, *D.H. Lawrence: The Failure and the Triumph of Art*, 21-36; Keith Sagar, *The Art of D.H. Lawrence*, Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1966, 105-14.

[2] See, for example, Millett, *Sexual Politics*, 269-80. For the affinities and the possibility of differentiation between Fascism and Western Modernism, see Fredric Jameson, *Fables of Aggression: Wyndham Lewis, the Modernist as Fascist*, Berkeley, CA: U of California P, 1979; and Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy, "The Nazi Myth", trans. Brian Holmes, *Critical Inquiry*, XVI/2 (Winter 1990), 291-312.

[3] Paul G. Baker, *A Reassessment of D.H. Lawrence's* Aaron's Rod, Ann Arbor, MI: UMI Research P, 1983. For an attempt at the novel's defence in terms of the rhetorical structure, see Humma, *Metaphor and Meaning*, 1-15. Humma asserts that the novel obtains, through the "linkage of metaphors" like a lily, a tree, or the rod, "an organic relation" between "characters and ideas" and "a satisfying internal coherence" (11-13). Virginia Hyde's book, *The Risen Adam: D.H. Lawrence's Revisionist Typology*, University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State UP, 1992, on the other hand, probes the novel's typological imagery and pattern without neglecting their ironic functions.

[4] Baker, *A Reassessment*, 166.

It is in fact inexpedient, as L.D. Clark points out in his review of Baker's book, to revaluate the novel as a coherently or organically constructed work from the viewpoint of the artistic achievement.[5] Although there can be found a tendency or symptom to seek for some kind of totality, connecting seemingly irrelevant events and giving them coherent meanings, the novel's point is that, menaced by the other tendency which resists or ignores both the formal and thematic totality, the former cannot be dominant or natural any longer, but must be suspended, foregrounded, and questioned. It is impossible to revaluate the novel without acknowledging this anti-organic tendency, which actually dismantles the novel's potential inclination towards proto-fascistic and phallocentric ideology as well.[6]

The prevalent view that sees Aaron Sisson and Rawdon Lilly as the two halves of Lawrence, and that sees the author's split selfhood as what "prevents Lawrence from resolving the powerful thrust toward self-discovery and rebirth" might be still valid.[7] However, the critical measure that values protagonists' development or formation of selfhood cannot apply to the anti-developmental inclination of *Aaron's Rod*.[8] The split of Lawrence's self, moreover, cannot be ascribed to his psychological problems alone: rather, it is closely related to the aesthetic and political ones, causing radical ruptures not simply between Aaron and Lilly but also within each of them. The split can also be seen between the work and the reader as well as between the author and the work. It is the nature and implications of these ruptures,

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[5] L.D. Clark, "Review of Paul G. Baker, *A Reassessment of D.H. Lawrence's* Aaron's Rod", *D.H. Lawrence Review*, XVII/3 (Fall 1984), 260-61.

[6] For a general discussion of Lawrence's politics and aesthetics in terms of authoritarian or organicist ideology, see Anne Fernihough, *D.H. Lawrence: Aesthetics and Ideology*, Oxford: Clarendon, 1993, 16-60.

[7] Clark, "Review of Paul G. Baker", 261. Marguerite Beede Howe, in *The Art of the Self in D.H. Lawrence*, Athens, OH: Ohio UP, 1977, also regarding the novel as one of "the clearest presentations of his ego psychology" (3), states that "Aaron's being is confirmed by Rawdon Lilly, his alter ego. The two men are complements; Lilly is analytical, verbal, asexual; Aaron is physical, emotional" (91).

[8] As Tony Pinkney suggests, in *D.H. Lawrence*, New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1990, it is important to recognize the "essentially synchronic nature" of the Aaron and Lilly couple, of which relation has "no beginning and no end" (107). There is no denying, however, the counter existence of the other temporal nature of the novel, which, belonging to the organic and developmental tendency, tries to engender a genuine continuity or diachronicness.

which cannot be developed or resolved but can be significantly transformed, that I would like to elucidate in the following argument.

**The author's and the novel's provocative indifference**

It must be noted first of all that the novel is self-reflexive about its unmoral, unconventional stance and about the possible discrepancy it creates between author and reader. The novel's episodic formlessness is in reality an important and inevitable effect of the author's provocative indifference not only to the reader but to his own artistic composition and characterization. This anti-aesthetic nature peculiar to *Aaron's Rod* is analogous to the free-floating and inharmonious Aaron and is quite convincingly discussed by John Worthen, who claims that the novel is "designed to make us protest" by being "as perverse and as obstinate as Aaron himself".[9]

Aaron's obstinacy in resisting any harmonious connection with people is specifically thematized by his musical preference. He wishes to "go back to melody pure and simple", abhorring any kind of chords and harmonies: "I know orchestra makes me blind with hate or I don't know what. But I want to throw bombs".[10] The positive tune Aaron plays on his flute is actually a "wild, savage, non-human lurch and squander of sound, beautiful, but entirely unaesthetic"(*AR*, 227). Besides, even in his relation to his flute, Aaron's rod, his soul does not necessarily pass into it smoothly: "There was a big residue left, to go bitter, or to ferment into good old wine of wisdom"(*AR*, 187). There is a disjunction between his self and his instrument of self-expression, which, as an imperfect medium of communication, is to be broken and left behind. Aaron's principle of conduct is veritably chance: "I believe, if I go my own way, without tying my nose to a job, chance will always throw something in my way: enough to get along with"(*AR*, 143). For him there are only contingent relations between being and action. Indeed what the novel protests against is the reader's aesthetic attitude that tries to find some organic and meaningful relations, judging their worth according to the degree to which they cohere.

The novel's provocative indifference to the world and the constructive form is shared by Lilly. He is not "only just one proposition" but "lots of mes" (*AR*, 103), and so he wanders

[9] Worthen, *D.H. Lawrence and the Idea of the Novel*, 121, 123.
[10] D.H. Lawrence, *Aaron's Rod* (1922), ed. Mara Kalnins, Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1988, 136 and 225 (hereafter cited parenthetically as *AR*).

geographically, apathetic to any fixed relation with the world or its people, believing that a man "should remain himself, not try to spread himself over humanity" (*AR*, 97) and that people never get anywhere till they "break the old forms" (*AR*, 120). Lilly is also allocated the similar predicament of self-expression. The representational vehicle of Lilly is words, in contrast to Aaron's music, but his words cannot be an authentic expression either, as Lilly defines his job as "to write lies" (*AR*, 110). When he tries to save Jim Bricknell, an ex-army officer and a socialist, "with a certain belief in himself as a saviour" (*AR*, 73), Jim punches Lilly in the wind (*AR*, 82). As with Aaron, there is a gap between Lilly and the world and his utterance is not received by people without trapping him in the system of Christ/Judas betrayal: "A Jesus makes a Judas inevitable" (*AR*, 97). He is thus forced to admit the gap between his essence and the medium, and between his being and the world. To be sure, he proposes an organic theory of self and society; his final role may be to integrate his own as well as Aaron's split, free-floating self. But his very enunciation and the content of the theory bring about, against his or Lawrence's intention, a radical contradiction which paradoxically contributes to breaking the novel's form.

**Aaron's opposing core as the base of his freedom of action**

The theme of self-discovery, which many critics find central to *Aaron's Rod* should be reassessed in the light of this anti-aesthetic aspect. For those critics who seek to defend the coherent form by including the novel in the picaresque or in *Bildungsroman*, the theme of self-realization is indispensable in supporting the generic form. Baker writes: "The growth from youth to maturity or 'consciousness' of the traditional *bildungsroman* is conceived in Lawrencean terms as the struggle of one man to escape the fetters of a life both meaningless and destructive."[11] William R. Barr also maintains that Aaron's development in "his perception of himself" contributes to the novel's creation of "a depth absent from other picaresque novels of comparable length".[12] A re-examination of the way in which the discovery or perception of Aaron's self is represented, however, brings to light his undeveloped sense of and repeated aberration from the identities imposed not only by society but also by the narrator and Lilly.

[11] Baker, *A Reassessment*, 123.

[12] William R. Barr, "*Aaron's Rod* as D.H. Lawrence's Picaresque Novel", *D.H. Lawrence Review*, IX/2 (Summer 1976), 222.

The following passage is often cited as proof of Aaron's self-realization:

> Then suddenly, on this Sunday evening in the strange country, he realised something about himself. He realised that he had never intended to yield himself fully to her or to anything: that he did not intend ever to yield himself up entirely to her or to anything: that his very being pivoted on the fact of his isolate self-responsibility, aloneness. His intrinsic and central aloneness was the very centre of his being. Break it, and he broke his being. Break this central aloneness, and he broke everything. It was the great temptation, to yield himself: and it was the final sacrilege. (*AR*, 162)

This describes a kind of epiphany which reveals Aaron's hidden past intentions and convinces him of the essence of his being. In addition, the revelation of the "intrinsic and central aloneness" appears to abolish "a gulf between his passional soul and his open mind" which he has kept "wilfully, if not consciously". For his "conscious mask" or his set of "authentic passports to be used in the conscious world" is suddenly broken: "There he sat now maskless and invisible" (*AR*, 163).

However, if the content of his realization is his intrinsic aloneness and invisibility that refuses any kind of conformity to the conscious world, it seems difficult to fix the revelation chronologically at this moment in the novel. For as early as Chapter II ("Royal Oak") Aaron's unassimilable essence is described as "a hard core of irrational, exhausting withholding of himself", "something in him that would not give in – neither to the whiskey, nor the women, nor even the music", or the "invisible black dog" sitting "in the middle of him" of whose presence he "knew" and "was a little uneasy" about (*AR*, 22). Barr, who argues that it is not Aaron's identity but rather "his perception of himself [which] can and does change",[13] might say that what is changed is not the content but the form of Aaron's self-realization. Still, the subconscious mode of his perceiving his essence does not change. Since he has "*hated* knowing what he felt" (*AR*, 163, emphasis in original) he knew subconsciously the presence of his core before, and it is "in his own powerful but subconscious fashion" (*AR*, 164) that the self-realization here occurs again. Both the content and the form of the realization of his intrinsic self are thus changeless.

[13] *Ibid*., 221.

What has changed suddenly is the narrative style and the way the reader should see Aaron. His open mind is lost but only replaced by and externalized into the narrator's words:

> If I, as a word-user, must translate his deep conscious vibrations into finite words, that is my own business. I do but make a translation of the man. He would speak in music. I speak with words.
>
> The inaudible music of his conscious soul conveyed his meaning in him quite as clearly as I convey it in words: probably much more clearly. …
>
> Don't grumble at me then, gentle reader, and swear at me that this damned fellow wasn't half clever enough to think all these smart things, and realise all these fine-drawn-out subtleties. You are quite right, he wasn't, yet it all resolved itself in him as I say, and it is for you to prove that it didn't. (*AR*, 164)

Thus, Aaron's open, conscious mask, "his complete and satisfactory idea of himself" (*AR*, 163), is simply transposed by the narrator into a comical mask. Due to the manifestation of the distance between the narrator and Aaron, the mode of narration becomes crucially ironical, and due to the enlarged distance between the reader and Aaron, Aaron becomes significantly comical.[14]

After justifying the intrusive translation of Aaron's musical mind, the narrator goes on to introduce organic metaphors that purport to be the signs of Aaron's self-sufficiency. According to the narrator, his "loneliness or singleness" is accepted as "a fulfilment" and his unified self gets rid of his past uneasiness. The non-verbal self-sufficiency is then compared to "a thing which has its root deep in life, and has lost its anxiety", and to the lily that is "life-rooted, life-central" and free from "that strain and that anxiety with which we try to weave ourselves a

[14] For the ironical mode of narration, or the definition of irony, see Paul de Man, "The Rhetoric of Temporality", in *Blindness and Insight: Essays in the Rhetoric of Contemporary Criticism*, Minneapolis, MN: U of Minnesota P, 1983, and "The Concept of Irony", in *Aesthetic Ideology*, Minneapolis, MN: U of Minnesota P, 1996. Drawing upon Friedrich Schlegel, de Man describes irony as "the author's intrusion that disrupts the fictional illusion" ("The Rhetoric of Temporality", 218-19), or as "the 'permanent parabasis' ... irony is everywhere, at all points the narrative can be interrupted" ("The Concept of Irony", 179). According to de Man, irony, which is "the mode of the present", "knows neither memory nor prefigurative duration"; and "Irony is a synchronic structure, while allegory appears as a successive mode capable of engendering duration as the illusion of a continuity" ("The Rhetoric of Temporality", 226).

life" (*AR*, 166). Nevertheless, this independent "singleness" proves to be illusory. At the beginning of the next chapter, for example, it is narrated that after his "breaking loose from one connection after another" there is "nothingness": "There was just himself, and blank nothingness" (*AR*, 178). The naturally fulfilled condition is at the same time human non-existence: the state of aloneness can thus be swayed by the diametrically opposed value judgments. Besides, what Aaron uses when he talks or disputes with other people including Lilly is still words, the mode of his self-expression which is assumed to be inauthentic. His action and enunciation thus make the whole epiphanic scene fictionally and metaphorically erroneous: the stable thing-like self or the unperceivable self-sufficiency without verbal consciousness becomes a mere illusion invented by the changeable narrator.

Disclosing hiatuses between the non-human and human worlds, between his musical thoughts and articulated words, between the organic metaphors and his existence, Aaron's endless journey makes clear the impossibility of the narrator's enclosure of Aaron into the non-verbal and natural sphere, completely separated from society. In fact, the influence of the outside conscious world remains unavoidable and his outside mask continues to function as his passport, as is clear from the succeeding episodes where he is welcome and willing to join various people and enjoy their company. The reconnection with the outside world is not necessarily positive: he cannot sometimes discern properly how the passport is exploited by surrounding people.[15] The more excited he feels about human communication, the more drastic the reaction becomes. After he gets "worked up" with the Marchesa Del Torre and robbed, "it became essential to him to feel that the sentinel stood guard in his own heart" (*AR*, 230-31). The "sentinel of the soul" (*AR*, 231) can be equated with the "invisible black dog" in the centre of Aaron's being, the "hard core" which resists being carried off. But the sentinel cannot prevent Aaron from being charmed by the Marchesa again. Denying deathly consummation with the Cleopatra-like Marchesa he eventually leaves her. But Aaron's broken rod, which means the demystification of his phallocentric and melocentric power over women, marks not the recuperation of his autonomous selfhood

[15] For a discussion of the exploitation of Aaron and the working class in relation to fascism and totalitarianism, see Mensch, *D.H. Lawrence and the Authoritarian Personality*, 119-69.

but the restart of his search for another partner, another mystifying bond with Lilly.

It would be worth confirming the feature of Aaron's opposing core, which keeps operating, even if transiently and reactively, as the base of his resistance and freedom of action. Whether it is called the "invisible black dog" or "the sentinel", the core should be differentiated not only from the passport given by society but also from a thing-like or a lily-like self-sufficient state. Its primordial characteristic is a reaction against the tendency that tries to fix him in society or in the natural world. Unlike in the traditional *Bildungsroman*, Aaron's self refuses to be incorporated into and identified by society;[16] nor can it make the natural world a peaceful habitat. The refractory core situates Aaron in the realm of the in-between, which never warrants his undeviating identity, splitting his selfhood between the core and either the natural world or the alluring human world.

**Aaron's precarious self and dreams**

The most conspicuous representation of Aaron's precarious self is the split that takes place in his dream at the beginning of the final chapter, just before his decisive encounter with Lilly's speech. Baker construes this dream, in which Aaron is fissured between the "palpable or visible" Aaron and the second "invisible, *conscious*" Aaron (*AR*, 287, emphasis in original) who anxiously watches the former, as "an integral part of his development" and attempts to interpret its conclusion as "a prophecy of his renewed motion towards Lilly" because "the *conscious* self replaces the old palpable self, hitherto unresponsive and insensitive to the warning cries of the truer 'conscious self'". Aaron's position in

[16] For the formulation of *Bildungsroman*, which would be useful to measure how far *Aaron's Rod* deviates from that tradition in literary history, see Franco Moretti, *The Way of the World: The* Bildungsroman *in European Culture*, trans. Albert Sbragia, London: Verso, 1987, 3-73. According to Moretti, the only possible ending for the classical *Bildungsroman* is marriage, which, as an intermediate link between the individual and the society, constitutes the teleological plot structure and thereby directs youth as the sign of social mobility into maturity, that is, social stability. For the readings that interpret Dickens
' novels as *anti-Bildungsroman* or self-deconstructive texts, see Eiichi Hara, "The King and the Apprentice: Writing *David Copperfield*", *Shiron*, 29 (1990), 17-34; and "Stories Present and Absent in *Great Expectations*", *ELH*, LIII/3 (Fall 1986), 593-614, reprinted in *Critical Essays on Charles Dickens's* Great Expectations, ed. Michael Cotsell, Boston: G.K. Hall, 1990, 198-216, and in Great Expectations: *Charles Dickens* (*New Casebooks)*, ed. Roger D. Sell, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1994, 143-65.

the boat is indeed reversed after he strikes his elbow against three stakes. But the view that the dream prophesies the reunification of Aaron's two selves and his decision to follow Lilly seems far-fetched. For the reversal is described as merely accidental: "the palpable Aaron changed his position as he sat, and drew in his arm: though even now he was not aware of any need to do so" (*AR*, 288). It cannot be presumed, as Baker does, that "heeding for the first time the call of his inner soul, Aaron therefore reverses his dream position".[17] The warning, which is in fact uttered by the boatmen, not by the conscious Aaron, is simply inaudible. The split of Aaron's self makes a violent contrast with the narrator's earlier assertion in Chapter XIII "Wie es Ihnen Gefällt" that the "inaudible music of his conscious soul conveyed his meaning in him quite as clearly as I convey it in words" (*AR*, 164). For here in the last chapter, there is no communication, no conveyance of meaning between the two split selves. In spite of the narrator's previous assumption that there exists an autonomy in his soul, in this dream, it is completely broken and there is no link between his intention and action.

It should be remembered that this episode is framed in a dream, that is, in an inauthentic form of narration, the content of which should not be taken literally. Aaron, in reality, does not allow either himself or others to connect dreams with real life by interpreting the meaning. He advises Lady Franks not to mind her dreadful dream of the usurpation of her house by the Novara work-people, assuring her that "whatever one foresees, and feels has happened, never happens in real life" (*AR*, 156). Aaron's indifference holds true for his own dreams: he cares nothing about his "violent dreams of strange, black strife, something like the street-riot in Milan, but more terrible" (*AR*, 258). As regards the present dream also, he relinquishes the effort to "remember what he had been dreaming, and what it all meant" (*AR*, 288). In this sense, it might be said that the novel requires the reader to share Aaron's indifference to dreams, whose form and content are illusory.

Then why is this long dream description necessary, if dreams truly are insignificant? The dream, indeed, symptomatically indicates a culmination of the fragmentary narrative: the reversal of quasi-realistic narration. It seems as if the narrator is driven to take recourse in the dream form, since he is unable to manage Aaron's increasingly uncertain and dream-like reality. For example, Aaron cannot make out the meaning of the street-riot in Milan, which is really happening before

[17] Baker, *A Reassessment*, 134, 138 (emphasis in original).

him: "His mind and soul were in a whirl. He sat in his chair and did not move again for a great while" (*AR*, 187). His response to the incident, as to his dreams, is a sort of paralysis caused by an undecipherable phenomenon. Just as the outside reality becomes accidental and dream-like, so does his inner reality, of which apt representation is possible only through this dream form.

The intrusive narrator could assert the consistency of the narrative function as the assistance of Aaron and the reader before. Yet we have here the fragmentary and allegorical description of Aaron, which means not only Aaron's self but also the narration are in a state of ambiguity and discontinuity, involving a radical reversal of narrative or representational values: for if the content of the dream is faithful to Aaron's selfhood, which our analysis judges it to be, then it is the dream form that acquires the representational authenticity because of the coherence of the form and the content, making the organic or quasi-realistic narration decidedly deceitful.

**Lilly's providential reality**

Instead of the narrator who, as the mediator between Aaron and the reader, is supposed to integrate the events of the novel only to reveal the narrative discrepancy and the degradation of the organic representation, Lilly appears as the final agent who is meant to synthesize Aaron's haphazard life and the fragmentary and unrealistic narrative tendency. Aaron feels "a thread of destiny attaching him to Lilly" (*AR*, 288), when he wakes from his dream. The approach of Aaron to Lilly hints at a re-reversal of the narrative tendencies: it is another temptation for Aaron and the reader to misconstrue that there lies at the bottom of the novel some providential and developing principle which, transcending phenomenal narrative gaps, organically and symbolically regulates Aaron's past and future.

In contrast to Aaron's governing principle, chance, Lilly's principle of conduct is destiny or providence. It seems to Sir William that Lilly believes in "the Invisible – call it Providence if you will – on his side" (*AR*, 143). In Aaron's chance, the appearance or action of his being is arbitrary because there is no organic correlation between them, whereas they must be organically connected in Lilly's providence. Lilly's conception of dreams and reality, brought out in the two men's dispute about the war, is therefore peculiarly providential, marked by the life-central or self-central causality of the awake self and its genuine action. Against Aaron, Lilly insists on the unreality of the war:

> "It never happened to me. No more than my dreams happen. My dreams don't happen: they only seem." (*AR*, 118)[18]

What is questioned by Lilly is the state of being of people who make war or are involved in it:

> "No man who was awake and in possession of himself would use poison gases: no man. His own awake self would scorn such a thing. It's only when the ghastly mob-sleep, the dream helplessness of the mass-psyche overcomes him, that he becomes completely base and obscene." (*AR*, 119)

According to Lilly, the sleeping self and the resultant delusive signification such as in dreams can contaminate people's consciousness, creating a false reality. His apparently nonsensical denial of the reality of the war is thus an appeal for a radical repolarization of dream and reality into Lilly, who is awake and adheres to reality, and into the sleeping world in which dreams rule.

Not only dreams but also presentiments can be vehicles that lead to death for people who are bereft of their awake and courageous self. Listening to Herbertson's horrible experience of the war, Lilly thinks about how a corporal Wallace might have avoided death through his own spirit or by Herbertson's help. His death, Lilly thinks, was self-inflicted because he let himself have a presentiment: "Perhaps the soul issues its own ticket of death, when it can stand no more" (*AR*, 116). It might not have happened, on the other hand, if Herbertson had said: "None of that, Wallace. You and I, we've got to live and make life smoke" (*AR*, 120). Lilly's conviction that "life controls life: and not accident" (*AR*, 116) shows that what is called "destiny" or "providence" refers to some genuine reality which is not determined by mechanical or occasional causality but is dependent upon one's own "life-courage" (*AR*, 120). Denying sheer accidents, he persists in internally hidden determinants which underlie actions and events in the world. What attracts Aaron is this providential reality: the organic connection between the wakeful self and its authentic actions and expressions.

Lilly associates the bombing and the eventual loss of Aaron's flute with its organic rebirth as well as death in the penultimate chapter: "It'll

[18] This view of the war is associated with Jean Baudrillard's *The Gulf War Did Not Take Place* by Jeff Wallace in his *D.H. Lawrence, Science and the Posthuman*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, 222.

grow again. It's a reed, a water-plant – you can't kill it." Aaron there was surely resonant with Lilly, thinking of what would normally be an accidental and contingent event as natural: "And the loss was for him symbolistic. It chimed with something in his soul: the bomb, the smashed flute, the end" (*AR*, 285). To Aaron, Lilly again seems to be the ideal figure who embodies the organic way of living. Aaron's split self makes him oscillate between a reactive separation from and absorption into the world. Lilly seems to gain the balance of the self and the world: "Aaron looked at Lilly, and saw the same odd, distant look on his face as on the face of some animal when it lies awake and alert, yet perfectly at one with its surroundings" (*AR*, 292). The use of an image of an animal in the natural world here reminds us of the description of Aaron's self-sufficiency wherein it is compared to a thing and a lily. Lilly's theory of the wakeful and spontaneous self and its developing consciousness is also based upon the analogy between the natural world and the human world.

**A double bind caused by Lilly's words**

The organic synthesis of the human and non-human worlds, however, reopens the fundamental hiatus again as the dialogue of Aaron and Lilly progresses. Lilly preaches to Aaron that one's own "innermost, integral unique self" develops bit by bit "from one single egg-cell which you were at your conception in your mother's womb, on and on to the strange and peculiar complication in unity which never stops till you die – if then" (*AR*, 295). There is an organic parallel between the development of one's soul and that of an egg-cell or a tree-cell, and the organic self is marked by its self-direction, which completely excludes outside conceptual influence:

> "You thought there was something outside, to justify you: God, or a creed, or a prescription. But remember, your soul inside you is your only Godhead. It develops your actions within you as a tree develops its own new cells. And the cells push on into buds and boughs and flowers. And these are your passion and your acts and your thoughts and expressions, your developing consciousness. You don't know beforehand, and you can't. You can only stick to your own soul through thick and thin."

No discrepancy exists between being and action or substance and expression in Lilly's formulation.

Yet in response to Lilly's harangue, Aaron declares that the intersubjective relationship is indispensable in the human world and that the natural entity cannot be confused with the human being:

> Aaron listened more to the voice than the words. It was more the sound value which entered his soul, the tone, the strange speech-music which sank into him. The sense he hardly heeded. And yet he understood, he knew. He understood oh, so much more deeply than if he had listened with his head. And he answered an objection from the bottom of his soul.
>
> "But you talk," he said, "as if we were like trees, alone by ourselves in the world. We aren't. If we love, it needs another person than ourselves. And if we hate, and even if we talk." (*AR*, 296-97)

Lilly apparently admits the difference but will not discard the organic model and connect the spontaneous self with the new intersubjective relation which is to come with the change of mode from love to power; while the altruistic aim of love is "to make the other person – or persons – happy", self-central power "urges from within, darkly, for the displacing of the old leaves, the inception of the new" (*AR*, 297-98).

Nonetheless, the contradiction becomes manifest when he specifies the change of mode as the reversal of the poles from male to female submission:

> "And of course there must be one who urges, and one who is impelled. Just as in love there is a beloved and a lover. The man is supposed to be the lover, the woman the beloved. Now, in the urge of power, it is the reverse." (*AR*, 298)

Whether or not the centre is relocated from the outside into the inside, because the self as the centre cannot grow into the other and eliminate the inside/outside polarity, the metaphor which neglects the existence of the other is incompatible with the human relation that is figured as the poles. In fact, there is no difference between the love-mode and the power-mode since they equally presuppose the interpersonal structure based on the self/other or inside/outside dichotomy; the difference lies only in the change of roles and in the centre/margin proportion. A large number of people are destined to find a much stronger outside centre: "And men must submit to the greater soul in a man, for their guidance: and women must submit to the positive power-soul in man, for their being" (*AR*, 298-99). If the power-urge develops independently of any

outside guidance, it is not necessary for Lilly, from his external position, to advocate reversing the poles or to urge Aaron to decide whether to yield or die. Also in terms of temporality, Lilly's abrupt claim on Aaron's instantaneous decision about life or death contradicts the natural growth of the new mode which the metaphor of leaves invokes.

Consequently Lilly's words become a double message, relegating Aaron and the reader to the state of a double bind. It is an order that people must and yet must not obey: to ignore the message means to betray the power-urge, whereas to submit means to betray the self which must grow spontaneously. Lilly's "speech-music" (*AR*, 297) on the autonomous self and the power-urge thus makes it impossible to bridge the gap between the self and other, between the natural world and the human world, and between the work and the reader. Along with the collapse of Lilly's organic and providential scheme, the reading that implicitly relies on this model also loses its authenticity.

**Aaron's words as the anti-aesthetic and anti-organic base**

What is at stake is the opportunity for the reader to resist the temptation to neglect this antinomy and resort to violent elimination of the gap that Lilly's theory shows. Only our adherence to Aaron's questioning of Lilly's speech can offer the chance of another reading, a critical verbal linkage between Aaron's resistive core and the reader. It would be logical, in fact, to consider that his words are uttered from his core of aloneness, which refuses to give in to anyone or anything. Although his invisible core derives from the separation from the outside conscious world, his intrinsic being and its expression are identified here. Despite the critical truism that the title of this chapter, "Words", refers to Lilly's authentic speech-music, they are not equivalent. Aaron listens "more to the voice than the words" and answers "an objection from the bottom of his soul" (*AR*, 296, 297). It is Aaron who utters the authentic words, words in which there is no gap between the subject and the enunciation, rather than the phallocentric and melocentric Lilly who, betraying his indifference to the world, cannot withhold his self-contradictory speech-music.

It does not follow, however, that Aaron paradoxically establishes his developing consciousness by refuting the preacher of that doctrine. His audible or visible words cannot perfectly represent his inaudible or invisible core, as the absolutely opposed perceptual adjectives denote. Aaron's enunciation, in addition, is not the spontaneous product of the developing core but the instantaneous and disjunctive reaction triggered

by the external pressure. There is no guaranteed safe way from his invisibility or inaudibility to the world of representation. The point is that as long as the subject is not a self-sufficient natural being or thing, it has to be reconnected with the world, uttering words even if they convey or represent only part of the self. On the other hand, in order to utter repeatedly critical statements without being contained by the conscious world, the subject's stubborn refusal of totalitarian absorption into that world is needed.

