

CRIP AUTHORITY

DISABILITY AND THE ART OF
CONSOLATION IN THE RENAISSANCE



Elizabeth B. Bearden

Crip Authority

Corporealities: Discourses of Disability

Series editors: David T. Mitchell and Sharon L. Snyder

Recent Titles

Crip Authority: Disability and the Art of Consolation in the Renaissance
by Elizabeth B. Bearden

Rehabilitative Postsocialism: Disability, Sex, and Race in Eastern Europe
by Kateřina Kolářová

Light of the Everlasting Life: Disability and Crip Eschatology in Old English Literature
by Leah Pope Parker

By Touch Alone: Blindness and Reading in Nineteenth-Century Culture
by Vanessa Warne

*Down Syndrome Culture: Life Writing, Documentary, and Fiction Film
in Iberian and Latin American Contexts*
by Benjamin Fraser

Crippling Girlhood
by Anastasia Todd

The Disabled Child: Memoirs of a Normal Future
by Amanda Apgar

Blind in Early Modern Japan: Disability, Medicine, and Identity
by Wei Yu Wayne Tan

Cheap Talk: Disability and the Politics of Communication
by Joshua St. Pierre

Diaphanous Bodies: Ability, Disability, and Modernist Irish Literature
by Jeremy Colangelo

Embodied Archive: Disability in Post-Revolutionary Mexican Cultural Production
by Susan Antebi

Beholding Disability in Renaissance England
by Allison P. Hobgood

A History of Disability, New Edition
by Henri-Jacques Stiker

Vitality Politics: Health, Debility, and the Limits of Black Emancipation
by Stephen Knadler

*Blindness Through the Looking Glass: The Performance of Blindness, Gender, and the
Sensory Body*
by Gili Hammer

HandiLand: The Crippest Place on Earth
by Elizabeth A. Wheeler

The Matter of Disability: Materiality, Biopolitics, Crip Affect
by David T. Mitchell, Susan Antebi, and Sharon L. Snyder, editors

Monstrous Kinds: Body, Space, and Narrative in Renaissance Representations of Disability
by Elizabeth B. Bearden

A complete list of titles in the series can be found at www.press.umich.edu

Crip Authority



*Disability and the Art of Consolation
in the Renaissance*

Elizabeth B. Bearden

University of Michigan Press
Ann Arbor

Copyright © 2025 by Elizabeth B. Bearden
Some rights reserved



This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License. *Note to users:* A Creative Commons license is only valid when it is applied by the person or entity that holds rights to the licensed work. Works may contain components (e.g., photographs, illustrations, or quotations) to which the rightsholder in the work cannot apply the license. It is ultimately your responsibility to independently evaluate the copyright status of any work or component part of a work you use, in light of your intended use. To view a copy of this license, visit <http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/>

For questions or permissions, please contact um.press.perms@umich.edu

Published in the United States of America by the
University of Michigan Press
First published September 2025

A CIP catalog record for this book is available from the British Library.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication data has been applied for.

ISBN 978-0-472-07761-8 (hardcover : alk. paper)

ISBN 978-0-472-05761-0 (paper : alk. paper)

ISBN 978-0-472-90519-5 (open access ebook)

DOI: <https://doi.org/10.3998/mpub.12343633>

The University of Michigan Press's open access publishing program is made possible thanks to additional funding from the University of Michigan Office of the Provost and the generous support of contributing libraries.

Cover image: The book's title "Crip Authority: Disability and the Art of Consolation in the Renaissance" is presented at the top of the cover in white and black text. The author's name "Elizabeth B. Bearden" is presented at the bottom of the cover in black text. The background is divided vertically with a dark orange on the left and a lighter orange on the right. The focal point of the cover presents a burnished, round metal disk with an image in relief representing a blind man holding a pilgrim's staff and rosary while being led by a guide dog. The man's body is muscular and well-proportioned with his torso slightly twisted as he follows the dog, which trots ahead with its head and tail alertly lifted. Latin text appears around the edge of the disk.

Authorized Representative: Easy Access System Europe, Mustamäe tee 50, 10621 Tallinn,
Estonia, gpsr.requests@easproject.com

*I dedicate this book to the memory of Timothy J. Reiss,
my teacher, mentor, and dear friend.*

Contents



<i>List of Figures</i>	ix
<i>A Note on Translations, Editions, Transcriptions, and Abbreviations</i>	xi
<i>Abbreviations</i>	xiii
<i>Acknowledgments</i>	xv
Introduction	I
1. Descending the Mountain: Consoling Disability in Petrarch's <i>Secretum</i> and <i>De remediis utriusque fortunae</i>	23
2. A Place at the Table for Teresa de Cartagena: Working Consolation in <i>Arboleda de los enfermos</i> and Marvelous Ability in <i>Admiración operum Dey</i>	70
3. From "El Manco de Lepanto" to "El Manco Sano": Memorializing Cervantine Disability	120
4. "Experto crede Roberto": Masquerading Crip Authority and Picturing Consolatory Antics in Robert Burton's <i>Anatomy of Melancholy</i>	142
5. John Milton's Consolations for Blindness: Polite Refusals, Disability Swagger, the Work of Patience, and Strength in Weakness	173
6. Styling Disability: Lomazzo, Mannerism, and Crip Touches Across Time	220
Coda	258

<i>Notes</i>	269
<i>Works Cited</i>	311
<i>Index</i>	343

Digital materials related to this title can be found on the Fulcrum platform via the following citable URL: <https://doi.org/10.3998/mpub.12343633>

Figures



1. Attrib. Antonio Carnicero, line drawing for frontispiece
of Cervantes's *Los trabajos de Persiles y Sigismunda* 130
2. Paul Gustave Doré, *Don Quijote in His Library* 143
3. Albrecht Dürer, *Melencolia I* 145
4. Christian Le Blon, engraved frontispiece for Robert Burton's
Anatomy of Melancholy, 1632 163
5. Annibale Fontana, portrait medal of Giovanni Paolo Lomazzo,
obverse 221
6. Annibale Fontana, portrait medal of Giovanni Paolo Lomazzo,
reverse 222
7. Leone Leoni, portrait medal of Michelangelo Buonarroti, obverse 253
8. Leone Leoni, portrait medal of Michelangelo Buonarroti, reverse 254

A Note on Translations, Editions, Transcriptions, and Abbreviations



Translations

When available, I use Loeb translations of Latin and Greek works. I use modern English or else early modern translations of medieval and early modern works. Unless otherwise attributed, translations are my own. Page numbers for attributed translations appear in parenthetical citations after a semicolon.

Editions

When possible, I use standard modern editions of ancient, medieval, and early modern works with preference for editions that are made freely available through resources for people with print disabilities. I have consulted early modern editions at the Newberry Library in Chicago, the William Andrews Clark Memorial Library in Los Angeles, and the Memorial Library Special Collections at the University of Wisconsin–Madison. Further choices about specific editions are noted on first use.

Transcriptions

In early modern editions, I silently modernize *u* and *v*, *i*, *j*, and *y* in vernacular texts, and I expand Latin contractions. This is helpful for those who use screen readers and are less accustomed to the phonetic differences that this premodern typography produces. Other alterations to primary texts, such as

in-line translations of foreign language phrases or other alterations to make the text more accurate and/or legible to a modern reader, are indicated with brackets. Occasionally I will place italic text in braces to make it more legible for those using a screen reader.

Abbreviations



Lidell and Scott abbreviations are used for ancient Greek author, title, and subsections, followed by a semicolon and pertinent translation page number.

Oxford Classical Dictionary abbreviations are used for Latin author, title, and subsections of ancient works, followed by a semicolon and pertinent translation page number.

Admiración: Cartagena, *Admiración operum Dey*; *Wonder at the Works of God*

Arboleda: Cartagena, *Arboleda de los enfermos*; *Grove of the Infirm*

BCE: Before the Common Era

CE: Common Era

Cervantes: Cervantes, *Bulletin of the Cervantes Society of America*

De rem.: Petrarca, *De remediis utriusque fortunae*; *Petrarch's Remedies for Fortune Fair and Foul*

DQ: Cervantes, *Don Quijote*; *Don Quixote*

DSQ: *Disability Studies Quarterly*

Fam.: Petrarca, *Rerum familiarum libri*; *Letters on Familiar Matters*

JWCI: *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes*

La corónica: *La corónica: A Journal of Medieval Hispanic Languages, Literatures, and Cultures*

ODNB: *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*

OED: *Oxford English Dictionary*

PL: Milton, *Paradise Lost*

PR: Milton, *Paradise Regained*

PMLA: *Publications of the Modern Language Association*

Ps.: *Psalm*

RQ: *Renaissance Quarterly*

SA: Milton, *Samson Agonistes*

Sec.: Petrarca, *Secretum meum*; *My Secret Book*

Sen.: Petrarca, *Rerum senilium libri*; *Letters of Old Age*

Acknowledgments



This book was a joy to write. It provided me with much-needed consolation through a pandemic and other vicissitudes. I dedicate it to my beloved mentor, Tim Reiss, gone but never forgotten. His unflinching support of my work gave me the confidence to continue through what has not always been an easy academic path. Marina Brownlee was my Minerva throughout this project, even when I felt like the beggar at the door in Ithaca. Leonard Barkan first led me down the path of art history and ekphrasis in particular; I continue to be inspired by his wit and *joie de vivre*. Susan Stanford Friedman, who would get stern with me whenever I said anything self-deprecating, taught me to be unapologetic about my accomplishments. I honor her passing.

Fellow disabled (and temporarily nondisabled) academics and writers have assured me that this work in premodern disability is pressing in its importance. They have provided a wonderful sense of *crip* community, even if at a distance, with marvelous graftings from a consolatory grove of scholarship. Simone Chess, Jason Farr, Rosemary Garland-Thomson, Penelope Geng, Morton Gernsbacher, Leona Godin, Allison Hobgood, Jenell Johnson, Encarnación Juárez-Almendros, Steve Kuusisto, Robert McRuer, Jennifer Nelson, Jennie Row, Linsey Row-Heyveld, Ellen Samuels, Katherine Schaap Williams, Sami Schalk, and Jess Waggoner all provided help and encouragement.

The project was supported by a short-term fellowship at the William Andrews Clark Library in Los Angeles, a fellowship at the School of Historical Studies in the Institute for Advanced Study (IAS) at Princeton, and a John Simon Guggenheim Fellowship. The University of Michigan Press continues to be an excellent place to publish. I owe special thanks to my previous

editors, LeAnn Fields and Sara Cohen, as well as my wonderful new editor, Haley Winkle, and her editorial assistant, Delilah McCrea. Thanks also to Marcia LaBrenz and Anne Taylor for help in production and for catching all of those unintentional errors.

Chapters 1 and 2 especially benefited from my time at IAS. I am grateful for advice and delightful conversation with Rebecca Benefiel, Joel Blecher, Chris Bonura, Anne Dunlop, Yasmin Haskell, Myles Jaxon, Thiago Nascimento Krause, Derek Krueger and Gene Rogers, Ewa Lajer-Burcharth and Martin Burcharth, Ari Levine and Reliang Sang, Esther Liberman Cuenca, Liz McGowan and Guy Hedreen, Nana Osei-Opare, K-Sue Park, Sharon Strocchia, Alicia Walker, Mantha Zarmakoupi, all of my friends from ceramics (especially Ellie Gould!), and the leader of our little band of early modern plus seminar, Francesca Trivellatto. Ninon Dubourg, whose excellent book on disabled clerics came out at just the right moment, was a kind and thoughtful correspondent. Reconnecting with my dear teacher Stanley Corngold was a highlight of the fellowship year; nobody is a better lunch companion. The entire IAS staff is a class act; I could write a book about how kind and caring you all are—thank you. The IAS is the most accommodating, least-ableist institution I have ever encountered.

My work on Cervantes received constant encouragement from my wonderful colleagues Mercedes Alcalá Galán and Steve Hutchinson. Emily Bergmann, Ann J. Cruz, Frederick de Armas, Adrienne Laskier Martin, and others also gave kind support and advice. An article based on an early version of chapter 3 with an emphasis on monstrous births appeared in a special issue of *eHumanista/Cervantes* 5, edited by Mercedes Alcalá Galán in 2016.

I could not have written the chapter on Milton without Leona Godin's good example. Though our being confused for each other at NYU simply due to our shared blindness was confounding, I still take it as a compliment. The chapter was in the works for a long time, and audiences at Willamette University in 2013 and Berkeley in 2017 gave helpful suggestions. Nigel Smith and Pasquale Toscano have been enthusiastic supporters of the project. Mistakes with Milton are my own, but it is comforting that Nigel is such a strong advocate for disability studies, and it warms my heart that Pasquale is helping to guide the future of the field.

I owe a special debt of gratitude to Michael Jay McClure, who was my indefatigable friend and interlocutor throughout this project—in the trenches and at the peaks. He has been especially enthusiastic about my work on Lomazzo and all things of a Mannerist “decline.” Jennifer Nelson kindly recommended helpful reading on Dürer and the sense of touch in art history

more broadly that was very helpful to my final chapter and future project. Dave Landreth encouraged me to touch Lomazzo's portrait medal, and my father-in-law, Jeff Harrison, helped me find a key to that castle. So, too, Alison Luchs and the staff at the National Gallery were very kind to grant me access. I look forward to continuing the conversation.

During the course of researching the project, I worked with a series of excellent assistants who helped me with tasks that are made more difficult by my disability. Diego Alegría, Sarah Friedman, Keith Gabler, Kelsey Ihinger, Emily Loney, and Cassidy Reiss cheerfully assisted me. I also benefited from the enthusiasm of undergraduate and graduate students at UW–Madison who are interested in all things early modern and disability related.

On a personal note, my friends and family are, to my advantage, too long to list here. My deepest gratitude goes to my wonderful husband, Michael Harrison. My parents, Nancy and Don, as well as their friends, have been fantastic. To the inner circle, be it the crews in California, Colorado, Maryland, North Carolina, Nebraska, New York, Oregon, Madrid, Paris, Toronto, Washington, DC, and Wisconsin, you know who you are, and thank you.

Introduction



This book grows out of my desire to discover more of what we call disability narrative, disability literature, or, sometimes, *crip lit*, in the early modern period. It considers how early modern people write about their lived experience of disability by drawing on the ancient genre of consolation, which aims to comfort people for a variety of hardships, including mental and physical disability. Renaissance writers use the art of consolation to resignify the mental and physical disabilities that their society frequently scorned into an expression of their military, spiritual, political, and, most importantly for this study, writerly authority. I name this kind of defiant authorial self-representation *crip authority*.

Early modern authors wrote brilliantly about what we would now call their mental or physical disabilities. Francesco Petrarca (1304–1374), Teresa de Cartagena (ca. 1424–ca. 1478), Giovanni Paolo Lomazzo (1538–1592), Miguel de Cervantes Saavedra (1547–1616), Robert Burton (1577–1640), and John Milton (1608–1674) all talk in their own ways about their experience of disability, and they all relate this experience to their role as writers. Nonetheless, their work has rarely been recognized as disability narrative or studied extensively from a disability studies standpoint.¹

The authors featured in this book “crip” their disabilities into expressions of authority by drawing on models of disability that they find in the consolation literature of their past and present. Discerning this generic genealogy and expression of authorial identity through disability reappropriation helps us to answer the following three exigent questions. First, how do Renaissance authors relate their lived experiences of disability? Second, can their disability narratives provide new possibilities for our understanding of disability gain,

or the positive valuation of disability as productive rather than solely problematic?² Third, have these authors provided a sense of disability community to later disabled writers and readers? This project accordingly draws on the history of formal, generic, and philosophical models of the art of consolation, as well as contemporary concepts taken from disability studies and crip theory, to help us understand how early modern disabled authors write disability narrative with crip authority.

The remainder of this introduction is divided into three sections. First, it defines five important keywords or phrases that underpin the concept of crip authority. It next lays out several forms of crip authority that the genre of consolation offers early modern disabled writers. Finally, it provides the reader with an overview of the book's structure and significance. In unearthing early modern disability narratives and their strategies of self-authorization, many of which are written by canonical Western authors, and in so bringing disability to the center of Renaissance studies, this book ultimately contributes to ongoing efforts to "crip" the Renaissance.

Keywords for Crip Authority

Disability

With a clear understanding of the particular historical semantics of the past,³ I use the word "disability" here, adopting the American cultural model's definition of the term.⁴ I do so for two reasons. First, the onus lies with early modern scholars to inform disability studies scholars and activists about the way that disability functioned in the past and the diversity of its historical and representational valences. Demonstrating parallel and alternative phenomena in past and present counteracts the exceptionalism and whiggish teleologies that some disability studies scholars espouse. Second, as a bevy of recent publications attest, scholars working on premodern cultures benefit from engaging with the critical paradigms of today's disability studies and crip theory, even if its terminology can be thorny. That said, I wish my writing to be welcoming to a wide variety of readers and listeners.⁵ Though the word "disability" was not used frequently or exclusively in early modern English to mean what we mean by disability today (which itself can vary), I concur with early modern scholars such as Simone Chess, Jason Farr, Sonya Freeman Loftis, Allison Hobgood, David Houston-Wood, Genevieve Love, Lindsey

Row-Heyveld, and Katherine Schaap Williams that disability should be considered an operational category of analysis for the early modern period.⁶

Disability Narrative

As to the generic scope of the project, disability literature is still not well defined. Sami Schalk nonetheless helpfully suggests two qualifications for generic inclusion: “the representation of a character, ideally a major character, with a disability” or “an author who has a disability or who has some particular knowledge of disability rights, culture, and experiences” (“Experience” 154). For the purposes of this book, I am more interested in the latter. I use the term “disability narrative” to encompass a range of texts by and about authors with disabilities in the Renaissance, and I relate this kind of writing to the models of disability narrative that early modern disabled authors knew and deployed. My use of the term is influenced by Susannah Mintz, who draws on Thomas Couser’s concept of “robust disability narratives” (Couser, *Vulnerable Subjects* 164) to define disability narrative as “first-person narrative acts that refuse cultural pressure to treat disability as an adversity to be overcome or an embarrassment requiring apology” (Mintz, *Unruly Bodies* 9).⁷ I add to this definition that early modern disability narratives can vary in tone between lamentation and consolation, allowing for a textured relation of the lived experience of disability. The term “disability narrative” is thus copious enough to encompass the variety of forms under examination here, such as prefatory and paratextual material, dialogue and other works of fiction that include the figure of the author, epistles, and other forms of self-authorizing writing; it is also narrow enough to comply with Schalk’s parameters for disability literature above.

Consolation

The art of consolation was an authorized genre that early modern disabled writers drew on to tell their own stories of disability. “As a literary genre,” Wilhelm Kierdorf defines consolation as “writings of a philosophic bent, whose authors either try to dissuade individuals from grieving in the face of misfortune, or proffer general counsel on overcoming adversity” (n.p.). Dating back to antiquity and composed by authors who drew on their own experiences of adversity, consolation provides comfort and coping mechanisms for

dealing with a variety of challenging circumstances, including physical and mental impairments. To discover disability narrative in the past, it is helpful to recognize the art of consolation as its ancestor.

Authority

Consolation licensed early modern disabled authors to write with authority in an ableist society.⁸ As a form, consolation was a venerated ancient genre, which made it authoritative for disabled authors to cite. Consolation also provided disabled writers with rhetorical strategies for conveying ethos through the disclosure of mental and physical impairment. In defining the terms *auctor* and *auctoritas* in a literary context, Alastair Minnis explains how citing authorities and being one were both necessary for establishing writerly authority in the medieval period: “*Auctor* denoted someone who was at once a writer and an authority, someone not merely to be read but also to be respected and believed. . . . In the specific sense, an *auctoritas* was a quotation or an extract from the work of an *auctor*” (10). Minnis argues that in the late medieval period “the *auctor* remained an authority, someone to be believed and imitated, but his human qualities began to receive more attention” (5). Kevin Dunn explores this personal mode of self-authorization in the humanist Renaissance tradition, emphasizing how it is often based on embodiment specifically.⁹ In speaking of the *Essays* of Michel de Montaigne (1533–1592), Dunn avers that Montaigne’s self-authorization in his preface is typical of an “omnipresent early modern rhetorical strategy: the individualizing of authority through a ‘bodily voice’” (13). Consolation provides numerous examples of precisely this kind of self-authorization through the foregrounding of embodiment, and I suggest that authorial embodiment includes disabled body-minds. In speaking of the exemplarity of consolatory prison writing from antiquity through the twentieth century, Rivka Zim observes that readers “invest texts with authority based on the experience they recognize. . . . Our sympathies follow our interest, and many writers, or their editors, recognized the political value of writing that projects ideas and images of suffering humanity in contexts calculated to authorize that experience and generate new insights and sympathies in their readers” (14). The authors I examine use consolation as a source both for authoritative example of disability (*auctoritas*) and for rhetorical strategies in articulating their ethos as disabled authors (*auctores*). Thus the art of consolation provides them with a model of authority that could in fact be based on disability. Early modern disabled authors had extensive classical, Judeo-Christian, and humanist consolatory models

to draw on when telling their own, emotionally textured stories or, as was so often the case, when responding to ableist invective.

Crippling Authority

The strategies that disabled early modern writers draw from consolation in their self-authorization crip traditional concepts of literary authority. As Mara Mills and Rebecca Sanchez suggest in their recent work on crip authorship and the framing of disability as method, “Crip authorship, in one register, transgresses the rules of authorship” (3).¹⁰ The reactions of the authors I examine to disability discrimination transgressively reappropriate disability into what Patty Berne calls the “fierce creativity” into which “Crip life invites us” (9). They take what is meant as an insult or perceived as a disadvantage and turn it to their advantage. As David Mitchell and Sharon Snyder expound, “The ironic embrace of derogatory terminology has provided the leverage that belongs to openly transgressive displays. The power of transgression always originates at the moment when the derided object embraces its deviance as value” (*Narrative Prosthesis* 35). Transgressive reappropriation and resignification is at the core of crip practices and theory.¹¹ As Victoria Lewis relates, “With the emergence of the disability civil rights movement in the 1970s, ‘crip’ gained wide usage as an informal, affectionately ironic, and provocative identification” (46). Crippling thus crafts community at the same time as it defies the negative cultural valuation of disability as deviance, a phenomenon that I suggest the community of disability consolation readers and writers achieves as well.

On a semantic level, Robert McRuer observes that, as a verb, “‘to crip,’ like ‘to queer,’ gets at processes that unsettle, or processes that make strange or twisted” (*Crip Times* 23). Crippling relocates disabled voices from the margins to the center; it “exposes the ways in which able-bodiedness and able-mindedness get naturalized and the ways that bodies, minds, and impairments that should be at the absolute center of a space or issue or discussion get purged from that space or issue or discussion” (23). The grammatical formulation of McRuer’s definition, which he breaks down into noun, adjective, and, as cited above, verb,¹² underscores the utility of the concept of “crip” to a literary studies–based analysis of the representation of disability in the past. As a scholar of early modern literature, I am acutely aware of the rhetorical, formal, and linguistic detail of past disability representation, where words such as *deaf*, *blind*, *mute*, *melancholic*, *mad*, or *crippled*, which carry both cultural stigma and negative metaphorical weight, are crippled by authors who

live these conditions and reappropriate them as productive of authorial ethos. I am also aware that the authors examined here faced different, though kindred, challenges to the social, technical, and legal barriers that today's disabled authors face.¹³

Resources of Consolation for Crippling Authority

At its heart, consolation is about turning something that may seem bad into a good, or at least into something bearable. The genre, which flourished in antiquity, is called *paramythia* in Greek and *consolatio* in the Latin tradition.¹⁴ Misfortunes that the art of consolation sought to soothe were varied and include death, poverty, exile, and, most significant for this study, disability. A variety of philosophical approaches existed to deal with adversity in different circumstances. Kierdorf breaks down these traditions as follows: Aristotelians contributed the concept of “moderate sorrow” or *metriopatheia*; the Platonic Academy contributed “the reflection that death released the soul of earthly care and led it to a better life”; Epicureanism recommended “methods of distraction (*avocatio*) and the recalling (*revocatio*) of pleasing aspects and activities”; the Stoics advocated “the ideal of freedom from the affects (*apátheia*) and the scorning of *fortuita*, the workings of chance, as irrelevant to happiness”; and, finally, Cyrenaics (the followers of Socrates’s hedonist pupil Aristippus) recommended “*praemeditatio malorum*, the imagined anticipation of evil, to ward off unexpected blows of fate” (n.p.). Renaissance authors of *consolatio* thus had a philosophically rich tradition to draw upon.

The influence of consolation literature on Renaissance crip authority is evident in at least three ways. First, rhetorical models of consolation grant authorial ethos by recommending disability disclosure in the proclamation of the humility or modesty topos and by providing rhetorical templates for persuading a disabled person to be comforted. Second, spiritual consolation authorizes the radical piety of the suffering body. Third, medical consolations talk through how disabilities can be beneficial to health. These three modes are by no means comprehensive or discrete. They overlap in compelling ways.

Disability Disclosure and the Modesty Topos

Strategies of self-authorization promoted in works of consolation have roots in ancient rhetoric that make them apt for disabled writers. When outlining the need to capture the audience’s good will (what is later referred to as the *captatio benevolentiae*), Aristotle (384–322 BCE) explains that the *prooemion*,

or opening of a speech, may require self-authorization or “*iatreuma*” (“remedies” *Rhetoric* 3:14.7, 262), a word based in medical discourse that can also be translated as a preventative. Latin rhetoricians expand on how this kind of self-authorizing remedy should be crafted and to what end. Marcus Tullius Cicero (106–43 BCE), in his discussion of the *exordium*, a Latin term for a preface to a speech, advises that when the case is uncertain or “bad,” it is appropriate for orators to insinuate themselves into the good graces of the audience (*De inventione* 1:16). So too in the anonymously authored *Rhetorica ad Herennium* (ca. 86 BCE), which was attributed to Cicero in the Renaissance, the author provides guidelines for capturing the benevolence of an audience through self-authorization as follows:

Ab nostra persona benivolentiam contrahemus si nostrum officium sine adrogantia laudabimus, atque in rem publicam quales fuerimus, aut in parentes, aut in amicos, aut in eos qui audiunt aperiemus . . . ; item si nostra incommoda proferemus, inopiam, solitudinem, calaninitatem, et si orabimus ut nobis sint auxilio, et simul ostendemus nos in aliis noluisse spem habere.

From the discussion of our own person we shall secure good will by praising our services without arrogance and revealing also our past conduct toward the republic, or toward our parents, friends, or the audience . . . ; likewise by setting forth our disabilities, need, loneliness, and misfortune, and pleading for our hearers’ aid, and at the same time showing that we have been unwilling to place our hope in anyone else. (1:5, 14; 15)

The technique of bolstering one’s ethos or moral authority through the disclosure of “incommoda” (“disabilities”) is only recommended by ancient rhetoricians when presenting a bad case. I submit that disabled or otherwise marginalized authors employ this kind of self-authorization because we are always presenting a bad case, so to speak, to an ableist society.

The strategy of self-authorization is further developed by other instructors of rhetoric under the auspices of the modesty topos, which I suggest is fundamentally crip in its practice. When prescribing methods of self-authorization in book 4 of the *Institutio oratoria*, Marcus Fabius Quintilianus (Quintilian) (ca. 35–ca. 100 CE) states, “[W]e shall derive some silent support from representing that we are weak, unprepared, and no match for the powerful talents arrayed against us. . . . For men have a natural prejudice in favour of those who

are struggling against difficulties” (4:1.8–9, 11). Essentially, Quintilian advises the speaker to take advantage of societal pity, flipping it to their advantage. In his analysis of this aspect of the modesty topos, Dunn avers, “Thus classical modesty bases itself on a simple inversion: the less physical, social, or political power one presents oneself as having, the more rhetorical power one has” (6).¹⁵ In its emphasis on making a sly argument based in the body, this rhetorical technique provides evidence of what Jay Dolmage identifies as disability *metis*, or “the rhetorical concept of cunning and adaptive intelligence” that demands “a view of the body and embodied thinking as being double and divergent” (*Disability Rhetoric* 5). It is, moreover, a rhetorical strategy that can be traced to Renaissance techniques of self-authorization. Though Dunn resists linking these ancient techniques of ethical self-authorization to writerly authority per se in antiquity, he insists that early modern authors repurpose these rhetorical techniques precisely to bolster their authority. The use of this strategy by disabled authors who disclose their disabilities is, moreover, fundamentally crip insofar as it resignifies what is considered bad by society, what the audience “pities,” into a powerful mode of self-authorization.

Cicero’s writings on consolation draw on what we can recognize as crip rhetorics of self-authorization and were a particularly influential model for the Renaissance. The *Tusculan Disputations* (ca. 45 BCE) performs consolation for mental and physical disabilities.¹⁶ Book 1 is a consolation for death, book 2 for pain, book 3 for mental disability, and book 4 for more types of impairment and distress. Book 5 considers both good fortune and the senses, including sensory disabilities. Books 2, 3, and 5 are especially focused on disability and provide the reader with an authoritative source for examples of positive valuations of disability to cite (*auctoritas*) and with formulations for self-authorization as authors (*auctores*).

For instance, Cicero asks in book 5, “[W]hat pleasures, pray, does the blindness you dread so much have to go without?” (535). Noting that “[n]ow the soul may have delight in many different ways, even without the use of sight” (537), he adduces numerous examples of blind people who found benefit in their blindness.¹⁷ The Cyrenaic Antipater enjoys sex or “the pleasures of the night” when blind. Appius Claudius, C. Drusus, and Cn. Aufidius the ex-praetor continued their professional careers after going blind, including authoring texts in Greek and Latin (537). Diodotus the Stoic continued his philosophical investigations, played music, and taught geometry (537, 539). Homer, Tiresias, and many other examples follow. Cicero highlights how these examples defy societal scorn and low expectation for people with disabilities, inserting ironic and playful questions that point up how these indi-

viduals have defied those societal expectations. Cicero's emphasis is that blind people not only can continue to do the things they enjoy but sometimes become even better at those things due to their blindness. This illustrates just one instance of how consolation can model the authorization of disabled writers, and it also provides evidence of the discourse of disability gain.

The *Tusculan Disputations* offers consolation for specific disabilities, but it also proposes consolation as a kind of rhetorical therapy, explaining specifically how it can reduce mental distress (both as a disability and as a result of the experience of adversity). The treatise functions as a theorization of the benefits of consolation as well as a practical handbook for subsequent writers of consolation. It posits a theory of the cause and remedy of *aegritudo*, or mental disability, which Cicero argues can be lessened through consolation. Anticipating disability studies theories of body-mind interdependence, Cicero likens physical and mental disability. He states, "And just as the eye, if out of order, is not in a right condition for discharging its function, and the other members, or the body as a whole, if it is not in its normal condition, fails to perform its function and work: similarly the soul, if disquieted, is not fitted to carry out its work" (243). Cicero's understanding of what we now call mental disability depends on the body-mind connection for its explanation. Furthermore, pain is both the symptom and the cause of mental disability as it is for physical disability: "But it is appropriate that, like sickness in the body, so distress in the soul has a name which in meaning is not distinct from the meaning of pain [*dolore*]. We must therefore trace out the origin of this pain which is the efficient cause of distress [*aegritudinem*] in the soul, as if we were diagnosing sickness in the body" (253). The cause of distress can be taking both good and evil things too strongly to mind, and he concedes that wise and temperate people are less likely to have disorders of the soul.

As a form of mental and physical therapy, then, consolation aims to lessen the impact of adversity. Cicero suggests a general strategy for consolation as follows: "The first remedial step therefore in giving comfort will be to show that either there is no evil or very little; the second will be to discuss the common lot of life and any special feature that needs discussion in the lot of the individual mourner; the third will be to show that it is utter folly to be uselessly overcome by sorrow when one realizes that there is no possible advantage" (317). Cicero also emphasizes that this general plan is not appropriate for all cases. He stresses that timeliness and consideration of the individual are important and that the consoler should take their cues from the principles of forensic rhetoric:

No need to wonder then that in the conduct of cases in court we do not always take up the same position (this is the term we apply to lines of argument in disputes), but we adapt the line we take to the occasion, to the character of the dispute, to the personality of the litigant; we act similarly in the alleviation of distress, for we have to consider what method of treatment is admissible in each particular case. (321)

Cicero's writings were held up in the Renaissance as the authoritative model of Latin prose. His influence on rhetorical education, and thus on the minds of generations of early modern people, cannot be overestimated. It is appropriate then that the model of consolation that he advocates, along with providing exempla for individual instances of consoling adversity, also becomes a kind of textbook for how to write consolation and how to achieve the desired effect of the alleviation of distress through the application of the authorized rules of forensic rhetoric.

Consolatio was a widespread genre in the early modern period in part because it was taught and theorized in the course of the standard rhetorical education. For instance, in his handbook on rhetoric, *The Garden of Eloquence*, Henry Peacham the Elder (1546–1634) provides the following definition: “Paramythia, in latine Consolatio, is a forme of speech which the Orator useth to take away, or diminish a sorrow conceived in the minde of his hearer” (100). For Peacham, consolation, when properly applied, can be of great civic value—a significant aim of oratory:

The use of this figure is great, and most necessarily required in this vale of misery, where mens harts are often fainting, and their mindes falling into despaire, for so great are mens losses in this fraile life, and so little is their fortitude to beare them, that they fall downe in their weaknesse lying still opprest under their heavy burthen, never able to rise againe, without the strength of comfort and consolation. (100–101)

Like Cicero in the *Tusculan Disputations*, Peacham believes that the proper rhetorical application of this genre is essential. He cautions the reader how to use *consolatio* properly, making four stipulations as follows. First, do not console when “correction and commination be more needefully required.” Second, do not console “out of season,” particularly “too soone, when the wound is new made . . . : or too late, as when the sorrow is either forgotten, or wel asswaged” (100). Third, he advises “that it be not unproper and impertinent to the cause and necessitie to which it is applied” (100). Finally, he

stipulates “that it be not weake by reason of the foundations consisting only in Philosophy and humane wisdomes which do many times rather increase sorrow then diminish it” (101). Peacham’s warnings here are meant to be practical, as he explains that “these and many mo[re] such like faultes offending against the true forme of consolation ought most carefully and diligently to be shunned, otherwise the use of consolation shall take small effect” (101). Peacham’s advice here is aimed specifically at the student of rhetoric, and it therefore relies on examples of consolation from antiquity, such as Virgil’s *Aeneid* (100). But as is typical of his time, he also relies on examples from the Judeo-Christian tradition, citing the book of Job for a model of consolation directly after his citation of Virgil (100).

Spiritual Consolation, or Finding Strength in Weakness

Along with classical pagan influences, biblical influence was strong in the development of early modern traditions of *consolatio* and the crippling of authority that this book traces. As Nancy Eiesland avers, Christian interpretations of disability vary from “symbolizing sin to representing an occasion for supererogation” (68), neither of which “adequately represents the ordinary lives and lived realities of most people with disabilities” (68–69).¹⁸ Nonetheless, these attitudes were a significant part of the lived experience of early modern people with disabilities and figure strongly in the consolation literature from which they draw for their own self-authorization. In particular, the apostle Paul crafts self-authorization through the suffering body in his letters to the Corinthians. Again, Eiesland’s analysis is useful here. She observes that “Paul’s ‘thorn in the flesh’ . . . that was used by Christ as a sign of divine grace (2 Cor. 12:7–10) has been influential in supporting a Christian theology of virtuous suffering” (70). Dunn observes how this Pauline representation of the suffering body as virtuous becomes integral to early modern humanist self-authorization, which draws on “Paul’s use of his suffering *in imitatione Christi* as a means of taking on authority” (39). In Dunn’s analysis, “suffering is no longer a sign of disobedience, of alienation from power, but at least potentially a source of power. . . . By making public a nonetheless privatized body, Paul forges a link between autobiography and authority, providing himself with the distinguishing marks of the martyr” (39). Dunn further asserts that this method of self-authorization is fundamentally transgressive, as Paul’s “thorn represents the transgressive and subversive intrusion of the body into two realms of authoritative rhetoric, classical and Hebraic, and that this intrusion allows Paul to create his own authority” (39). Eiesland correctly

notes the potential for harm in this model of virtue derived from suffering, in which people with disabilities might internalize the idea that an inability to endure suffering with patience is not virtuous. Yet these modes of self-authorizing through the suffering body and identification with the suffering Christ were extremely influential in early modern Christian consolation (for both Protestants and Catholics) and, indeed, are still influential in disability liberation theology.¹⁹ Many early modern people with disabilities are drawn to Paul's strategy of proclaiming "strength in weakness,"²⁰ and they often turn this trope to their own self-authorizing advantage.

Church fathers, such as Jerome, Augustine, and Tertullian, wrote *consolatio* texts that affirm the Pauline notion of the advantages of suffering. Consolations that bridged the pagan and biblical traditions were especially influential in the Renaissance. For instance, the popularity of Boethius, who brought the pagan and Judeo-Christian traditions together in his *Consolation of Philosophy*, is well studied and documented.²¹

Yet Renaissance authors frequently go straight to the Bible itself for models of both lamentation and consolation. The Psalms, most of which were thought to be composed by King David, a political leader and divinely inspired poet, consist of 150 poems treating human emotions and the relationship with God. Any reader of the Psalms will notice their overwhelming focus on lamentation or complaint. Depending on how you count them, well over half of the Psalms can be generically categorized as complaints. They were a fertile ground for Renaissance poets, who often wrote their own versions, translations, or musical settings. Speaking of the widespread influence of the seven Penitential Psalms,²² Clare Costley King'oo observes their emphasis on the suffering or disabled body, noting that not only does the psalmist "suffer from a wide range of physical problems (sickness, weakness, weariness, disability, or old age), but he is also burdened with emotional distress (he bows low with mourning or succumbs to fits of weeping)" (6). Not only does the content of the Psalms include the experience of physical or mental disability, but the singing of the Psalms was frequently associated with disabled people in early modern Europe, in particular brotherhoods of blind street singers who performed the Penitential Psalms.²³ Many early modern writers draw on the Psalms to relate their experiences of disability specifically.

For example, the seventeenth-century devotional poet An Collins (fl. 1653) uses psalmic discourse for disability consolation and self-authorization as a writer.²⁴ Though the exact nature of Collins's disability is unknown, Sidney Gottlieb notes that "illness, weakness, and bodily pain were more

than devotional or expressive devices for Collins" (viii), who, throughout her poetry, "finely anatomizes both physical and spiritual pain" (ix). Lyn Bennett has shown that Collins uses the ancient tradition of the modesty topos for self-authorization as a woman writer. Collins's use of modesty also fits Patricia Pender's interpretation of early modern women writers' modesty as strategic. Women writers evoke modesty not simply as submission to patriarchal expectations of silence and obedience but as what Pender calls "authorial alibis" (3). Collins's authorial stance is also, I suggest, complicated and enhanced by her being a disabled author. Collins uses the modesty topos in the *exordium* to her poem "The Discourse" to state authorial ethos in a manner that claims her right to write as a woman. Bennett observes, "Collins's interest in ethos indicates that she is also interested in negotiating room for her own voice within a rhetorical and public space," and evoking the modesty topos both "allow[s] her to claim the status of an artless private woman" and enables her to "be taken seriously in a public forum" ("Meditations" 46). Collins's humility cripples authority, and though Bennett does not discuss Collins's disability in this article, she avers that Collins's self-authorizing strategy transgresses what is expected of her embodiment: "Given the poet's obvious transgression of gendered codes of behavior, the poem's four opening stanzas aim . . . to persuade of her speaker's good character. They also suggest a concerted attempt to thwart the immediate condemnation of a woman audacious enough to write and (worse) to publish" (46).²⁵ The work of feminist critics to supersede interpretations of marginalized authors' modesty as a sign of capitulation to oppression lays the groundwork for my own assertions about how disabled authors find rhetorical strength in perceived weakness.

Beyond her strategic use of the modesty topos, Collins molds biblical consolation to her ends of poetic self-authorization. Weaving references to biblical consolation throughout her work with an emphasis on the Psalms, Collins acknowledges her own suffering and turns that suffering into a justification for her literary authority. In her "To the Reader," she explains, "I have been restrained from bodily employments, suting with my disposition, which enforced me to a retired Course of life; Wherin it pleased God to give me such enlargednesse of mind, and activity of spirit, so that this seeming desolate condicion, proved to me most delightfull: To be breif, I became affected to Poetry, insomuch that I proceeded to practise the same" (1). Collins's disability is only a "seeming" desolation, one that in fact brings her "delight" in poetry (1). Here Collins uses the pious, Christian-inflected modesty trope of strength in weakness evident in Pauline discourse; but as Mintz rightly

stresses, Collins's attitude toward her disability does not simply conform to a moral model of spiritual compensation, for Collins "records a body whose internal workings and/or external aspect, far from evidence of a despised flesh that must be subdued in order to access the divine, are rather the vehicle of intimacy with and knowledge of that sought-after presence" ("An Collins" 55).²⁶

Collins's physical ailments insistently and repeatedly occur throughout her life; they grant her not only the ability but the authority to write, which she accomplishes with the aid and authority of biblical consolation that does not erase her suffering body in exchange for that authority. For instance, in "The Discourse," she laments, "Even in my Cradle did my Crosses breed, / And so grew up with me, unto this day" (lines 57–58, 10).²⁷ Although she finds comfort in her religious belief, "This Yet am I not so firm I must confess / But many times discomforts will intru'd, / Which oft prevailes to hinder quietness, / And by that means, some sorrows are renew'd" (lines 155–58, 13). Collins's lived experience of disability is not a simple story of overcoming. Moreover, her moves from lament or "sorrow" to consolation are full of references to the Psalms.²⁸ For example, she continues in the same stanza: "Which hope will help mee quickly to exclu'd: / So though distress continu for a night, / Yet joy returneth by the morning light" (lines 157–61, 13). Lament is immediately followed here by the consolatory allusion to *Ps.* 30:5, "Weeping may endure for a night, but joy cometh in the morning." Again, in the "Second Meditation," which follows upon a physical crisis, Collins avers, "So may I with the *Psalmist* truly say, / Tis good for me that I have been afflicted, / Before I troubled was, I went astray, / But now to godlinesse I am adicted Again" ("Second Meditation" lines 97–100, 73). Collins's attitude toward religious consolation does not reinforce negative interpretations of her disability or conceive of her body as something that should be overcome or erased; rather, her disabled body authorizes her to write.²⁹

Collins represents her work as both an autoconsolation and consolation for future readers, or as she puts it, "for the benifit, and comfort of others, Cheifly for those Christians who are of disconsolate Spirits" ("To the Reader" 1). Margaret Hannay highlights the communal nature of Collins's psalmic mode of consolation, noting that "other women were inspired to follow [her] example" (118–19). Along with reaching out to future women writers, Collins's work also creates and invites disability community, emphasizing the intersectional nature of disability and gender and how those intersections can be a source of strength.

Medical Consolation

Alongside rhetorical and biblical models of consolation, early modern authors take up consolation as a form of medical therapy. This medical perspective on disability is not the same as what disability scholars refer to as a medical model of disability, in which disability is always framed pathologically and as a problem that must be solved or cured. It is rather based in a belief in the healing influence of words on the passible body and in the notion that, as a part of a larger humoral balance, illness could have what we might call positive side effects.

For instance, the physician Girolamo Cardano (1501–1576) writes books of consolation to console himself for his mental distress.³⁰ In “To the Reader,” the English translator of the 1683 edition calls Cardano’s text an “antidote” (*Cardan his three books* 1) offered by Cardano, whose book “sprang from his own Natural Affection, and great trouble of mind” (2). The translator further explains that Cardano “had (’tis true) his Deliriums in common with all great Wits; but his lucid intervals were such, as made him pass in the Opinions of some, that read his Works, for more than a Man” (1). Cardano’s disability motivates the writing of the work, and the translator frames Cardano’s disability as both authoritative and salutary.

The framing of Cardano’s text also emphasizes disability gain. The earlier 1573 English translation by Thomas Bedingfield (1540–1613) includes a dedicatory poem by the soldier-poet Thomas Churchyard (1520–1604) that proclaims Cardano’s text as a remedy for disability. Churchyard avers:

You troubled mindes with tormentes toste,
 that sighes and sobs consumes: . . .
 Come reade this booke that freelye bringes, a boxe of balme full swete,
 An oile to noynt the brused partes, of everye heavye spriete.
 A souplinge salve for everye sore, a medicine for the sicke,
 A seede that eates up cankred fleshe, and searcheth neare the quicke.
 (*Cardanus comforte* lines 1–9, n.p.)

According to Churchyard, the work alleviates both mental and physical distress. He goes on to enumerate how various kinds of people, including people with disabilities, will benefit from Cardano’s consolation: “The blinde that mournes for want of sight, coude he but heare this red, / Would take his blindnes in good part, and beare a quiet hed” (lines 11–12), and “The lame

whose lacke of legges is death, unto a loftye minde, / Will kisse his crotche and creepe on knees, Cardano woorkes to finde” (lines 13–14, n.p.). Crucially, the work does not simply proffer cure in this formulation. Though “he that is not shaped right, may here be made a newe” (line 51, n.p.), the focus of Churchyard’s poem is as much about revaluing disability as it is about diminishing its effects. The blind man will not be given back his sight by reading this book but will “take his blindnes in good part,” and the lame will not be straightened but “[w]ill kisse his crotche and creepe on knees, Cardano woorkes to finde.” Here, consolation cripes disability, making it into something valuable (something to take “in good part” or even to “kisse”). The printer error or perhaps alternative spelling of “crotche” for “crutch” also opens the reading of consolation to queer potentialities, which supports recent scholarship that considers the relation between queer and crip discourse to be mutually enabling in the period.³¹ Churchyard emphasizes that through the work of *consolatio*, the advantages in the adversity of disability are revealed.

Cardano’s work itself posits five strategies of compensatory medical consolation that are typical of the genre. First, illness makes you appreciate health: “Who can relish health, that has never been sick?” (*Cardan his three books* 17). Sickness is in fact necessary to the enjoyment of health, for “Sickness is as necessary as Food or Rayment, or any other of the things of this Life, which we cannot be without: ’Tis like Sawce, making us relish the benefits of health” (152). Second, debility of the body is compensated with a healthy mind: “A Distemper’d Body do’s oft-times much conduce to the health of the mind” (17). Third, time heals, and patience is a virtue: “We ought to behave our selves like men in Prison that are in hopes of deliverance, who altho attended with weariness at present, yet (especially if men of courage) yield not themselves up to Grief” (33). Fourth, illness and disability often make for a longer lifespan: “It is observ’d that Sickly people for the most part live longer than those of a firmer constitution” (17). Finally, disability and illness have spiritual and emotional compensations: “Sickness puts us in mind of another life, it renders us sober and thoughtful, and capable of hearkning to that good counsel, which when in Health we could not abide. Were it not for Sickness a Man would become more hard-hearted than a Tiger, and more cruel than a Lioness” (154–55). In this final condolence, illness and disability provide the capacity not only to be closer to God but to be closer to other human beings, because they foster compassion. Cardano is certainly focused on the rhetoricity and spirituality of the art of consolation, but to these aspects he also adds his own understanding as a physician of human body-minds.

Cardano’s treatise is useful to consider as it touches on so many of the

consolatory strategies that Renaissance writers used, many of which correspond with concepts theorized in today's disability studies. As is typical of consolation, there is an emphasis on what is gained in the experience of adversity. Cardano himself opines, "[T]here's scarcely any misery so great but is attended with some advantage" (15). And later in the text, he advises: "When Sickness is come upon thee, consider that even this condition is not without its advantages" (151). *Consolatio* texts have thus provided tried and true rhetorical, spiritual, and medical strategies for coping with and crippling mental and physical disability for millennia.

Consolation and Disability Gain

Discovering consolation's presence in its generic genealogy unlocks a trove of early modern disability narrative that relates the lived experience of disability as both suffering and disability gain. The rhythms of complaint and fortitude evident in works of consolation are well suited to narrating disability, in which there are ups and downs. Disability narratives that appeal to both disabled and nondisabled audiences tend to balance the two. Self-pity is not sustainable, but, as Eli Clare has put it, the expectation of overcoming all obstacles, "the inspirational supercrip crap, the believe-it-or-not disability story" (3), is also not sustainable.

As such, consolation functions as what Rosemarie Garland-Thomson has called a "narrative resource" ("The Case for Conserving" 344) for expressions of disability gain, which in turn enriches our epistemological and ethical understandings of "why we might want to conserve rather than eliminate disability from the human condition" (341). In particular, her reading of Arthur W. Frank's *The Wounded Storyteller* (1995) relates well to this study's emphasis on consolation and crip authority.³² Garland-Thomson avers that Frank's narrative provides an argument for conserving disability insofar as it "counteract[s] the social disqualification and accompanying alienation from self" that is often deemed typical of the lived experience of disability and in which "narrative is a productive rather than compensatory resource in . . . disability's contribution to self-understanding and identity formation" (345). Frank himself draws on the work of writers in the past with disabilities in his argument for disability's value and for his own form of self-consolation.

The utility of consolation to disabled authors is evident in their intertextual references, or allusions to or citations of other texts within their own narratives. Garland-Thomson, who is herself a disabled writer, draws on Frank's intertextual practice to make a point about how disabled authors can be com-

forted by other disability narratives. Early modern disabled authors are similarly thoughtful about intertextuality both to enhance their own authority and to provide their readers with recommended reading and writing practices as a form of consolation and enduring community.

The dialogue between past writers of disability narrative and subsequent disabled writers and scholars, with whom I identify as a blind woman, has provided a sense of disability community and will continue to do so. As Mitchell and Snyder put it,

This championing or critique of one disabled writer by another demonstrates that a consciousness of disability has been available during prior ages. If one is cut off or isolated from a community of like-minded individuals, the archive can operate, not as a repository of dehumanizing values, but as an imaginative refuge for alternative ways of seeing. (*Narrative Prosthesis* 34)

Today's disabled authors can thus break into the vault of early modern disability narrative, just as their predecessors in the Renaissance turned to ancient modes of consolation to crip their own society's ableist notions of who should be authorized to write.

Book Organization

In chapter 1, the book begins with an examination of works by Francesco Petrarca (Petrarch), a hugely influential writer of Renaissance literature. Petrarch declares that he experiences *acedia*, a world-weary depression that he relates back to the Stoical concept of *aegritudo*, or mental disability. He consoles himself and later generations in his *Secretum* (ca. 1353), an imagined dialogue with St. Augustine. In the *Secretum*, Petrarch discloses his mental disability and crafts crip authority. He entertains numerous consolatory strategies, but he does not overcome his disability. Instead, he recommends consolatory reading and writing to alleviate it. His later book of consolation, *De remediis utriusque fortunae* (ca. 1366), advises how to handle disabilities as varied as deafness, blindness, war wounds, madness, and chronic pain. Strongly influenced by Cicero's *Tusculan Disputations* and the consolatory works of Seneca, the *De remediis* was fundamental for the Renaissance art of consolation and proves especially useful to later writers with disabilities. The *De remediis* articulates models of what we can now call disability gain, including an argument for the dignity of disability. Without denying the downsides

of disability, such as pain, which, like Cicero, Petrarch does not view as a good in itself, these texts find creative ways of elevating disability into various forms of authority. Petrarch's works, especially the *De remediis*, prove to be an inspiration to a variety of premodern authors who write about their lived experiences of disability in the early and later Renaissance.

Chapter 2 centers on the writings of Sor Teresa de Cartagena, a Deaf Spanish nun from a prestigious family of *conversos* (Spanish Jews who converted to Christianity). Teresa writes to console herself and her community of infirm readers for disability in *Arboleda de los enfermos* (written before 1481). Graced with an excellent humanist education, she cites and interprets ancient and biblical consolation, particularly the Psalms, and she takes inspiration from consolation texts written by Petrarch and others. Rather than viewing her Deafness as a problem that needs solving, she resignifies her disability into a blessing from God and an authorization of her literary output. She elaborates spiritual consolation in a series of crip readings of biblical images. Drawing on the practices of conventual life, she focuses on strategies of voluntary humility and the capacities of disabled people to work to sidestep the societal ableism that she calls malicious ignorance. When accused of plagiarism, Teresa mounts a second defense of her crip authority as a disabled woman in her *Admiración operum Dey* (*Wonder at the Works of God*) (ca. 1481). Rather than engaging in malicious curiosity that leads to doubt, she enjoins her readers to conceive of her work as evidence of the marvels of God's grace. Though her *Arboleda* has been examined with an eye to its debts to consolation texts, has been held up as protofeminist, and has also received attention from disability studies scholars (e.g., Juárez-Almendros; Rivera-Cordero; Hsy), my work brings these three threads together, emphasizing the links between reception of consolation, intersectional disability identity, and how both of Teresa de Cartagena's works exemplify crip authority.

The next two chapters explore works from the later Renaissance that continue to make use of early humanist consolation and emphasize spiritual consolation in community for their crip authority. Being a wounded warrior, which earned him the epithet "el manco de Lepanto," is vital to Miguel de Cervantes's self-representation and his development of crip authority out of militaristic as well as spiritual authorization. Cervantes's left hand was grievously wounded in the naval battle waged between the Holy League and the Ottomans in the Gulf of Lepanto in 1571. Chapter 3 examines letters, paratextual materials, the *Viaje del Parnaso* (1614), his short story *El licenciado Vidriera* (1613), and his last work of fiction, *Los trabajos de Persiles y Sigismunda* (1617), to demonstrate how Cervantes draws on the art of consolation

to craft crip authority. After his ransom and return from captivity in Algiers, Cervantes associates his disability with his role as author as well as soldier, drawing particularly on Petrarch's *De remediis* to defend himself against the ableist invectives of his contemporaries and to convey the authority that his war wounds exude as both veteran and writer. In his later works, he dwells on scenes of disability community as represented in votive offerings at shrines to the Virgin Mary. These material offerings commemorate experiences of adversity and acknowledge a Christian community of both suffering and healing in a manner that emphasizes disability futurity and an ethics of care.

Chapter 4 examines Robert Burton's famous treatise *The Anatomy of Melancholy* (1621–1651) as a work of consolation and its influence on later disabled writers. A reader of Cervantes and Petrarch, Burton makes extensive use of the consolatory tradition to console himself and his readers for melancholy. Burton adopts an antic (comic or grotesque) tone in his disability disclosure and crafting of crip authority, availing himself of what Tobin Siebers later calls disability masquerade by donning the authorial persona of Democritus Junior to descant on a melancholic *theatrum mundi*. Burton makes clear that his own melancholy gives him the authority to write about melancholy, and the errancy of his writing self-consciously mirrors his melancholy mind. Like Petrarch and Teresa de Cartagena, Burton recommends consolatory reading and writing as palliative, but he adds to this the advice to engage in word-image comparison in the form of what I call ekphrastic therapy. Drawing on the material culture of emblems, *imprese*, heraldry, and illustrated books, Burton encourages his readers to fight idleness and melancholy with *enargeia*, a rhetorical term for bringing images before the mind's eye. Burton represents both the sweet and the sour of melancholy in his work, and though cure may not be possible, he develops a wide array of consolatory methods for its alleviation. Moreover, Burton's text appeals to other melancholic writers. As Angus Gowland among others has shown, the positive association between melancholy and literary genius is by no means uniform in the Renaissance, and melancholy's affects were by no means all positive. Nevertheless, Burton's disability narrative creates a community of disability discourse based in crip authority and disability gain.

Chapters 5 and 6 consider the crip authority of two canonical writers of the Renaissance who both became blind in middle age and who exerted great influence both despite and because of their disability. Milton, whose blindness has confounded most scholars until recently, derives crip authority from military and spiritual consolation. Though Milton's sonnets on blindness and the proems to *Paradise Lost* (1667–1674) are touchstones for his disability dis-

course, contextualizing them through a close reading of Milton's Latin prose tracts and theological works reveals a sophisticated understanding of disability gain that relies on St. Paul's Epistles and the Psalms. Furthermore, the use of the rhythm of consolation and lamentation in *Samson Agonistes* (1671), while not strictly autobiographical, allows Milton to reenvision biblical models of disability gain with an emphasis on the spectacular reach of the theater. In staging disability in a closet drama with a blind tragic hero, Milton enjoys some of the benefits of disability masquerade with none of the antics. The chapter engages closely with other blind Miltonists, such as the unsung early Milton critic Eleanor Gertrude Brown, whose monograph on Milton's blindness and memoir demonstrates the way that early modern narratives of disability gain and crip authority create disability community across time.

The final chapter focuses on how crip authority can transform our understanding of Renaissance aesthetics more broadly. The sixteenth-century painter and art theorist Giovanni Paolo Lomazzo was a foundational figure in the theorization of Mannerism, a movement in late Renaissance art that emphasizes the individual style of the artist. The fact that Lomazzo went blind in his early thirties and was blind during the writing of all of his works of art theory is rarely cited as more than a curiosity or excuse for the presence of errors in his printed works—this despite the fact that Lomazzo writes about his blindness in his autobiography and poetry collected as *Rime* (1587) and in both of his major art treatises, *Trattato dell'arte della pittura . . .* (1584) and *Idea del tempio della pittura* (1590). Lomazzo laments his blindness, yet he also finds comfort in art, spiritual consolation, and his community. He promotes a theocentric model of artistic inspiration, in which the *concetto*, or idea of the work, appears to the mind and not to the eyes of the artist. He gives Mannerism a crip twist in his praise for a melancholic *maniera*, or style, and in his celebration of the grotesque. Embracing the particularity of each artist's embodiment, Lomazzo links diverse body-minds to particular excellence of *maniera*. In this schema, traits such as melancholy, which Lomazzo attributes to Michelangelo and to himself, produce disability gain. Furthermore, Lomazzo writes extensively on the grotesque, which anticipates Siebers's concept of disability aesthetics in modernity. Lomazzo's writing is highly ekphrastic. Because he can no longer make visual examples of the techniques he describes, he creates an elaborate memory theater to recall and describe the embodiment and works of his favorite artists, which also makes his work accessible to blind and sighted readers. Lomazzo's crip authority in the form of his writing, in turn, goes on to guide generations of artists and art historians.

The book's coda sums up and revisits the chapters' claims and gestures toward possible new avenues of research. Accounting for rhetorical, biblical, and medical forms of disability-focused consolation reveals new aspects of the formal and social history of premodern disability narrative. Early modern disabled authors use consolation as a resource to craft their writerly authority, thereby transgressively crippling their (and our) society's ableist notions of authority. The book thus brings today's models of disability studies and crip theory together with early modern articulations of disability gain based in ancient and Renaissance models of military, political, biblical, and literary authority. It should appeal to a broad audience of readers interested in the fields of Renaissance studies, the reception of antiquity, crip and disability studies, queer studies, the history of gender and sexuality, visual culture and word-image studies, and autobiography and life writing. It takes a comparative approach, engaging with classical, Italian, Iberian, French, Neolatin, and English literature. It revives the voices of lesser-known writers such as Cartagena and Burton, and it claims the voices of canonical authors such as Petrarch, Cervantes, Milton, and Lomazzo as part of a transhistorical disability discourse.

No other monographs take a similar approach to the history of consolation, early modern disability studies, crip theory, and disability narrative. I have found no scholarship on consolation that focuses on the rich history of disability discourse that the genre provides. Though the work of Hobgood and Wood is fundamental in revealing premodern histories of disability gain and makes use of crip theory in the examination of works by several early modern authors, and though valuable articles exist that treat various concepts of disability as they relate to the works of Cartagena, Cervantes, Burton, and Milton, Petrarch and Lomazzo have, to my knowledge, never been considered from a disability studies perspective. Furthermore, none of the aforesaid authors have been treated in a book-length work focusing on concepts of disability per se with the exception of Eleanor Gertrude Brown's 1930s monograph on Milton's blindness, which I examine. Mintz admirably connects concepts of disability narrative to several early modern authors, but she does so in articles that treat English authors only. In sum, this book makes a significant contribution to the growing field of early modern disability studies and the history of autobiography and disability narrative, and it invites us to rethink the extent of crip history and the endurance of disability gain.

One

Descending the Mountain

Consoling Disability in Petrarch's Secretum and De remediis utriusque fortunae



Pestis animi, quam accidiam moderni, veteres egritudinem dixerunt. (“You have a deadly plague of the mind, the moderns call it *acedia*, the ancients *aegritudo*” Sec. 2. 13. 1; trans. mine)

[H]abeas velut in animo conscripta remedia. (“You have the [remedy] already written out in your mind, so to speak” Sec. 2. 16. 2; 69–70)

[H]abet et error voluptatem suam. (“Yes, even error has its own delights!” *De rem.* 2. 115. 40; 280)

In a letter to his confessor, Dionigi di Borgo San Sepulcro (1300–1342), Francesco Petrarca (1304–1374) (henceforth Petrarch) writes that, in the spring of 1336, he summited the peak of Mont Ventoux.¹ This solitary mountain emerges with a windswept granite cap from the hillocks of the Vaucluse region of Provence in France that Petrarch then called home. He explains that he was “sola videndi insignem loci altitudinem cupiditate ductus” (“led solely by a desire to view the great height of it” *Fam.* 4. 1.1; 172).² The letter inspires subsequent assessments of Petrarch as the “father of humanism” (Kristeller and Randall 3).³ Reading the letter, Jacob Burckhardt (1818–1897) emphasizes the exceptionality of Petrarch as “one of the first truly modern men” (206). He notes that “the deepest impression of all was made upon [Petrarch] by the ascent of Mont Ventoux,” asserting that “the ascent of a mountain for its own sake was unheard of” (207). Petrarch, according to Burckhardt, is a Renais-

sance man, or an “all-sided man”—‘l’uomo universale” (97), who developed a “free personality,” in which “man became a spiritual individual and recognized himself as such” (93). Although all agree that Petrarch was not the first mountaineer, the letter continues to be a key text in debates about the Renaissance as a cultural and historical rebirth and step toward modernity.

In this chapter, I read this familiar letter with two of Petrarch’s works of consolation—the *De secreto conflictu curarum mearum* (henceforth *Secretum*) and *De remediis utriusque fortunae* (henceforth *De remediis*)—to a different end.⁴ In these Latin works, disability is central to the human experience and the humanism that sought to dignify that experience. Although Petrarch has not yet received attention from disability studies scholars, he discloses his mental disability in the *Secretum*, he contributes to the Renaissance art of consolation, and he resignifies impairment as crip authority. Petrarch can be read, as he was by many of his disabled imitators, as valuing human error and vulnerability, interdependence, and the advantage that can be found in adversity.⁵

Descending Mont Ventoux: How to Err, Not to Overcome

Mountain climbing may lend itself to assessing the measure of man, but it is also emblematic for “overcoming” disability. For example, Erik Weihenmayer claimed in 2001 to be the first blind man to summit Mount Everest. His website promoted slogans such as “Overcoming fear” and injunctions to “Live a NO BARRIERS life.”⁶ The website defined this “no barriers” philosophy as “OVERCOME, ADAPT, BE RESILIENT, EMBRACE. THAT IS NO BARRIERS.” Weihenmayer solicits participation in his brand of overcoming disability by asking his followers to make a no barriers “pledge.”

Yet overcoming is not for everybody. Noting that “the mountain as metaphor looms large in the lives of marginalized people,” Eli Clare relates that overcoming narratives feature “one of the dominant images of disabled people, the supercrip” (1). Such stories “focus on disabled people ‘overcoming’ our disabilities. They reinforce the superiority of the nondisabled body and mind. They turn individual disabled people, who are simply leading their lives, into symbols of inspiration” (1). Expanding on the consequences of these stories, Stella Young decries what she calls “inspiration porn” (n.p.). Although mountain climbing is a remarkable accomplishment, Clare’s and Young’s points about the ableism in which overcoming is based are relevant. Inspiration porn promotes the idea that “the only disability in life is a bad attitude” (Young). Young disagrees:

No amount of smiling at a flight of stairs has ever made it turn into a ramp. Never. (Laughter) (Applause) Smiling at a television screen isn't going to make closed captions appear for people who are deaf. No amount of standing in the middle of a bookshop and radiating a positive attitude is going to turn all those books into braille. It's just not going to happen.

Barriers to access are real; pretending that they are not will not make them go away. Nepal banned blind people and double amputees from climbing Everest in 2017 to "reduce the number of deaths on the mountain" ("Nepal Bans"). In addition to physical barriers, social and political barriers exist. Though the Nepalese Supreme Court overturned this ban in March 2018 (Travis), the ableist assumptions motivating the ban remain.

Overcoming disability, moreover, aligns with the modern liberal injunction to rehabilitate disability through independent living. Weihenmayer's website omitted the names of his guides, though he praises his climbing teams in his memoirs, which he also acknowledges were composed with the help of ghostwriters. Disabled mountaineers, just like their able-bodied counterparts, are usually interdependent with other climbers. But overcoming is about rugged individualism. In fact, along with prohibiting disabled climbers in 2017, Nepal also banned solo climbers ("Nepal Bans"). Barriers to access exist for everyone, including digital barriers. When I clicked on Weihenmayer's no barriers pledge, I got a Domain Name Service (DNS) resolution error. This means, to make a telephonic analogy, "Sorry, we rang, but we can't get through because that number hasn't been set up yet, or the wires got crossed, or there was just a bad connection."

For Petrarch, I suggest, the error is the point. The ideal story of overcoming is fragmented, scattered into diverging paths, made errant in the folds of his language and style of relation. Petrarch emphasizes error from the start of his alpine adventure. He coyly relates that though he had contemplated the climb for some time, he was moved to action by reading about the mountaineering of King Philip V of Macedon (238–179 BCE) in the account by the Roman historian Titus Livius (Livy) (59 BCE–17 CE).⁷ Philip's expedition to climb Mount Haemus in the Balkans for military reconnaissance was unsuccessful due to weather conditions, as Petrarch well knew (Livy 40:22). Petrarch performed what his biographer Ernest Hatch Wilkins calls "an extraordinary feat in the field of classical learning" when he "produced what may fairly be called the first scholarly edition of all the known por-

tions . . . of Livy's *Ab urbe condita libri*" (16).⁸ King Philip's error becomes part of Petrarch's humanist effort to revive Roman history.⁹

In climbing the mountain of textual practice, moreover, errors are valuable. Identifying and editing ancient manuscripts relies on the presence of common errors. Tracing the reproduction of errors made by scribes (scribal variants) was one method early humanists used to determine stemmatics, in which the family tree of a manuscript is traced.¹⁰ Furthermore, as Seth Lerer observes in his discussion of the history of the errata page—a page in a book that lists postproduction errors—early humanists made their reputations around the identification and correction of errors.¹¹ Lerer claims that “the admission of error and the public mark of self-correction stand as the identifying gestures of the humanist subject” (53). The ancient climb that inspires Petrarch may have been a mistake, but the story of the ascent survives for thousands of years because of his textual practice and copious understanding of error.

Imitating the failure of King Philip may seem “curious,” as Thomas Greene has observed (*The Light* 105),¹² but I interpret this choice as evidence of Petrarch's appreciation of the productivity and authority of error. Framing his climb with the errant episode from Livy illustrates Petrarch's allowance for error in Humanist endeavors more broadly. Arthur Kinney notes that Petrarch advises imitating the ancients such that “the audience may see the residual traces of the original, which has been the initial impulse or model” (18). Kinney emphasizes that Petrarch valued divergence. Rather than viewing deviation as “retrogressive,” Petrarch's “humanist poetics of creative imitatio based in divergence from resources cherishes and preserves *both* the old text *and the new*” (18). The early humanist poetics that Petrarch helped to define thus allows for variation from sources and attributes error with authority.

Moreover, Petrarchan style in the vernacular—what makes Petrarch canonical—embraces error. In the first sonnet of his most famous work, the *Rime sparse*, Petrarch proclaims the work to be a product of his “giovenile errore” (“youthful error” line 3, 36; 37). To put it simply, the error of Petrarch's youth is his unrequited love for a woman named Laura. Error is essential to Petrarch's poetic style because his emotional instability is self-consciously mirrored in his stylistic errancy: “del vario stile in ch'io piango et ragiono” (“the varied style in which I weep and speak” line 5, 36; 37). In many respects, it is this dispersed, errant style that is most appealing to Petrarch's later vernacular imitators.¹³ Yet his concentration on error is apparent throughout his Latin works as well. Error as a path toward the discovery of truth is, according to François Rigolot, fundamental not just for Petrarch but for writ-

ers of the Renaissance who follow his model. As Rigolot opines, “Error can be identified as a regrettable mistake, an unforgivable *faux pas*; or, on the contrary, something he or she should be proud of, because it signals another order of truth” (“The Renaissance Fascination” 1219). Petrarch’s error is both fundamental to his poetic style and exemplary for other authors.¹⁴

Returning to Mont Ventoux, Petrarch does not go solo. After careful consideration of climbing partners (*Fam.* 4. 1. 3–5; 172–73),¹⁵ he selects his brother Gherardo Petracco (b. 1304) and their servants. Furthermore, they are not the first to attempt the climb.¹⁶ An elderly shepherd they encounter summited the peak fifty years before. Like King Philip, however, the shepherd’s example is not a good one. The shepherd warns them that he returned from his own ascent with “nichilque inde retulisse preter penitentiam et laborem, corpusque et amictum lacerum saxis ac vepribus” (“nothing but repentance, weariness, and his body and clothing torn by stones and bushes” 4. 1. 7; 173).¹⁷ Petrarch’s party continues the ascent, nonetheless.

From the start of the climb, Petrarch emphasizes his own waywardness. Lagging behind,

presertim ego montanum iter gressu iam modestiore carpebam,
et frater compendiaria quidem via per ipsius iuga montis ad altiora
tendebat; ego mollior ad ima vergebam.

I, in particular, pursued a more modestly inclined mountainous path. My brother proceeded to the heights by shortcuts over the ridges of the mountain, but I, being weaker, turned toward the lower reaches. (*Fam.* 4. 1. 9; 174)

Petrarch says he is “mollior”—which can mean weaker or feebler than his brother—indicating that the trial is taxing physically. Yet he also discloses his psychological difficulty in completing the task, attributing his reluctance to climb to his “ignavie” (4. 1. 10; 174), his laziness or faint-heartedness. While his brother and their servants ascend, he continues “per valles errabam, cum nichilo mitior aliunde pateret accessus” (“wandering through the valleys, without finding a more gentle access anywhere” 4. 1. 10; 174). This strategy leads to “Nichilo” (“nothing”) except “et via cresceret et inutilis labor ingravesceret” (“the way grew longer and my exertion became even more useless” 4. 1. 10; trans. mine). He repeats his error: “[N]on sine fratris risu, hoc indignanti michi ter aut amplius intra paucas horas contigit” (“This happened to me three or more times within a few hours, not without my annoyance or

my brother's laughter" 4. 1. 11; 174). Here Petrarch relates his waywardness in a light-hearted manner. We are tempted to laugh along with Gherardo, but Petrarch's error is more than a joke.

Petrarch pauses the narrative to reflect in an internal dialogue upon his repeated error as a spiritual challenge. He likens his errant traversal of the mountain to his wayward path toward salvation as follows:

Atque utinam vel sic animo peragam iter illud, cui diebus et noctibus suspiro, sicut, superatis tandem difficultatibus, hodiernum iter corporis pedibus peregi!

How I wish that I could complete with my mind that journey for which I sigh day and night as I overcame all the difficulties of today's journey with my physical body! (4. 1. 15; 175)

Although he eventually overcomes ("superatis") the physical climb, he does not overcome his mental waywardness.

By the time Petrarch reaches the mountaintop, remedy for his error still seems possible, but this is not to be. When he summits the peak, he appreciates the view but soon turns his focus inward.¹⁸ Petrarch performs a sortilege. He picks a page at random from a little volume of Augustine's *Confessions*, which the addressee of the letter, San Sepulcro, gave to him and which Petrarch carries with him. As with the example from Livy, this intertextual move reaches back to the authoritative past (Augustine's work was seminal for Christians). It also activates networks of learned exchange for Petrarch's community of scholarly readers.¹⁹ Just as citing Livy insinuates to other humanists that the climb may not be a success, the performance of an Augustinian sortilege indicates that Petrarch's spiritual journey is still errant.

The passage upon which Petrarch's eyes fall discloses his error in an ironic and humbling manner. "Forte" ("by chance"), he selects a passage from the tenth book of the *Confessions*:

Et eunt homines admirari alta montium et ingentes fluctus maris et latissimos lapsus fluminum et oceani ambitum et giros siderum, et relinquunt se ipsos.

And they go to admire the summits of mountains and the vast billows of the sea and the broadest rivers and the expanses of the ocean and the revolutions of the stars and they overlook themselves. (*Fam.* 4. 1. 27; 178)²⁰

This sortilege turns out very differently from the episode in the *Confessions* that inspires Petrarch's action.²¹ Whereas Augustine's sortilege of scripture in the garden in Milan results in his conversion and joyful union with God,²² Petrarch's sortilege of Augustine renders stupefaction and frustration with himself: "Obstupui, fateor" ("I confess that I was astonished" *Fam.* 4. 1. 27; 178). Refusing to read further, "librum clausi, iratus michimet quod nunc etiam terrestria mirarer" ("I closed the book enraged with myself because I was even then admiring earthly things" 4. 1. 27; 178). Petrarch's wayward sortilege offers numerous interpretive possibilities: For Victoria Kahn, Petrarch uses the sortilege to model willful misreading; for David Lee Miller, the passage offers transcendence through humility;²³ and for Unn Falkeid, the sortilege evinces an "experience of the self as uneven and fragmented, subject to changes by time and place, which in my opinion can be characterized as the modern self of Petrarch" (20).²⁴ If the disclosure of waywardness, humility, and vulnerability constitutes the Petrarchan self, as these three interpretations imply, I suggest that the authority of this Petrarchan self invites a crip reading and identification.

Whether or not Petrarch happened upon this passage in Augustine "Forte" ("by chance"), as he swears, his reaction expresses humility and awareness of his own errors as closely tied with his reading, citation, and writing practices. In turn, these practices demonstrate his humanist authority to his network of readers, but this authority itself is presented in a playful, crip way. Petrarch's disclosure of his error through his Augustinian allusions is ludic—the practice of sortilege being itself a game and divergence from Augustine being a puzzle for the reader to decode. He shuffles Augustine's deck to draw a deeper awareness of his own imperfection and suffering. He does not overcome the mountain as a triumphal, secular, independent modern subject. He does not portray the challenge of climbing Mont Ventoux as an orthodox, allegorical representation of spiritual overcoming. At the end of the letter and of the descent, Petrarch calls on Sepulcro (his addressee and confessor), "[P]ro [meam cogitatus] ora, queso, ut tandiu vagi et instabiles aliquando subsistant" ("I beg you to pray for [my thoughts] so that having been rambling and unstable for so long, they may sometimes find rest" 4. 1; 180). Petrarch portrays himself as variable, vulnerable, and subject to error. Rather than resulting in "nothing," as Falkeid would have it (20), Petrarch's disclosure of error impels and constitutes the letter's narrative. He thus resignifies his error into something productive in much the same way that crippling disability does not overcome disability but resignifies it into something valuable and creative of community.

Mont Ventoux and its surroundings shape Petrarch's legacy in geographical and poetic terms. Runoff from the mountain feeds the Fontaine

de Vaucluse—the dramatic karst spring that is the source of the river Sorgue and that was adjacent to Petrarch's country retreat in Vaucluse. This natural wonder was a tourist destination even in Petrarch's time.²⁵ In his *Letters of Old Age*, he relates in loving detail when as a youth he first beheld the spring with his friend Guido Sette (1304–ca. 1367) and determined to live there one day (*Sen.* 10. 2. 3; 364–65).²⁶ Many of Petrarch's works were written or conceived at his home in Vaucluse (*Fam.* 8. 3; 399). The place is mentioned or alluded to throughout his writing, and he signs off many of his familiar letters with the words "From the Source of the Sorgue." His literary fame has also enhanced its notoriety, as he anticipated (*Sen.* 10. 2. 5; 364). Robert Edwards refers to Petrarch's emphasis on place as a "lived geography" (5), and Giuseppe Mazzotta believes place is "central to Petrarch's imagination: the source of the Sorgue River, the grass of Vaucluse, . . . are privileged spots which show that for Petrarch there is a truth of the moment as well as the truth of a place" (20). Furthermore, Hannah Chapelle Wojciehowski suggests that "Petrarch built an affective community out of that place. Remarkably, that community still exists today" (8). This place still draws "those of us who are in the community of Petrarch scholars and aficionados, or who may feel called to join it: virtual lovers charged with positive feelings for all things Petrarch, including his solitude, his melancholy and his fits of pique and passion" (19). This autobiographical emphasis on place as a source of writing and community extends to how places are environmentally interrelated, especially in images of hydraulic dispersal,²⁷ which, in turn, can provide consolation.

Readers of Petrarch associate his errant poetics with Mont Ventoux and its watershed. Rosalie Colie traces the environmental connection between Mont Ventoux and the source of Petrarch's poetic inspiration in her literary criticism and in her poetry. She shows how he imagines the Fontaine de Vaucluse as a version of Helicon, the classical source of the muses' inspiration near the beginning of the *Rime sparse*. She notes, "Sometimes it is the Rhone," but "more often" Helicon is "the Sorgue, rising as if spontaneously from the deep pothole at the end of the Vaucluse and flowing down the enclosed valley into the Rhone past Avignon, fed in fact by the runoff from Petrarca's windy mountain, Mont Ventoux" (*Paradoxia* 77–78). This aqueous image of Petrarchan poetics inspires Colie's response to Petrarch in her posthumous *Atlantic Wall and Other Poems*. Her poems treat themes of melancholy, love, and loss, with somber allusions to Petrarchan poetry and geography. For instance, she writes, "The mountains last and send their rivers down— / The towering Mont Ventoux of love still pours / Out of her secret cellarage to fill / The poet's brook that bears the heart away, / That carries off our loves into the sea" ("Atlantic Wall" IV, lines 11–15, 27).²⁸

Always an adroit reader and felicitous writer, Colie traces rivulets of poetic inspiration and outpouring of lost love back to the environment of Mont Ventoux. She maps Petrarch's errancy onto her own experience of love-melancholy and despair through her deft intertextual allusions.²⁹ In becoming a Petrarchan poet, Colie connects herself to a long line of women readers and writers of Petrarchan form.³⁰ She also demonstrates how Petrarch's aqueous images can be a source of consolation, as Petrarch's consolatory works will attest.

The pursuit of writing, of loving, and, as narration of the ascent of Mont Ventoux makes clear, of spiritual salvation are all for Petrarch errant. He relates these quests repeatedly back to his own wayward mind, a disclosure that makes him more vulnerable in his powerful art. When we pay closer attention, the manly exceptionalism, the overcoming narrative that many Petrarchan scholars attribute to the story, is questioned, diverted, and, I suggest, crippled in its elaboration. Many of the Renaissance ideals that Petrarch is supposed to have embodied are thus confronted with emphasis on error, vulnerability, and variability. Petrarch's productive error is significant in part for this project, moreover, because it resonates with disability gain. It shows how, even in the texts that are thought to be most emblematic of the Renaissance, there are rays of what Eli Clare calls brilliant imperfection, as I will elaborate. The mountain is thus far more than a physical challenge for Petrarch to overcome. But why is Petrarch central to a book about disability in the Renaissance?

Mental Disability: The "Secret" of the *Secretum*

Petrarch began writing the *Secretum* (ca. 1342–1343) in Vaucluse at the source of the Sorgue near Mont Ventoux (Wilkins xvi). The narrator's disclosure of mental disability and its consolation constitute the work. Ugo Dotti argues that mental "perturbationes" comprise "il tema cioè che costituisce la vera struttura del libro e la sua stessa radice" ("the theme which constitutes the true structure of the book and its very root" 162). I may be the first to reclaim Petrarch as a disabled writer, but scholars note that "his life and works were dominated by a virulent form of ennui" (Kuhn 68) and call Petrarch a "fundamentally melancholic and 'accidioso' writer" (Zampini 3). Through his consolatory writing, moreover, "Petrarch broadly formulated for himself a special role as a consoler and rhetorical healer" (McClure 18), which makes the *Secretum* a source of consolation to subsequent disabled readers.

This highly personal text,³¹ which George McClure calls "Petrarch's self-consolation" (18–29),³² takes the form of a Ciceronian dialogue.³³ The proem

of the work opens with the narrator Franciscus “anxium atque pervigilem” (“wide awake with anxiety” Proem 1. 1; 5).³⁴ A stunning woman suddenly appears to him, much as the allegorical figure of Philosophy appears to Boethius in *The Consolation of Philosophy* (523 CE). This apparition thus sets up generic expectations of consolation. She reassures him that “Errores tuos miserata, de longinquo tempestivum tibi auxilium laturo descendi” (“I pity your errors, and I have descended from a distant place to bring you some much-needed help” Proem 1. 2; 5). With a playful but obscure reference to Petrarch’s unfinished epic, which she calls “Africa nostra” (“our Africa”), the woman reveals herself to be “veritatem” (“Truth” Proem 2. 1–2, 5–6).³⁵ This is a vote of confidence for Petrarch as a writer. Yet this recognition and the whole conversation with Truth only comes about because of Franciscus’s mental suffering, vulnerability, and errors.

Franciscus then notices “virum iuxta grandevum ac multa maiestate venerandum” (“an old man, of venerable and majestic appearance” Proem 2. 4; 6), whom he recognizes as St. Augustine. Truth addresses Augustine’s character in the dialogue, named Augustinus, explaining that Franciscus “periculosa et longa egritudine tentus sit, que eo propinquior morti est quo eger ipse a proprii morbi cognitione remotior!” (“is suffering from a long and dangerous illness, an illness which is the more likely to prove fatal the less he understands it!” Proem 3. 2; 7). Truth reminds Augustinus of his own, similar suffering and implores him to console Franciscus as follows:

Quod cum ita sit, passionum expertarum curator optime, . . . silentium tamen istud, ut sacra et michi singulariter accepta voce discutias oro, tentans si qua ope languores tam graves emollire queas.

So I beg you, who are the best person to heal passions from which you yourself have suffered, . . . to break that silence with your sacred voice, which I love so much, and see if you can by some means raise him from his dreadful prostration. (Proem 3. 3; 7)

Although the precise nature of Franciscus’s “periculosa et longa egritudine” (“long and dangerous illness”) has not yet been disclosed, Augustinus becomes a consoler and potential healer based on his own experience of mental suffering. With “illa de singulis in silentio iudicante” (“[Truth] a silent judge on every single point” Proem 3. 4; 7), Franciscus and Augustinus engage in a three-day dialogue that wanders through general consolations for adversity,

specific identification and disclosure of Franciscus's mental disability, and Franciscus's resistance to the rooting out of this illness with crip authority.

Even in the work's proem, key concepts of this study are evident. Petrarch foregrounds {disability} as the central concern of this {disability narrative}. He establishes generic expectations for {consolation}. He calls on Augustine based on the {authority} the saint derives from his own suffering. Petrarch also elevates his own authority in a {crip} manner, as his persona Franciscus's disability brings about Truth's visit and authorizes the creation of the work.

The rest of this section focuses on Petrarch's engagement with ancient and monastic traditions of mental disability to understand his own. We can, in turn, learn from Petrarch's disability discourse to nuance our understanding of mental disability now. Palliative consolation based in reading and writing practices offers prosthetic aid and fosters cripistemology, or disability know-how. The text elaborates crip authority with sly use of the modesty topos, intertextual allusions, and substitutions that are indicative of disability *metis*, or rhetorical workaroud. Franciscus admits a dark pleasure in his suffering, anticipating later associations of creative genius with melancholy. Franciscus resists Augustinus's proffered cure in the treatise in contentious dialogue. Ultimately, Franciscus refuses to give up the alleged sources of his suffering, which are also, in part, the sources of his success.

At its heart and at the midpoint of the text, the *Secretum* discloses mental disability. Augustinus names Franciscus's malady: "Habet te funesta quedam pestis animi, quam accidiam moderni, veteres egritudinem dixerunt" ("You have a deadly plague of the mind, the moderns call it acedia, the ancients *egritudo*" *Sec.* 2. 13. 1; trans. mine). The condition is sustained and severe, for as Augustinus states, "[D]iu per hunc graviterque vexatus es" ("It has been a grave affliction of yours for a long time" 2. 13. 1; 60). Franciscus affirms this is the case, stating:

Fateor, et illud accedit quod omnibus ferme quibus angor, aliquid, licet falsi, dulcoris immixtum est; in hac autem tristitia et aspera et misera et horrenda omnia, apertaue semper ad desperationem via et quicquid infelices animas urget in interitum. Ad hec, et reliquarum passionum ut crebros sic breves et momentaneos experior insultus; hec autem pestis tam tenaciter me arripit interdum, ut integros dies noctesque illigatum torqueat, quod michi tempus non lucis aut vite, sed tartaree noctis et acerbissime mortis instar est. Et (qui supremus miseriarum cumulus dici potest) sic lacrimis et doloribus pascor, atra quadam cum voluptate, ut invitus avellar.

I admit that. Moreover, in all the other ills which distress me there is something, however delusory, which is pleasurable; in this sadness, on the other hand, all is cruel and wretched and horrible, the way to despair is always open, and everything conspires to drive unhappy souls to their destruction. To make things worse, while other afflictions launch attacks which are frequent but short-lived, this sickness takes such a hold on me at times that I am in torment for days and nights on end; I endure a period, not of light and life, but infernal night and the semblance of bitter death. And (what is the worst of all miseries) I feed on my tears and cry with a sort of dark pleasure, so that it is only with great reluctance that I can tear myself away from them. (2. 13. 1–2; 60)

Franciscus's avowal "Fateor," which can be translated as "I confess," "I admit," or "I disclose," reveals the secret of the *Secretum* to be mental disability.

The terms Augustinus uses to diagnose Franciscus—*aegritudo* and *acedia*—each have their own meanings and traditions.³⁶ As Augustinus and Franciscus attest (2. 15. 9; 69), Petrarch's understanding of *aegritudo* comes from authoritative, ancient works of consolation, including Cicero's *Tusculan Disputations* and Lucius Annaeus Seneca's *Epistolae morales ad Lucilium* (ca. 65 CE) and *De tranquillitate animi* (ca. 60 CE). Petrarch relies on Cicero for the definition, gravity, and causes of *aegritudo*; he turns to Seneca for its lived experience of mental wandering, sociospatial factors, and *atra voluptas*, or dark pleasure.

Petrarch's affinity for the *Tusculan Disputations* is undisputed.³⁷ As McClure avers, it is "the principal single source for Petrarch's psychological theory" (25). It offers general advice on consolation and comforts mental and physical disabilities. To define *aegritudo*, Petrarch draws on Cicero, who elaborates the term as "*molestiam, sollicitudinem, angorem*" ("vexation, anxiety, and anguish" *Tusc. disp.* 3. 12; 253). These words all appear in the *Secretum* to describe Franciscus's mental disability.³⁸ Cicero and Petrarch believe *aegritudo* results from the four perturbations of the mind.³⁹ In this sense, *aegritudo* is a natural occurrence for all people based in circumstance and does not result from an underlying humoral predisposition or imbalance.

Aegritudo is gravely perilous. Cicero likens it to physical torture that destroys the mind:

[T]um carnificina est aegritudo. . . . tabem, cruciatum, ad afflictionem, foeditatem; lacerat, exest animum planeque conficit.

[*Aegritudo*] means being actually put upon the rack. . . . [I]t means decay, torture, agony, hideousness; it rends and corrodes the soul and brings it to absolute ruin. (*Tusc. disp.* 3. 13; 259)

Tortuous, soul-crushing severity also characterizes Franciscus's mental anguish. He similarly decries his *aegritudo* in his disclosure of mental disability cited in full above (*Sec.* 2. 13. 1–2; 60).

Aegritudo, moreover, is caused by present circumstances. Cicero explains that it “est opinio [opinio] magni mali praesentis et quidem recens opinio talis mali, ut in eo rectum videatur esse angī” (“is the idea of a serious present evil and indeed an idea freshly conceived of an evil of such sort that it seems a due reason for anguish” *Tusc. disp.* 3. 12; 255). For Franciscus, distress also resides in the present:

Nullum in me adeo vetustum vulnus ut oblivione deletum sit; recentia sunt cuncta que cruciant. Et siquid tempore potuisset aboleri, tam crebro locum repetiit fortuna, ut hians vulnus nulla unquam cicatrix astrinxerit.

I have no wound so old that it might be forgotten; all the things that trouble me are recent. And, even if there were a wound that time had healed, fate strikes so often in the same place that no scar could grow over it. (*Sec.* 2. 13. 7; 61)

Franciscus's mental disability is cumulative and raw; it is a mental wound that will not heal.⁴⁰ It is brought on by his circumstances, which he grieves throughout the dialogue.

Seneca's consolatory dialogue *De tranquillitate animi* (*On the Tranquility of the Mind*) also informs Petrarch's narration of the lived experience of *aegritudo*, including mental instability and sociospatial environment.⁴¹ Seneca's friend Annaeus Serenus complains that his mental condition is unstable and makes him waver in all things. He implores Seneca to help him “si quod habes remedium, quo hanc fluctuationem meam sistas” (“if you have any remedy by which you could stop this fluctuation of mine” *Tranq. anim.* 1. 18; 211). Seneca states that Serenus lacks “stabilem animi” (“stability of mind”) and seeks “tranquillitatem” (“tranquility” 2. 3; 213). He explains, “Innumerabiles deinceps proprietates sunt” (“The characteristics of the malady are countless in number” 2. 7; 215, 217). Those with “intemperie animi et cupiditatibus timidis” (“a lack of mental poise and . . . timid or unfulfilled desires”) exist in a state

of suspense and “semper instabiles mobilesque sunt” (“are always unstable and changeable” 2. 7; 217). This ultimately results in “taedium et displicentia sui et nusquam residentis animi volutatio” (“boredom and dissatisfaction and the vacillation of a mind that nowhere finds rest” 2. 10; 217). Franciscus also complains of his fluctuating mind, which Augustinus affirms: “[T]uque inops consilii modo huc modo illuc mira fluctuatione volvaris, nusquam integer, nusquam totus” (“You lack all discernment, and you veer this way and that in a very strange fashion, never single-minded and never healthy” *Sec.* 1. 15. 10; 34). This condition, moreover, is related to one’s environment.

Petrarch and Seneca share a focus on the role of socialization and spatial environment in enabling and disabling the impaired mind. Too much solitude frustrates a vigorous mind, but the stress of urban life exacerbates mental distress. Seneca suggests that for some,

domum, solitudinem, parietes non fert, invitus aspicit se sibi relictum.
Hinc illud est taedium et displicentia sui et nusquam residentis animi
volutatio.

the mind cannot endure home, solitude, and the walls of a room, and sees with dislike that it has been left to itself. From this comes that boredom and dissatisfaction and the vacillation of a mind that nowhere finds rest. (*Tranq. anim.* 2. 9–10; 217)

Yet travel does not provide a remedy either: “Inde peregrinationes suscipiuntur vagae et in via litora pererrantur et modo mari se modo terra experitur semper praesentibus infesta levitas” (“Hence men undertake wide-ranging travel, and wander over remote shores, and their fickleness, always discontented with the present, gives proof of itself now on land and now on sea” 2. 13; 221).⁴² Although public life affords the most opportunity to do good, the world is corrupt and thus disturbing to vulnerable minds. Appropriate location and occupation can therefore mitigate the condition. A balanced private life out of the limelight of public service with discrete contributions to the community best supports a tranquil mind (3. 1–4; 223, 225).

The *Secretum* similarly addresses sociospatial contributions to mental disability.⁴³ Franciscus laments the mental stress of urban life:

Quis vite mee tedia et quotidianum fastidium sufficienter exprimat,
mestissimam turbulentissimamque urbem terrarum omnium, angus-
tissimam atque ultimam sentinam et totius orbis sordibus exundan-

tem? Quis verbis equet que passim nauseam concitanti [concitant] . . . tam denique discordantes animos, artesque tam varias, tantum confusis vocibus clamorem, et populi inter se arietantis incursum? Que omnia et sensus melioribus assuetos conficiunt et generosis animis eripiunt quietem et studia bonarum artium interpellant.

Who has any idea of what I suffer daily in the gloomiest and most unruly city on earth, a bottomless choking cesspit overflowing with the filth of the whole world? Who could describe the nausea which rises at every step I take? . . . There are so many unruly souls, so many trades being plied, such a confusion of shouts, such a crowd of people stumbling into each other. All this wounds the feelings of those who are used to better things, destroying their peace of mind and interrupting any worthwhile pursuits. (*Sec.* 2. 15. 6–7; 68)

Augustinus agrees that urban life is stressful, but he also indicates that a tranquil mind is less vulnerable to environmental stress (2. 15. 9; 69). He then recommends an unspecified letter and the “*De tranquillitate animi*” of Seneca,⁴⁴ and he reminds Franciscus that in the *Tusculan Disputations* “habes et de tota hac mentis egritudine tollenda librum III. Ciceronis egregium” (“you also have for removing all manner of mental distress Cicero’s extraordinary book III” 2. 15. 9; trans. mine). Petrarch thus plumbed Seneca and Cicero for his understanding of *aegritudo*.

Petrarch joins the ancient concept of *aegritudo* with the medieval concept of *acedia*, which is associated with a solitary, monastic life. *Acedia* has a long, complicated history, but as McClure states succinctly, “It is the deadly sin, and the part of Christian psychology that, along with its sister sin *tristitia*, most approximated depression and melancholy” (26).⁴⁵ Augustinus’s diagnosis of Franciscus occurs in the context of a penitential examination of the sins to which Franciscus could be liable.⁴⁶

Petrarch does not specify sources for his knowledge of *acedia* as he does for *aegritudo*,⁴⁷ but the terms overlap in at least three aspects: mental fluctuation, displeasure with self, and contempt for the world more broadly.⁴⁸ The mental instability that Seneca addresses and which the *Secretum* explores is typical of both *aegritudo* and *acedia*. It is also evident in confessional aspects of the letter relating to the ascent of Mont Ventoux. Augustinus and Franciscus frequently remark upon fluctuations in Franciscus’s mind,⁴⁹ and these aspects of his disability are indicated for both *aegritudo* and *acedia*.

Similarly, world-weariness is present in both traditions. After diagnosing his mental disability, Augustinus asks Franciscus what most exacerbates it:

- F. Quicquid primum video, quicquid audio, quicquid sentio.
 A. Pape! nil ne tibi placet ex omnibus?
 F. Aut nichil aut perpauca quidem. . . .
 A. Totum est hoc eius quam dixi accidie. Tua omnia tibi displicent.
 F. Everything I see around me, everything I hear, and everything I touch.
 A. Good heavens! Is there really nothing you like?
 F. Nothing; or at least very little. . . .
 A. This is quite typical of what I call acedia. Everything you have to do displeases you. (2. 13. 9–10; 62)

Displeasure from acedia relates back to ancient formulations of mental disability. Seneca identifies it as being “sibi displicere” (“dissatisfied with oneself” *Tranq. anim.* 2. 9; 216). It also can extend to “odium generis humani” (“hatred of the whole human race” 15. 1; 273). Franciscus experiences this universal displeasure: “Accedit et humane conditionis odium atque contemptus, quibus omnibus oppressus non mestissimus esse non valeo” (“Add to that my loathing and contempt for the human condition, and you will see that I can hardly be other than gloomy” *Sec.* 2. 13. 7–8; 61–62). Petrarchan world-weariness thus aligns both with ancient *aegritudo* and spiritual acedia.⁵⁰

Some elements of Franciscus’s mental disability do not pertain to acedia. For instance, Franciscus reports pleasure in his mental pain, which Wenzel stipulates is “totally foreign” (“Petrarch’s” 45) to the tradition of acedia. In disclosing his disability, Franciscus admits that “sic lacrimis et doloribus pascor, atra quadam cum voluptate, ut invitus avellar” (“I feed on my tears and cry with a sort of dark pleasure, so that it is only with great reluctance that I can tear myself away from them” 2. 13. 2; 60). Scholars connect this pleasurable pain with love-melancholy in ancient medical discourse and with Petrarch’s *Rime sparse*.⁵¹ Augustinus attributes it to love for Laura (*Sec.* 3. 7. 1–3; 90–91), to which Franciscus responds, “[F]ateor, quoniam cuncta, que memoras, de medio experientie libro michi videris excerptisse” (“[I admit] You’re right. All the things you say are like excerpts from the book of my experiences” 3. 7. 11; 93). Again, Franciscus affirms, “fateor,” I admit or disclose, to Augustinus’s diagnosis.

Atra voluptas, or dark pleasure, does pertain to the ancient discourse of *aegritudo*. Seneca likens it to an infected wound that the sufferer cannot let be:

Ut ulcera quaedam nocituras manus adpetunt et tactu gaudent, et foedam corporum scabiem delectat quicquid exasperat, non aliter dixerim his mentibus, in quas cupiditates velut mala ulcera eruperunt, voluptati esse laborem vexationemque.

Just as there are some sores which crave the hands that will hurt them and rejoice to be touched, and as a foul itch of the body delights in whatever scratches, exactly so, I would say, do these minds upon which, so to speak, desires have broken out like wicked sores find pleasure in toil and vexation. (*Tranq. anim.* 2. 11–12; 219)

Likening this dark pleasure to tossing and turning in bed, Seneca further observes, “Sunt enim quaedam, quae corpus quoque nostrum cum quodam dolore delectent” (“For there are certain things that delight our body also while causing it a sort of pain” 2. 12; 219). Petrarch thus need not have relied on the medical discourse of love-melancholy to include *atra voluptas* in Franciscus’s reported symptoms.⁵²

Attending to Petrarch’s terms for mental disability shows that the definition and lived experience of *aegritudo* and *acedia* do not differ significantly in the *Secretum*. Petrarch did not hesitate to think of mental disability in a trans-historic manner. As Augustinus states, “[Q]uam accidiam moderni, veteres egritudinem dixerunt” (“The moderns call it *acedia*, the ancients *aegritudo*” 2. 13. 1; trans. mine). I take Franciscus at his word when he exclaims: “Hanc sive egritudinem, sive accidiam, sive quid aliud esse diffinis haud magnifacio; ipsa de re convenit” (“It hardly matters whether you call it [*aegritudo*] or *acedia*, we are in agreement [*convenit*] on the nature of the affliction” 2. 13. 8; 62). Petrarch’s willingness to embrace ancient and more recent articulations of mental disability—his apparent openness to learn from their conjunction—supports a disability studies reading of his text now. The dialogue allows mental disability in different times and places to *convenire*—to agree or to come together. Learning from the past thus assists Petrarch in reckoning with and consoling disability in his present.

Consoling Disability, Resisting Cure

Consolatory remedies that are textual in practice appeal most to Franciscus. Reading and annotating consolatory texts functions as a prosthesis for Franciscus’s wayward memory. Reframing stressful circumstances with soothing metaphors further helps Franciscus to allay his anxiety. These consolation

methods are palliative, a therapy of words he may remember and revise over time. Nevertheless, Franciscus uses textual allusion and substitution to resist Augustinus's demands for cure. By citing consolatory authorities in a sly manner, Franciscus demonstrates disability *metis*. By pushing back in the dialogue, Franciscus harnesses his consolatory reading and writing knowledge as a crip resistance to cure.

Lamenting how the stress of urban life blocks his ability to think and write, Franciscus exclaims, "I nunc, et honestis cogitationibus incumbe! I nunc et versus tecum compone canoros" ("In these circumstances how can I achieve anything or even think straight? Go now and compose harmonious verse" *Sec.* 2. 15. 7; 69). Augustinus recommends reading works by Seneca and Cicero, which Franciscus says he has read but forgets when he needs them (2. 15. 9; 69). Augustinus prescribes close reading and careful annotation. If Franciscus could "suis locis notas certas impresseris" ("imprint in their own places fixed notes" 2. 16. 1; trans. mine), he could benefit more from his reading. Augustinus expands on his consolatory reading method as follows:

Quotiens legenti salutare se se offerunt sententiae . . . noli viribus ingenii fidere, sed illas in memoriae penetralibus absconde multoque studio tibi familiares effice; ut, quod experti solent medici, quocumque loco vel tempore dilationis impatiens morbus invaserit, habeas velut in animo conscripta remedia.

Every time you come across something [salubrious] in your reading . . . [don't just rely on the power of your natural talent,] make sure it is deeply impressed on your memory, and become so familiar with it that—like doctors when they are having to cope with illnesses which must be dealt with at once—you have the prescription already written out in your mind, so to speak. (2. 16. 2; 69–70)

Petrarch's extensive notation in his books is well known. The practice of reading, note taking, and remembering aligns with the art of memory,⁵³ but Augustinus recommends the method as a consolatory therapy specifically.

In the context of disability studies, Katherine Ott defines prostheses "within the broad category of assistive devices that people use to support what they want to do. Assistive devices, in general, enhance such capacities as mobility and agility, sensory apprehension, communication, and cognitive action" (140). I suggest that consolatory reading in the *Secretum* is prosthetic in its communicative and cognitive applications. When Franciscus responds

to Augustinus's reading advice by interpreting Virgil's representation of the winds of Aeolus in book 1 of the *Aeneid* as an allegory for controlling the passions,⁵⁴ Augustinus approves the interpretation, but he pushes him further. He tells him not simply to identify therapeutic passages but to use them as a remedy for his own mental disability to help him with

de qua multa iam diu loquimur, pestem, aliquid semper excogita; quod cum intenta tibi ex lectione contigerit, imprime sententiis utilibus (ut incipiens dixeram) certas notas, quibus velut uncis memoria volentes abire contineas. Hoc equidem presidio consistes immobilis cum adversus cetera turn contra animi tristitiam, que umbra velut pestilentissima virtutum semina et omnes ingeniorum fructus enecat.

especially that sickness of which we have already talked so much. [Whenever you lay hands on such passages through your strenuous reading], you must mark the helpful passages very clearly, as I said to begin with: they will then be held in the memory as if by hooks, when they would otherwise slip away. With such help you will stand firm against all ills, and particularly against that sadness in the soul which, like a pestilential cloud, kills off the seeds of virtue and all the fruits of the intellect. (2. 16. 10; 71–72)

About this therapeutic, consolatory reading practice, Andrea Torre observes, “In the *Secretum*, medical treatment is represented as an education to read, in a mnemonically oriented way, books, the world, and one's self” (82).⁵⁵ If consolatory reading becomes a way of constituting the self, this kind of reading presumes that the self in question is disabled. It is not enough for Franciscus, who admits his memory is imperfect and that his thoughts are errant, to rely on his “genius” or native talents alone. This prescribed form of reading with annotations that serve like *uncis*, or hooks, that can secure memories in the mind works as a prosthesis.

This is not the only time Petrarch characterizes his relationship with books as prosthetic. He speaks about his interdependence with the same little volume of the *Confessions* on which he performs sortilege during his ascent of Mont Ventoux as prosthetic. Resolving to give the book to his younger friend Luigi Marsili (ca. 1342–1394) because “ita ut iam senex a sene sine ingenti difficultate legi nequeat” (“being old, it cannot be read by an old man without enormous difficulty” *Sen.* 15. 7; 581), Petrarch imagines his own aging process and his fading eyesight as parallel to his beloved book and the fading of its

ink. He goes on to remark, “[I]ta ut iam prope manus mea et liber unum esse viderentur, sic inseparabiles usu perpetuo facti erant” (“My hands and the book seemed to be one, so inseparable had they become from [perpetual use]” *Sen.* 15. 7; 581). He explains how it has become for him what Edwards calls, commenting on this passage, “a textual prosthesis, an inseparable extension of his hand” (9). Prosthesis is not cure, it does not make disability disappear, but it can be a consolation.⁵⁶

The only other method of consolation to which Franciscus consents is Augustinus’s related recommendation to desensitize himself to stressors through writerly means. Augustinus advises him to reframe the tumult of distressing sounds and emotions with aqueous metaphors and similes. This therapy has ancient sources. In the *Epistolae morales ad Lucilium*, Seneca endures the stress of his noisy, urban environment by imagining the cacophony to be the sound of falling water: “At mehercules ego istum fremitum non magis curo quam fluctum aut deiectum aquae” (“But I assure you that this racket means no more to me than the sound of waves or falling water” 56. 3; 375). Augustinus similarly suggests that Franciscus adjust to city noise by imagining it to be the sound of water: “Ubi et consuetudo longior profuerit, si strepitum populorum velut cadentis aque sonitum aures tuas edocueris cum delectatione percipere” (“In the long term it would also be helpful if you could accustom yourself to listening to the din of human beings with some pleasure, as though it were the sound of falling water” *Sec.* 2. 16. 12; 72). Given how often Petrarch writes about flowing water in his descriptions of the river Sorgue and Fontaine de Vaucluse, it makes sense that this would be a comforting metaphor. Augustinus then stretches these similes to include metaphors of having shelter in a storm and observing a shipwreck from shore as follows:

[P]ectus enim serenum et tranquillum frustra vel peregrine circum-eunt nubes vel circumtonat externus fragor. Itaque velut insistens sicco litori tutus, aliorum naufragium spectabis et miserabiles fluitantium voces tacitus excipies; quantum ve tibi turbidum spectaculum compassionis attulerit, tantum gaudii afferet proprie sortis, alienis periculis collata, securitas.

A [serene and tranquil heart] is unaffected by the clouds which drift around it and the thunder which resounds outside it. You will stand safely on the shore watching others being shipwrecked and hearing their cries in silence. The spectacle will indeed arouse your pity; but

your own safety, compared with the others' danger, will arouse just as much pleasure. (2. 16. 13; 72)⁵⁷

Consolatory writing moves from placid similes of hearing falling water to having shelter in a storm to observing victims of shipwreck from the shore. Franciscus uses similar metaphorical logic to connect the winds of Aeolus and the passions in Virgil's *Aeneid* (Sec. 2. 16. 5; 70). These techniques for calming the emotions are based in a textual set of operations, ones for which Franciscus already has demonstrable capability. The difference is that Franciscus interprets Virgil's story as a metaphor for the control of the passions, whereas Augustinus advises Franciscus to invent metaphors to assuage his own sensations and emotions. It is also intriguing that these aqueous images—flowing water, rainstorms, shipwrecks—appear throughout Petrarch's works. Perhaps they could also have a prosthetic function, being fixed like hooks in his writing to both express and reframe his *aegritudo* and *acedia*.

Consolatory reading and writing in disability narrative can be considered a premodern cripistemology, or a way of “thinking from the critical, social, and personal position of disability,” including the “sometimes-elusive crip subjectivities informed by psychological, emotional, and other invisible or undocumented disabilities” (Johnson and McRuer 134). Petrarch's disclosure of disability in the *Secretum* makes this cripistemology legible to him as well as readers and writers who follow. These palliative forms of consolation are not only more amenable to Franciscus; they provide him with a means of resisting unwanted demands for cure.

The treatise presents a variety of consolatory methods, as did Cicero. When it came to his self-consolation, he tried them all “ut fere nos in Consolatione omnia in consolationem unam coniecimus; erat enim in tumore animus et omnis in eo temptabatur curatio” (“pretty nearly as in my Consolation I threw them all into one attempt at consolation; for my soul was in a feverish state and I attempted every means of curing its condition” *Tusc. disp.* 3. 31; 317). This kitchen sink approach to consolation fits Petrarch's method, insofar as he could experiment with various modes for his own benefit. In other words, posing possible consolations in the mouth of Augustinus allows for possible reactions from Franciscus. Alleviating *aegritudo* with reading and writing holds the most consolatory sway in the *Secretum*. As Panizza avers, Petrarch “explicitly identified these Latin sources of Stoic psychotherapy, recognized their similarity to Augustine and later, more derivative Christian works, exploited their fuller description of mental illness, and found their remedies more helpful” (126). Furthermore, as Gur Zak observes, “The emphasis on

care of soul through spiritual exercises such as reading and writing is central to the thought of Augustine”; nevertheless, Petrarch “departs from [this tradition] in significant ways, a departure that underscores the humanistic nature of his ethics of care of the self” (*Petrarch’s* 86). Divergences from the Augustinian model in particular demonstrate Petrarch’s crip authority.

Petrarch presents his own works as authoritative throughout the *Secretum*. Truth refers to Petrarch’s *Africa*, and Augustinus and Franciscus cite Petrarch alongside authoritative ancient authors. But Petrarch, as on Mont Ventoux, cites authorities to complicate the story he tells rather than to overcome or resolve it. In the lead-up to his diagnosis of Franciscus, Augustinus asks, seemingly rhetorically, what good book learning has done for Franciscus. Augustinus then voices a version of the passage that Petrarch lands upon in the sortilege atop Mont Ventoux as follows:

Quanquam vel multa nosse quid relevat si, cum celi terreque ambitum, si, cum maris spatium et astrorum cursus herbarumque virtutes ac lapidum et nature secreta didiceritis, vobis estis incogniti?