For the reader also, Aaron's words never warrant a reading conducive to any aesthetic totality. They function, rather, as the articulated base against the novel's aesthetic and organic tendency. It is his words that sustain the novel's other countervailing tendency, making it impossible either to reassess *Aaron's Rod* in terms of a coherently or organically constructed work or to condemn it as an embodiment of Fascistic ideology because the leadership scheme itself is led to logical impossibility. The anti-aesthetic expressions, however, do not necessarily exclude the readership; rather, they reconnect the reader anti-organically and anti-aesthetically with the work, freeing us from the double bind caused by Lilly's enunciation. The novel brings to the reader a not necessarily happy consciousness but a critically important one, which provokes the reader not only to rethink the standard that has valorized and canonized Lawrence's major novels so far but also to be vigilant against the organic retotalization in Lawrence's writing in his later novels like *The Plumed Serpent* (1926), and in our reading of them.

# CHAPTER 3

# DETERRITORIALIZATION AND RETERRITORIALIZATION: *AARON'S ROD* AND *A THOUSAND PLATEAUS*

## Lawrence for Deleuze and Guattari

D.H. Lawrence does not necessarily enjoy a privileged position in the works of Deleuze or Deleuze and Guattari. While Gilles Deleuze had discussed literature in some of his books that dealt with figures such as Marcel Proust and Lewis Carroll, he had never explored Lawrence systematically. The sole exception to this may be found in the shape of Deleuze's essay entitled "Nietzsche and Saint Paul, Lawrence and John of Patmos".[1] However, there is no denying that Lawrence is often mentioned in the works of Deleuze and Guattari and that even if their references are fragmentary they are in fact quite positive.[2] In this respect, Deleuze and Guattari make an interesting contrast with Michel Foucault, who maintained a negative stance towards D.H. Lawrence.

Deleuze or Deleuze and Guattari's engagement with Lawrence could be summarized as follows: firstly, there is the Lawrence who is against Freudianism as in *Fantasia of the Unconscious* (1922); secondly, Lawrence as one of the writers who draw the lines of flight continually to escape from capitalist societies that give money enormous value and power: *Aaron's Rod* (1922), *Kangaroo* (1923), *Studies in Classic American Literature* (1923); and thirdly, the Lawrence who closely resembles Friedrich Nietzsche: *The Man Who Died* (1931), *Apocalypse* (1931).

We can consider these three areas of interest in a little more detail as follows. To take the first: in order to decompose the myth of Oedipus, Deleuze and Guattari adopt Lawrence's anti-Freudianist viewpoint,

[1] Gilles Deleuze, "Nietzsche and Saint Paul, Lawrence and John of Patmos", in *Essays Critical and Clinical* (1993), trans. Daniel W. Smith and Michael A. Greco, Minneapolis, MN: U of Minnesota P, 1997, 36-52.

[2] For a recent study, which thoroughly traces and examines Deleuze's or Deleuze and Guattari's citations of Lawrence, see Mary Bryden, *Gilles Deleuze: Travels in Literature*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007, 50-83.

evaluating highly his early and astute critique of the "Oedipus complex" with its social implications. Actually, *Fantasia of the Unconscious* can be a very effective introduction to Deleuze and Guattari's *Anti-Oedipus*, particularly in the light of its discussions on desire.[3]

As for the second: one of Lawrence's novels that Deleuze and Guattari refer to favourably is *Aaron's Rod*, a novel that has traditionally been accorded a rather low standing within Lawrence's body of work. This does not mean, however, that Deleuze and Guattari discuss *Aaron's Rod* in its entirety: what they focus on is Lawrence's notion of love,[4] the function of Aaron's flute,[5] and the point at which Aaron arrives.[6] But there is nevertheless a connection between this novel where the protagonist leaves his family and Deleuze and Guattari's book which exhorts the reader to escape from Oedipal familialism.

In the third instance: in "Nietzsche and Saint Paul, Lawrence and John of Patmos", Deleuze regards Lawrence as a follower of Nietzsche who, placing himself in the flow of life, developed the thought of affection. Since the influence of Nietzsche on Lawrence has often been investigated, Deleuze's claim is not very surprising; the characters of Rupert Birkin in *Women in Love* and Rawdon Lilly in *Aaron's Rod*, both, make a mention of Nietzsche's "the will to power". It must be said, however, that what Deleuze calls "the point of Aaron" is opposed to the stance of Lilly. As discussed in Chapter 2, Lilly's Nietzschean thoughts can be regarded as Nazistic or Fascist. It is unthinkable that the authors of *Anti-Oedipus*, "the major enemy" of which, according to Foucault, is Fascism, value that aspect of Lawrence's thought.[7] Actually, Deleuze and Guattari do not overlook the latent Fascism in writers like Lawrence who are sensitive to the flow of desire. The relation between

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[3] Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia* (1972), trans. Robert Hurley, Mark Seem and Helen R. Lane, London: Athlone, 1984.
[4] *Ibid*., 5.
[5] *Ibid*., 357: "Will Aaron leave with his flute, which is not a phallus, but a desiring-machine and a process of deterritorialization?"
[6] Deleuze, "Nietzsche and Saint Paul, Lawrence and John of Patmos", 51: "Stop loving. Oppose to the judgment of love 'a *decision* that love can never vanquish.' Arrive at the point where you can no longer give any more than you can take, where you know you will no longer 'give' anything, the point of Aaron or *The Man Who Died*, for the problem has passed elsewhere: to construct banks between which a flow can run, break apart or come together" (emphasis in original).
[7] Michel Foucault, "Preface", in Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*, xiii.

Lawrence and Deleuze and Guattari, therefore, has to be probed along the line of Aaron's character that opposes and leaves Lilly. That is to say, when adopting Deleuze's or Deleuze and Guattari's view of D.H. Lawrence, we have to find at least two flows in Lawrence and articulate them.

In what follows, focusing on *Aaron's Rod*, I attempt a new articulation of the motivations of Aaron and Lilly, drawing on various hints seeded throughout the works of Deleuze and Guattari. Aaron and Lilly have often been considered to be Lawrence's split selves. When we grasp the two characters from the standpoint of Deleuze and Guattari, simply speaking, Aaron plays the embodiment of deterritorialization, whereas Lilly represents the spirit of reterritorialization. I examine this articulation closely, referring, mainly, to some chapters of *A Thousand Plateaus* by Deleuze and Guattari.[8]

**Exodus as a framework or a pretext for Aaron's escape**

What informs Aaron's escape? First of all, it should be remembered that this novel is based on Exodus, the second book of the Christian Old Testament. Analysing James Joyce's *Ulysses* (1922), Fredric Jameson claims that "the *Odyssey* parallel in *Ulysses*" is like "an empty form" which "offers a useful but wholly extrinsic set of limits against which the writer works, and which serve as a purely mechanical check on what risks otherwise becoming an infinite proliferation of detail".[9] Virginia Hyde states that the framework of Exodus is ironically used in *Aaron's Rod*,[10] and it may be nothing but the "empty form" that frames Aaron's wanderings.[11] Nevertheless, while *Odyssey* is a story of return, Exodus

[8] Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia* (1980), trans. Brian Massumi, London: Athlone, 1988.

[9] Fredric Jameson, "'Ulysses' in History", in *James Joyce and Modern Literature*, eds W.J. McCormack and Alistair Stead, London: RKP, 1982, 126-41, reprinted in *James Joyce (Modern Critical Views)*, ed. Harold Bloom, New York: Chelsea House, 1986, 179. Drawing upon Deleuze and Guattari's dichotomy of molar and molecular, Jameson discusses empty forms in detail in his *Fables of Aggression*. For an objection to Jameson's recapitulation of Deleuze and Guattari's concepts, see David E. Musselwhite, *Partings Welded Together: Politics and Desire in the Nineteenth-Century English Novel*, London: Methuen, 1987, 227-51; see also Fredric Jameson, "Marxism and Dualism in Deleuze", in *A Deleuzian Century?*, ed. Ian Buchanan, Durham, NC: Duke UP, 1999, 13-36.

[10] Hyde, *The Risen Adam*, 119-41.

[11] For a discussion of *Aaron's Rod* from the standpoint of Jameson, see Pinkney, *D.H. Lawrence*, 100-23.

is the story of departure. This fact tells much about the difference between the two Modernists, Joyce and Lawrence, revealing that Lawrence's interest lay in depicting beginnings and betrayals. Deleuze states that the English understand the Old Testament as "the foundation of the novel" and that "The traitor is the essential character of the novel, the hero":

> A traitor to the world of dominant significations, and to the established order. This is quite different from the trickster: for the trickster claims to take possession of fixed properties, or to conquer a territory, or even to introduce a new order.[12]

The framework of *Aaron's Rod* cannot be regarded as arbitrary. It may be a return to "the foundation of the novel", but it does not necessarily mean imitation or a lack of originality; rather, it should be regarded as a novelistic apparatus that is opposed to dominant significations like Christianity or psychoanalysis, or as a pretext which produces a new form of betrayal.[13]

While referring to the escape of the Jewish people from imperial Egypt, in *A Thousand Plateaus* ("5. 587 B.C. – A.D. 70: On Several Regimes of Signs"), Deleuze and Guattari articulate the two regimes of the "paranoid Pharaoh and the passional Hebrew": "a paranoid, signifying, despotic regime of signs and a passional or subjective, postsignifying, authoritarian regime." The despotic regime forms a circular network, where "the sign refers to another sign, ad infinitum", and the despotic signifier reigns at the centre: "Anything that threatens to put the system to flight will be killed or put to flight itself"; "the system's line of flight is assigned a negative value, condemned as that which exceeds the signifying regime's power of deterritorialization (the principle of the scapegoat)." In the authoritarian regime, on the other hand, "*a sign or packet of signs detaches from the irradiating circular network* and sets to work on its own account, starts running a straight

[12] Gilles Deleuze and Claire Parnet, *Dialogues II* (1977), trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam, New York: Columbia UP, 2007, 41.

[13] As to the *Odyssey* parallel, see Fredric Jameson's later article, "Modernism and Imperialism", in *Nationalism, Colonialism, and Literature*, Minneapolis, MN: U of Minnesota P, 1990, 64. He restates that "it is as though this Third World modernism slyly turned the imperial relationship inside out, appropriating the great imperial space of the Mediterranean in order to organize the space of the colonial city, and to turn its walks and paths into the closure of a form and of a grand cultural monument".

line, as though swept into a narrow, open passage .... Here, it seems that the line receives a positive sign, as though it were effectively occupied and followed by a people who find in it their reason for being or destiny."[14]

While the two regimes of signs are distinguished in this way, Deleuze and Guattari propose that all semiotics are mixed in reality. Psychoanalysis is "a definite case of a mixed semiotic: a despotic regime of significance and interpretation ... but also an authoritarian regime of subjectification and prophetism". By the same token, "Christianity is a particularly important case of a mixed semiotic, with its signifying imperial combination together with its postsignifying Jewish subjectivity."[15] It is on the day of Christmas Eve that Aaron suddenly leaves. This seems to suggest that his flight is not only from Oedipal familialism but also from the regime of Christianity. Thus, ultimately, Aaron must be supposed to discard these cases of "a mixed semiotic", but he should first leave the despotic and imperial regime, of whose signification regulates Aaron's words and actions, by means of a passional and postsignifying subjectification. Descriptions of Aaron's escape from his family will clarify what passional subjectivity actually is.

**Aaron and deterritorialization**

Citing a passage from *Aaron's Rod* (Chapter I, "The Blue Ball"), Deleuze and Guattari, in *A Thousand Plateaus* ("10. 1730: Becoming-Intense, Becoming-Animal, Becoming-Imperceptible ..."), discuss "Peace *and* exasperation" in the following way: music is "joy", but at the same time it has "a thirst for destruction", wherein lies "the 'danger' inherent in any line that escapes, in any line of flight or creative deterritorialization: the danger of veering toward destruction, toward abolition". The destructive element of music, however, is not necessarily Fascistic: "Whenever a musician writes *In Memoriam*, it is not so much a question of an inspirational motif or a memory, but on the contrary of a becoming that is only confronting its own danger, even taking a fall in order to rise again: a becoming-child, a becoming woman, a becoming-animal, insofar as they are the content of music itself and continue to the point of death."[16] Thus, what Deleuze and

[14] Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 116-17, 121-22 (emphasis in original).
[15] *Ibid*., 125.
[16] *Ibid*., 299 (emphasis in original).

Guattari conceive as the moment of Aaron's escape seems clear: when Aaron plays "sixteenth-century Christmas melody" (*AR*, 13), he is seized by exasperation as well as peace, which drives him not towards Fascism but towards the minority along the dangerous line of flight.

After the representation of the delirious impulse caused by music, in Chapter II ("Royal Oak") of *Aaron's Rod*, the process of subjectification essential for a passional regime is described:

> He recognised it as a secret malady he suffered from: this strained, unacknowledged opposition to his surroundings, a hard core of irrational, exhausting withholding of himself. Irritating, because he still *wanted* to give himself. A woman and whiskey, these were usually a remedy – and music. But lately these had begun to fail him. No, there was something in him that would not give in – neither to the whiskey, nor the woman, nor even the music. Even in the midst of his best music, it sat in the middle of him, this invisible black dog, and growled and waited, never to be cajoled. (*AR*, 22, emphasis in original)

According to Deleuze and Guattari, "The point of subjectification is the origin of the passional line of the postsignifying regime". The point of subjectification "can be anything". Food for anorexics is shown as an interesting example: "anorexics do not confront death but save themselves by betraying food, which is equally a traitor since it is suspected of containing larvae, worms, and microbes."[17] Being conscious of his "malady", Aaron, too, refuses to "give in – neither to the whiskey, nor the woman, nor even the music". A woman, whiskey, and music, which are usually a "remedy", thus, become the object of betrayal, that is, the point of subjectification, and there concurrently arises in Aaron the invisible and resistant "hard core" of his subject. Furthermore, the unbearable repulsion he feels towards political discussion here in this pub can refer to his refusal to partake of any meaning or interpretation, to his visceral resistance to "a despotic regime of significance and interpretation".

Thus, Aaron's postsignifying line of flight is drawn from his invisible core of resistance as its origin by the means of his destructive and rebellious passion. It should be noted that flight or escape is impossible without subjectification because "a point of subjectification" constitutes "the point of departure of the line".[18] Later,

[17] *Ibid*., 129.
[18] *Ibid*., 127.

in Chapter XIII "Wie es Ihnen Gefällt" there is a scene where Aaron reaffirms his existence:

> Then suddenly, on this Sunday evening in the strange country, he realised something about himself. He realised that he had never intended to yield himself fully to her or to anything .... His intrinsic and central aloneness was the very centre of his being. Break it, and he broke his being ....
>
> Now at last, after years of struggle, he seemed suddenly to have dropped his mask on the floor, and broken it. His authentic self-describing passport, his complete and satisfactory idea of himself suddenly became a rag of paper, ridiculous. (*AR*, 162-63)

This description may refer to the point at which Aaron finally arrives, what Deleuze positively calls "the point of Aaron"; the phenomenon of "dismantling the face" or "defacialization" can also be seen in this passage.[19]

Aaron's "intrinsic and central aloneness" as "the very centre of his being" in the passage just quoted is, however, nothing but a condition of his departure, which has already been covered in Chapter II ("Royal Oak"). Therefore, this novel cannot be a *Bildungsroman*. Aaron's voyage of treachery cannot be carried out without abandoning his socially accepted identity. Besides, since his escape is always adjacent to black holes, Aaron cannot find relief no matter where he journeys to. In fact, at the beginning of Chapter XIV, "XX Settembre", Aaron, who is "breaking loose from one connection after another" feels: "There was nothingness. There was just himself, and blank nothingness" (*AR*, 178). Moreover, as Aaron cannot resist the temptation of union with the Marchesa Del Torre in Florence, he needs to restart his voyage again and again. Tony Pinkney points out "the essentially synchronic nature" of Aaron and Lilly: "their relations have, structurally speaking, no beginning and no end."[20] But as far as Aaron or his journey is

[19] *Ibid*., 188, 190: "Dismantling the face is no mean affair. Madness is a definite danger: Is it by chance that schizos lose their sense of the face, their own and others', their sense of the landscape, and the sense of language and its dominant significations all at the same time? The organization of the face is a strong one. We could say that the face holds within its rectangle or circle a whole set of traits, *faciality traits*, which it subsumes and places at the service of significance and subjectification" (emphasis in original).

[20] Pinkney, *D.H. Lawrence*, 107.

concerned, it cannot be denied that there are incessant restarts from breaks or in-betweens, as there are transformations.

Deleuze and Guattari state that the genre of the novel is removed from the genres of epic or drama in that the novel "has always been defined by the adventure of lost characters who no longer know their name, what they are looking for, or what they are doing, amnesiacs, ataxics, catatonics": "The knight of the novel of courtly love spends his time forgetting his name, what he is doing, what people say to him, he doesn't know where he is going or to whom he is speaking, he is continually drawing a line of absolute deterritorialization, but also losing his way, stopping, and falling into black holes."[21] Unlike Gerald in *Women in Love*, who, driven by passional love but unable to draw a line of absolute deterritorialization, falls into a black hole, Aaron, who continues to stumble sometimes humourously and sometimes like an "idiot", is better qualified as a character of the novel.

**Lilly and reterritorialization**

The last temptation that Aaron faces up to in this novel is Lilly. Although the implications of the ending where the two men confront each other have been much discussed, some ambiguities are yet to be resolved. What, for example, does Lilly's mysterious face, which is "like a Byzantine eikon" (*AR*, 299) tell? Why does Lilly's face merit a close-up at the very last moment and the description "like a Byzantine eikon"? If we were to employ Deleuze and Guattari's concepts, we would interpret Lilly's face as a symbol of the regime of reterritorialization that he alludes to in order to prevent Aaron succumbing to the spirit of deterritorialization, which would be emboldened by his escape.[22] At one point Aaron felt like liberating

[21] Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 173-74. Deleuze and Guattari value highly novelists such as Kleist, since he rebelled against Goethe, who is considered to have pioneered the *Bildungsroman*: "All of Kleist's work is traversed by a war machine invoked against the State, by a musical machine invoked against painting or the 'picture.' It is odd how Goethe and Hegel hated this new kind of writing" (*ibid*., 268).

[22] For the face in terms of deterritorialization and reterritorialization, see *ibid*.,115: "It [the face] is a whole body unto itself: it is like the body of the center of significance to which all of the deterritorialized signs affix themselves, and it marks the limit of their deterritorialization .... The face is the Icon proper to the signifying regime, the reterritorialization internal to the system. The signifier reterritorializes on the face .... Conversely, when the face is effaced, when the faciality traits disappear, we can be sure that we have entered another regime, other zones infinitely muter and more imperceptible where subterranean becomings-animal occur, becomings-molecular,

himself from his "faciality" – his face that was regulated by society – but then he was spellbound by the Marchesa's Cleopatra-like face, and is now mesmerized by Lilly's face "like a Byzantine eikon".

When Deleuze and Guattari discuss the two figures of the face (the "terrestrial signifying despotic face" and the "maritime subjective passional authoritarian face"), they refer to Jean Paris' argument, which dovetails with a transition thematized in *Aaron's Rod*.[23] Yet in this novel the chronological and geographical transition from the despotic face to the passional face is reversed. For Aaron's rod is broken, though it had seemed to blossom with "the red Florentine lilies" (*AR*, 269) in Florence, the centre of the Italian Renaissance, and his line of flight appears to reterritorialize on the face of Lilly "like a Byzantine eikon". In addition, it should not be overlooked that "the power urge" which Lilly tells Aaron to accept is connected with Egypt:

> "We've got to accept the power motive, accept it in deep responsibility, do you understand me? It is a great life motive. It was that great dark power-urge which kept Egypt so intensely living for so many centuries." (*AR*, 297)

Lilly's words and face offer Aaron a suggestion of the Egyptian regime from which the Jewish people had escaped, or the Byzantine regime from which the Italian Renaissance had made its transition, that is to say, Lilly stands before Aaron as the symbol of a return to the signifying imperial regime.[24]

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nocturnal deterritorializations overspilling the limits of the signifying system."

[23] See *Ibid*., 184-85: "Jean Paris has clearly shown how these poles operate in painting, the pole of the despotic Christ and that of the passional Christ: on the one hand, the face of Christ seen from the front, as in a Byzantine mosaic, with the black hole of the eyes against a gold background, all depth projected forward; and on the other hand, faces that cross glances and turn away from each other, seen half-turned or in profile, as in a quattrocento painting, their sidelong glances drawing multiple lines, integrating depth into the painting itself ... ".

[24] As to the Byzantine Empire, D.H. Lawrence writes in *Movements in European History* (1921; 1925), ed. Philip Crumpton, Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1989, 24: "It is curious that, though it was a purely Christian state, yet Constantine had really established an oriental form of government. The emperor was a Christian, yet he accounted himself *divine*, and supreme above all men. He was as absolute as any Persian tyrant, for he was beyond all laws and all criticism. The people, the state, were at his mercy. And so they continued for a thousand years. This was the way of life the Byzantines preferred. It was a curious form of oriental Christianity, all the pride and glory centring in one man, himself a servant of Jesus" (emphasis in original).

As Aaron's refusal of Lilly is not explicitly narrated at the end of the novel, Aaron's point of arrival, to which Deleuze refers emphatically, is indeed quite precarious. However, Aaron's dialogue with Lilly in the final chapter (XXI, "Words") appears to bring into relief not only Lilly's stance or the implications of his word but also some possibility of Aaron's resistance and further flight. At the beginning of the chapter, Aaron meets his double in a dream: Aaron's self is divided into his body and his consciousness. This phenomenon can be defined as "the consciousness-related double" (consciousness becomes the double of oneself), in contrast to his relationship with the Marchesa, which can be defined as the experience of "the passional double" (the Marchesa is both a god and a victim of Aaron, and vice versa).[25] With Aaron caught in this predicament, Lilly offers his advice. Using the organic model, Lilly (that is, Lawrence) talks about the absolute interiority of the development of one's self. Lilly preaches to Aaron:

> "… you've never got to deny the Holy Ghost which is inside you, your own soul's self .... You thought there was something outside, to justify you: God, or a creed, or a prescription. But remember, your soul inside you is your only Godhead. It develops your actions within you as a tree develops its own new cells." (*AR*, 296)

However, Lilly also preaches the importance of exteriority as men's need to "submit to the greater soul in a man, for their guidance" (*AR*, 299). Lilly's theory of leadership is without doubt self-contradictory because if interiority takes precedence, Lilly, from his external position, should not advocate the submission to the great leader outside oneself; meanwhile, if this kind of submission is important, Lilly should not preach the natural and internal growth of the self.

This point has already been discussed in Chapter 2; what is intriguing here is the correspondence between the inside/outside dichotomy in Lilly's words and the transcendent/immanent dichotomy in Deleuze and Guattari's theory of power. "What is important, what makes the postsignifying passional line a line of subjectification or

[25] According to Deleuze and Guattari, the Double "has two figures since there are two kinds of doubles: the syntagmatic figure of consciousness, or the consciousness-related double, relating to form (Self = Self [*Moi* = *Moi*]); and the paradigmatic figure of the couple, or the passional double, relating to substance (Man = Woman; here, the double is immediately the difference between the sexes)" (Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 132).

subjection", according to Deleuze and Guattari, "is the constitution, the doubling of the two subjects, and the recoiling of one into the other, of the subject of enunciation into the subject of the statement". When a dominant reality "functions from within", "a transcendent center of power" is no longer necessary: "power is instead immanent and melds with the 'real', operating through normalization." In response to Aaron's refutation of Lilly's valuation of the deep and internal self, Lilly brings up external manifestations of his argument in the form of "a greater man" or "a more heroic soul" (*AR*, 299), which imply nothing but the resurgence of "a transcendent center of power".[26]

Aaron, who stands in front of Lilly's face, is thus in the state of a double bind. Yet Aaron's problem no longer appears to lie in the choice between the alternatives of immanent and transcendent power. To maintain that Aaron goes in the direction of "a becoming-woman", "a becoming-animal", and "becoming-imperceptible" may be far-fetched. There seems to be no doubt, however, that Deleuze and Guattari try to draw Aaron's (that is, Lawrence's) line of flight in that direction.[27]

**A line of flight against what is organic**

The various concepts presented by Deleuze and Guattari and their reading of literary texts based upon such concepts have nothing to do with the organic construction or coherence of the work. One of their standards of valuation is whether a line of flight is drawn to break up what is organic. Hence, their concepts and viewpoints are highly suggestive when challenging the aesthetic standard that has haunted *Aaron's Rod*: the artistic achievement of the novel consists in its organically and coherently developed theme and form. It is no coincidence then that Deleuze and Guattari mention not Lawrence's well-known novels but his later relatively minor works such as *Aaron's Rod* and *The Man Who Died (The Escaped Cock)*.

With the emergence of post-colonialism and other critical perspectives, Deleuze is today quite apt to be criticized.[28] In con-

[26] *Ibid*., 129-30.
[27] *Ibid*., 232-309.
[28] See, for example, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, "Can the Subaltern Speak?", in *Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture*, eds Cary Nelson and Lawrence Grossberg, Urbana, IL: U of Illinois P, 1988, 271-313, and *A Critique of Postcolonial Reason: Toward a History of the Vanishing Present*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1999, 246-311; Slavoj Žižek, *Organs without Bodies: Deleuze and Consequences*, New York: Routledge, 2004. For a critical view on Deleuze and Guattari from the standpoint

sideration of such trends, new Deleuzian readings of Lawrence's literature may be encouraged and explored. There is no doubt that Deleuze and Deleuze and Guattari prompt not only a revaluation of Lawrence's minor works but a new reading of his major works as well.

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of feminism and the possibility of an alliance between the both sides, see Elizabeth Grosz, "A Thousand Tiny Sexes: Feminism and Rhizomatics", in *Gilles Deleuze and the Theater of Philosophy*, eds Constantin V. Boundas and Dorothea Olkowski, New York: Routledge, 1994, 187-210.

# CHAPTER 4

# RENUNCIATION OF REVENGE AND VERTEBRAL CONSCIOUSNESS: *KANGAROO* AND THE THEORY OF THE CROWD

## Revaluating *Kangaroo*

On his way to America, D.H. Lawrence stopped over in Australia, where he wrote *Kangaroo* (1923) in just about six weeks. The plot is simple in one sense, for the novel depicts some experiences of a poet and critic called Richard Lovatt Somers, a character who is a near replica of the author, Lawrence. Both right- and left-wing political groups ask for his cooperation, but he refuses and leaves Australia. Despite its simple plot, the novel has a multilayered structure which consists of various elements such as theological discussion and travel writing about the Australian people and nature.

The initial reception of this book was not unfavourable, but owing to the subsequent establishment of an aesthetic standard for Lawrence's novels in terms of their organic coherence and construction, *Kangaroo* was relegated by critical opinion to the status of being one of Lawrence's second-string works. A revaluation, however, was triggered by the biographical and socio-historical investigations of Lawrence and Australia in the early 1920s. Before the revaluation, the opposition, in the novel, between "the diggers club" – the right-wing organization of veterans who are inclined towards White Australianism – and the Labour Party, which seeks the union of workers with an eye to the possible cooperation with immigrants from the Asian countries, had been considered to be based on, and transplanted from, the political opposition caused by the rise of Fascism that Lawrence had seen in Italy. Yet, as the study, which questioned such imaginariness and inquired into the actual persons or political organizations which Lawrence might have used as models, progressed, the revaluation of *Kangaroo* gained momentum particularly in Australia.[1]

[1] Robert Darroch, *D.H. Lawrence in Australia*, South Melbourne: Macmillan, 1981; Joseph Davis, *D.H. Lawrence at Thirroul*, Sydney: William Collins, 1989. But see also David Ellis, "Lawrence in Australia: The Darroch Controversy", *D.H. Lawrence*

Along with the historical and biographical approach, there have been other attempts to revaluate the multilayered and fragmentary aspect of *Kangaroo*.[2] A Bakhtinian approach has been suggested by Paul Eggert, who, for studies of Lawrence's use of comedy, draws our attention to "Menippean laughter" or "dialogism".[3] The following characteristics of Menippean satire (the menippea) that Mikhail Bakhtin mentions are certainly applicable to *Kangaroo*: "the adventures of an *idea* or a *truth* in the world", "a dialogic relationship to one's own self (fraught with the possibility of split personality)", "elements of *social utopia* which are incorporated in the form of dreams or journeys to unknown lands", "a wide use of inserted genres: novellas, letters, oratorical speeches, symposia", "a mixing of prose and poetic speech", "the multi-styled and multi-toned nature" and "its concern with current and topical issues".[4]

These socio-historical or generic studies have been and will be quite significant, but it should also be acknowledged that the various discourses that seem to have been thrown into the novel randomly are yet to be disentangled. For even if we read *Kangaroo* in the socio-historical contexts of Australia or in terms of Menippean satire, some elements remain obscure: these elements should be examined in relation to the discourses of eugenics, social psychology, and metaphysics in Britain in those days.

Makoto Kinoshita, for example, in his pioneering essay on *Kangaroo*, from the standpoint of eugenics and social psychology,

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*Review*, XXI/2 (Summer 1989), 167-74; Bruce Steele, "Introduction", in D.H. Lawrence, *Kangaroo*, Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1994, xxiii-xxxii; Paul Eggert, "The Dutch-Australian Connection: Willem Siebenhaar, D.H. Lawrence, *Max Havelaar* and *Kangaroo*", *Australian Literary Studies*, XXI/1 (May 2003), 3-19.

[2] See, for example, See-Young Park, "Lev Shestov's Perspective on Fragmentary Writing and the 'Bitty Representation' in *Kangaroo*", in *D.H. Lawrence: Literature, History, Culture*, eds Michael Bell, Keith Cushman, Takeo Iida and Hiro Tateishi, Tokyo: Kokushokankokai, 2005, 259-84.

[3] Paul Eggert, "Introduction" and "Comedy and Provisionality: Lawrence's Address to His Audience and Material in His Australian Novels", in *Lawrence and Comedy*, eds Paul Eggert and John Worthen, Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1996, 13, 137.

[4] Mikhail Bakhtin, *Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics* (1963), ed. and trans. Caryl Emerson, Minneapolis, MN: U of Minnesota P, 1984, 115, 117-18 (emphases in original). In *A Genealogical Study of English Menippean Satire* (Japanese), Tokyo: Kenkyusha, 1996, Zenzo Suzuki begins by defining satire as "mixture" or "a mixed dish" (from the Latin word *satura*), covering from classical times by way of Romanticism (Blake's *The Marriage of Heaven and Hell*) to Modernism (Eliot's *The Waste Land* and Joyce's *Ulysses*).

argues that what *Kangaroo* and the theory of instinct developed by studies like Wilfred Trotter's *Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War* (1916, 1919) have in common is the discourse in which political problems can be discussed biologically.[5] Since Trotter mentions Karl Pearson and H.G. Wells, Kinoshita also suggests a parallelism between *Kangaroo* and the discourse of eugenics.[6]

This kind of reading is necessary when, from a new point of view, we attempt to place *Kangaroo* in the historical context of the time it was written and to clarify Lawrence's views on the leader and the crowd. However, Lawrence's reference to Trotter's *Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War* in his letter of 1916 should not be neglected, even though the content does not necessarily have to be taken literally: Lawrence expresses an undisguised abhorrence of the scientific attitude that attempts to analyse and explain living creatures mechanically.[7] Moreover, as long as the discourse of eugenics is many-sided, in order to not lump Lawrence and Trotter together nebulously, it is necessary first of all to place Trotter in the eugenic discourse and then compare Trotter with Lawrence. In what follows, after surveying *Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War* and its relation to *Kangaroo*, we elucidate the meaning and function of the concept and representation of the crowd as conveyed in this novel.

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[5] Makoto Kinoshita, "The Dark Side of Frontier Myth: D.H. Lawrence's *Kangaroo* and Degeneration" (Japanese), *Otsuka Review*, 33 (1997), 47. See also David Game, "Aspects of Degenerationism in D.H. Lawrence's *Kangaroo*", *D.H. Lawrence Review*, 32-33 (2003-2004), 87-101.

[6] Kinoshita, "The Dark Side of Frontier Myth", 53. Kinoshita's essay raises the contemporary problem of post-colonialism too. The relation between social Darwinism and the colonial discourse would be an important subject for study. For the representation of Aborigines by James Frazer or T.H. Huxley who were influenced by Charles Darwin's theory of evolution, see D.J. Mulvaney, "The Australian Aborigines 1606-1929: Opinion and Fieldwork Part II: 1859-1929", *Historical Studies: Australia and New Zealand*, 8 (1958), 297-314; "Gum Leaves on the Golden Bough: Australia's Palaeolithic Survivals Discovered", in *Antiquity and Man*, eds John D. Evans, Barry Cunliffe and Colin Renfrew, London: Thames and Hudson, 1981, 52-64; "The Darwinian Perspective", in *Seeing the First Australians*, eds Ian Donaldson and Tamsin Donaldson, Sydney: George Allen and Unwin, 1985, 68-75. As to the affinity between Lawrence and Trotter as well as Lawrence's ambivalence about eugenics, see Wallace, *D.H. Lawrence, Science and the Posthuman*, 152-58.

[7] *The Letters of D.H. Lawrence: Volume III: October 1916-June 1921*, eds James T. Boulton and Andrew Robertson, Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1984, 59.

**Wilfred Trotter's *Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War* and the eugenic discourse**

Trotter's basic premise is that "the herd instinct" is primary and innate in human beings along with "such obvious instincts as self-preservation, nutrition, and sex". Therefore, some central concepts of eugenics or social Darwinism such as "natural selection" and "the struggle for existence" do not play such an important part in his thought. For Trotter "the herd instinct" can be a crucial countermeasure against natural selection: "the wolf which does not follow the impulses of the herd will be starved." It seems natural then that this group-oriented idea should lead to "altruism". In fact, altruism is considered to be "the direct outcome of instinct", "a source of union", and "a supreme moral law". Trotter's pacifism can be said to derive from this altruism because he does not take sides with the "doctrine of the biological necessity of war" based upon the theory of "degeneracy" or the struggle for existence.[8]

The first Galton Professor of Eugenics at University College London, Karl Pearson, was presented with great reverence by Trotter as the person who had pointed out that "the so-called ethical process, the appearance, that is to say, of altruism, is to be regarded as a directly instinctive product of gregariousness, and as natural, therefore, as any other instinct".[9] Nevertheless, Trotter's understanding of natural selection or the struggle for existence does not suggest that his biological and political position can be equated with Pearson's. As many scholars including Kinoshita mention, after the hard battles of the Boer War, the Edwardian period saw the emergence of the problem of degeneracy. Pearson worked on the pretext of coping with the decreased strength of enlisted soldiers, most of whom were lower-class town workers; he was a proponent of social Darwinism that attempted to exclude the unfit. Although Pearson endorsed virtues such as altruistic conduct, humanism, and sympathy, he was in favour of political intervention among individuals in order to enhance the efficiency of the race.

Actually, Pearson subscribed fundamentally to the view of history that held that the physically and mentally fitter race has always survived in the struggle for existence between races or nations. It is no wonder, therefore, that such a view led him to a stance that tried to exterminate, in the name of eugenics and under the pretext of racial hygiene, the unfit

[8] Wilfred Trotter, *Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War* (1916, 1919), London: Oxford UP, 1953, 5, 16, 96, 99-104.
[9] *Ibid*., 12.

such as lunatics, invalids, or criminals who, protected by various social activities, show a higher birth-rate than middle-class people who voluntarily practise birth control.[10] According to Takao Tomiyama, the notion of degeneration, which states that civilized society debilitates itself by interfering with natural selection and propagating the unfit, can be traced back to Charles Darwin himself. It may be said that Pearson's stance is overtly social Darwinistic because, promoting that aspect of Darwin, he regards the various communal activities that try to help the unfit as furthering social deterioration. Therefore, if Trotter clearly shares a sense of national crisis with Pearson, it seems certain that their stances cannot be one and the same.

This is not to say that Trotter should be situated outside social Darwinism or eugenics: according to G.R. Searle, "a majority of eugenists in Britain (and also in America)" had contended that war was "dysgenic",[11] and Michael Freeden had pointed out that most eugenists "had come to reject the brutal struggle for existence while not relinquishing its end".[12] S. Herbert, for instance, proposes "the more civilised and moral process of 'mutual aid' coupled with 'rational selection'" through the coalition of eugenics and Socialism.[13] Pearson is an exception. Tomiyama also examines the intricate and non-monolithic discourses of, or on, eugenics by studying writers such as Benjamin Kidd, who negates the struggle for existence among free individuals and considers that social evolution itself is based upon altruistic feelings, Caleb Williams Saleeby who, standing opposed to Pearson, tries to further the eugenics movement without condemning

[10] Karl Pearson, *The Grammar of Science* (1892), Bristol: Thoemmes, 1991, 425-39; *National Life from the Standpoint of Science*, 2nd edn, London: Adam and Charles Black, 1905; Bernard Semmel, *Imperialism and Social Reform: English Social-Imperial Thought 1895-1914*, London: George Allen and Unwin, 1960, 29-82; Takao Tomiyama, *Darwin no Seikimatsu* (Japanese), Tokyo: Seidosha, 1995, 198-206. For an example of a sense of crisis about voluntary birth control from the eugenic point of view, see Havelock Ellis, "Birth-Control and Eugenics", *Eugenics Review*, IX (1917), 32-41. For Pearson's intellectual background and his achievements as the founder of biometry, see Daniel J. Kevles, *In the Name of Eugenics: Genetics and the Uses of Human Heredity* (1985), Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1995, 20-40. For a bibliographical study, see Lyndsay A. Farrall, "The History of Eugenics: A Bibliographical Review", *Annals of Science*, 36 (1979), 111-23.

[11] G.R. Searle, *Eugenics and Politics in Britain 1900-1914*, Leiden: Noordhoff International, 1976, 37.

[12] Michael Freeden, "Eugenics and Progressive Thought: A Study in Ideological Affinity", *Historical Journal*, XXII/3 (September 1979), 653.

[13] S. Herbert, "Eugenics and Socialism", *Eugenics Review*, II (1910), 122.

social policies, and Petr Kropotkin, who uses biological data to challenge the Darwinian struggle for existence.[14] According to this articulation, it would be construed as valid to locate Trotter nearer to Kid rather than to Pearson.[15] Even though Trotter is negative about anarchism, it does not seem inappropriate to suggest his similarity to Kropotkin whose *Mutual Aid* (1902) insists on the importance of not only struggle but also mutual aid in evolution.[16]

**Trotter's view of the First World War**

Trotter's view of war and the people at war is surveyed in concrete terms below. For Trotter, who thinks that "a true national homogeneity" is an ideal state based upon "Nature", "The occurrence of war between nations renders obvious certain manifestations of the social instinct which are apt to escape notice at other times". Accordingly, "the usual view that primitive instincts normally vestigial or dormant are aroused into activity by the stress of war" is theoretically unsound and "of no practical value". Trotter regards the homogeneity established in the herd as "the basis of morale", and the prevalent "impulse towards unity" at the beginning of the Great War as "a true and sound instinctive movement of defence". In "a nation engaged in an urgent struggle for existence", individuals who cannot actively respond to "the call of the herd" are nothing but "parasites" because even if many of them are important persons in peacetime, in wartime they become dysfunctional. Actually, it is owing to the "mental stability" of politicians, officials, bishops, and so on – their "inaccessibility to new and strange phenomena" – that civilization "has never acquired an organic unity of structure" and has ended up in a disaster. In that sense the war has proved that the development of European civilization is "radically unsound".[17] In this manner, valuing positively the tendency of the English people to unite in the war, treating it as a national struggle for existence, Trotter thinks that the progress of civilization lies in the direction of making the national homogeneity durable.

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[14] Tomiyama, *Darwin*, 189-235. As to the relation between Kidd and Pearson, see Semmel, *Imperialism and Social Reform*, 29-52; although they both altered the direction of social Darwinism from its individualistic and liberal path as typified by Herbert Spencer, their relation became extremely antagonistic later.

[15] Benjamin Kidd, *Social Evolution* (1894), London: Methuen, 1920.

[16] Petr Kropotkin, *Mutual Aid: A Factor of Evolution* (1902), Boston: Extending Horizons Books, 1955.

[17] Trotter, *Instincts of the Herd*, 109, 110, 114, 117, 128.

It must have been clear to Trotter that England was not responsible for the defects of European civilization, but had an exclusive opportunity for future development. This nationalistic view of the First World War and civilization will be revealed more clearly by the following classification of herds and nations. Trotter distinguishes three trends of evolution: "the aggressive gregariousness of the wolf and dog, the protective gregariousness of the sheep and the ox", and "the more complex social structure of the bee and the ant" which may be called "socialized gregariousness". The first two types of gregariousness have been "adopted for the most part by primitive peoples" such as "the natives of North America and Australia". Yet Germany is identified as the aggressive type on the following assumption: "The wolf in man, against which civilization has been fighting for so long, is still within call and ready to respond to incantations much feebler than those the German State could employ."[18]

Despite his negation of the arousal of primitive instincts through war, the "wolf in man" is mentioned and the line is drawn between Germany and Britain:

> Nature has provided but few roads for gregarious species to follow. Between the path England finds herself in and that which Germany has chosen there is a divergence which almost amounts to a specific difference in the biological scale .... We are not taking part in a mere war, but in one of Nature's august experiments. It is as if she had set herself to try out in her workshop the strength of the socialized and the aggressive types.[19]

Furthermore, in order to emphasize the ferocity of the aggressive type, Trotter points out a difference in the treatment of colonies and conquered territories:

> To the English the normal method of treating a conquered country is to obliterate, as soon as possible, every trace of conquest, and to assimilate the inhabitants to the other citizens of the empire by every possible indulgence of liberty and self-government. It is, therefore, difficult for him to believe that the German actually likes to be reminded that a given province has been conquered, and is not unwilling that a certain amount of discontent and restiveness in the

[18] *Ibid*., 132, 134, 136.
[19] *Ibid*., 139-40.

> inhabitants should give him opportunities of forcibly exercising his dominion and resuscitating the glories of conquest.[20]

This does not mean that England has already achieved an ideal society, as he is alarmed at the segregation: "The moral homogeneity so plainly visible in the society of the bee is replaced in man by a segregation into classes which tends always to obscure the unity of the nation and often is directly antagonistic to it." Nevertheless, the fact remains that for Trotter, the socialized type, which points to a possible solution to the problems of civilization, is represented by England.[21]

Sigmund Freud probably has this kind of description in mind when he writes that Trotter's book "does not entirely escape the antipathies that were set loose by the recent great war".[22] It is not that Trotter's work is underestimated by Freud. But Freud's view of war is radically opposed to Trotter's:

> It [war] strips us of the later accretions of civilization, and lays bare the primal man in each of us. It constrains us once more to be heroes who cannot believe in their own death; it stamps the alien as the enemy, whose death is to be brought about or desired; it counsels us to rise above the death of those we love. But war is not to be abolished ....[23]

**Lawrence's view of the First World War**

Based on the overview of *Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War* above, I will now examine accounts of the First World War and the crowd or the mob in *Kangaroo*. According to the "Explanatory notes" in the Cambridge edition of the text of *Kangaroo*, since it was in 1915 that Trotter wrote his discussion of the World War and Somers (Lawrence) experienced the "nightmare",[24] despite Lawrence's dislike of Trotter's book, it "had clearly influenced him when he was sensitive to wartime

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[20] *Ibid*., 146-47.
[21] *Ibid*., 107, 201.
[22] Sigmund Freud, *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego* (1921), trans. James Strachey, New York: Norton, 1959, 63.
[23] Sigmund Freud, "Thoughts for the Times on War and Death" (1915), trans. E. Colburn Mayne, in *The Major Works of Sigmund Freud (Great Books of the Western World)*, ed. Robert Maynard Hutchins, Chicago: Encyclopædia Britannica, 1952, 766.
[24] Lawrence may be supposed to be distinguished from Somers or the narrator of the novel, but they are considered to be identical as a matter of practical convenience.

mass psychology".[25] There must have been some kind of influence, to be sure, but the enormous difference between the two cannot be denied.

Somers' wartime experiences are abruptly inserted in Chapter XII ("The Nightmare") of *Kangaroo*, causing a fissure in the time-line of the novel. This might be termed as the return of the repressed, which reveals that Somers' repugnance of the crowd is attributable to that trauma. What Trotter thinks of as a socialized crowd of people is nothing but "a mob" for Somers:

> It was the whole spirit of the war, the vast mob-spirit, which he could never acquiesce in .... Practically every man was caught away from himself, as in some horrible flood, and swept away with the ghastly masses of other men, disinclined to speak, or feel for himself, or to stand on his own feet, delivered over and swirling in the current, suffocated for the time being, and enjoying it. (*K*, 213)

Trotter's value judgments concerning the individual and the group are reversed in *Kangaroo* because for Lawrence a mob occurs when each individual loses his or her autonomy by responding to "the call of the herd".[26]

Moreover, Lawrence condemns the herd as the mob, which, far from protecting the individual from natural selection, "tortures the isolated and independent" who will not or cannot obey the herd (*K*, 225). In fact, Somers values the individual more than the group – he undergoes an examination for conscription and is rejected as "unfit" (*K*, 221): he is "One of the unfit", the very kind of person who is excluded from the herd. The "dread, almost the horror, of democratic society, the mob" (*K*, 259) is the expression used by the novel for the recapitulation of the nightmare of wartime. The national and moral homogeneity of society that is invaluable to Trotter is the very object of abhorrence to Somers (Lawrence) since it is democratic.

In Somers' eyes, the "mob-spirit" was ubiquitous in every country involved in the war; hence, his hatred of the war and the mob naturally includes Germany: "He had been in Germany times enough to know *how* much he detested the German military creatures: mechanical bullies they were" (*K*, 213). But because Somers was "marked out as a spy" in Cornwall in spite of his belief in "the constitutional liberty of an

[25] D.H. Lawrence, *Kangaroo* (1923), ed. Bruce Steele, Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1994, 403 (hereafter cited parenthetically as *K*).
[26] Trotter, *Instincts of the Herd*, 117.

Englishman" (*K*, 217), his hatred stemming from the feeling of having been betrayed is directed more harshly against England:

> But then the industrialism and commercialism of England, with which patriotism and democracy became identified: did not these insult a man and hit him pleasantly across the mouth? How much humiliation had Richard suffered, trying to earn his living! How had they tried, with their beastly industrial self-righteousness, to humiliate him as a separate, single man? They wanted to bring him to heel even more than the German militarist did. (*K*, 213-14)

For Somers, too, England may have represented the "socialized gregariousness" of the bee and the ant, but that society cannot be ideal; he even feels that "if a man is to be brought to any heel, better a spurred heel than the heel of a Jewish financier" (*K*, 214) and that "We all lost the war: perhaps Germany least" (*K*, 222). Without doubt, Lawrence is far removed from Trotter who claims: "If there is any truth in the view I have expressed that the moral reactions of Germany follow the gregarious type which is illustrated by the wolf and the dog, it follows that her respect is to be won by a thorough and drastic beating, and it is just that elementary respect for other nations, of which she is now entirely free, which it is the duty of Europe to teach her."[27]

It is true that the Lawrentian leader, like the Nietzschean superman, can be Fascistic. However, if, together with the great leadership Lawrence imagines, his repulsion towards the crowd or the mob is sealed off, we may lose sight of what he tried to confront.[28]

**The theory of the crowd in *Kangaroo***

At the beginning of Chapter XVI ("A Row in Town") of *Kangaroo*, "the study of collective psychology" is taken up and criticized from the standpoint of the individual living creature beyond the scope of scientific definitions or causality:

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[27] *Ibid*., 161.

[28] For the negative view of the Nietzschean superman shared by most British eugenists, see Freeden, "Eugenics and Progressive Thought", 648-49; also see J.A. Lindsay, "Eugenics and the Doctrine of the Super-Man", *Eugenics Review*, VII (1915), 256, 261. Lindsay judges that as Nietzsche's training is "literary and philosophical", "the Doctrine of the Super-Man is not likely to promote the cause of Eugenics". But see also Dan Stone, *Breeding Superman: Nietzsche, Race and Eugenics in Edwardian and Interwar Britain*, Liverpool: Liverpool UP, 2002, 62-93.

> Before we can begin any of the so-called humane sciences, we must take on trust a purely unscientific fact: namely, that every living creature has an individual soul, however trivial or rudimentary, which connects it individually with the source of all life, as man, in the religious terminology, is connected with God, and inseparable from God. So is every creature, even an ant or a louse, individually in contact with the great life-urge which we call God. (*K*, 295)

For Lawrence the connection of every living creature with "the great life-urge" is "more than evolution". The change from caterpillar to butterfly, for example, is not "cause and effect" but "an answer to the strange creative urge, the God-whisper". Supposing that the evolution or the cause-and-effect link which eliminates the unknowable is horizontal, the creative transformation which is more than evolution might be described as vertical. It is obvious then that Lawrence, who supports the idea of transcendent transformation against that of scientific evolution, sees as his object of attack the discourses of writers like Trotter.

However, while it is indeed deconstructive to find rifts or residues between cause and effect, word and thing, or between the signifier and the signified, the connection of the individual living creature with "the great life-urge" is not free from causality either since "the strange creative urge, the God-whisper" is defined as "the one and only everlasting motive for everything" (*K*, 295): it is the origin indicative of negative theology. Besides, when Lawrence likens the "curious throbs and pulses of the God-urge" to "the almost inaudible beating of a wireless machine" (*K*, 296), the transcendent sphere of God appears to resemble the automatically mechanized world that Lawrence himself criticizes. It could be said, in this respect, that *Kangaroo* has a rhetorical structure similar to that of *The Birth of Tragedy* by Nietzsche.[29]

Following the argument of the creative transformation, *Kangaroo* describes the generating mechanism of a crowd or a mob from the perspective of the herd instinct. According to Lawrence, it is not instinct but "a vertebral-telegraphy, like radio-telegraphy" or "vertebral telepathy" that is "the true means of communication between the

[29] For the reading that questions the attempt of *The Birth of Tragedy* to bridge the distinction between essence and appearance as well as the authority of metaphor of the text, see Paul de Man, "Genesis and Genealogy (Nietzsche)", in *Allegories of Reading: Figural Language in Rousseau, Nietzsche, Rilke, and Proust*, New Haven, CT: Yale UP, 1979, 79-102.

animals". It may not be impossible to think that this "vertebral telepathy" or "vertebral consciousness" is a Lawrentian paraphrase of the herd instinct discussed by people like Trotter, for it is evident that Lawrence assumes the continuity or commonality between animals and human beings just as Trotter does. Still, this paraphrase shows differences between the two in their understanding of the generating mechanism of a herd. I explore Lawrence's theory of "vertebral telepathy" below.

Lawrence writes that vertebral telepathy as the means of communication between animals is "perhaps most highly developed where the brain, the mental consciousness, is smallest". Indeed the vertebral consciousness and the mental consciousness are "mutually exclusive". The great sperm whales are mentioned as the possessors of the "highest form of vertebral telepathy". Napoleon is considered one of the leaders who had the power of sending out messages "without the exact intermediation of mental correspondence". It is "in some ways, the very *reverse* of brain-power": "A marvellous reversion to the pre-mental form of consciousness." While this "pre-mental form of consciousness" is "most perfect" in the great whales, it is "most *absolute* in the cold fishes and serpents, reptiles" (emphases in original). The cold fishes are different from the great whales in that the former have only "a form of telepathy, like a radium-effluence, vibrating fear principally", whereas the latter have "the second telepathic vibration, the sympathetic", too. It could be said that in the case of the great whales the balance between the first telepathic vibration and the second telepathic vibration is maintained ideally. The "passion of amorous love" and the "cold exultance in power" are "the two great telepathic vibrations which rule all the vertebrates, man as well as beast": "Man, whether in a savage tribe or in a complex modern society, is held in unison by these two great vibrations emitted unconsciously from the leader, the leaders, the governing classes, the authorities" (*K*, 299-300).

The importance of the leader for Lawrence indicates his difference from Trotter. Trotter states that "susceptibility to leadership is a characteristic of relatively primitive social types, and tends to diminish with increasing social complexity":

> During the war itself the submission to leadership that England showed was characteristic of the socialized type. It was to a great extent spontaneous, voluntary, and undisciplined, and gave repeated evidence that the passage of inspiration was essentially from the common people

> to its leaders rather than from the leaders to the common people. When the current of inspiration sets persistently in this direction, as it unquestionably did in England, it is very plain that the primitive type of leadership that has led so many civilizations to disaster is no longer in unmodified action.[30]

"Trotter's exposition is open", Freud writes, "to objection that it takes too little account of the leader's part in a group".[31] Freud then refutes Trotter's claim that the fear of small children when they are left alone is a manifestation of the herd instinct, maintaining that "for a long time nothing in the nature of herd instinct or group feeling is to be observed in children" because "a communal or group feeling" of children "first grows up, in a nursery containing many children, out of the children's relation to their parents" and is then "further developed at school". Hence, the herd instinct is "not primary in the same sense as the instinct of self-preservation and the sexual instinct". In conclusion, correcting Trotter's pronouncement that "man is a herd animal", Freud asserts that "he is rather a horde animal, an individual creature in a horde led by a chief".[32] Like Freud, Lawrence emphasizes the role of the leader in group formations. It should be remembered, therefore, that Lawrence's persistence in the 1920s on the issue of leadership went side by side with Freud's emphasis on the leader(s) within a group. In addition, Lawrence's ideal leader, namely, the "single soul that stands naked between the dark God and the dark-blooded masses of men" who is "not the strongest instrument, like Napoleon" (*K*, 303) seems similar to Freud's idea of Moses as the mediator between Jehovah and the people.[33]

The similarity between Lawrence's views on the ideal leader and Freud's ideas on the same subject is significant because, as mentioned in Chapter 3, Lawrence is generally considered to be an anti-Freudianist. Furthermore, when taking into account Foucault's view of the Freudian endeavour against a eugenic ordering of society,[34] the similarity

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[30] Trotter, *Instincts of the Herd*, 201, 202-203.
[31] Freud, *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*, 65.
[32] *Ibid*., 66, 65, 68.
[33] As to Mosaic leaders for Freud, see Serge Moscovici, *The Age of the Crowd: A Historical Treatise on Mass Psychology* (1981), trans. J.C. Whitehouse, Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1985, 347. Moscovici states that "Mosaic leaders can only govern if they strengthen the ego", whereas "totemic leaders" whose prototype is Napoleon "only if they weaken it".
[34] Michel Foucault, *The History of Sexuality Volume I: An Introduction* (1976), trans.

between Lawrence and Freud seems to become all the more significant.[35] There may be a disagreement about the insistence on the connection between the two with reference to Foucault. Actually, the regeneration of Australia through some bloodshedding, which *Kangaroo* suggests (*K*, 78, 89), is ominous in that it can be associated with the Nazistic thematics of blood.[36] However, it is certain that *Kangaroo* cannot be identified with the discourse of the eugenic ordering of society that Foucault outlines nor with that of Wilhelm Reich, around whom, "the historico-political critique of sexual repression" was formed between the two world wars.[37] Nonetheless, even if the theoretical propinquity between Freud and Lawrence is admitted, it is still difficult to refute the criticism of their works from the perspective of post-colonialism and gender.[38]

Another intriguing difference between Lawrence and Trotter is related to "revenge": while Trotter does not regard revenge as a fundamental motive for people,[39] Lawrence, it seems, tries to find a positive significance in a revengeful crowd by differentiating it from a mob. There is a chapter called "'Revenge!' Timotheus Cries" (Chapter XIII) in *Kangaroo*, which can be found before "A Row in Town" (Chapter XVI) and immediately after "The Nightmare" (Chapter XII). This chapter hints at the inevitability that the whole world should be working up to "the volcanic pitch", which has already been reached by the Russians and the Irish; the Indians in India and Somers himself are approaching this point (*K*, 262). The mechanism through which a crowd falls into a mob and the difference between a mob and a revengeful crowd is explained as follows:

> A mob occurs when men turn upon *all* leadership. For true, living activity the mental and the vertebral consciousness should be in harmony. In Caesar and Napoleon the vertebral influence of power

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Robert Hurley, New York: Vintage, 1980, 149-50.

[35] As for the Freudian resistance against a eugenic ordering of society, see also Sander L. Gilman, "Sexology, Psychoanalysis, and Degeneration: From a Theory of Race to a Race to Theory", in *Degeneration: The Dark Side of Progress*, eds J. Edward Chamberlin and Sander L. Gilman, New York: Columbia UP, 1985, 72-96.

[36] Foucault, *The History of Sexuality*, I, 149.

[37] *Ibid*., 131.

[38] Marianna Torgovnick, *Gone Primitive: Savage Intellects, Modern Lives*, Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1990; *Primitive Passions: Men, Women, and the Quest for Ecstasy*, Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1996.

[39] Trotter, *Instincts of the Herd*, 160-61.