What is the use of knowing so much—the extent of earth and sky, the expanse of the sea, the stars in their courses, the qualities of plants and stones, all the secrets of nature—if you do not know yourself? (*Sec.* 2. 7; 38)

The ability to make intertextual connections is one answer to the question about the value of book learning. The passage cited here echoes and amplifies the excerpt from book 10 of the *Confessions* selected at random on Mont Ventoux, where Petrarch relates his error. It appears again here in the *Secretum* with no reference to mountains and with a change of sentence form, person, and syntax that underscores Petrarch’s sustained mental perturbation. Rather than a declaration about people in the third person, who, being distracted by the wonders of the world, “relinquunt se ipsos” (“overlook themselves” *Fam.* 4. 1. 27; 178), the version of the passage in the *Secretum* is interrogative, in the second person, and ends in the conditional, asking for what good is this knowledge, “vobis estis incogniti?” (“if you do not know yourself?” *Sec.* 2. 7; 38). This passage iterates through Petrarch’s works as a sign of humility, irony, and crip resignification. Petrarch is vulnerable to error and to mental disability; on Mont Ventoux, he does not overcome them, in the *Secretum*, he admits them, but he refuses to give up their causes.

Consolation in the *Secretum* does not equate to cure. As John Fleming observes, Petrarch “recognizes crisis without overcoming it, identifies conflict without resolving it, diagnoses pathology without curing it” (147). The *Secretum* seems to promise to resolve Petrarch’s mental disability through Augustinian conversion, but as in the letter relating the ascent of Mont Ventoux, Petrarch’s narrator will not conform to this model. The figure of Truth suggests that Augustine is the best person to “cure” Franciscus because of their shared experience of suffering, but the *Secretum*’s intertextual allusions to Augustine’s *Confessions* reappropriate and resignify the Augustinian model.

Petrarch’s intertextual play with Augustine creates crip authority and exemplifies what Jay Dolmage calls disability *metis*, a “rhetorical concept of cunning and adaptive intelligence” that “demands a view of the body and embodied thinking as being double and divergent” and that “in a world of chance and change . . . allows us to craft available means for persuasion” (5). Augustine sums up his own experience, explaining that

[c]apillum vulsi, frontem percussi digitosque contorsi; denique complexis genua manibus amplexus amarissimis suspiriis celum aurasque complevi largisque gemitibus solum omne madefeci. Et tamen hec inter idem ille qui fueram mansi, donec alta tandem meditatio omnem miseriam meam ante oculos congescit. Itaque postquam plene volui, ilicet et potui, miraque et felicissima celeritate transformatus sum in alteram Augustinum, cuius historie seriem, ni fallor, ex *Confessionibus* meis nosti.

I too tore my hair out, I too struck myself on the forehead, I too wrung my hands, and finally I too clasped my knees tightly and filled the air and sky with bitter sighs and bathed all the earth around me with my flowing tears. And yet, for all that, I did not change myself until deep meditation had brought all my unhappiness before my eyes. And then, as soon as I really wanted to change, I was able to, and with amazing speed I became a different person, the story of whose life I think you know from my *Confessions*. (*Sec.* 1. 5. 5; 17)

Augustinus discloses his experience of mental instability, equating its outward signs with those of Franciscus while designating them as a thing of the past. Franciscus recognizes aspects of himself in the *Confessions* and responds as follows:

Ex quo fit ut, quotiens *Confessionum* tuarum libros lego, inter duos contrarios affectus, spem videlicet et metum, letis non sine lacrimis interdum legere me arbitrer non alienam sed propriam mee peregrinationis historiam.

Whenever I read your *Confessions*—caught as I am between two contrary feelings, hope and fear, and weeping as I am, but not with bitter tears—at times I have the impression that I am reading not of someone else’s but my own wanderings. (l. 6. 4; 18)

For a text that Petrarch knew as well as the back of his hand, which was so often in his hand that it functioned like a prosthesis, the substitutions that Franciscus makes in his identification with Augustinus’s story are significant. Whereas Augustinus refers to the *Confessions* as “*historie seriem*”—the sequence or chain of his story—Franciscus reads the *Confessions* as akin to “*propriam mee peregrinationis historiam*”—his own story of wandering or error. Kahn puts pressure on Franciscus’s “substitution,” which she argues “marks Franciscus’s ability to identify with Augustine’s wandering, his error, but not with his exemplary conversion” (158). Franciscus is not Augustinus. As Edwards suggests, “There is a large difference, [Franciscus] insists, between the shipwreck (*naufigum*) he endures and the safe haven (*portum*) that Augustinus has reached. The contrast is between a past resolved and a present that remains open” (13). Furthermore, as Carol Quillen avers, the *Secretum* “is less a reading of [the *Confessions*] than an appropriation of Augustine’s authority” (*Rereading* 190). The substitutions evident here and in the sortilege constitute a crip resignification of Augustine’s story; Petrarch has crippled Augustine’s authority to authorize his own disability narrative. As Edwards suggests, Petrarch “fundamentally changed the mechanics of Augustine’s conversion narrative, with important consequences for his own narrative” (13). Disability functions in the *Secretum* like one of the hooks of notation in consolatory reading that help Franciscus to re-member his scattered mind.⁵⁸ The *Secretum* ensures that the lived experience of mental disability is not simply a thing of the past; it may be consoled but will not be forgotten. Franciscus’s resistance to cure could thus be read as affirmation of Petrarch’s wonderfully wandering and errant mind.

The dialogue form also affords crip resistance insofar as it allows Franciscus to dispute with Augustinus.⁵⁹ Franciscus objects to Augustinus’s claim that his unhappiness is voluntary in a manner that negates ableist “no barriers” and moral models of disability. Petrarch puts hardline Stoical views into

the mouth of Augustinus,⁶⁰ who holds forth that anyone who wants to be happy can be by willing it so, “[q]uia qui miseriam suam cupit exuere, modo id vere pleneque cupiat, nequit a tali desiderio frustrari” (“because whoever wishes to discard his unhappiness, provided he wishes it really and truly, can’t fail to have his desire” 1. 1. 5; 11). Franciscus protests as follows:

Quam multi enim sunt, quos vel corporis adversa valitudo, vel carorum mors, vel carcer, vel exilium, vel paupertas, perpetuis premit angoribus, aliaque huius generis, que sicut enumerare longum est, sic tolerare difficile atque miserrimum; que, quamvis sint patientibus permolesta, tamen, ut vides, abiecisce non licet. Dubitari igitur meo iudicio non potest quin multi quidem inviti nolentesque sint miseri.

There are so many who are weighed down by continual anguish—bodily illness, or the death of loved ones, or imprisonment, or exile, or poverty, or other things of that kind; it would take too long to tell them all, and it is difficult and distressing to bear them all. Moreover, however burdensome they are, we cannot, as you see, rid ourselves of them. I have no doubt whatsoever that many people are unhappy who certainly don’t wish to be. (1. 2. 1; 11)

Franciscus roundly rejects Augustinus’s “no barriers” philosophy. He further criticizes Augustinus’s views as inhumane, asking, “[A]ut quis tam ignarus rerum humanarum tamque ab omni mortalium commercio segregatus est” (“Who is so ignorant of mortal affairs, and so cut off from all human society”) so as not to know that miseries “invitis accidere plerunque, volentibus autem nunquam?” (“are unwelcome for the most part, and certainly never willed into existence?” 1. 2. 4; 12). From this he concludes that “verum fit miseriam propriam et novisse et odisse facillimum, depulisse non ita” (“while it is very easy to recognize and hate one’s own unhappiness, getting rid of it is a very different thing” 1. 2. 4; 12). Franciscus’s logic rejects what disability scholars call the moral model of disability, in which disability is a sign of moral weakness or in which a person may be told that they simply are not trying hard enough to overcome their disability. Of particular interest here is Franciscus’s suggestion that accepting adversity, including disability, should be part of human nature—a concept that is later elaborated in the *De remediis*. Augustinus and Franciscus dispute the role of virtue in overcoming unhappiness. They never come to an agreement.⁶¹

By the dialogue’s third day, Franciscus accepts palliative consolation, but

he deflects cure. Augustinus identifies two causes of his mental disability as “Amor et gloria” (“Love & glory” 3. 2. 1; 75), which he calls Franciscus’s adamantine chains (3. 1. 2; 75). Franciscus is having none of this. He objects, “Proh Superi, quid audio! Has ne to catheras vocas, hasque, si patiar, excuties?” (“Heavens, what are you saying? You call them chains? And if I let you, you would take them away from me?” 3. 2. 1; 75). Although Augustinus varies his attempts to combat Franciscus’s desired love and glory, he gains little ground.

Franciscus has learned how to use consolatory reading and writing with disability *metis*. Franciscus parries upsetting condemnations of his love. Consolatory reading forges prosthetic memory hooks for exempla that alleviate distress, but it also provides fodder to justify the causes of that distress. When confronted with Augustinus’s accusation that “[i]nexpugnabili erroris arce consistis” (“you are making a stand in an impregnable fortress of error” 3. 4. 1; 81), he cites Cicero to counter Augustinus. Defending his love, Franciscus exclaims, “[S]uccurritque tullianum illud: ‘Si in hoc erro, libenter erro, neque hunc errorem auferri michi volo, dum vivo’” (“There is support for me in Cicero’s remark: ‘If I am wrong in this, I am happy to be wrong; I don’t want to give up my error as long as I live’” 3. 2. 6; 77). Franciscus is unconcerned when Augustinus points out that this passage is not about love but rather about belief in the immortality of the soul. Augustinus calls this use of the citation out of context “verbis abuteris” (“abuse of the words” 3. 2. 7; trans. mine).⁶² Similarly, when Augustinus insists on Laura’s mortality, Franciscus repurposes storm similes for comfort, exclaiming, “Rapiant venti tamen ista que loquimur, et spargant augurium procelle” (“I hope that a stormy wind will blow away such ill-omened words as we have spoken, and scatter them!” 3. 3. 9; 81). Franciscus hooks his citation of Cicero and invents his storm-scattering simile. He uses them in a sly fashion that is indicative of disability *metis*. Franciscus thus uses consolatory reading and writing to turn the tables on Augustinus.

Franciscus moderates his mental disability with consolation; he does not eradicate it. Though the text is not decisive about these reasons, dark pleasure and the possibility of genial melancholy are brought up as possible explanations for Franciscus’s resistance to cure. In dissuading Franciscus from love, Augustinus compares him with the ancient Greek hero Bellerophon (3. 7. 1; 90).⁶³ I am unaware of any version of Bellerophon’s story that attributes his fall into isolation and mental disability to love-melancholy. Zeus strikes him down for his audacious attempt to summit Mount Olympus on the back of the flying horse Pegasus, who was associated with poetic inspiration. Bello-

phon wanders alone, blinded by thorns that pierce his eyes in his ignominious fall. This myth resonates with Petrarch's ascent of Mont Ventoux. The myth is similarly errant and does not result in a triumphant overcoming. Bellerophon's disability narrative—though it has little to do with love-melancholy—expresses social isolation and pain resulting from and contributing to disability. Although *atra voluptas* does not occur solely due to love-melancholy and has ancient precedent for its expression in *aegritudo*, it gives Franciscus's mental disability texture. There is some pleasure in mental pain. Augustine eventually does convince Franciscus that his love is immoderate, but Franciscus is unwilling to relinquish it. He only consents to a change of location to lessen its effect (3. 9. 13; 100).

Another possible reason for Franciscus's resistance to cure is the association of mental disability and literary genius. Petrarch certainly knew this association from the *De tranquillitate animi*, where Seneca advises that occasionally letting go of mental control enhances mental health and creativity:

Nam sive Graeco poetae credimus "aliquando et insanire iucundum est," sive Platoni "frustra poeticas fores compos sui pepulit," sive Aristoteli "nullum magnum ingenium sine mixtura dementiae fuit": non potest grande aliquid et super ceteros loqui nisi mota mens. Cum vulgaria et solita contempsit instinctuque sacro surrexit excelsior, tunc demum aliquid cecinit grandius ore mortali. Non potest sublime quicquam et in arduo positum contingere, quam diu apud se est; desciscat oportet a solito et efferatur et mordeat frenos et rectorem rapiat suum eoque ferat, quo per se timuisset escendere.

For whether we believe with the Greek poet that "sometimes it is a pleasure also to rave," or with Plato that "the sane mind knocks in vain at the door of poetry," or with Aristotle that "no great genius has ever existed without some touch of madness"—be that as it may, the lofty utterance that rises above the attempts of others is impossible unless the mind is excited. When it has scorned the vulgar and the commonplace, and has soared far aloft fired by divine inspiration, then alone it chants a strain too lofty for mortal lips. So long as it is left to itself, it is impossible for it to reach any sublime and difficult height; it must forsake the common track and be driven to frenzy and champ the bit and run away with its rider and rush to a height that it would have feared to climb by itself. (*Tranq. anim.* 17. 10–11; 285)

This articulation of disability gain associates madness and what would later be referred to as genial melancholy with *vatic*, or divinely inspired poetry.

Nevertheless, Augustinus denies that *vatic* compensation applies to Franciscus, avowing that Franciscus's mental condition is different and ought to repel the muses:

[A]ut quis amor Musas cohiberet, ne a consueto domicilio, tantis turbinibus offense tantaque hospitis alienatione, diffugerent. Nam quod ait Plato: "frustra poeticas fores compos sui pepulit," quodque eius successor Aristotiles: "nullum magnum ingenium sine mixtura dementie," alio spectat, nec ad istas insanias referendum est.

I also wonder what affection could keep the Muses still with you, since they must be displeased by the folly of their host. Plato's assertion that it is useless for him who is sane to knock at the gates of poetry and what his successor Aristotle says: There is no great genius without a touch of madness—these remarks refer to other things, and not to this madness of yours. (3. 10. 5–6; 101)

Here Augustinus refutes that Franciscus's illness is a boon to creativity, thereby blocking one avenue for disability gain. He also makes plain his bias against literary pursuits and wishes Franciscus would quell them. Franciscus declines.

Augustinus demands that Franciscus relinquish writing to avert his desire for glory, the second of his "adamantine chains." He chastises him for writing the *De viris illustribus* and the *Africa* (3. 14. 10–11; 113). The *De viris illustribus* provides consolatory exempla in the *Secretum* and the *De remediis*. Moreover, Franciscus recognizes Truth thanks to her allusion to the *Africa*, which Augustinus cites throughout the dialogue. In this sense, Augustinus's advice seems alien to the project of the *Secretum*. Yet these works did remain unfinished. Perhaps putting this advice in Augustinus's mouth was a consolation.

After a vigorous debate, Franciscus is unwilling to relinquish his so-called adamantine chains. Thanking Augustinus, he draws the discussion to a close, remarking:

Adero michi ipse quantum poterò, et sparsa anime fragmenta recolligam, moraborque mecum sedulo. Sane nunc, dum loquimur, multa me magnaue, quamvis adhuc mortalia, negotia expectant.

I shall keep myself in mind as much as I can; I shall gather up the scattered fragments of my [mind] and [devote attention to the care of myself.] But now, even while we are speaking, there are many important matters (admittedly mortal ones) which demand my attention. (3. 18. 5–6; 125)

Franciscus takes to heart consolatory reading and writing practices to *recol-ligere*, to gather again or re-collect, the errant fragments of his distressed mind. Yet he is unwilling to abandon what Augustinus deems the causes of his mental disability. He states that “desiderium frenare non valeo” (“I cannot restrain my desires” 3. 18. 7; 125). Augustinus concedes “sic eat, quando aliter esse non potest” (“let things carry on like this, since they cannot be otherwise” 3. 18. 8; 125). Like the ending of the letter relating the ascent of Mont Ventoux, the *Secretum* closes with deferral and prayer for the future. Franciscus opines: “[U]t et duce Deo integer ex tot anfractibus evadam . . . subsidantque fluctus animi, sileat mundus et fortuna non obstrepat” (“I pray that I may issue safely from such winding ways. . . . I hope [my mind’s fluctuations will subside], the world around me fall silent, and fortune stop troubling me” 3. 18. 8; 125). He has profited from the dialogue, but he does not comply with Augustinus’s cure.

The *Secretum* comes back into focus as an autoconsolation in Franciscus’s reasons for writing it. He claims to transcribe the discussion so as not to forget it:

[S]ed ut dulcedinem, quam semel ex colloctione percepi, quotiens libuerit ex lectione percipiam. Tuque ideo, libelle, conventus hominum fugiens, mecum mansisse contentus eris, nominis proprii non immemor. Secretum enim meum es et diceris; michique in altioribus occupato, ut unumquodque in abdito dictum meministi, in abdito memorabis.

My hope is that I may, whenever I read it, experience once again the pleasure which I had in the conversation itself. Therefore, little book, avoid the places where men assemble, and be content to stay with me, remembering the name which I have given you. You are my Secret Book, and so you shall be called. When I think about important matters, what you have recorded in secret will be recalled in secret. (Proem 3. 4. 1; 8)

Petrarch left the book unpublished during his lifetime. The Latin word *secretum* means not only a secret but also a place for storing valued books or, in the context of the art of memory, a mental space for storing treasured recollections (Carruthers 26–27). This relates to Augustine’s consolatory reading therapy. Scholars agree that Petrarch worked on the book for many years. The writing and revision of it—the demand to invent more figures of emotion—may also thus correspond with consolatory writing. Petrarch extends these powerful methods of consolation to a broader audience in his *De remediis*.

The *Secretum* goes beyond disclosure of disability to provide self-consolation for Petrarch’s mental distress. Its aim is palliative, not curative. Petrarch reappropriates the authority of St. Augustine and crafts crip authority as a writer of disability narrative. Its generic form, wayward intertextuality, and crip resistance to cure result in a conflicted but hopeful portrayal of disability that allows for both advantages and disadvantages in its experience. As the next section explores, Petrarch takes seriously Augustine’s advice in the *Secretum* to make “a manual of mental remedies; the *De remediis* gives literary form to that therapeutic ideal” (McClure 47).

The *De remediis*: Dignifying Disability

Petrarch returns to the topic of mental disability in his *De remediis*.⁶⁴ Finished in 1366, it had a wide distribution throughout early modern Europe and beyond.⁶⁵ It, in fact, “may be [Petrarch]’s most influential treatise” (Enenkel, “Petarca” n.p.). Petrarch relies on a variety of consolatory texts for the content of the work;⁶⁶ he bases the structure of *De remediis* on the brief collection of consolatory dialogues titled *De remediis fortuitorum*, which he thought was written by Seneca (*De rem.* 1. Preface; 1).⁶⁷ The treatise is divided into two books of dialogues with allegorical speakers based in the four perturbations of the mind.⁶⁸ In the first, the character *Ratio* (Reason) advises *Gaudium* (Joy) and *Spes* (Hope) how to handle good fortune in a circumspect manner, and in the second, Reason treats the bad fortune lamented by *Dolor* (Sorrow) and *Metus* (Fear).⁶⁹ The treatise advises throughout how to cope with mental and physical disability.

To disclose the *De remediis*’s consolatory aims and disability discourse, this section first examines each of the two books’ prefaces, which characterize human existence as full of error and strife but promise consolation for their readers. It next considers how the *De remediis* comforts mental disability in dialogues that address tranquility and perturbation of the mind. The *De remediis* expands on themes already touched upon in the *Secretum*. For the

alleviation of *aegritudo*, it adds the injunction to contemplate the variety of creation and dignity of human beings including disability. It also expands on the relation between literary creativity and mental disability. Crip authority is evident both in humorous retorts and in objection to the most moralistic of Reason's advice, especially in the remarkable dialogue on pain (2. 114). The *De remediis* thus emphasizes disability gain while it leaves space for lamentation and resistance to cure.

In tune with the ascent of Mont Ventoux and the *Secretum*, the *De remediis*'s first preface broadcasts humans' tendency for error. Misery always accompanies humans (1. Preface; 1). What is worse, we seek out this misery, making life "miserandum ac triste negotium effecimus, cuius initium cecitas et oblivio possidet, progressum labor, dolor exitum, error omnia" ("a wretched and woe-ful chore—its entrance blind insentience, its progress toil, its exit pain, and all of it, error" 1. Preface; 1). Petrarch evokes the primacy of error in all of human existence, from birth to death.

The preface to the second book amplifies the theme of error by adopting the pre-Socratic philosopher Heraclitus's concept of strife.⁷⁰ Petrarch opens the preface claiming:

Ex omnibus que vel michi lecta placuerint vel audita, nichil pene vel insedit altius, vel tenacius inhesit, vel crebrius ad memoriam rediit, quam illud Heracliti: Omnia secundum litem fieri.

Of all I have read or heard that has pleased me, hardly anything is more important, more deeply imprinted in my mind or more often remembered, than the saying of Heraclitus: everything exists by strife.
(2. Preface; 1)

A long disquisition ensues on how all creation is in a constant state of strife, including the elements, plants, and animals, culminating in the antagonism of human beings: "Ad summam ergo, omnia, sed in primis omnis hominum vita, lis quedam est" ("In short, therefore, the life of man, more so than anything else, consists of strife" 2. Preface 12). Human antagonism plays out, moreover, "neque contra aliud individuum . . . et in intimis anime penetrabilibus: quisque secum assidue bellum habet" ("not against other individuals, but against ourselves. This is constant warfare . . . within the secret recesses of the mind" 2. Preface 12). Assuaging this mental strife is the central aim of the treatise.

Rather than consulting "his quos Physicos dicunt" ("those who call them-

selves *physici*—natural scientists” 2. Preface; 12), the *De remediis* offers a consoling “*medicamenta verborum*” (“medication by words” 1. Preface; 10). This remedy may be thought of as a premodern version of “‘psychotherapy’ in its etymological sense of ‘healing the soul,’ or, more precisely for this context, ‘healing the passions,’ understood as disturbed emotions” (Panniza 118). However, this does not mean that Petrarch approved of the medicalization of mental disability. His distrust of physicians is evident in his invective *Contra medicam* and throughout his letters.⁷¹ Julie Singer observes that Petrarch’s “invectives are not just an offensive against one particular medical practitioner, but a pushback against the broader culture of medicalization” (55).⁷² This distrust conforms with rejection of what disability scholars call a medical model of disability, in which disability is conceived from a medicalized perspective that equates disability with the disadvantages and costs it brings to society. In the medical model, there is no room for disability gain; there is only the pursuit of cure without consideration for palliative treatments or societal reform to improve the lives of disabled people. Petrarch’s views on disability are more complex than a strictly medicalized model affords. As does Cicero in his *Tusculan Disputations*, Petrarch believes that moral philosophy is a superior method for addressing mental perturbation than remedies that a physician of his time might concoct.

In *De remediis*, human existence may seem bleak, but consolation emphasizes disability’s potential for advantages or gain. The treatise is dedicated to a disabled patron, Azzo da Correggio (1303–1362). Petrarch addresses his friend Azzo, observing that though “[i]am in primis valitudine prosperrima et corporis viribus” (“you used to be in excellent health and of enormous physical strength”), Azzo now lives with illness and physical disability:

[U]t penitus tuum illud pristinum robur amiseris, non inferiore miraculo dexteritatis eximie atque insolite gravitatis, ut qui olim pene eripes fueris, nunc acclinis aut servorum manibus equi tergo impositus aut humeris nixus lentis terram passibus metiaris.

You had lost completely your old robustness, but, no less amazingly, had acquired great aptness, and uncommon dignity. You, once endowed with legs of steel, now had to be lifted into the saddle by your servants, or lean upon their shoulders, scarcely able to walk a few paces. (1. Preface; 8)

Though Azzo suffers from his physical disability, Petrarch places value on his lived experience, observing that it has only increased his *gravitatis* (“dig-

nity”).⁷³ As Bernhard Huss avers, “The author figure in *De remediis* partakes in the readers’ afflictions, while promising a cure for the affective community of which he, too, is a part” (63). Dedicating the book to Azzo shows that books of consolation can be written by disabled writers for disabled readers.

The *De remediis* picks up on the textually based modes of consolation offered in the *Secretum*. Petrarch prescribes Azzo consolatory reading. He advises Azzo that “et multo maxime iugis lectio ac pervigil scriptorumque nobilium monumenta profuerunt” (“continued and diligent reading of the works of outstanding writers is of benefit” 1. Preface; 3). Though he admits that contemporary writers are useful, Petrarch implores Azzo “gratia, claris et probatis scriptoribus est habenda, qui multis ante nos seculis in terram versi, divinis ingeniis institutisque sanctissimis nobiscum vivunt, cohabitant” (“to consider how much we owe to the brilliant and famous authors hundreds of years before our time, who still live and dwell with us, and talk to us with divine intellect in their great books” 1. Preface; 3–4). Writers from the past can comfort disability in the present. Petrarch employs writerly images of consolation to illustrate this point. Ancient authors

colloquuntur interque perpetuos animorum fluctus, ceu totidem lucida sidera et firmamento veritatis affixa, ceu totidem suaves ac felices aure, totidem industrii ac experti naute et portum nobis quietis ostendunt et eo voluntatum nostrarum lenta carbasa promovent et fluitantis anime gubernaculum regunt, quoad tantis procellis agitata consilia tandem sistat ac temperet?

amidst the perpetual turmoil of our minds, like so many bright stars fixed on the firmament of truth, like so many pleasant and favorable breezes, like so many eager and skilled sailors, they point us to the port of rest and guide the limp sails of our hopes and the helm of our wavering thoughts until such time as our own judgments, battered by so many storms, do find firm ground permitting their control. (1. Preface; 4)

Petrarch likens the comfort of ancient authors to celestial signs, pleasant breezes, and apt sailors that guide the reader through emotional storms to a safe harbor. This encourages readers today to be similarly receptive to the disability discourse of the past, including Petrarch’s consolatory works, and is evidently how Petrarch used these writers for his own comfort.

The *De remediis* was a self-consolation for Petrarch. In a letter written to Jean Birel, Grand Prior of the Carthusian Order (1346–1360), he notes,

“Est mihi liber in manibus, *de Remediis ad utramque fortunam*” (“I do have a book in hand, *De remediis ad utranque fortunam*”), in which “viribus nitor, et meas, et legentium passiones animi mollire” (“to the best of my ability, I try to soften the passions of my [mind] and the readers’ [minds]” *Sen.* 26. 9; 641). The process of writing and reading the *De remediis* consoled Petrarch’s own mental disability,

ut dum de tristitia miseriaque tractatus venisset, ad calamum, essemque in eo occupatus, ut eiusmodi tristitia, nullis certis ex causis ortam, quam aegritudinem animi Philosophi appellant, obiectu contrarii consolarer, quod nullo melius modo sit, quam causas laetitiae conquirendo id vero nihil est aliud, quam humanac conditionis exquirere dignitatem

[for] when the pen came to dealing with sadness and misery and I was engrossed in it, by chance it happened that the sort of sadness arising from no certain causes, which the philosophers call sickness of the spirit, I assuaged by juxtaposing its opposite—which can be done in no better way than by searching for the causes of joyfulness. That is nothing else than seeking the dignity of the human condition. (26. 9; 641)

In the process of consoling himself, Petrarch introduces contemplation of the wonders of creation and dignity of humans as a new comfort for *aegritudo*.

The dialogue in the *De remediis* to which Petrarch refers in his letter to Birel is “Sadness and Misery” (2. 93), in which Reason consoles Sorrow for their mental disability, which is named as *aegritudo*.⁷⁴ The dialogue’s debts to the *Secretum* and its Ciceronian and Senecan sources are evident in *aegritudo*’s causes, symptoms, and diagnosis. Reason explains, “Mali huius tot radices, quot sunt que, uno nomine, ‘adversa’ dicitis” (“Your malady has as many causes as there are things you people call adverse” *De rem.* 2. 93; 224). Sorrow insists the distress resides in present woes, complaining, “Presentis me miserie cogitatio mestum facit” (“Thinking about the misery of our times makes me dejected” 2. 93; 224). Symptoms of *aegritudo* are also largely the same in the *De remediis*. Related dialogues address a fluctuating mind and world-weariness.⁷⁵ Reason takes special care with the variety of *aegritudo* that causes “dolendi voluptas quedam, [que] mestam animam facit” (“a certain *voluptas dolendi*—delight in sorrowing—that makes your mind dejected” 2. 93; 224). Whereas this was just one of Franciscus’s symptoms, here Reason

presents it as most perilous, warning that “*pestis eo funestior, quo ignotior causa atque ita difficilior cura est*” (“this ill is all the more serious because its cause is unknown, and the cure all the more difficult” 2. 93; 224). Nevertheless, consolation is possible.

Cicero and Seneca are again the most prominent ancient sources on *aegritudo* in the *De remediis*.⁷⁶ Commenting on the malady’s danger and the need to evade it, Reason avers:

Itaque hanc ceu anime scopulum, omni velorum, ut dici solet, ac remorum auxilio, fugiendam censet Cicero, cui in hoc quidem, ut in multis, assentior.

Because of this, Cicero thought that such shoals of the mind should be avoided, so to speak, with full spread of sail and reach of oars. And, as in so many other things, I agree with Cicero on this. (2. 93; 224)

Moreover, Reason recommends *reading* Cicero and Seneca specifically to alleviate “*egritudinem vero animi, ita enim hanc Philosophi appellant*” (“*aegritudo animi*—the distress of the mind, as the philosophers call it” 2. 93; 229). Reason invites Sorrow and the reader to perform consolatory reading with Cicero and Seneca, as Petrarch evidently has done.

As Petrarch’s account of writing this dialogue makes clear (*Sen.* 26. 9; 641), he adds a new strategy for consolation. Reason enjoins Sorrow to contemplate the wonder of creation and the dignity of human beings. Reason launches into an enumeration of these pleasant aspects of life, and their praise parallels and counteracts the worldly suffering and strife lamented in the prefaces of the *De remediis*. Reason reminds Sorrow that humans are made in the image of God (2. 93; 224). This grants “*ingenium, memoria, providentia, eloquium, tot inventa, tot artes hinc animo famulantes*” (“your mind, your memory, foresight, and speech; that so many inventions and arts are here to serve your soul and body” 2. 93; 224). So, too, the world’s great variety is pleasing to the senses: “*tot odorum et colorum et saporum et sonorum ex contrariis orta Concordia*” (“the harmony by contraries of scents, colors, tastes and sounds” 2. 93; 224). Here contraries harmonize rather than strive against each other. Likewise, the variety of land, air, and sea animals are “*non nisi vestris usibus dedita, hominisque solius ad obsequium creata*” (“all for your use, created to obey your wishes!” 2. 93; 224). If humans do not enjoy full mastery over the world’s creatures, it is because of the Fall (2. 93; 224), which makes all humans imperfect.

Reason goes on to relate the world's wonders, including water, earth, and sky. I cite the passage at length to capture the sense of copiousness that Reason conveys as follows:

Adde collium prospectus, apricationes vallium, umbrosos saltus, argentesque Alpes, et tepentia litora. Adde tot salubres scatebras aquarum, tot sulphureos fumantesque, tot nitidos ac gelidos fontes, tot infusa et circumfusa terris maria, tot amnes assidue mobiles, et immobili stabilitate certissimos regnorum fines. Adde lacus, maris emulos, et stagna iacentia, et rivos inter montium convexa precipites, et floreas ripas, "riparumque thoros, et prata recentia rivis," ut Virgilius ait. Quid sonoris litoribus spumantes scopulos, antraque roscida, et flavescentes agros, et vineta gemmantia, et commoditates urbium, et ruris otia, et solitudinum libertatem? Quid spectaculorum omnium lucidissimum atque angustissimum stellantis celi ambitum, incomprehensibili celeritate volubilem atque incomparabili decore mirabilem, inque illo fixas et errantes quas dicitis, seu vagantes stellas, solem in primis ac lunam "clarissima mundilumina," ut Maro ait, seu "lucidum celi decus," ut Flaccus ait. Hinc terre fruges, hinc vigor animantium, hinc varietates tempestatum: hinc vos annum, hinc menses et dies, et noctes et momenta metimini, sine quibus vita fastidio non careret.

Add here the beckoning hills, the sun-drenched valleys and shady glens, the icy Alps, and the mild seashore, the wholesome bubbling waters and the springs, some sulfurous and steaming, some clear and cold—the sea upon the earth, the ever-changing streams, and the borders of kingdoms of never changing permanence. Add lakes as big as oceans, swamps, the waters rushing through mountain gorges and those flowering edges, "the cushioned riverbanks and meadows fresh with streams," as Virgil says. Think of the foaming cliffs, the dank caverns, and fields of golden wheat, the budding vineyards, the ease of cities, and the quiet of the countryside, the freedom of the wilderness—and that most brilliant and noble spectacle of all, the vault of the starry firmament that turns with incredible speed. In it are the fixed stars and the "wanderers," as you call the moving planets, foremost among them sun and moon, "the world's brightest lights," as Virgil says, or Horace's radiant lights of the heavens. On these depend the fruit of the earth, the stamina of all living things, and the changing seasons. By them we measure the year, the months, days, nights, and those short moments without which life would be dreary indeed. (2. 93; 224–25)

Reason's praise constitutes Petrarch's "famous counterstatement of the dignity of man," as Charles Trinkaus observes (123). However, I do not agree that it elevates "autonomy" and reveals a "total focus on the individual as an individual," which "aptly illustrates Burckhardt's conception of Renaissance individualism," as Trinkaus also argues (121). Humans are not autonomous in Reason's pleasant cosmology. The world is depicted as interconnected in a tactile dance of movement and stillness. Geological features are touched by sun, shade, and ice; the oceans "infusa et circumfusa" ("pour out and circulate") upon the earth's surface as the courses of rivers deviate alongside the relatively stable borders of kingdoms that they define. All the while some stars wander among others that are fixed in their courses, orchestrating the passage of time.⁷⁷ The speech also demonstrates how interconnected Petrarch's works of consolation are with its citation of Virgilian and Horatian praise for pastoral and imperial life.⁷⁸

Humans do not entirely dominate this world, in part due to original sin but also according to other ancient concepts of personhood. They are, as Timothy Reiss has it, a passible part of that world (*Mirages* 303–30). They are vulnerable, variable, and capable of suffering and change.

Furthermore, many of them are disabled. This speech appears in a consolatory dialogue that takes human suffering and need for care as its premise. Reason is caring for Sorrow and Fear, not curing Sorrow and Fear, who continue their lamentations for thirty more dialogues. What makes this speech on human dignity remarkable in the history of disability is that it is born out of a dialogue that addresses mental disability and includes disability within its praise of human dignity specifically. Reason lauds the human ability to create prosthetics and other disability-related workarounds. Reason extols,

[H]omo autem, per se nudus, ingenio vestitur atque ornatur, et, si res poscat, armatur; claudus atque debilitatus equo aut navi fertur, aut vehiculo aut auxiliariis bacillis innititur; denique modis sese omnibus adiuvat attollitque; quin, amissis artibus, pedes ligneos, manus ferreas, nasos cereos, fabricari didicit et fortuitis casibus obstare; valitudinem fatiscentem medicaminibus erigit, gustumque torpentem saporibus excitat; visum languidum ocularibus refovet, qua in re maioribus vestris acutius cogitastis, qui vasculis vitreis aqua plenis, ut Seneca meminit, utebantur; prope delectabilis nature ludus (blanda parens ac benigna!), quod hinc filio eripit, inde restituit, et, cum tristem fecerit, consolatur.

Man, however, though he be naked, is appareled, adorned, and, when necessary, armed with a mind. If he gets lame and weak, he rides on

a horse, in a boat or a carriage, or leans on a helpful staff. In short, he uses all available means to assist and ease himself. He has learned to make wooden legs, iron hands, and wax noses, when these organs are missing, and deals with unforeseen mishaps by preparing medicines to brace his failing health. He wakes his sluggish appetite with spicy sauces, succors his bleary eyes with glasses, in which respect you have made significant progress over your ancestors, who, as Seneca mentions, used glass containers filled with water. All these are the delightful pastimes of Nature. She is a charming and kindly parent, who restores to her children what she has taken from them and cheers again those whom she made sad. (2. 93; 227)

The challenges that disability presents contribute to the dignity of human beings. Though Petrarch drew on Augustine's *City of God* book 20 and Cicero's *Natura Deorum* book 2 for this speech, praising disability ingenuity is Reason's special emphasis. In speaking of Nature's delight in diversity, including disability, Petrarch taps a long tradition of praising Nature's variety.⁷⁹ For instance, Pliny extols Nature "in her ingenuity [*ingeniosa*]," for having "created all these marvels in the human race, with others of a similar nature, as so many amusements [*ludibria*] to herself, though they appear miraculous to us" (*Hist. nat.* 7. 2; 135). Petrarch evokes what Pierre Hadot identifies as the Orphic rather than Promethean understanding of nature: "Whereas the Promethean attitude is inspired by audacity, boundless curiosity, the will to power, and the search for utility, the Orphic attitude, by contrast, is inspired by respect in the face of mystery" (96). Respect for Nature's variety enables Petrarch to embrace the material world as itself part of the miracle of creation.

The speech also constitutes another variation of the citation from book 10 of the *Confessions*, which, as I have suggested, circulates through Petrarch's disability discourse in moments of crip authority. This much amplified iteration of the passage, however, has taken a new turn. Whereas previous versions of this citation discourage desire to know about the material world in favor of self-awareness of error and disability, this passage appreciates the world's marvelous variety, including the errant and variable human body-minds it includes therein.

In this dialogue, disabled people have a place in this world and a future. Petrarch adopts an interdependent notion of the material and the spiritual, in which human error can be accommodated in faith and imperfect bodies are included in salvation and resurrection. This gorgeous passage is also similar to the fourth of Petrarch's *Psalmi penitentiales*,⁸⁰ a group of original Latin psalms

with the central fourth psalm written in praise of the world and humanity's dignified place within it.⁸¹ Petrarch's inclusion of language and imagery from the psalm here in the *De remediis* illustrates how disabled people find spiritual consolation in the *Psalms*,⁸² and Reason emphasizes the promise of salvation, including the eschatological expectation that the body, albeit weak and transitory, will be restored in the end times. The body is celebrated: "[A]ccedit corpus, licet caducum et fragile, imperiosum tamen aspectu, serenumque et erectum, aptumque celestibus contemplandis" ("You have a body, admittedly mortal and frail, but commanding in appearance, beautiful, and erect, able to view the sky" 2. 93; 225). Reason considers the restoration of the body in resurrection a consolation:

[A]ccedit immortalitas anime, et ad celum iter, ac pretio exiguo merces inextimabilis, et que in finem sciens distuli, quia tam magna errant, ut per me illa non caperem [capere], nisi fidei magisterio didicissem: resurgendi spes, et hoc ipsum corpus post interitum, agile quidem lucidumque et inviolabile, multa cum gloria resumendi; et, quod omnem non humanam modo, sed angelicam dignitatem supereminet, ipsa humanitas sic coniuncta divinitati, ut qui Deus erat, homo fieret, idemque, unus numero, perfecte duas in se uniens naturas, esse inciperet Deus et Homo, ut hominem Deum faceret, factus homo.

You have an immortal soul, a road to heaven, and inestimable goods bought at a paltry price, which I have left to the end, knowing they are so great that I myself could not comprehend them without the teachings of the faith: the hope of resurrection of the body after burial, whole and shining, without guilt, cleansed to resume in great glory the erstwhile place, which surpasses all dignity of man on earth and also that of the Angels—that nature of man without Sin, so linked to the nature of Godhead, that He Who was God Himself became a man and, being but one person, comprehended perfectly within Himself two natures, and was both, God and man, so that being made a man He might make man a god. (2. 93; 225)

Salvation promises consolation for the body and mind. The body will be resurrected in the end times, "lucidumque et inviolabile," which can be translated as "brilliant and inviolable."⁸³ Bringing together body and mind may not completely resolve the tensions of the *Secretum*, but this new strategy of consolation gets around the conflict that Augustinus's asceticism created.

Reason's praise of the dignity of human beings brings together the Ciceronian, skeptical version of Stoical consolation that held sway in the *Secretum* with a version of Augustine that is less ascetic and more focused on grace. As Panizza suggests, "Petrarch has taken to heart Augustine's *City of God*"; nevertheless, Petrarch knew that Augustine was influenced by Cicero's "Stoic account of divine providence and the excellence of man in . . . *natura deorum*" (133).⁸⁴ As a result, Panizza convincingly argues that Petrarch revives "yet another strand of Latin Stoicism in this 'dignity of man' dialogue and associating Augustine with it" (133). In this sense, Petrarch again retunes Augustine, this time in harmony with the contrasting views of Ciceronian therapy that were presented as salutary in the *Secretum*.

This speech is not Petrarch's final word on mental disability in the *De remediis*. Dialogues that offer consolation for perturbations of the mind include "Fame as a Writer" (1. 44), "Love Affairs" (1. 69), "Tranquility" (1. 90), "Inner Conflict" (2. 75), "Being Doubtful" (2. 76), "Botheration" (2. 90), "Sadness and Misery" (2. 93), "Taedium vitae: weariness" (2. 98), and "Insanity" (2. 115). Methods of consolation for mental disability in the *De remediis* overlap with those proposed in the *Secretum*. For instance, in the dialogue on "Botheration" (2. 90), Reason advises writerly consolation for a tumultuous environment. Reason suggests that Sorrow can reframe disturbing noise with aqueous metaphors: "Finge animo te aquarum exundantium ac scopulis allisarum sonitum audire" ("Imagine in your mind that you are listening to the sound of waters rushing over rocks" 2. 90; 209). Reason lists further examples, including the injunction to "persuade tibi esse vel ad fontem Sorgie, ubi, ingenti strepitu, exhorrendo specu, lucidissimus amnis emanat" ("persuade yourself that you are at the fountain of the Sorgue, where the clearest of streams gushes from an awesome chasm with a deafening roar" 2. 90; 209). Petrarch had probably left Vacluse when he wrote this, but it does not preclude him from using the recollection of its sound as therapy.

The *De remediis* also treats poetic furor and melancholy. This discussion occurs in relation to the topics of love and glory that Augustinus called Franciscus's adamantine chains. Whereas the *Secretum* focused on showing that earthly love is an error, the *De remediis* treats the psychological benefits and risks arising from writing love lyric. In "Love Affairs" (1. 69), Reason tries to dissuade Joy from love with warnings against the dangers of lust and with a panoply of ancient examples, but, like Franciscus, Joy does not budge in their desire. When Reason warns Joy that they will be sorry for this love, Joy retorts that writing love poetry will be a consolation (1. 69; 202). Reason admits that many poets exhibit this talent, drawing on the ancient concept of poetic *furor* to excuse its practice:

Inter multas, fateor, mira hec amantium amentia. . . . Nam et poetas Graiorum et vestros quedam de alienis, multa de suis amoribus plausibiliter conscripsisse compertum est atque unde morum infamiam merebantur eloquentie gloriam consecutos. Tolerabilior apud illos Sappho: etas, sexus, animi levitas puellam excusant.

I must admit that this special folly of lovers is one of the most remarkable things. Thus we know that the poets of Greece and your own country have written brilliantly, some about the loves of others, most about their own, and have earned fame for their eloquence although they deserved notoriety for their conduct. Among the Greeks, Sappho was least offensive, as age, sex, and light-mindedness excuse a girl. (I. 69; 202)

Although Reason values the “furor,” or madness, of poets, thinking it “mira,” or a wonder, the approval is qualified. This “amentia,” or being out of one’s mind, is excusable for poets including Sappho, for instance, because she is a woman and therefore “animi levitas” (“lightminded”) or, to translate the phrase differently, an airhead. This dialogue appears on the heels of a series of misogynistic pronouncements on wives and daughters. Reason then launches into a diatribe against earthly love, including disapproval of Plato’s “amoris suis etiam turpibus” (“filthy loves” I. 69; 203), which refers to depictions of pederasty and same-sex love.⁸⁵ As mentioned earlier, Augustinus claims that Franciscus is not subject to the kind of mental disturbance quoted in authors such as Plato that enhances creativity. Nevertheless, Reason does present poetic furor as desirable insofar as it is marvelous, but it is also represented as undesirable intersectionally with gender and sexuality. In short, Reason does not entirely approve of writing love poetry and thinks it exacerbates mental disability, advising, “Loquendo canendoque amor alitur accenditurque, non extinguitur nec lenitur, ut quos memoras cantus et carmina tuorum non fomenta, sed irritamenta sint vulnerum” (“By talking and singing love is strengthened and inflamed, not extinguished or relieved; and the songs and poems which you utter do not heal, but irritate the wound” I. 69; 204). Reason’s advice expands on Augustinus’s tirade against love in the *Secretum*.⁸⁶ Eventually, contraries to love, such as “egritudo, deformitas, inopia, grave negotium, senectus, errorum iuvenilium castigatrix eximia” (“sickness, ugliness, poverty, sweat, toil, and old age”) will castigate the “errorum iuvenilium” (“juvenile errors” I. 69. 204–5). This turn of phrase echoes Petrarch’s naming his youthful error of loving Laura as justification for writing and for his errant style at the opening of the *Rime sparse*.

Several dialogues in the *De remediis* treat the second adamantine chain of glory, but “Fame as a Writer” (1. 44) treats its relation to melancholy and writing specifically.⁸⁷ Reason believes reading books is better than writing them but concedes that writing is acceptable: “Si ut ingenium exerceas scribendoque aliis te doceas, si ut obliviscaris temporum preteritique memoria presens tedium effugias, excuso” (“If you write to exercise your mind and teach yourself by writing for others, if to forget the times and escape the boredom of the present by remembering things past . . . I must forgive you”), but “si ut scribendi morbo quidem occulto et insanabili medeare, misereor” (“if you write in order to relieve a secret and incurable compulsion to write, I must pity you” 1. 44; 144). Reason attributes this compulsion to write to melancholy specifically: “[S]unt namque, si nescis, qui non scribunt nisi quia nequeunt desinere et velut ex precipiti decurrentes nolentesque subsistere rapiuntur” (“For there are some, in case you do not know it, who would not write save that they cannot desist: like running downhill, they are dragged on relentlessly, not knowing how to stop” 1. 44; 144). The ends of writing may excuse it, but Reason warns that its risks to mental health are real. When Joy reveals a compulsion to write, “[s]cribendi impetus ingens est” (“the urge to write is enormously strong”), Reason explains, “Melancholie species infinitas ferunt: alii lapides iactant, alii libros scribunt; huic scribere furoris initium est, huic exitus” (“One hears of innumerable kinds of melancholy. Some throw stones, others write books. For one, writing is the beginning of madness; for another, it is the end” 1. 44; 144). This is the only use of the word “Melancholia” in the treatise.⁸⁸ Though the term is not elaborated here, Reason acknowledges that the causes for melancholy are many, and she also makes a glib connection between melancholy, despair, and death, all of which will be picked up by later writers on melancholy in the Renaissance, as subsequent chapters explore. The dark humor of this retort is typical of exchanges in the *De remediis*, especially when Reason’s interlocutors do not comply with her advice.

Crip authority is legible in the *copia* of disability gain that Reason professes and in the often playful style and resistance to reason that the dialogues present. Disability gain consoles a variety of mental and physical disabilities. Some dialogues center on a specific condition, and some treat a variety of related conditions. For instance, dialogues that treat physical disabilities directly include a deformed body and very short stature (2. 1), weakness (2. 2), long-term illness (2. 3), wounds including loss of limbs (2. 77), old age including dementia (2. 83), gout (2. 84), scabies or possibly dermatitis (2. 85), sleep disorders (2. 86–87), plague (2. 92), toothaches (2. 94), leg cramps and weakness (2. 95), blindness (2. 96), deafness (2. 97), obesity (2. 98), speech

impediment or delay (2. 102), muteness including the loss of the tongue (2. 103), fevers or possibly malaria (2. 112), colic and fainting (2. 113), and pain and leprosy (2. 114). Some dialogues also focus on cognitive ability, such as quickness and dullness of wit (1. 7; 2. 100) and a strong or weak memory (1. 8; 2. 102). Each of these dialogues seeks advantage in adversities with many examples and discussion of disability gain.⁸⁹

As to the playful, resistant style of the *De remediis*, most modern scholars find the dialogues repetitive and/or flat, but I disagree. Huss, who has recently edited and translated the *De remediis*, explains that the style has been interpreted to characterize “the four ‘passiones animi’ as dull, inflexible, fundamentally irrational, capable only of monotonous self-assertion, and entirely lacking in argumentative capacity” (64). I agree with Huss that “the discursive and argumentative role of Ratio’s adversaries in *De remediis* is much more sophisticated” (64), and I add that repetition often functions as a comedic device to my ear in these dialogues, where Joy, Hope, Sorrow, or Fear can voice resistance or ironic dismissal by repeating retorts. Furthermore, responses to Reason, though often brief, also vary in a subtle manner that shows they have understood Reason’s advice but are unimpressed, unconvinced, or even downright annoyed. For instance, when Reason goes after Joy for being pleased about having a beautiful body, Joy responds to attacks with small, but highly amusing variations that demonstrate, in a deadpan manner, just how over the top Reason’s rhetoric can be. To Reason’s repeated arguments about the erosion of the body with the passage of time in gruesome, ghastly detail, Joy responds repeatedly and with growing exacerbation and small variation that their body is “eximia” (“splendid”), “egregia” (“extraordinary”), “elegantissima” (“superb,”), and “mira” (“marvelous” 1. 2; 17) and eventually retorts, “Forma interim clara est” (“So far, the appearance of my body is exceptional” 1. 2; 18). While Joy eventually asserts that they will strive for their behavior to match their beauty, they never actually agree that there are any drawbacks to beauty.⁹⁰ Petrarch establishes early on a rhythm between the positive of Joy and the negative of Reason that reaches a détente by the end of the dialogue. This supports Huss’s view that it is a mistake to believe that the style of the dialogue is an indication that “Ratio’s discursive victory is essentially a foregone conclusion, notwithstanding the fact that the affects never actually admit defeat” (64). Attending to the often humorous interplay that the dialogues pose, moreover, reveals that the exchange is both dynamic and crip in its playfully ironic stance. Again, as Huss observes, “The relationship in which Ratio and the affects are conjoined is not characterized by separation, but rather by a strong interdependence” (64).

Nevertheless, Reason can overstate advantages that disability may bring in a manner that verges on a “no barriers” attitude, to which Sorrow and Fear respond with lively and humorous crip resistance and authority. This is most evident in the dialogue on pain (2. 114), which addresses severe pain and its psychological toll. The lamentation of the character *Dolor*, which can be translated as Pain as well as Sorrow, is countered by the consolation of Reason. When Reason suggests that “*Stoici . . . dicunt*” (“the Stoics say”) that physical pain, “*molestissimus licet, malum tamen utique non sit*” (“no matter how severe, cannot be considered an ill”), Sorrow exclaims, “*Heu michi misero, ego torqueor, tu disputas, Philosophice fabelle*” (“Alas, I am wretched, I am tormented—and you engage in philosophical babble!” 2. 114; 268). Further on, Sorrow responds to Reason’s philosophizing that “[s]onora hec in scholis, famosa per libros, sed nec equuleos nec egrotantium ascensura grabatulos: dicuntur scribunturque facilius, quam probantur” (“these resounding phrases are for the classroom, made famous by books. But on the torture rack or in the sickbed, when you are deadly ill, they mean absolutely nothing. It is easier to profess and write them than to prove them!” 2. 114; 268). The two characters have a heated exchange, and Sorrow again objects, “*Heu, ego crucior tu disputas!*” (“Oh dear! I am being tormented, and you perorate” 2. 114; 268). Petrarch’s consolation text does not enforce overcoming. The lived experience of disabilities varies, and as Cicero knew, the right words of consolation must be found for the right occasion. The “*medicamenta verborum*” (“medication by words” 1. Preface; 10) that the treatise promises cannot be uniform, or it risks becoming “[p]hilosophice fabelle” (“philosophical babble”). Sorrow’s resistance directs the dialogue into exploring the negative consequences of impairment, in this case severe pain.

Reason does gain some ground with Sorrow through gallows humor and misogynist appeals to virility, pointing out that “[s]i summus, nempe brevis est dolor. . . . Interim forti animo ferre mortalia speciosum ac virile est” (“if your pain is unbearable, it will also be brief. . . . And remember in the meantime that it is beautiful and manly to bear the hazards of human life with a courageous mind” 2. 114; 268). Sorrow grants this is “[s]peciosum dictum” (“beautifully said”), but “*factu ne possibile quidem reor*” (“I do not think it can possibly be done” 2. 114; 268). In other words, easy said is not easy done.

When moral philosophy fails, Reason switches gears and illustrates points with examples of heroic suffering from history, to which sorrow replies: “*Heu michi, rursus ad historias vocor, et in medio dolorum estu, vix presentium, vix mei ipsius memor, ad memoriam protrahor antiquorum!*” (“Alas, I am again referred to history and, amidst burning pain, being hardly aware of here and

now, or even myself, am asked to bother with remembering the deeds of the ancients!" 2. 114; 268). When Reason asks if contemplating the fortitude of exemplary men does not "magnum affert in omni rerum asperitate solatium lenimenque?" ("bring comfort and soothing relief when you encounter hardships?" 2. 114; 268), Sorrow refuses to be a supercrip. Trying to imitate heroes sounds like "gloriosa consilia" ("magnificent advice"), but it is "alta nimium supraque hominem" ("too high-flown and beyond human capacity at this point" 2. 114; 268). When Reason objects that this is not "supra hominem" ("superhuman" 2. 114; trans. mine), because exceptional people have borne severe pain without complaint, Sorrow lets loose with a volley of responses that destroy Reason's objections. As Huss observes, "Ratio clearly has a hard time articulating a coherent position vis-à-vis severe physical impairment" (65).⁹¹ Unreasonable social expectations of forbearance exacerbate the lived experience of pain. For people with disabilities, the injunction to imitate the overcoming of others is often not only psychologically eroding but simply not always possible. As Sorrow puts it, quoting a line from Virgil's *Eclogues*, "non omnia possumus omnes" ("everybody just can't do everything" 2. 114; 239).⁹² In this dialogue, Sorrow, who is a perturbation of the mind, is far more reasonable than Reason.

There is space in this dialogue for both lamentation and consolation. Reason gives ground against Sorrow's insistence. Sorrow, in turn, also gives ground when Reason points out that their strategy of lamentation is not working well:

[C]ui si ostenderis, murmur aut gemitum utilem tibi, levamenque aliquod mali esse, versis ultro consiliis, utrunque permiserim seu iusserim. Quod si indignatio et querele nil aliud quam accessio mali sunt, quid morbo corporis addere animi morbum iuvat, teque miseriozem flendo facere.