> prevailed – and there was a break of balance, and a fall. In Lincoln and President Wilson the vertebral influence of love got out of balance, and there was a fall. There was no balance between the two modes of influence: the mind ran on, as it were, without a brake, towards absurdity. So it ran to absurdity in Napoleon.
>
> Break the balance of the two great controlling influences, and you get, not a simple preponderance of the one influence, but a third state, the mob-state. This is the state when the society, tribe or herd degenerates into a mob. In man, the mind runs on with a sort of terrible automatism, which has no true connection with the *vertebral* consciousness. The vertebral intercommunication gradually gathers force, apart from all mental expression. Its vibration steadily increases till there comes a sudden click! And then you have the strange phenomenon of revolution, like the Russian and the French revolutions. It is a great disruptive outburst. It is a great eruption against the classes in authority. And it is, finally, a passionate, mindless vengeance taken by the collective, vertebral psyche upon the authority of orthodox *mind*. In the Russian revolution it was the *educated* classes that were the enemy really: the deepest inspiration the hatred of the *conscious* classes. – But revolution is not a mob-movement. Revolution has direction, and leadership, however temporary. There is point to its destructive frenzy.
>
> In the end, it is a question with us today whether the masses will degenerate into mobs, or whether they will still keep a spark of direction. All great mass uprisings are really acts of vengeance against the dominant consciousness of the day. It is the dynamic, vertebral consciousness in man bursting up and smashing through the fixed, superimposed mental consciousness of mankind, which mental consciousness has degenerated and become automatic.
>
> The masses are always, strictly, non-mental. Their consciousness is preponderantly vertebral .... like whales which suddenly charge upon the ship which tortures them, so they burst upon the vessel of civilisation. (*K*, 300-301, emphases in original)

In this quotation, the revengeful crowd is clearly thought to provide some kind of breakthrough to the present condition of the world. The "*vertebral* consciousness" which has lost the connection with the mind does not necessarily bring about "the mob-state". The revolutionary crowd turns upon "the authority of orthodox *mind*", but this crowd is different from a mob because it has "direction, and leadership", that is to say, it does not nondirectionally attack "*all* leadership". The enemy of the Russian revolution is specified as "the *educated* classes" or "the *conscious* classes". If people attacked not only these old intellectual

classes but also the new leadership of the revolution, it would mean that "A mob occurs" because "men turn upon *all* leadership". In the last paragraph, the non-mental nature of the masses is re-emphasized, and through the trope of whales which charge upon the ship, the possibility of revenge against civilization by means of the vertebral consciousness is described. Since Lawrence converts Trotter's theory of instincts into the possibility of revolution in this manner, the political implications of Lawrence's theory of vertebral consciousness are unquestionably different from those of Trotter's theory.

**The representation of a mob and leadership in *Kangaroo***

But why must Lawrence persist in the differentiation between the revengeful masses and the mob? It seems easy to attribute this to his desire for revenge caused by the war or to his sympathy with the working classes from which he comes. Apart from these probable reasons, however, I investigate another reason, approaching the subject in terms of the theory of vertebral consciousness and re-reading the above quotation from the start.

At the beginning, a mob is defined: "A mob occurs when men turn upon *all* leadership". Readers may think that this is a reactionary statement which ascribes the occurrence of a mob to the insurgency against leadership. Yet, in reality, as has already been discussed, "*all*" is emphasized to show that this statement is not meant to be reactionary, anti-revolutionary. The next sentence reads: "For true, living activity the mental and the vertebral consciousness should be in harmony." It would be logical to consider that a mob is created because the harmony of the two types of consciousness is broken. This sentence about the harmony, however, is followed by two contrasting examples:

> In Caesar and Napoleon the vertebral influence of power prevailed – and there was a break of balance, and a fall. In Lincoln and President Wilson the vertebral influence of love got out of balance, and there was a fall.

Which should be deemed to be the cause of a mob: the disharmony of the mental and the vertebral consciousness, or the imbalance between the vertebral influence of power and that of love? The next statement may suggest a solution: "There was no balance between the two modes of influence, the mind ran on, as it were, without a brake, towards absurdity." That is to say, the onset of a mob mentality may be

understood as a two-stage process: first, the balance between the two modes of influence is broken, and as a result, the harmony of the two modes of consciousness is lost, bringing about the absurdity of the mind and the insurrection against all leadership.

This interpretation makes it possible to comprehend logically the following description at the beginning of the second paragraph that "a third state, the mob-state" is not the state of "a simple preponderance of the one influence" but the state when "In man, the mind runs on with a sort of terrible automatism". Still, this corollary about a mob seems divergent from the definition or representation of a mob as an insurgent crowd that is against "*all* leadership" or a destructive crowd that is like "a mass of bullocks driven to frenzy by some bott-fly, and charging frantically against the tents of some herdsmen" (*K*, 298).

The above quotation is clearly a symptomatic passage that concerns the function of the mind or the mental consciousness. When the concept of vertebral telepathy or consciousness was introduced through the example of a flock of birds in the preceding passage of this quotation, it was initially supposed to be incompatible with mental consciousness (*K*, 299). Thus, the first premise of Lawrence's theory of vertebral consciousness suggests a possible discrepancy between humans and the rest of the animals rather than a continuity between the two. In fact, the articulation that proceeds from fishes and whales to whales and humans reveals the gaps between them. In descriptions such as "the two great telepathic vibrations which rule all the vertebrates, man as well as beast" (*K*, 300), not only are fish, which experience telepathic vibrations of fear, excluded, the description also fails to establish an exact correspondence with "man". For whereas the great sperm whales are supposed to have the ideal balance between "the two great telepathic vibrations", the examples of Napoleon or Lincoln show the impossibility of establishing that balance in human society or civilization. "A marvellous reversion to the pre-mental form of consciousness" by Napoleon, in fact, resulted in nothing but the production of a mob through the absurdity of the mind.

Readers, therefore, cannot but conclude that while, unlike fishes, human beings have to keep the balance between the two telepathic vibrations, and unlike sperm whales they also have to keep the balance between mental and vertebral consciousness, the realization of these goals in human society, owing perhaps to its very imperfection, never seems to have occurred. Lawrence's seemingly abrupt insistence on the importance of the harmony between mental and vertebral

consciousness can be regarded as an attempt to include the mind, an aspect that he himself had excluded or depreciated initially, but its effect is nothing more than a revelation of the gap between "man" and "beast". Thus, it becomes clear from the description just before the above quotation that the mind is what the theory of vertebral consciousness tries both to exclude and include at the same time: the function or meaning of the mind is quite ambivalent because it is a lack as well as a surplus in human groups or societies.

All this motivates us to re-examine the symptomatic passage quoted above more carefully. First of all, the proposition at the start of the first paragraph, which ascribes the creation of a mob to an insurrection against "*all* leadership", causes a momentous contradiction in the theory of vertebral consciousness. For while this proposition attributes the cause of a mob to a crowd of people, another description in the same paragraph attributes that cause to the leadership, more specifically, to the imbalance of the two modes of vertebral influence, as cited in the cases of Napoleon and Lincoln. To put it simply, Lawrence adheres to his distinction between a revengeful crowd and a mob because, by means of transfiguring the concept of a mob, he seeks to maintain the possibility of forming a group or society based upon the theory of vertebral consciousness.

As long as the cause of the mob is ascribed to leadership in spite of the proposition at the beginning of the citation, the insurrection of the crowd can have a positive possibility. As a matter of fact, between the first paragraph and the second paragraph of the quotation, the point of view is transferred from the leadership to the crowd, and instead of love and power, vengeance is emphasized as a function of vertebral consciousness. This rings in a radical solution that addresses the gap between the intricate human society and the herd of animals: the resurrection of the vertebral consciousness that can generate the crowd or herd without the mental consciousness. The purpose of the formation of the crowd does not consist in harmony any more, but in destruction. That is why the insurgence of people against civilization is represented by the trope of whales at the end of the last paragraph. Here at this stage of the novel, Lawrence's theory of vertebral consciousness has come to adopt the Romanticist framework wherein the overcoming of consciousness by unconsciousness, or reason by feeling, is attempted.

It is now clear that the mind plays the role of a mediator in the transition, as the bearer of vertebral communication from the leadership to the crowd. The mind is not only the automatized mob-state as a result

of the broken balance of love and power but also the repressive authority, as the inciting cause of the formation of the revengeful crowd. Moreover, since mental consciousness is already in the degenerate state in this quotation, it is undoubtedly the mind that is being branded as degenerate. To be sure, a row in town, which is represented in the novel after the descriptions of the mob or the crowd that we have been examining so far, produces "A mob with many different centres" (*K*, 314). But we should not be distracted by this representation of a mob. For Lawrence's concept and representation of a mob, along with his description of the cause of a mob, contain an element of undecidability; at least, according to the argument in the quotation we are discussing, it is when the mind is automatized that a group or crowd of people transmogrifies into a mob.

Therefore, strictly speaking, the statement, "A mob occurs when men turn upon *all* leadership", is also dissociated from the representation of a mob that is brought about by a row in town: this statement is a superfluous signifier that lacks an obvious referent within the text of *Kangaroo*. The distinction between a revengeful crowd and a mob is nothing but a verbal act that, by putting the mark of degeneration on the mind and setting the mind as the target of attack, seeks to overcome the suspicion of a discontinuity between various animals due to the existence of the mind and preserves the theory of vertebral consciousness that is based upon the idea of a continuity between animals.

Therefore it could be said that the degeneration illustrated in *Kangaroo* is different from the concept of degeneration in the discourses of eugenists such as Pearson. Trotter's understanding and use of degeneration is clearly more eugenistic. Nevertheless, criticizing "the invention of the disastrous word 'degenerate'" and the tendency to find "the most expeditious way of getting rid of this troublesome flaw", Trotter emphasizes that the "degenerate" refers to "the mentally unstable", and that "degeneracy" develops not as "a primary quality" but as "a secondary quality in these sensitive minds".[40] Trotter was intro- duced by a book on social psychology at that time as a social thinker who regarded not the environment but "the instincts of the man" as "the sole sources of human motives, the sole springs of human action". Trotter, one of the "most extreme advocates" of such a view, "would apparently account for the most striking characteristics of the

[40] *Ibid*., 44-45.

social behavior of man upon the basis of a single instinct – the gregarious or 'herd instinct'".[41] Yet, for Trotter, the social instinct, being far from perfect, has the "tyrannous power" in "repressing and distorting instinctive expression": what is repeatedly encouraged is "the interposition of the intellect as an active factor in the problem of the direction of society" or the "trained and conscious mind" as "a definite factor in man's environment".[42] There can be discerned, in spite of Freud's remark, Trotter's idea that the scientists who are familiar with the biological knowledge should be the active leaders of the herd or the society.

What is paradoxically shared by Lawrence and Trotter could not be the overall reliance on the instincts as is generally acknowledged, but what Jacques Derrida terms the "supplement", the paradoxical logic: each text discloses a radical deficiency of nature or instinct just by insisting on the importance of intellect or mind.[43] It has to be added that in Trotter's text it is difficult to find such moments of renunciation as *Kangaroo* offers.

**Resemblance to Freudian conscience**

In the end, Lawrence renounces the prospect of revolution through the political movements of Australia. This implies also the renunciation of the Romanticist theory of vertebral consciousness. The point to which Lawrence returns in the final chapter of *Kangaroo* (Chapter XVIII, "Adieu Australia") is "our real civilised consciousness" and "the aware, self-responsible, deep consciousness" (*K*, 348). This "consciousness" is rather ambiguous, just like the mental consciousness which should be smashed through. Yet when the plot development of *Kangaroo* is taken into consideration, it resembles what Freud calls "conscience", formed by directing his or her desire for aggression towards the ego of one's own.[44] In terms of the emphasis of leadership or "civilised consciousness", Lawrence at this stage of his career seems to occupy a theoretical position similar to Freud's after *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*.[45]

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[41] Charles A. Ellwood, *The Psychology of Human Society: An Introduction to Sociological Theory* (1925), New York: D. Appleton, 1927, 277-78.
[42] Trotter, *Instincts of the Herd*, 204-205.
[43] Jacques Derrida, *Of Grammatology* (1967), trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins UP, 1976, 141-64.
[44] Sigmund Freud, *Civilization and Its Discontents* (1930), trans. James Strachey, New York: Norton, 1961, 84.
[45] Sigmund Freud, *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* (1920), trans. James Strachey, New

The renunciation of a subversive or Romanticist transformation of society can be fairly significant if political phenomena such as Fascism, Nazism, or Stalinism are grasped as the products of modern mass society, which are inevitably accompanied by despotism. To be sure, it should not be forgotten that although *Kangaroo* avoids an existent or near-future vision of totalitarian society, there is still a possibility that this novel might be associated with a vision which aspires for a strong leader who can mediate between the God of negative theology and each individual with unconscious vitality.

Meanwhile, before "our real civilised consciousness" (*K*, 348) is mentioned in the final chapter, there is a scene in the penultimate chapter (Chapter XVII, "Kangaroo is Killed") where Somers, who is "As alone and as absent and as present as an aboriginal dark on the sand in the sun" on the Australian shore, becomes indifferent to the landscape, love, or humanity (*K*, 331-32). Deleuze and Guattari find in this scene, which precedes the representation of the Freudian conscience, the possibility of a line of flight: "The uncertain moment at which the white wall/black hole, black point/white shore system, as on a Japanese print, itself becomes one with the act of leaving it, breaking away from and crossing through it."[46]

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York: Norton, 1961. As to the theoretical variation of Freud after "Thoughts for the Times on War and Death" and *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, see Kojin Karatani, "World Intercourse: A Transcritical Reading of Kant and Freud", trans. Hiroki Yoshikuni, *UMBR(a): A Journal of the Unconscious* (2007), 150. Karatani states: "war is absent in literature written during wartime. On the other hand, 'postwar literature,' of the First or Second World War or the Vietnam War, is in the broad sense a literature of war neurosis. Even after its end, war is repeated in the nightmares of war neurotics. It is not the war as an observed fact, but the invisible war repeated in dreams that changed the framework of Freud's psychoanalysis."

[46] Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 189.

# CHAPTER 5

# THE DISAPPEARANCE OF THE CROWD AND THE PREVALENCE OF EVIL: FROM *KANGAROO* TO *ST MAWR*

## Beyond the uncritical treatment of nature

D.H. Lawrence's *St Mawr* (1925) has often been interpreted as a novella that severely criticizes contemporary civilized society and attempts to present the possibility of new life,[1] in that it depicts its heroine, Lou Witt, as someone who, after a cosmopolitan life leads her to a dead end, realizes her true self through contact with the eponymous male horse, St Mawr, and the nature of the south-western US.[2] That is to say, dis- cussions of this novella have postulated an opposition between nature, or living beings, and a civilization epitomized by the modernization of contemporary society. However, as post-colonialism or discourse analysis comes to the forefront, it is becoming difficult to grasp *St Mawr* simply as a work that tries to overcome civilization by nature, or machine by natural life.

Howard J. Booth, for example, discusses how Lawrence's theory that contact with the "other" and other cultures regenerates an individual collapsed between 1917 and 1925 and how Lawrence replaced this view with a Eurocentric view of culture and civilization. Booth then insists that Lawrence's cross-cultural experiences in Australia or the Americas and the later novels, such as *Kangaroo* (1923), *St Mawr* (1925), and *The Plumed Serpent* (1926), should be

[1] For example, in *D.H. Lawrence: Novelist*, F.R. Leavis, who judges that *St Mawr* "can hardly strike the admirer as anything but major" (271), considers Rico, Lou's husband, to be "representative of modern civilized 'life'" (274). Leavis states, "the life she proposes on the ranch ... in the 'wild America' is the antithesis of that represented by the Bloomsbury world she lived in with Rico. And we still feel that she truly apprehends, in this antithesis, something positive, a possibility of creative life" (296).

[2] Alan Wilde, "The Illusion of *St Mawr*: Technique and Vision in D.H. Lawrence's Novel", *PMLA*, 79 (1964), 164-70, reprinted in *D.H. Lawrence: Critical Assessments Volume III*, eds David Ellis and Ornella De Zordo, Mountfield: Helm Information, 1992, 324-35; Courtney M. Carter, "Journey toward the Center: A Jungian Analysis of Lawrence's *St. Mawr*", *D.H. Lawrence Review*, XXVI/1-3 (1995-1996), 65-78.

re-examined from this point of view. Booth points out that, in *Kangaroo*, the "spirit of place" is represented as something evil that causes fear in Somers: even in this early stage of Lawrence's pan-Pacific journey, the "other" is understood as evil. Accordingly, for Booth, *St Mawr* can be seen as nothing other than the text that reveals Lawrence's doubt about intercultural experiences and as a novella that gives an extremely reactionary and pessimistic vision of his work.[3] According to Booth, this is clearly evidenced by the vision of ubiquitous evil in *St Mawr*, and Lawrence has "taken a step towards imagining his own journey back to Europe", when "Europe's past and classical civilization" are invoked as countermeasure against the evil "spirit of place" at the novella's end.[4] On the other hand, Makoto Kinoshita situates *St Mawr* in the context of social Darwinism and eugenics in England, discussing propinquity and the possible influence of the latter on the former.[5] Although each takes a different approach, both studies object to a reading of *St Mawr* that uncritically treats nature as the antithesis of civilization.

Taking into account this critical trend, the present chapter investigates the change that occurs between *Kangaroo* and *St Mawr* in terms of vengeance and the idea of the crowd. As examined in the previous chapter, in *Kangaroo*, the foregrounding of vengeance begins with Somers' memory of the First World War, as does the unfolding of the novel's reflection on the crowd or mob. Somers' memory of his wartime experiences has been repressed, but it suddenly returns in Chapter XII ("The Nightmare"). The war is represented, through the analogy of a flood, as an infiltration of the "mob-spirit". The next chapter, "'Revenge!' Timotheus Cries" (Chapter XIII), describes it as inevitable that the vengeance of all of the world's oppressed people, like the Russians, the Irish, the Indians in India, and Somers himself, should explode (*K*, 262). This vengeful feeling Somers harbours closely relates to the differentiation between the mob and the revolutionary crowd in *Kangaroo*. Unlike the mob of war, in which a "vast mob-spirit" sweeps people away like a flood, this crowd supposedly has

[3] Howard J. Booth, "Lawrence in Doubt: A Theory of the 'Other' and Its Collapse", in *Modernism and Empire*, eds Howard J. Booth and Nigel Rigby, Manchester: Manchester UP, 2000, 211-12, 215-16.
[4] *Ibid*., 216-17.
[5] Makoto Kinoshita, "*St. Mawr* and Eugenics: For a Historical Reading of the Text" (Japanese), in *D.H. Lawrence and New Theories*, eds Masazumi Araki, Saburo Kuramochi and Hiromichi Tateishi, Tokyo: Kokushokankokai, 1999, 214-34.

the potential to create a new world because of its direction and leadership.

It is worth noting that, as the revenge of the crowd against civilization is described through the trope of whales that charge upon a ship, *Kangaroo* relies on the commonality between animals and humans. This commonality is the basis on which Lawrence speculates about the crowd and vengeance. In reality, this commonality is undermined by the text itself, as, instead of uncivilized vertebral consciousness, "our real civilised consciousness" and "the aware, self-responsible, deep consciousness" (*K*, 348) is privileged in the final chapter of *Kangaroo*. This may mean that "Lawrence had taken a step towards imagining his own journey back to Europe",[6] not just in *St Mawr* but also already in *Kangaroo*. If this is true, the step is connoted only at the end of the novel: the disappearance of the crowd and vengeance is not a main theme in *Kangaroo*. In what follows, the denoted process of the disappearance in *St Mawr* is examined.

**St Mawr as an illusion**

While *Kangaroo* tends to rely on similarities between animals and humans, *St Mawr* describes their difference through the eyes of Lou as follows:

> A battle between two worlds. She realised that St. Mawr drew his hot breaths in another world from Rico's, from our world. Perhaps the old Greek horses had lived in St. Mawr's world. And the old Greek heroes, even Hippolytus, had known it .... "Meet him half way," Lewis said. But half way across from our human world to that terrific equine twilight was not a small step. It was a step, she knew, that Rico could never take. She knew it. But she was prepared to sacrifice Rico.[7]

Whatever world the horse inhabits, a fundamental antagonism separates it from Rico's world or the contemporary human world. Lou's preparedness to "sacrifice Rico" suggests the impossibility of bridging the gap between the two worlds could lead to some kind of catastrophe. To be sure, if we consider St Mawr's world to be the world of unconscious desire and Rico's world to be that of conscious mind, it can be said that *St Mawr* adheres fundamentally to the opposition between

[6] Booth, "Lawrence in Doubt", 217.

[7] D.H. Lawrence, *St. Mawr and Other Stories*, ed. Brian Finney, Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1983, 35 (hereafter cited parenthetically as *SM*).

"the vertebral consciousness" and "the mental consciousness" depicted in *Kangaroo*. However, as Lou laments of humans, men in particular, "It's the animal in them has gone perverse, or cringing, or humble, or domesticated, like dogs" (*SM*, 61), it is the depletion of animal energy in human beings that *St Mawr* topicalizes. This explains why St Mawr's world is inaccessible for Rico, whereas, in *Kangaroo*, animals like whales share with humans "vertebral consciousness" or unconscious desire.

Furthermore, the theme of societal renovation by means of vengeful action in *Kangaroo* does not appear in *St Mawr*. In the first place, a discontinuity can be found between the two works in that, instead of gregarious animals, St Mawr, a solitary horse, is featured. The solitariness of St Mawr, who was raised "for stud purposes" but did not "seem to fancy the mares" (*SM*, 29), metaphorically excludes the possibility of the revolutionary crowd formed in *Kangaroo*. In fact, while unconscious desire or drive is the source of crowd formation in *Kangaroo*, such a drive is narrowly kept by St Mawr in return for his isolation in the novella. Concurrently, because St Mawr is after all "a dependent animal" (*SM*, 61) and "one of the kings of creation in the order below man" (*SM*, 83), the relation between St Mawr and human beings is hierarchical as well as antagonistic; this hierarchy imposes limits on the horse's rebellion from the beginning.

For Lou, what characterizes the horse is above all its dangerous and vindictive nature:

> Something told her that the horse was not quite happy: that somewhere deep in his animal consciousness lived a dangerous, half-revealed resentment, a diffused sense of hostility. She realised that he was sensitive, in spite of his flaming, healthy strength, and nervous with a touchy uneasiness that might make him vindictive. (*SM*, 28)

As she is "prepared to sacrifice Rico", it is St Mawr's dangerous and vindictive nature that fascinates Lou, who thinks that the horse may provide a potential breakthrough in her current situation.

However, the prospect of St Mawr rebelling or his vengeance exploding diminishes when St Mawr falls on top of Rico and crushes his ankle. Lou's infatuation wavers, as she perceives evil in the fallen horse:

> It had come to her as in a vision, when she saw the pale gold belly of the stallion upturned, the hoofs working wildly, the wicked curved hams of the horse, and then the evil straining of that arched, fish-like neck, with the dilated eyes of the head. Thrown backwards, and working its hoofs in the air. Reversed, and purely evil.
>
> She saw the same in people. They were thrown backwards, and writhing with evil. And the rider, crushed, was still reining them down.

Shortly thereafter, Lou asks herself about the cause of this accident, "Which was wrong, the horse or the rider? Or both?" (*SM*, 78-79). Then, wondering if there is "something mean and treacherous in St Mawr's spirit, the vulgar evil", Lou associates St Mawr with a "slave":

> ... Rico was so considerate of the brutal horse. But not a spark of consideration did the stallion have for Rico. No, it was the slavish malevolence of a domesticated creature that kept cropping up in St. Mawr. The slave, taking his slavish vengeance, then dropping back into subservience .... Freedom! Most slaves can't be freed, no matter how you let them loose. Like domestic animals, they are, in the long run, more afraid of freedom than of masters .... (*SM*, 81)

In this passage, "vengeance" is equated with "slavish malevolence" that falls back into "subservience". Here, *St Mawr*'s distance from *Kangaroo*, which narrates the potential of a revolutionary crowd, is conspicuous. Indeed, this equation of vengeance with slavishness seems to represent a significant departure of *St Mawr* from *Kangaroo*, in which revolution as "a passionate, mindless vengeance taken by the collective, vertebral psyche upon the authority of orthodox *mind*" is tenaciously distinguished from "a mob-movement", and the masses who "burst upon the vessel of civilisation" are likened to "whales which suddenly charge upon the ship which tortures them" (*K*, 301). The negation of vengeance in *St Mawr* thus correlates with the disappearance not only of the revolutionary crowd but also of the optimistic analogy between human and animal.

It is not the horse but the rider, Rico, whom Lou finally judges as wrong, thinking he is "one of mankind's myriad conspirators, who conspire to live in absolute physical safety, whilst willing the minor disintegration of all positive living" (*SM*, 82). Yet the identification of evil with "slavish vengeance" remains an important turning point in the novella, as this identification ultimately ends St Mawr's role as the ferocious horse. The mutual catastrophe experienced by Rico and St

Mawr is foreshadowed when the relation between the two is defined as a "battle" and Lou as "prepared to sacrifice Rico" (*SM*, 35). Many critics have interpreted the "break" made by St Mawr as a simple manifestation of Lawrentian life; yet, if it is really "a compelled and necessary protest or rebellion of life", [8] it should be positively represented as an act of creative destruction. However, in confronting the horse's actual destructiveness, Lou tries to avert her eyes from its dangerous nature. To put it simply, in this incident at the Devil's Chair, Lou transitions from perceiving St Mawr's vindictive potency as good to perceiving it as evil.

Lou's subsequent questioning of whether it is "the natural wild thing" in St Mawr that causes disasters or "the slave, asserting himself for vengeance" can be seen as her attempt to rediscover his positive attributes not in his vindictiveness but in "the natural wild thing" in him. Nonetheless, her sense that "Everything seemed curiously changed" (*SM*, 82) implies that her disillusionment with St Mawr has already begun. Trying to settle this question of whether "his meanness or his spirit" (*SM*, 83) defines his behaviour, she reaches a conclusion, as the following passage describes:

> And a grief and a sympathy flooded her, for the horse. She realised now how his sadness recoiled into these frenzies of obstinacy and malevolence. Underneath it all was grief, an unconscious, vague, pervading animal grief, which perhaps only Lewis understood, because he felt the same. The grief of the generous creature which sees all ends turning to the morass of ignoble living. (*SM*, 84)

Lou conclusively finds in St Mawr "sadness" or "grief" that recoils into the "frenzies of obstinacy and malevolence". The horse's sadness or grief appears to be a highly subtle displacement or synthesis of the opposition between "the natural wild thing" and "vengeance", or between "spirit" and "meanness". The horse's "frenzies of obstinacy and malevolence" are similar to his "vengeance", but differentiated in that they are ascribed to the "sadness" or "grief" of "the generous creature". However, sadness that leads to nothing but "frenzies of obstinacy and malevolence", is, ultimately, too negative and passive an emotion for "the natural wild thing".

[8] Leavis, *D.H. Lawrence: Novelist*, 291.

After the Atlantic crossing, St Mawr turns out to be an "illusion" (*SM*, 137) to Lou. In this sense, the horse is a vanishing mediator whose function in the founding of Lou's life is replaced by "wild America" (*SM*, 155). The implications of this withdrawal of St Mawr from the novella before its ending have been widely discussed by critics. One of the most persuasive explanations remains the one provided by Alan Wilde. It may be true that St Mawr is "neither the force itself nor its ideal embodiment" but "only the appearance of the vital force", and that St Mawr, whose energy is "largely the energy of opposition", reaches Texas and "loses his savage fury and with it his vitality and his importance".[9] From my standpoint, however, it is Lou's failure or refusal to imagine the immediate connection between the "vital force" and the "appearance", or her failure to see the possibility of such a source of life existing at all, that leads to the disappearance of St Mawr.[10] The decisive factor is thus not the horse's Atlantic crossing but Lou's introspection. Although she attempts to rediscover the positive nature of St Mawr as "the natural wild thing", her failure to do so causes him to lose his *raison d'être*.[11]

**The globalized evil in *St Mawr***

As St Mawr's vengeance disappears, the view of the world or society taken in this novella becomes quite pessimistic and misanthropic. The

[9] Wilde, "The Illusion of *St Mawr*", 329.

[10] From the post-structural perspective of John Haegert, it might be possible to say that, in an effort to reach the "mysterious life at the source which transcends all metaphors and all signs", Lou in reality "represses all memory of the 'void' which constantly reveals itself beneath the play of signifiers throughout the novel" (John Haegert, "Lawrence's *St. Mawr* and the De-Creation of America", *Criticism*, XXXIV/1 [Winter 1992], 85).

[11] Michael Ragussis insightfully maintains that, as St Mawr's apparent nobility is described as a "bluff" (*SM*, 83), after the episode at the Devil's Chair, his difference from Rico, whose charm has also been termed a "bluff" (*SM*, 32), dissolves, revealing that the structure of the novel is "ultimately one of ironic analogies, not vital distinctions" (Michael Ragussis, "The False Myth of *St. Mawr*: Lawrence and the Subterfuge of Art", *Papers on Language and Literature*, 11 [1975], 189). It seems, however, that unlike the precariousness of the horse's fundamental nature, Lou retains the distinction between Rico and St Mawr as reflecting civilization's difference from nature, when she perceives St Mawr's "unconscious, vague, pervading animal grief" and his spirit, which "knew that nobility had gone out of men" (*SM*, 84). As I will subsequently discuss, it is in America that, along with the disappearance of both St Mawr and Rico, the dichotomy of nature as good and civilization as evil is finally abandoned.

evil Lou first notices after the accident in which St Mawr and Rico are upturned becomes exceedingly prevalent and enormously global:

> And she had a vision, a vision of evil. Or not strictly a vision. She became aware of evil, evil, evil, rolling in great waves over the earth. Always she had thought there was no such thing – only a mere negation of good. Now, like an ocean to whose surface she had risen, she saw the dark-grey waves of evil rearing in a great tide ....
>
> There was no relief. The whole world was enveloped in one great flood. All the nations, the white, the brown, the black, the yellow, all were immersed in the strange tide of evil that was subtly, irresistibly rising. No-one, perhaps, deliberately wished it. Nearly every individual wanted peace and a good time all round: everybody to have a good time.
>
> But some strange thing had happened, and the vast, mysterious force of positive evil was let loose. She felt that from the core of Asia the evil welled up, as from some strange pole, and slowly was drowning earth. (*SM*, 78)

The trope of the flood is reminiscent of the representation of "the whole spirit of the war, the vast mob-spirit" by which people were swept away "as in some horrible flood" in Chapter XII ("The Nightmare") of *Kangaroo*. However, while the flood in *Kangaroo* clearly refers to the war, the reference to "the strange tide" of globalized evil in *St Mawr* is ambiguous in the extreme. The "core of Asia" appears to be summoned out of nowhere as if to resolve this ambiguity.

The vagueness of the referent of evil reflects that of the novella's object of criticism. In fact, the war, which deeply confounds Somers and the author, Lawrence, in *Kangaroo*, is disassociated from the representation of evil in *St Mawr*, where the target of attack that replaces the war seems diffused and difficult to focus on.[12] As a result, the confrontation between the oppressor and the oppressed is dismantled and the possibility of "great mass uprisings" that are "really acts of vengeance" (*K*, 301) disappears without a trace. As is shown in

[12] Naturally, the war is not absent from the whole novella. It casts a dark shadow over *St Mawr*. For instance, Lawrence writes that, "During the latter part of the war", Mrs Witt, Lou's mother, "had worked in the American Red Cross in France, nursing" (*SM*, 24); Phoenix, Mrs Witt's groom, "had been badly shell-shocked, and was for a time a wreck" (*SM*, 25); Morgan Lewis was at the front as a groom and lost his "little finger from a bullet" (*SM*, 71). But they are not haunted by the nightmare of the war like Somers is.

the following quotation, not only Fascism but also Socialism and Bolshevism are seen as revelations of evil:

> The evil! The mysterious potency of evil. She could see it all the time, in individuals, in society, in the press. There it was in socialism and bolshevism: the same evil. But bolshevism made a mess of the outside of life, so turn it down. Try fascism. Fascism would keep the surface of life intact, and carry on the undermining business all the better. All the better sport. Never draw blood. Keep the hemorrhage internal, invisible.
>
> And as soon as fascism makes a break – which it is bound to, because all evil works up to a break – then turn it down. With gusto, turn it down. (*SM*, 79)

Thus, with both right and left political activities branded as evil, the sharpness with which the two sides are contrasted in *Kangaroo* is diminished in *St Mawr*. The disappearance of St Mawr's vengeance could be seen as a metaphor for the absence of a revolutionary crowd under the influence of the pessimistic perspective of the world.

In comparing *St Mawr* with *Kangaroo*, I have so far discussed the disappearance of the crowd and vengeance in the former. The argument can be summarized as follows. In *Kangaroo*, the return of Somers' repressed memory of the war in the middle stage of the novel precipitates the foregrounding of vengeance and explicates speculation on the crowd or mob. In contrast, in the middle stage of *St Mawr*, a vision of evil unfurls after the riding accident, negating the potential of vengeance and the prospect of the crowd. As discussed in the previous chapter, the reflection on the war in *Kangaroo* allows the novel's discourse to disengage from the discourse of social Darwinism or the eugenics of Wilfred Trotter. But in *St Mawr*, war is neither the cause nor the result of evil. As F.R. Leavis suggests, it may be estimable that Lawrence repudiated Fascism in the middle of 1920s.[13] However, the exclusion of war from the representation of evil appears to draw on two other discourses of political activism: one is the discourse of pan-Mongolism or the Yellow Peril and the other is that of social Darwinism or eugenics. In the rest of this chapter, the representation of Asia is explored from the point of view of the former discourse.

[13] Leavis, *D.H. Lawrence: Novelist*, 291.

**Asia, Germany and *St Mawr***

Many critics have discussed the implications of "a vision of evil", which Lou first glimpses after St Mawr falls on top of Rico and crushes his ankle. There is no doubt that this incident, which occurs in Shropshire, is the story's crucial, core turning point. For example, in *D.H. Lawrence: Novelist*, Leavis examines "a vision of evil" and its implications in detail.[14] The influential articles of Michael Ragussis and Alan Wilde also discuss this incident extensively, regarding it as the "first climax"[15] or the "dramatic highpoint".[16] Nonetheless, the reason the centre of evil should be located in "the core of Asia" does not seem to have been fully investigated.[17] I first suggest a possible reason for this by referring to the letters Lawrence sent from Germany in 1924. Taking into consideration representations of Japanese or Chinese people in *Aaron's Rod* (1922) and *Kangaroo* (1923), I then explore the significance of this location as the centre of evil. The argument finally addresses the relation of *St Mawr* to what Walter Benn Michaels terms "nativist modernism".

Concerning the passage quoted earlier in which "the core of Asia" is represented as the source of evil, Howard J. Booth notes Lawrence's letters from 1922, in which he expresses a fear that native people are going to "swarm over" and "suffocate" Europeans.[18] He then suggests that Lawrence might have associated the location of evil with "his Ceylon experiences and fantasies".[19] In so far as the image of swarming natives corresponds to "the strange tide of evil" referenced in the quote above, Lawrence's experiences in Ceylon may well be reflected in his representation of Asia in *St Mawr*. Geographically speaking, however, Ceylon cannot be identified as "the core of Asia".

Two of his letters from Germany, bearing the same date of 19 February 1924, suggest a specific location. Lawrence wrote *St Mawr* during the summer of 1924 in New Mexico, after spending several

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[14] *Ibid*., 288-92.
[15] Wilde, "The Illusion of *St Mawr*", 327.
[16] Ragussis, "The False Myth of *St. Mawr*", 188.
[17] For an exception, see Yoshikuni Shimotori, "The Evil Flood Welling Up from the Core of Asia: *St. Mawr* and Anxiety of Empire", *Studies in English Literature*, English Number 45 (2004) [The English Literary Society of Japan], 59-77, which explores routes of the representations of Asia in *St Mawr*.
[18] *The Letters of D.H. Lawrence: Volume IV: June 1921-March 1924*, eds Warren Roberts, James T. Boulton and Elizabeth Mansfield, Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1987, 234.
[19] Booth, "Lawrence in Doubt", 216.

months in England, France and Germany. In January, Lawrence had visited Frederick Carter in Shropshire, which was to be the setting for *St Mawr*. It is probable, then, that his stay in Germany also had some influence on his writing of the novella. One letter he sent to Mabel Dodge Luhan from Baden-Baden, Germany, contains the following:

> That *Men Beasts and Gods* seems to me a good deal faked. Anyhow that oriental stuff is a fraud. The middle of Asia there is the old evil destructive centre, now about to rouse again and work on us – particularly Europe.
>
> But we have no real faith unless we can see through all that stuff, and then ignore it.[20]

What Lawrence calls *Men Beasts and Gods* is actually *Beasts, Men and Gods* by Ferdinand Antoni Ossendowski, a Polish academic, explorer, and writer. Ossendowski's chronicle of adventures in Central Asia was first published in New York in 1922 and translated into many languages. It is unclear which part of the book Lawrence refers to as "that oriental stuff".

In fact, it is dubious whether Lawrence had even read *Beasts, Men and Gods* when he wrote this letter in February, because, in July 1924, he wrote what follows to E.M. Forster, mentioning Forster's newly published *A Passage to India* (1924):

> Thank you for the book. I suddenly read three books in succession, as chance shuffled them this way – we hadn't a book to read, till 3 weeks ago. – *Beasts Men and Gods – Caste and Outcaste* – by a Brahmin, Mukerji – and your book. Ahora sufficiente! – I won't read any more books for a spell, for my belly is full.[21]

Nevertheless, Lawrence must have heard about *Beasts, Men and Gods* before this letter from July and that Lawrence was also writing *St Mawr* in July seems to indicate a close connection between *Beasts, Men and Gods* and *St Mawr*.

Regardless of whether he had read Ossendowski, in the letter from February, Lawrence was probably reacting to the book's reference to the pan-Mongolian movement as represented by people like Baron

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[20] *The Letters of D.H. Lawrence: Volume IV*, 586.

[21] *The Letters of D.H. Lawrence*: *Volume V: March 1924-March 1927*, eds James T. Boulton and Lindeth Vasey, Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1989, 77.

Ungern von Sternberg, who was a descendant of "an old family, a mixture of Germans with Hungarians – Huns from the time of Attila".[22] Baron Ungern fought as an anti-Bolshevik Russian General for the independence of Outer Mongolia. Ossendowski reports with some sympathy that the Baron had told him:

> The tribes of Jenghiz Khan's successors are awakened. Nobody shall extinguish the fire in the heart of the Mongols! In Asia there will be a great State from the Pacific and Indian Oceans to the shore of the Volga. The wise religion of Buddha shall run to the north and the west. It will be the victory of the spirit. A conqueror and leader will appear stronger and more stalwart than Jenghiz Khan and Ugadai. He will be more clever and more merciful than Sultan Baber and he will keep power in his hands until the happy day when, from his subterranean capital, shall emerge the King of the World .... And Russia must first wash herself from the insult of revolution, purifying herself with blood and death; and all people accepting Communism must perish with their families in order that all their offspring may be rooted out![23]

Lawrence's letter probably refers to this kind of apocalyptic, pan-Mongolian, anti-Bolshevik vision. To be sure, since Lawrence describes the "oriental stuff" of this book as "a fraud" and advises Mabel to ignore it, the existence of "the old evil destructive centre" in the "middle of Asia" is brought into question. It cannot be sheer coincidence, however, that, in *St Mawr*, Lou imagines evil as originating from the core, or the middle, of Asia, and that she embraces the apocalyptic and anti-revolutionary aspects of Baron Ungern's vision.

In fact, as the other letter, "A Letter from Germany", shows, Lawrence does not underestimate the popularity of *Beasts, Men and Gods*. Rather, in spite of his general scepticism about Ossendowski's work, Lawrence acknowledges the positivity of the destructive centre:

> The inevitable, mysterious barrier has fallen again, and the great leaning of the Germanic spirit is once more eastwards, towards Russia, towards Tartary. The strange vortex of Tartary has become the positive centre again, the positivity of western Europe is broken. The positivity of our civilization has broken. The influences that come, come invisibly

[22] Ferdinand Ossendowski, *Beasts, Men and Gods* (1922), McLean, VA: IndyPublish, 2002, 166.
[23] *Ibid*., 185.

> out of Tartary. So that all Germany reads *Beasts, Men and Gods* with a kind of fascination. Returning again to the fascination of the destructive East, that produced Attila .... The hope in peace-and-production is broken. The old flow, the old adherence is ruptured. And a still older flow has set in. Back, back to the savage polarity of Tartary, and away from the polarity of civilized Christian Europe.[24]

The assumption here of a destructive and positive centre in Asia, and its mysterious influences, is common to Lou's vision.

In addition, like "A Letter from Germany", the early manuscript of Lawrence's short story, "The Border-Line" (1924) was based on his stay in Germany. It also represents "the heart of Asia" as the place towards which Germany is receding savagely. The heroine, Cynthia, who has journeyed by train from France to Germany across the plains of the Rhineland, becomes fascinated with the Black Forest:

> In the forest, she felt as if the slate of Time had been wiped clean. The air, frozen and savage, felt clean, as if civilisation had never been. Among the trees she seemed to feel the ghosts of the old wolves and bears, the ghosts of the old skin-clad Germans. She would climb to the top of the hill and look at the forest rolling eastwards, rolling, it seemed to her, to the heart of Asia, the source of all our races.[25]

It is not clear what exactly "the source of all our races" means. It may derive from "the popular Romantic idea that the origins of mankind could be traced geographically to a pure source which seemingly moved ever eastwards – hence the term 'Caucasian,' which by stopping at the mountains between the Black and Caucasian seas, was still considerably to the West of the ultimate origins that, according to Herder or Schlegel, lay in the mountains of the Himalayas".[26] The core or heart of Asia, therefore, seems to have played an important part in

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[24] D.H. Lawrence, "A Letter from Germany" (1934), in *Phoenix: The Posthumous Papers of D.H. Lawrence* (1936), ed. Edward D. McDonald, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1978, 108-109.

[25] D.H. Lawrence, "'The Border-Line': Early Manuscript Version" (1924), in *The Woman Who Rode Away and Other Stories*, eds Dieter Mehl and Christa Jansohn, Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1995, 291.

[26] Robert J.C. Young, *Colonial Desire: Hybridity in Theory, Culture and Race*, London: Routledge, 1995, 65.

Lawrence's imagination at the time, and it is probable that by "the core of Asia" he specifically meant Tartary.[27]

As you might expect, there are differences between "A Letter from Germany" and *St Mawr*. In *St Mawr*, the effect of the "mysterious force" spreads around the world and is attributed to "positive evil", while, in "A Letter from Germany", savage influences from Tartary are almost entirely restricted to Germany and not necessarily judged negatively. In the letter he sent to Koteliansky from Baden-Baden on 9 February 1924, Lawrence conveys a positive impression of Germany. He writes: "Germany is queer – seems to be turning – as if she would make a great change, and become manly again, and a bit dangerous in a manly way. I hope so .... there is a certain healthiness, more than in France, far more than in England, the old fierceness coming back."[28] Thus, compared to Lawrence's ambivalent view of a changing Germany, Lou's overwhelmingly pessimistic view of ubiquitous evil is remarkable and cannot simply be attributed to the author.

### *St Mawr* and America

In order to further clarify the specificity of Lou's vision, it is useful to compare it with representations of Asian people in Lawrence's previous novels. In *Aaron's Rod*, for example, Rawdon Lilly thinks that he "can't do with folk who teem by the billion, like the Chinese and Japs and orientals altogether". But while Lilly's disgust is fundamentally directed towards "the mob" or "the mass-bullies", he also hates "Europeans" and "Africans" as well as "Asiatics" (*AR*, 97). At one point, Lilly suggests Jim Bricknell, who thinks "the salvation of the world" lies with the Japanese (*AR*, 75), should be more like them because they "keep themselves taut in their own selves" (*AR*, 81).[29]

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[27] Lawrence mentions Tartary in *Movements in European History*, Chapter VI, "The Huns": "For thousands of years the Huns must have roamed between China and the Volga, and between the arctic regions and Persia, in that immeasurable basin of dreary land called Tartary or Scythia. They were of Tartar or Mongolian race, dark yellow in colour, Asiatic" (65).

[28] *The Letters of D.H. Lawrence: Volume IV*, 574.

[29] As to the relation between Jim and Lilly, see Nobuyoshi Ota, "Empire, the Pacific, and Lawrence's Leadership Novels", in *D.H. Lawrence: Literature, History, Culture*, eds Michael Bell, Keith Cushman, Takeo Iida and Hiro Tateishi, Tokyo: Kokushokankokai, 2005, 50-72; Ota maintains that "the dialogic and dialectic interplay between Jim and Lilly in their discussion of new geopolitical situation discloses the issues of British imperialism, such as the redefinition of the empire and the renewal of the alliance with Japan" (66).

Thus, the Japanese are represented somewhat ambivalently. In *Kangaroo*, in concert with Jack Callcott's anxiety about the possibility of a Japanese invasion and the influx of "coloured labour" into Australia, Richard Somers expresses his view that what India, China, and Japan want is nothing but "tyranny" or "slavery" (*K*, 90). The threat of Asian people is thus more concretely and urgently represented in this novel. Somers later associates himself with "the Indians in India", "the Irish", and "the Russians" (*K*, 262), identifying with the inevitability of their volcanic rage. In contrast to *Aaron's Rod* and *Kangaroo*, concrete references to Asian people are strikingly absent from *St Mawr*.

However, although such reference are not necessarily apparent, their presence may be implied by the flood of evil, for the core of Asia is indeed the true centre of evil if it can affect not only Europe but Ceylon, India, Australia, and even America. In other words, the "core of Asia" functions as a transcendent signifier, structuring the cognitive map of *St Mawr*. This global perspective correlates with the characters' movements and actions. They move as if they were escaping from Asia. Rico and the Manbys move from Australia to England while, in the wake of her "vision of evil", Lou returns from England to the United States. One episode symbolically explains her departure from England. After St Mawr's accident, Lou comes back to her house in London and meets a Welsh groom, Morgan Lewis, who sits in a chair "with his feet on a delicate old carpet from Turkestan", and she thinks:

> … he made the Asiatic, sensuous exquisiteness of her old rugs and her old white Chinese figures seem a weariness. Beauty! What was beauty, she asked herself? The Oriental exquisiteness seemed to her all like dead flowers whose hour had come, to be thrown away. (*SM*, 121)

The "Oriental exquisiteness" may seem to contradict the destructive image of evil previously described, but the evil from Asia is also described as "a soft, subtle thing, soft as water" (*SM*, 78). Lou, in her awareness of the evil from Asia, feels that it is time to discard the illusive exoticism that her house symbolizes: a London, or England, immersed in an evil of which the products of Asia are a symptom. Consequently, Lou follows Phoenix's instruction to go to the west of the US, avoiding California (*SM*, 85). Even her avoidance of the Pacific Coast may reflect the mysterious power of evil working on the US across the Pacific Ocean.

Thus, the absence of concrete representations of Asian people in *St Mawr* does not necessarily signify Lawrence's lack of interest in Asia. Indeed, the existence of a global evil and Lou's return to the US may connect this work with an Asian problem in America at the time. In the 1920s, there was a conspicuous tendency in the United States to regard Asian people as a menace to the white race. The Immigration Act of 1924 was one of its consequences. Alluding to this tendency in his book *Our America*, Michaels identifies in American texts of the 1920s the discourse of "nativist modernism".[30] In response to the increasing anxiety over the numbers of immigrants arriving in the US, these texts committed themselves to a redefinition of American identity.[31]

Michaels cites *The Rising Tide of Color against White World-Supremacy* (1920) by Lothrop Stoddard as an example of pluralistic and anti-assimilationist nativism. Dividing the world's population into "five major races – brown, black, red, yellow, and white", Stoddard tries to teach the white race, especially Nordics, the importance of a "true *race*-consciousness" (emphasis in original). According to Stoddard, the Russo-Japanese War "signified a body-blow to white ascendancy" and "sent a feverish tremor throughout Islam". He also describes the First World War as suicidal because it "unquestionably left Europe much poorer in Nordic blood". Meanwhile, Stoddard regarded Lenin as "a modern Jenghiz Khan plotting the plunder of a world", and Bolshevism as "the arch-enemy of civilization and the race": "the renegade, the traitor within the gates, who would betray the citadel, degrade the very fibre of our being, and ultimately hurl a rebarbarized, racially impoverished world into the most debased and hopeless of mongrelizations." In consideration of these predicaments of the white world, he warned, "It is, in fact, Asiatics, and above all Mongolian Asiatics, who form the first waves of the rising tide of color .... If the

[30] Walter Benn Michaels, *Our America: Nativism, Modernism, and Pluralism*, Durham, NC: Duke UP, 1995, 2.

[31] As Richard Hofstadter states in *Social Darwinism in American Thought* (1944), Boston: Beacon, 1992, the menace of the Yellow Peril had already been widely discussed between 1905 and 1916, and "fear of the Japanese was especially strong in California, where oriental immigration had been resented for over thirty years" (189). However, according to Michaels in *Our America*, while Progressive-era racism was "hierarchical and assimilationist", nativism was "plural and anti-assimilationist" because of its essentialist view of races (67).

white man goes, the Asiatic comes – browns to Africa, yellows to Latin America."[32]

There is a similarity between *The Rising Tide of Color* and Lou's vision of evil: in both cases, the peoples of the world are categorized by their colour, and the common figure of a rising flood or tide is used to show that Asia is the source of the calamity. Lou sees a "mysterious potency of evil" in Socialism and Bolshevism (*SM*, 79), and shares with Stoddard an anti-revolutionary stance. It is initially tempting, therefore, to see *St Mawr* as expressing the same sense of crisis over the Yellow Peril as *The Rising Tide of Color* and superimposing American fear on Europe.

However, Michaels contends that *St Mawr* produces "the structure of nativist modernism without the nativism", [33] and there is an undeniable difference between the two texts. I discuss this problem in the following chapters, paying attention to the discourse of social Darwinism or eugenics.

[32] Lothrop Stoddard, *The Rising Tide of Color against White World-Supremacy*, New York: Blue Ribbon, 1920, 309, 21, 70, 183, 219, 221, 231-32.
[33] Michaels, *Our America*, 101.

# CHAPTER 6

# THE ABSENCE OF DESTRUCTIVE CREATION: THE CONCEPTS OF NATURE AND CIVILIZATION IN *ST MAWR*

## The omission of the red race and Lou's line of flight

Although Walter Benn Michaels does not discuss Lou's vision, the representation of Asia appears to be another "crucial difference from as well as an extension of the American discourse of modernist nativism".[1] First, the biographical fact that Lawrence did not seem interested in the argument made by people like Lothrop Stoddard should not be neglected. Lawrence sent a letter from New Mexico to Catherine Carswell in October 1924, saying the following:

> It was good to be alone and responsible. But also it is very *hard* living up against these savage Rockies. The savage things are a bit gruesome, and they try to down one. – But far better they than the white disintegration. – I did a long novelette – about 60,000 words – about 2 women and a horse – 'St Mawr' ....
>
> I loathe winter. They gas about the Nordic races, over here, but I believe they're dead, dead, dead. I hate all that comes from the north.[2]

Additionally, while *The Rising Tide of Color* identifies specific races with the rising tide, *St Mawr* does not: rather, in Lou's vision, "the strange tide of evil" spreads across all nations, including the yellow ones. Moreover, the nations in *St Mawr* include "the white, the brown, the black, the yellow" but not the red, which Stoddard treats as one of the "five major races – brown, black, red, yellow, and white".[3] This omis- sion of the red race seems to foreshadow or coincide with Lou's line of flight from England to the South-West of the US, the land of the red people.[4] Furthermore, the absence of the red from Lou's vision contrasts the following avowal by Lilly in *Aaron's Rod*:

[1] Michaels, *Our America*, 98.
[2] *The Letters of D.H. Lawrence*: *Volume V*, 148 (emphasis in original).
[3] Stoddard, *The Rising Tide of Color*, 309.
[4] Concerning the line that crosses the Atlantic, Keith Brown writes that "the hills of

> "Only vermin teem by the billion. Higher types breed slower. I would have loved the Aztecs and the Red Indians. I *know* they hold the element in life which I am looking for – They had living pride." (*AR*, 97, emphasis in original)

While, for Stoddard, the whites are "the slowest breeders",[5] the Red Indians "breed slower" for Lilly. Lilly's approbation of the Red Indians appears relevant to Lou's vision of the tide of evil from which the red people are kept apart.

### *St Mawr* and the discourse of social Darwinism or eugenics

All this induces us to deconstruct any reading based on the simple premise of Asian evil. Indeed, closely reading Lou's reflection on evil and on the idea of a flood from Asia transforms the core factor of evil. At first, Lou regards the evil as "a rapid return to the sordid chaos". Such an evil could be associated with ancient and barbaric Asia. However, as Lou's introspection continues, the savage nature, as well as the location, of the evil becomes dubious; evil is ascribed even to the Manby girls who, Lou thinks, are "so glibly evil" and "undermine" people (*SM*, 79). Once evil is described as immanent in Lou's acquaintances, it becomes difficult to connect it exclusively with a barbaric Asia. As the following quotation makes evident, the agents of evil are in reality not barbaric, but civilized human beings:

> Creation destroys as it goes, throws down one tree for the rise of another. But ideal mankind would abolish death, multiply itself million upon million, rear up city upon city, save every parasite alive, until the accumulation of mere existence is swollen to a horror. But go on saving life, the ghastly salvation army of ideal mankind. At the same time secretly, viciously, potently undermine the natural creation, betray it with kiss after kiss, destroy it from the inside, till you have the swollen rottenness of our teeming existences. – But keep the game going. Nobody's going to make another bad break, such as Germany and Russia made.
>
> Two bad breaks the secret evil has made: in Germany and in Russia. Watch it! Let evil keep a policeman's eye on evil! ...

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Wales, glimpsed to the westwards early on, foreshadow the highlands of the American Southwest at the close" (Keith Brown, "Welsh Red Indians: D.H. Lawrence and *St Mawr*", *Essays in Criticism*, XXXII/2 [April 1982], 158-79, reprinted in *Rethinking Lawrence*, ed. Keith Brown, Milton Keynes: Open UP, 1990, 25).

[5] Stoddard, *The Rising Tide of Color*, 7.

> Man must destroy as he goes, as trees fall for trees to rise. The accumulation of life and things means rottenness. Life must destroy life, in the unfolding of creation. We save up life at the expense of the unfolding, till all is full of rottenness. Then at last, we make a break. (*SM*, 80)

The evil here clearly belongs to the "ideal mankind", while "the natural creation" is expected to enact creative destruction. Given this equation of evil with civilization, it becomes difficult to ascribe evil merely to a barbaric image of Asia. Evil from "the core of Asia" becomes, as it were, a floating signifier without a clear referent within the text.

To be sure, it might still be possible to find a similarity between this quotation and *The Rising Tide of Color*, because of the former's resemblance to Stoddard's discourse of social Darwinism or eugenics.[6] Makoto Kinoshita points out that the logic and rhetoric of this passage is that of social Darwinism and eugenics, which condemned state aid to the poor or the weak for hindering natural selection and bringing about race degeneracy.[7] Kinoshita refers to "The Future of the English Race" by W.R. Inge, one of the leading eugenics ideologues at the time, which construes "the lowest class" that is more fertile than "the better stocks" as "a large parasitic class subsisting on the taxes and hampering the Government" and as "the waste products of our civilisation".[8] Kinoshita also refers to R. Austin Freeman's contention in *Social Decay and Regeneration* that "viewed in the light of biology, Collectivism is seen to possess the eminently unsatisfactory property of tending to lower the quality of the race; which it does, on the one hand, by developing the organic type of the aggregate at the expense of that of the individual; and on the other hand by hindering the elimination, and securing the survival, of the unfit".[9] Kinoshita argues that the destruction advocated in *St Mawr*, which inevitably occurs during "the unfolding of creation", is nothing less than the equivalent of natural selection in social Darwinism or eugenics.

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[6] For more on the connection between Stoddard and eugenics in America and Nazi Germany, see Stefan Kühl, *The Nazi Connection: Eugenics, American Racism, and German National Socialism*, New York: Oxford UP, 1994.
[7] Kinoshita, "*St Mawr* and Eugenics", 225.
[8] W.R. Inge, "The Future of the English Race", *The Edinburgh Review* (April 1919), 225.
[9] R. Austin Freeman, *Social Decay and Regeneration*, London: Constable, 1921, 236.

Donald J. Childs and David Bradshaw also mention the affinity between Lawrence and eugenics. Childs claims that Lawrence is "extreme in his negative eugenics" like George Bernard Shaw and H.G. Wells.[10] He cites as proof Lawrence's letter from 1908, which mentions "a lethal chamber as big as the Crystal Palace"[11] and his comment in "[Return to Bestwood]": "Hopeless life should be put to sleep, the idiots and the hopeless sick and the true criminal."[12] By the same token, citing Mellors' words, "An' let the insane and the deadly sick be put to sleep",[13] which did not make it into the published text, Bradshaw argues that *Lady Chatterley's Lover* (1928) is "the culmination of his lifelong espousal of hereditarian eugenics".[14]

Preoccupied with race rather than class, Stoddard is also concerned about the harmful effects of civilization. He writes, "Now it is the Nordics who are most affected by the disgenic aspects of our civilization .... in all those regions which typify the transformation of the industrial revolution, the Nordics do not fit into the altered environment." In contrast, he later explains, "the entire process of colonial settlement was one continuous, drastic cycle of eugenic selection. Only the racially fit ordinarily came, while the few unfit who did come were mostly weeded out by the exacting requirements of early American life." For Stoddard, the Spencerian "survival of the fittest" is a fallacy that "confuses the terms 'fittest' and 'best'". Thus, Stoddard resorts to Prescott F. Hall's idea of world-eugenics, which, by means of immigration restrictions, had attempted to encourage superior races to propagate and prevent inferior races from multiplying. In order to preserve the racial purity of the Nordics, Stoddard advocates artificial intervention as a necessity: "Unless man erects and maintains artificial barriers the various races will increasingly mingle, and the inevitable result will be the supplanting or absorption of the higher by the lower

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[10] Donald J. Childs, *Modernism and Eugenics: Woolf, Eliot, Yeats and the Culture of Degeneration*, Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2001, 10.

[11] *The Letters of D.H. Lawrence: Volume I: September 1901-May 1913*, ed. James T. Boulton, Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1979, 81.

[12] D.H. Lawrence, "[Return to Bestwood]" (1968), in *Late Essays and Articles*, ed. James T. Boulton, Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2004, 24.