If you can show me that murmuring and groaning are helpful to you and alleviate somewhat your disease, I shall reverse myself and let you, or rather encourage you to, do just that. But, as long as resentment and complaining accomplish nothing but increase your suffering, what good does it do to add to the sickness of the body *animi morbum*—sickness of the mind. (2. 114; 270)

Reason now takes a gentler approach. Citing Cicero, Reason states, "Non enim dolorem, inquit, dolorem esse nego" ("I do not deny the reality of pain"

2. 114; 272). Reason then recommends consolatory strategies from the second book of the *Tusculan Disputations*. Sorrow should arm themselves against misfortune with “[c]ontentio, confirmatio, sermoque intimus” (“determined effort, steadfastness, and communing with oneself” 2. 114; 276), to which Reason adds speaking out loud or with God (2. 114; 277–78). This is a far cry from Reason’s initial approach of simply telling Sorrow to just get over it. Pain may thus not be a moral good in itself, but it develops strategic preparedness, patient endurance, and healthful communication. Disabling pain might give you the authority to become exemplary, but Reason acknowledges that ingenuity, patience, and community are better for coping with disability. Here the raw, uncut lamentation of Sorrow is tempered by Reason, and though this debate is unresolved, what ultimately results in Petrarch’s dialogues is textured disability narrative that rides the highs and plumbs the depths of the lived experience of both mental and physical disability—sometimes roughly, sometimes beautifully.

Despite the richness of this treatise, I do not claim that Petrarch’s work is universal. He is a white man writing in a patriarchal society. For a writer who made his poetic reputation in praising the attributes of an idealized woman, dialogues on wives and daughters in the *De remediis* are remarkably misogynist. For a humanist scholar who relied at least in part on the transfer of ancient knowledge to the medieval world that Jewish and Islamicate cultures made possible, he expressed many anti-Semitic sentiments, especially toward Arab scholars. Though Petrarch is admired for his elevation of friendship between men and, at minimum, praised the work of Sappho, he is clearly homophobic about what he calls Socrates’s filthy loves. His views on disability, accordingly, can also be ableist in a manner that is intersectional with his gender, racial, and ethnic biases. There is often a hierarchy presented in his works in which mental and cognitive disability is presented as more grave than physical disability. Lamentation, moreover, is at times lambasted as foreign or womanish. These are attitudes that most students of early modern literature expect from the past. Most of us operate under the dubious assumption that we live in a more tolerant world than did canonical Western European writers. Yet there is much to be admired in Petrarch’s interest in disability gain and in his crip resistance to moral and medical models of disability. What Petrarch offers disability discourse and what later disabled authors embrace is the balance of the raw and insistent lamentation of figures such as Franciscus, Sorrow, and Fear being put into dialogue with the consolation of figures such as Truth, Augustinus, and Reason.

This chapter has drawn crip connections between Petrarch's writing on the vulnerability of human beings from the peak of Mont Ventoux to the inner closet of his secret self-consolation, to the dramatic disability dialogues in one of his most widely read works in the Renaissance. If Quillen is correct that out of all of Petrarch's Latin works, the *Secretum* "is central, indeed indispensable, to any understanding of the humanist movement and the revival of antiquity that so shaped many facets of early modern European culture" ("Preface" viii), then we must acknowledge that the discourse of mental disability, which I have shown to be the central concern of the work, is a significant part of that intellectual history. If Huss is correct that "with his comprehensive treatment of the fundamental problems faced by humanity, Petrarch sought to establish a community of readers that included nothing less than the 'genus humanum' as a whole" and that the "*De remediis* did indeed appeal to an unusually diverse readership from a wide array of social backgrounds," then we must acknowledge that inclusion of a variety of mental and physical disability within that *genus humanum* is part of the reason for the *De remediis*'s tremendous success. Petrarch represents adversity in beautiful works of literature that range from familiar letters to melancholic love lyric and spiritual dialogues of comfort and solace. Yet in all of these genres, Petrarch does not seek to downplay his own so-called errors, including his mental disability; he instead presents them as occasions for both lamentation and growth that inspire crip authority in the disabled writers who constitute his posterity.

A Place at the Table for Teresa de Cartagena

*Working Consolation in Arboleda de los enfermos and
Marvelous Ability in Admiración operum Dey*

By the mid-fifteenth century, Petrarch's *De remediis* and many ancient works of consolation that inspired it found eager reception across Europe. The early humanists of the Iberian Peninsula were keen to write, copy, and translate works of consolation, making them available to a wide audience, including people with disabilities, women, and *conversos* (converts to Christianity from Judaism).¹ Teresa de Cartagena (ca. 1424–ca. 1478) (henceforth Teresa), a Deaf and disabled *conversa nun*,² is the first woman we know of to have written a consolation text in Spanish (Aguirre de Cárcer Casarrubios 124).³ *Arboleda de los enfermos* (henceforth *Arboleda*) treats disability specifically. Teresa discloses her deafness, muteness, and unspecified chronic physical disabilities including pain, and she emphasizes the disability gain that her impairments create. She addresses her treatise to a community of disabled readers as an example of patience and redemption in suffering. This was not Teresa's last word on the matter. In response to ableist and misogynist accusations of plagiarism, she composes *Admiración operum Dey* (henceforth *Admiración*) to defend her authority to write as a disabled woman. In both works,⁴ Teresa's disability is central to her narration. The traditions of ancient, biblical, patristic, and other consolation texts shape her work, and she develops crip authority to combat her critics.

Though we know much less about Teresa's life, education, and access to literary sources of consolation than we do about Petrarch's, we know more about her than many famous Renaissance writers. Unwarranted presumptions

that have been made about dating her onset of deafness will be addressed in due course, but some biographical facts are undisputed. Born after 1424 and probably before 1434 in Burgos, Teresa lived at least until 1478.⁵ She was a member of the powerful Santa María *converso* family.⁶ Her paternal grandfather, Rabbi Solomon ha-Levi (ca. 1351–1435), converted to Christianity circa 1390 and was baptized Pablo de Santa María. He became bishop of Cartagena and Burgos and was a respected author. He was acquainted with Pedro de Luna (1328–1423), whom he met in Avignon.⁷ Pedro de Luna became Antipope Benedict XIII (aka Papa Luna). He helped to build the collection of the complete works of Petrarch in the papal library,⁸ and he wrote his own book of consolation, *Libro de las consolaciones de la vida humana* (*Book of the Consolations of Human Life*) (ca. 1414). Teresa's father, Pedro de Cartagena (1387–1478), served in King Juan II's court and was a counselor to subsequent monarchs Enrique IV and Fernando and Isabel. Her mother, Doña María de Sarabia, was his first wife.

Teresa's membership in this family gave her access to an exceptional education, including works of consolation held in her family's libraries. For instance, the library inventory of Álvaro García de Santa María (Teresa's paternal great uncle) lists many works of consolation (Cantera Burgos 198–200), to which his nieces had access (200). One of Teresa's paternal uncles, Gonzalo García de Santa María (1379/80–1448), was a professor at Salamanca.

Of particular interest is Teresa's paternal uncle Alfonso de Cartagena (1385–1456), who has been called the father of Iberian Humanism (Di Camillo, *El humanismo* 16).⁹ He translated several Senecan works, including the pseudo-Senecan book of consolation *De remediis fortuitorum*, which influenced Petrarch's *De remediis*.¹⁰ He defended the intelligence of women in glosses to his works of Seneca and may have composed part of a work on exemplary women.¹¹ He also took special interest in the life of his niece. We know that Teresa was a professed nun in the Franciscan convent of Santa Clara in Burgos at least from 1446 to 1452. Teresa's uncle wrote at least two petitions to Pope Nicholas V on her behalf. First, he asked that she be allowed to change religious orders from her Franciscan convent of Santa Clara to a Cistercian or Benedictine one (Apr. 6, 1449). Second, he requested that she be eligible for benefices and, once she reached the age of twenty-five, leadership positions in her new convent if elected (May 2, 1449).¹² He remembers her in his will of 1456 as "Teresie moniali" ("the little nun Teresa" Cantera Burgos 538).

We also know what Teresa reveals about herself in her two works and in the colophons to those works, the first of which was transcribed by Pero

López del Trigo. The second treatise appears in the same volume and is dated 1481. It was dedicated to Juana de Mendoza (ca. 1425–1493), who served as the principal *camarera*, or lady-in-waiting, to Queen Isabella.¹³ Juana Mendoza was married to Gómez Manrique (1412–1490), whom Teresa also mentions in her second treatise. He was a relative of Teresa by marriage and a famous poet.

In *Arboleda*, Teresa discloses her postlingual deafness, which came on twenty years before she composed the work: “[Q]ue [h]oy son veinte años” (“It has now been twenty years” 51; trans. mine). She relates that her deafness began in her childhood—her “*puericia o moçedat*”—and continued into her “*adoleçençia*” (“adolescence” 52; 37). She presents her muteness as subsequent to her deafness. She indicates that her suffering was doubled in her *juventut*, or prime (52; 37), perhaps by her muteness or by the painful physical disabilities to which she refers obliquely. She states that she studied in Salamanca (103; 80). In *Admiración*, she reports the accusation of plagiarism that was brought against her first treatise (113; 87). Writing *Admiración* as a rebuttal to this accusation was slow due to her multiple disabilities (111–12; 86–87).

Although her writing went unnoticed for centuries preserved in a single manuscript in the Escorial library,¹⁴ feminist artists and scholars now embrace Teresa as an ancestor.¹⁵ In arguing for recognition of Teresa as an early Humanist woman writer, Emilie Bergmann notes Teresa’s place in Judy Chicago’s famous feminist installation piece “The Dinner Party” (1974–79), where Teresa’s name appears on the “heritage floor” that supports the table, at which other premodern women, such as Christine de Pizan (1364–ca. 1430), have a place setting (Bergmann 219). Though there are no known likenesses of Teresa, I suggest we can think of her inscribed floor tile as a kind of author portrait that honors her place in feminist history. Teresa’s name is etched in gold on porcelain with a rainbow luster. Teresa has thus become a foundational figure for women writers, and though her disability has assuredly been a part of that story, it has not always been given the dignity that Teresa herself elaborates in its representation.

Most scholarship on Teresa focuses on her status as a woman and *conversa* writer in the context of literary forms of autobiography,¹⁶ mysticism,¹⁷ and, to a lesser extent, consolation.¹⁸ Although scholars recognize that Teresa was deaf, they acknowledge her experience of chronic physical disabilities, including pain, and at times they approach her impairments with ableist assumptions. Important exceptions include the fundamental essays of Encarnación Juárez Almendros (“The Autobiography”), Brenda Jo Brueggemann, Victoria Rivera Cordero, Jonathan Hsy, Connie Scarborough (99–130), and Juan-

Carlos Conde. These disability studies scholars read Teresa's work with care and attention to disabled embodiment, Deaf writing and authority, the socio-spatial construction of disability, embodied metaphors, and the history of Deaf and mute culture in Spain, and with an intersectional model of disability identity, respectively.¹⁹ Intersectionality captures how elements of Teresa's identity are not discrete or simply additive; unjust social systems multiply their oppression. As Allison Kafer and Eunjung Kim explain, considering disability from an intersectional perspective is "not merely a matter of 'adding' disability to the list, but rather a critical examination of how disability is fully enmeshed in the histories, experiences, and meanings of age, race, class, and sex, as well as sexuality, citizenship, nation, religion, health status, and other categories of difference" (124). This chapter expands this scholarship by examining how Teresa responds to her own lived experience of disability and to society's disability-based biases in her art of consolation and crip authority.

Branching, Grafting, and Digesting Consolation in the Grove of the Infirm

In the *Arboleda*, Teresa taps into the tradition of consolation to express both lamentation and alleviation for her and her readers' disabilities. She adopts an interlaced narrative structure and embodied arboreal and alimentary metaphors to characterize her relationship to her consolatory sources and to represent her disabilities. Consolatory reading and writing practices demonstrate Teresa's knowledge of material culture and the early humanism that her family fostered. Furthermore, the treatise aims to provide consolation to a community of disabled readers.

The *Arboleda's* colophon immediately indicates that the work is a disability narrative with a consolatory aim. The scribe, López de Trigo, attributes its authorship to Teresa, "seyendo apasionada de graves dolencias, especialmente aviendo el sentido del oír perdido del todo" ("being afflicted with grave ailments and, in particular, having lost completely her sense of hearing" Cartagena, *Arboleda* 37; 23). The scribe next relates the purpose of the treatise, explaining that Teresa

fizo aquesta obra a loor de Dios e espiritual consolación suya e de todos aquellos que enfermedades padeçen, porque, despedidos de la salud corporal, levante[n] su deseo en Dios que es verdadera Salud.

wrote this work in praise of God and for her own spiritual consolation and that of all those who suffer illness so that, forsaken of their physical health, they may place their desire in God who is true Health. (37; 23)

According to the colophon, the purpose of the treatise is threefold: first, her work is an offering to God; second, it is a self-consolation for Teresa, not unlike Petrarch's *Secretum*; and third, like Petrarch's *De remediis*, it consoles a community of disabled readers, of which Teresa is a part.

The prologue opens in the first person and relates lamentation and consolation for disability. It alternates between similes of insular sorrow and comforting community. A smothering "niebla de tristeza" ("cloud of sadness") transforms into "un espeso toruellino de angustiosas pasiones" ("a whirlwind of anguished suffering") that casts Teresa away on an "ínsula" ("island"), where she endures a living death, an "exillio e tenebroso destierro, más sepultada que morada me sintiendo" ("exile and shadowy banishment, [in which I feel myself more entombed than housed]" 37; 23). Yet with the light of God's "piadosa gracia" ("compassionate grace"), "alunbrad mi entendimiento" ("my understanding enlightened"), and "desbaratada la niebla de mi pesada tristeza" ("the cloud of my heavy sadness dispelled" 37–38; 23–24), Teresa finds consolation. She relates this shift, explaining that "vi esta ínsula ya dicha ser buena e saludable morada para mí" ("I saw [the aforementioned island to be] a good and healthful dwelling place for me" 38; 24). At this point, one might think that this is yet another story of overcoming disability. On the contrary, for Teresa, the experience of disability is complex and changes over time, and her disability narrative captures this complexity.

Positive and negative images of disability branch out through the body of the treatise, constituting an interlaced consolatory form. Alan Deyermond observes that Teresa's digressive narrative is purposive: "Devices of amplification branch out and interlace, rather in the manner that Eugene Vinaver has demonstrated for the structure of the medieval romances" ("El convent" 23). Interlaced narrative structures are common in the representation of atypical body-minds in premodernity.²⁰ In Teresa's case, this structure allows her to repeat and revisit elements of her disability across different times and places, thereby adding to the complexity and nuance of its representation.²¹ She shuttles back and forth in time and space from the "grand tiempo ha" ("long ago" 37; 23) of her frustration with the exilic ablistm of her society to the "ya" ("now" 38; 24) of the relative tranquility of beneficial solitude.

The effect of the *Arboleda's* recursive structure is cumulative and commu-

nal: “Continuously increasing activity without pauses or accents is set up, and repetition aims primarily at giving each particular motive a potential infinity” (Vinaver 78). Interlace enables Teresa’s “motive” of consoling disability to move from particular to pervasive, from individual experience to communal. This “motive” is also apparent in her increasing use of the first-person plural to signal the “we” of her disability community of the infirm: “los enfermos con quien tengo hecha carta de hermandad” (“the sick with whom I have signed a pledge of sisterhood” 61; 45).²² Teresa’s identification with the “enfermos” (“infirm”) also underscores Christian Laes’s assertion that infirmity amounts to disability identity within premodern monastic communities. As he observes, “All monastic traditions of late Antiquity seem to have included the possibility of the presence of ‘infirm’ monks or nuns who were encouraged to participate as much as possible in monastic life” (“Introduction” 14).

The cyclic interlace form that Vinaver suggests resembles “the complex continuity of curves, spirals, and entwined stems” of “ribbon” motifs of medieval art (70) also reflects Teresa’s image of a consolatory grove. In seeking models for community consolation, Teresa may have been influenced by images of consolatory groves in works of Ramon Llull (1235–1315), including his *Arbre de la ciència*, which uses groupings of trees to organize visually his method of spiritual inquiry.²³ Furthermore, her uncle Alfonso de Cartagena employs a grove metaphor for spiritual consolation in his *Oracional* (Hutton; Cortés Timoner, “Las imágenes”).

The consolatory grove simile first appears alongside Teresa’s disclosure of deafness. The titular *arboleda*, or grove, grows on the solitary island she describes in the prologue. It is populated

de arboledas de buenos consejos y espirituales consolaciones, de guisa que la soledat penosa de las conversçiones del siglo se convierta en compañía e familiaridad de buenas costumbres. E porque mi pasión es de tal calidad e tan porfiosa que tan poco me dexa oír los buenos consejos como los malos, conviene sean tales los consejos consoladores que sin dar bozes a mi sorda oreja, me pued[a]n poner en la claustra de sus graçiosos e santos consejos; para lo qual es neçesario de recorrer a los libros, los quales de arboledas saludables tienen en sí maravillosos enxertos.

with groves of good counsel and spiritual consolation so that my painful isolation from worldly conversations is converted into the companionship and familiarity of good customs. And since my suffering is

of such a treacherous nature that it prevents me from hearing good as well as bad counsel, it is necessary that my consoling counsels be able to bring me to the cloister of their gracious and holy wisdom without shouting into my deaf ears; for this, I must recur to [those] books which have wondrous graftings from healthful groves. (38; 24)

The grove is polysemous. Moving from the particular to the communal, the grove stands for the consolation of writerly sources that pertain to and can help comfort Teresa's disability, but it also represents the community of "los enfermos" to whom Teresa's treatise is addressed. In this sense the trees might belong to the *enfermos* or they might stand in for them. Teresa's community of the infirm includes disabled writers of consolation who preceded her as well as the "enfermos" for whom her work offers comfort. I suggest that Petrarch is one of those consolatory sources.

Petrarch may have influenced Teresa as relates to consolatory reading and writing and to Teresa's understanding of disability more broadly. Teresa could have known Petrarch's *De remediis*, a copy of which was held in her great uncle Álvaro García de Santa María's library (Cantera Burgos 198). We know, moreover, that her great uncle was in the habit of lending books to his nieces. Teresa's sister Juana borrowed (and did not return) a copy of Boethius's *Consolation of Philosophy* (Cantera Burgos 200), a work that Teresa cites.²⁴ Teresa's uncle Alfonso de Cartagena certainly knew Cicero's *Tusculan Disputations*, upon which Petrarch's dialogue on deafness is based and which Alfonso de Cartagena cites in his discourse on sensory impairment in the treatise "Questionae Ortolanus" (ca. 1440), which he coauthored with Rodrigo Sánchez de Arévalo (ca. 1404–1470) (Cartagena and Sánchez Arévalo 2. 2. 88). In the dialogue on deafness in Petrarch's *De remediis* (2. 97), Reason advises consolatory reading and writing for deaf people. When the character Sorrow laments hearing loss, Reason suggests that "[s]i cum aliis colloqui prohibitum est" ("if one cannot converse with others" 2.97; 240–41) due to deafness, other forms of conversation are possible. For instance:

[Q]uamvis et colloqui surdo quoque permissum, legendo scilicet scribendoque; cum antiquis nempe loquitur qui legit, et cum posteris qui scribit; ad hec, celestis philosophie libros et qui legit Deum audit, et qui orat alloquitur. In hoc quidem gemino colloquio nec lingua, nec auribus opus est, sed oculis digitisque ac devote animo. Et hic igitur, ut in multis, nostri consilium Ciceronis amplectimur, ut sicut cecus aurium, sic se surdus oculorum subsidio consoletur. Tu proinde, si au-

dire homines non potes, scriptos ab hominibus libros lege et legendos ab hominibus libros scribe. Celum preterea ac terras et maria respice, horumque omnium auctorem in silentio contemplare: nil ad hoc surditas ista nocuerit, multum fortasse profuerit.

Of course, even a deaf person can enter into discourse by reading or by writing, for when we read we talk with the ancients, and when we write we talk to posterity. But when we read the books of sacred philosophy, we hear the Lord God, and when we pray we talk to Him. For these we need neither tongue nor ears—only eyes and fingers, and a devout heart. Here, as in many other things, you should accept the advice of your countryman Cicero, that, just as the blind may derive consolation from their hearing, the deaf may find it through their sight. Therefore, since you cannot hear the voices of your fellow men, you should read the books written by them and write books for them to read. And contemplate in silence the heavens, the earth, and the sea—and the Creator of it all. Deafness cannot keep you from any of this, but could, in fact, help you to do it. (2. 97; 240–41)²⁵

Reason advises that reading and writing can console deafness and that deafness has spiritual advantages as it can bring the deaf person closer to God. The recommendation to contemplate the wonders of creation, of which people with disabilities are a part, calls back to Reason's speech on the dignity of humans, including the dignity of disability (*De rem.* 2.93). This passage circulates through Petrarch's consolatory work in moments of crip authority, and Teresa uses comparable arguments to find authority in her own experience of disability.

Reason's recommendation to read books as an accessible form of conversation is similar to Teresa's purpose in consulting her *Arboleda*. Teresa relies on consolatory reading, and she uses the image of the grove to elaborate that practice. She identifies her inability to hear spoken counsel (both good and bad) as a traitorous aspect of her deafness,²⁶ but she works around her deafness by reading good books,²⁷ which she likens to the trees in a pleasant grove. Her consolatory reading practice resembles the method recommended by Augustine in Petrarch's *Secretum* (2. 16. 10; 71–72). Whereas Augustine prescribes careful reading and notation to serve like prosthetic *Uncis*, or hooks, to aid Franciscus's mental fluctuation, Teresa, who does not disclose mental or cognitive disability in the *Arboleda*, likens her reading process to a kind of hearing aid that enables her to comprehend consolation in writing. Although

she cannot hear a spoken therapy of words, she can read consolation in books that, rather than being notated with helpful hooks, have been compiled with marvelous grafts from the grove of her consolatory authorities.

Calling consolatory passages *maravillosos enxertos*, or marvelous grafts, could indicate that Teresa used a commonplace book to gather the helpful counsel she found or that she was reading compendia of such advice. Petrarch, for instance, promises Azzo da Correggio that the *De remediis* will draw a variety of consolations from many authorities into one “in exigua Pixide” (“little box” *De rem.* I. Preface 7). Likening consolatory reading to grafting also implies that Teresa thoroughly incorporates her sources. The grafting metaphor demonstrates what Victoria Rivera Cordero identifies as Teresa’s affinity for embodied metaphors. As Jonathan Hsy puts it, Teresa uses embodied metaphors to “take abstract ideas and processes and convert them into embodied actions” (“Disability” 29).²⁸ Grafting occurs naturally when trees inosculate or grow together as their roots, trunks, or branches touch, and humans graft different varieties of twigs, called scions, onto tree trunks or rootstocks (Mudge et al. 439).²⁹ Grafting does not require hearing or speech; it only requires touch. The grafting metaphor emphasizes how Teresa’s reading is an organic process of melding her disabled body with her enabling sources of consolation.³⁰

The melding valence of the grafting metaphor anticipates Teresa’s alimentary simile for absorbing consolatory sources. Teresa does not simply collect sources but digests and disposes them like a meal of small plates, or tapas, as follows:

E porque en mi pequeño plato no todos cabrían, dexaré los que non dexan por eso de ser provechosos y más que buenos, e tomaré algunos para comienço de mesa e otros para la mesma yantar, e reservaré algunos para levantar de la tabla; y no de aquéllos me entiendo aprovechar que más hazen, no sólo al propósito de mi pasión, mas al aumentación de mi devoçión y consolación spiritual.

And since not all these counsels will fit on my small plate, I will omit some which are nevertheless profitable and more than good, and take some for the beginning of the meal and others for during the meal, and I will reserve some for after the meal; and I intend to make use of only those counsels that aid most the purpose of my suffering and the growth of my devotion and spiritual consolation. (*Arboleda* 38; 24–25)

As in the grafting metaphor, Teresa imbibes her sources in a manner that emphasizes her own embodiment. Her deafness does not preclude her from seeing or tasting the sustenance of consolation. Teresa does not simply devour her sources of consolation but disposes them in a manner that will be most healthful for her own comfort and the consolation of her community of readers. She takes timing into account, serving out her consolatory sustenance in a particular order, and she only will consume the consolations that are most helpful for her and other *enfermos*.

The alimentary simile is significant both for Teresa as an individual and for her community of the infirm. It relates to monastic rules that regulate diets of both healthy and infirm community members.³¹ For instance, in Richard Fox's 1517 translation of the Benedictine rule for English nuns, regulation of diet features for both sick and infirm sisters. The thirty-sixth chapter is devoted to the alimentation of "sike s[i]sters" (Collett et al. 130).³² The care of the sick, especially their diet, is required for the whole community: "Th[ere] muste good hede be taken to the s[i]sters that be s[i]ke and diseased" (131). They should do for their sick sisters as they would do for Jesus: "[A]s ye wolde doo your duetie and service unto christe so shal ye unto them / for christe saythe. I was s[i] ke / and ye dyd visit me / and againe / what so ever ye did to [one] of the leeste of these my servants / to me ye did it" (131). The rules also stipulate the timing of what is most needed and helpful in food: "[E]atinge of fleshe / may be graunted all way / to suche as be s[i]ke and feble / for their more spedy recovery. And after that they be amended / then must they all abstaine fro[m] fleshe / as they were wonte to doo" (131). Moderation in eating, moreover, is encouraged for the benefit of the entire community as indicated in the thirty-ninth chapter, which "treateth of the mesure of meate" and suggests there be a choice of foods for times of the year and day, such that "the diseases of diverse persones" may be accommodated (133). Jenni Kuuliala explains that, according to monastic rules, caring for the disabled was communal:

Bodily conditions were a burden of the whole mankind, a part of our shared defectiveness. The infirm were not held responsible for their bodily conditions, nor were they responsible for their recovery. Those matters belonged to the whole community. (345)

The rules encourage appropriate diet, which in turn benefits the whole community.

Teresa's alimentary simile also reflects ancient rules of rhetoric for composition. In particular, it resembles Seneca's advice for collecting and digesting the works of others. He famously compares the writer's activity to *apes*, or honey bees, who convert *diversa lectione*, or various reading sources (likened to various nectars), into one distinct honey (*Ad Luc. Epist.* 84; 277, 279). Seneca then likens this process to digesting a meal of many dishes, such that

alimenta, que accepimus, quamdiu in sua qualitate perdurant solida innatant stomacho, onera sunt; at cum ex eo quod erant, mutata sunt, tunc demum in vires et sanguinem transeunt. Idem in his, quibus alunt ingenia, praestemus, ut quaecumque hausimus, at patiamur integra esse, ne aliena sint. Concoquamus ilia; alioqui in memoriam ibunt, non in ingenium Adsentiamur illis fideliter et nostra faciamus, unum quiddam fiat ex multis, sicut unus numerus fit ex singulis

the food we have eaten, as long as it retains its original quality and floats in our stomachs as an undiluted mass, is a burden; but it passes into tissue and blood only when it has been changed from its original form. So it is with the food which nourishes our higher nature—we should see to it that whatever we have absorbed should not be allowed to remain unchanged, or it will be no part of us. We must digest it; otherwise it will merely enter the memory and not the reasoning power. Let us loyally welcome such foods and make them our own, so that something that is one may be formed out of many elements. (*Ad Luc. Epist.* 84; 279, 281)

As is the case with Teresa's embodied metaphor, the Senecan model is organic and corporal. As Timothy Reiss suggests, Seneca describes "an incorporation, a process of growing a new creation by bringing together what were once parts of different growths" (*Against Autonomy* 166). It focuses on the artist's creative role in an organic process of gathering and synthesizing material (161–83). To put this in rhetorical terms, it goes beyond the principles of *inventio* and emphasizes the *dispositio* of the many digested sources as an ingenious and creative act on the part of the imitator.³³ Whether or not she was familiar with Seneca's letter,³⁴ Teresa partakes in the kinds of figural work that scholars praise as central to early humanism to characterize her consolatory reading and writing.

Grafting and alimentary similes capture how consolatory sources diversify and improve the fruits of Teresa's literary labor. They also reflect how her

deafness is not an obstacle and may be a boon to her work. Teresa refers to the product of her suffering with disabilities as spiritual fruit. She explains:

[M]erescamos cojer fruto saludable e sí liberalmente y de buen grado nos gloriaremos en nuestras enfermedades, porque more en nuestras ánimas la virtud de Cristo. E aun no me consiente mi devoçión poner e[n] olivid[o], antes me manda traer a la memoria, una palabra que en la estoria deste santo Apóstol se escribe, donde dize: “La virtud en la enfermedad es acabada e perfecta.”

May we deserve to harvest healthful fruit, and we shall glory generously and willingly in our sickness so that Christ’s virtue may dwell in our souls. And yet my devotion will not allow me to forget these verses, but rather it reminds me of what is written in the epistle of this saintly Apostle, where it says, “For virtue is made perfect in infirmity.” (62; 45)

Here Teresa’s disabilities yield the glorious fruit of salvation for which Christ suffers. They are her strength in the model of Paul’s thorn in the flesh. Teresa cites 2 Corinthians 12:9, which is fundamental for spiritual consolation for disability.³⁵ In her translation, moreover, disability is not only strength but virtue, indicating that she rejects a negative moral model of disability in which disability is equated to sin. The suffering Christ as glorification of disability and Paul’s discovery of strength in weakness are central motifs in today’s disability theology. Although Teresa hesitates to draw comparisons between herself and Christ, her use of Pauline discourse contributes to disability theology.³⁶

Alfonso de Cartagena and his comrade Rodrigo Sánchez de Arévalo’s treatise debating the relative merits of sight and hearing also likely influenced Teresa’s figuration of the fruits of disability. The utility of the senses is in part judged in their treatise with arboreal metaphors of fruit-bearing trees. Disabled people, who are compared with trees in a grove, should not be dismissed out of hand. They should rather be judged by the fruits they produce. In defending the utility of the sense of sight, Sánchez de Arévalo states: “Hinc arborem uitis arbuste preferimus, sic et olivam quercui antepoñimus, quoniam utiliora longe producunt” (“Hence we prefer the cypress tree to the shrub, and so we prefer the olive tree to the oak, since they produce far more useful things” Cartagena and Sánchez de Arévalo I. 22; 83) and “Ideo apud Salvatorem nostrum arbor bona commendatur, quia bonos producit fructus”

(“Therefore with our Savior the good tree is commended, because it produces good fruits” I. 23; 84). This arboreal and alimentary metaphor comes in the midst of a defense of the merits of sight over hearing, in which Sánchez de Arévalo claims that deafness is not as grave as blindness. Although this treatise is critical of sensory impairment, both sides of the argument in Cartagena and Sánchez de Arévalo’s treatise muster examples of the marvelous capacities of people with sensory disabilities in the course of arguing for their preferred sense.

Imagining Disability as Spiritual Advantage and Interpreting Scripture with Consolatory Exegesis

Teresa writes about her experience of disability with vivid images that appeal to multiple senses. Amador de los Ríos claims, “Dotada de lozana imaginación” (“Gifted with a lively imagination”), Teresa

[i]mpresionaba . . . á sus descripciones pintoresco y agradable colorido: llevada por su talento reflexivo à la contemplacion interna de los sentimientos, comunicaba a su frase extraordinaria viveza: su estilo y su lenguaje eran por tanto tan enérgicos como espontáneos.

imparted her descriptions with painterly and pleasing colors: led by her talent for self-reflective contemplation of inward feelings, she communicated extraordinary vividness in her phrasing: her style and her language were thus as energetic as they were spontaneous. (177)

Picturesque prose prioritizes the sense of sight in Teresa’s work. Amador de los Ríos implies that Teresa’s energetic style is a compensation for her deafness. Her style enhances her ability to disclose her inner feelings about her experience of sensory disability in a compelling manner.

Throughout the *Arboleda*, Teresa figures consolation with powerful images of disability, most of which she draws from biblical literature. Of particular interest to consoling disability and establishing crip authority are her images of disability as a manual sign from God, as a halter and bit, and as a meal or feast.³⁷ Teresa alternates between lamentation and consolation in her explanation of the meaning of these images. As she moves through the treatise, she loops back to prior images, interlacing them to strengthen her points. This makes for a repetitive, confusing narrative for a modern reader, but attention to Teresa’s interlaced images reveals a rich variety of consolatory strategies

that disclose her authority as a disabled writer. In particular, Teresa elaborates her images of writerly consolation with embodied metaphors, knowledge of her material culture, invocation of disability community, sense-for-sense translation, and what I call consolatory exegesis to bring herself and others spiritual comfort.

Teresa reframes her deafness and muteness as advantage by imagining them as commands from God conveyed through manual signs. She relates that “estando enbuerta en el tropel de las fáblas mundanas e bien rebuelto e atado mi entendimiento en el cuidado de aquéllos” (“thus enmeshed in the confusion of worldly chatter, with my understanding disordered and bound up in worldly cares”), she could not “oír las bozes de la santa dotrina que la Escritura nos enseña e amonesta” (“hear the voices of holy doctrine that Scriptures teach us” *Arboleda* 40; 26). Teresa thus likens her onset of deafness to a manual gesture from God that commands she stop listening to worldly chatter.³⁸ Teresa relates that God “hízome de la mano que callase. E bien se puede así dezir, pues esta pasión es dada a mí por su mano” (“signaled me with His hand to be quiet. And one may well say that this suffering is given to me by His hand” 41; 26). This first, forceful gesture commands Teresa to stop hearing, since with his sign “claustra Dios a puesto en mi oír” (“God has placed . . . [a cloister] on my hearing” 42; 28). However, this sign does not suffice for Teresa to give up desire for worldly concerns. Though she is “callando por fuerza” (“silenced by force”), she did not listen “de grado lo *que* tanto me cunplía, mas con mi neçesidad a cuestras porfiando de llevar adelante mis daños” (“[willingly] to what I should hear; rather, burdened with my foolishness, I struggled to further my own harm” 41; 27). Her deafness is at first thus painful to bear.

A divine manual sign also signals Teresa’s onset of muteness. God commands Teresa to stop talking with a second manual gesture as follows:

[A]ñadió su misericordia la segunda signa del dedo en la boca, dán-dome claramente a entender que no es su voluntad que yo hable en las cosas del siglo mas que calle e del todo callar. E asaz manifesto parece serme hecha esta signa con el dedo divinal, quando en tanto grado es acreçentada mi pasión que aunque quiero hablar no puedo e aunque me quieren hablar no pueden.

Merciful God added a second sign with His finger to His [mouth], clearly indicating that it is not His will that I speak of things of this world but that I be completely silent. And it seems clear enough that

this sign was made to me by a divine [finger] when my suffering is increased to such a degree that, even though I want to speak, I cannot, and even though people may wish to speak to me, they cannot. (41; 27)

This second manual sign mutes Teresa,³⁹ but it does not quell her desire for worldly conversation. She explains that “en tanto grado es acrecentada mi pasyón que aunque quiero hablar no puedo e aunque me quieren hablar no pueden” (“my suffering is increased to such a degree that, even though I want to speak, I cannot, and even though people may wish to speak to me, they cannot” 41; 27). Her muteness is socially disabling because it adds to her sense of social isolation and creates tension with members of her community who wish her to speak. Teresa relates that “me enojan algunas personas quando me ruegan y dizen: ‘Id a fulanos qu’ os quieren ver e aunque vos no lo oigaes, oirán ellos a vos” (“I am angered when people beg me and say, ‘Go to so-and-so’; for they want to see you and even though you cannot hear them, they will hear you” 41; 27). Although Teresa believes “que se me dize con buena amistad e sinpleza apartada de toda malicia” (“that this is said in good friendship and innocence without any malice”), it nonetheless annoys her, “conosciendo claramente qu’el ablar es prolixo sin el oír, se puede dezir fe syn obras” (“knowing as I do that speech is pointless without hearing, like faith without works” 41–42; 27). It is unclear if her acquaintances do not understand or do not believe that Teresa has lost her speaking ability. Regardless, the demand to speak causes her frustration.

Teresa reframes her disabilities with a third manual sign. This sign brings about a shift in her understanding of her disabilities as follows:

[N]o solamente es quita del oír e fablar mío en las conversaciones del siglo, mas el deseo que me solía hazer no pequeño daño, con la piadosa mano de su divinal graçia as del todo apartado de mí! ¡O señal provechosa no punto discrepante de las primeras, mas muy favorable y sostenedora de aquéllas!

Not only [has my hearing and speaking been removed] from worldly conversations but, with the merciful hand of [your] divine grace, you have removed completely my desire, which used to cause me so much trouble! Oh beneficial sign that confirms and sustains previous signs! (43; 28)

The third manual sign from God brings Teresa consolation for her disability. Teresa relates that after the third sign, her “deseo es ya conforme con mi

pasión, y mi querer con mi padescer son así abenidos” (“desire now conforms with my suffering and my longing is thus reconciled to my affliction” 43; 28–29). Teresa’s transformation is profound. She no longer even desires to hear or speak: “que nin yo deseo oír nin me pueden hablar, nin yo deseo que me hablen” (“so that I no longer wish to hear nor can people speak to me nor do I want them to speak to me” 43; 29). Teresa emphasizes the transformation of her disability, likening it to salvation and reconciliation: “Las que llamava pasiones agora las llamo resurecciones. Ya son abenidos los dos enemigos, que son mi querer e mi padescer” (“What I used to call my crucifixion, I now call my resurrection. Now are my two enemies reconciled, my desire and my suffering” 43; 29). Teresa shifts her understanding of her deafness and muteness from burden to blessing, from deadly privation to replenishing resource.

The three divine manual signs Teresa receives function as an alternative form of communication and consolation from therapeutic speech or writing. They enable communication between Teresa and God that does not require her to hear or speak. The signs have physical and spiritual effects. Her exclusion from worldly matters helps her commune with the divine. The idea that Deafness and muteness had spiritual compensations was available to Teresa in works of consolation that she could have read. As Reason advises in Petrarch’s dialogue on deafness, “Celum preterea ac terras et maria respice, horumque omnium auctorem in silentio contemplare: nil ad hoc surditas ista nocuerit, multum fortasse profuerit” (“Contemplate in silence the heavens, the earth, and the sea—and the Creator of it all. Deafness cannot keep you from any of this, but could, in fact, help you to do it” *De rem.* 2. 97; 240–41). Both Petrarch and Luna discuss how loss of hearing and speech enables hearing with the ears of the soul and speaking to God with the tongue of the soul,⁴⁰ concepts that Teresa also frequently opines.

The consolation of divine manual signs also evokes the silence and signing conventions that were “everyday habits of monastic life” (Hsy, “Disability” 30). Although the Cistercian Order is the best known for manual signs, numbers, and alphabets, silence and the use of signs is baked into the Benedictine Rule that governed many monastic orders.⁴¹ In Fox’s translation of the Benedictine Rule for women, several of the rules treat limitations on speech,⁴² silence, and the use of signs. For instance, the sixth chapter treats “silence and sobernesse in wordes” (Collett et al. 103–4), and keeping silent is a sign of humility, when a nun “reffaineth hir toonge from spekinge / and whan she kepeth sile[n]ce and putteth not fourth nor speketh no worde / till she be questioned” (109). Furthermore, “depe and profunde silence” was to be kept at the table while scripture was read aloud, such that “the wisperinge or

voice of noo person there be h[e]arde / but oonly of the reder . . . And if so be they nede ought . . . let them aske it rather by the sounde of some maner of signe or tokin / than by any voice" (132–33). The number of signs that were in use in monastic communities were limited and varied from place to place, but they were a well-known element of monastic life.

Although monastic manual signs were not invented for Deaf and/or mute people, members of Teresa's family knew that conventual manual signing systems could function as communication for deaf nuns. Alfonso de Cartagena avers "licet" ("it's a given") that deaf and mute people "astutissimi ingenii esse soleant" ("tend to be of the most shrewd minds") and some can communicate using "nutibus iuxta monialium" ("signs as do nuns" Cartagena and Sánchez de Arévalo 2. 18. 95).⁴³ Although Teresa names only one manual gesture, that of placing the finger to the mouth, its meaning changes with context in her treatise as do the meanings of spoken or written words. The sign of placing the finger to the mouth is listed in compendia and monastic customaries. For instance, in compiling Cistercian signs, Walter Jarecki lists the sign "[t]acere" ("to be silent") as indicated with "[i]ndex iunctus ad os extensus dat reticere" ("the index finger brought to the open mouth so that it might close" 359). As Hsy suggests, "Linking the hand, mouth and visual understanding, this communicative action situates an individual body in relation to a community of others" ("Disability" 31). As a sign for silence, it is so widely known as to be comprehensible to any reader, lay or no, hearing or no.

Teresa's use of manual sign imagery as a form of writerly consolation thus supports Hsy's conclusion that *Arboleda* illustrates Deaf Gain. H-Dirksen Bauman and Joseph Murray explain that Deaf Gain occurs when "the unique sensory orientation of Deaf people leads to a sophisticated form of visual-spatial language that provides opportunities for exploration into the human character" (246). Teresa's representation of "deafness affords other ways of knowing (visual, kinetic) and can be considered an asset" (Hsy, "Disability" 32). In addition, just as Petrarch values the know-how that disability brings as contributing to the dignity of human beings, Teresa's elaboration of the significance of manual gesture demonstrates cripistemology gathered from the lived experience of deafness and muteness.

Images from the Psalms are also integral to Teresa's representation of disability.⁴⁴ Psalmic allusions appear throughout *Arboleda* to express both lamentation and consolation.⁴⁵ Teresa adopts the image of the *camo et freno*, or bridle and bit, from *Ps.* 31:9 to reframe her disabilities as bindings that guide and draw her closer to God. Teresa declares at the end of her prologue: "[P]or fundamento de la qual me plaze tomar las palabras siguientes"

(“As a foundation for my treatise it pleases me to take the following words”) and cites *Ps.* 31:9 in Latin: “In camo et freno maxillas forum constrainje, qui non aproxima[n]t [a]d te” (*Arboleda* 40; 26). Teresa weaves psalmic allusions throughout *Arboleda* and *Admiración*, but *Ps.* 31:9 is, as she promises, fundamental for representing her deafness and muteness.

Teresa cites *Ps.* 31:9 later in the treatise, translates it, and performs an exegesis to reveal its multiple meanings, or fourfold senses.⁴⁶ She does not simply repeat the citation but rather makes it her own: “Pues bien puedo dezir e aun tomar por mía, doquier que la halle, a esta muy graciosa y más verdadera cançión de Davit, la qual en comienço desta simple escritura e por fundamento della tomé” (“For indeed I can repeat, and even take as my own, David’s most gracious and truthful song, which I cited as the beginning and foundation of this simple treatise” 47; 32). She then presents a translation of *Ps.* 31:9 from Latin to Spanish. The translation makes small changes to the Latin source. It renders “camo et freno” (“bridle and bit”) with the more specific Castilian word choice of “cabestro y freno” (“halter and bit” 47). The Spanish translation also adds to the intended recipients of the halter and bit, such that the psalm now addresses not just those who do not approach God but those who do not approach “e quieren allegar” (“and wish to approach” 47; 33). Teresa could have made this translation herself, or she may have cited an extant translation. She certainly is attentive to the differences between source and target text in her subsequent exegesis. The alterations to the psalm are subtle, but they reposition the text with Teresa’s culture’s equine practices and turn the text to her own situation. These changes also correspond with the translation theory and practice of her uncle Alfonso de Cartagena, who repositioned source texts to fit target language culture with a tendency to amplify the source text. Her uncle’s translation practice anticipates Renaissance theories of translation, when “translation was by no means a secondary activity, but a primary one, exerting a shaping force on the intellectual life of the age, and at times the figure of the translator appears almost as a revolutionary activist” (Bassnett, *Translation Studies* 59). Focusing on what is gained rather than lost in translation is also useful for framing how sensory impairments were conceived in premodernity as benefiting from the interrelation or translation of the senses,⁴⁷ in which one sense may support another. Translation gain is further relevant for Deaf Gain, as both concepts emphasize the value of biolinguistic diversity. Translation in this instance allows Teresa to express what she gains in her Deafness.

Teresa next performs an exegetical interpretation, “[p]ara mejor ver cómo e cuánto haze a mi propósito esta autoridat” (“to better [show] how this . . .

authority suits my purpose” 47; 33). She begins her interpretation on the literal level with the function of a halter and bit for training horses and mules as follows:

[E]ste acatamiento de cabestro e freno es diputado para los animales brutos que careçen de razón, porque con estos artificiales acatamientos son traídos casi por fuerça adonde les cumple e al serviçio de su dueño conviene, así que por el cabestro son guiados e por el freno son costreñidos.

Adherence to the halter and bit is deputed to brute animals who lack reason so that with this artificial obeisance they are brought well-nigh by force to where they comply and are fit for the service of their master, such that they are guided by the halter and bound by the bit. (47; trans. mine)

As I can attest from my own equine experience, the halter and bit can be a mutual aid of tactile communication for both horse and handler.⁴⁸ Teresa could have been familiar with equine tack and training due to her family’s military service and authorship of chivalric conduct manuals. Teresa’s knowledge of equestrian matters thus demonstrates her membership in a community and makes her writing accessible to a wider audience. The horse’s or mule’s tack functions as a tool of communication between the animal and the handler. Commands are given *casi*, almost or as if by force, but not entirely by force. Just as the Spanish translation of the psalm adds that the halter and the bridle are for animals that wish to approach God, Teresa’s analysis of the role of the halter and bit emphasizes that they help those who *quieren*, or desire, to come closer to their master—to be in the right place.

As with her use of the image of manual signs, Teresa underscores desire as well as discipline in her interpretation. As Sunny Harrison observes, manuals for equine medical care in the late Middle Ages provide evidence of the methods that were used in horse training. Breaking a horse, or accustoming it to being ridden, required that a colt (or adolescent horse from two to four years old) first be made accustomed to a halter, which has no bit and is fastened around the horse’s poll directly behind the ears. Later, the trainer introduces the bit, which sits in the back of the horse’s mouth on top of the tongue and provides more control to the rider. A halter is gentler than a bit. Horse breaking and training should not and in fact cannot be achieved through brute force, and this particular psalm has connections to spiritual

elements of this process. Harrison observes, “Horse-handlers might also use elements of devotional writing as ritual prayers or charms to calm a willful or violent horse” (361). Harrison then cites a fifteenth-century Italian treatise that advises in the case of “chavalo fortissimo che non voltar in pace” (“a most strong horse who will not return peaceably” ct. and trans. Harrison 361–62), the handler should “say the words of *Psalm* 31:9” (361). The literal tools of the halter and the bit are reinforced with the spiritual repetition of the psalm that addresses those who do not come close to God in the way that the horse will not be recalled to its master. Harrison points out that the psalm

likens the unrepentant sinner to a horse or mule: lacking rationality and understanding it must be dragged around by a bridle and bit, but the charm uses this imagery to invoke the horse to transcend its brutishness. It uses seemingly contradictory notions of free will, understanding and forced compliance to encourage the horse to cast off its wildness and rebelliousness. (362)

The charming power of the psalm reflects the give-and-take of working with animals. Teresa alludes to the subtlety of horse training and its paradoxes of free will and compliance to express similar complexities in her experience and acceptance of disability.

Teresa next interprets the psalm on an allegorical and a moral level. She explains, “El cabestro es la razón y el freno es la tenprança y la discrìcion” (“The [halter] is our reason and the [bit] our temperance and discretion” *Arboleda* 48; 33). She expands on the image’s moral sense. First, the halter, or reason, “nos guía e debe guiar a todo lo que es bueno e complidero, no sólo a nuestro bien tenporal mas a lo espiritual e pertenesçiente al serviçio de nuestro Señor” (“guides us toward all that is good and fitting for our temporal good and our spiritual well-being in the service of our Lord”); and second, the bit, or temperance and discretion, “nos costringen a refrenar los apetitos desordenados de nuestra humana flaqueza” (“[binds] us to curb the disordered appetites of our human [frailty]” 48; 33). These constraints work to different extents on different people, but all people are morally imperfect and need guidance, in Teresa’s view.

Teresa writes to console herself for disability and to accept it. Her engagement with scripture here differs from the religious model of disability that Edward Wheatley outlines for the Middle Ages (10–19), because she does not focus on cure, nor does she attribute disability with negative moral judgment in and of itself. Teresa does attribute ethical value to her disabilities.

Nonetheless, rather than simply adopting “compensatory exaltations of spirit at the expense of ‘deformed’ flesh, the ‘light’ of grace or inspiration meant to make up for a damaged body” (Mintz, “Ordinary” n.p.), Teresa’s judgment of disability is closer to what Suzanna Mintz observes of recent, spiritual disability narratives, where “faith becomes not the end-point of a uniformly structured narrative but an intermittently recurring emphasis that serves to remind readers of the inextricable link between body and spirit” (“Ordinary” n.p.). This is not to say that Teresa does not perceive a spiritual end for her disability. She rather holds space for lamentation as well as consolation in her interlaced narrative structure. She does not denigrate her disabilities but frames them as enabling her faith.

Teresa finally moves to the anagogical level of her interpretation of the psalm. Taken as metaphors for disabilities, the halter and the bit have a spiritual end for her and her community of the infirm. She states that “que por mi grand bien y manifesto provecho, el Señor soberano con cabestro y freno de dolencia e pasiones costrñó las mexillas de mis vanidades” (“for my great good and manifest advantage, my sovereign Lord with a halter and bit of pains and sufferings constrained the jaws of my vanities” 49; trans. mine). Here the halter and bit transform into embodied metaphors for disability, where only touch is necessary for the tack to perform its function. Disability is a manifestation of God’s greater plan for Teresa, which she elaborates with the image of halter and bit: “La dolencia buena y durable es cabestro para abaxar la çerviz de sobervia e es freno para costreñir los deseos dañosos y enpeçibles al ánima” (“A good and lasting ailment is a [halter] to humble the proud neck and a bit [to constrain] desires dangerous and injurious to the soul” 49; 34). She takes her exegesis a step further, relating the biblical citation to her personal experience of disability as follows:

¿Pues cuánto con mayor razón e más propio exerçio se puede dezir en esta mi pasión, que todas sus fuerças no las enplea sino en retraer a mí por fuerça de lo uno y atraerme a lo ál, con tanto, que aunque me pese, he de querer lo que ella quiere y ella sienpre desquite lo que yo quiero? Ca si quiero oír, non me lo consiente; e si hablare, vame la mano, e claramente me dize no ser otra su intuición sinon [devedar] lo que quiero y hazerme creer lo que no quiero. Lo que quiero es enbolverme en alas ocupaciones mundanas e lo que no quiero es la soldat o apartamiento de todo ello.

And how much more this applies to my own particular suffering that invests all its force in removing me from one thing and drawing me

towards another, so that, in spite of myself, I have to want what my suffering wants, and my suffering always rejects what I want. For if I want to hear, my affliction does not allow it; and if I want to speak, it signals me with its hand and clearly indicates that its intention is to prohibit what I want and make me want what I do not want. What I do want is to involve myself in worldly activities, and what I do not want is solitude or isolation from them. (50; 35)

In interpreting the spiritual significance of the halter and bit of the psalm for her own situation, Teresa does not shy away from expressing her aversion to the sense of isolation that results from her deafness and muteness. Immersed in sorrow for her suffering, Teresa loops back to the consolatory image of disability as a manual sign from God. This amplifies the sense of her disability as a command as well as a constraint. It also helps her to reframe the emotional distress that her disabilities bring as having a spiritual end. The consolation process she elaborates is recursive. Reframing metaphors of disability interlace through the text, helping Teresa to work through her lamentation toward alleviation. None of these images represent a miraculous cure or complete overcoming of her disabilities, which she goes on experiencing and accepting.

As is the case in her image of the manual sign, the meaning of the halter and bit shifts from a sign of her suffering to a sign of her blessing. She explains, “Pues bien mirada su intinción” (“For if its intention is well-spied” 50; 33), the spiritual end of the halter and bit of her disabilities “major es que no la mía” (“is better than mine” 50; trans. mine). Her understanding of this shift is depicted in visual terms—the intention must be *bien mirada*—or looked at hard—and reframing of her disability is represented grammatically in the present progressive: “Ya voy conociendo su buena voluntat” (“I am coming to know its goodwill” 50; 35). Accepting her disabilities takes time and cannot happen entirely by force. She further explains her understanding of the spiritual meaning of her disability as follows:

Tiempo es ya que la dexe obrar enteramente aquel fin virtuoso lleno de provecho espiritual porque el Señor me la dió. ¡O cabestro y freno de pasión saludable! Si [hasta aquí] me llevas rastrando y mal paresciendo en pos de ti, agora de mi buen grado te quiero seguir! E pues me sigues, y allí quiero colocar mi morada donde claramente me guías, ¿quánto es a mí provechoso ser atada con estas pasiones, las cuales [ca] vsan que mi indominable porfía sea vençida de la misericordia divinal! Pues con cabestro [e] freno son costreñidas las mexillas de mis vanos deseos, porque [a] Dios no me quería allegar.

It is now time that I let it achieve completely its virtuous end, full of spiritual benefit because the Lord gave this suffering to me. Oh [halter and bit] of my healthful suffering! . . . If so far you have been dragging me badly behind you, now I want to willingly follow you! [And since you pursue me, I wish also to make my residence where you clearly guide me.] How beneficial it is to me to be bound by these sufferings that cause my indomitable persistence to be conquered by His divine mercy! So, because I did not want to draw near to God, the jaws of my vain desires have been constrained with a [halter and bit, because I did not wish to approach God]. (51; 35)

Teresa begins to perceive her hearing and speech disabilities as beneficial constraints, and she derives consolation from her interpretation of *Ps.* 31:9. Teresa is not the only early modern writer to make this connection. Petrarch uses the image of the bit as a reframing metaphor for muteness in his *De remediis*,⁴⁹ where Reason states: “Hanc tibi custodiam et hoc frenum seu a natura quidem, seu a fortuna oblatum, ne contempseris, libensque te regendum prebe, neve contra tuam sortem calcitres” (“To you, this heed and a [bit] have been provided by nature or fortune. Do not despise them, be willingly controlled, and do not try to resist your lot” 2. 103; 250). As does Teresa, Petrarch uses the noun “frenum,” or bit, that is present in *Ps.* 31:9 as a metaphor for muteness. Like Teresa, Petrarch also peppers psalmic allusions throughout his consolatory work. Teresa learns to take the bit of her muteness, which draws her closer to God, but her consolatory exegesis of the psalm outstrips Petrarch’s.