[13] D.H. Lawrence, *Lady Chatterley's Lover and A Propos of "Lady Chatterley's Lover"*, ed. Michael Squires, Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1993, 430.

[14] David Bradshaw, "Eugenics: 'They Should Certainly Be Killed'", in *A Concise Companion to Modernism*, ed. David Bradshaw, Oxford: Blackwell, 2003, 43. See also another article by Bradshaw, "Red Trousers: *Lady Chatterley's Lover* and John Hargrave", *Essays in Criticism*, LV/4 (October 2005), 352-73.

types."[15] Lou's speculation resembles Stoddard's view of the plight of the "best", who do not "fit" into the modern environment. As Kinoshita maintains, if what Lou calls "wild America" (*SM*, 155) could be the place where natural selection prevents the "accumulation of life and things" (*SM*, 80), the orientation of the novel would parallel Stoddard's evocation of the "untamed wilderness" that functioned as "eugenic selection" in colonial times.[16]

There is no denying Lawrence's propinquity to the discourse of social Darwinism or eugenics, or the significance of interpreting his work from that perspective. Nevertheless, it is essential to scrutinize the difference between that discourse and Lawrence's texts as well. This is not merely because of the following reference to eugenics Lawrence made in *Fantasia of the Unconscious* (1922):

> There we are, at the top of our Pisgah of ideals, crying *Excelsior* and trying to clamber up into the clouds: that is, if we are idealists with the religious impulse rampant in our breasts. If we are scientists we practice aeroplane flying or eugenics or disarmament or something equally absurd.[17]

It is also essential because a salient feature of Lawrence's writing is to react to discourses of his contemporaries intensely in his novels or stories with the purpose of dislocating or evading those discourses, as I will evince in what follows.

**The "natural creation" as a floating signifier**

The two texts under discussion deal with this matter very differently. While *The Rising Tide of Color* insists on artificial intervention, *St Mawr* does not, as is implied by the organicist figure of trees that "fall for trees to rise". Its actual countermeasure is not "artificial barriers" but the individual's flight and fight:

> What's to be done? Generally speaking, nothing. The dead will have to bury their dead, while the earth stinks of corpses. The individual can but depart from the mass, and try to cleanse himself. Try to hold fast to the living thing, which destroys as it goes, but remains sweet. And in his soul fight, fight, fight to preserve that which is life in him from the

[15] Stoddard, *The Rising Tide of Color*, 163, 262, 273, 259-60, 302.
[16] *Ibid*., 262.
[17] D.H. Lawrence, *Psychoanalysis and the Unconscious and Fantasia of the Unconscious*, ed. Bruce Steele, Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2004, 68.

> ghastly kisses and poison-bites of the myriad evil ones. Retreat to the desert, and fight. But in his soul adhere to that which is life itself, creatively destroying as it goes: destroying the stiff old thing to let the new bud come through. The one passionate principle of creative being, which recognises the natural good, and has a sword for the swarms of evil. (*SM*, 80)

The fight in the individual soul, reminiscent of the "little eternal hammer" in Count Dionys' breast in *The Ladybird* (1923),[18] seems too mystical and far from the practical measures of eugenics. Although Lawrence's organicist principle apparently brings *St Mawr* close to the eugenic viewpoint, when the principle is limited to the individual and the action is so internalized, there seems no suggestion of literal destruction.

More importantly, "the natural creation" or "the living thing, which destroys as it goes" (*SM*, 80), does not refer to attributes or actions of characters in the novel, let alone to "the Nordics" or "the core of Asia". The "natural creation" is another floating signifier. It is seemingly reflected in the dangerous nature of St Mawr who, at first glance, belongs to nature rather than civilization. For example, Margot Norris differentiates the wild thing's "autotelic" aggressiveness, which refers "only to itself, to the potency of its life flowing forth unchecked and dangerously", from the slave's "reactive" vengeance, which has an "extrinsic" motive, thereby associating the former with wild animals, including, I think, St Mawr.[19] Still, there remains an unbridgeable gap between "the natural creation" and St Mawr; as I explained in the previous chapter, St Mawr's ancient and positive power is transformed when the pivotal incident at the Devil's Chair occurs.

A.J. Greimas' semiotic rectangle, introduced to literary criticism by Fredric Jameson, is useful for formulating the relation between the story of *St Mawr* and the vision of "the natural creation" portrayed in the passage quoted in this chapter's second section.[20]

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[18] D.H. Lawrence, *The Fox, The Captain's Doll, The Ladybird*, ed. Dieter Mehl, Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1992, 187.

[19] Margot Norris, *Beasts of the Modern Imagination: Darwin, Nietzsche, Kafka, Ernst, and Lawrence*, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins UP, 1985, 182-83.

[20] According to Jameson's recapitulation in *Fables of Aggression*, "The rectangle is the representation of a binary opposition (two contraries), along with the simple negations (or contradictories) of both terms (the so-called sub-contraries), plus the various possible combinations of these terms, most notably the 'complex term' (ideal synthesis of the two contraries) and the 'neutral' term (ideal synthesis of the two sub-contraries)"

Figure 1




The vision of "the natural creation" (that is, destructive creation or creative destruction), which is the ideal synthesis of the two contraries ( 〈creation〉 and 〈destruction〉 ), can be equated with nature as good. The simple negation of 〈destruction〉 , 〈non-destruction〉 , is represented by the degraded form of destruction indicated by the words "undermine" and "break", the agents of which are Rico and "Germany and Russia", respectively. While Lou inhabits this world of 〈non-destruction〉 with Rico, she tries to escape from it, envisaging a true creative life. Lou, therefore, is situated between 〈non-destruction〉 and 〈creation〉 . Lou's questioning of St Mawr's true nature concerns whether or not the horse's ferocity can lead to the genuine 〈destruction〉 that differs from vengeance, that is, to "the natural creation" that is connected with "the natural wild thing" (*SM*, 82). However, as

(99). See also Fredric Jameson, *The Prison-House of Language: A Critical Account of Structuralism and Russian Formalism*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1972, 162-68.

discussed above, she can imagine St Mawr's positive attributes existing neither in his vindictiveness nor in "the natural wild thing"; St Mawr cannot be the agent of "the natural creation" (that is, destructive creation or creative destruction). Thus, betraying Lou's expectation, St Mawr comes closer to the term of 〈non-creation〉 or "parasite" and disappears from the novella. Civilization as evil or "ideal mankind" occupies the "neutral" term (synthesis of 〈non-destruction〉 and 〈non-creation〉).

The disjunction between St Mawr and a positively creative destruction is clear, because it is not the horse but "Man" that "must destroy as he goes, as trees fall for trees to rise". This becomes clearer when we refer to the passage about the fight in the individual soul, quoted at the beginning of this section. As this passage suggests, the individual's flight and fight, advocated as a countermeasure to the swarming evil, cannot be applicable to the horse; rather, it is the human individual, Lou in particular,[21] who should "Retreat to the desert, and fight", adhering to the idea of "that which is life itself, creatively destroying as it goes" (*SM*, 80).

It may be possible, then, to connect "the natural creation" with Lou rather than St Mawr. In fact, Wilde perceives her as embodying the principle of creative destruction: "In anticipation of her vestal life on the ranch in New Mexico, Lou goes on 'creatively destroying' her relationships with the world she no longer believes in."[22] However, whether it is destructive creation or creative destruction, the "principle of creative being, which recognises the natural good, and has a sword for the swarms of evil" (*SM*, 80), does not become her principle in her new life of New Mexico, as will be argued in the following section.

**The higher stages of creation and the marginalized evil**

In "wild America", nature itself is no longer represented as a positive good. Lou comes to think that her "mission" is to keep herself for "the spirit that is wild, and has waited so long" (*SM*, 155). Yet what she has to fight against is also wild nature: "the animosity of the spirit of place: the crude, half-created spirit of place, like some serpent-bird forever attacking man, in a hatred of man's onward-struggle towards further

[21] Drew Milne, "Lawrence and the Politics of Sexual Politics", in *The Cambridge Companion to D.H. Lawrence*, ed. Anne Fernihough, Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2001, 209.
[22] Wilde, "The Illusion of *St Mawr*", 328-29.

creation" (*SM*, 150). Although degraded modern civilization remains disgusting to Lou, she does not discard the value of civilization itself; rather, this value must always be newly achieved through the incessant efforts of human beings:

> Every new stroke of civilisation has cost the lives of countless brave men, who have fallen defeated by the "dragon," in their efforts to win the apples of the Hesperides, or the fleece of gold. Fallen in their efforts to overcome the old, half-sordid savagery of the lower stages of creation, and win to the next stage.
>
> For all the savagery is half-sordid. And man is only himself when he is fighting on and on, to overcome the sordidness.
>
> And every civilisation, when it loses its inward vision and its cleaner energy, falls into a new sort of sordidness, more vast and more stupendous than the old savage sort. An Augean stables of metallic filth.
>
> And all the time, man has to rouse himself afresh, to cleanse the new accumulations of refuse. To win from the crude wild nature the victory and the power to make another start, and to cleanse behind him the century-deep deposits of layer upon layer of refuse: even of tin cans ....
>
> And now arrived Lou, new blood to the attack. (*SM*, 151)

As this passage makes clear, Lou's "wild America" is the battleground for a new civilization as well as the antithesis of a degraded civilization. The previous opposition between nature and civilization is transformed into that between lower and higher stages of creation. Similarly, any simple dichotomy between good and evil vanishes. Evil may still be inherent in nature or civilization, but if it diffuses itself in both of them, the category becomes, if not insignificant, at least marginal. Replaced by the synthetic notion of the lower stages of creation, evil ceases to be a negative polarity, appearing neither as "the core of Asia" or as modern civilization.

In this passage, which gives a positive value to civilization and depicts nature as what must be overcome, the absence of destructive creation becomes definitive. Figure 2 formulates these newly presented concepts of nature and civilization and reveals their differences from previous concepts.

Figure 2




In the previous formulation (Figure 1), "the natural creation" presupposed the synthesis of 〈creation〉 and 〈destruction〉 and that of nature and human beings, as seen in the imagery of the tree. In this formulation (Figure 2), along with the disappearance of the tree imagery, the opposition between nature and human beings is foregrounded. As "the crude wild nature", which can defeat human beings, is destructive, so are human beings who are supposed to overcome "the lower stages of creation" and "cleanse the new accumulations of refuse". In this sense, it may be said that the agent of destruction is split into Lou (human beings / civilization) and "the spirit of place" (nature). Meanwhile, 〈creation〉 has transmuted into 〈fight〉, and 〈destruction〉 into 〈power〉. Thus, "the natural creation" in Figure 1 is substituted by the new ideal vision of the higher stages of creation, which synthesizes the two contraries, 〈fight〉 and 〈power〉.

I have re-examined the representations of evil and the concepts of nature and civilization in *St Mawr*, focusing on their shifting features.

A close examination of the features of evil reveals that, after it is ascribed to degraded civilizations and after the setting of the narrative shifts to America, the very notion of evil itself becomes marginalized. Meanwhile, the social Darwinistic or eugenistic vision of "the natural creation", which embodies nature as good, is dissociated from the story and characters. When its prerequisite opposition between nature as good and civilization as evil is discarded towards the end of the novella, this vision turns out to be a floating signifier without a clear referent within the text.

# CHAPTER 7

# "THE CORE OF ASIA" AS A VANISHING MEDIATOR: *ST MAWR* AND NATIVIST MODERNISM

## Lou's encounter with "the Real"

As maintained in Chapter 5, Lawrence's letters from 1924 make it possible to infer that, by "the core of Asia", he specifically meant Tartary. This location, along with the global nature of the evil he depicts, invites us to read the novella in relation to pan-Mongolism or the Yellow Peril. However, it should be remembered that the proper name of Tartary is not mentioned in the novella. The reader is required to adhere not to a realistic but to an ambiguous and abstract representation of the core of Asia.

It thus seems significant to again quote and examine this passage on evil from this point of view:

> And she had a vision, a vision of evil. Or not strictly a vision. She became aware of evil, evil, evil, rolling in great waves over the earth. Always she had thought there was no such thing – only a mere negation of good. Now, like an ocean to whose surface she had risen, she saw the dark-grey waves of evil rearing in a great tide ....
>
> There was no relief. The whole world was enveloped in one great flood. All the nations, the white, the brown, the black, the yellow, all were immersed in the strange tide of evil that was subtly, irresistibly rising. No-one, perhaps, deliberately wished it. Nearly every individual wanted peace and a good time all round: everybody to have a good time.
>
> But some strange thing had happened, and the vast, mysterious force of positive evil was let loose. She felt that from the core of Asia the evil welled up, as from some strange pole, and slowly was drowning earth. (*SM*, 78)

For the sake of expedience, I have referred and will refer to this passage as "a vision of evil", but, to be exact, what Lou possesses is not a vision but an awareness of evil. The phrase "she had a vision, a vision of evil"

is followed by "Or not strictly a vision. She became aware of evil ...." Generally speaking, Lou has seen nothing more than a phantasm. Why, then, is it necessary to revise her hallucinatory experience and portray it as solid awareness? How can we grasp this phenomenon, in which "a mere negation of good", or a relative evil, turns into a "positive" or absolute evil?

In navigating this problem, some concepts proposed by Jacques Lacan and Slavoj Žižek, particularly "the Real", will be useful. According to these thinkers, what we usually see as reality is nothing but fantasy that can be radically transformed by the Real: the encounter with the Real causes an unfamiliar breach in the mundane reality as fantasy, or causes a "void in the centre of the symbolic order".[1] In this scene, Lou faces the Real, a breach or a void in her fantasy of the symbolic order of her familiar society. The flood of evil that envelops the whole world wells up through this breach, fundamentally changing everyday society. Her awareness of evil replaces her vision of evil, solely because she encounters the Real that collapses her fantasy of the ordinary world. Unless the breach is closed or the void once again filled with a fantasy, Lou will be unable to stand the horror and succumb to madness. For this reason, the representation of "the core of Asia" is invoked to fill the void in her symbolic order. According to Žižek, the object related to the Real is the sublime object, which is "a mere secondary positivization of the 'nothing,' the void" and "holds the place of, stands in for, what has to be excluded, foreclosed, if 'reality' is to retain its consistency".[2] The repre- sentation of "the core of Asia" is what "holds the place of, stands in for" the nothingness or the void in Lou's reality. Thus, as long as "the core of Asia" is no more than another fantasy for the void, it is not inevitable that the location of the void will be "the core of Asia".

In fact, as Walter Benn Michaels suggests when he uses the universalistic aspects of *St Mawr* to differentiate it from the discourse of "nativist modernism", evil is universalized and made abstract in the novella. As a result, the embodiment of evil is represented as something supernatural and externalized:

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[1] Slavoj Žižek, *The Sublime Object of Ideology*, London: Verso, 1989, 185.
[2] Slavoj Žižek, *Tarrying with the Negative: Kant, Hegel, and the Critique of Ideology*, Durham, NC: Duke UP, 1993, 38.

> Mankind, like a horse, ridden by a stranger, smooth-faced, evil rider. Evil himself, smooth-faced and pseudo-handsome, riding mankind past the dead snake, to the last break.
>
> Mankind no longer its own master. Ridden by this pseudo-handsome ghoul of outward loyalty, inward treachery, in a game of betrayal, betrayal, betrayal. The last of the gods of our era, Judas supreme! (*SM*, 79)

Žižek considers Kant's distinction between "the beautiful" and "the sublime", explaining that, whereas "the beautiful is a way to represent to ourselves 'analogically' the good in the phenomenal world", "the sublime" that appears as chaos like "the rough sea" or "mountain rocks" belongs to the unrepresentable dimension of "radical evil". Žižek then cites the following view of Etienne Balibar on the externalization of evil when, in terms of the possibility and impossibility of representation, the unsymmetrical relation between "the beautiful" and "the sublime" is reversed:

> ... by means of the sentiment of beauty, we can represent to ourselves in an intermediate, symbolic way our freedom, our destiny which consists in our being free, whereas by means of the sentiment of sublime, we experience the impossibility of representing to ourselves – although analogically – radical evil, the alterity and the conflict of freedom. Every symbolization of evil externalizes it in its relationship to the subject, while every sublimation of the good exposes us to the danger of mysticism, to the illusion of omnipotence which, in the practical domain, is called the delirium of holiness.

It could be said that in *St Mawr*, evil, also symbolized and externalized, appears as "a supernatural, external force which takes possession of the individuals".

Meanwhile, the "reverse of the same operation is the sublimation of the good", which, according to Balibar, "exposes us to the danger of mysticism, to the illusion of omnipotence which, in the practical domain, is called the delirium of holiness".[3] As mentioned in Chapter 6, the opposition between good and evil is described as follows:

> Retreat to the desert, and fight. But in his soul adhere to that which is life itself, creatively destroying as it goes: destroying the stiff old thing

[3] Slavoj Žižek, *Enjoy Your Symptom!: Jacques Lacan in Hollywood and out*, New York: Routledge, 1992, 164.

> to let the new bud come through. The one passionate principle of creative being, which recognises the natural good, and has a sword for the swarms of evil. (*SM*, 80)

The "natural good", or the creative destruction of evil, seems unrepresentable and strongly tinged with mysticism.

Thus, the passage of evil in *St Mawr* describes the process in which a person escapes into an arbitrary fantasy when confronted by the Real. It is undoubtedly important to investigate why evil comes from none other than "the core of Asia". At the same time, it should be noted that *St Mawr* is a text that makes it possible for the reader to find contingency and arbitrariness in the representation of "the core of Asia".

**Lou's three objects: St Mawr, "the core of Asia" and "wild America"**

By referring to texts of Lacan and Žižek, I further investigate the transformations experienced by Lou as a consequence of her "vision of evil" and investigate the function of "the core of Asia" over the course of those transformations. First, I examine Lacan's analysis of Freud's dream of Irma's injection, because a parallel exists between Freud and Lou. Lacan distinguishes two parts of Freud's dream. In the first part, Freud sees into the mouth of Irma, his patient, and finds there "the primitive object", or "the image of death in which everything comes to its end". Irma's mouth reveals nothing other than "that which is least penetrable in the real, of the real lacking any possible mediation, of the ultimate real, of the essential object which isn't an object any longer, but this something faced with which all words cease and all categories fail, the object of anxiety *par excellence*".[4]

In the second part, Freud becomes frightened and escapes, calling upon "the congress of all those who know".[5] Then, after the cause of Irma's disorder turns out to be an injection given to her by his friend Otto, the formula for trimethylamine comes to Freud. According to Lacan, in the transition from the first part to the second part of the dream, Freud "becomes something totally different, there's no Freud

[4] Jacques Lacan, *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan: Book II: The Ego in Freud's Theory and in the Technique of Psychoanalysis 1954-1955*, ed. Jacques-Alain Miller, trans. Sylvana Tomaselli, New York: Norton, 1991, 164.
[5] *Ibid*., 159.

any longer, there is no longer anyone who can say *I*". [6] This transformation of the subject caused by the encounter with the Real can be said to have also happened to Lou, who visualizes Texas after the riding accident (*SM*, 82).

From another Lacanian viewpoint, Lou's imaginary retreat from Europe to Texas could be considered "withdrawal" as "the *act* in the Lacanian sense", or as a "*symbolic suicide*: an act of 'losing all,' of withdrawing from symbolic reality", which Žižek refers to in his discussion of Roberto Rossellini's film, *Stromboli*. Finding the same withdrawal or conversion at work in Freud's dream of Irma, Žižek suggests that the opening of Irma's throat corresponds to the crater of the volcano that the heroine of the film, Karin (Ingrid Bergman), faces after running away from the oppressive village. According to Žižek, despairing in the face of the powerful volcano's smoke, Karin encounters "the *Real*", but "After we pass through the 'zero point' of the symbolic suicide, what a moment ago appeared as the whirlpool of rage sweeping away all determinate existence changes miraculously into supreme bliss – *as soon as we renounce all symbolic ties*".[7] A "new silence" or a "new coolness" that Lou feels after the accident (*SM*, 82) seems to correspond approximately to the "bliss" Žižek mentions.

What is the function of "the core of Asia" in Lou's transformation from the standpoint of the Lacanian concepts of the Imaginary, the Symbolic, and the Real? Žižek finds a formal homology between Freud's dream of Irma's injection and James Hilton's *Lost Horizon* (1933), in which the mythical and idyllic world in Tibet (Shangri-La) is

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[6] *Ibid*., 164 (emphasis in original).

[7] Žižek, *Enjoy Your Symptom!*, 43 (emphases in original). Žižek writes in *Enjoy Your Symptom!*, 63-64 (note 21): "The dual, imaginary dialogue with Irma, dominated by Freud's narcissistic interests, culminates in a look into her open mouth; suddenly, this horror (where the throat's opening clearly corresponds to the crater in *Stromboli*) changes miraculously into a sort of ataraxia, the subject floats freely in symbolic bliss – as soon as the dreamer (Freud) renounces his narcissistic perspective." Regarding "the act", Žižek points out "we shouldn't forget that the paradigmatic case of such an act is *feminine*: Antigone's 'No!' to Creon, to state power; her act is literally suicidal, she excludes herself from the community, whereby she offers nothing new, no positive program – she just insists on her unconditional demand. Perhaps we should then risk the hypothesis that, according to its inherent logic, the act as real is 'feminine,' in contrast to the 'masculine' performative, i.e., the great founding gesture of a new order ... The 'break with nature' is on the side of woman, and man's compulsive activity is ultimately nothing but a desperate attempt to repair the traumatic incision of this rupture" (*ibid*., 46, emphasis in original).

represented as "the formula of the mysterious reversal of horror into bliss" or "the transmutation of Real into Symbolic". The representation of "the core of Asia" may also allude to some mythical world, but, compared to Shangri-La, it is too unsubstantial to be called a "fantasy-space".[8] The new place where Lou assumes "new symbolic mandates" and accepts her "new symbolic identity"[9] would be "wild America", the South-West of the US, which might make the embodiment of her symbolic bliss possible. Because Lou voluntarily chooses this place for her own sake, "wild America" differs from the horse, St Mawr, through whom Lou only glimpsed another world, or differs from "the core of Asia", a momentary fantasy, which blocks off her look into the abyss of the Real.

In *The Sublime Object of Ideology*, Žižek turns to Lacan's teaching that "we have to distinguish at least three types of object". The difference among Lou's objects can be clarified by adopting the concepts of the Imaginary, the Symbolic, and the Real. In the Lacan and Žižek schema, Lou's three objects appear in the process of the symbolization of the Imaginary (St Mawr), the realization of the Symbolic ("the core of Asia"), and the imaginarization of the Real ("wild America").[10]

St Mawr is "a leftover, remnants which cannot be reduced to a network of formal relations proper to the symbolic structure"; however, the horse is "paradoxically, at the same time, the positive condition for the effectuation of the formal structure", or "an object of exchange circulating among subjects, serving as a kind of guarantee, pawn, on their symbolic relationship".[11] That St Mawr seems to Lou to live in the world of "the old Greek horses" or "that terrific equine twilight" (*SM*, 35) and cannot be assimilated into the world of Lou and Rico is precisely what makes the horse "a leftover, remnants". Still, St Mawr is "an object of exchange circulating" between the couple, as Lou becomes so fascinated with the horse that she cannot help buying him for Rico. Thus, in the sense that St Mawr mediates Lou and Rico, whose marital relationship has reached a dead end, Lou's symbolic world is reconstructed by the horse: the Imaginary (the imaginary dual relationship) is symbolized for Lou as well as Rico.

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[8] Žižek, *Tarrying with the Negative*, 114-19, 116.
[9] Žižek, *Enjoy Your Symptom!*, 44.
[10] Žižek, *The Sublime Object of Ideology*, 182-85.
[11] *Ibid*., 182.

However, after the riding accident and the subsequent influx of the Real, St Mawr is no longer Lou's object and is replaced by "the core of Asia". This is another type of object for her, one that appears in the transition from the Symbolic to the Real: according to Žižek, it is "the *objet petit a*, the lack, the leftover of the Real setting in motion the symbolic movement of interpretation, a void in the centre of the symbolic order, a pure semblance of the 'mystery' to be explained, interpreted".

A third type of object, which has "a massive, oppressive material presence", is "a mute embodiment of an impossible *jouissance*" and "the impassive, imaginary objectification of the Real".[12] This type of object is "wild America", which is not "an object of exchange circulating among subjects" like St Mawr nor "a pure semblance of the 'mystery' to be explained, interpreted" like "the core of Asia". Soon after taking over the role of Lou's object from St Mawr, "the core of Asia" is replaced by "wild America". The "core of Asia" is therefore another vanishing mediator whose significance fades after it is invoked as the origin of evil.[13]

**The sacrifice and the big Other**

It should not be overlooked that the transition of Lou's object to "wild America" brings about another problem, for Lou's action in the place of her new start, the American South-West, closely resembles what Lacan and Žižek term "the sacrifice". Emphasizing the difficulty and importance of resisting the fascination of the sacrifice, Lacan explains, "the sacrifice signifies that, in the object of our desires, we try to find evidence for the presence of the desire of this Other that I call here *the dark God*".[14] *St Mawr* does not thematize "the dark God", one of the keywords in Lawrence's later works. It seems more than mere coincidence, however, that both Lacan and Lawrence mention the dark God, because, in "wild America", Lou thinks "it's my mission to keep

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[12] *Ibid*., 184-85.

[13] For more on the concept of the vanishing mediator, see Fredric Jameson, "The Vanishing Mediator; or, Max Weber as Storyteller", in *The Ideologies of Theory: Essays 1971-1986: Volume 2: Syntax of History*, London: Routledge, 1988, 3-34, and Slavoj Žižek, *For They Know Not What They Do: Enjoyment as a Political Factor* (1991), 2nd edn, London: Verso, 2002, 182-97.

[14] Jacques Lacan, *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis*, ed. Jacques-Alain Miller, trans. Alan Sheridan, New York: Norton, 1981, 275 (emphasis in original).

myself for the spirit that is wild, and has waited so long here: even waited for such as me" (*SM*, 155). Regarding sacrifice, Žižek expounds:

> In its most fundamental dimension, sacrifice is a "gift of reconciliation" to the Other, destined to appease its desire. Sacrifice conceals the abyss of the Other's desire, more precisely: it conceals the Other's lack, inconsistency, "inexistence," that transpire in this desire. *Sacrifice is a guarantee that "the Other exists"*: that there *is* an Other who can be appeased by means of the sacrifice. The trick of the sacrifice consists therefore in what the speech-act theorists would call its "pragmatic presupposition": *by the very act of sacrifice, we (presup)pose the existence of its addressee* that guarantees the consistency and meaningfulness of our experience ...[15]

Žižek further explains that the subject "*(presup)poses* the big Other in the guise of Historical Reason or divine Providence in the very moment and gesture of conceiving himself as its executor, as its unconscious tool".[16] Lou is exactly the subject who, (presup)posing the big Other as "the spirit that is wild", is to serve it by sacrificing herself.

Towards the end of *St Mawr*, the novel advocates winning "from the crude wild nature the victory and the power to make another start" (*SM*, 151), which suggests Lou may not be on the side of nature completely. Still, it can be conceived that, while "Historical Reason" corresponds to civilization, "divine Providence" corresponds to nature, or "a wild spirit" (*SM*, 155). "Historical Reason" and "divine Providence" might be inextricably linked, and it is to this compound of civilization and nature as "the big Other" that Lou is supposed to devote herself. According to Žižek, the freedom attained by "an act" is "unbearably suffocating, the very opposite of relief, of 'liberation'". Through her encounter with the Real, Lou seems to have at one point gained this freedom by renouncing any support from the Other, but she ends up the subject who needs the Other to serve as her guarantee. Thus, if Rossellini's films are "unideological" and "enable us to break out of the ideological closure" because they endeavour to enact "the 'undoing' of the founding ideological gesture of (presup)posing the Other",[17] *St Mawr*, on the contrary, may be a text that ultimately attempts to inclose us in the ideology of nativist Modernism.

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[15] Žižek, *Enjoy Your Symptom!*, 56 (emphases in original).
[16] *Ibid*., 59 (emphasis in original).
[17] *Ibid*., 59.

However, another description by Žižek suggests that *St Mawr* contains an undecidability that differs from the one at the ending in *Stromboli*. Lou's recognition in "wild America" is nothing other than the "imaginary (mis)recognition": "when I recognize myself as the addressee of the call of the ideological big Other (Nation, Democracy, Party, God, and so forth), when this call 'arrives at its destination' in me, I automatically misrecognize that it is this very act of recognition which *makes me* what I have recognized myself as."[18] That is to say, "wild America" is in principle another fantasy that, like St Mawr, could lead to Lou's disillusionment. In addition, in light of Žižek's differentiation of the saint from the priest, Lou's ambiguity becomes evident.[19] While her resemblance to Antigone as a saint cannot be denied, Lou also resembles Kate Leslie, who plays the role of priestess in Lawrence's next novel, *The Plumed Serpent* (1926). This suggests that a line of flight can be drawn from Lou to Kate, though the two women still differ significantly, as will be discussed in the following section.

**Nativism, primitivism, universalism**

Furthermore, the access of *St Mawr* to nativist Modernism through Lou's sacrificial attitude does not necessarily gain negative significance by examining Walter Benn Michaels' discussion with much circumstance and revising his reading of *St Mawr*. I have sketched two opposing readings above, one based on the evil from Asia and the other on problematizing such a core of evil. The dualistic tendency of *St Mawr* can be understood as having what Michaels calls "the structure of nativist modernism without the nativism".[20] Michaels claims that *St Mawr* is nativist – that is, anti-imperialist and anti-assimilationist –

[18] *Ibid*., 10-12 (emphasis in original).

[19] According to Žižek in *The Sublime Object of Ideology*, "The priest is a 'functionary of the Holy'; there is no Holy without its officials, without the bureaucratic machinery supporting it, organizing its ritual, from the Aztec's official of human sacrifice to the modern sacred state or army rituals. The saint, on the contrary, occupies the place of *objet petit a*, of pure object, of somebody undergoing radical subjective destitution. He enacts no ritual, he conjures nothing, he just persists in his inert presence .... Lacan saw in Antigone a forerunner of Christ's sacrifice: in her persistence, Antigone is a saint, definitely not a priestess. This is why we must oppose all attempts to domesticate her, to tame her by concealing the frightening strangeness, 'inhumanity', *apathetic* character of her figure, making of her a gentle protectress of family and household who evokes our compassion and offers herself as a point of identification" (116-17, emphasis in original).

[20] Michaels, *Our America*, 101.

because it advocates purified blood and breeding, a characteristic theme of nativist Modernism, exemplified by a "dispossessed Indian" Phoenix (*SM*, 35); a "high-bred" stallion St Mawr (*SM*, 29); and Lou, who "will finally live up to the responsibility of sterility". Yet Michaels finds difference, too; while the nativist text identifies "the refusal of procreation" with "racial or cultural purity, with 'breeding' itself", Lawrence identifies such refusal with "a deeper reality and with masculinity". According to Michaels, the location of Lou's ranch in New Mexico has no relation to American national or cultural identity, because it represents the aboriginality of "wild America". In contrast to nativist pluralism, Lawrence's commitment to "blood" is defined by Michaels as "a primitivist universalism, one that transcends the boundaries of race and nationality".[21]

This "primitivist universalism" connects Lawrence to another Modernism, "an international modernism" exemplified by such Modernists as T.S. Eliot and Ezra Pound, in whom, "as in related figures like Lawrence and E.M. Forster, the deployment of race is more or less explicitly disarticulated from the nation and committed instead to the formation of a distinctively nonnational community". Although nativist Modernism claims to be culturally or racially pluralistic, it can readily turn into racism. Yet, it is international Modernism that has usually been associated with racism, because it tends to bring various cultures or races into the same arena and judge which is superior and denounce those judged inferior. "Pound's commitment to culture is", according to Michaels, "absolutely interchangeable with Lawrence's primitivism and sometimes emerges as, in fact, a form of primitivism".[22] It is not so surprising that Michaels points out a similarity between Pound and Lawrence, as Lawrence's works, particularly *The Plumed Serpent*, have often been described as having Fascist tendencies.[23]

Michaels' argument about Lawrence's non-nationalistic – that is, his international – tendency is astute and pointed, although it would be problematic to generalize Lawrence as simply primitivistic or

[21] *Ibid*., 169, 98, 100.
[22] *Ibid*., 100, 102, 108.
[23] For attempts to articulate the similarities and differences between *The Plumed Serpent* and Nazism, see Jad Smith, "*Völkisch* Organicism and the Use of Primitivism in Lawrence's *The Plumed Serpent*", *D.H. Lawrence Review*, XXX/3 (2002), 7-24, and Carl Krockel, *D.H. Lawrence and Germany: The Politics of Influence*, Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2007, 269-99.

universalistic. In the first place, as Gilles Deleuze (or Deleuze and Guattari) emphasizes, his primitivism does not reflect a simple belief in the possibility of going back to nature or to a primitive life.[24] Lawrence's progressive view of history can be recognized in *St Mawr*'s final valuation of the higher stages of creation. Besides, although Michaels presupposes the homogeneity of St Mawr, Lewis, Phoenix, and "wild America", subsuming them under the rubric of "aboriginal", they should also be differentiated if the story's development is taken into account. After leaving Britain, both the aboriginal Welsh groom, Lewis, and the Welsh horse, St Mawr, become insignificant.[25] In contrast, despite Lou's refusal of any intimate relation with the aboriginal Indian, Phoenix, Lou and Phoenix do stay together, recovering their connection with their native continent, America. British aboriginality is alienated from American aboriginality. In this respect, what is treated as universal in *St Mawr* is not so much any single character as the evil from Asia or from civilization in general. The novella suggests that, whether it comes from Asia or another idealistic civilization, evil permeates almost all nations, crossing racial and national boundaries.

Accordingly, Lawrence's universalism must be reconsidered. As proof of this universalism, Michaels notes, for example, Kate's disregard for her racial difference from native people in *The Plumed Serpent* (1926). It is true that Kate crosses the racial boundary by her marriage to the Indian, Cipriano Viedma. Nevertheless, interracial or international relationships are restricted to what Ramón Carrasco calls "the Natural Aristocrats of the World". Ramón says, "The races of the earth are like trees, in the end they neither mix nor mingle .... Only the Natural Aristocrats of the World can be international, or cosmopolitan, or cosmic."[26] Lawrence himself shows a similar pluralistic view of races in the "Epilogue" to *Movements in European History*:

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[24] Deleuze, "Nietzsche and Saint Paul, Lawrence and John of Patmos", 52; Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 188-89.

[25] Regarding Lewis' aboriginality, Keith Brown notes in "Welsh Red Indians", Lawrence "certainly knew enough to use the term 'Celt' in its proper sense, to cover not only Ireland and the surviving British 'Celtic Fringe', but also the vanished world of Gaul and Ancient Briton. Thus Lewis in *St Mawr* has not a Welsh but a '*British* [i.e. Ancient British] stare'" (24, emphasis in original).

[26] D.H. Lawrence, *The Plumed Serpent* (1926), ed. L.D. Clark, Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1987, 248 (hereafter cited parenthetically as *PS*).

> In its root and trunk, mankind is one. But then the differences begin. The great tree of man branches out into different races ...
>
> Every branch has its own direction and its own growing tip. One branch cannot take the place of any other branch .... My manhood is the same as the manhood of a Chinaman. But in spirit and idea we two are different and shall be different forever, as apple-blossom will forever be different from irises.[27]

In this passage, he seems to display a more pluralistic view of race than the one Michaels suggests he had. In addition, while Kate is oriented towards the fusion of blood, Lou, as Michaels points out, is not. The difference between *St Mawr* and *The Plumed Serpent* should not be underestimated, because, in terms of race or blood, the two heroines' attitudes clearly differ.

Although the two texts may be similar in that they are nativist – that is, anti-imperialist – nativism in each text has a different meaning and function. The nativism in *The Plumed Serpent*, which takes place in Mexico, cannot be the same as that in *St Mawr*, the final setting of which is the US, because *The Plumed Serpent* confronts the imperialist US from the outside while *St Mawr* confronts it from inside. At any rate, despite the crucial distinction Michaels makes between the novella's nativistic and universalistic aspects, *St Mawr* appears to be more involved with nativism than he allows.

**Michaels and Said on Lawrence and imperialism**

Michaels also associates Lawrence with E.M. Forster on account of their similar view of the race and lack of pluralism at the core of nativism. However, as just discussed, the nativism in *The Plumed Serpent* suggests the necessity of dissociating this text from *A Passage to India* (1924). Michaels argues that *A Passage to India* is imperialist "in the sense that it is *antinationalist*", and that Edward Said in *Culture and Imperialism* is "right to see Forster's contempt for Indian nationalism as an expression of imperialism but wrong to identify it with the conviction that Indians 'are not yet ready for self-rule' ... ".[28] Michaels does not specifically identify Lawrence as an imperialist, but seems to imply this by saying that Lawrence should not be considered nationalistic. However, the difference between *Passage to India* and *The Plumed Serpent* appears to be as crucial as the difference between

[27] Lawrence, *Movements in European History*, 256.
[28] Michaels, *Our America*, 106, 171 (emphasis in original).

*St Mawr* and *The Plumed Serpent*. That *The Plumed Serpent* pursues the possibility of a kind of nationalism in Mexico in opposition to Western modernization cannot be overlooked.

In fact, it seems no coincidence that Michaels does not link Lawrence directly to imperialism, and that Edward Said, who discusses Modernists like Forster and W.B. Yeats, almost never mentions D.H. Lawrence. Said admits that Raymond Williams is "a great critic", whose work he admires and has "learned much from", but, at the same time, he senses "a limitation in [Williams'] feeling that English literature is mainly about England".[29] If Said had discussed D.H. Lawrence in terms of imperialism along with Forster, this could have served as an effective refutation against Williams. However, Said kept peculiarly silent about D.H. Lawrence.

Thus, it is noteworthy that Said mentions Gilles Deleuze as one of the few major French theoreticians who has not been "unheeding" to the matter of imperialism, and that Said favourably refers to Deleuze and Guattari's concepts, such as "nomadology" and the "war machine" in *A Thousand Plateaus*, which had a considerable impact on *Empire* by Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri.[30] For in "To Have Done with Judgment", Deleuze regards Lawrence as the writer who places value not on war but on "combat" and "describes the imperialism of death, from the ancient Romans to the modern Fascists".[31] Deleuze's viewpoint makes it possible to read *The Plumed Serpent* in a new light.

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[29] Edward W. Said, *Culture and Imperialism*, London: Chatto and Windus, 1993, 14.

[30] In Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Empire*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2000, taking into consideration Michaels' argument, the authors note that the "imperial racist theory in itself is a theory of segregation". However, referring to *A Thousand Plateaus*, they write, "Deleuze and Guattari challenge us to conceive racist practice not in terms of binary divisions and exclusion but as a strategy of differential inclusion" (193-94). Regarding Michaels, Hardt and Negri state that he "critiques the kind of racism that appears in cultural pluralism, but does so in a way that seems to support a new liberal racism" (445). Meanwhile, Walter Benn Michaels critically discusses Hardt and Negri's *Empire* in *The Shape of the Signifier: 1967 to the End of History*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 2004, 169-82.

[31] Gilles Deleuze, "To Have Done with Judgment", in *Essays Critical and Clinical*, trans. Daniel W. Smith and Michael A. Greco, Minneapolis, MN: U of Minnesota P, 1997, 133.

# CHAPTER 8

# SEXUALITY, NAZISM, POST-COLONIALISM: *THE PLUMED SERPENT* AND *THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY VOLUME I*

## Kate and sexuality

It may be going too far to say that the prevalent and simplistic view that Lawrence liberated sex from the Victorian repression is no longer valid. However, the following claim made by Stephen Heath makes us continue to rethink the problematics of sex in Lawrence's texts and thought: now that the media are filled with overflowing discourses on sex, there can be found no liberation of sex but a new terrorism of sex, to which Lawrence contributed formidably.[1]

It is doubtless that Stephen Heath is indebted theoretically to Michel Foucault's *The History of Sexuality Volume I: An Introduction* – a book in which Foucault claims that what has been regarded as the repression of sexuality in the Victorian period was in reality the production of sexuality, and describes the way in which, by directing the attention of people to the secrets of sex, power is exerted in a new, subtler way. In this framework of analysis, since Heath accuses him of open and innumerable representations of sex, Lawrence might indeed have been trapped by a network of power and contributed to extending that network further and deeper.

Towards the end of *The History of Sexuality Volume I* (Part Five: "Right of Death and Power over Life") indeed Foucault cites the words

[1] The valuation of Lawrence by Heath, who advocates not the liberation of sexuality but the liberation from sexuality, is extremely negative. For Heath, "Freud and Lawrence, novel and psychoanalysis go together"; Lawrence who "fills characters with the new ideas of sex, debates psychoanalysis and sexology, pushes the phallus to the forefront of the novel", and "constantly declares himself to be writing against pornography, is in fact very much bound up with it, directly pornographic" (Stephen Heath, *The Sexual Fix*, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1982, 109, 108). Heath's criticism of Lawrence might be connected with Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick's criticism in *Between Men: English Literature and Male Homosocial Desire*, New York: Columbia UP, 1985, which finds homophobia and misogyny in Lawrence's reception of Walt Whitman (215-17).

of Kate Leslie, the heroine of Lawrence's novel, *The Plumed Serpent* (1926):[2]

> By creating the imaginary element that is "sex," the deployment of sexuality established one of its most essential internal operating principles: the desire for sex – the desire to have it, to have access to it, to discover it, to liberate it, to articulate it in discourse, to formulate it in truth. It constituted "sex" itself as something desirable. And it is this desirability of sex that attaches each one of us to the injunction to know it, to reveal its law and its power; it is this desirability that makes us think we are affirming the rights of our sex against all power, when in fact we are fastened to the deployment of sexuality that has lifted up from deep within us a sort of mirage in which we think we see ourselves reflected – the dark shimmer of sex.
>
> "It is sex," said Kate in *The Plumed Serpent*. "How wonderful sex can be, when men keep it powerful and sacred, and it fills the world! like sunshine through and through one!"[3]

Thus, Foucault states that "sex" being "the imaginary element", "the desire for sex" is established by "the deployment of sexuality". It is by this deployment that we are induced to desire sex. Sex is neither the means to defy power nor the end to achieve through fighting against power: it fastens us to the deployment of sexuality and power. Therefore, even though a clear negative judgement is not meted out to the novel as a whole, the context of Foucault's argument makes it feasible to think that Kate's words are quoted as a conspicuous example of a subject who is attracted to and driven by the desirability of sex.[4]

Foucault does not discuss Kate's perception of "sex" in detail; but it is possible and necessary to make Foucault's implications clear by

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[2] Although Robert Burden's *Radicalizing Lawrence* also refers to this passage, it is another novel by Lawrence, *The Rainbow* (1915), that Burden analyses in detail using Foucault's works, including *The History of Sexuality Volume I*.

[3] Foucault, *The History of Sexuality*, I, 156-57.

[4] Foucault does not simplistically identify the liberation of sex with the production of sex. Foucault believes that "the so-called 'sexual liberation' movements must be understood as movements of affirmation 'beginning with' sexuality" in which all minorities are colonized: "these are movements which take off from sexuality, from the apparatus of sexuality within which we're trapped, which make it function to the limit; but at the same time, these movements are displaced in relation to sexuality, disengaging themselves from it and going beyond it" (Michel Foucault, "The End of the Monarchy of Sex", in *Foucault Live [Interviews, 1961-1984]*, ed. Sylvère Lotringer, trans. Lysa Hochroth and John Johnston, New York: Semiotext(e), 1996, 217).

taking into consideration the history of the deployment of sexuality, which he delineates in the same part of *The History of Sexuality* ("Right of Death and Power over Life"). According to Foucault, in the West in the nineteenth century, the society where "power spoke *through* blood" changed into a society where "power spoke *of* sexuality and *to* sexuality".[5] Nevertheless, despite this transformation of power, "the thematics of blood" did not entirely disappear: "Nazism was doubtless the most cunning and the most naïve (and the former because of the latter) combination of the fantasies of blood and the paroxysms of a disciplinary power."[6] In *The Plumed Serpent* too, Kate understands the

[5] In *The History of Sexuality*, Foucault contrasts a society of blood with a society of sex in the following way: "The blood relation long remained an important element in the mechanisms of power, its manifestations, and its rituals. For a society in which the systems of alliance, the political form of the sovereign, the differentiation into orders and castes, and the value of descent lines were predominant; for a society in which famine, epidemics, and violence made death imminent, blood constituted one of the fundamental values. It owed its high value at the same time to its instrumental role (the ability to shed blood), to the way it functioned in the order of signs (to have a certain blood, to be of the same blood, to be prepared to risk one's blood), and also to its precariousness (easily spilled, subject to drying up, too readily mixed, capable of being quickly corrupted). A society of blood – I was tempted to say, of 'sanguinity' – where power spoke *through* blood: the honor of war, the fear of famine, the triumph of death, the sovereign with his sword, executioners, and tortures; blood was *a reality with a symbolic function*. We, on the other hand, are in a society of 'sex,' or rather a society 'with a sexuality': the mechanisms of power are addressed to the body, to life, to what causes it to proliferate, to what reinforces the species, its stamina, its ability to dominate, or its capacity for being used. Through the themes of health, progeny, race, the future of the species, the vitality of the social body, power spoke *of* sexuality and *to* sexuality; the latter was not a mark or a symbol, it was an object and a target. Moreover, its importance was due less to its rarity or its precariousness than to its insistence, its insidious presence, the fact that it was everywhere an object of excitement and fear at the same time. Power delineated it, aroused it, and employed it as the proliferating meaning that had always to be taken control of again lest it escape; it was *an effect with a meaning-value*" (I, 147-48, emphases in original).

[6] *Ibid*., 149: "Beginning in the second half of the nineteenth century, the thematics of blood was sometimes called on to lend its entire historical weight toward revitalizing the type of political power that was exercised through the devices of sexuality. Racism took shape at this point (racism in its modern, 'biologizing,' statist form): it was then that a whole politics of settlement (*peuplement*), family, marriage, education, social hierarchization, and property, accompanied by a long series of permanent interventions at the level of the body, conduct, health, and everyday life, received their color and their justification from the mythical concern with protecting the purity of the blood and ensuring the triumph of the race. Nazism was doubtless the most cunning and the most naïve (and the former because of the latter) combination of the fantasies of blood and the paroxysms of a disciplinary power." As Kate faces the power that tries not to protect

meaning of Ramón and Cipriano's "acquiescence in the primitive assertion": "It was the renewal of the old, terrible bond of the blood-unison of man, which made blood-sacrifice so potent a factor of life. The blood of the individual is given back to the great blood-being, the god, the nation, the tribe" (*PS*, 417). Moreover, as "the blood of the treacherous" (*PS*, 382) is brutally and relentlessly shed at an execution by Cipriano Viedma, what Foucault calls "*a symbolic function*" of blood is obvious in this novel. This suggests that Kate idealizes the combination of power and blood, which uncannily parallels the movements of Nazism. Thus, if the implications of Foucault's citations are enlarged by his own historical outline, we are supposed to think of Kate as an instance of the subject who is trapped by the desirability of sex, which in reality is mystified by the deployment of sexuality that mobilizes power and blood blatantly.

**The resistant and resilient self of Kate**

However, when we examine Kate's words and actions more closely, it becomes difficult to think that she is unquestionably involved with the deployment or representation of sexuality. To be sure, Kate becomes attracted to the movement led by Ramón Carrasco, which aims to regenerate a primitive Mexican religion and nation. But she never ceases to be hesitant about her commitment to this movement. This will become explicit, if the passage Foucault quotes from the final chapter of *The Plumed Serpent* (Chapter XXVII, "Here!") is cited more extensively. In particular, the words that follow just after Foucault's quotation show her strong resistance:

> She walked across the beach to the jetty, feeling the life surging vivid and resistant within her. "It is sex," she said to herself. "How wonderful sex can be, when men keep it powerful and sacred, and it fills the world! Like sunshine through and through one! – But I'm not going to submit, even there. Why should one give in, to anything!" (*PS*, 436)

Kate may be attracted to "a sort of mirage" or "the dark shimmer of sex".[7] But at least in this passage, her vital resistance is portrayed in the sequel: she does not see herself reflected in the mirage of sex. While the objects of Kate's refusal of submission are Cipriano, Ramón's

"the purity of the blood" but to unite the blood, it is too simplistic to identify *The Plumed Serpent* with an embodiment of the ideology of Nazism.

[7] *Ibid*., 157.

movement and Mexico within the novel, in the context of the deployment of sexuality the object of Kate's or the novel's resistance could be the representation of sex that is inevitably connected with power.

Kate was well aware, in the first place, that she was torn between a self that was fascinated by Ramón and Cipriano and the other self that was repulsed by them:

> It was as if she had two selves: one, a new one, which belonged to Cipriano and to Ramón, and which was her sensitive, desirous self: the other hard and finished, accomplished, belonging to her mother, her children, England, her whole past. This old accomplished self was curiously invulnerable and insentient, curiously hard and "free." In it, she was an individual and her own mistress. The other self was vulnerable, and organically connected with Cipriano, even with Ramón and Teresa, and so was not "free" at all.
>
> She was aware of a duality in herself, and she suffered from it. She could not definitely commit herself, either to the old way of life, or to the new. She reacted from both. The old was a prison, and she loathed it. But in the new way she was not her own mistress at all, and her egoistic will recoiled. (*PS*, 429)

From the viewpoint of this divided self, it might be her "hard and finished" or "old accomplished" self that enables Kate to reject the idea of submission. Nonetheless, there seems to be some gap between this hard and accomplished self and the Kate who feels "the life surging vivid and resistant within her". Rather, it seems to be another resistant and resilient self, which should be differentiated from the old as well as new self, that resists and opposes the new self and the new world. Kate, in fact, "could not definitely commit herself, either to the old way of life, or to the new". It is possible and necessary, then, to recognize another self, the third self of Kate, which wavers between the old life and the new life, belonging to neither of them.

Furthermore, what becomes clear later from the dialogue about Kate's homecoming is that Kate is also divided between her unstable emotions about herself and her confident words to Ramón which express her belief in herself. Her duality is thus multi-layered: her disassociation is not only the diachronic or allegorical one between the new self (Mexico) and the old self (Europe) but also the synchronic or ironical one between the self (emotions) that recognizes the duplicity and the self (words) that negates that duplicity. Her multilayered duality

here is described negatively as an unbearable state of suspension. However, as I have mentioned, it is possible to say that this undecidability – that is, the flowing and struggling part of Kate – leads to her positive resistance to submission. This aspect must necessarily be emphasized because it is this state of Kate, which – refusing the easy correspondence between emotions and words, it will not be contained either in the new world or in the old world – brings about her insight, and subsequently, as will be discussed below, the open ending of the novel.

In fact, the victory of Kate's old self over her new self does not wrest her freedom from the deployment of sexuality. Kate, who questions herself about what it means to leave Cipriano for England, is represented as follows:

> Sex, sexual correspondence, did it matter so very much to her? It might have mattered more, if she had not had it. But she had had it – and very finally and consummately, with Cipriano. So she knew all about it. It was as if she had conquered another territory, another field of life. The conqueress! And now she would retire to the lair of her own individuality, with the prey.
>
> Suddenly, she saw herself as men often saw her: the great cat, with its spasms of voluptuousness and its life-long lustful enjoyment of its own isolated individuality. Voluptuously to enjoy a contact. Then with a lustful feline gratification, to break the contact, and roam alone in a sense of power. Each time, to seize a sort of power, purring upon her own isolated individuality. (*PS*, 437-38)

Kate here compares herself to the conqueress who retires to "the lair of her own individuality, with the prey". What is caricatured and detested is the figure of a woman who fertilizes her individuality single-mindedly by satisfying her sexual desires. It is the figure of the "idle" woman who is captured by the net of sexuality in the Western bourgeois society where the target of power is not blood but sex.[8] While

[8] Foucault notes in *The History of Sexuality* that although a view of the history of sexuality in terms of repression would lead to the supposition that "sexual controls were the more intense and meticulous as they were directed at the poorer classes", this was not the case: "it was in the 'bourgeois' or 'aristocratic' family that the sexuality of children and adolescents was first problematized, and feminine sexuality medicalized; it was the first to be alerted to the potential pathology of sex, the urgent need to keep it under close watch and to devise a rational technology of correction. It was this family that first became a locus for the psychiatrization of sex. Surrendering to fears, creating

returning to the old ego means escaping from the trap of sexuality revitalized by "the thematics of blood", it can also mean the re-entrapment by the Western sexuality and the continual operation of sexual desire under the illusion of freedom.

It may be far-fetched to say that Lawrence anticipated and thematized the two types of Foucauldian power. But it could be said at least that Kate's new self corresponds to a system of power where "blood was *a reality with a symbolic function*" whereas her old self can be matched with another system of power where sexuality is "*an effect with a meaning-value*".[9] At any rate, Kate, who is split between the two selves, has become aware that to go back to the old self would mean nothing less than the resumption of her ceaseless search for the confirmation of her identity through her sexuality – a re-entrapment in the ego: a prison built upon the illusion of freedom.

Neil Roberts points out the manipulativeness of this episode: "Even if such a woman is imaginable, there has been no evidence earlier in the novel that Kate is one .... We are invited to entertain a completely new idea about the heroine's character in the last chapter, in order to motivate her decision to stay in Mexico."[10] This remark is astute, to be sure. However, the references in the novel to the sexuality of Kate and other Western women are important because they make Lawrence's insight that women are enslaved by sexuality comparable to Foucault's views on the subject.

**Kate as a subject of "a historical 'retro-version'"**

Foucault observes, too, that love, on which the West has bestowed "a value high enough to make death acceptable", has been replaced by sex.[11] It is well known that Lawrence attacks the idea of love and the self-sacrifice or self-confirmation that results from the idealization of love. But Kate's introspection quoted above reveals that sex too,

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remedies, appealing for rescue by learned techniques, generating countless discourses, it was the first to commit itself to sexual erethism. The bourgeoisie began by considering that its own sex was something important, a fragile treasure, a secret that had to be discovered at all costs. It is worth remembering that the first figure to be invested by the deployment of sexuality, one of the first to be 'sexualized,' was the 'idle' woman. She inhabited the outer edge of the 'world,' in which she always had to appear as a value, and of the family, where she was assigned a new destiny charged with conjugal and parental obligations" (I, 120-21).

[9] *Ibid*., 147-48 (emphases in original).

[10] Roberts, *D.H. Lawrence, Travel and Cultural Difference*, 165.

[11] Foucault, *The History of Sexuality*, I, 156.

especially when it is connected with a bourgeois subject, is at the receiving end of Lawrence's target. However, Kate's resistance to a world filled with powerful and sacred sex, a scenario that shapes her insight on sex, is progressively weakened as she introspects further. For the relation between Kate's ego and her sexual desire is substituted by the problem of women's ego in general, and by the relation between ego and love, not sex:

> It is all very well for a woman to cultivate her ego, her individuality. It is all very well for her to despise love, or to love love as a cat loves a mouse, that it plays with as long as possible, before devouring it to vivify her own individuality and voluptuously fill the belly of her own ego. "Woman has suffered far more from the suppression of her ego than from sex suppression," says a woman writer, and it may well be true. But look, only look at the modern women of fifty and fifty-five, those who have cultivated their ego to the top of their bent! Usually, they are grimalkins to fill one with pity or with repulsion. (*PS*, 438)

A woman's cultivation of her ego is linked to her disdain for love, and then to the modern women who are like grimalkins. When Kate feels she has consummated her "sexual correspondence", she seems inclined, at this point, to demystify sex. But in this quotation, detesting the endless cultivation of the ego, Kate attributes the main factor not to sexuality but to the complicity between love and the ego.

As a result, a re-idealization of sex is represented as follows:

> After all, when Cipriano touched her caressively, all her body flowered. That was the greater sex, that could fill all the world with lustre, and which she dared not think about, its power was so much greater than her own will. But on the other hand when she spread the wings of her own ego, and sent forth her own spirit, the world could look very wonderful to her, when she was alone. But after a while, the wonder faded, and a sort of jealous emptiness set in.
>
> "I must have both," she said to herself. "I must not recoil against Cipriano and Ramón, they make my blood blossom in my body. I say they are limited. But then one must be limited. If one tries to be unlimited, one becomes horrible. Without Cipriano to touch me and limit me and submerge my will, I shall become a horrible, elderly female. I ought to *want* to be limited. I ought to be *glad* if a man will limit me with a strong will and a warm touch. Because what I call my greatness, and the vastness of the Lord behind me, lets me fall through a hollow floor of nothingness, once there is no man's hand there, to

> hold me warm and limited. Ah yes! Rather than become elderly and a bit grisly, I will make my submission; as far as I need, and no further." (*PS*, 439, emphases in original)

The sex, of which "power was so much greater than her own will", has regained its lustre. As the wonder of spreading "the wings of her own ego" is still placed in opposition to "the greater sex", Kate's ego is not relinquished completely. In fact, Kate, who says to herself that she must have both, is persistently seeking the middle way or a sublation of her two selves, her two worlds. Besides, since she thinks she will make her submission "as far as I need, and no further", it could be said that the submission is not total but limited and that Kate still has a part that is inalienable. Yet it should be noted that what Kate calls "my greatness" is recounted together with "the vastness of the Lord behind me", and Cipriano can be thought of as the mediator between the transcendent existence, "the Lord", and Kate. That is to say, even if her ego or will is not nullified, it is submerged and situated at the bottom of the three-tiered order.

Thus, although Kate had felt "the life surging vivid and resistant within her" before, she now ironically thinks: "I ought to *want* to be limited. I ought to be *glad* if a man will limit me with a strong will and a warm touch." Her unconscious vitality of resistance is transformed into her rather conscious and obligatory decision. As long as Cipriano is idealized, thus, as the person who has the key to "the greater sex", the following criticism may continue to be valid: the goal of Kate's introspection is the idealization of sex and sexism based upon blood and power.