Teresa fits the authoritative text of *Ps.* 31:9 to her own lived experience of disability through what I call consolatory exegesis. Along with the methods of consolatory reading and writing that she uses in *Arboleda*, Teresa employs biblical exegesis to find advantage in the adversity of her disabilities, even when the scripture that she reads is not overtly about disability. As Ronald Surtz avers, “Although her imagery is often biblically inspired, it is assimilated and personalized in such a way that it also functions on a vital level. Such interrelated image patterns mirror the interplay between received doctrine and personal experience” (“Image” 303). Moreover, as Conde argues (“La ortodoxia”), Teresa’s highly personal exegetical reading of scripture is not exactly orthodox. Her sly mode of exegesis anticipates practices that the inquisition would later deem heterodox and transgressive. Stretching scripture to depict disability as an advantage thus also exemplifies disability *metis*,

where the text can be bent to reflect embodied experience. Teresa's consolatory reading and writing are thus augmented with consolatory exegesis to grant her *crip* authority. Teresa interprets the authoritative, biblical text to reveal that the disabilities that her society deems deviant can be resignified into a spiritual boon. In turn, Teresa's disability, rather than being a disadvantage to understanding, gives her the authority to interpret the psalm. Her hermeneutic approach thus constructs *crip* authority for a disabled nun who not only lives a conventual life but engages in an early form of disability theology.

In the midst of her analysis of *Ps.* 31:9, Teresa circles back to the alimentary image of the moderate meal of consolatory sources to show how the halter and bit apply to the whole community of the infirm. As previously mentioned, alimentary similes characterize Teresa's consumption and disposition of consolatory reading sources. These images have strong ties to monastic rules that regulated food consumption for the community and reflect early humanist models for transformative imitation. Food images interlard the entire treatise, as do images of manual signs and halters and bits. She compares the halter and bit to the moderation of diet that infirmity necessitates. She brings in an "exemplo" ("example") from everyday life, in which "un onbre enfermo no osa nin osará comer de todas las viandas, e aun de las menos dañosas no come quanto quiere" ("a sick man dares not to eat all foods and even with less harmful foods he does not eat as much as he wants" 49; 34). Just as physical disabilities constrain the body, so too they constrain immoral behavior as follows:

Pues ya parece que en los actos corporales resiste y enfrena la dolelencia, ved que deuv hazer en los espirituales; ca si discriçión pone regla en las viandas por conservar la salut tenporal, mayor discreçión e de más durable provecho es, en verdat, poner regla en las obras por difensya y guarda de la salut espiritual. Sea verdat que a todos sería o es conplidero y no poco saludable guardar diecta en el dañoso manjar de los pecados, pero no es dubda que más abiertamente lo amonesta la razón a los enfermos que no a los sanos. Ca así como en las viandas corporales [a] todos es bien guardarse de lo dañoso, pues çierto es que más estrecho y con mayor premia es costreñido de se guardar el enfermo que el sano, bien asi de los majares dañosos al ánima, que son los pecados, con más premia y manifesta neçesidad se deve abstener el enfermo qu' no el sano.

If an ailment thus resists and curbs physical acts, imagine how it affects spiritual acts; for if our discretion imposes rules on eating to preserve our temporal health, it is a greater discretion of more lasting benefit to impose rules on our deeds to safeguard our spiritual health. While it is true that it is fitting and healthy for everyone to adhere to a strict diet during a harmful meal of sins, there is no doubt that reason more openly influences the infirm than the healthy. For although it is good for everyone to avoid harmful foods, certainly the invalid is more strictly constrained to avoid them than a healthy person. Likewise, a sick person will abstain with more rigor and necessity from foods harmful to his soul—from sins—than a healthy person. (49; 34)

The infirm are more likely to curb not only physical excesses but spiritual dangers due to the constraints provided by the halter and bit of their disabilities. As Surtz suggests, Teresa can depict disabilities as a “shortcut on the road to salvation” (“Image” 302). Teresa does argue for a moral model of disability, but one in which the disabled person may gain access to spiritual benefits without despising their disabilities.

Teresa extends the image of the moderate meal to gaining a seat at the table for the infirm. Her use of this image to represent her experience of sensory disability may respond to her uncle Alfonso de Cartagena and Sánchez de Arévalo’s treatise on the relative merits of sight and hearing. The conversation that her uncle’s treatise purports to record takes place at the table “inter ipsas epulas atque ut ita dixerim in media mensa” (“between courses and, so-to-speak, *in media* meal”) on the grounds of the Hospital del Rey in Burgos (I. 2. 79). The setting for the treatise evokes the literary tradition of the banquet of the senses,⁵⁰ and its content touches on the kinds of infirmities that the proximate residents of the hospital might have experienced.⁵¹ Although her uncle’s treatise discusses disability at a supper without the explicit presence of disabled guests, Teresa uses scripture to authorize her own place at the table of disability discourse.

Teresa likens her experience of disability to being invited to a “cena” (“supper” 54; 39). In particular, she explicates the parable of the rich man’s supper in Luke 14.⁵² She paraphrases the parable on a literal level, relating how a man “hizo una grand çena e llamó a muchos” (“prepared a grand supper and invited many”), but when it was time for the guests to arrive, they “por ocupaciones variables, o por mejor dezir, desvariadas, se escusaron de venir” (“excused themselves from attending for various and[, better said,] foolish reasons” 54–55; 39). Indignant at this outcome, the paterfamilias, or man of

the house, commands his servant to go out “a las plaças y mercados y cuántos enfermos, claudos y débiles hallares, co[n]stríñelos que entren, porque sea llena mi casa” (“to the plazas and marketplaces, and as many infirm, crippled, and weak that you find, compel them to enter, so that my house may be filled” 55; 39). Teresa chooses the same verb for the constraining action of the bit in *Ps.* 31:9, *co[n]striñer*, or to compel, as she uses in her description of the roundup of disabled guests in *Ps.* 31:9. Luke 14, unlike *Ps.* 31:9, however, treats disabled people on a literal level.

Teresa interprets the meaning of the parable for disabled people specifically. From this she gathers the following allegorical and moral meanings:

[L]os enfermos, por fuerça son traídos a la çena manífiça de la salut perdurable, ca la dolença les rasga el manto e los haze entrar por la puerta de obras virtuosas, ca si por esta puerta no entramos, no podremos llegar a tan grande colmo de onor, como es ser asentados a la mesa de la largueza divina.

The sick are brought forcibly to the magnificent supper of eternal health, for affliction pulls at their mantle and makes them enter through the door of [good works]; for if we do not enter through this door, we cannot reach such great heights of honor as to be seated at the table of divine generosity. (55; 39–40)

Extraordinarily, Teresa celebrates the parable of the rich man’s supper rather than focusing on the Sabbath dinner at the opening of the chapter, during which Jesus heals the infirm (Luke 14:2–4). According to Teresa, the rich man’s supper is an allegory for accepting disability, in which disabled people are invited to take a seat at the table based on their ability to perform good works without the expectation of cure. She thus takes advantage of the central role of people with disabilities in the parable to make her broader points about moral advantages of disability gain without making disability disappear.

Furthermore, Teresa does not omit the role of the will in accepting the benefits that the adversity of disability entails. She calls those who willingly come when summoned to the supper of the infirm a “bienaventurado convento de los enfermos” (“blessed convent of the [infirm]” 55; 40). Teresa again highlights the parable’s application to the disabled community, and her reference to the convent emphasizes the integral place of disability in conventual life. She further unfolds her understanding of the relationship between compulsion and obeisance in accepting disability as one might accept a summons

to a meal. In asking the question, “¿[Y] cómo entran de grado si los llevan por fuerça?” (“And how do they enter willingly if they are led there by force?”), she first establishes that any person with a disability, “por bueno e virtuoso que sea” (“no matter how good or virtuous”), experiences disabilities “contra su voluntad” (“against [their] will” 55; 40).⁵³ She further establishes that it is natural not to wish for a disability, but people with disabilities can nonetheless assent to the spiritual consolation that disability can bring:

No, ninguno en los humanos yo creo se podría hallar tan perfecto que negase aquello a que naturalmente es inclinado, que es desear la salut sobre toda cosa. Pues quien deste bien es despojado, síguese que fuerça es fecha a su querer y deseo, e ya paresçe que le lleva por fuerça aquella pasión que contra su voluntad padesçe. Pero entra de grado a la çena ya dicha sy conosçe serle dada por su bien, y con devota paçiencia y aççion de graçias, conforma a su querer con la voluntat de Dios; plaziéndole, no naturalmente, ca esto no podía ser, mas espiritualmente, con todo aquello que al Señor plaze. Y desanpar[a] luego las plaças y mercados donde se conpran y venden los temporales plazer es e se va llegando a la puerta de la casa donde la mesa de los espirituales manjares e verdaderos bienes está aparejada.

No human, I believe, is so perfect that he will deny what he naturally prefers, which is to desire health above all things. So it follows that when someone is deprived of this blessing, force is imposed on his wants and desires, and the suffering he endures against his will leads him forcibly to this supper. Yet he enters gladly if he recognizes that it is given for his own good, and with devout patience and gratitude he conforms his desire to God’s will, taking pleasure spiritually—not naturally, for that cannot be—in everything pleasing to the Lord. And he abandons immediately the streets and marketplaces where temporal pleasures are bought and sold and approaches the door of the house where the table of spiritual platters and true riches is prepared. (55–56; 40)

Distinguishing between what is natural (desire for health) and what is spiritually beneficial (desire for what God wills), Teresa makes room for emotional distress in the lived experience of disability. She also invites her readers to reframe this experience as a spiritual boon. Disability draws people away from worldly cares toward the divine, but only if they are willing.

Teresa enhances her exegesis of the parable by citing her own reluctance to turn away from worldly desires, stating, “Dígolo por mí, ca deste crímine me hacuso” (“I say this for myself, for I accuse myself of this crime” 57; 41). Her so-called crime is her desire for worldly things, which makes her balk at the benefits of her disabilities. She relates her experience to those who are unwilling to take a seat at the table of the infirm. She states, “[L]a tardanza, sin provecho, que en la calle deste mundo tantos años me detiene” (“[My lingering] in the streets of this world so many years [without gain]”) testifies to “estar paralítico mi entendimiento y muy más flaca y enferma se muestra mi descripción que mi conplisión” (“the paralysis of my understanding and [how much more weak and infirm my discretion is even than my constitution]” 57; 41). As previously, however, she cycles back to an acceptance and even celebration of her disabilities, calling them a divine “señal de vida” (“sign of life” 57; trans. mine). She perceives the endurance of her stubborn desires: “[C]onosco ya mi contu[ma]sçia [e] porfia ser tanto dañosa quanto durable” (“I now realize that my willfulness and obstinacy are as dangerous as they are enduring” 57; 41). At the same time, “Conosco en este mi mal el gran bien y merçed [que] Dios me haze en me penar y no menos en me penar tanto tiempo” (“I now recognize the great good in my misfortune and the mercy God has shown me in making me suffer for so long” 57; 41). Teresa’s interpretation of the parable of the supper in Luke 14 continues her pattern of consolatory exegesis, which validates the lived experience of disability in scripture. She interlaces her previous images of disability into her exegesis to further support her interpretation of disability as a spiritual benefit.

The interpretation of the parable culminates on an anagogical level with Teresa’s image of digesting disability as a bitter meal. Lamentation of disability alternates with Teresa’s avowals of acceptance. Teresa reframes the bitterness of her experience by keeping in mind her perception of its ends. She states: “Suframos el tormento por respecto del fin, amemos la dolencia no por sí sola, ca no lo mereçe, mas por respecto de la virtud” (“Let us endure our torment because of its end; let us love our pain not for its own sake, for it does not deserve our love, but because of its virtue” 62; 46). This leads her to conclude to “dexemos lo ajeno y usemos de nuestra dieta, y de tales viandas gustemos que nos hagan buen estómago” (“let us leave what we cannot have and get accustomed to our own diet, and let us partake of those foods that suit our stomach” 62; 46). In elaborating the corporal metaphor of disability as a bitter meal, Teresa emphasizes the sense of taste, stating, “Por ende quera- mos lo amargo, pues lo dulce no nos quiere, porque el [a]margo del paladar, que se entiende por el sentimiento humano y se co[nviert]a en dulçedunbre

del *ánima*” (“Therefore, let us love the bitter since the sweet does not love us, so that what is bitter to our palate (that is, to our human senses) may be converted into sweetness for our soul” 62–63; 46). Likening sensory disability to dietary restriction evinces an embodied metaphor for processing the difficulties of disability, but it also aligns with Teresa’s alimentary simile for digesting consolation, which implies that this is a natural and transformative process.

Teresa figures how bitter the experience of disability can be. She submits the following heart-wrenching statement:

E yo no sé para qué queremos los enfermos cosa deste mundo, ca bien que rodemos, no halleremos en él cosa que bien nos quiera. Los plazerres que en él son del todo nos habor[r]esçen, la salut nos desanpara, los amigos nos olvidan, los parientes se enojan, e aun la propia madre se enoja con la hija enferma, y el padre abor[r]esçe al hijo que con continuas dolencias le ocupare la posada. Y no es maravilla que así sea. Ca desde que el enfermo se abor[r]esçe y enoja de sí mesmo, no destas cosas temporales tan grand[an]bre padesçemos los dolientes, procuremos lo que más a la mano nos conviene, y esto es lo espiritual y saludable al *ánima*.

And I do not know why we infirm should want anything from this world, for as much as we may wander, we shall never find anything in it that loves us well. Worldly pleasures despise us, health forsakes us, friends forget us, relatives get angry, and even one’s own mother gets annoyed with her sickly daughter, and one’s father despises the son who with chronic afflictions dwells in his home. And it is no wonder that this is so, since even the invalid loathes and is vexed with himself. (63; 46)

Ableism is present even in the sanctuary of the home, where the disabled person might expect the support and nourishment of family. It is thus no wonder that disabled people internalize this ablism. Teresa, however, does not dwell on these harmful facts. In rejecting her desire for the supposed sweetness of worldly pleasures, Teresa rejects the ablism that goes along with them.

In elaborating her image of disability as a bitter meal, Teresa recommends “*seys viandas*” (“six dishes”) of bitter, although healthful foods:

tribulada tristeza, paçiençia durable, contriçión amarga, confesión verdadera y frequentada, oraçión devota, perseeraçión en obras virtuosas.

grievous sadness, enduring patience, bitter contrition, frequent and heartfelt confession, devout prayer, perseverance in virtuous works. (62; 46)

For Teresa, none of these dishes are appetizing, but she has come to learn their nourishing potential. In particular, the final dish of good works has provided Teresa with great consolation.

Working Through Disability, Resisting Malicious Ignorance

Teresa develops crip authority with concepts of disability work in the *Arboleda*. She resists ableist and ignorant assumptions about the capacities of people with disabilities to work, and she submits her own writing as evidence of such work. Teresa emphasizes the value of living with a disability as itself a good work, and she criticizes ableist assumptions about the capacities of people with disabilities as what she calls malicious ignorance. In appreciating what Teresa brings to the table in the history of disability work, it is important to recognize that scholars can impose biases, unconscious or not, about what disabled people were capable of accomplishing. In particular, an intervention is due in the currently accepted dating of the onset of Teresa's deafness.

The act of writing her treatise is a consolation for Teresa. She discloses that she writes to combat her "soledat e oçiosydat" ("loneliness and idleness" 38; 25). She then hails her writing as a remedy, stating: "A pues así es que esta tan esquiva e durable soledat apartar de mí no puedo, quiero hazer guerra a la [o]çiosydat ocupándome en esta peque[ñ]a obra" ("And since I cannot rid myself of this unsparing and lasting loneliness, I want to combat my idleness by busying myself with this little treatise" 39; 25). Teresa will have much more to say about the writing of *Arboleda* when she is forced to defend her authorship of it in *Admiración*, but at this point, she offers it as a humble work.

According to Teresa, good works are especially important for people with disabilities to perform for two reasons. First, "porque el doliente está así preso, ca lo tenporal o corporal nin puede aprovechar a sí nin a los otros" ("because the ailing person is so imprisoned in [their] suffering, [they] cannot [take advantage of] others [or] of temporal or corporal things" 49; 34). Second, "porqu'el enfermo ya paresçe tener el pie en el estribo para partir desta vida" ("because the sick person already appears to have one foot in the [stirrup] to depart this world" 49; 34). Yet Teresa immediately relates the exigency of performing good works back to the temporarily nondisabled as well:

[A]unque algunas vezes acaece que más aína parte desta miserable vida el sano que no el enfermo. Ca avemos visto y vehemos algunos bevir muchos años con grandes dolenças, e a otros que en su sanidad floresçen, avemos vito, por nuestros pecados, partir desta vida de grande ar[r]ebato. Aquí miren los que de la salut corporal son bien guarneçidos, porque el sueño de aquesta suguridat no los apremie de tal guisa que la açelerada e forçosa partida los halle durmiendo.

Even though sometimes it happens that the healthy person more promptly departs this miserable life than the sick person, for we see some people with great ailments live many years, and others, flourishing in good health, we have seen depart in a flash. Here let those blessed with physical health beware, lest the dream of their invulnerability deceive them in such a way that an accelerated and unavoidable death catches them napping. (49–50; 34)

The experience of disability can make a disabled person more cognizant of their spiritual obligations through their isolation, the scorn that society bears them, or the sense that they may be closer to death. Nevertheless, Teresa does draw on a key point found in premodern medical consolation—namely, that an ailing person may outlive a healthy one due to the care that they must pay to their health and the moderate way in which they must live.⁵⁴

In defining what constitutes work for disabled people, Teresa argues that the experience of disability itself is laborious. She compares the physical suffering that many disabilities entail to an overland journey:

Ca aunque pareçe de nuestro acatamiento quel doliente se está quedo en la posada, más camino anda de quanto pe[n]samos, y aun estando en la cama preso de hiebre, o sea de otra qualquier [p]enosa dolença, yo creo que él anda más de cinquenta jornadas.

For although it may seem that the afflicted stays still at home, he traverses more roads than we think and, even if bedridden, in the grip of a fever or some other painful affliction, he walks more, I believe, than a fifty-day journey. (72; 55)

Though an infirm person might not be able to travel, their experience of disability is a travail.⁵⁵ Relating this to her own situation, she opines, “[D]el

término en que me tomaron mis dolencias a éste en que agora me tienen, más jornadas ay que desde aquí a Roma” (“From the first day of my afflictions to the present, the painful spurs of my great suffering have forced me, to my dismay, to travel more day-journeys than from here to Rome” 72; 55). The analogy of the sick bed and day journey is especially relevant for conventual work accommodation. As Ninon Dubourg observes, the accommodations most often requested for conventual duties in papal petitions in the late Middle Ages were for mobility disabilities, and “the Church compromised on this issue more than on any other” (195). This makes Teresa’s point about disability work more legible to her audience in the same way that mobility impairments, especially in the collective symbol of a wheelchair for disability, are easily recognizable today. In my own experience, in the first few sessions of teaching disability studies classes, when I ask students to come up with lists of disabilities,⁵⁶ they overwhelmingly list mobility-related impairments. This is not to say that mobility-related impairments are better than others. They are perhaps more visible than other impairments. By the end of the semester, students’ understanding of the variety and value of disability improves, partly through reading disabled writers such as Teresa.

Designating the experience of disability as a form of work is fundamentally crip in a society that puts undue scrutiny on the capacities of disabled people to work, as is still the case today. Teresa berates those who accuse disabled people of being malingerers. They clearly do not know what being disabled is like. She rails that whoever

dize de el [en]fermo esta[r] oçioso, éste no sabe qué cosa es dolencia, ca si lo supiese, la mesma espirençia le dar[i]e a conosçer cómo el enfermo sienpre está ocupado en trabajos meritorios e ocultos, apartados sin dubda de todo loor humano.

says that the invalid is idle does not know what affliction is, for were he to know it, his own experience would teach him how the invalid is always busy in worthy and secret labors, hidden without doubt from all human praise. (80; 61–62)

Yet the assumption that the disabled are slothful goes beyond simple lack of experience.

Teresa defines the poignant term “malicious ignorance” to characterize ableist presumptions that disabled people are idle. She challenges people “que

con inorancia dizen: ‘¡Qué bien se están los dolientes que se están holgando!’” (“who say in ignorance, ‘How well off are the suffering in their leisure!’” 80; 62). Teresa deplores this ableist attitude:

Yo llamo a esta tal inorancia, inorancia maliçiosa, llena de envidia espiritual. La inorancia es no saber o aver gastado el xarope trabajoso de las dolencias. Y la maliçia y envidia espiritual es en ser tan apartados de caridad e piedad de sus próximos, que viéndol[o]s padecer desiguales payones, no solamente no han dellos compasión, mas aun los que dolencias pasan se lo puede sentir.

I call this kind of ignorance malicious ignorance, full of spiritual envy. Their ignorance is not knowing or never taking the [laborious remedy] of afflictions. And their malice and spiritual envy consist in being so distanced from charity or pity of their neighbors that, seeing them subjected to extreme suffering, they not only have no compassion for them, [but this certainly hurts those to whom the ailments occur]. (80; 62)

Teresa demands compassion, not just pity, although the maliciously ignorant do not even demonstrate pity.⁵⁷ She demands what feminist scholars call an ethics of care, which Dolmage and Hobgood recommend as a path toward “caring through” disability (“An Afterward”) and which Garland-Thomson highlights as an ethical resource of disability that should be conserved (“The Case for Conserving”).

As it relates to Teresa’s concept of disability work, I contest a *terminus post quem* of the spring of 1449 for her onset of deafness and a consequent dating of her work to have been composed no sooner than 1469. In their influential 2004 article, Dayle Seidenspinner-Núñez and Yonsoo Kim presume that Teresa could not have been deaf in the spring of 1449 and her works therefore could not have been written before 1469. They dismiss Teresa’s statement that her deafness began in her childhood, her “puericiã o moçedat” (Cartagena, *Arboleda* 52; 37).⁵⁸ They posit their dating based on an ableist reading of Teresa’s uncle’s 1449 petitions that she be allowed to move orders and be eligible for leadership work in her new convent. They presume deafness necessarily would have precluded Teresa from taking on any leadership position at all in a convent, which flies in the face of Teresa’s own attitudes toward disability work and contradicts the historical record of the conventual work accommodations that were prevalent in Teresa’s time. The purpose of my interven-

tion here is twofold: first, to correct the historical record; and second, in the spirit of Teresa's crip authority, to show that disability studies does not simply contribute to diversity, equity, and inclusion in academic institutions; it also makes for better scholarship.

In the first petition, Alfonso de Cartagena intercedes for his niece Teresa,⁵⁹ asking that she be allowed to transfer monastic orders because "cum animi sui quiete commode nequeat deinceps in huiusmodi monasterio et ordine ex certis rationabilibus causis remanere" ("she can no longer remain with a quiet and comfortable mind, for certain reasonable causes, in this kind of order and monastery" "Petition from Alfonso" Apr. 6, 1449). Alfonso de Cartagena does not specify these causes, perhaps because his position as bishop granted him the authority simply to vouch for them or perhaps because there was appended documentation that was not kept in the record. Given that "ordinem sancti Benedicti et Cisterciensem] singularem gerat devotionis affectum" ("she bears a feeling of singular devotion for the Benedictine and Cistercian orders"), Alfonso de Cartagena requests that Teresa be allowed to transfer to "quodcumque dictorum ordinum Cisterciensium], aut sancti Benedicti monasteriorum in quo regularis vigeat observantia et benivolas invenerit receptrices" ("whichever of the said Cistercian orders, or else a convent of Saint Benedict where observance of his rule is strong, and where she may find a kind welcome" 159). Although against canon law, changing orders was not unheard of, though it did require a petition and papal dispensation.⁶⁰

After the petition to transfer orders was approved, Alfonso de Cartagena then requested Teresa be allowed to accept benefices and leadership positions in her new convent, if elected. Seeking eligibility for benefices and being raised to conventual duties required such a petition for those who had changed orders. Alfonso de Cartagena supplicates as follows:

[Q]uodque per illius moniales regi solitum beneficium, etiamsi prioratus, dignitas etiam conventualis, administratio vel officium fuerit, concedere [se cumque] ut quamprimum vicesimumquintum suae aetatis annum attigerit, ut ad quascumque dignitates abbatiales praefici, eligi et assumi illasque recipere et retinere ac regere et gubernare et illis praesse valeat misericorditer dispensare.

Whatever rights are customarily held by those nuns by the rule of that order, even if it be a priory, or even a conventual office, administration or duty, be granted to her whenever, such that as soon as having reached the age of twenty-five years, she may be put in charge of any

abbatial offices for which she is chosen, elected, or selected, and that she may accept and retain them, and also manage and govern them, and dispense them with firm strength and mercy. (“Petition from Alfonso” May 2, 1449)

Pope Nicolas also granted this petition, stipulating that as to election to offices, “[f]iat, si eligatur” (“so might it be, if she is elected” “Petition from Alfonso” May 2, 1449). The pope dispenses equal rights to benefices and leadership opportunities for Teresa, if she is elected by her community.

Seidenspinner-Núñez and Kim incorrectly conclude the following from Alfonso de Cartagena’s second petition: “This would imply, of course, that Teresa was suited to exercise abbatial powers, that in 1449 she had not yet been afflicted with her deafness, which, while it may not have disqualified her from entering a monastic house, surely would have disqualified her from holding office or a position of conventual authority” (136). All possible leadership positions, they aver, would be off-limits to Teresa because “all obviously require extensive communication and interpersonal skills” (136n34). These statements presume that deaf people simply do not possess “communication and interpersonal skills.” Seidenspinner-Núñez and Kim do not support these claims with any evidence.⁶¹ As Sarah Rose remarks of attitudes toward disabled people’s capacities to work, “Disability has often been equated with the inability to do productive work, but rarely has this assumption reflected the lived experiences of people with disabilities” (“Work” n.p.). There is no proof that Teresa could hear when her uncle made this petition for her to be allowed to work in a leadership position. Although Kim has subsequently engaged somewhat with disability studies, twenty years after publication of the article she coauthored with Seidenspinner-Núñez, she holds to dating the onset of Teresa’s deafness after Teresa’s uncle’s work request. Moreover, Kim continues to characterize Teresa’s deafness as a catastrophe:

[Teresa] was prepared and educated to become an abbess in a distinguished convent. However, her destiny changed when she was stricken with deafness. All the glory and fame became twisted against her, and she was forgotten by her family, friends, and spiritual advisers, the community, and society itself, as Teresa clearly states in the text. (“Teresa de Cartagena’s Illness” 136)

Teresa does not make these statements in either of her texts. Though Teresa calls out her society’s ablism and its painful psychological and circumstantial

consequences, she rebukes that ableism. Teresa does not authorize today's scholars to present her as pitiful.

Although there is no proof that Teresa was deaf when her uncle made these petitions, we should not rule out this possibility.⁶² Requests for disability accommodations, including transfers between orders and request for work modifications, were negotiated through the petition process. Dubourg explains that "Papal Chancery permitted monastics to leave enclosure to transfer location, and thereby contravene the vow of *stabilitas Loci* (stability of location), for reasons relating to ill health and incapacity" (212).⁶³ Dubourg records the same vague Latin phrase that Alfonso de Cartagena uses to plea for his niece's need to transfer orders—*ex certis et legitimis causis*—being used in petitions making monastic disability accommodation requests. For instance, a German cleric asks for a mobility-related accommodation for "ex certis et legitimis causis" (ct. Dubourg 123n88). Furthermore, disabled nuns were in fact not prohibited from taking on an abbess's duties. As Dubourg avers, "Clerics with disabilities were not barred from seeking promotion to the bishopric or abbacy. Nevertheless, if they pursued such a promotion, they were required to request a pontifical dispensation for their eventual election to be authorized" (168). Moreover, conventual accommodation requests were often granted, especially when the supplicant was highly educated. As Dubourg explains, "It was hard to find well-educated clerics. As such, applicants with a strong educational background potentially had an advantage over their able-bodied, less-educated peers" (175). Dubourg further states that disability "was not a deal-breaker for the Curia. . . . In the cases we have been able to study, the Papal Chancery invariably prioritized, and promoted, clerical education, rather than being swayed by concerns regarding clerical disability. A high degree of education could functionally neutralize the 'problem' of a cleric's disability" (177). Work accommodations were frequently made for "monastic rules," in order "to soften the rigours of monastic life" (194–95). These accommodations could include "additional support, with the appointment of procurators, coadjutors, or vicars—individuals who assumed responsibility for tasks that impaired clerics could not perform" (195). *Auxiliaries* could be assigned "to carry out certain well-defined tasks in the name of the 'public good' (*publica utilitas*). Such appointments were permitted in canon law" (196). Summing up her findings, Dubourg concludes:

The pontifical institution demonstrated great capacity and notable commitment in adapting its underlying structures and regulations to adapt to clerics' physical and mental disabilities. Canonical legisla-

tion laid the groundwork for the personal difficulties encountered by impaired petitioners to be taken into account in pontifical judgments on their requests. The Chancery went even further, granting pardons that were more expansive in their remit than the established canonical provisions. In this way, the petition process was a mechanism by which the Church could selectively implement or soften the rules to which all clerics were subject, offering adaptations tailored to the ability and disability of each individual supplicant. (230)

As a bishop who doubtless made such petitions on a regular basis, Alfonso de Cartagena would have been aware of these kinds of work accommodations.⁶⁴ He adduces the example of a blind archbishop of Seville, who was able to perform his duties with assistance (Cartagena and Sánchez de Arévalo 2. 22. 98).⁶⁵ As mentioned previously, he was also aware of the capacities of deaf people to utilize monastic manual signs that were prevalent in Cistercian and Benedictine convents (2. 18. 95). We should not rule out the possibility that Teresa wished to move to a convent where these manual sign systems were more robust.

Alfonso de Cartagena was also of the opinion that deaf and blind people could work. He argues regarding the necessity of the senses that, strictly speaking, neither sight nor hearing is necessary because blind and deaf people can still be baptized and can perform work. He explains as follows:

[N]ec visus nec auditus necessarius est, cum sine eis et saltem anime cecus et surdus per baptismatis undam recipere et receptam innocenter vivendo tueri inspirante Deo, cuius misericordia numquam deest, inocentibus animis, posset; sanitatem vero corporis parentibus consanguineis vel amicis aut saltim hospitalibus vel domibus piis cibos utiles ministrantibus tueri valeret, quin eciam ad conservacionem speciei opportuna operari posset, si in aliis menbris sanus existeret, sicut et ceteri homines operantur.

Neither seeing nor hearing is necessary, since without them, at least in regards to the soul, the blind and the deaf can receive the wave of baptism, and having received it can uphold it by living innocently, inspiring God, whose mercy is never lacking with innocent souls; corporal health should be protected by parents, blood relatives, or friends, or at least in hospitals or holy houses providing helpful sustenance, and why should they not be able to take on work for the preservation

of the species, if the other parts of the body are sound, just as other people work. (2. 19. 96)

These sentiments voice appreciation for the spiritual and labor capacities of disabled people. Alfonso de Cartagena even negates Aristotle's denial that people with disabilities can be happy. He explains that although sensory disability is inconvenient, regarding those "qui luis sensibus vel eorum altero caret" ("who lack these senses [i.e., hearing and sight] or another of them"), there is no reason why they cannot attain true happiness. He explains as follows:

[N]am veram felicitatem nec surdo nec ceco nec muto negamus, cum omnes hii et alii adversis valitudinibus presi a Christo interdum sanati sunt et tam in corpore quam in anima sospites facti.

We do not deny true happiness to the deaf or the blind or to the mute, since all these and others afflicted with adverse infirmities have at times been healed by Christ and have become sound in body and soul. (2. 20. 96)

Teresa's own attitude toward disability exceeds that of her uncle, insofar as she does not look for cure but perceives a reason for spiritual happiness in the experience of her disabilities.

We should not pity Teresa, who does not pity herself. We should rather celebrate the ways in which she turns her disabilities to her own spiritual advantage and provides consolation for even today's disabled readers, who face systematic discrimination and denial of workplace accommodation. This intervention into the biographical dating of Teresa's deafness does not even touch on the fact that hearing loss is not an all-or-nothing proposition, a fact that Scarborough considers in her analysis of Teresa's works. Teresa relates that her move away from oralism was gradual, painful, and, ultimately, gratifying.

Humility, Authorial Alibis, and the Wonders of Crip Authority

Teresa uses humility and authorial alibi as rhetorical strategies for crip authority. In *Arboleda*, she discloses her disabilities in what Ernst Robert Curtius refers to as the modesty topos,⁶⁶ and she submits the treatise as a humble, good work, to authorize her writing. She further emphasizes what

she calls voluntary humility as a therapeutic tool to protect against the emotional effects of societal scorn. In her response to accusations of plagiarism in *Admiración*, Teresa turns the tables on her accusers by attributing them with what she calls “malicious wonder.” Teresa ultimately shows that malicious wonder is harmful to women and people with disabilities, whereas wonder at the works of God is enabling. Teresa deftly defends her authority to write by arguing that a lack of faith in the ability of disabled women to write amounts to a lack of faith in God’s grace.

In the prologue to the *Arboleda*, Teresa’s first articulation of the modesty topos follows directly on her disability disclosure. She explains that she seeks written sources of consolation for her “sorda oreja[s]” (“deaf ears” 38; 24) and that she does so while being well-aware of “la baxeza e grosería de mi mugeril yngenio” (“the lowliness and grossness of my womanly mind” 38; 24). Her rhetoric is aimed at people who find her writing “enojoso e digno de reprehensión” (“vexing and reprehensible” 39; 25). Teresa’s self-deprecation and disclosure of disability are rhetorically brilliant—they are just what Cicero likely would have advised for someone with a “bad” case and a hostile audience. The *De inventione* and the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* (which was attributed to Cicero) advise the expression of humility, including the disclosure of weakness or disability,⁶⁷ to bolster the *captatio benevolentiae*, or capturing of the goodwill, of the audience (Cicero, *De inventione* 1. 16; attrib. Cicero, *Rhetorica ad Herennium* 1. 5. 14).⁶⁸

The modesty topos has long been recognized as a sly self-authorizing strategy for women writers, but it should also be viewed as evidence of disability *metis* and a strategy for attaining crip authority. Teresa humbly submits the *Arboleda* as a good work to “hazer guerra a la [o]ççiosydat” (“combat my idleness” 39; 25). In doing so, she plays up her own disadvantages: “non desenbuelta la lengua, y peor dispuesto el sentido” (“my tongue is not eloquent and my sense is ill-prepared” 39; 25). Teresa presents the work itself as humble, calling it “esta peque[ñ]a obra” (“this little [work]” 39; 25), and she submits that it “no es buena nin comunal, mas mala del todo” (“is neither good nor even ordinary, but rather completely bad” 39; 25). Nevertheless, the modesty topos can serve as a self-authorizing strategy.

Teresa employs humility as what Patricia Pender has referred to as “authorial alibi” (3). Rather than considering early modern women’s use of the modesty topos “as the straightforward sign of the author’s submission to a hostile, patriarchal literary culture” (2), Pender suggests that rhetorical formulations of modesty can function as “‘authorial alibis’ in the sense that they provide ‘an excuse, a pretext, a plea of innocence’ to early modern strictures against

women's authorship" (3). Use of humility as authorial alibi fits Teresa's case, with the extra complexity that Teresa speaks from the position of gender and disability oppression. On the heels of her devaluation of her own work, Teresa adds the following caveat:

Pero pues el fin porque se haze es bueno, bien se puede seguir otro mayor bien. E por la mi voluntat, éste sea que aquel soberano Señor, que más las voluntades que las obras acata, quier[a] hazer aplazible e açebto delante los ojos de su grand clemencia lo que enojoso e digno de reprehensyón a las gentes paresçe.

However, since it is written for a good purpose, a greater good consequently may ensue. And because of my good intention, may our sovereign Lord, who judges intentions rather than works, find my writing, which seems vexing and reprehensible to some people, pleasing and acceptable to His merciful eyes. (39; 25)

Although Teresa claims that only God can understand her intentions, her humility can be sincere and at the same time strategic.⁶⁹ Teresa here lays groundwork to defend her writing against potential detractors. She further develops this proleptic authorial alibi in her concept of disability work and its relation to malicious perceptions of disabled people as idle, as was explored in the previous section of this chapter.

The strategic aim of Teresa's humility sometimes emerges in a playfully ironic tone. In what we might now call a humble brag, Teresa mentions her education in Salamanca. If her analysis of patience is erroneous,

ca a esto no bastaria mi flaco juicio, mas segund la pequeña facultad de aquél y los pocos años que yo estudié en el estudio de Salamanca, los quales más me hazen dina de remisión plenaria en la sinpleza de lo sobredicho que no me otorgan sabiduría en lo que dezir quiero.

[it is] due to my weak judgement; for my limited faculty and the few years that I was at the University of Salamanca, while they make me fully responsible for the simplicity of what I said above, grant me no wisdom in what I want to say now. (103; 80–81)

Teresa may claim education in a sly manner to undercut her avowal of intellectual weakness; she also could be making a point about the limits of

book learning compared with what lived experience of disability can teach about patience.⁷⁰ Either way, she comes across as well versed in humility and extraordinarily educated for a woman, much less a Deaf woman of her time.

Teresa takes humility a step further, elaborating a concept of voluntary humility that deflects societal ableism and reflects the Benedictine rules. In her consolatory exegesis of the parable of the five talents in Matthew 25:14–25, she likens each talent to a potential benefit of disability. She compares the fourth *marco*, or talent, to the humiliation and contempt that others show disabled people. To be clear, Teresa does not claim that humiliation and scorn are good; they are simply what disabled people get handed. She advises that rather than internalizing this ableist humiliation and scorn, as the man who inters the single talent he receives from God to no avail (Matt. 25:18), the disabled person can avoid the effects of this humiliation and scorn by voluntarily esteeming themselves less than do their detractors. Teresa explains that voluntary humility has spiritual and temporal advantages as follows:

[Q]ue trabajemos porque la humilldad natural e voluntaria nos aga despreçiar a nosotros mesmos. Ca el fundamento de la verdadera humilldad yo creo que es despreçiar onbre a sí mesmo e tenerse en reputaçion de mucho menos estima y valor de aquélla que sus despreçiadores e dezidores le tienen. De lo qual allende de los espirituales y meritorio bienes que en ello consyente, aun se puede seguir en lo temporal dos grandes provechos: el vno es que el despreçio que los otros nos hazen no nos paresçerá[n] ynjurioso ni nos provocará a saña, y el otro provecho es que la nuestra pasiõ e[n] grand grado será aliviada; no digo la pasiõ corporal, mas la del espíritu e ynteriores sentimientos.

[Let us work so that our natural and voluntary humility makes us scorn ourselves]. For the foundation of true humility, I believe, is for man to despise himself more and esteem and value himself less than his detractors do. Beyond the worthy spiritual benefits this allows, two great temporal advantages can ensue: one is that the contempt that others show us does not offend us or provoke us to anger, and the other advantage is that our suffering—our inward spiritual suffering, not our physical suffering—will be alleviated to a great extent. (89; 69)

In other words, choosing the path of humility has spiritual benefits and can help the disabled person let go of the negative emotional effects of ableism.

Although the strategy of voluntarily humbling oneself can be hard for a

modern secular reader to grasp, given modernity's promotion of self-esteem as a prerequisite for resilience, most if not all disabled people are familiar with the anger and psychological hurt that societal humiliation and scorn produce. Teresa makes the point that physical disabilities "no solamente flagelan y llagan el cuerpo, faziendo doler la cabeça, el ojo, el brazo" ("not only scourge and wound our bodies, causing our heads, eyes, and arms to ache"), but even more harshly they "[h]azen . . . doler el corazón y aflegir el espíritu e sentimiento ynterior" ("cause our hearts to ache and afflict our spirit and inner feelings" 89–90; 69). Physical disability does not cause these negative affects "por sí sol[a]" ("solely per se" 90; 69). The cause is rather "este marco ya dicho de umiliación y desprecio" ("this aforementioned talent of humiliation and contempt"), such that "segund la calidad del desprecio y segund la persona que le recibe, que sea más atormentada de aqueste dolor que no de los mucho[s] corporales que tengan" ("depending on the quality of the contempt and the person who receives it, someone can be more tormented by this type of anguish than by his many physical pains" 90; 69). Voluntary humility is a good remedy for these distressing emotions in part because "los trabajos desta vida miserable no es en nuestra mano poderlos fuir" ("the travails of this miserable life are not in our [hands] to drive away" 90; 69). In this sense, voluntary humility could be thought of as letting go. As Shane Clifton suggests in his theological examination of the possible benefits of humility for disabled people, "To let go of the need for control is to move from humiliation to humility, and so to open oneself to the healing and peace that are the essence of grace—even the peace that comes with facing the worst life has to give" (200–201). In Teresa's and Clifton's formulation, humility is about embracing one's vulnerability and finding strength in weakness (Clifton 199), and that entails premeditating and accepting life's vicissitudes.

Moreover, the conventual practices with which Teresa was familiar value humility. The *Benedictine Rule* stipulates degrees or levels of humility that, though not directed exclusively to disabled people, coincide with the voluntary humility that Teresa recommends as having emotional and spiritual value. In particular, Richard Fox translates the following pertinent rules on humility: "[W]h[e]n a religiose person for the vertu of obedi[n]ce / in thinges that be harde and contrary to hir minde / yea and in wronges takith pacie[n]ce / and sufferinge / chidethe not / grudgethe not / ne therfore tumethe hir minde from hir goode purpose" (Collett et al. 107). The rules on humility extend to "religiose persons fulfillingng with pacience the co[m]mau[n]diment of god in adversities and injurys" (108), and they advise total subjection to humiliation and scorn, commanding

that a [nun] in every behalfe shewe hirselfe to be inferior under all other / & more vile person than any other / and that she doo thus nat only with hir toonge / but also that she thinke it inwardly in hir hart / submitinge hir selfe / and saynge with the prophete / I am a worme: and not a woman / the rebukinge stocke of me[n] / and outcaste of people / nowe exalted / nowe put downe and confounded. (109)

The rule's citation of *Ps.* 21:7—"and saynge with the prophete / I am a worme: and not a woman / the rebukinge stocke of me[n] / and outcaste of people" and so forth—resonates with Teresa's own citation of this same verse in the opening of her prologue to *Arboleda*. Teresa calls the island of her solitude "[o]probrium hominum et abjecio plebis" (37; 23).⁷¹ *Ps.* 21 is also appropriate for grounding Teresa's concept of voluntary humility because the psalmist bemoans the scorn of others, lamenting, "Omnes videntes me deriserunt me; locuti sunt labiis, et moverunt caput" ("All they that saw me have laughed me to scorn: they have spoken with the lips, and wagged the head" *Ps.* 21:8 Vulgate.net). In citing this psalm and in perhaps alluding to the Benedictine Rule on humility that also does so, Teresa asserts her authority to write consolation based in humility and her lived experience of disability.

Humility may have intrinsic and strategic value, but it also has limitations. Even if humility can be used to deflect humiliation and scorn, as Teresa would have it, it does not make the humiliation and scorn cease. As Clifton observes, the "danger of advocating the virtue of humility in the context of disability is that it works to entrench the status quo" (201). A disabled person's humility does not counter paternalism, which Clifton argues "lies at the center of the oppression of people with disabilities" (202). Teresa's carefully laid out proleptic humility defense in *Arboleda*—her use of the humility topos, her authorial alibis, and her introduction of the concept of voluntary humility—does not dissuade her attackers.

Despite Teresa's framing her writing as a good work and her savvy use of humility to pacify those readers who were already vexed by her writing, the *Arboleda* inspires accusations of plagiarism from "algunos de los prudentes varones e así mesmo henbras discretas" ("some prudent men and also discreet women" 113; 87). Scholars tend to focus on the sexist motivation of the plagiarism accusation and on Teresa's response as one of the first defenses of women's writing authored by a woman. Less attention has been given to the accusation's being predicated on Teresa's disabilities.

Teresa explains the situation to her addressee, Juana de Mendoza, doubling down on her use of the modesty topos with an even stronger emphasis

on her disabilities. Teresa explains that writing her rebuttal has been slow because of her “enfermedades e corporales pasiones que de continuo he por familiares” (“illnesses and physical sufferings that I have continually for companions”). Yet the delay is mostly due to her emotional state, which she compares with a secret and dangerous army,

llena de interiores combates y espirituales peligros con muchedumbre de vanos e variables pensamientos, los quales así como una güeste de gente armada cercan de cada parte la angustia[da] ánima mía.

full of inner conflicts and spiritual dangers, with a mob of vain and inconstant thoughts that, like a host of armed soldiers, besiege my anguished soul on every flank. (111–12; 86)

Teresa emphasizes the weakness and vulnerability of her body and mind, illustrating the emotional effects of humiliation and scorn treated in the *Arboleda*. Teresa adds to this disclosure her “entendimiento flaco y mujeril” (“weak womanly understanding” 112; 86), which amplifies her avowal of humility. Gender and disability are inextricably linked, as she then asks, “¿[Q]ué palabra buena ni obra devota debéis esperar de mujer tan enferma en la persona y tan vulnerada en el ánima?” (“What good words or devout works can you expect of a woman so infirm in her body and so wounded in her spirit?” 113; 87). Teresa presents her disabilities and gender as intersectional; together they multiply her vulnerability.

The accusations in question are not really about Teresa’s work; they are rather ad hominem, “ca manifiesto no se hace esta admiración por meritoria de la escritura, mas por defecto de la autora” (“since apparently their [wonder] does not result from the merits of my text but from the defects of its author” 113; 87). Teresa cites her detractors, stating that “dan voces contra mí y llaman a todos que se maravillen diciendo: ‘¿Cómo en persona que tantos males asientan puede haber algún bien?’” (“they cry out against me and call upon everyone to [wonder], saying, ‘How can there be any good in a person afflicted with so many misfortunes?’” 113; 88). Teresa’s fortifications against the humiliation and scorn of what she calls malicious ignorance do not shield her from this onslaught of discrimination. Yet Teresa has more rhetorical weapons to wield in her defense.

Though Teresa’s ability to write should be self-evident, she launches into a flurry of brilliant rebuttals that recast her weakness and vulnerability as her strength. Her argument, put simply, is based a priori on divine omnipotence

and the wonder that is due all of God's creations such that "la menor cosa que este soberano e potentísimo Hazedor ha fecho e faze, no es de menor admiración que la mayor" ("all things, great and small, created by God's omnipotence are marvelous and worthy of great wonder" 114; 89). Accordingly, she argues that it is wrong to wonder more at a woman writer than a man just because women do not write as often as men (114; 98–90).⁷² The same is true of people with mental or physical disabilities. The ability to write is God's to give or take away, according to his grace. Teresa names her defense "Wonder at the Works of God," and she presents *Arboleda* as a work resulting from God's grace. To doubt that a woman or a person with disabilities could perform such work is to doubt the capacities of God. To hone her argument to a sharp edge, Teresa draws a distinction between two types of wonder. She explains as follows:

[A]ya una admiración o manera [de] maravillarse en l[a] qual es loado e venerado el Hazedor o Inspirador de aquella obra de que nos maravillamos, [e] que ay otra admiración en la qual no es loado ni sirvido el soberano Hazedor, antes es e[n] eniuria e ofensa suya.

There is a kind of wonder that praises and venerates the Maker or Inspiration of the work that excites our wonder, and there is another wonder that neither praises nor serves our sovereign Maker but rather insults and offends Him. (121–22; 95)

Teresa further distinguishes beneficial versus malicious wonder in order to demonstrate how her detractors are guilty of the latter.

Teresa first expands on what she means by beneficial or good wonder, which is appropriate for examples of God's grace and includes women and people with disabilities. She states that the wonder by which God is "loado e venerado" ("[lauded and venerated]") occurs when "la admiración que avernos çerca de sus santas obras [e] maravillosas ispiraciones es mesclado con devoción e fe, creyendo que su onipotencia e sabiduría todo lo puede e sabe hazer" ("our wonder at His holy works and marvelous inspiration is mixed with devotion and faith, and we believe that His omnipotence and wisdom can do anything" 122; 95). This positive wonder should be directed to everyday things but also to the less common instances of God's grace, which Teresa calls "bienes de graçia" ("blessings of grace" 122; 95). Among blessings of grace, she places the potential elevation of women but also of people with disabilities, stating that God can dispense blessings of grace to people, "que sea varón

o enbra; ni a la disposición e abilidad del entendimiento” (“[whether they be male or female and regardless of mental talent or ability]” 123–24; 98). Blessings of grace hold true for people with physical disabilities as well, for “¿por qué no sobreabundará donde abundan las otras defetuosidades e pasiones corporales, como éstas no sean pecado?” (“why cannot grace superabound where other defects and physical sufferings are abundant, since these are not sins?” 124; 98). In claiming that anything is possible for God, Teresa also makes clear that there is nothing sinful about disability *per se*.

Teresa builds on the concept of malicious ignorance that she developed in *Arboleda* to develop her idea of malicious wonder. She explains that there is another kind of wonder “con la qual no es loado ni servido el Señor que haze las maravillas, antes es en ofensa suya” (“which neither praises nor serves the Lord who works these wonders but rather offends Him” 126; 98). This malicious wonder occurs when

tanto y tanto e tan estremadamente nos maravillamos de alguna gracia o beneficio que Dios haze a nuestros próximos, que parese que no lo crehemos, e aqueste dubdoso maravillillar p[ro]cede de aver más respeto a la cosa que vemos que a la Fuente donde deciende ca nos acatamos a la facultad o estado [de] la persona umana, que no a la grandeza de la potencia divina.

we marvel so much and so excessively at some grace or blessing that God grants to our neighbors that it seems that we do not believe it. And this doubting wonder proceeds from having more regard for the thing itself than for the fount whence it comes, for we consider only the faculty or condition of the human being and not the greatness of divine power. (126; 98)

Like malicious ignorance, malicious wonder entails undue scrutiny of people with disabilities. Whereas malicious ignorance accuses people with disabilities of malingering, malicious wonder casts doubt on the ability of people with disabilities to produce good works. Given that Teresa believes that even the experience of disability is work, disabled people cannot catch a break.

Teresa makes clear that this malicious wonder is especially inappropriate in cases of blessings of grace. Among the blessings that Teresa stipulates should not be subjected to this malicious wonder, she includes the ability to learn. While education is usually only allowed for men in her society, Teresa points out that men typically learn not on their own but from teachers. God

can convey learning to anyone he pleases, and doubting this is *inde vota*, or impious wonder (127; 99). Teresa relates this back to her composition of *Arboleda*, which she explains was written solely to praise God and for her own consolation. As for “el tratado *que yo hize*” (“the treatise that I wrote”), her detractors already know that its purpose is “saber conoscer e reduzir a la memoria los beneficios de Dios e saber conoscer e escodriñar e buscar en estos mis públicos males las ascondidas misericordias del Señor” (“to know and commit to memory the blessings of God and to acknowledge and scrutinize and discover in my public misfortunes the hidden mercy of the Lord” 129; 101). In writing it, moreover, Teresa’s only teachers were her own experience and God’s inspiration, which she explains as follows:

Pues la ispiencia me faze cierta e Dios de la verdad sabe que *yo* no ove otro maestro ni me consejé con otro algund letrado, ni lo trasladé de libros, como algunas personas con malÍciosa admiración suelen dezir. Mas sola ésta es la verdad: que Dios de las ciencias, Señor de las virtudes, Padre de las misericordias, Dios de toda consolación, el que nos consuela en toda tribulación *nuestra*, Él solo me consoló, e Él solo me enseñó, e Él solo me leyó.

For my experience makes me sure, and God of truth knows that I had no other master nor consulted with any other learned authority nor translated from other books, as some people with malicious wonder are wont to say. Rather, this alone is the truth: that God of all knowledge, Lord of all virtues, Father of mercy, God of every consolation, He who consoles us in all our tribulation, He alone consoled me, He alone taught me, He alone read (to) me. (131; 103)

Lacking a written account of the accusations that were brought against Teresa, it is only possible to gather the nature of that accusation from her rebuttal, but it seems probable that the extent and depth of her reading and the richness of her writing and thought brought on this malicious wonder.

Teresa did consult many consolatory sources. She says as much herself. Her digressive grafting and alimentary models of processing those works are transformative skills of invention and imitation that were praised as marvelous in male humanist authors of the time. Yet so-called nontransformative imitation of sources resulted in condemnation in what Pigman identifies as the simian and crow models of imitation, in which the ape imitates without understanding and the crow steals outright. The simian and crow models

are used “pejoratively to indicate particularly slavish, nontransformative imitation” (8),⁷³ and these animal comparisons are tied to a long tradition of marginalizing writers based on race, sex, class, and other markers of social or physical difference. My point is not that Teresa’s detractors used ape or crow images to characterize Teresa’s writing but rather that humanist models of imitation can cut both ways. What earns one writer praise can cause another undue suspicion in a culture that venerates authoritative sources and puts up barriers to access those authorities. Teresa is doubtless correct when she avers that it is not the work but the fact that she is a disabled woman doing the work that is the problem.

As a maligned disabled woman author, Teresa is in good company. Hellen Keller (1880–1968), who was Deaf-Blind, writes about her own experience of being accused of plagiarism in the winter of 1892, when “joy deserted my heart, and for a long, long time I lived in doubt, anxiety and fear. Books lost their charm for me, and even now the thought of those dreadful days chills my heart” (60). Mark Twain (1835–1910) consoles Keller with humor in a letter on St. Patrick’s Day in 1903, saying “how unspeakably funny and owlshly idiotic and grotesque was that ‘plagiarism’ farce!” (731). He goes on to call her opponents “a collection of decayed human turnips” and “solemn donkeys” (731). Responding with rage to Keller’s trial, Georgina Kleege reflects on her own frustration both at the injustice of accusing an eleven-year-old of plagiarism and over what Kleege perceives as a docile response on Keller’s part, exclaiming, “I wish you’d take off a shoe and throw it at them, Helen” (*Blind Rage* 39).⁷⁴ Mulling over her own experience, Teresa muses, “[M]aravillanse las gentes de lo que en el tratado escreví e yo me maravillo de lo que en la verdad callé” (“People marvel at what I wrote in the treatise and I marvel at what, in fact, I kept quiet” 131; 102). Although Teresa, like Keller, does not express rage, she does throw a book at her accusers, so to speak. As Brueggemann avers, “Teresa at least had a chance to answer her detractors, to come at the story another way, to counter wonder for wonder” (583). Teresa’s response may be measured, but it is far from docile.

Although Teresa reiterates voluntary humility as a strategy for deflecting the humiliation and scorn of her accusers, it is apparent that humility will not suffice. Humility may be a virtue, but as Clifton suggests, “It is one thing to advance a move from humiliation to humility, but something more is needed to empower people to flourish, namely pride” (202). Though, strictly speaking, Teresa would have viewed pride as a sin within the context of Christian virtues, she does view disability as a kind of badge of *crip honor*. In disclosing her disabilities, in drawing them to the center of her discourse, Teresa marks

her work with what she refers to as a coat of arms. In the context of her consolatory exegesis of Matthew's parable of the five talents, she describes how disability marks the disabled as follows:

[C]'así *comma* sello puesto sobre la cera dexa en ella su mesma se[ñal], así las dolencias con el sello de la mortificación hazen quedar en el cuerpo e cara del doliente la señal de sus propias armas.

For just as a seal placed over wax leaves its own impression, so afflictions with the stamp of mortification impress on the body and face of the sufferer the seal of its own coat of arms. (82; 63–64)

This coat of arms, although it makes a person unrecognizable to their friends and family, makes them recognizable to the community of the infirm. The *figura*, or imprint, of the sigil can include “la color de la cara marcesida, el andar paso e sin fuerças, los huesos de las manos que se trasluzen” (“the color of their pale face, their labored and feeble walk, the translucent bones of their hands” 82; 73). A coat of arms had the military purpose of recognizing friends and enemies on the battlefield, but it also conveyed courtly status and was used in court livery. Teresa first dons this livery reluctantly, but she wears it with crip pride.

Conclusions

Teresa taps into the tradition of consolation to express both lamentation and alleviation. She transforms works of consolation to fit her own circumstances. She demonstrates consolatory reading and writing practices in drawing on her community of authors, interpreting texts and images, and elaborating disability similes and allegories. To do so, she draws on a variety of ancient and contemporary consolatory models and performs consolatory exegesis of biblical texts, including the Psalms. She elaborates a rich concept of disability work, including a defense against the malicious ignorance that doubts the abilities of disabled people.

Admiración mounts a defense for women and people with disabilities to write that is based in an abiding faith that they deserve to have their work be respected just as they deserve God's grace. Through her carefully wrought argument, Teresa turns the tables on her accusers. She resignifies their sexism and ableism to accuse them of a lack of faith in divine grace. Teresa builds on the concept of malicious ignorance she developed in *Arboleda* to comment on

what she calls malicious wonder to grant her crip authority based in the disabilities that her society scorned. Teresa relies on the strength of her conviction that even though her society views disability as a deficit, her disability is beneficial. Finally, her image of wearing disability as a coat of arms or badge of honor anticipates the largely masculine discourse of crip pride that later disabled veterans such as Miguel de Cervantes will espouse.

Three

From “El Manco de Lepanto”
to “El Manco Sano”

*Memorializing Cervantine Disability*¹



When we think about disability studies in premodern literary representations, the first figure that usually comes to mind is William Shakespeare’s Richard III. In what counts as a current event for Renaissance scholars, in 2012 a team of forensic archeologists discovered the historical King Richard’s remains in the ruins of a monastery buried under a parking lot in Leicester, England.² King Richard’s war wounds and scoliosis were key factors in his body’s identification. University of Leicester Archeological Services released a three-dimensional model depicting the excavation of King Richard’s grave, with segments of the model labeled “The head is propped up,” “The grave appears to be poorly dug,” “A curved spine,” “Injuries to the skull,” and “No feet.”³ Allison Hobgood remarks: “Long after his death and even now in his resurrection, King Richard’s body—and the various processes used to diagnose that body—always take center stage” (“Teeth Before Eyes” 24).

Miguel de Cervantes Saavedra, on the other hand, has not received much attention from disability studies scholars, despite his having prioritized his physical disability in his own self-representation and despite the fact that his works are supremely interested in suffering, impaired, and otherwise atypical bodies.⁴ In an odd coincidence, though, Cervantes and King Richard III now have something new in common: they have both been brought back to wide public attention through the unearthing of their bones. Cervantes’s remains, the exact location of which was lost for hundreds of years, have also been rediscovered recently.

As was the case for the archeological team who sought the bones of King Richard, Cervantes's disability in the form of war wounds was a key identifying factor when a likely tomb was discovered in the Convento de las Trinitarias Descalzas in Madrid. Bones were found inside and strewn about the remnants of a splintered wooden coffin etched with the initials "M.C."

Cervantes's bones had been interspersed with those of other people, but his skeleton was marked by bullet wounds, which had damaged his ribs and left arm in particular and which helped the scientists piece together his remains. These wounds were referred to by NPR as "telltale signs, even before DNA testing, that the archaeologists had found their man" (Frayer). Again, a medical model of disability takes precedence, in which the disability stands in for the person.⁵

Cervantes left words as well as bones to help us trace his disability identity. In this chapter, I focus on the manifestation of disability in Cervantes's life and art. Cervantes uses *crip* authority to transgressively reappropriate his own impairments into empowerment in his self-representation with an emphasis on self-consolation that recasts his war wounds as a mark of honor; in his fiction, he crafts spiritual consolation out of the representation of votive offerings that memorialize and testify to prayers for intercession and miraculous cure. Cervantes directly addresses disability, both biographically and thematically, by resignifying disability as authority and opportunity for grace. Embracing his identity as *manco*, or crippled, Cervantes leverages authority through military and religious discourse to show how disability can have value, and his art ultimately gives us further insights into the lived experience of disability in the Siglo de Oro.

"El Manco de Lepanto": Cervantes's War Wounds and Crip Authority

Although the link between military self-writing on the part of wounded veterans and the development of the disability rights movement in the twentieth century is fundamental to disability studies,⁶ the premodern roots of disability identity based in the traumas of war have received less attention. Studies on early modern military identity and life writing in the Hispanic context are nonetheless helpful in laying the groundwork for this investigation. For instance, Miguel Martínez's study of veterans' homecoming in the context of what he calls the "soldierly republic of letters" (1) and Faith Harden's work on links between military self-writing and its claims to honor begin to bring into focus how military experience and wounding became such a prominent part of Cervantes's life as an author.⁷ Harden argues that the tradition of

military life writing in early modern Spain, which she defines as “first-person, retrospective prose narratives that emphasize the author’s military service in the course of accounting for a broad life trajectory” (6), plays a large part in the establishment of Hispanic autobiographical genres and reflects changing concepts of honor and the self. In Cervantes’s case, writing about his military identity ultimately enhances his position as a disabled author by providing him with an honorable frame for his wounded and vulnerable body that commemorates that wounding as well as deploying it as a support for his literary endeavors.

Disability is an indelible part of Cervantes’s authorial self-image. As Barry Ife has noted, Cervantes did not start his writing career until he was thirty-eight years old, after he was already “a disabled veteran and ex-prisoner of war” (608). Being a wounded warrior, which earned him the epithet “el manco de Lepanto” (“the cripple of Lepanto”), is vital to his self-representation.⁸ Specifically, he was grievously wounded in the naval battle waged between the Holy League and the Ottomans in the Gulf of Lepanto in 1571.⁹ He relates the manner of his wounding in a letter to Mateo Vázquez: “El pecho mío, de profunda herida sentía llagado, y la siniestra mano estaba por mil partes ya rompida” (“I could tell my chest had been deeply wounded, and my left hand was now broken into a thousand pieces” “Epístola” 226).¹⁰ This letter, written from a prison in Algiers, was a plea for deliverance from captivity,¹¹ and the relation of his military service and wounding composed an important part of Cervantes’s life story and appeal for aid.¹²

After his ransom and return from captivity, Cervantes associates his disability with his role as author as well as soldier. In the prologue to *Novelas ejemplares* (1613), in the course of introducing himself to his readers, Cervantes says that he would have liked for his portrait to have appeared. As Steven Rendall observes, “Among the more obvious signs of authorial presence in Renaissance texts are the author-portraits that frequently appear in them as frontispieces” (143).¹³ Since the portrait did not come to pass,¹⁴ Cervantes relates an image of himself in a long, sprightly *prosopographia*, or vivid description of personal appearance, that, along with depicting his sparkling eyes, aquiline features, and chestnut hair, does not omit his now graying beard, sparse teeth, and war wounds in close connection with his accomplishments as an author as follows:

Éste, digo que es el rostro del autor de La Galatea y de Don Quixote de la Mancha, y del que hizo el Viage del Parnaso, a imitación del de César Caporal Perusino, y otras obras que andan por ahí descarriadas,

y, quizá, sin el nombre de su dueño. Llámase comúnmente Miguel de Cervantes Saavedra. Fue soldado muchos años, y cinco y medio cautivo, donde aprendió a tener paciencia en las adversidades. Perdió en la batalla naval de Lepanto la mano yzquierda de un arcabuzazo.

This, I say, is the face of the author of the *Galatea* and of *Don Quixote of La Mancha*, and of him who wrote the *Voyage to Parnassus*, in imitation of Cesare Caporali of Perugia, and other works that wander astray, and perchance without the name of their master. He is commonly called Miguel de Cervantes Saavedra. He was a soldier for many years, and for five and a half a captive, where he learned to be patient in adversity. He lost in the naval battle of Lepanto his left hand from an arquebus shot. (1; 51)

Printed author portraits in the Renaissance frequently include a brief epigram, and "in this collocation of an image and a text," they "resembled the device or emblem" (Rendall 144). Both the creation and the interpretation of personal emblems are tightly tied to self-authorization in the period;¹⁵ they call on the reader-viewer to assemble ethos from the word, referred to as the soul, and the image, referred to as the body, of the emblematic text. Cervantes's *prosopographia* performs much of the work that an author portrait and epigram might achieve, but it does what author portraits generally avoid in the period: it discloses disability as a part of that creation of ethos.¹⁶ Here Cervantes closely relates his roles of author and soldier in his imagined self-portrait, a melding of the talents of arms and letters that embodies the Renaissance ideal, and his wounds are explicitly a part of that ideal.¹⁷

As Ife observes, "Cervantes was proud of his war wound" (603). But this does not mean that Cervantes does not suffer from these wounds. In her discussion of the experiences of wounded veterans of the Nine Year's War, Clodagh Tait reminds us that "wounding and stoical endurance were evidence of honourable military masculinity" but "lack of compassionate recognition of patient suffering and of sacrifices of health, finances and career could heap further emotional wounds on suffering shoulders" (217). Cervantes is thus careful to elaborate the description of his hand wound with attention to the way it should be perceived as follows:

[H]erida que, aunque parece fea, él la tiene por hermosa, por aberla cobrado en la más memorable y alta ocasión que vieron los passados siglos, ni esparan ver los venideros.

A wound which, although it appears ugly, he accounts beautiful, because he received it on the most memorable and lofty occasion that centuries past have seen, or can hope to see. (1; 51)

Cervantes consoles himself for his injuries by insisting that what others may see as “fea,” or ugly, he sees as “hermosa,” or beautiful, because his wounds attest to his valor.

Seeking advantage in adversity is a key element of consolation, and Cervantes certainly could have drawn on a number of *consolatio* texts for his defiant representation of his disability. Yet I suggest that Petrarch’s *De remediis* dialogue II. 77, called “Vulneribus crucior gravissimis” (“I am tormented by most serious wounds”), is particularly influential on Cervantes. The dialogue addresses war wounds including the loss of hands in naval battle specifically and shares many turns of phrase with Cervantes’s account. Petrarch’s *consolatio* text was translated numerous times into Castilian and Italian, so even if Cervantes did not read a Latin copy, there were readily available editions in vernacular.¹⁸

Petrarch’s character Reason responds to Sorrow’s lament that he has been made ugly by wounds by reassuring him that “[v]iri fortis speciosum, pro iustitia, susceptum vulnus” (“the wound received by a brave man in the service of a just cause is beautiful” 2. 77; 175). Francisco de Madrid, in his early sixteenth-century translation of this dialogue, renders the Castilian as follows, “[H]ermosa es la llaga que el constante varon recibe por la justicia” (“Beautiful is the wound that a constant man justly receives” fol. 127r). This diction aligns well with Cervantes’s characterization of his own wound: “herida que, aunque parece fea, él la tiene por hermosa” (“a wound which, although it appears ugly, he accounts beautiful” *Novelas* 1; 51). In the logic of consolation’s promotion of disability gain, a war wound that at first may seem ugly should be considered beautiful because of its conferral of moral authority. Cervantes’s war wound is an integral part of his identity, a disability that he discloses, indeed flaunts proudly, rather than trying to overcome or hide.

In another assertion of disability gain, Cervantes figures his disability as a form of exchange, with his literary talent as compensation for his wounds. In the *Viaje del Parnaso* (*Voyage to Parnassus*) (1614),¹⁹ the character Mercurio (Mercury) says to Cervantes,

Bien sé que en la naval dura palestra
perdiste el movimiento de la mano
yzquierda, para gloria de la diestra,

y sé que aquel instinto sobrehumano
que de raro inventor tu pecho encierra
no te le ha dado el padre Apolo en vano.

Well do I know that in that naval fight
you lost your left hand's mobility
for the glory of the right,
and I know that superhuman ability
of rare invention enclosed within your chest
wasn't granted by father Apollo in jest. (I, 214–19, 68)

Mercury, himself the god of exchange, makes clear that Cervantes's wounding has a purpose and should be respected as a sacrifice not only for his military service and faith but for the sake of his literary talent as well, his right hand being the hand with which he writes. It is also notable that Cervantes's chest, which was also wounded in the battle, is what houses the rare invention that characterizes his particular brand of poetic inspiration.²⁰ In *Viaje del Parnaso*, the comparison between good and bad poets is itself figured as a battle, which is perhaps an appropriate representation for the often antagonistic and satirical stances that many poets took toward each other during the Siglo de Oro.²¹

Cervantes did not escape the biting satire of other authors of his time, and it is in response to these circumstances that he most transgressively reappropriates his status as *manco*. The Spanish word *manco*, according to Sebastián de Covarrubias (1539–1613), can mean “[a]quel que tiene algún brazo o mano débil, que no usa della” (“someone with a weak arm or hand who cannot use it”) or more broadly “lo que está falta” (“that which is crippled or defective” 1233). The transgressiveness of Cervantes's reappropriation of this word *manco* becomes clear when he responds to accusations made against him by Alonso Fernández de Avellaneda, the pseudonym of the unknown author of the false *Quijote* (1614), which was an unauthorized sequel to the first part of *Don Quijote* (1605). Avellaneda's ableist invective is aimed at Cervantes's disability specifically. He concedes that the first part of *Don Quijote* sprang from the hand of Cervantes and goes on to mock Cervantes's disability ruthlessly as follows: “Y digo mano, pues confiesa de sí que tiene sola una; y . . . como soldado tan viejo en años cuanto mozo en bríos, tiene más lengua que manos” (“And I say hand, since he must admit that he only has one; and . . . as a soldier as old in years as he is youthful in courage, he has more tongue than hands” 196). Cervantes's injuries were extensive enough to prohibit use of his hand, which is itself disabling, but Avellaneda's abuse further pro-

duces disability through social discrimination. Enrique García Santo Tomás explains, “The war veteran joined the waves of immigrants that triggered the demographic growth of Spain’s major cities between 1550 and 1650, and later suffered from the same stigma as other social outcasts like witches, gypsies, and lepers” (n.p.). It was thus not uncommon for wounded war veterans to be subjected to the kind of ableist discrimination that Avellaneda spews, and this experience was akin to other forms of oppression suffered on the grounds of gender, religion, race, and on the part of other people with disabilities.

Though we do not know the identity of Avellaneda, scholars speculate that he was an ally of the famous poet and playwright Lope de Vega Carpio (1562–1635), who also aimed criticism at Cervantes using ableist invective. Lope attacks Cervantes in terms of his disability, for instance, in his *sonetada* “Pues nunca de la Biblia digo lé.” Lope inveighs, “Para que no escribieras, orden fué / Del cielo que mancases en Corfú” (“So that you should not write, Heaven / ordered your hand be crippled in Corfu” lines 5–6, ct. and trans. Martin, *Cervantes and the Burlesque* 232). He declares that Cervantes’s wounding was intended as a punishment from God to prevent Cervantes from writing; fortunately for us, it was his left hand that was injured. Nevertheless, the scorn that Lope evinces here is emblematic of a larger cultural tendency to espouse a negative moral model of disability, in which disability is interpreted as a providential sign of displeasure.

Yet Cervantes resignifies the disabling invective of his peers. In the prologue to *Don Quijote* part 2 (1615), he answers Avellaneda’s provocation with crip authority. Cervantes humbly discloses that he is old and crippled, or *manco*:

Lo que no he podido dexar de sentir es que me note de viejo y de {*manco*}, como si huviera sido en mi mano aver detenido el tiempo que no passasse por mi, o si mi {*manquedad*} huviera nacido en alguna taberna, sino en la mas alta ocasion que vieron los siglos passados, los presentes, ni esperan ver los venideros.

What I can’t help but lament is that he points out that I’m old and {*crippled*}, as if it were in my hands to prevent time from passing, or as if my *being* {*crippled*} had happened in some tavern, and not on the grandest occasion that past, present, or future centuries have seen or will see. (543; emphasis mine)²²

Feeling sorrow at this discrimination, Cervantes emphasizes the commemorative value of his being “manco” (“crippled”), particularly given the cultural

significance of the battle of Lepanto.²³ As he did in his verbal self-portrait in his prologue to *Novelas ejemplares*, Cervantes makes a point of situating his wounding temporally. In the prologue to *Novelas*, he relates he was wounded "en la más memorable y alta ocasión que vieron los passados siglos, ni esparan ver los venideros" ("on the most memorable and lofty occasion that centuries past have seen, or can hope to see" 1; 51). In his response to Avellaneda, he again commemorates how, in this instance, past, present, and future centuries are marked by this occasion. Wounds mark not only past valor but a potential for disability futurity or "what it means to project disability into the future" (Kafer 20),²⁴ in which his disability contributes to his lasting fame.

Cervantes next further consoles himself by turning the disadvantage of his being wounded into an insignia of honor. He exclaims:

Si mis heridas no resplandecen en los ojos de quien las mira, son estimadas, a lo menos, en la estimacion de los que saben dónde se cobraron. . . . Las que el soldado muestra en el rostro y en los pechos, estrellas son que guian a los demas al cielo de la honra, y al de desear la justa alabança.

If my wounds aren't splendid in the eyes of those who see them, they are esteemed, at least, in the estimation of those who know where they were received. . . . Those wounds the soldier shows on his face and breast are stars that guide others to the heaven of honour and to the desire of just praise. (543)

Cervantes again probably draws on Petrarch's *De remediis* dialogue II. 77 for the language he uses to extol his wounds. Whereas Petrarch's character Sorrow laments, "Vulneribus deformatus sum" ("I am deformed by wounds"), Reason rejoins:

Dixi iam, immo si causa vulnerum pulchra est, honestatus, ac insignitus, viri quidem fortis pro iustitia, magnum aliquid aggressi, durumque aliquid perpassi, non fœdis frons fulcata vulneribus videri debet, sed notis stellata fulgentibus, neque vero cicatrices, aut vulnera, sed virtutis sunt dicenda vestigia, & præclaris affixa frontibus signa meritorum.

I have already told you that if there is just cause for the wounds, they honor and grace a brave man for having undertaken something significant and difficult, striking a blow for justice. His face must not be

viewed as marred by ugly wounds but, rather, as adorned with glorious marks which are not so much scars and wounds as they are tokens and badges of merit on the brow of one who earned them! (2. 77; 177)

Petrarch's Latin original reads "notis stellata fulgentibus" for "adorned with glorious marks," a phrase that, with its emphasis on "stellata," or star spangled, is very similar to Cervantes's calling wounds "estrellas," or stars. Furthermore, Francisco de Madrid renders the Latin phrase in Spanish to say that these "heridas" ("wounds") should be viewed "como estrellas resplandecientes" ("as resplendent stars" fol. 127v). Regardless of Cervantes's source, he is clearly partaking in a moral model of disability in this instance as did Lope de Vega and Avellaneda, but instead of viewing disability as a sign of moral corruption, Cervantes turns his wounds into emblems of and a path toward "el cielo de honra" ("the heaven of honor" *DQ* 543). As Harden demonstrates, one of the aims of military autobiography in the Siglo de Oro is to establish authority for the writer based in the honor of military service.²⁵ The kind of honor that Cervantes insists his wounds confer fits best with Harden's category of spiritual honor, where she argues that "wounds sustained in Turkish captivity" as related by one of Cervantes's contemporaries "are presented as signs of special discernment, a spiritual knowledge acquired through somatic means" (80–81).²⁶ In a similar fashion, Cervantes consistently embraces his disability identity as a veteran whose wounds should be honored, and this probity grants him crip authority in his literary career.

Cervantistas have long noted the playfully "loose sense of authorship" (Biggs 219) taken by the narrator of the prologue to *Don Quijote* part 1, where the narrator's friend recommends manufacturing a table of authoritative citations and plagiarizing typical front matter poems in praise of the author—who in fact turns out to be a mysterious *morisco* named Cide Hamete Benengeli, whose Arabic text the narrator relies on yet another person to have translated. Whereas the prologue of *Don Quijote* part 1 is thereby famously evasive about the question of authorship,²⁷ the prologue to part 2, which responds to Avellaneda's ableism, insists on Cervantes's authority. Of course, being capable of sending up ancient models of authority evidences a close familiarity with authorial traditions in the first place. As Frederick de Armas convincingly argues, Cervantes was more than fluent in the ideas of Virgilian *cursus* (a venerated model for crafting writerly authority based on the literary career of Virgil), but as he also avers, Cervantes's version of this *cursus* is always that of an "innovator" as well as "continuator" ("Cervantes and the Virgilian Wheel" 282). Cervantes's characterization of his authority

is based in his disability, and his disability is transgressive both in his celebration and use of it to establish authorial ethos. His status as *manco* thus only lends him more authority.

"El Manco Sano": Memorializing Cervantine Disability

As is so typical of the Cervantine spirit, the author's attitude is never too strident or too far from gentle humor.²⁸ His ability to make light of himself is one of his most enduring qualities, and his crip authority likewise has a light touch, as is illustrated in his prologue to his last work, *Los trabajos de Persiles y Sigismunda: historia setentrional* (1617). Cervantes, who is deathly ill with dropsy, recounts traveling on the road with a group of friends and being overtaken by a young student, who responds to hearing Cervantes's name as follows:

Apenas hubo oído el estudiante el nombre de Cervantes cuando, apeándose de su cabalgadura, cayéndosele aquí el cojín y allí el portamanteo (que con toda esta autoridad caminaba), arremetió a mí, y, acudiendo asirme de mano izquierda, dijo:—¡Sí, sí, éste, éste es el manco sano, el famoso todo, el escritor alegre y, finalmente, el regocijo de las musas!

Scarcely had the student heard the name Cervantes when he dismounted from his pack animal, sending his saddlebags flying in one direction and his valise in another—he traveled so completely outfitted—and rushed up to me, seizing my left hand and saying, "Yes, yes, this is the complete cripple, the completely famous and comic writer, and lastly, the delight of the muses!" (120–21; 15)

An eighteenth-century drawing, reproduced in figure 1 and intended for an edition of the *Persiles*, depicts this encounter on the road. It shows at the top of the frontispiece Cervantes's bust among the stars and clouds, indicating that he has passed on in a kind of apotheosis. Below this bust is a drawing of the scene on the road, with the disheveled student grasping the disabled left hand of Cervantes, who is mounted on a spindly steed. Calling Cervantes the *manco sano*, or as it can be translated, healthy or complete cripple, lends Cervantes's authority a disabled epithet that is not dissimilar from the more famous *manco de Lepanto* that was also used to describe him. But this passage also lends a light-hearted tone to Cervantes's crip authority and further



Figure 1: Antonio Carnicero, *Sketch for Prologue to Cervantes's Los trabajos de Persiles y Sigismunda*, 1775–1814, pen and ink on laid paper, H 8 1/8" × W 5 13/16". Courtesy of the Hispanic Society of America, New York, NY.

articulates disability gain. He is both an author and a proud wounded war veteran. His being crippled coexists with his being healthy and complete.

In the rest of this chapter, I concentrate on how Cervantes memorializes disability rather than pathologizing or medicalizing it in two of his works: his short story *El licenciado Vidriera* and the *Persiles*. While military sacrifice is one source of cripp authority, Cervantes also calls on Christian belief to elevate the impaired body with lasting spiritual value. He joined a Franciscan lay order later in life (becoming what is called a secular Franciscan tertiary), and his belief in Christianity's ability to accept and potentially heal the suffering or impaired body is evident in several of his works. In particular, his focus on disability's relation with ex-voto offerings and how that relation honors and memorializes disability provides premodern models of crippling medical teleologies of cure.

Ex-voto offerings, which appear throughout history and across cultures, commemorate the experience of adversity, including disability. As Mary Laven explains in her study of the material practice of making votive offerings in the early modern period, "Since antiquity, people have recorded moments of divine intervention in their lives by leaving votive objects at religious shrines" ("Wax" 35).²⁹ Votive offerings frequently manifest in "the practice of making an image in one's likeness, in the form of either a portrait or a model of a single body part, and presenting it at a shrine as a wish or thank-you" (Weinryb, "Introduction" 8). They memorialize hardships endured, promises made, or miracles performed. Though votives could be made for a variety of experiences, from salvation from shipwreck to freedom from captivity, a preponderance of votives reflect the lived experience of disability. In the case of the commemoration of cures, offerings could consist of "anatomical models, most commonly made of wax, papier mâché or metal, that referred to the part of the body that had been healed" (Laven, "Wax" 35). These molded objects included (and continue to include) replicas "of eyes, ears, breasts, limbs, etc., in recognition of a healing located in a specific part of the body" (35).³⁰

By the end of the fifteenth century, moreover, people from all walks of life also made gifts of panel paintings (*retablos* in Spanish and *tavoletta* in Italian), which depicted the supplicant's individual experience of adversity and/or deliverance from that adversity along with an image of the interceding saint. These paintings further developed the narrative element of the votive; as Fredrika Jacobs explains, they were "distinguished from other ex-votos by [their] singular ability to relate the circumstances that had prompted [their] bestowal" (141). Indeed, these votives "depict the who, what, when, and where of an event in which a saint miraculously intervened," and "*Tavolette* also

conveyed something about the donor” (141). Both anatomical models and painted panels were often accompanied with inscriptions or other details that indicated the identity of the particular donor and their family.³¹

Given ex-votos’ highly personal commemorative and representational capacities, I suggest that they can be interpreted as material forms of disability narrative. As Ittai Weinryb observes, votives are tied to individual experience and record that experience. She argues that they therefore constitute material evidence of what she and other cultural historians call egodocuments, or “a category of texts, usually written in the first person, that are narratives or autobiographies on the subject of human life and thought. Identification as an egodocument has become a marker for a type of material cultural production with an awareness of self, with that awareness enabled by material networks” (“Introduction” 8). In this sense, Weinryb encourages us to think of votives as a material form of autobiography. Though she concedes that “the term ‘egodocument’ has been used as a tool that enables scholars to distinguish between types of texts, within the material context the concept of the egodocument can be deployed to refine further our scholarly understanding of ex-voto” (8). I add to Weinryb’s insights that the recognition of the narrative capacities of ex-votos as documents relating the lived experience of disability also can help us to refine our understanding of the history of disability narrative across time and cultures.

Votive offerings appear in Cervantes’s brief relation of Tomás Rodaja’s visit to the shrine of Loreto in Italy in *El licenciado Vidriera* (*The Glass Graduate*) and in the ampler description of the Spanish monastery of Guadalupe in Extremadura in book 3 of the *Persiles*. In both of these texts, protagonists visit holy shrines and witness the presence of numerous ex-voto offerings that are left to propitiate or give thanks for the alleviation of various hardships. The descriptions of votives in Cervantes’s work exemplify alternative ways of imagining the endurance of disability as a communal experience and form of disability gain.

In his collection of short stories in the Italian style titled *Novelas ejemplares* (1613), in the prologue in which Cervantes discloses his disability as noted above, several stories explore mental and physical disability, though none more directly or with more nuance than *El licenciado Vidriera*.³² The story relates the fantastic adventures of a young Spanish man named Tomás Rodaja. Tomás’s tale commences when two gentlemen come across the lad near the river Tormes. Though he refuses to reveal his background, they are impressed by his wit and employ him as their valet at the University at Salamanca, where he also pursues legal studies. After eight years, Tomás leaves

their employ to follow an army captain with a troop that has been deployed to Italy and Flanders. Disillusioned with army life, he makes his way back to Salamanca to complete his studies with a wide range of experience and travel under his belt. The most remarkable part of the story, as the title makes clear, happens after his return to Salamanca, where Tomás falls into the delusion of being made of fragile glass. The delusion results from mental disability brought on by his being dosed with a toxic love potion by a rebuffed would-be lover. Due to the melancholic, dry predisposition of this avid scholar,³³ the acute symptoms of the poisoning dry out his humors further and have the peculiar outcome of a delusion of being made of glass, a delusion that was apparently not unique in Cervantes's time.³⁴

The depiction of Tomás's madness is certainly extraordinary, which explains in part why Tomás's travels prior to this experience have received less attention. Indeed, Cervantine scholars have puzzled over what they deem to be an atypically disjointed or unbalanced narrative arc, which has been called "a problem with which its critical readers have had to contend" (Forcione, *Cervantes's Humanist* 225).³⁵ I suggest that attention to this period of travel from a disability studies perspective may help us to understand the structure of the work as well as its message of spiritual consolation and disability gain.

The short episode that most interests me takes place during Tomás's travels before his madness sets in. As mentioned above, finding the soldier's life less to his liking than advertised, Tomás makes his way back to Salamanca to advance his studies, but his travels transform into a kind of grand tour meets pilgrimage, with an emphasis on the holy sites in Italy, where he visits the shrine of the Virgin Mary at Loreto:

[F]ue a nuestra señora de Loreto, en cuyo santo templo no vio paredes ni murallas; porque todas estaban cubiertas de muletas, de mortajas, de cadenas, de grillos, de esposas, de cabelleras, de medios bultos de cera y de pinturas y retablos, que daban manifiesto indicio de las innumerables mercedes que muchos habían recibido de la mano de Dios por intercesión de su divina madre, que aquella sacrosanta imagen suya quiso engrandecer y autorizar con muchedumbre de milagros, en recompensa de la devoción que le tienen aquellos que con semejantes doseles tienen adornados los muros de su casa.

[H]e went to Our Lady of Loretto, in whose sacred shrine he saw no walls or partitions, because they were all covered with crutches, shrouds, chains, shackles, manacles, locks of hair, remedies figured in

wax, paintings, and votive images, which indicated and made manifest the innumerable mercies received by multitudes from God's hand through the intercession of His divine mother, whose holy image He desired to give power and authority through a multitude of miracles, as a reward for the reverence which is shown to her by those who have adorned the walls of her house with such coverings. (2; 50)

As suggested by Jane Garnett and Gervace Rosser, an *ex-voto* "is the trace of a memory which is, at the same time, both personal and collective. It is a part of a larger nexus of relationships between the donor, the deity, and the community" (52). The propitiations commemorated by the votive offerings in this shrine do not equate to the disappearance of disabilities. Instead, the offerings perpetuate the memory of the traumatic events, accidents, diseases, and other adversities, intercessions for which the pilgrims have prayed. They also craft a community of disability, reminding the spectator that they are not alone in their experience. But though Tomás views these votives with interest and calls them miraculous, there is no indication that he takes the opportunity to give thanks or to make an offering of his own. The matter-of-fact style of this section of the narrative—its plain style—is not atypical for early modern travel journals.³⁶ But the passage does indicate a lack of Christian commitment or sense of communion on Tomás's part. When contrasted, for instance, with Michel Eyquem de Montaigne's relation of his visit to the same shrine, an account that Cervantes certainly could have read, Tomás's response comes off as distant. Montaigne's account is not only longer and more detailed; it also includes a description of his own offering and installation of an *ex-voto* painted panel, something that Tomás apparently neglects to do.³⁷

Tomás's experience at the shrine occurs about one-third of the way into his narrative, when he has already adopted and discarded the identity of servant, law student, soldier, wanderer, and now pilgrim. Indeed, the word "distant" would be the best way to describe him. Tomás is a man alone in the world. Indicating that he prefers not to reveal his parentage at the opening of the story, he has been a highly independent actor, refusing his first masters' offer to stay on to serve them in their hometown of Malaga, refusing to enlist in the army that he follows, and after this episode in the shrine, refusing all the charms of the women of Venice. It would seem that he is only willing to commit to books. Throughout his travels, he keeps two books on his person: a volume of Garcilaso de la Vega (ca. 1498–1536), whose life and poetry illustrated the ideal of the melding of arms and letters, and a book of hours. Both volumes perhaps foretell the military and spiritual directions his life will eventually take, but at this point, he is still a loner.

After his return to the life of a student in Salamanca, Tomás again refuses human connection and commitment offered by a beautiful would-be lover, who, as mentioned before, schemes for Tomás to be dosed with a love potion gone wrong. His delusion results in distressing episodes of abuse that represent mental disability with stark social realism along with gentle touches of humor and goodwill that argue for disability gain. The mental illness brought on by the poisoning transforms Tomás's emotional distance into agoraphobic behavior, as his delusion convinces him that he will shatter at the slightest touch: "[C]uando alguno se llegaba a él, daba terribles voces pidiendo y suplicando con palabras y razones concertadas que no se le acercasen, porque le quebrarían" ("When anybody came near him he would cry out horribly, begging and supplicating them with words and well-chosen arguments not to come near him as they might shatter him" Cervantes, *Novelas* 53). He implores people to speak to him "desde lejos" ("from a distance" 53)—a kind of bordering or social distancing behavior that some respect and others do not at first.³⁸ He is subjected, for instance, to abuse by boys who harass and hurl rocks at him, but his mental disability also apparently leads to great acquisition of seemingly divine wisdom—he becomes a kind of holy fool, emphasizing both the social discrimination and the potential for disability gain that madness grants in early modern Spain (53–54).

His treatment, moreover, reflects that of many so-called human monsters of the time, who were often valued and displayed at the Spanish court to demonstrate their extraordinary attributes.³⁹ A nobleman who takes an interest in Tomás's reputed abilities invites him to the court at Valladolid,⁴⁰ where Tomás, like so many disabled people before him, demonstrates his abilities to great acclaim: "[D]e toda la Corte fue conocido en seis días, y a cada paso, en cada calle y en cualquier esquina, respondía a todas las preguntas que le hacían" ("He was known by the whole court in six days, and at every turn, at every street, and on whichever corner, he gave answers to all the questions that were asked of him" 57). His noble patron in Valladolid gives him the name of "señor licenciado Vidriera" (57). Yet this fame still comes at a distance, and Señor Vidriera's witty repartee criticizes the commitments of others, be it to family or to profession.

It is not until Tomás connects with his own spirituality that his condition is transformed, and his transformation does not medicalize his disability. In the course of his wise interchanges, he casts doubt on the medicine of his time, inveighing against both apothecaries and physicians for their quackery and the sometimes fatal consequences of their "cures" (62–63). It is thus appropriate that Tomás's condition is finally alleviated by a Hieronymite monk who specializes in both the treatment of mental illness and Deaf edu-

cation.⁴¹ Though the monk's treatment removes his delusion of being made of glass, it does not erase it entirely. Despite another change of name (this time from Vidriera to Rueda), he is unable to shake the fame of his disability identity. He exclaims to a crowd of people who follow him to court expecting him to persist in his delusion as follows:

Señores, yo soy el licenciado Vidriera, pero no el que solía: soy ahora el licenciado Rueda. Sucesos y desgracias que acontecen en el mundo por permisión del cielo me quitaron el juicio, y las misericordias de Dios me le han vuelto.

Gentlemen, I am the licenciado Vidriera, but not as I used to be: I am now the licenciado Rueda. Events and adversities that come to pass in the world with the leave of the heavens made me lose my mind, and the compassion of God has returned it to me. (74)

Here Tomás finally acknowledges the necessity for compassion that was apparently lacking in his previous life, but as is the case with the commemorative function of *ex-votos*, Tomás's miraculous cure does not erase his disability. Despite his repetition of the above speech, crowds continue to pursue him, preventing him from finding secure employment at court. For this reason, Tomás commits to return to his life as a soldier as follows:

[S]e fue a Flandes, donde la vida que había comenzado a eternizar por las letras la acabó de eternizar por las armas, en compañía de su buen amigo el capitán Valdivia, dejando fama en su muerte de prudente y valentísimo soldado.

[H]e went to Flanders, where the life he had begun to eternalize by letters ended up being eternalized by arms in the company of his good friend Captain Valdivia, his death leaving behind the fame of a prudent and most valiant soldier. (74)

And so, Tomás's life, which begins in obscurity, ends with the fame of a soldier. His acceptance of the "misericordia" ("compassion") of God eventually results in the fame of his military commitment and sacrifice. The form of spiritual healing that Tomás first witnesses in Loreto thus echoes through his story, perhaps anticipating his own trials, but his initial lack of engagement also functions as a counterpoint to his later acceptance of the compassion of

God that he receives through the divine cure of the Hieronymite monk. He moves from a boy who preferred not to remember his family origins, to a young man who would seem to refuse all emotional ties, to a man who prefers to die honorably in the company of a "buen amigo" ("dear friend"). He moves from an apparently sane person who is emotionally distant, to a madman whose delusion demands physical distance, to a man who lives and dies with close personal and spiritual bonds. Tomás's story is certainly punctuated by two scenes of healing (the votives at Loreto and the intervention of the monk), if not structured around them, and the spiritually based cure that is offered does not erase the experience of disability; moreover, it is only effective when it results in the compassion and sense of belonging in community that Tomás eventually accepts.

Another instance of spiritual healing that highlights disability gain in disability community takes place in Cervantes's last work, the *Persiles*, which recounts a group of foreigners' trials and pilgrimage from a northern barbarian isle, across northern Europe and the Mediterranean, to Rome. The episode that takes place in the monastery of the Virgin of Guadalupe, which Alban Forcione has called "one of the most important visions of the work" (*Cervantes's Christian Romance* 86), illustrates how disability also makes an important journey in the narrative, in which disabled people, who leave votive offerings, have a place in Christian miracle and salvation. The pilgrims discover the votive offerings as follows:

Entraron en su templo y, donde pensaron hallar por sus paredes, pendientes por adorno, las púrpuras de Tiro, los damascos de Siria, los brocados de Milán, hallaron en lugar suyo muletas que dejaron los cojos, ojos de cera que dejaron los ciegos, brazos que colgaron los mancos, mortajas de que se desnudaron los muertos, todos, después de haber caído en el suelo de las miserias, ya vivos, ya sanos, ya libres y ya contentos, merced a la larga misericordia de la madre de las misericordias, que en aquel pequeño lugar hace camppear a su benditísimo hijo con el escuadrón de sus infinitas misericordias. De tal manera hizo aprehensión estos milagrosos adornos.

They entered her church expecting to find on its walls purple cloth from Tyre, damask from Syria, and brocade from Milan hanging for adornment; they found instead crutches left by the lame, wax eyes left by the blind, arms hung there by the maimed, and shrouds cast aside by the dead, things from all these people who, after having been bowed

down by misery, are now alive, healthy, free, and happy—thanks to the generous compassion of the Mother of Compassion, who in that little place has her blessed Son take the field armed with her countless mercies. (3, 5, 471; 217)

Like Tomás's relation of the votives at the shrine in Loreto, this description of the votive offerings to the Virgin demonstrates the power of Christian belief both to testify to suffering and to provide consolation. The alternation between lamentation or grief and consolation or healing represents one of the major generic as well as biographical tendencies in disability narrative; it also speaks to the variability of the lived experience of disability. Again, as Garnett and Rosser aver, an *ex-voto*

does not function in isolation, but works as a metonym for a narrative of personal experience which exists simultaneously within the life of the giver and, as a story shared with the wider community, as an element in a multifaceted and enduring embodiment of the society of participants in the cult. (54)

The experience of visiting the shrine is an important step in the spiritual development of the pilgrims, and the subplot of Feliciano de la Voz that frames the visit to the monastery, moreover, emphasizes the power of the Virgin to protect and redeem the weak. Feliciano, an unwed mother who has just given birth alone in the woods, seeks refuge with the Virgin at the shrine, and the hymn that she sings in the shrine and later copies down at the end of the conflict (after she is reconciled with her male relatives) emphasizes the Virgin's miraculous powers.⁴²

Moreover, the pilgrims' experience of viewing *ex-votos* results in this instance in what would seem to be the desired effect of spiritual inspiration and compassion. Unlike the initially distanced relation of Tomás in *Vidriera*, the sight of the votives impels the pilgrims to respond emotionally in a flight of fancy, in which they imagine the suffering people who have left these relics of their impairments as follows:

De tal manera hizo aprehensión estos milagrosos adornos en los corazones de los devotos peregrinos, que volvieron los ojos a todas las partes del templo, y les parecía ver venir por el aire volando los cautivos envueltos en sus cadenas a colgarlas de las santas murallas, y a los enfermos arrastrar las muletas, y a los muertos mortajas, buscando lugar

donde ponerlas, porque ya en el sacro templo no cabían: tan grande es la suma que las paredes ocupan.

These decorations commemorating miracles made such an impression on the hearts of the devout pilgrims that they gazed all around the church and imagined they could see captives come flying through the air with their chains wrapped around them, then go hang them on the holy walls, and the sick dragging their crutches, and the dead their shrouds, looking for a place to put them because there is no more room in the holy church, so great is the number that already cover the walls. (3, 5, 471–72; 217)

This response is so strong as to border itself on the delusional, though it was not unprecedented for pilgrims to experience this kind of overwhelming emotional reaction to a multitude of votives that can make up a "deposit of innumerable personal stories: a palimpsest of particular narratives which have become integrated into a shared history" (Garnett and Rosser 54).⁴³ Speaking of the pilgrims' reaction to this scene, Forcione avers that "they behold everywhere relics which speak of suffering and regeneration, death and resurrection, the pattern repeatedly actualized in the narration of the *Persiles*" (Cervantes's *Christian Romance* 86). In this moment, Cervantes's art and life come together to valorize disability through spiritual consolation. In fact, Cervantes himself was explicitly a part of the community that the shrine's votives create. As Amy Remensnyder observes, Cervantes must have known that the victors at the battle of Lepanto, in which Cervantes received his wounds, believed Mary to be responsible for the victory and made a significant votive offering, "donating one of their prize trophies from the battle—the Ottoman flagship's lantern—to [Mary's] renowned shrine at Guadalupe in western Castile" (647). The lantern still hangs in the cupula of the shrine today, commemorating both the honor Cervantes claims for his war wounds and the redemptive power of spiritual consolation for devotees.

Cervantes was physically impaired by his war wounds and used this fact to enhance his authorial identity, and his understanding of the lived experience of disability may help explain the subtle portrayal of disability in his art as well. In a pair of brief articles about the status of imperfection in Cervantes's art, Mary Malcolm Gaylord makes the provocative claim that "in Cervantes' literary cosmos, the authorial deity is a crippled god" ("Cervantes's Portrait" 102). She bases this claim on the surmised influence of a particular passage from the *Philosophia antigua poética* (1596) by Alonso López Pinciano

(El Pinciano) (ca. 1547–1627) on Cervantes’s own literary theory.⁴⁴ Gaylord suggests that Cervantes’s art coincides with El Pinciano’s claims that the art of literature, “como todas las demás, tiene sus fragilidades y impotencias” (“like all the others, has its weaknesses and disabilities” López Pinciano II, 73), and that out of the ancient pantheon, only the god Vulcan, “que entre ellos era artifice, el qual era coxo” (“who out of all of them was the artificer [or maker], was the only one who was crippled” II, 73–74). The spirit of Gaylord’s claims supports the claims of this chapter, with the addition that Cervantes’s reliance on the art of military and spiritual consolation is essential to the crip affinities of his literary style.

Indeed, Cervantes’s “portrait” cannot be complete without the disclosure of his disability, as his own self-description in the prologue to *Novelas* makes clear. But in unearthing Cervantes’s impairments as part of a larger disability narrative, we must also move beyond a medical and forensic model of disability that reduces Cervantes’s identity to his bones, to a broader understanding of the gainfulness of disability in the Siglo de Oro. In a recent essay, Rosemarie Garland-Thomson considers how Christian models of disability might be reappropriated through “a semiotic understanding of the cultural work of images” (“Disability Liberation Theology” 100) in the context of liberation theology. Although she traces how Nancy Eiesland’s thesis of conceiving of Christ as a disabled God is borne out in the religious iconography of the vulnerable body of the suffering Christ in a way that complements mid-twentieth-century iconic images from the disability civil rights movement, Garland-Thomson calls for a more reciprocal understanding of the spiritual value of disability to emphasize an ethics of care rather than prioritizing the idea of the individual, liberal subject. At the end of her essay, Garland-Thomson accordingly evinces the “iconography of the medieval and early modern Catholic Marian tradition” as a “resymbolization of care relations as affirmations of human life and dignity through which people with disabilities might reimagine acts of body care as sacred rituals” (114). She argues that “images of the Nursing Madonna, or Maria Lactans, . . . sacralize . . . the quotidian acts that support human embodied life” and that the “parallel image of the Pieta, the Madonna cradling her dead child in adulthood, suggests that care for and of human bodies extends throughout the arc of human life” (114). According to Garland-Thomson, this Marian iconography “universalizes human dependency and the mutual reliance that upholds the sacred human duty of living and dying” (114) and “affirms human interdependence rather than independence” (115). The representations of votive offerings that this chapter has explored in the context of Cervantine disability further

substantiate and provide historical evidence of the potential for spiritual consolation to be both redemptive and liberating in an ethics of disability care.

Noting how Cervantes's impairment was disabling and at times enabling and examining the way he represents disability in two of his works ultimately contributes to disability studies in several ways. From a new historical perspective, it helps add to our archive of disability representation. It contributes to our understanding of biographical criticism of disability and adds social realism to the depiction of disability in the past. Finally, and most importantly for the concept of crip authority in this study, Cervantes provides us with a resignification of disability and evidence of disability gain in a time period that most disability scholars have not recognized to be capable of such statements.

Four

“Experto crede Roberto”

Masquerading Crip Authority and Picturing Consolatory Antics in Robert Burton’s Anatomy of Melancholy



Miguel de Cervantes’s disability in the form of war wounds is central to his self-conception as an author, but the mental disability and madcap adventures of his character Don Quijote have most captivated the imagination of subsequent writers and artists. Figure 2 reproduces Paul Gustave Doré’s 1862 illustration of Don Quijote in his library.¹ Seated with mouth agape, the Don reads a book held in his left hand while brandishing his sword over his head with his right arm. In the background, fantastical scenes of damsels in distress, knights, and monsters emerge from tapestries and over the bindings of books, including *Amadis de Gaula* (1533) and *Tirant lo Blanch* (1490). In the foreground miniature knights tourney on mouseback.

Don Quijote loses his mind from, as Robert Burton puts it in *The Anatomy of Melancholy* (1621–1651),² “overstretch[ing] his wits” by reading nothing “but play-books, idle poems, jests, Amadis de Gaul, the Knight of the Sun, the Seven Champions, Palmerin de Oliva, Huon of Bordeaux, &c.” (2, 90). The Don has been analyzed and retrospectively diagnosed time and time again to seek the cause of his mental disability.³ Yet in *Don Quijote* Cervantes also adopts a melancholic pose in the prologue’s framing authorial figure. The narrator of *Don Quijote* uses humility to understate the work’s worth, but as Frederick de Armas has recently put it, he “transforms it in unexpected ways,” emphasizing melancholic iconography to perhaps invite “the reader to recall all the travails Cervantes endured in his life” (“Saturnine” n.p.). Though this



Figure 2: Gustave Doré, illustration of Don Quijote in his library, *L'Ingenieux Hidalgo Don Quixote de la Manche*, 1863, plate 1, engraving, Paris, France.

is much in line with what I have identified in this study as the sly usage of the modesty topos to craft crip authority, Cervantes does not claim here to be himself suffering from melancholy. He rather attributes these qualities to the work itself. Instead of a beautiful, ingenious work, this book, which was conceived of in a prison cell, will be “un hijo seco, avellanado, antojadizo y lleno de pensamientos varios y nunca imaginados” (“a dried up, shriveled, moody child rife with various unimaginable thoughts” *DQ* 1, 10). Nevertheless, the framing narrator, who has often been considered an autoreferential “portrait of an artist” (de Armas, “Saturnine” n.p.), pictures himself in what Ana María Laguna identifies as an iconic melancholic posture (42–44). The narrator describes himself at an impasse, “y estando una suspenso, con el papel delante, la pluma en la oreja, el codo en el bufete y la mano en la mejilla” (“and once, being suspended like one in a trance, with a sheet of paper before me, my pen tucked behind my ear, my elbow resting on the writing desk, and my cheek in my hand” *DQ* 1, 10–11).⁴ This melancholic authorial pose influences other disabled writers,⁵ including the seventeenth-century English writer Robert Burton, who was himself, as just cited, a reader of *Don Quijote*.

In *The Anatomy of Melancholy*, Burton brings a similar example of the melancholic pose before the mind’s eye in the following brief ekphrasis: “Albertus Durer paints melancholy, like a sad woman leaning on her arme with fixed looks, neglected habit, etc. and held therefore by some [to be] proud, soft, sottish, or halfe mad, as the Abderites esteemed of Democritus, and yet of a deep reach, excellent apprehension, judicious, wise and witty” (1, 391). Burton here describes Albrecht Dürer’s famous engraving *Melancholia I* (ca. 1514). Figure 3 reproduces a print of this intricate engraving. Dürer’s winged allegorical figure of Melancholy sits staring as if entranced, with elbow on knee. Her cheek rests on her clinched fist. She is surrounded in her study with visions of astrological signs, geometrical and mathematical tools, apotropaic polygons and puzzles,⁶ an emaciated dog, a bat-like creature that brandishes the title of the work on its wing, and a putto busy with an engraving tool. The thickly symbolic surroundings of the figure of Melancholy have garnered more attention than the figure herself; but Raymond Klibansky notes that “Dürer was himself a melancholic” (“Preface to the German” xxv) and speculates along with his coauthors Erwin Panofsky and Fritz Saxl in their fundamental study, *Saturn and Melancholy*, that it was his own melancholy that drove Dürer to make the engraving. So, too, Burton’s encyclopedic text attempts a global reckoning with melancholy, including its positive and negative affects, and the authority upon which Burton bases this vast, melancholic knowledge is his own crip authority.



Figure 3: Albrecht Dürer, *Melencolia I*, 1514, engraving on laid paper, 9 1/2" x 7 3/8", Creative Commons Zero, Rosenwald Collection. Courtesy National Gallery of Art, Washington, DC.

Although *The Anatomy of Melancholy* (henceforth the *Anatomy*) is a remarkably wide-ranging text, it is fundamentally a consolation for the melancholy of Burton and his readers. Melancholy has diverse causes, symptoms, and possible cures, which the *Anatomy* considers from a variety of medical, spiritual, and philosophical perspectives.⁷ In a moment of uncharacteristic succinctness, Burton defines melancholy as “a kinde of dotage without a fever, having for his ordinary companions, feare and sadnesse, without any apparent occasion” (I, 162). Unlike Petrarch’s *aegritudo* and *acedia*, which originate in the mind,⁸ melancholy’s cause rests for the most part in the body. Springing from an imbalance of the four humors,⁹ melancholy can result from a substance called black bile.¹⁰ Melancholy nonetheless affected both mind and body, or as Lawrence Babb puts it, “Since Renaissance thinkers recognize the interaction of body and mind, *melancholy* is both a psychological and a medical term” (*Sanity* 1). Some people were predisposed to the condition based on heredity and climate, or what Mary Floyd-Wilson calls geohumoral factors,¹¹ and this predisposition could be indicated in their complexions and other physiognomic traits. Yet melancholy could also be brought on through a variety of distressing circumstances or when any of the humors were altered in a process known as *adustion*.¹²

Melancholy was considered an inevitable consequence of the variability and vulnerability—the passibility—of body-minds, but although it is a natural consequence of humoral theory, melancholy is an early modern form of disability. Its diagnosis was based on a normative understanding of mental and physical ability, and its lived experience produced social stigma. Speaking of the manner in which humoralism was normative, Allison Hobgood and David Houston Wood aver, “Perfect somatic balance—known as *eukrasia*—was a method for denoting typical human functionality in the Renaissance, even as it anticipated the impossibility of individuals ever fully measuring up. . . . This failure was absolutely stigmatizing insofar as it meant straying from a norming baseline and idealized type” (“Early Modern Literature” 33).¹³ Melancholy is most akin to current medical models of anxiety and depression, but it cannot be mapped onto particular modern psychological “disorders,” not least because melancholy was recognized as having both positive and negative affects.

The early modern humoral system differs from medical models of disability in part because it finds advantage as well as disadvantage in variation from kind, or as Hobgood and Wood aver, “Non-normativity—humoral and other kinds too—was not exclusively stigmatic in the period; it was also productive” (“Early Modern Literature” 33). Melancholy has at least two faces. Negative valences of melancholy tend to be framed by moral and medical models. Genial

or positive valences are based in pseudo-Aristotelian and Neoplatonic contexts. Speaking of this split tradition in the English Renaissance, Babb states:

Two rather definite and very different conceptions of melancholy emerge. . . . According to one, melancholy is a degrading mental abnormality associated with fear and sorrow. It may be a morose, brooding morbidity of mind, it may be a sottish lethargy, or it may be an insanity accompanied by sorrowful and fearful delusions, often ridiculous. . . . Its source is the medical literature in the tradition of Galen. According to the second conception, melancholy is a condition which endows one with intellectual acumen and profundity, with artistic ability, sometimes with divine inspiration. . . . Its source is the Aristotelian problem and its popularity is largely due to Marsilio Ficino. (*The Elizabethan* 175)

The *Anatomy* explores both positive and negative aspects of melancholy, but its genial aspects do not counteract the treatise's overall aim to alleviate melancholy's negative affects. Rather than simply touting melancholy as a blessing or lamenting it as a curse, however, Burton employs it as a qualification for his authority to write.