However, it is worth bearing in mind that Kate's decision at this point is to limit her own desire. Kate is not a naïve Western subject who, internalizing her desire for sex, does not doubt the spontaneity of that desire. She is not a subject manipulated by invisible power, but a subject longing for limitation by a visible power: a subject of "a historical 'retro-version'".[12] In this sense, we have to establish the fact that it is not only Foucault's concept of the deployment of sexuality but also Lawrence's text itself that together make it impossible to naïvely advocate the representation of sex in *The Plumed Serpent*. If this is indeed confirmed, it would be significant to examine closely the similarities and differences between the representations of sex in *The*

[12] *Ibid*., 150.

*Plumed Serpent* and Foucault's concept of sexuality. For such an attempt can lead to a discussion as to whether it is valid to choose a scene from a novel arbitrarily and condemn the novel or the novelist in the name of Foucault.

**Implications of the undecidability of the novel**

I have argued so far that examining the implications of Foucault's quotation from *The Plumed Serpent* in terms of the history of sexuality would point to the possibility that *The Plumed Serpent* is similar to Nazism, which combined "the fantasies of blood and the paroxysms of a disciplinary power". It is also true, however, that the framework of Western modernity is not sufficient to comprehend the relation between Kate and sexuality. Foucault might have recognized the complicity of sexuality and colonialism or imperialism for he mentions not Lawrence's *Lady Chatterley's Lover* but *The Plumed Serpent*, for which the non-Western world was used as the setting. Yet, in line with the views of scholars such as Ann Laura Stoler who maintain that Foucault's concept of sexuality should be reconsidered from the viewpoint of colonialism and post-colonialism, it would be more convincing to think that Foucault does not take into consideration the problems of colonialism or imperialism outside the Western world.[13] In contrast, *The Plumed Serpent* is a text that represents sexuality in

[13] In *Race and the Education of Desire: Foucault's* History of Sexuality *and the Colonial Order of Things*, Durham, NC: Duke UP, 1995, Ann Laura Stoler states: "By not engaging the significance of the nineteenth-century discourses of nation and empire and the gender-specific nature of them, the cultivation of the bourgeois self and its sexual deployments remain rooted in Europe and *inside* the bourgeois nation, rather than constitutive of it. Foucault may have alluded to the metonymic quality of the bourgeois body for the nation, but left us to show that its cultivation and unique sexuality was nourished by a wider colonial world of Manichean distinctions: by Irish, 'Mediterranean,' Jewish, and non-European Others who provided the referential contrasts for it" (135-36). Like Stoler, Homi K. Bhabha in *The Location of Culture*, London: Routledge, 1994, points out, from the standpoint of post-colonial criticism, that "Foucault directly links the 'flamboyant rationality' of Social Darwinism to Nazi ideology, entirely ignoring colonial societies which were the proving grounds for Social Darwinist administrative discourses all through the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries" (248). Still, it seems somewhat simplistic for Bhabha to criticize *The History of Sexuality Volume I* by saying that "racism emerges in the nineteenth century in the form of an historical retroversion that Foucault finally disavows" (247-48). For Foucault tries to grasp "racism in its modern, 'biologizing,' statist form"; what he regards as "a historical 'retro-version'" is the theory and practice of psychoanalysis (Foucault, *The History of Sexuality*, I, 149, 150).

connection with the non-Western world. Hence it would not be equitable to discuss this text exclusively in terms of Nazism, in disregard of Western colonialism or imperialism. Jad Smith makes the following assertion: "the racist discourse of residual primitivism in the novel has more to do with a nostalgia for 'civilization' and with the failure of the Western subject than with endorsing an up-and-coming Fascist ideology. Furthermore, Lawrence's use of this racist discourse does more to short-circuit proto-fascist *völkisch* ideologies than promote them."[14]

In addition, strictly speaking, Kate's self or desire in the final chapter does not cease to waver even at the end of the novel. Far from shaking the belief of Ramón and Cipriano, it is Kate's resistance that appears to be on its way to being tamed and eliminated by their belief and persuasion. Also, as a result of Lawrence's rewriting of the ending of the previous version, *Quetzalcoatl*,[15] it may be difficult to deny that the ending of *The Plumed Serpent* implies strongly that it is Mexico that Kate chooses to stay in. Nonetheless, we might be able to say that, as is typical of Lawrence's novels, the ending of *The Plumed Serpent* is open because the reader cannot be absolutely sure whether Kate stays in Mexico or leaves for England.

In order to confirm this, it would be useful to follow Kate's words and actions until the very end of the novel. As discussed above, Kate seeks the middle way or a sublation of her two selves or worlds. Despite the effort, however, it is clear from the conversation between Kate and Cipriano or Ramón that her split is not resolved. When Kate says, "You don't really want me", Cipriano answers, "Yes, I want you!" But "even amid her tears", she thinks to herself: "*What a fraud I am! I know all the time it is I who don't altogether want them. I want myself to myself. But I can fool them so that they shan't find out*" (*PS*, 443, emphasis in original). Kate is well aware of her fraudulence and the dissonance between her emotions and words or actions. Yet Ramón sees through her deception. "It is you who don't want", he says, and advises: "You needn't commit yourself to *us*. Listen to your own best desire" (*PS*, 443-44, emphasis in original). Then, to Kate who asks, "And if it tells me to go away?" Ramón says, "Then go! Oh certainly go!" Kate sheds tears, just saying, "I knew you didn't really want me" (*PS*, 444). Thus,

[14] Smith, "*Völkisch* Organicism and the Use of Primitivism", 22.
[15] D.H. Lawrence, *Quetzalcoatl* (1995), ed. Louis L. Martz, New York: New Directions, 1998.

knowing it is she who does not want them, Kate tries to shift the blame for their imperfect relationship onto Ramón and Cipriano. Needless to say, as her departure is mentioned conditionally, it seems impossible to know what Kate's own best desire is. No matter how urgently Kate wants to go away, her self would not be divided without her desire to stay. Hence it could be said that she emphasizes persistently her needlessness for Ramón and Cipriano partly because she expects them to break their bonds she cannot break spontaneously. Meanwhile, Kate fears that her words, "You don't really want me", may have been a reflection of the truth: this enunciation by Kate suggests her wish to be needed by them genuinely. In sum, she wants them to deny the superfluity as well as the necessity of her existence.

Actually, after Ramón leaves because of Cipriano's objection that Kate is not his, Kate seems to rebound, trying to be assured of her importance to Cipriano. What is significant in this scene is that Kate's hesitation brings about some dissonance in the homosocial relationship between Ramón and Cipriano. For while Ramón accepts Kate's decision to return, Cipriano insists that she stay, which means, at the same time, that Kate's self is torn between Ramón who reads her inner feelings and Cipriano who does not doubt her outer words and actions. Yet it should not be ignored that there is a Kate who reacts against Ramón's generous indifference, and there is another Kate who reacts against Cipriano's stubborn insistence. For as the above examination of the waver of Kate's self and desire shows, it seems improbable that Kate will accept Cipriano's love obediently. If Ramón connotes that Kate is unnecessary in Mexico, she might be driven by the desire to deny it and stay. Likewise, after Cipriano asserts that he needs Kate, it is probable that she would be driven by the desire to deny it and go home. Whether she leaves or stays, Kate will seek for the words that encourage her to act, while resisting them at the same time.

In reality, after Cipriano declares, "I like you very much!" (*PS*, 444), Kate replies, "You won't let me go!". These words, which constitute the last utterance of Kate as well as the last words of the novel, have been interpreted as a performative sentence – that is, the words by which she asks Cipriano to detain her. Is this true? Could it not be a constative sentence that shows Cipriano's unwillingness to set Kate free? It seems highly probable, actually, that this utterance by Kate will have been followed by her previous words again: "You don't really want me." The fact that her desires are so far removed from obedience invites this speculation. In the novel, she does not refer to her needlessness in front

of them, let alone declare her will to go home. But we could say, at least, that Kate's last sentence, which cannot be judged either as performative or constative, is an utterance that condenses the undecidability as to whether she will stay or leave.

It is this undecidability that is directly related to the open ending of the novel, the implications of which are described below in terms of whether Kate will leave or stay. The significance of the open-endedness cannot be trivial because the novel induces us to think about various interpretations and implications and to resist them at the same time.

First, Kate's stay in Mexico means that she is trapped by what Foucault calls the deployment of sexuality and the Nazistic regime of blood. However, it also means that she commits herself to the anti-Western and anti-colonial movement in Mexico. The difference between Ramón's religious movement and Nazism can be found in the simple fact that the object of Kate's commitment is not Europe but Mexico. Still, as Jad Smith maintains, the elements of colonialism in the novel do not necessarily disappear.

Next, whereas Kate's leaving Mexico can mean an escape from the Nazistic regime of blood, it can also mean a return to the clutches of the Western bourgeois sexuality and the resumption of access to totalitarianism as a historical reality. Besides, as Kate compares herself to a conqueress, her departure can also allude to her exploitative and colonialistic attitude towards Mexico. Yet, it would not be impossible to interpret her return to the West as a renunciation of her connection with the racial other, based upon the recognition that the Western subject's limitedness makes an encounter with the other in the non-Western world inevitably colonialistic.

These plural possibilities of reading are closely connected with the multi-layeredness of the text. For example, objecting to the previously dominant view that *The Plumed Serpent* is a naïve text in which Lawrence expresses his belief in the revival of the old religion of Mexico, Tony Pinkney insists that this text is "a formidably self-conscious work, preoccupied almost to the point of obsession with questions about the nature of reading, writing and meaning". "The irony of the book", Pinkney maintains, "is that, by its close, she [Kate], the naïve reader of the text of Mexico City, has become the sophisticated reader of the text of Quetzalcoatl, and the formerly ironic Ramón and Cipriano are the new naïves". Furthermore, according to Pinkney, while *Aaron's Rod* is basically "synchronic", *The Plumed Serpent* is "'diachronic' as well as 'synchronic'": "For *Ulysses* and *The Waste*

*Land* are not the only modernist texts that Lawrence's novel ponders; also inter-textually present throughout is Joseph Conrad's *Heart of Darkness*" – "The virtue of *The Plumed Serpent*, that most shrewd of modernist texts, is that it can bring together both second wave formal preoccupation, which it dramatises through Kate's dilemmas as reader, and first wave social content, whereby Mexico seeks to liberate itself from both American capitalism and the Catholic church, that cultural residue of a much earlier European imperialism."[16]

In fact, the last words of Kate are self-reflexive in a different sense of the word from the last words of Birkin in *Women in Love* ("I don't believe that" [*WL*, 481]). Whereas Birkin's (that is, Lawrence's) sentence projects the realization of an ideal society, which is absent from the text, onto the future, Kate's (that is, Lawrence's) utterance both advocates and doubts the *raison d'être* of the ideal community realized in *The Plumed Serpent*. As a result, like Aaron, when he stands in front of Lilly's face, Kate and the reader are put in the situation of a double bind. But as long as there is a Kate who floats schizophrenically between various binary oppositions, it could be said that there is a possibility for a "line of flight" which may enable her to escape from the double bind. Further, it might be said that in this representation of Kate there is a key to understanding what Deleuze and Guattari term "a becoming-woman": "even those who pass for the most virile, the most phallocratic, such as Lawrence and Miller", in writing, become "women".[17]

### *The Plumed Serpent* and Deleuze

Focusing on Kate, the previous section explored the possibility of a reading that is divergent from the Foucauldian reading of *The Plumed Serpent*. This section refers to another reading that values the movement of Cipriano and Ramón positively. It is Deleuze's reading. Deleuze's critical stance is quite close to Foucault's, but, as mentioned in Chapter 3, their valuations of Lawrence are contrastive. After Foucault's publication of *The History of Sexuality Volume I* in 1976, Deleuze sent a letter in 1977 to Foucault who, according to Deleuze, said to him, "I can't stand the word desire; even if you use it differently, I can't stop myself from thinking or experiencing the fact that desire = lack, or that desire is repressed .... So, what I call 'pleasure' is maybe

[16] Pinkney, *D.H. Lawrence*, 148, 158, 159, 161-62.
[17] Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 276.

what you call 'desire,' but in any case, I need a word other than desire." The following quotation is Deleuze's response to Foucault in the letter:

> For me, desire includes no lack; it is also not a natural given. Desire is wholly a part of a functioning heterogeneous assemblage. It is a process, as opposed to a structure or a genesis. It is an affect, as opposed to a feeling. It is a hecceity – the individual singularity of a day, a season, a life. As opposed to a subjectivity, it is an event, not a thing or a person. Above all, it implies the constitution of a field of immanence or a body-without-organs, which is only defined by zones of intensity, thresholds, degrees and fluxes. This body is as biological as it is collective and political .... I cannot give any positive value to pleasure because pleasure seems to interrupt the immanent process of desire. Pleasure seems to me to be on the side of strata and organization; and in the same breath desire is presented as inwardly submitting to the law and outwardly regulated by pleasures .... Pleasure seems to me to be the only means for persons or subjects to orient themselves in a process that exceeds them. It is a re-territorialization. From my point of view, this is precisely how desire is brought under the law of lacking and in line with the norm of pleasure .... In a very important passage in *WK*, Michel writes about how life gives a possible status to forces of resistance. D.H. Lawrence wrote about this life which is not at all Nature, but rather the variable plane of the immanence of desire, through all the determined assemblages. Lawrence's conception of desire relates to positive flight lines. (A small detail: the way in which Michel uses Lawrence at the end of *WK* is contrary to how I use Lawrence).[18]

[18] Gilles Deleuze, "Desire and Pleasure", in *Two Regimes of Madness: Texts and Interviews 1975-1995*, ed. David Lapoujade, trans. Ames Hodges and Mike Taormina, New York: Semiotext(e), 2006, 130-32. The following description of "life" in *The History of Sexuality Volume I* is what Deleuze refers to: "A normalizing society is the historical outcome of a technology of power centered on life. We have entered a phase of juridical regression in comparison with the pre-seventeenth-century societies we are acquainted with .... Moreover, against this power that was still new in the nineteenth century, the forces that resisted relied for support on the very thing it invested, that is, on life and man as a living being .... what was demanded and what served as an objective was life, understood as the basic needs, man's concrete essence, the realization of his potential, a plenitude of the possible. Whether or not it was Utopia that was wanted is of little importance; what we have seen has been a very real process of struggle; life as a political object was in a sense taken at face value and turned back against the system that was bent on controlling it. It was life more than the law that became the issue of political struggles, even if the latter were formulated through affirmations concerning rights. The 'right' to life, to one's body, to health, to happiness, to the satisfaction of needs, and beyond all the oppressions or 'alienation,' the 'right' to rediscover what one is and all that one can be, this 'right' – which the classical juridical

The last part of the quotation, "the way in which Michel uses Lawrence at the end of *WK*", refers to the very quotation by Foucault from *The Plumed Serpent* that we have examined. For Foucault the basis of resistance is "life and man as a living being" or "life, understood as the basic needs, man's concrete essence, the realization of his potential, a plenitude of the possible".[19] This grasp of "life" is important not only for Deleuze but for Lawrence as well: it could be said that Foucault, Deleuze and Lawrence share the same concept of "life". Still, it should be remembered that their differences might not be nullified: as Deleuze writes, the way in which Foucault uses Lawrence is contrary to how Deleuze uses Lawrence. Deleuze's "To Have Done with Judgment" in *Essays Critical and Clinical* refers briefly to *The Plumed Serpent*. In what follows, I deal with that essay.

Deleuze regards D.H. Lawrence as one of the "four great disciples" of Spinoza who broke with the Judeo-Christian tradition. The other three are Nietzsche, Kafka, and Artaud: like Lawrence who "lived under the accusations of immoralism and pornography" they all "had personally, singularly suffered from judgment". According to Deleuze, "The doctrine of judgment appears in the Apocalypse or the Last Judgment", and "as Lawrence says, Christianity did not renounce power, but rather invented a new form of power as the Power to judge": "For all four, the logic of judgment merges with the psychology of the priest, as the inventor of the most somber organization." Deleuze enumerates five points on which existence and judgement are opposed: "*cruelty versus infinite torture, sleep or intoxication versus the dream, vitality versus organization, the will to power versus a will to dominate, combat versus war*."[20]

*The Plumed Serpent* is associated with two of these points. One is "*sleep or intoxication versus the dream*". Stating that "the question of judgment is first of all knowing whether one is dreaming or not", Deleuze considers Apollo to be "both the god of judgment and the god of dreams" who "judges" and "imposes limits and emprisons us in an organic form". Thereafter, a sentence is cited from *The Plumed Serpent*:

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system was utterly incapable of comprehending – was the political response to all these new procedures of power which did not derive, either, from the traditional right of sovereignty" (Foucault, *The History of Sexuality*, I, 144-45).

[19] Foucault, *The History of Sexuality*, I, 144, 145.

[20] Deleuze, "To Have Done with Judgment", 126, 127, 134 (emphasis in original).

> The peyote rites, according to Artaud, and the songs of the Mexican forest, according to Lawrence, are not dreams, but states of intoxication or sleep. This dreamless sleep is not a state in which we fall asleep, but one that traverses the night and inhabits it with a frightening clarity. It is not daylight, but Lightning: "In the dream of the night I see gray dogs, creeping forward to devour the dream." This dreamless sleep, in which one does not fall asleep, is Insomnia, for only insomnia is appropriate to the night, and can fill and populate it. The dream is rediscovered, no longer as a dream of sleep or a daydream, but as an insomniac dream .... This dreamless sleep in which one nonetheless does not fall asleep, this insomnia that nonetheless sweeps the dream along as far as the insomnia extends – such is the state of Dionysian intoxication, its way of escaping judgment.

The "songs of the Mexican forest" in this quotation refers to a passage in *The Plumed Serpent*, Chapter XXIII, "Huitzilopochtli's Night".

The other reference to *The Plumed Serpent* is made in terms of "*vitality versus organization*". What Deleuze calls "the skinny, oily Mexican general" must point to Cipriano, who is, according to Deleuze, "organically defective or unattractive" but "nonetheless traversed by this intensive vitality that defies organs and undoes their organization".[21] From these references by Deleuze, it is unquestionable that Cipriano is grasped quite positively. Therefore, the activity to which Cipriano commits himself would be not "war" but "combat".[22] Deleuze implies most probably that Lawrence is an anti-imperialist writer who, as one of the "four great disciples" of Spinoza, defies the god of judgement, war, or "the imperialism of death, from ancient Romans to the modern Fascists" and that *The Plumed Serpent* is part of that "combat".

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[21] *Ibid*., 129, 130, 131.

[22] *Ibid*., 133: "Combat is not war. War is only a combat-against, a will to destruction, a judgment of God that turns destruction into something 'just.' ... In war, the will to power merely means that the will wants strength [*puissance*] as a maximum of power [*pouvoir*] or domination. For Nietzsche and Lawrence, war is the lowest degree of the will to power, its sickness. Artaud begins by evoking the relation of war between America and the USSR; Lawrence describes the imperialism of death, from the ancient Romans to the modern Fascists. They do so in order to show more clearly that this is *not* the way combat works. Combat, by contrast, is a powerful, nonorganic vitality that supplements force with force, and enriches whatever it takes hold of. A baby vividly displays this vitality, this obstinate, stubborn, and indomitable will to live that differs from all organic life" (emphasis in original).

Some readers may be perplexed by Deleuze's daring reading, and may be inclined to object. For it is Cipriano who executes traitors relentlessly in "Huitzilopochtli's Night": he "judges" even if it is in the name of pagan gods. Yet Deleuze seems to think that Cipriano embodies the "system of cruelty" which is "everywhere opposed to the doctrine of judgment".[23] This figure of Cipriano cannot be understood without Deleuze's critique of the Judeo-Christian tradition and imperialism. It cannot be derived from Foucault's viewpoint either. In this regard, *The Plumed Serpent* brings into relief the differences between Foucault and Deleuze in terms of imperialism or colonialism as well as sexuality.

Although it might be possible and tempting to interpret Lawrence's texts totally and systematically based upon Deleuze's or Deleuze and Guattari's reading of Lawrence, the possibility that this will lead to a pared-down and overtly simplistic view of Lawrence should not be overlooked. In the future, however, new Deleuzian perspectives will emerge that will engender new readings of Lawrence. And Lawrence's texts, which contain various forms of ambivalence, will continue to induce us to think about the contemporary significance of modern and post-modern theories and thought systems.

[23] *Ibid*., 133, 128.

# Conclusion

## Lawrence and Canon

### *Lady Chatterley's Lover* and Lawrence's literary canon

Between the 1950s and 1960s, D.H. Lawrence was incorporated into the "great tradition" of English novelists by F.R. Leavis and the *Lady Chatterley* trial earned him increased attention in the UK, the US and Japan. Although his fame diminished after he attracted criticism from feminists such as Kate Millett in the 1970s, Lawrence's works have survived and are read in diverse ways using modern critical theory. Therefore, few would object to canonizing some of Lawrence's novels, including his final novel, *Lady Chatterley's Lover* (1928), which is so well known that it is sometimes used as a pronoun for the author's name.

Compared to *Sons and Lovers*, *The Rainbow* or *Women in Love*, however, *Lady Chatterley's Lover* has not traditionally been well received by scholars: the main reason for this could be the hierarchization of Lawrence's novels by F.R. Leavis. Yet, Rachel Bowlby presents a viewpoint that makes us rethink this phenomenon and its relationship to the Chatterley trial.[1] Bowlby refers to *The Oxford Anthology of English Literature* and its inclusion of Lawrence's *Pornography and Obscenity* (1929), an action that might have provided Lawrence with the self-justification for writing *Lady Chatterley's Lover*.[2] She then points out that the reason the anthology's editors, Frank Kermode and John Hollander, selected *Pornography and Obscenity* is Lawrence himself, who, in the wake of Matthew Arnold's cultural criticisms, attempted to clearly distinguish his writing and pornographic mass culture. This distinction was an important element

[1] Rachel Bowlby, "'But She Would Learn Something from Lady Chatterley': The Obscene Side of the Canon", in *Decolonizing Tradition: New Views of Twentieth-Century "British" Literary Canons*, ed. Karen R. Lawrence, Urbana, IL: U of Illinois P, 1992, 113-35.

[2] D.H. Lawrence, *Pornography and Obscenity*, in *The Oxford Anthology of English Literature: Volume II*, eds Frank Kermode and John Hollander, New York: Oxford UP, 1973, 1957-68.

of both the defence and prosecution's arguments in the Chatterley trial, because both the anthology's compilation and the court's standard of judgement were based on whether or not the work was for the public good. Likewise, Kate Millett's criticism mirrors this binary conflict, repeated not only by Raymond Williams or Richard Hoggart throughout the trial but also by Frank Kermode and John Hollander. Bowlby's argument highlights an irony and binary nature of *Lady Chatterley's Lover*'s exclusion from, and the inclusion of *Pornography and Obscenity* in, *The Oxford Anthology of English Literature*.

F.R. Leavis' and others' relative disregard for *Lady Chatterley's Lover* is shared by Deleuze and Guattari or Michel Foucault. In *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, Deleuze and Guattari refer to such expressions as "the dirty little secret" from *Pornography and Obscenity*, but the novel they focus on is *Aaron's Rod*, as I pointed out in Chapter 3. Meanwhile, as discussed in Chapter 8, Foucault mentions Lawrence in *The History of Sexuality Volume I*, but the quotations are from another self-defensive essay by Lawrence, "A Propos of *Lady Chatterley's Lover*" (1930),[3] and *The Plumed Serpent*.

The increased interest in *Lady Chatterley's Lover* since the 1980s has compensated somewhat for the novel's years of abandonment by academia. Although the history of the book is a multi-faceted one, and parallels the development of various critical theories, Foucault is hard to ignore because his discourse analysis and concepts of sexuality would be exceedingly influential in examining the novel and the sexual representations within it.[4] This is another irony because crucial momen-

[3] D.H. Lawrence, "A Propos of *Lady Chatterley's Lover*", in *Lady Chatterley's Lover and A Propos of "Lady Chatterley's Lover"*, ed. Michael Squires, Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1993, 303-35.

[4] See, for example, Lydia Blanchard, "Lawrence, Foucault, and the Language of Sexuality", in *D.H. Lawrence's "Lady": A New Look at* Lady Chatterley's Lover, eds Michael Squires and Dennis Jackson, Athens, GA: U of Georgia P, 1985, 17-35, reprinted in *D.H. Lawrence*, ed. Peter Widdowson, London: Longman, 1992, 119-34; David Kellogg, "Reading Foucault Reading Lawrence: Body, Voice, and Sexuality in *Lady Chatterley's Lover*", *D.H. Lawrence Review*, XXVIII/3 (1999), 31-54. The following works by Linda Ruth Williams are not Foucauldian but significant: *Sex in the Head: Visions of Femininity and Film in D.H. Lawrence*, Detroit, MI: Wayne State UP, 1993; *D.H. Lawrence*, Plymouth: Northcote House in association with The British Council, 1997.

tum to the revaluation of *Lady Chatterley's Lover* is provided by Foucault, who is critical of Lawrence and does not mention this novel.

**Lawrence and critical theory**

I have to admit that besides the limited reference to critical theory in this book, my selection may be viewed as arbitrary or inconsistent. However, each adaptation has a reason behind it: my primary motivations have been, first, my sense of discomfort about the fact that the image of Lawrence is almost exclusively associated with sexuality, and second, my subconscious yet incessant purpose of grasping the essence of Lawrentian desire. It may be possible to reconsider and redefine Lawrentian desire by way of investigating not his novels but his philosophical works. But it is most probable that the attempt would result in the reinforcement of the image of Lawrence as an organicist who espouses spontaneous desire. It is nothing but this image that the different readings of his novels in this book seek to resist and encourage the reconsideration of.

*Women in Love* is reminiscent of the world of Dostoevsky. In order to disentangle and understand the intricate relationships between the characters' desires, it is necessary once to be free from the *idée fixe* of Lawrentian spontaneous desire – Girard, who unravels Dostoevskian desire, is of great value here. Lawrence cannot simply be repudiated as a writer who has an illusion of spontaneous desire: it could he said, on the contrary, that Lawrence recognizes and reveals the structure of metaphysical desire in *Women in Love*.

*Aaron's Rod* contains ample fissures and contradictions. It is Aaron's words, I insist, that sustain the novel's anti-aesthetic and anti-organic tendency, making it impossible either to reassess *Aaron's Rod* in terms of a coherently or organically constructed work or to condemn it as an embodiment of Fascistic ideology because the leadership scheme itself is led into a logical impossibility. The anti-aesthetic expressions, however, do not necessarily exclude the readership; rather, they reconnect the reader anti-organically and anti-aesthetically with the work.

I used Deleuze and Guattari's theory of desire, which is congruous with Lawrentian desire, making it a mandatory reference for a positive revaluation of *Aaron's Rod*, along with a deconstructive perspective. (Meanwhile, in order to understand Deleuze and Guattari's concepts such as "line of flight", *Aaron's Rod* is useful as a sort of isagoge.) The various concepts presented by Deleuze and Guattari and their reading

of literary texts based upon such concepts have nothing to do with the organic construction or coherence of the texts. One of their standards of literary value is whether a line of flight has been drawn to break up what is organic. Hence, their concepts and viewpoints are highly suggestive when challenging the aesthetic standard that has haunted *Aaron's Rod*.

Like Girard, Foucault is effective in relativizing the spontaneity of Lawrentian desire. Chapter 8 of this book, therefore, has attempted to elucidate the implications of Foucault's quotation from *The Plumed Serpent*. Foucault may suggest that we should think of Kate as an instance of the subject who is trapped by the desirability of sex. However, as long as Kate floats schizophrenically, it can be said that there is a possibility for a line of flight which will enable her to escape from the trap of sexuality. It could also be said that in this representation of Kate there is a key to understanding what Deleuze and Guattari term "a becoming-woman". Thus, I add that *The Plumed Serpent* brings into relief the difference between Foucault and Deleuze in terms of imperialism and colonialism as well as sexuality.

What has become clear by examining *Kangaroo* in Chapters 4, 5 and *St Mawr* in Chapters 5, 6, 7 in comparison with the social discourses of the day is that although Lawrence's texts are often strongly influenced, they nevertheless manage to diverge narrowly and subtly from the discourses, drawing lines of flight or combat. It could be said, in fact, that the intended interpretation of degeneration in *Kangaroo* is divergent from the concept of degeneration in the discourses of eugenists represented by Karl Pearson. The representation of "the core of Asia" as the centre of global evil in *St Mawr* invites us to read the novella in relation to pan-Mongolism or the Yellow Peril. But a close examination of the features of evil in this novella has revealed that the very notion of evil is itself marginalized in the end.

This book does not insist on some radical recanonization of Lawrence's novels; it is not proposed, for example, that we should replace *Sons and Lovers* or *The Rainbow* with *Kangaroo* or *The Plumed Serpent*. What I urge is that it is difficult to revaluate Lawrence's later novels by using the old norms and that it is necessary to attempt a new reading in the light of critical theory. I hope that my attempt here leads to the reconsideration of not only Lawrence's later works but also his other novels and the works of other writers.

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