This chapter explores how Burton derives his authority from his lived experience of melancholy. His disclosure of disability is playful and humble. To enhance his crippled authority, Burton performs disability in taking on the mask of Democritus Junior in a manner akin to what Tobin Siebers calls disability masquerade. Furthermore, in writing the *Anatomy*, Burton seeks to console himself and his readers. He does so with extensive consolatory reading and writing practices. He also imbues his own writing style with elements that typify the melancholic mind's tripping wit and waywardness. Burton favors the rhetorical figure of transumption, and he advises melancholics to enliven their minds with word and image interrelations, or what I call ekphrastic therapy. Burton expresses both negative and positive sides of melancholy—the sweet and the sour. Though he writes to avoid melancholy and in no way recommends it, he discerns pleasure and gain in certain aspects of its experience and potential alleviations.

Masquerading Disability in a Melancholic *Theatrum Mundi*

Burton claims outright that he is a melancholic. He states that "Saturne was Lord of my geniture" (1, 4). In the astrological parlance of the Renaissance, the planet Saturn is associated with melancholy.¹⁴ By identifying as a child

of Saturn, Burton discloses that he is melancholic. An autograph copy of Burton's astrological chart in the Bodleian Library in Oxford confirms this observation.¹⁵ It is also possible that the leave of absence that Burton took in his course of study at Oxford from 1593 to 1599 was due to melancholy. Barbara Traister notes that a man named Robert Burton who was the same age as our author consulted the astrologer doctor Simon Forman and was diagnosed with melancholy in London in the summer of 1597 ("New Evidence"). Burton spent the majority of his adult life writing about melancholy. He also discloses his melancholy in death. His memorial in Christ Church Cathedral depicts his Saturnine astrological chart (Lund, *A User's* 78), and as Babb notes, Burton's epitaph, which he wrote himself, reads, "Paucis notus paucioribus ignotus hie iacet Democritus Junior cui vitam dedit et mortem melancholia" ("Known to a few, unknown to fewer, here lies Democritus Junior, to whom melancholy gave life and death" *Sanity* 31; trans. mine). Burton identifies himself as melancholic at every turn.

Melancholy grants Burton crip authority. He relates how his lived experience of disability authorizes him to write as follows: "Concerning my selfe . . . that which others heare or read of, I felt and practised my selfe, they get their knowledge by Bookes, I mine by melancholizing, Experto crede Roberto [Trust Robert who is experienced]" (1, 8). Here mental disability becomes a basis for trust. Robert Burton is to be believed, because he is an expert, an authority on the matter. Yet Burton is painfully aware that disclosing his disability is risky and will leave him open to the prying eyes of his readers.

Burton discloses his disability in the *Anatomy* in the prefatory section called "Democritus Junior to the Reader," which puts Burton's crippling of authority on ludic display. Burton adopts the fictional persona of Democritus Junior, asking, "Gentle Reader, I presume thou wilt be very inquisitive to know what Anticke or Personate Actor this is, that so insolently intrudes upon this common Theater, to the worlds view, arrogating another mans name, whence hee is, why he doth it, and what he hath to say" (1, 1). Burton's adoption of this "anticke" (i.e., grotesquely amusing or playful; absurd, fantastical, "antic," adj., *OED* sense 2.a) theatrical persona as spokesperson for his topic is a hallmark of early humanist texts. For instance, in Desiderius Erasmus's *In Praise of Folly* (1509), the allegorical figure of Folly speaks for herself.¹⁶ Also like Erasmus, Burton situates his text within the metaphor of the *theatrum mundi*, or the idea that as the melancholic character Jaques puts it in William Shakespeare's *As You Like It*, "All the world's a stage" (2, 7, 134).¹⁷ In the *theatrum mundi*, everyone is an actor, playing their part. Burton here links the *theatrum mundi* metaphor to performing authority. He addresses

the reader's implied questioning of the author's ethos and ties that authority to the antic, or comic actor, Burton, who "errogates" or takes on the role of Democritus Junior to speak about melancholy. Scholars debate the reason for Burton's adoption of this persona, or as John Bamborough muses, "We may indeed wonder why Burton chose to masquerade as 'Democritus Junior'" ("Introduction" xxxi).¹⁸

But what do we make of the fact that the actor is disabled? Burton is not crippling up—he is not a nondisabled actor taking on the role of a disabled character.¹⁹ Burton, who is melancholic, adopts the role of the melancholic persona, Democritus Junior, who is a fictional character inspired by the pre-Socratic Thracian philosopher Democritus (ca. 460–ca. 370 BCE), who was, according to legend, himself melancholic.²⁰ In the first edition of the *Anatomy* (1621), Burton expands on this theatrical device in the concluding section of the work titled "The Conclusion of the Author to the Reader," where Burton states, "The last Section shall be mine, to cut the strings of Democritus visor, to unmaske and shew him as he is" (3, 469). Here Burton opines that Democritus Junior is a mask, but though the strings of this mask can be cut, a melancholic Burton is still on stage. Burton asks, "Democritus began as a Prologue in this Trage-comedie, but why doth the Author end, and act the Epilogue in his owne name?" (3, 469). Burton was familiar with the conventions of the theater, having written and put on at least two Latin comedies.²¹ It is also likely that he knew treatises on theater that indicated its emotional affects on audiences. Playwrights and poets availed themselves of generic theory that proposed playgoing as a way to alleviate melancholy, but critics of the theater decried playgoing as dangerous for the imagination, which could easily become overwrought.²² Calling the *Anatomy* a tragicomedy fits the mixed dramatic genre's supposed power to temper the humors and cure melancholy,²³ as theorized by the Italian playwright and poet Giovanni Battista Guarini (1538–1612) and taken up by English playwrights such as John Fletcher (1579–1625) and Ben Jonson (1572–1637), whose work Burton knew.²⁴

Keeping disability center stage offers us new ways of understanding Burton's choice to don Democritus Junior. Burton is performing disability, a phenomenon that has been studied and lived by sociologists, disability studies scholars, and cripp actors. As Carol J. Gill observes, "A central feature of the disability 'insider' experience is a persistent and disquieting sense of mistaken identity," because "disabled persons find that the identities they forge and present to the world are commonly dismissed by others in favor of stereotypical identity ascriptions" (353).²⁵ In asking what disability studies and performance studies might offer each other, moreover, Carrie Sandahl and Philip

Auslander observe, “The notion that disability is a kind of performance is to people with disabilities not a theoretical abstraction, but lived experience” (2). Responding to the stickiness of these social interactions, Siebers draws on queer and race-based notions of passing to elaborate what he calls disability masquerade, which “claims disability as a version of itself rather than simply concealing it from view” (“Disability as Masquerade” 5). In Siebers’s formulation, disabled people may at times find it necessary to play up a disability that is invisible or misunderstood, but at other times, it may be advantageous to play it down.²⁶ As Siebers explains, “The masquerade fulfills a desire to tell a story about disability, often the very story that society does not want to hear because it refuses to obey the ideology of able-bodiedness. It may stress undercompensation when overcompensation is required, or present a coming out of disability when invisibility is mandatory” (19). But reading the room can be tricky for disabled people, or as Siebers observes, “To pass or not to pass—that is often the question” (2). Siebers’s question resonates with Burton’s melancholy. It echoes Shakespeare’s melancholic Prince Hamlet’s famous soliloquy on despair, but it also speaks to Burton the scholar and other knowledge workers’ justified anxieties about disclosing mental disability in the academy. It is important to remember that Burton was a scholar at Oxford.²⁷ As Jay Dolmage observes, “The ethic of higher education still encourages students and teachers alike to accentuate ability, valorize perfection, and stigmatize anything that hints at intellectual (or physical) weakness” (*Academic Ableism* 4). This is especially true for people with mental disabilities in academic cultures that privilege what Margaret Price identifies as the academic mandatory “topoi” of rationality, productivity, participation, collegiality, and so forth (*Mad* 1–24).

Masquerading as Democritus Junior plays up Burton’s melancholy and protects him from ableist assumptions about his capacities. Burton explains his contrary aims as follows: “I intended at first to have concealed my selfe,” but on second thought “for some reasons I have altered mine intent, and am willing to subscribe” (3, 369). In deciding to “subscribe,” or sign his name to, the *Anatomy*, Burton relinquishes the protection that Democritus Junior provides. He characterizes this as a self-sacrifice, averring, “Me me adsum qui feci, in me convertite ocellos Lectores, . . . meus hic labor est [I, the one before you, did the deed, turn your little eyes on me readers], . . . [this is my work]” (3, 369). In this passage, Burton cites Virgil’s story of Nisus and Euryalus in book 9 of the *Aeneid* (line 427), when Nisus begs to be killed in his beloved companion’s stead. Burton substitutes “ocellos,” or little eyes, for Virgil’s “ferrum,” or steel (as in weapon), which emphasizes the theatricality of his

unmasking. Burton knows that in writing the *Anatomy*, he has opened himself up to scrutiny, or as he explains, "If ought be otherwise then it should be, since I have now put my selfe upon the stage, I must undergoe and abide the censure of it, . . . and I may not escape it. . . I have laid my selfe open (I know it) in this Treatise, and shall be censured I doubt not" (3, 469). Burton refers to the inevitability of errors in the work, but his language also makes clear that in signing the work and thereby disclosing his disability of melancholy, he has opened himself to something more invasive. In placing himself on the stage and saying that he has "laid my selfe open," Burton evokes the anatomy theater, where the human anatomy was opened to view. Yet on Burton's stage, the "ocellos," or little eyes, of the readers substitute for the "ferrum," or steel, of the knife. In his discussion of societal scorn (partition 2, section 3, mem. 7), Burton advises that people with physical disabilities preempt scorn by disclosing their disabilities themselves in a light-hearted manner. He advises: "[S]peak of it first thyself, and so thou shalt surely take away all occasions from others to jest at, or contemn, that they may perceive thee to be careless of it" (2, 203). Burton's disability masquerade, like the voluntary humility of Teresa de Cartagena and the light-hearted self-deprecation of Cervantes, is strategic. Burton ends the 1621 edition by signing off, "From my Studie in Christ-Church Oxon. Decemb 5. 1620. Robert Burton" (3, 673). In subsequent editions, Burton removes this signature and entire concluding section from the work, incorporating much of its material into the preface. Although it is impossible to know for certain why Burton cut the "Conclusion to the Reader" in subsequent editions, this move fits with the flexibility of disability masquerade, in which the person with a disability sometimes plays up and sometimes plays down their disability.

Burton also makes strategic use of the modesty topos to achieve the goal of capturing his audience. Burton humbly explains that his adoption of the diminutive "Junior" for his authorial persona signals his inferiority to his model, Democritus. After briefly listing Democritus's many accomplishments, Burton humbly assures the reader, "I confesse indeede that to compare my selfe unto him for ought I have yet said, were both impudency and arrogancy. I doe not presume to make any parallell" (1, 3). Nevertheless, Burton follows this disclaimer with a statement of his own university education and employment:

Yet thus much I will say of my selfe, & that I hope without all suspicion of pride, or selfe-concept, I have liv'd a silent, sedentary, solitary, private life, mihi & musis [just me and the muses], in the University

as long almost as Xenocrates in Athens, ad senectam fere [almost to old age], to learne wisdom as he did, penned up most part in my study. For I have beene brought up a Student in the most flourishing Colledge of Europe. (1, 3)

Similar to Teresa de Cartagena's "humble brag" about having been educated at Salamanca in the midst of volunteering her humility, Burton's disclosure of his educational background invites an ironic reading of his modesty topos. Burton was a highly educated clergyman and fellow at Oxford, where he accumulated and eventually donated a wide-ranging library.²⁸ It is evident, however, that his melancholy more than his institutional affiliation authorizes him to write the *Anatomy*.

Burton's identity as author of the *Anatomy* was never entirely hidden. Personally identifiable information is scattered throughout all editions of the work.²⁹ As Bamborough notes, "from the third edition onwards, although his [full sic.] name is not found, his portrait is placed on the title page together with his family arms distinguished by the appropriate 'difference', the crescent which would indicate that he was the second son. In an age with such an interest in heraldry he might as well have signed his name" ("Introduction" xxxi). Burton in fact updates his portrait in subsequent editions to keep his likeness current. As Margery Corbett and Ronald Lightbown observe, the 1638 portrait depicts Burton as "now elderly" and thus demonstrates that Burton "was obviously concerned that the title-page should not lose its impact by appearing in any way out-of-date" (200). After worrying in the first edition that he himself would be anatomized, Burton's self-portrait appears alongside an image of the melancholic Democritus in the midst of anatomizing animals to seek out the cause of melancholy, an image to which I will return in the next section.

Democritus's experience of disability makes him a good authority for Burton. Burton describes Democritus as "a little wearish old man, very melancholy by nature, averse from company in his latter dayes," and adds, "and to the intent he might better contemplate, I finde it related by some, that he put out his eyes, and was in his old age voluntarily blind, yet saw more then all Greece besides" (1, 2). Democritus's experience of melancholy and his possible experience of blindness give him crip authority.³⁰ Furthermore, Burton relates that Democritus began a treatise on melancholy.³¹ Democritus writes about melancholy

to the intent he might better cure it in himselfe, by his writings and observations, teach others how to prevent & avoid it. . . . Democritus

Junior is therefore bold to imitate, & because he left it unperfect, & it is now lost, quasi succenturiator Democriti [as a quasi-substitute for Democritus], to revive againe, prosecute and finish in this Treatise. (I, 6)

Democritus's unfinished treatise on melancholy inspires Burton's project, and Democritus's ironical laughter at the world's absurdities inspires Burton's antic tone. Burton therefore playfully takes on the persona of Democritus Junior and attempts to accomplish what Democritus never finished.

Consolatory "Antickes," or Transuming Melancholy

Scholars frequently observe that the *Anatomy* functions as a consolation. Rosalie Colie considers "the entire book" to be "a *consolatio philosophiae*" and adds that in writing the *Anatomy*, Burton "shakes himself out of his disease by attacking it foursquare, and he consoles his miseries by that activity" (*Paradoxia* 437).³² Like many other disabled authors such as Petrarch and Teresa de Cartagena, Burton engages in consolatory writing as a remedy for his disability. In defense of his writing, he avers, "If any man except against the matter or manner of treating of this my Subject, and will demand a reason of it, I can alleage more then one, I write of Melancholy, by being busie to avoid Melancholy" (I, 6). He takes this task in hand "to ease my minde by writing" (I, 8). He also "would helpe others out of a fellow-feeling" by dedicating "time and knowledge . . . for the common good of all" (I, 8). Addressing the explicit reader directly, Burton proclaims, "[T]hou thyself art the subject of my discourse" (I, 16). Writing about melancholy might alleviate Burton's melancholy, but he aims to ease the melancholy of the reader as well.

Burton licenses his writing with the *auctoritas* of consolation specifically, citing a wide variety of consolation texts to support his own. He explains that "[t]o doe my selfe good," he "turned over such Physitians as our Libraries would afford, or my private friends impart, & have taken this paines" (I, 8). Furthermore, in the section of the work called "A Consolatory Digression," in which Burton consoles a variety of disadvantages and disabilities culminating in melancholy, he states, "I confess, many have copiously written of this subject" (2, 268). He goes on to list ancient authors of consolation such as "Plato, Seneca, Plutarch, Xenophon, Epictetus, Theophrastus, Xenocrates, Crantor, Lucian, Boethius" as well as more recent authors of consolation, such as "Sadoletus, Cardan, Budaeus, Stella, Petrarch, Erasmus, besides Austin, Cyprian, Bernard, &c" (2, 268). Burton relies on authoritative consolation texts, both modern and ancient, to justify his own writing. He also recommends reading

more broadly “to expell Idlennesse and Melancholy” (2, 84) with a “world of books” (2, 85).

Burton does not claim that melancholy can be cured with consolation. Slipping into the first-person plural, he patly observes, “[W]ee can easily give counsell to others” (2, 103), suggesting that consolation is easy to give, but it is not always so easy to take. He then addresses his community of melancholic readers, acknowledging the limits of the many cures his treatise proposes as follows:

Wee know this to be true, we are led captives by passion, appetite, wee should moderate our selves, but we are furiously carried, we cannot make use of such precepts, we are overcome, sicke, malè sani, distempered & habituated in these courses, we can make no resistance; you may as well bid him that is diseased, not to feele pain, as a melancholy man not to feare, not to be sad: ‘tis within his blood, his braines, his whole temperature, it cannot be removed. But he may choose whether he will give way too farre unto it, he may in some sort correct himselfe. (II, 103)

In analyzing this passage, Mary Ann Lund observes that “as a melancholic,” Burton speaks “out of experience, a fact which gives him the only acceptable weight of authority in the sufferer’s eyes” (*Melancholy* 145). The authority of experience allows Burton to speak with confidence about the limitations and efficacy of consolation, but he also derives authority from reading and writing consolation.

Consolatory reading and writing may not provide cure, but it does provide comfort. Burton asks, “And why not? Cardan professeth he writ his booke De Consolatione after his Sonnes death, to comfort himselfe, so did Tully write of the same Subject with like intent, after his Daughters departure” (1, 8).³³ As Bamborough observes, for Burton, “Cardan was clearly a very important author. In the *Anatomy* he is quoted or referred to over 150 times—quite exceptional for a ‘modern’ authority” (“Burton and Cardon” 183). The reference to Cicero is to his lost consolation for the death of his beloved daughter Tullia, a forgery of which Burton later calls out. Burton also makes extensive use of Petrarch’s *De remediis* and *Secretum*.³⁴ Although these examples come out of the tradition of consolation as moral philosophy, Burton cites all manner of consolation texts, including medical manuals of his time that encompassed consolatory elements, such as André Du Laurens’s *Discours de la conservation de la veuë: des maladies melancoliques: des catarrhes, & de la vieil-*

lesse (1594) as translated into English by Richard Surphlet in 1599, as well as Timothy Bright's *A Treatise of Melancholie* (1586). He makes extensive use of biblical consolation with a special emphasis on Church Fathers such as Augustine, who gets the last word of the *Anatomy*.

Burton goes so far as to claim that the *Anatomy* is a cento.³⁵ This composite genre comprises a collection of quotations from other works, artfully arranged, or to put it in modern parlance, a mash-up. But Burton does not simply cite other works; rather, he transforms them. As Anthony Wood avers in his *Athenae Oxonienses* (1691), Burton was notable "for his ready and dexterous interlarding his common discourses among them with verses from the poets, or sentences from classic authors" (535). Burton evokes the composite apian or honeybee model for transformative invention, which, as this study has demonstrated, is a favored model for disabled writers in the Renaissance. Burton avers,

I have only this of Macrobius to say for my selfe, Omne meum, nihil meum, 'tis all mine and none mine. As a good hous-wife out of divers fleeces weaves one peece of Cloath, a Bee gathers Wax and Hony out of many Flowers, and makes a new bundle of all, Floriferis ut apes in saltibus omnia libant, I have laboriously 'collected this Cento out of divers Writers, and that sine injuria, I have wronged no Authors, but given every man his owne. (I, 11)

In citing Macrobius on the apian metaphor for invention, Burton extends this metaphor to women's piecework with textiles. This gesture can be interpreted as another instance of the strategic use of the modesty topos, or as Lund observes, Burton "places himself in a tradition of writing with female associations: it is a humble, industrious task," which differs "from the more ambitious claims to textual authority made by some of his contemporaries" (*A User's* 11). Burton also demonstrates knowledge of the checkered history of this apian metaphor for literary imitation, which was associated with plagiarism in its textual transmission.³⁶ Burton assures his readers that he will not take his borrowing too far. In a rhetorical move that is again reminiscent of Teresa de Cartagena, Burton makes a proleptic argument against accusations of plagiarism, assuring the reader that "I cite & quote mine Authors" (I, 11). This defensive posture may reflect Burton's abiding concern with authority as a disabled writer in an ableist society.

Disability masquerade discloses Burton's disability in an antic performance, but Burton also discloses disability in his antic style of writing. As

Bridget Lyons observes, “One of the main achievements of the *Anatomy* as a work of literature is to portray the melancholy mind in action, even while it is occupied with melancholy as a formal subject” (114). Burton’s melancholy mind is evident in his errant writing style, or as Lyons argues, “Burton’s self-portraiture, direct or oblique, is closely connected with what seems to be his general purpose in the *Anatomy*: to show the symptoms, cures and general characteristics of the melancholy mind in action, even while it is busying itself with the subject of melancholy. . . . Style must correspond to subject-matter, and the subject-matter is sufficiently diverse to require a multiplicity of styles” (124). Burton’s melancholy manifests in the diversity of his style, and it can also be traced in his motivation, research methods, and figuration.

Consolatory writing can alleviate melancholy, but, paradoxically, as Reason suggests in Petrarch’s *De remediis*, it can also be a symptom of its continuance. When Joy proclaims their compulsion to write, Reason responds,

[S]i ut scribendi morbo quidem occulto et insanabili medeare, misereor; sunt namque, si nescis, qui non scribunt nisi quia nequeunt desinere et velut ex precipiti decurrentes nolentesque subsistere rapiuntur. . . . Melancholie species infinitas ferunt: alii lapides iactant, alii libros scribunt; huic scribere furoris initium est, huic exitus.

If you write in order to relieve a secret and incurable compulsion to write, I must pity you. For there are some, in case you do not know it, who would not write save that they cannot desist: like running downhill, they are dragged on relentlessly, not knowing how to stop. . . . One hears of innumerable kinds of melancholy. Some throw stones, others write books. For one, writing is the beginning of madness; for another, it is the end. (1. 44; 145)

Burton, who is very familiar with Petrarch’s works of consolation, reveals that he must write, “for I had *gravidum cor, foetum caput* [*a heavy heart, a teeming head*], a kind of Impostume [Abscess] in my head, which I was very desirous to be unladen of, and could imagine no fitter evacuation then this” (1, 7). His motivation to write is a compulsion, and Burton continues to write about melancholy for most of his life, augmenting the *Anatomy* with every new edition.

Furthermore, Burton emphasizes his melancholic condition in the characterization of his wayward research methods. Although Burton is learned in a variety of fields, he makes clear that his scholarship is errant. Burton’s learning has led him to act as follows:

[L]ike a ranging Spaniell, that barks at every bird he sees, leaving his game, I have followed all, saving that which I shoud, and may justly complaine, & truly, qui ubique est, nusquam est [he who is everywhere is nowhere] . . . that I have read many Bookes, but to little purpose, for want of good method, I have confusedly tumbled over divers Authors in our Libraries, with small profit, for want of Art, Order, Memory, Judgement. (I, 4)

Here Burton submits that his mental capacity for study is wayward, which springs from his melancholy. Lyons observes that Burton's "digressiveness is certainly also intended to be a manifestation of the melancholy character," noting that "one aspect of melancholy, derived from the medieval idea of *acedia*, was a busyness about everything except one's real work. It is this characteristic, with less of a connotation of sinfulness, that Burton conveys by his image of the ranging spaniel" (127). As working dogs chiefly trained for hunting fowl, spaniels must rein in their instincts to pursue the hunter's chosen game; a spaniel should not, to make a modern filmic reference, go after every "SQUIRREL!!!" (*Up*). Burton singles out dogs as being especially prone to melancholy, stating, "Of all other [animals], dogges are most subject to this malady" (I, 66). The connection between Burton's own melancholy and the roving spaniel is further cemented in his digression on air, where he must call his melancholy spaniel to heel: "[M]y melancholy spaniel's quest, my game, is sprung, and I must suddenly come down and follow" (II, 61). Images of dogs, moreover, are typical in the iconography of melancholy scholars in their studies in Renaissance art (Klibansky et al. 322–23), a convention that perhaps persists in today's slang term of "black dog" for depression ("black Dog" *OED* sense 2).

The figuration of melancholy takes an antic tone in Burton's writing in part through his heavy use of the rhetorical figure of transumption. *Transumptio* in Latin or *metalepsis* in Greek is a kind of metaphor that elides at least one element in a chain of signification composed of tropes poised across time and space. To put it differently, transumption is an extended metaphor that skips a beat. The reader has to understand what has been elided or skipped to get the comparison. John Hollander enumerates three properties of transumption: "1 There is a transition from one trope to another; 2 The tropes in question are in some way anterior and posterior; 3 There will be one or more unstated, but associated or understood figures, transmused by the trope, but which are to be reconstructed by interpretation" (140). Burton uses transumption to characterize his own melancholy with moral and medical

models, but his use of contrasting images and ludic style undercuts the seriousness of such models. Burton reveals that

I was not a little offended with this maladie, shall I say my Mistris *Melancholy*, my *Egeria*, or my *malus Genius*, & for that cause as he that is stung with a Scorpion, I would expell *clavum clavo*, comfort one sorrow with another, idlenes with idlenes, *ut ex vipera Theriacum*, make an Antidote out of that which was the prime cause of my disease. (I, 8)

Burton's raucous prose takes the reader on a bumpy ride that demands we fill in the gaps of his tripping, transumptive figures. His malady, which the reader must recognize sounds like "ma lady," becomes a mistress, but the reader must understand that this mistress is fickle: she is both *Egeria*, who was a Roman prophetic nymph of legend that the reader must identify as exemplary of a helpful muse, and his *malus genius*, or evil genius or impish devil. Melancholy is thus simultaneously a good and a bad angel on Burton's shoulders. The reader must supply the sense of Burton's allusions to arrive at a moral signification for melancholy, but that moral meaning is ambivalent. In this sense, transumption dodges the ableism that Mitchell and Snyder detect in what they call the materiality of metaphor, in which disabilities simply stand in for social ills. Burton's use of transumption to represent melancholy avoids this pitfall in part because the disability in this instance (melancholy) does not equate to a single moral meaning but echoes or ripples through several tropes of similitude as both desirable and deviant.

When transumption works, it's fireworks; it excites the reader, who is rewarded for supplying what is left out, for being in the know. Transumption nonetheless walks a tightrope of signification, with the possible outcome of catachresis, a failed or mixed metaphor. In its rhetorical history, transumption has been considered eccentric. Quintilian recommends against it except "in comodia" ("in comedy" *Institutio Oratore* 8. 6. 446), and Erasmus starts his entry on it by stating, "Similar to catachresis is metalepsis" (*De copia* 1. 21. 339). Burton's attempt in his transumptive passage above to alleviate melancholy teases a move from anterior disability to posterior cure, but this diachronic substitution is incomplete because Burton's transumption does not stop. His proposed self-cure of treating like with like follows the medical advice of Paracelsus (ca. 1493–1541),³⁷ but Burton twists this potential cure in an antic direction, loading examples of likeness to the point that their copiousness is overwhelming: scorpion sting for sting, "clavum clavo" ("drive one nail out with another"), combat idleness with more idleness, and use a viper's venom

as antidote for its bite. From a therapy of matching like to like, the passage veers into excess, and the symptom becomes at best a dubious cure.

Burton further characterizes his style as being *ex temper*, or reflecting the everyday patterns of speech, and as being like a meandering river. He states, "I neglect phrases, and labour wholly to informe my Readers understanding, not to please his eare; 'tis not my study or intent to compose neatly, which an Orator requires, but to expresse my selfe readily & plainly as it happens" (1, 17). Rather than a well-formed argumentative style, his presentation is like that of free-flowing water, which he relates back to his melancholy:

So that as a River runnes sometimes precipitate and swift, then dull and slow; now direct, then *per ambages* [*circuitously*]; now deepe, then shallow; now muddy, then cleare; now broad, then narrow; doth my stile flow: now serious, then light; now Comicall, then Satyricall; now more elaborate, then remisse, as the present subject required, or as at that time I was affected. (1, 17)³⁸

The image of a meandering river can be related back to the figure of transumption that Burton so favors. As Hollander observes, Michael Drayton (1563–1631), drawing on the legendarily twisted course of the river Meander in Lycia, defines what he calls a meandering style as "intricate turnings by a transumptive and Metonymicall kind of speech called Meanders" (Drayton, "Rosalind to Henry II," ct. Hollander 148). As Hollander puts it, "Not only do we have a prior allusion as part of a trope"—for example, the legendary river Meander—"but one of those self-descriptive images that point to the nature of their own language: *meandering*, as a figure, is an 'intricate turning' of a river of sense going back on itself recursively" (148). Burton's meandering style, like Teresa de Cartagena's interlaced style, loops back on itself and branches out "now serious, then light" (1, 17).³⁹ It provides crip space and crip time for lamentation and consolation of melancholy, "as the present subject required, or as at that time I was affected" (1, 17). Although many Burton scholars cite this passage to comment on his wayward style, it is also important to remember that this wayward style is closely tied to the effects of his melancholy. He explains to his reader that "[t]here be many other subjects, I doe easily grant" that might have been preferable to this one, "but that at this time I was fatally driven upon this Rocke of Melancholy, and carryed away by this by-streame, which as a Rillet, is deducted from the maine Channell of my studies, in which I have pleased and busied my selfe at idle houres, as a subject most necessary and commodious" (1, 20). Burton's experience

of melancholy, which he likens to a deadly shipwreck but also to a pleasing rivulet, leads him to compose (like a busy bee) this work on the subject of his disability, which is both necessary and commodious, a term that refers to both comedy and comfort in its etymology.

The pervasiveness of Burton's melancholy antics in the treatise does not preclude its efficacy as a work of consolation. Burton proposes a myriad of atypical methods for alleviating melancholy and its delusions, and in many cases, the efficacy of treatment depends on comical theatricality. For instance, he cites a case described by the famous physician Felix Platter (1536–1614), who speaks of a man “that thought he had some of *Aristophanes* Frogs in his belly, still crying *Brecec'ekex, coax, coax, oop, oop, oop*, and for that cause studied Physicke seven yeares, and travelled over most part of *Europe* to ease himselfe” (1, 8). The man who believes he has frogs in his belly is brought up again later in the *Anatomy* alongside melancholic individuals, mostly of the hypochondriac or windy variety (1, 385), who maintain other imaginative delusions, such as believing oneself to be made of glass, as is the case in Cervantes's *Licenciado Vidriera* or *Glass Graduate*, who is considered in the previous chapter.⁴⁰ But here the activity of researching one's condition, no matter how antic or strange that process or condition might be, is palliative.

Moreover, in referring to the frogs as pertaining to Aristophanes's comedy *Ranae*, or *Frogs*, Burton emphasizes comic theatricality and the implicit utility of laughter. The frogs in this man's belly sing the famous chorus of Aristophanes's play, “Brekekekex koax koax” (line 209), an onomatopoeic rendering of the sounds that frogs make. This sound provides the choral backdrop for Dionysus's comical boat ride to Hell, where he intends to retrieve the dead poet Euripides. Dionysus chooses to take this journey over water rather than the various modes of suicide that his half-brother Heraclitus sardonically recommends when Dionysus asks for directions to Hades. In this way, Burton's disclosure of his own melancholy journey and even his desire for consolation are related in a playfully ironic manner, one that emphasizes the jovial or ingenious side of the illness over its potential to induce despair.

Ekphrastic Therapy and Emblemizing the Sweet and Sour of Melancholy

Although the consolatory strategies that Burton recommends for alleviating melancholy vary widely, one method that shows up throughout the treatise and is related to Burton's fascination with theatricality consists of what I call ekphrastic therapy.⁴¹ Ekphrasis, which James Heffernan defines as “the verbal

representation of visual representation" (3),⁴² brings an image vividly before the mind's eye, a process that ancient Greek rhetoricians call *enargeia* and that has a strong effect on the *fantasia*, or imagination.⁴³ To put it another way, when executed properly, ekphrasis can inspire a profound and persuasive emotional affect in its audience.⁴⁴

In discussing "exercises, or recreations of the minde," Burton enthusiastically exclaims that there is nothing "so fit & proper to expell Idlenesse and Melancholy, as that of Study" (2, 84), including the examination of a wide range of ekphrastic content. Although Burton recommends viewing extant works of art, his advice immediately slides into the ekphrastic realm. In the course of extolling "Mappes, Pictures, Statues, Jewels, marbles," he specifies those, "which some so much magnifie, as those that Phidias made of Old" (2, 84). Only Roman copies and verbal descriptions of the works of Phidias remain. Similarly, Burton exemplifies the consoling power of verbal images with the epitome of ekphrasis, the description of Achilles's shield from the *Iliad*, as follows:

When *Achilles* was tormented and sad for the losse of his deare friend *Patroclus*, his mother *Thetis* brought him a most elaborate and curious Buckler made by *Vulcan*, in which were engraven Sunne, Moone, Starres, Planets, Sea, Land, men fighting, running, riding, women scolding, hills, dales, townes, castles, brooks, rivers, trees, &c. with many pretty landskips, and perspective peeces: with sight of which he was infinitely delighted, and much eased of his griefe. (2, 84–85)

The famous description of Achilles's shield, forged by the disabled god Vulcan, produces *enargeia*, calling forth Homer's world of vivid words, and in Burton's interpretation, it possesses the power to relieve the hero's melancholy. As Stephanie Shirilan has suggested, Burton's "use of *enargeia* in the description of a study cure cultivates an imaginative agility in the reader by which he or she may replace melancholic thoughts and images with those that are, quite literally, more uplifting" (109). I add that the effect of *enargeia* to relieve melancholy depends on the interrelation of word and image to have emotional affect.

Burton's promotion of ekphrastic content to alleviate melancholy is appropriate given the centrality of disability metaphors used to compare the sister arts in the Renaissance. Drawing on the *paragone*, or comparison, between poetry and painting, Burton cites the oft remarked saying of Simo-nides that painting is "*muta poesis* [mute poetry]" (2, 84).⁴⁵ Comparisons of

word and image teem with disability metaphors. The relation between word and image, with an emphasis on what each lacks and the other supplies, could be called prosthetic, or the relation could be considered interdependent. In his definition of ekphrasis, Jay Dolmage flags ekphrasis's potential to provide disability access across media, where word and image speak "in dialogue with one another, enhancing meaning reciprocally rather than having a one-to-one or transactional relationship" (*Disability Rhetoric* 140). The interrelation of painting and poetry can be mutually assistive, and their interrelation might also help to enliven the melancholic mind. Burton exhorts the reader to consider the visual together with the verbal. Though it is good to look at works of art and antiquity in the collections of cardinals, for instance, Burton advises both to gaze at them and to read their descriptions for the full salutary affect (2, 85).⁴⁶ Burton, in recommending this multimedia form of study, moreover, writes his own ekphrastic world, not only name-dropping the great artists of his past and present but recommending the contemplation of "elaborate Maps" (2, 86) and their "exquisite descriptions" (2, 87) along with travel narratives and their "curiously cut" engravings, as well as herbals, bestiaries, and wonder books "truly expressed in lively colours, with an exact description of their natures" (2, 87). Not only does Burton aver that he has himself benefited from these activities, but in describing them, he creates the kind of *enargeia* that ekphrastic therapy might offer his melancholic readers.

Yet there can be too much of a good thing. As Shirilan observes, Burton's melancholics "demonstrate a heightened imaginative agility and capacity for assimilative mimesis that causes them to become overburdened by the same studies in which they seem especially astute" (110). Following on the heels of his exuberant incitement to study, Burton warns the reader not to go too far. Although "[t]o most kinde of men it is an extraordinary delight to study" to the "sweet content and capacity" (2, 85–86), the same activity can turn sour. It is only sweet, "[p]rovided alwaies that his malady proceede not from overmuch study, for in such cases he addes fuell to the fire, and nothing can be more pernicious; let him take heed he doe not overstretch his wits, and make a *Skeleton* of himselfe" (2, 90). This overstretching of wits is the fate of Don Quijote, whose melancholic fate Burton includes in this admonition.

When it comes to just how much advantage Burton finds in melancholy, scholars disagree. The modes of consolation from which Burton draws afford both sweet and sour perspectives, and Burton relies on ekphrasis to convey melancholy's advantages and its dangers both for himself and for his readers. This is apparent in the frontispiece of the *Anatomy* and its ekphrasis. The frontispiece (fig. 4) first appeared in the 1628 third edition of the *Anatomy* and




Figure 4: Christian le Blon, *Frontispiece to Robert Burton's Anatomy of Melancholy*, 1632, engraved on laid paper, Creative Commons License, Division of Rare and Manuscript Collections. Cornell University Library Digital Collections, Ithaca, NY.

was engraved by Christian Le Blon the elder (ca. 1600–1655).⁴⁷ As Corbet and Lightbown discuss in their analysis of the frontispiece, “The engraving is divided into three bands or panels; the middle panel is formed as a plinth and pedestal supporting a balcony” (190). Along with the title of the work, the frontispiece displays ten numbered scenes with allegorical elements depicting different aspects of melancholy. It starts with the figure of Democritus and ends with Burton’s self-portrait.⁴⁸

Burton describes the engraved frontispiece in verse in “The Argument of the Frontispiece,” and throughout the *Anatomy* these types reappear with further description in his prose. The frontispiece is fundamentally emblematic, or as William Engel observes, each of the ten images,

like a collection of moral emblems, has its own Latin title; for example, “Inamorato,” “Hypocondriacus,” and “Superstitiosus.” Were I to cut out each of the ten images and then the verses that go with them and paste each beneath its corresponding image, I would produce a short book of moral emblems after the fashion of Wither or Combe. The overarching theme, which could serve as the title of the book of emblems, is melancholy. (268)

In elaborating his ekphrastic therapy, Burton in fact encourages melancholics to “invent” such “Impresses” and “Emblemes” (2, 94).⁴⁹

The juxtaposition of visual and verbal representation in the *Anatomy*’s front matter and its enticement to interpretation exemplify the ekphrastic therapy that Burton recommends for melancholics, inviting the reader to commence consolation for melancholy immediately. The ekphrastic complement to the frontispiece’s engravings, called “The Argument of the Frontispiece,” describes each of the ten scenes in coupled rhyme octaves—eight-line stanzas with an *aa, bb, cc, dd* rhyme scheme.⁵⁰ An omniscient speaker commands the reader to “see” (1, lxii, lines 40, 42, 49) and to “behold and see” (line 79) the images with frequent reference to the visuality of their representation, as in the first line of the second stanza, “Toth’ left a Landskip of Jealousye, Presents it selfe unto thine eye” (line 9). Other scenes are called “portrature” (1, lxii, lines 18, 54) and a “picture” (line 55). The poem does not correspond exactly to the engraving, which the speaker discerns, stating, “Marke well: Ift be not as’t should be, Blame the bad Cutter and not me” (1, lxii, line 24).⁵¹ Although Burton here characterizes the engraver’s omissions from what the verbal description details as “bad,” his verbal descriptions complement the images; they do not call out individual omissions. Burton thus presents the

reader with an emblematic representation of melancholy with the engraving, "Argument," and subsequent prose descriptions corresponding roughly with the image, motto, and explanation that made up early modern emblems and *imprese*.

The visual and verbal representations of the first figure, Democritus of Abdera, and the tenth, the portrait of Burton himself, are most relevant to Burton's construction of *crip* authority. In "The Argument of the Frontispiece," Burton describes the engraving of Democritus as follows:

Old Democritus under a tree,
Sittes on a stone with booke on knee,
About him hang there many features,
Of Cattes, Dogges and such like creatures,
Of which he makes Anatomy,
The seat of blacke choler to see.
Over his head appears the skye,
And Saturne Lord of Melancholy. (1, lxii, lines 1–8)

In this ekphrasis of the engraving, Burton calls attention to Democritus's own bimedial activity in the course of conducting anatomical research. Democritus makes observations in text "with booke on knee" (1, lxii, line 2) and in images that "[a]bout him hang" of the "features" (line 3) of his anatomized "creatures" (line 4). As Engel suggests, we might consider the other nine engraved scenes or squares as extensions "of Democritus Senior's creatures, unique and self contained, and yet once opened up and exposed to view, presumed to add to the knowledge of the larger topic. The ten squares depict the discrete entities which the literary anatomist, Democritus Junior, aims to cut up and disperse throughout his enclosed garden, his book" (267).

Depicting melancholy in pictures and words aligns the *Anatomy* not only with the conventions of medical manuals with illustrations of often naked or anatomized patients, but with the popular genre of wonder books, in which illustrations of monstrous creatures, many of them people with disabilities, iterate across time, space, and word-image relations to produce the marvelous.⁵² Included in this gallery of melancholic creatures are Burton's own "features," kept up to date and hung up on view in the tenth square that presents his allegorical portrait. Burton's portrait further emblemizes the author with his heraldic imagery in upper left and his book in lower left along with astronomical and geographical research instruments on upper and lower right. If Teresa de Cartagena and Cervantes must resort to notional ekphrasis

when describing a crip coat of arms in *Arboleda* and when depicting a verbal self-portrait in the prologue to the *Novelas ejemplares*, respectively, Burton multiplies images and words about himself and his disability ad infinitum in his disability masquerade.

Burton describes the scene of Democritus at Adbera repeatedly throughout the *Anatomy* in ways that deepen and nuance his discourse of disability. In a précis of Democritus's story, Burton emphasizes busy action and compassion, placing Democritus

in the Suburbs, under a shady Bowre, with a booke on his Knees, busie at his study, sometimes writing, sometime walking. The subject of his booke was Melancholy and madnesse, about him lay the carcasses of many severall beasts, newly by him cut up and anatomized, not that he did contemne Gods creatures, as he told *Hippocrates*, but to finde out the seat of this *atra bilis* or Melancholy, whence it proceeds, and how it was engendred in mens bodies. (1, 6)

In this rendition, Burton gives Democritus mobility (writing and walking). He also indicates that Democritus is not without feeling for his animal test subjects. Democritus is thus freed from the image of unmoving and unmoved static specimen of a person with mental disability to an active, feeling melancholic person who is engaged in conversation. These details complement the image on the frontispiece, since the engraving is limited in its ability to depict motion and emotion.

Burton returns to the figure of Democritus later in the preface, emphasizing the significance of spectacle and beholding in the social construction of disability and the limits of a medical model of disability. Burton paraphrastically translates the pseudo-Hippocratic "Letter to Damagetos" for the content of Democritus's story as before, but in this version, Burton highlights the scrutiny of Democritus's neighbors and their intolerance of his atypical behavior, particularly what they deem to be his inappropriate laughter: "the Citizens of Abdera," taking Democritus "to be mad," sent for "Hypocrates the Physitian" (1, 33). On Hippocrates's arrival "the people of the Citty came flocking about him, some weeping, some intreating of him, that hee would doe his best" (1, 33). Hippocrates goes to see Democritus, "the people following him," and at their meeting, "[t]he multitude stood gazing round about to see the congresse" (1, 33). This account of the meeting displays the Abderites' ableism. Yet it does not simply represent the audience engaging in what

Hobgood calls out as "ableist gawking that defers any possibility for ethical beholding" (158). These onlookers are themselves depicted as emotionally distraught. When Democritus "profusely laughed" at Hippocrates's excuse for not having time to do his own research because he was too busy caring for his community, Democritus's "friends and the people standing by" were "weeping in the meane time and lamenting his madnesse" (1, 33). The observation and reaction of the audience of Democritus's neighbors underscore the social construction of disability. They are, as so often is the case in judgments of mental atypicality, wrong in their assumptions, but the account focuses on their desire, misplaced as it may be, to help their friend and neighbor. While the Abderites are far from displaying the kind of ethical beholding that Hobgood encourages, imploring us "to desire difference deeply, and to know and value disability's profound promise" (175), the story Burton tells ultimately does validate Democritus's melancholy. Burton stages a conversation between would-be physician and would-not-be patient in which Hippocrates seeks to find the cause of Democritus's laughter. I concur with Angus Gowland that the outcome of this debate results in "a transferral of authority from medical science, represented by Hippocrates, to moral philosophy and psychology, represented by Democritus" (*The Worlds* 11). I add that the meeting also allows the Abderites and Burton's readers to "behold" Hippocrates's ability "to know and value disability's profound promise" (Hobgood, *Beholding* 175). After Democritus regales Hippocrates with the laughably absurd behavior of human beings, Hippocrates gives Democritus, if not a clean bill of health, certainly approval of his mental atypicality as follows: "[A]ll the Cittizens came about flocking, to know how hee liked him. Hee told them in briefe, that notwithstanding those small neglects of his Attire, Body, Diet, the World had not a wiser, a more learned, a more honest man, and they were much deceived to say that hee was mad" (1, 37). Outward symptoms of atypical behavior are not a sufficient cause for diagnosis of madness in this instance, and the medical model of disability is not applicable in Democritus's case. Burton essentially gives Democritus the last laugh.

Burton returns repeatedly to the figure of Democritus with an emphasis on the relation of word and image and with the positive and negative aspects of melancholy poised in tension. He indirectly refers to the melancholic pose of Democritus in his ekphrasis of Dürer's figure of melancholy, who "leaning on her arme with fixed looks, neglected habit, etc." was thought to be "proud, soft, sottish, or halfe mad, as the Abderites esteemed of Democritus" (1, 391), but who is also, as Hippocrates gleans of Democritus, "of a deep reach,

excellent apprehension, judicious, wise and witty” (1, 391). Burton’s apparent emphasis on the social misperception of Democritus as mad does not imply, moreover, that Burton scorns people who are mad.

In Burton’s ekphrasis of the seventh figure of his frontispiece, titled “Maniacus, a madman,” he again enhances the image with an emphasis on compassion in his verbal description and enjoins the reader to do so as well:

But see the Madman rage downe right
 With furious lookes, a gastly sight.
 Naked in chaines bound doth he lye,
 And roares amaine he knowes not why?
 Observe him, for as in a glasse,
 Thine angry portraiture it was.
 His picture keepe still in thy presence,
 Twixt him and thee, ther’s no difference. (1, lxii, lines 49–56)

Burton renders a more nuanced picture in words of the madman than does the engraving alone. Rather than drawing a bright line between melancholy and madness, Burton views madness as an extreme form of melancholy with more violent delusions (1, 132–33).⁵³ Although he does not suggest that madness is in any way desirable, he implies that all people are vulnerable to this state. In replicating the image in words, he encourages his readers to view the image as “a mirror; would we see ourselves, we should simply look therein. Each of us is a maniacus, just as each of us is melancholy” (Mueller 1084). Furthermore, Burton takes this identification to heart, claiming, “If any man shall asked in the meane time, who I am, that so boldly censure others, to *nullane habes vitia?* have I no faults? Yes more then thou hast whatsoever thou art . . . I confesse it againe, I am as foolish, as mad as any one” (1, 109). Although Burton writes of melancholy and not madness per se, he makes sure to include madness in melancholy’s possible manifestations and includes poets and prophets as well as the demonically possessed and delusional within its bounds.

Burton further emphasizes the variability of the melancholic condition in a vivid poem titled “The Author’s Abstract of Melancholy,” which consists of the same octave, coupled rhyme stanza form as does “The Argument of the Frontispiece.” Whereas the “Argument” follows the engravings with ekphrastic descriptions, the “Author’s Abstract” elaborates both the positive or sweet and the negative or sour elements of many aspects of melancholy that the *Anatomy* presents. Written in the first person, the poem presents both exulta-

tion of melancholy's pleasures and despair over its grave consequences as is evident in the difference in tone between the first stanza and the last:

When I goe musing all alone,
Thinking of divers things fore-knowne,
When I build Castles in the aire,
Void of sorrow and voide of feare,
Pleasing my selfe with phantasmes sweet,
Me thinkes the time runnes very fleet.
All my joyes to this are folly,
Naught so sweet as melancholy. (1, lxix, lines 1–8)

[I'll] change my state with any wretch,
Thou canst from [jail] or dunghill fetch:
My paines past cure, another Hell,
I may not in this torment dwell,
Now desperate I hate my life,
Lend me an halter or a knife.
All my griefes to this are jolly,
Naught so damnd as Melancholy. (1, lxx, lines 89–96)

The alternation of elation and despair repeats throughout the abstract. The poem consists of six pairs of stanzas. The last line of the first stanza, "Naught so sweet as melancholy" (line 8), becomes an endline refrain that alternates across stanzas, ending in the phrases "Naught so sad as Melancholy" (line 16), "None so soure as Melancholy" (line 32), "None so damnd as Melancholy" (line 48), which comes at the midpoint of the poem, "Naught so harsh as Melancholy" (line 64), and "Naught so fierce as Melancholy" (line 80).⁵⁴ In the final pair of stanzas, Burton alternates the line "None so divine as Melancholy" (line 88) with repetition of the midpoint line, "Naught so damnd as Melancholy" (line 96), as the final line of the poem. The poem explores the highs and lows of melancholy across several of its manifestations, all of which are pictured in the frontispiece or treated in the body of the work.

The poem presents fascinating contrasting experiences of the same condition in different contexts. For instance, the first two stanzas explore how melancholy can alter the perception of time as "fleet" (line 6) or "slow" (line 14). The second pair of stanzas contrasts melancholic perceptions of the natural environment as uplifting or oppressive in "a brooke side or wood so greene" (line 19) or "In a darke grove, or irkesome denne" (line 27). The third pair

explores how melancholy can distort sensory perception, especially sight and hearing with sounds and visions that are either “lovely or divine” (line 38) or “Dolefull outcries, and fearefull sightes” (line 45). The fourth and fifth pairs contrast positive and negative aspects of love melancholy and a desire for solitude, respectively, and the final pair of stanzas explores how melancholy can bring about both religious ecstasy and the worst of melancholy’s consequences, suicidal despair. The speaker shifts from being “ravish’t” (line 82) with “joy” (line 83) to being “Now desperate” (line 93), proclaiming “I hate my life / Lend me an halter or a knife” (lines 93–94). Although genial elements of the experience of melancholy are traced throughout the *Anatomy*, I concur with Bamborough that “what Burton does not do at any point is to suggest that anyone should deliberately invite the experience of even its mildest manifestation” (xxx). Yet, as Bamborough also avers, this does not prevent “many readers” from feeling “a certain kind of ambiguity in *The Anatomy of Melancholy*, a sense almost of double vision” (xxx), a situation that I suggest is amplified through Burton’s insistence on coupling the sweet with the sour in multimedia productions of melancholy’s manifestations.

Burton’s *Anatomy* is not an overcoming supercrip story. The melancholic figure who is held up as being most exemplary and deserving of imitation, Democritus, does not cure himself of melancholy. He has, like Burton, laid himself open and simultaneously sought to comfort himself through writing about melancholy. Burton discloses his melancholy in a playful, crip manner that is simultaneously modest and theatrical. Burton captures our benevolence, much like the figure of Folly in Erasmus’s *In Praise of Folly*, by explaining his alias, Democritus Junior, in a humorous manner, but Burton’s play is more serious than that of Erasmus. In donning Democritus Junior, Burton masquerades this disclosure of disability rather than criping up.

Burton engages in extensive consolatory reading and writing practices. Yet in shifting between subject positions from his first-person singular disclosures to first-person plural identification with his disabled readers, Burton demands much from those readers through his self-consciously antic style. Transuming melancholy demands the reader fill in the gaps of Burton’s allusions, and ekphrastic therapy entails intense bimedial comparisons similar to what Shirilan has called the “assimilative mimesis” demanded of Burton’s readers and what Drew Daniel, speaking of the structure of Burton’s work, calls a “melancholy assemblage.” At his most expansive, Burton in fact avers that the whole world is melancholy, but to perceive this fact, one must read the world, like Burton, across media with a library’s worth of consolatory references and with a willingness to be included if not as a member at least as an ally of Burton’s melancholic community.

One more example of Burton's global, ekphrastic, and antic melancholizing is helpful here. Speaking as Democritus Junior, Burton promises that

thou shalt soone perceive that all the world is mad, that it is melancholy, dotes: that it is (which Epichthonius Cosmopolites expressed not many yeeres since in a Map) made like a Fooles head (with that Motto Caput Helleboro dignum [a head worthy of hellebore]), . . . cavea stultorum [A cage for fools], a Fooles paradise. (1, 24)

To illustrate the global reach of melancholy, Burton points to a world map framed with a fool's cap pseudonymously attributed to Epichthonius Cosmopolites, or a citizen of the world. The *Anatomy's* commentators note that a copy of the map is still held at the Bodleian Library and that a cartouche inscription on the side reads, "Democritus Abderites deridebat" ("Democritus of Abdera laughed at it") (Burton 4, 50n25). This world map exemplifies the kind of ekphrastic content that Burton recommends to elevate the melancholic mind, but it also figures forth the pervasiveness of that melancholy by making the head in need of a dose of hellebore a synecdoche for both the disabled body and the melancholic world. Burton encourages the reader to "[e]xamine the rest in like sort" (1, 24)—that is, to apply this emblematic insight to all the world's inhabitants. Doing so will lead to the discovery that all "are out of tune, as in Cebes Table, omnes errorem bibunt [all drink of error], before they come into the World, they are intoxicated by Errors Cup, from the highest to the lowest, have need of Physicke" (1, 25). Emblematic knowledge leads to more ekphrastic insight, as Burton here refers to the *Tabula Cebetis*, or *Tablet of Cebes*, a moral Stoic text in which the old, wise character Genius describes an allegorical painting of the journey of life to an audience of onlookers. In the picture, all humans drink from the cup of error before climbing life's mountain. Here Burton acknowledges the centrality of error to life, a sentiment that Petrarch reflects in his ascent of Mont Ventoux and that Burton restates in citing Petrarch's views on Heraclitan strife from the second preface to the *De remediis*, in which life is "*error omnia*" ("all error" 1, 272). Unlike Petrarch in the *De remediis*, however, Burton looks to the laughing philosopher Democritus rather than the crying philosopher Heraclitus to guide him and us through his melancholy labyrinth.

Given that Burton acknowledges that melancholy can affect perception of environment, does Burton, masquerading as Democritus Junior, perceive the world as melancholy because he is melancholy? Does this melancholy imply, as Burton says of Dürer's *Melencolia I*, that he is "halfe mad" or of "excellent apprehension" (3, 391) or both? The predicament of disclosure is especially

paradoxical in the case of mental disability. The more Burton discloses his condition, the greater his claim to crip authority. Yet disclosure may also lead to more questioning and scrutiny of his mental capacities. In other words, the melancholic may have access to truths that others cannot perceive. To claim this additional insight, however, the melancholic must again disclose and risk the costs of disclosure.

In working through the fruitful contradictions of Burton's masterpiece and its depiction of mental disability, I come back again to Colie's reflections on its paradoxes. As Colie observes of Burton's melancholic *theatrum mundi*, "Burton's technique, like that of Cervantes in *Don Quixote*, is to assimilate landscape—in Burton's case, the landscape of the entire universe—to mood, to inward need. The actual voyage of discovery is only *{apparently}* through the sensible world. *{Actually}* the voyage is inward, through the fantastic worlds the imagination creates" (453; italics in braces mine), and what a fantastic, imaginative world is Burton's. In the final subsection of Burton's consolatory digression, he allows different aspects of melancholy to jostle:

If new and in disposition, 'tis commonly pleasant, and it may be helped. If inveterate, or an habite, yet they have *lucida intervalla*, sometimes well, and sometimes ill; or if more continue . . . 'tis *hostis magis assiduus quam gravis*, a more durable enemy then dangerous: And amongst many inconveniences, some comforts are annexed to it. (I, 206)

Burton surveys different degrees of melancholy, from its pleasant beginnings, to its intermittent version, to a sustained melancholic experience, but amongst many inconveniences he finds that in all its manifestations "some comforts are annexed" (I, 206). The ability to tease out both the sweet and the sour paradoxes of melancholy is one of Burton's most enduring gifts to his readers. As the next chapter will explore, Milton certainly discerns texture in the experience of melancholy as he intertwines it with the sensory disability of his blind epic hero Samson. Building on Thomas Warton's early editorial comments on the influence of Burton on John Milton's poetry,⁵⁵ Lyons suggests, "It was Milton who succeeded in translating the complex and contradictory ideas connected with melancholy into lyric poetry" (150). Milton's most famous rendition of melancholy can be found in his ode to melancholy in "Il Penseroso." Yet this poem pales by comparison with the melancholic despair of Samson, and Milton himself, by contrast, finds consolation for disability.

Five

John Milton's Consolations for Blindness

Polite Refusals, Disability Swagger, the Work of Patience, and Strength in Weakness



[F]aciam equidem quod hortaris ne oblatam undecumque divinitus fortassis opem repudiare videar. ("For my part I shall do what you urge, so as not to be seen as scorning an offer of help from whatever source, perhaps divine" "Letter to Philaras" 239)¹

The conscience, friend, to have lost them overplied / In liberty's defence, my noble task, / Of which all Europe talks from side to side. (Sonnet 22, 10–12, 161)

Doth God exact day labor, light denied? (Sonnet 19, 7, 157)

[T]um enim infirmissimus ero simul et validissimus, caecus codem tempore et perspicacissimus. ("For then I shall be at once the weakest and the strongest, at the same time blind and most perceptive" *Defensio secunda* 37)

Of all the writers examined in this study, John Milton is most notorious for being disabled. Milton's blindness has been the source of praise and blame. Sometimes, it is invisible. Milton's bones, like those of Miguel de Cervantes, were subject to disinterment, not once but three times. In 1790, having lost track of the location of Milton's remains in the church of St Giles-without-Cripplegate in London, church officials opened the vault where his body was thought to rest. They found a coffin, "roughly in the spot that Milton's was anecdotally held to occupy although no identification could be found, even after washing the lid: no inscription, initials, or plate" (Clymer 103). According to Philip Neve (n.d.), the coffin and corpse were then put on display

by unscrupulous church servants and tradesmen. Neve relates that a certain Elizabeth Grant, whom Neve calls “the grave-digger” and who was a servant to the sexton Mrs. Hoppey, contrived after hours to take “possession of the coffin,” and because of its dark location,

she kept a tinder-box in the excavation, and, when any persons came, struck a light, and conducted them under the pew; where, by reversing the part of the lid which had been cut, she exhibited the body, at first for 6d. and afterwards for 3d. and 2d. each person. The workmen in the church kept the doors locked to all those who would not pay the price of a pot of beer for entrance, and many, to avoid that payment, got in at a window at the west end of the church, near to Mr. *Ascugh's* counting-house. (20–21)

Milton's corpse presented a horrible spectacle. Elizabeth Grant was a guide and light bearer into the gruesome underworld of the crypt. She peeled back the lead exterior of the coffin, which was washed and cut open like an anatomized body, to reveal the crumbling wood and decaying human remains inside to anyone willing to pay for the show in coin or alcohol.

The display of human monsters—alive or dead—for profit was commonplace in Europe in the early modern period. Although some people with disabilities, such as the conjoined twins Lazarus and Johannes-Baptista Coloredo (1617–ca. 1646), were able to make a living from directing their own exhibition,² this was not the case for most people with abnormal physiology in life. It seems that all bets were off when it came to their treatment in death. One famous instance of such desecration in the name of science occurred to Charles Byrne (1761–1783), the self-styled “Irish Giant O'Brien.” Byrne's fear of having his body anatomized was so great that he provided in his will for his corpse to be guarded and buried at sea. These stipulations were not enough to stymie the greed of the guards, whom the physician John Hunter (1728–1793) successfully bribed. Hunter filched Byrne's body, which he boiled in order to display the large man's skeleton.³ Byrne's bones stood on display in the Hunterian Museum in London until 2023.⁴ Like Byrne, Milton did not wish for his bones to be disturbed.⁵ Also like Byrne, Milton's fame resulted in the objectification of his corpse. Milton's body was subjected to this desecration for the purposes of selling relics from the corpse, shroud, and coffin itself and for the sake of identifying the body as that of Milton. A series of pamphlets expressing indignation at the making of Miltonian relics—not at the forensic attempt to identify the corpse—were launched.⁶

Milton's blindness was not center stage at the spectacle of his exhumation and subsequent memorialization. Unlike war wounds or a crooked spine, blindness is invisible in death, both to the surgeons who sought to identify his body and to those seeking to commemorate a national poet. Milton's memorial in St Giles bears the simple inscription: "John Milton, author of *paradise lost*, Born Dec. 1608, Died Nov. 1674, His Father John Milton Died March 1646, They were both interred in this church." Milton's role as poet takes pride of place here in the memorial, as it does for us today in the English literary canon. It omits his blindness.

Milton's disability was nonetheless a liability in the legacy of his fame.⁷ Detractors defamed Milton's blindness as monstrous during his lifetime and during his literary afterlife. Several of his political opponents blamed his blindness on God's displeasure. In his response to Milton's *Eikonoklastes* (1649), Joseph Jane (1595–1658) derides that "[t]his prodigious blindness is a beginning of his punishment" (28). Not satisfied simply to claim that Milton's blindness is a monstrous prodigy or a sign of his punishment from God, Jane extends his invective through a series of similes to liken Milton's blindness to racialized Otherness and sexual deviance. Jane compares Milton's "blind" mischaracterization of royalists to "those negroes, that paint the Devill white" and "will have none free from blindnes" (28). Here, Jane uses the materiality of the metaphor of blindness as ignorance, but he also ties it intersectionally to the racialized "negro." Jane extends his intersectional, hateful similes further, proclaiming that Milton's blindness is akin to "that blindnes" that angels sent "upon the men of Sodom, while they inhumanely pursued their wickednes, and while these men with fury breake downe the fences of humane societie, and seeke to turne men into beasts" (28). Jane refers to the story of Sodom and Gomorrah (Gen. 19:11) and thus implies that Milton's blindness is punishment for sins that are comparable to sodomy and rape. Jane's invective exemplifies disability drift. As Jay Dolmage explains, disability drift occurs when a disability is attributed to a person or group that does not have that disability. For instance, disability drift happens when "people with physical disabilities are assumed to be cognitively disabled" or when people who are not disabled but are otherwise oppressed are attributed with disabilities, as when disability is attributed to people based on "the categories of gender, race, and sexuality. . . . This is another way disability drifts" (*Academic* 9–10). Jane's similes here thus go beyond the damage of the negative moral model of disability by extending his abstraction of Milton's blindness to his society's constructions of monstrous, racial, and sexual Otherness.

Even when it comes to Milton's most famous work, *Paradise Lost* (1667;

1674),⁸ editors and critics found Milton's blindness a flaw. Richard Bentley (1662–1742), who edited *Paradise Lost* in 1732, decries that when Milton wrote the work he was “obnoxious to the Government, poor, friendless, and what is worst of all, blind” (n.p.). Bentley believed Milton's blindness was to blame for “Errors in Spelling, Pointing, nay even in whole Words of a like or near Sound in Pronunciation,”⁹ faults of “Orthography, Distinction by Points, and Capital Letters,” and (Bentley assumes) since he could not revise the work, “Inconsistencies in the System and Plan of his Poem, for want of his Revisal of the Whole before its Publication” (n.p.).

Scholars now generally accept that Bentley's accusations are spurious. I know Bentley was wrong from my own experience of dictation. Like Milton, I grew up learning how to read and write print with sight (albeit my sight was always limited). Like Milton, I do not use braille, which gives blind people similar footing with sighted people at least in terms of composition and revision ability, especially with the advent of braille displays and printers. I touch-type and use adaptive software that echoes text back to me as speech, but before this technology was available to me and especially after reading back what I had written with magnification became onerous, I occasionally would dictate my work, as did affluent early modern people who used the services of secretaries. Just like business executives and physicians in the twentieth century who dictated recordings for office workers to transcribe, moreover, I adjusted the level of granularity of my dictation depending on my experience with the amanuensis. I use brackets to illustrate how one can vocalize these details: for example, It [capital I] is easy to include directions for punctuation [comma] capital [final a] letters [comma] and differentiation in spelling of homonyms while dictating [comma] but with a trusted amanuensis much of this vocalization can be omitted [period] Working with a good amanuensis differs significantly from dictating to a virtual assistant such as Siri. It is also the case that a good amanuensis can read text back with such details spoken aloud for proofing.¹⁰ Dictation also forces the writer to slow down, which can help catch errors. Finally, though *Paradise Lost* is a lengthy book, the idea that writing is necessary for organizing or holding long narratives with complicated structures in the mind is false, as is obvious to anyone who lives in cultures with oral storytelling traditions.

Bentley excoriates the first edition of Milton's *Paradise Lost* with images of monstrosity. He exclaims the work was “polluted with such monstrous Faults, as are beyond Example in any other printed Book,” and with Milton being blind, the first editor sought to “foist into the Book several of his own Verses, without the blind Poet's Discovery” (n.p.). Although Bentley does

not approve of what he deems to be unauthorized interpellations, he also does not hesitate to make his own emendations to Milton's text. He questions Milton's authority to write on the basis of his disability at every turn. Bentley's invective is not simply ignorant but rather maliciously ignorant; his wonder at Milton's work is malicious wonder, as Teresa de Cartagena might have put it.¹¹

Bentley's ableist scrutiny is not surprising, especially when even Milton's friend Andrew Marvell (1621–1678) opens his dedicatory verses "On Mr. Milton's *Paradise Lost*" (1674) by simultaneously disclosing Milton's blindness and his own misgivings about its monstrosity. Marvell reveals that "When I beheld the poet blind, yet bold, / In slender book his vast design unfold" (1–2, 287), Milton's blindness gave him pause, such that "[I] Held me a while misdoubting his intent, / That he would ruin (for I saw him strong) / The sacred truths to fable and old song, / (So Samson groped the temple's posts in spite) / The world o'erwhelming to revenge his sight" (6–10, 287). Marvell's "misdoubting" springs from low expectations of blind people's abilities and "intent[s]." It also encompasses fear that a monstrous "strong" Milton would "ruin" the project just as the blind "Samson groped" his way into wreaking havoc for "spite" and "in revenge of his sight." These doubts are followed by lines that further scrutinize the ability of blind people to write with ableist mobility and cognitive disability metaphors. Even when Marvell concedes that "I liked his project" (12, 287), he still "the success did fear; / Through that wide field how he his way should find / O'er which lame Faith leads Understanding blind, / Lest he perplexed the things he would explain" (12–15, 287). Although Marvell's writing is notoriously difficult to pin down, these lines epitomize a negative moral model of disability, disability drift, and malicious wonder. I do read Marvell's introduction to the "bold" blindness of Milton as a proleptic move to assuage readers who might harbor similar doubts,¹² since Marvell goes on to apologize to Milton, imploring, "Pardon me, mighty poet, nor despise / My causeless, yet not impious, surmise" (23–24, 288). The problem with this apology is that even though Marvell admits that his "surmise" turns out to be "causeless" in Milton's case, this scrutiny, he insists, is "not impious," implying that Milton is simply the exception to the rule that blind people are morally suspect and bad writers.¹³

Furthermore, many scholars have assumed that, due to his blindness, Milton's later writing lacks visual force, such that "the lack of visual detail in Milton's verse—his epic's 'generic' or 'archetypal imagery'—has become a commonplace in early modern scholarship" (Dobransky 4).¹⁴ As a blind person who is drawn to the visual, I concur with Stephen Dobransky's argu-

ment that *Paradise Lost* and Milton's other later writing contain "acute and sometimes astonishing images that grew out of his reading and imagination but were also influenced by his contemporary culture" (2).¹⁵ Given my own experience of having friends describe art and other visual elements of my world to me, which not only is caring of them but also asks them to look and notice things that they might otherwise not see, I find it odd that, to my knowledge, no critics propose that Marvell or other literary friends of Milton might have benefited from his friendship by becoming better at capturing images in words. I share this sense of asymmetry with Leona Godin—who also is blind—who concludes the following from her own reading of Milton and his critics:

The bold stance that enforces the notion that sighted people can speak with confidence about the world of the blind, while blind people cannot talk sensibly about the world of the sighted . . . creates an infuriating asymmetry: blind characters are everywhere drawn by sighted writers, and blind people's real experiences seem then to fall short of sighted expectations. A fundamental sight-centric bias makes it very difficult for blind writers to tell their truths. . . . This in part explains the dearth of blind writers, and the scrutiny that follows those brave enough to write. (81)

Godin's personal, disability studies–based reading of Milton's use of visual images in *Paradise Lost* masterfully reveals how sighted assumptions about blindness are disabling to Milton and subsequent blind writers. Eleanor Gertrude Brown (1887–1964), who was blind, also explores the theme of Milton's blindness with many excellent insights to which I will return. Godin's and Brown's readings of Milton refuse to play down Milton's blindness and their own by rendering blindness invisible or exceptional, and they refuse to deem Milton a moral monster based on his disability. Instead, they recognize him as a kindred blind writer whose blindness only enhances his authority. Accordingly, this chapter considers how Milton navigated the deviance his society attributed to his disability with consolation and crip authority, and it prioritizes the views of the community of blind scholars and readers who have encountered that authority.

Unlike many other disabled writers examined in this book, Milton is not particularly humble or apt to make strategic use of modesty topoi when disclosing disability. As Stephen Fallon remarks, "Milton found it difficult not to write about himself" (ix).¹⁶ Although Milton can veer into supercrip ter-

ritory in his self-representation, he also takes comfort in disability community and in the Pauline notion of finding strength in weakness. Furthermore, Milton does not voluntarily disclose his disability—at least not directly—in his major works.¹⁷ He tends instead to discuss his blindness in response to the requests or invectives of others. One downside of being disabled in Milton's time and in ours is society's insistence on ascribing meaning to disability and placing disabled people under greater scrutiny than their peers. As a blind professor, I am frequently asked questions about the onset and nature of my disability and queried about my process for research, writing, and teaching—questions that would never be asked of my colleagues who are not perceived to be disabled. Even before I published work in disability studies, many colleagues made avuncular assumptions in the tony tearooms of scholarly institutes and the dismal hotel halls of academic conferences that I must work on Milton. And, so, I too have found it difficult not to write about Milton. I do so, moreover, in a manner that includes my own lived experience of blindness when that experience may shed some metaphorical light on Milton's crip authority.

Milton lost his vision over a period of about ten years and was completely blind by the time he was forty-four. Neither Milton nor physicians of his time understood his condition much beyond the copious term “drop serene” (*PL* 3, 45, 361),¹⁸ which Milton himself uses. Milton describes his blindness's onset and symptoms in a letter to the Athenian diplomat Leonard Philaras (ca. 1595–1673) in 1654. He also elaborates his understanding of the value of his blindness in his Latin prose tract *Defensio Secunda pro populo Anglicano* (1654) (henceforth *Defensio secunda*), which responds to ableist invective. He treats the topic of his disability in a variety of genres. Critics have paid the most attention to the theme of blindness in the sonnets, which, other than his personal letters and political prose, treat his blindness most directly.¹⁹ “To Mr. Cyriack Skinner Upon His Blindness” (henceforth Sonnet 22) and “When I Consider How My Light Is Spent” (henceforth Sonnet 19) demonstrate militaristic and spiritual disability consolation, respectively.²⁰

This chapter considers how Milton's writing resignifies his disability, which his society scorned, into a source for his crip authority. Milton's attitude toward his disability is not static. Like Petrarch, Teresa de Cartagena, Cervantes, and Burton, Milton does not simply view his disability as a misfortune or a boon. He uses consolation to carve out lamentation and alleviation in his poetry and prose.²¹ Sources of consolation include fonts of moral philosophy, such as Petrarch's *De remediis*, classical texts that were its inspiration, and more contemporary works of consolation that drew upon Petrarch

as well as medical and biblical sources. Milton draws heavily on militaristic and moral models of disability. He does so with a keen emphasis on what he deems to be the potential advantages of his blindness in both his letters and in his lyrical and dramatic work. Milton attributes the wounding of his eyes to his political service to the Republicans in the interregnum. He also finds spiritual consolation in his blindness. He explores the meaning and rhythm of psalmic discourse to express the ups and downs of the lived experience of disability, but he also argues for a strong compensatory model of disability, in which his blindness enables a vatic or divinely inspired poetic production. Milton ultimately universalizes the experience of disability to create a discourse of disability community, gain, and futurity in his personal writings on blindness. Although consolation is enabling for Milton, it does not provide sufficient comfort in Milton's last published work, *Samson Agonistes*, where the blind tragic hero, Samson, is an inconsolable supercrip whose story ends in a monstrous, horrible spectacle.

Polite Refusals of Medicalization and Taking Darkness Lightly

In the personal account of his blindness in his "Letter to Philaras," Milton distances himself from medicalization with spiritual and intellectual acceptance and contemplation of blindness's downsides and benefits based in the tradition of disability consolation.²² Acquaintances of disabled people today push us to reach out to medical authorities in hopes of curing disability, as if the disabled person could not keep up with medical developments themselves or would necessarily wish to pursue experimental cures. Something similar happens with Philaras, who, despite having met and been impressed with Milton, pressed him to describe his onset of blindness so that he might pass on that information to a French physician named François Thévinin (d. 1656), who was famed for curing blindness. This pressure puts the disabled person in a double bind. Refusing what is meant as a kind offer of assistance risks losing what might be an otherwise valuable acquaintance, but complying with the request affirms the presumption that disability is totalizing, tragic, and never to be desired. It also obligates the disabled person to spend time and money for an uncertain outcome that may result in pain or injury just to make others feel better. Milton's "Letter to Philaras" deftly navigates this double bind by indicating compliance yet implicitly declining Philaras's request through the authority of consolation.

Milton is grateful for Philaras's friendship. He appreciates Philaras's high regard, which he shows Milton

visensque non videntem, etiam in ea calamitate propter quam con-
spectior nemini, despectior multis fortasse sim, eadem benevolentia
prosequaris.

by going to see one who could not see, and even in that misfortune
because of which I am more regarded by nobody, less regarded perhaps
by many, you continue honoring me with kindness. (*Epistolarum* 237)

Here Milton acknowledges that the ableism of his society makes his blind-
ness a barrier to his social standing. He does not want to seem ungrateful
to his new friend, who offers a remote medical consultation with “Parisii
Tevenotum medicum in curandis praesertim oculis praestantissimum” (“the
Parisian physician Thevenot who is especially outstanding in curing the
eyes” 237). Milton threads this needle by responding, “[F]aciam equidem
quod hortaris ne oblatam undecumque divinitus fortassis opem repudiare
videar” (“For my part I shall do what you urge, so as not to be seen as scorn-
ing an offer of help from whatever source, perhaps divine” 237). Milton
writes that he will take Philaras’s advice so as not to seem ungrateful to
his friend or closed to the possibility that God might grant him grace in
the form of a cure. Milton, however, follows his acquiescence and gratitude
by relating the nature of his blindness in a manner that undermines the
urgency or need for its cure.

Milton’s onset and experience of blindness at first involves discomfort,
distortion, and disorientation. He explains that in the beginning, when he
would commence reading, “oculi statim penitus dolere” (“my eyes immedi-
ately were deeply pained” 237). His vision, moreover, distorts light and depth
perception, for “[q]uam aspexissem lucernam, Iris quaedam visa est redimire”
 (“the way I beheld a lantern, a sort of rainbow seemed to wreath it” 237).
He describes the blindness in his left eye as a “caligo” (“mist or fog”) that
“nubilavit” (“clouded” 237) his vision on that side, and “[a]nteriora quoque, si
dextrum forte oculum clausissem, minora visa sunt” (“things that were closer,
if I happened to close my right eye, seemed smaller” 237). As the sight in
his right eye diminishes over three years, Milton experiences vertigo, such
that “quae immotus ipse cernerem, visa sunt omnia nunc dextrorsum, nunc
sinistrorsum natere” (“when I myself remained immobile, everything I saw
seemed to swim now to the right, now to the left” 237), and “[f]rontem totam
atque tempora inveterati quidam vapores videntur insedissee, qui somnolenta
quadam gravitate oculos a cibo” (“some inveterate vapors appear to have set-
tled over my whole forehead and temples, which produces a kind of somno-

lent heaviness in my eyes” 237). This pain, distortion, and disorientation are by no means neutral.

Yet, as is the case for many blind people, the absence of vision also translates into a dance of light. Milton insists on this fact and describes the quality of his vision as follows:

Sed neque illud omiserim, dum adhuc visus aliquantum supererat, ut primum in lecto decubuissem meque in alterutrum latus reclinassem, consuevisse copiosum lumen clausis oculis emicare; deinde imminuto indies visu colores perinde obscuriores cum impetu et fragore quodam intimo exsilire; nunc autem, quasi extincto lucido, merus nigror aut cineraceo distinctus et quasi intextus solet se effundere. Caligo tamen, quae perpetuo observatur tam noctu quam interdiu, albenti semper quam nigricanti propior videtur, et volvente se oculo aliquantillum lucis quasi per rimulam admittit.

But I should not omit that, while sight still remained somewhat, as soon as I first went to bed and laid on either side, copious light would burst before my closed eyes; as day-to-day sight diminished, colors likewise more muted with violence and a sort of crash would burst within; but now, as if the light were almost extinguished, pure black as if embroidered with ashy light pours down. Yet the mist that I constantly perceive, both night and day, always seems closer to white than black; and rolling my eyes admits a small amount of light as if through a chink. (239)

This dark yet sparkling description of blindness recalls the proem of book 3 of *Paradise Lost*, sometimes referred to as the Hymn to Light, in which the blind poet likens their writing to a bird who “sings darkling” (*PL* 3. 59). Milton’s description of the play of light in blindness is somewhat similar to my own experience of retinal anomaly and to accounts of other blind people who have partial vision or whose vision deteriorates over time.²³ Stephen Kuusisto, who is blind, explains that “blindness is often perceived by the sighted as an either/or condition: one sees or does not see. But often a blind person experiences a series of veils” (5). Georgina Kleege, who is also blind, describes blind spots in the center of her field of vision when she looks at a blank wall as an

irregularly shaped blotch, which throbs slightly and is either an intense blue-violet, or a deep teal green. More often, I see a blur slightly darker

in color than the wall overlaid with a pattern of tiny flecks. Depending on lighting conditions these flecks are bright white, sometimes edged in violet or a golden yellow. Sometimes the flecks are less vividly colored, and the wall appears like a surface of water dappled by a breeze or soft rain. These flecks or dapples vibrate, pulsate, shiver. (*Sight* 100)

As Milton and later blind writers attest,²⁴ blindness is not static; it does not simply equate to darkness, nor is it without pleasures.

Although Milton complies with Philaras's request, he refuses to portray blindness as tragic or a condition that must be cured. In describing the gloaming quality of his vision in his letter, Milton concedes that the physician may offer a similar "spei . . . elucere" ("glimmer of hope" 239). Nonetheless, Milton ultimately expresses indifference to cure and finds comfort in spiritual consolation and acceptance of his disability, stating, "[T]amen ut in re plane insanabili ita me parò atque compono" ("Yet, as if the business were plainly incurable, I proceed preparing and composing myself" 239). Milton accepts his disability and, exercising Cyrenaic consolation in the form of *praemeditatio malorum*, lives his life accordingly.

Milton foregrounds the consolation of blindness in his letter with an emphasis on the vatic and spiritual advantages of his disability. From the letter's opening, Milton subtly emphasizes disability gain by coyly crediting his long-held love for Athens to his own second sight. His meeting the Athenian Philaras fulfills "augurio meo" ("my augury" 237). Milton suggests, albeit playfully, that his blindness grants him prophetic powers. In the course of describing his experience of blindness, moreover, he likens it to that of "Salmydesii vatis Phinei in *Argonauticis*" ("the Salmydessian prophet Phineas of the *Argonautica*" 239), whose blindness was a trade-off for his ability to foretell the future.²⁵ This compensatory logic appears repeatedly in Milton's works, especially as it relates to a vatic model of poetry, in which God compensates the blind poet with divinely inspired poetic ability. He ties his disability to his poetic authority specifically. In the *Defensio secunda*, he notes his likeness with "priscos vates, ac sapientissimos" ("old inspired poets and wise"), whose blindness the gods "multò potioribus donis compensarunt" ("recompensed with far more powerful gifts" 32). He lists Tiresias and Phineus as marvelous compensatory models (32). A vatic or prophetic model of poetic inspiration and authority also appears in *Paradise Lost*. The blind poet evokes Tiresias and Phineus (*PL* 3, 56, 361) and bids God's "celestial light / Shine inward" (71–72, 362) to "[i]rradiate" (73, 362) his spiritual sight.

Petrarch's dialogue for consoling blindness in the *De remediis* may be a

model for Milton's concept of vatic compensation, where Reason also refers to inner light enhanced by blindness and provides vatic models of blind prophets and poets (*De rem. 2. 96; 236–37*).²⁶ Furthermore, Milton signs off his letter to Philaras by referring to himself as Lyncias (239), who was the sharp-eyed lookout on the *Argo*. This continues references to the *Argonautica* exemplified by Milton's comparison of his blindness to that of Phineas, but it also may refer to comparisons of the blind Homer to Lyncias made by Reason in the *De remediis*, which states,

Sin ad liberalium studiorum decus aspiras, Homerum et Democritum
contemplare, quorum alter, ut fama est, dum mira illa ac divina dictaret, oculis non videbat, animo linceus.

If you favor the dignity of the liberal arts, contemplate Homer and Democritus, the first of whom, it is said, did never see with eyes while he dictated those marvelous, divine lines but had a mind as sharp as Lynceus. (*De rem. 2. 96; 237*)

Whatever his direct source, by comparing himself to the perspicacious Argonaut, Milton eloquently asserts that his blindness does not halt his endeavors as a writer and that consolation literature provides marvelous models of disability compensation and gain.

Milton also turns to the Bible, upon which he performs consolatory exegesis to fit scripture to his lived experience of disability, as did Teresa de Cartagena before him. In the letter, Milton alludes to Ecclesiastes 11:8, which reads, “But if a man live many years, and rejoice in them all; yet let him remember the days of darkness; for they shall be many. All that cometh is vanity” (KJV).²⁷ Milton turns this verse, which encourages enjoyment of life that is given by God, to the appreciation of his own days of blindness that are not as dark and devoid of pleasures as the dark days of death that Qoheleth—the wise man or teacher of Ecclesiastes—foretells. Milton states:

[I]lludque saepe cogito, cum “destinati cuique dies tenebrarum” (quod monet sapiens) “multi sint”, meas adhuc tenebras singulari Numinis benignitate inter otium et studia vocesque amicorum et salutationes illis letalibus multo esse mitiores.

And I often consider, that since “the days of darkness destined for all are many” (as the wise man warns), my darkness by the singular mercy

of God thus far is made much milder than deadly darkness, between leisure and study and the voices and visits of friends. (239)

The biblical verse warns of the dark days of death while it encourages valuation of the life that is given. Milton finds joy in his own days of blindness with the comfort of his intellectual pursuits and the conversation of friends. These are consolations for the blind that echo through texts from antiquity to the humanist consolations of Petrarch.²⁸

Milton further applies biblical consolation to his own case in noting that possessing eyesight is not as important as possessing faith. He quotes from Deuteronomy 8:3 and Jesus's citation of this verse to Satan in Matthew 4:4,²⁹ both of which verses speak to the inadequacy of worldly things compared with the sustenance of God, but to which Milton gives his own, crip twist as follows:

Quod si, ut scriptum est, "non solo pane vivet homo sed omni verbo prodeunte per os Dei", quid est cur quis in hoc itidem non acquiescat: non solis se oculis, sed Dei ductu ac providentia satis oculatum esse?

But if, as it is written, "man shall not live by bread alone, but by every word that proceedeth out of the mouth of God," why cannot repose similarly be found in the following: man cannot see with the eyes themselves alone, but only with the command and Providence of God? (239)

Here Milton turns the commands of God expressed in the Hebrew Bible and the promise of Christ in Matthew to a justification of the adequacy of blindness with faith as opposed to sightedness without it.

Yet Milton goes a step further, insisting that blindness enhances his relationship with God, who serves as his sighted guide. He explains to Philaras,

[D]ummodo ipse mihi prospicit, ipse mihi providet (quod facit), meque per omnem vitam quasi manu ducit atque deducit, nae ego meos oculos, quandoquidem ipsi sic visum est, libens feriarum iussero.

Provided that He himself looks out for me and He himself provides for me (which He does) and leads me as if by the hand accompanying me throughout life, verily, since it has pleased Him, I will happily grant my eyes a holiday. (239)

Milton most likely alludes to the imagery of God as protector and guide who leads by the hand from *Psalms* 25 and 139, as well as Isaiah 41:10 and 41:13. He portrays his relationship with God as one of consensual, beneficial dependence.

Although there is a long literary tradition of depicting guides for the blind as disloyal,³⁰ consolation texts portray them as a boon. For instance, in Petrarch's dialogue on blindness in the *De remediis*, Reason comforts Sorrow, stating:

At dux tuus videt, sive is est animus, sive unus aliquis, ex more ceci, gressum dirigens, cuius ductu non modo rectum iter invenias, sed ad contemptum vite nobilem et preclare virtutis actus, ultimos ad fastigia summa pervenias; neque, nisi vis animi defuerit, generosum facinus, lux amissa prepediet.

But your guides can see—be it now your mind or one of those who customarily assist blind people in their steps. With their help you can find the right way and also approach those main concerns, noble disdain of life and ultimate acts of virtue—achievements unimpaired by lack of eyesight, as long as the mind's powers do not fail you. (*De rem.* 2. 96; 238)

Here blindness is enabling. There are advantages to relying on sighted guides and to conducting oneself with the eyes of the mind rather than the eyes of sight.

Perceiving advantages in disability can, according to Petrarch, lead to “comtemptum vite nobilem” (“noble disdain of life” *De rem.* 2. 96; 238), including the disabilities that life can present. Milton refers to the onset of his blindness as a *Feriarum* (239), which can mean holiday or rest from work.³¹ Milton emphasizes a familiar and sometimes even playful style in this letter, but he can also adopt a defiant or harsh tone to represent the difficulty of disability and to argue that bearing disability is a noble act.

Military Consolation: *Sprezzatura*, *Asprezza*, and Disability Swagger

Cyriack, this three years' day these eyes, though clear
To outward view, of blemish or of spot,
Bereft of light their seeing have forgot,

Nor to their idle orbs doth sight appear
Of sun or moon or star throughout the year,
Or man or woman. Yet I argue not
Against Heaven's hand or will, nor bate a jot
Of heart or hope, but still bear up and steer
Right onward. What supports me dost thou ask?
The conscience, friend, to have lost them overplied
In liberty's defense, my noble task,
Of which all Europe talks from side to side.
This thought might lead me through the world's vain masque
Content though blind, had I no better guide. (Milton, Sonnet 22,
160–61)

Whereas Milton voluntarily, albeit reluctantly, discloses details of his blindness to his friend Philaras, Milton's foes expose his blindness to do him harm. Negative comments about Milton's blindness appear in a series of invectives between him and royalist sympathizers. Their attacks attribute his blindness to monstrosity and sin. For instance, in the dedication of the *Regii Sanguinis Clamor* (*The Cry of the Royal Blood*) (1652), the anonymous author, who we now know was Peter du Moulin (1601–1684), paraphrases Virgil's description of the Cyclops Polyphemus to malign Milton's blindness. He calls Milton "[m]onstrum horrendum, informe, ingens; cui lumen ademptum" ("a monster, horrid, ugly, huge, bereft of sight" Moulin fol. 9).³² This insult attributes moral monstrosity to blindness. Polyphemus, a man-eating giant with one eye, was defeated and blinded by Odysseus in the *Odyssey*, and Aeneas comes across him in the *Aeneid* in a deplorable condition. But lest this image prove too powerful, Moulin undercuts it, stating, "[Q]uanquam nec ingens, quo nihil est exilius, exsanguis, contractius" ("Yet not huge, for there is nothing scrawnier, paler, or stingier" Moulin fol. 9). From a powerful giant, Moulin reduces Milton to a "genere animalculorum quae quo pungunt acrius" ("a kind of lowly animal which therefore stings more sharply" Moulin fol. 9). Moulin also compares Milton to the Libyan giant Antaeus, who would challenge all newcomers to wrestle and would keep their skulls as trophies of his victories.³³ Moulin asserts that like Hercules, he will bereave Milton of his power by lifting him from the ground where his power resides. The uncovering of the chink in the armor of an adversary, be it Achilles's heel or Samson's hair, is a long-standing story for the discovery of vulnerability. Moulin is consistently focused on turning Milton's blindness into a catastrophic vulnerability that will help him best an otherwise fearsome, if loathsome, foe.

Like other disabled writers before him, Milton bites back at ableist detractors. He reappropriates his blindness in militaristic crip authority as a war wound in Sonnet 22. Milton believed that the process of writing a political defense of his party called the *Defensio pro populo Anglicano* (1651) (henceforth *Defensio*) took what was left of his failing vision. He therefore judges his loss of sight as a political war wound, closing the sonnet with the speaker's statement that he is "Content though blind" (14, 161). The sonnet's message of defiance in the face of Milton's blinding in service to his country parallels Cervantes's pride in being a wounded war veteran. Yet Milton's consolatory armor, like that of Cervantes, is not without chinks.

Sonnet 22 opens relating the fact of the speaker's blindness to his friend Cyriack Skinner (1627–1700), who was Milton's student, his friend, and one of his amanuenses and may have served as a sighted guide. The sonnet is an anniversary poem for the speaker's full onset of blindness, which took place "this three years' day" (1, 160). Overall, the poem represents blindness as a sign of rectitude. It takes a traditional, though *sprezzata*, or harsh, Petrarchan form.³⁴ A mostly iambic pentameter octave with some strain on the form is followed by a Sidneian sestet. The sestet is also mostly iambic, though the interjected question at the volta results in some metrical substitution in lines 9 and 10. The rhythm is fairly regular, with caesuras, or pauses, occurring mostly at midline. The metrical regularity of the sonnet's ending conveys confidence in the reappropriation of disability as probity. This consolatory sonnet takes blindness, which Milton's society viewed as an ill, embraces its difficulty, and resignifies it as a badge of crip pride. It discovers authority in blindness with *sprezzatura* and with the *sprezzata* style. Whereas *sprezzatura* allows the speaker to disdain or disregard his own disability in a manner that functions as both disability passing and prosthesis, the use of the *sprezzata*, or harsh, style in the sonnet produces dignity out of harshness or difficulty.

Sonnet 22 uses *sprezzatura* at several points to play down disability. Baldassare Castiglione (1478–1529) coined the term *sprezzatura* for the art of making something difficult seem easy in order to get ahead socially. As I have argued elsewhere, "Sprezzatura elucidates aspects of the lived experience of disability that still persist today, because it functions both as a prosthetic technology and as a mode of passing" (*Monstrous Kinds* 57).³⁵ The speaker of Sonnet 22 first demonstrates *sprezzatura* in drawing attention to the appearance of their eyes. The speaker states that their eyes are free "of blemish or of spot" (2, 160). This presents the possibility of passing as nondisabled. In the *Defensio secunda*, Milton relates that his eyes are "ita tamen extrinsecus illaesi, ita sine nube clari ac lucidi, ut eorum qui acutissimum cernunt: in hac solum

parte, memet invito, simulator sum" ("thus still externally uninjured, without a cloud, clear and also bright, as those that see most acutely. In this respect alone, against my will, do I deceive" 31). Passing for nondisabled, like *sprezzatura*, always involves a level of deceit, but passing is not always intentional. If Milton passes for sighted, it is involuntary. The speaker of the sonnet next depicts blindness as passive. His eyes "Bereft of light their seeing have forgot, / Nor to their idle orbs doth sight appear" (3–4, 160). In this formulation, disability is downplayed and disdained. Being "Bereft" of light is no different than being forgetful or idle, but this also introduces the threat of oblivion and stasis.

This sonnet also uses the Italian style of *asprezza* (asperity, difficulty, or harshness) that Milton adopted from the poetic theory of Torquato Tasso (1544–1595) to express the difficulty and dignity of disability.³⁶ Tasso discusses *asprezza* in relation to the magnificent style in both lyric and epic. It is precisely the irregularity of *asprezza* that gives poetry dignity. Tasso explains the function of *asprezza* in his *I discorsi dell'arte poetica* (*Discourses on the Art of Poetry*) (1587) as follows:

S'accresce la magnificenza con l'asprezza, la quale nasce dal concorso di vocali, da rompimenti diversi, da pienezza di consonanti ne le rime, da lo accrescere il numero nel fine del verso, o con parole sensibili per vigore d'accenti, o per pienezza di consonanti. Accresce medesimamente la frequenza de le copule, che come nervi corrobori l'orazione. Il trasportare alcuna volta i verbi contro l'uso comune, benché di'rado, porta nobiltà a l'orazione.

Magnificence is increased by asperity, which derives from the assonance of vowels, from enjambment, from a fullness of consonants in the rhymes, intensifying the rhythm at the end of the verse, or that are keenly felt through vigorous accentuation or alliteration. Likewise, the frequency of the connectives enhances magnificence, for they strengthen the discourse like sinews. Sometimes unusual positioning of the verb, if done rarely, ennobles speech. (58; 139)

Here breaking the norms of the form enhances the dignity of the style. Tasso later illustrates this effect by likening *asprezza* to mobility impairment in his *Discorsi del poema eroico* (*Discourses on the Heroic Poem*) (1594), stating that the difficulty of *asprezza* "sono somiglianti a colui ch' intoppa e cammina per vie aspre: ma questa asprezza sente un non so che di mag-

nifico e di grande” (“resembles someone who stumbles as he walks a rough path. But this roughness suggests somehow the great and magnificent” 212; 143). A stumbling gate, rather than detracting from dignity, illustrates noble perseverance.

The idea that the difficulty of disability can enhance dignity is evident in a wide range of consolation and institute texts as well.³⁷ In his dedication of the *De remediis*, Petrarch explains that Azzo da Correggio’s illness and mobility impairment has given him “dexteritatis eximie atque insolite gravitatis” (“great aptness, and uncommon dignity” 1. Preface; 8). In the dialogue on sadness and misery, moreover, Reason includes disability know-how as evidence of the dignity of human beings (2. 93; 227).³⁸ Furthermore, Castiglione coins the word *sprezzatura*—which like the word *asprezza* is based in the root word *sprezzare*, to disdain—to demonstrate how the disabled Duke of Urbino, Guidobaldo da Montefeltro (1472–1508), is only made more dignified by enduring disability.

The *asprezza* style first conveys the privation of blindness in Sonnet 22. The second quatrain runs on with an enjambment from lines 4 to 5 of the speaker’s depiction of blindness as passive absence with a growing sense of privation. The absence “Of sun or moon or star throughout the year” (5, 160) emphasizes how blindness has progressed over time. Blindness is now, like these unseen celestial bodies, a constant for the speaker. The repetition of the connective “or” creates strong assonance across the lines and emphasizes the potential endlessness of the loss, which is not simply additive. The irregular, stumbling meter of the opening of line 6 with the absence of sight of “Or man or woman” (6, 160) may express the emotional strain of this loss and threatens to halt the regular progress of the sonnet.

The inability to see human faces in Sonnet 22 is raw, and it preoccupied Milton, who treats the topic elsewhere. For instance, in Sonnet 23, which grieves the loss of a spouse, the speaker relates a dream, in which “Methought I saw my late espoused saint” (1, 163). The speaker can see in dreams, but “Her face was veiled, yet to my fancied sight” (10, 163). In this difficult line, “yet” can indicate that the spouse’s face is still invisible. In other words, her face is veiled despite the speaker’s ability to see in the dream. However—and the midline comma supports this reading—“yet” could also mean nonetheless. In this reading, the veil may block the speaker’s view, but it cannot obscure the “Love, sweetness, goodness in her person,” which “shined / So clear, as in no face with more delight” (11–12, 163). The speaker does not lament the inability to see the veiled face, because the ability to perceive spiritually when blind is, despite its difficulty, superior to the physical sense of sight. Both readings are

possible, but the slide in meaning from lamentation of blocked physical sight to the consolation of spiritual sight is, I suggest, typical of Milton's consolatory writing on disability.

Milton also uses the *asprezza* style in lamenting a series of things that the speaker can no longer see in the famous proem to book 3 of *Paradise Lost*. The speaker laments,

Seasons return, but not to me returns
Day, or the sweet approach of ev'n or morn,
Or sight of vernal bloom, or summer's rose,
Or flocks, or herds, or human face divine (*PL* 3. 61–64, 362–63).

And yet, the speaker's loss of physical sight allows for greater spiritual sight. The passage closes with a command:

So much the rather thou celestial light
Shine inward, and the mind through all her powers
Irradiate, there plant eyes, all mist from thence
Purge and disperse, that I may see and tell
Of things invisible to mortal sight. (3. 71–75, 363)

A pattern of lamentation and consolation, all expressed with the irregularity of *asprezza*, emerges in Milton's writings on blindness, in which blindness is difficult yet does not lack dignity.

Milton could have found a precedent for this pattern of consolation for blindness in Petrarch's *De remediis*, where descent into a series of things that can no longer be seen culminating in the inability to see faces is also answered with inner sight. After noting that Sorrow can no longer see sun, sky, or Earth (2. 96; 235), and before launching into a list of things it is preferable not to see, Reason concedes:

Non videbis ammodum frondosas valles, aerios montes, floreas cespites, umbrosos specus, lucidos fontes, vaga flumina, prata virentia, quodque pulcherrimum visu dicunt, humani oris effigiem.

Now you cannot see the green valleys, the lofty mountains, the flowery heaths, the shady dells, the silvery fountains, the winding streams, the lush meadows, and, what they say is the most beautiful sight of all, images of human faces. (*De rem.* 2. 96; 235)

Loss of the ability to see human faces would seem to be the most lamentable consequence of blindness, but Reason goes on to admonish, “[N]eu lugeas cecitatem, mentis oculos aperturam” (“Do not mourn, for your blindness will open the eyes of your mind” 2. 96; 236).³⁹ Just as the speaker’s inability to see the physical face of his spouse in Sonnet 23 helps him to recognize her admirable qualities, and just as the blindness of the speaker of *Paradise Lost* opens the possibility of divine inspiration, Reason suggests that the loss of physical sight should not be mourned and the advantages of blindness should be recognized.

To return to the difficulty of Sonnet 22, the diminuendo of capacity and stumbling of line 6 of the second quatrain is halted with a strong midline stop. The speaker then states, “Yet I argue not / Against heavens hand or will” (6–7, 160). This first-person assertion of faith moves the representation of blindness from passive privation to active acceptance. The sonnet then uses enjambment to emphasize a crescendo of capacity from lines 6 to 8 with embodied mobility metaphors. Though sight has diminished, the speaker will not “bate a jot” (7, 160)—that is, deduct one little bit—of “heart or hope” (8, 161), objecting with fricatives and alliteration of aspirant *b* sounds that blindness does not deprive a person of these qualities. The halting meter of line 6 now swings into a triumphant march. The speaker likens their acceptance of blindness to keeping one’s course, stating they will “still bear up and steer” (8, 161) with strong forward mobility, which guides the sonnet “right onward” (9, 161) into the sestet. This image of the blind person bearing their disability and keeping their course suggests a grasp of orientation and mobility, which can be difficult for newly blind people to manage without assistance. The speaker’s lived experience of blindness makes the act of traveling a straight line at speed into an embodied metaphor for adapting to one’s disability and defying low social expectations for the blind.⁴⁰

The momentum of the sonnet again breaks at midline, with the imagined question of Cyriack, “What supports me dost thou ask?” (9, 161). This need for “support” implies that, in order for the speaker to maintain their course, the speaker requires assistance just as a blind person might rely on a sighted guide, a guide dog, or a cane. Support could also be necessary for the speaker’s emotional endurance. In the context of managing the perception of disability, *sprezzatura* is again relevant here. The ease of the speaker’s forward mobility depends on support, and, as I have argued elsewhere, “*sprezzatura* may thus be used prosthetically to conceal impairment, but this act of concealment further marks impairment as deviant” (*Monstrous*

Kinds 58). The speaker's fame conceals disability, providing support, but this fame is dependent on the prosthetic aid of his friend, who serves as an amanuensis and possibly a guide.

The speaker first answers Cyriack's ventriloquized question by stating that fame is a support. The speaker proclaims to their "friend" to have lost "[their] eyes overlaid / In liberty's defence, my noble task, / Of which all Europe talks from side to side" (10–12, 161). The speaker's fame swaggers across the continent "from side to side." The speaker thus judges the deed of writing the first defense worth the wounding of sight,⁴¹ emphasizing the renown of civic service with an embodied mobility metaphor that likens the spread of fame to a confident swagger. Yet Cyriack's prosthetic support (in the form of his friendship and aid) enables the speaker to write and hence to disdain the difficulty of blindness. The speaker's "better guide" of the final line could be Cyriack himself, as he is addressed by name in the first line and as the speaker's "friend" in the tenth. As a friend and amanuensis, he was certainly a support for Milton. The speaker also compares their fame to a guide, explaining that "This thought" of fame "might lead me through the world's vain masque / Content though blind, had I no better guide" (13–14). The speaker again accepts the difficulty of disability, turning the sonnet to other consolations in the final clause, which uses the embodied metaphor of guidance for the blind to express the speaker's sense of comfort.

Milton's crip characterization of his disability is transformative both in his celebration of his impairment and in his use of it to establish his authority as a political writer. Further evidence of disability swagger can be found in Milton's *Defensio secunda*, which also employs militaristic consolatory strategies and extols Milton's supportive community of allies. Milton expands on the idea that his blindness is akin to a war wound, reflecting that after the writing of the *Defensio* had been assigned to him,

tempore et adversa simul valetudi ne, et oculo iam penè altero amisso
conflictarer, praedicerentque difertè medici, si hunc laborem suscep-
sem, fore, ut utrumque brevi amitterem, nihilistâ praemonitione deter-
ritus.

and even then when I was vexed simultaneously with adverse health
and the near loss of my second eye, and different doctors were predict-
ing that if I were to undertake this labor, I would lose it in a short time,
I was in no way deterred by the warning. (34–35)

Undaunted by blindness, Milton frames his situation as fateful, “duasque sortis, fatali quodam nutus jam mihi propositas” (“and two lots by a certain command of fate had now been set before me” 35). Milton knows that he will lose his sight eventually, but he also knows that choosing to write the first defense will hasten this loss.

Milton likens his predicament to the choice of Achilles, in which Achilles must select between “[d]uplicia fata” (“two fates” 35) prophesied by the Delphic oracle and relayed by Achilles’s mother, Thetis, in book 9 of Homer’s *Iliad*. Milton cites the prophesy as follows:

Si hic manens circa Troum urbem pugnauero,
 Amittitur mihi reditus: sed Gloria immortatalis erit.
 Si domum revertor dulce ad Patrium solum,
 Amittitur mihi Gloria pulcra, sed diuturna
 Vita Erit.

If I stay here fighting around the city of Troy,
 I am denied return, but my fame will be immortal.
 If I return home to my pleasant fatherland,
 I am denied my noble glory, but life will be long. (35)

As Jessica Wolfe observes, Milton’s allusions to the choice of Achilles throughout his work show how he “discerns in Homer a sympathetic recognition of the vital and agonizing choices demanded by the continual exercise of political and spiritual liberty,” and this particular passage in the *Defensio secunda* “informs Milton’s own autobiography” (331). Here Milton evokes the blind bard Homer’s heroic character Achilles to model a crip version of heroic sacrifice, in which the price of disability is worth the fulfillment of his civic duty, which Milton values even more highly than glory.⁴² Noting that “multos gravioere malo minus bonum morte gloriam, redemisse” (“many people bought less good with greater harm, glory paid with death” 35), Milton avers he was offered “majus bonum minore cum malo” (“a greater good with a smaller harm” 36), since “cum caecitate sola vel honestissimum officii munus implere” (“I could with blindness alone fulfill the most honorable requirement of my duty” 36). Consoling war wounds by considering them a noble sacrifice for duty is reminiscent of Cervantes’s disability narrative, but in Milton’s case, the form of the wound is blindness, and blindness does not prevent him from continuing to fulfill his duty.⁴³

Milton lists examples of other blind political and military leaders from

antiquity, many of whom Cicero, Petrarch, and contemporary English and continental authors also mention in their consolations for blindness.⁴⁴ Milton asks, "Sive illos commemorem civili prudentia, gestisque rebus admirabiles olim viros" ("Or should I call to mind those men of old who were admired for civility and prudence in carrying out their achievements?" 33). He mentions the General Timoleon of Corinth (ca. 411–337 BCE),⁴⁵ the Roman senator Appius Claudius (ca. 312–279 BCE),⁴⁶ and the Pontifex Lucius Caecilius Metellus (ca. 290–221 BCE) (33). Like Petrarch (*De rem.* 2. 96; 238), Milton also adduces modern examples of blind leaders, asking, "Quid alios recentiorum temporum adjungam" ("What if I add others of recent times" 33), evincing the doge of Venice Enrico Dandolo (1107–1205) and the Bohemian Hussite general Jan Zizka (1360–1424).⁴⁷

Furthermore, Milton avers that his sacrifice is respected by his community, and he emphasizes the support of friends like Cyriack. Milton states that he now has better friends than before his onset of blindness and that his political allies value him as much if not more since the wounding of his eyes. He explains "quod et amici officiosius nunc etiam quàm solebant" ("that friends are now even more attentive than they used to be" 38). Milton likens his friendships to the legendary devotion of Orestes and Pylades and of Hercules and Theseus, and he cites examples of these friends offering each other guidance and support.⁴⁸ Moreover, Milton's friends do not believe that all that is "probi aut cordati" ("honest and prudent") resides "in oculis" ("in the eyes" 38). Milton relates that "et summi quoque in Republic viri" ("even the highest men in the Republic" 38) do not esteem him less now that he is blind. They rather

vacationem atque otium faciles concedunt; si quid est ornamenti, non detrahunt; si quid publici muneris, non adimunt; si quid ex ea re commodi, non minuunt.

readily grant exemption and leisure, if there is any distinction, they do not remove it, if any public office, they do not take it away, if there is any advantage from that office, they do not diminish it. (39)

Acknowledging that he may no longer be as "utili," or "useful, as he once was, Milton depicts his situation as that of an honored wounded war veteran. He insists that "eodem plane honore, ac si, ut olim Athenienfibus mos erat, in Pryta néo alendum decrevissent" ("they pay me the same honor as if, according to the custom of ancient Athens, they had decreed that I take my meals

in the Prytaneum” 39). Here Milton likens his treatment to the generals and most highly regarded citizens of Athens who were allowed to eat at the public expense. And this alone would leave Milton “content though blind,” but he has still more resources to “guide” him through (Sonnet 22, 14, 161).

Spiritual Consolation: Psalmic Rhythm and the Power of Patience

When I consider how my light is spent,
 Ere half my days, in this dark world and wide,
 And that one talent which is death to hide,
 Lodged with me useless, though my soul more bent
 To serve therewith my Maker, and present
 My true account, lest he returning chide,
 “Doth God exact day labor, light denied?”
 I fondly ask; but patience to prevent
 That murmur soon replies, “God doth not need
 Either man’s work or his own gifts; who best
 Bear his mild yoke, they serve him best; his state
 Is kingly. Thousands at his bidding speed
 And post o’er land and ocean without rest:
 They also serve who only stand and wait.” (Milton, Sonnet 19, 157–58)

Sonnet 19 is Milton’s most famous deliberation on his blindness. The sonnet was first published in *Poems, etc. upon several occasions*, in 1673, shortly before Milton’s death. The speaker sorrowfully questions how they can work and serve God as an aging blind person. The speaker’s question is answered by the figure of Patience, who enjoins that faith is enough. Like Teresa de Cartagena, Milton confronts low expectations for disabled people’s capacities to work, and like Teresa, he comes to the realization that living with disability is itself work that God approves.

This sonnet has received a great deal of critical attention, though as Brown noted in 1934, the theme of blindness is not always well understood. She notes the poles of scholarship in her day, when some readers view the sonnet as triumphal. Alden Sampson discerns “not a sound of repining” (122). Others perceive it as pure complaint. E. M. W. Tillyard, for instance, likens Milton to “a beaten dog” (190). Scholars whose readings I otherwise respect still respond to blindness in this sonnet in ways that I find confounding. One scholar says that Milton represents himself in the sonnet as “a helpless wanderer groping over vast spaces in utter darkness with an extinguished lantern”

(Lewalski 306). The use of the word “groping” exceeds Milton’s own language and is pejorative for blind people. Another scholar describes Milton’s blindness as it relates to this poem as “an irrevocable, crippling loss” (Teskey 252), an “existential calamity,” and an “annihilation of a poet’s powers” (256). These scholars produce nuanced readings of this poem, but they overlay their readings with a scrim of ableist assumptions and negative disability imagery that is harmful to blind people. Even in a recent reading that touches on disability studies,⁴⁹ the scholar does not forebear to call Milton’s blindness an “acquired affliction” (Dhar 76). As to the other pole, in a disability studies-based reading, Angelica Duran claims that though “the octave provides a sense of frustration about being unproductive” the sonnet, “however, does not articulate grief” (143). Although this interpretation may be less problematic than catastrophizing blindness, it leaves no room for the speaker’s lamentation, which is strong enough itself to merit the intervention of the figure of Patience as a consoler.

Brown loves Sonnet 19 because it palpates the lows and highs of the lived experience of blindness. She is unapologetic about the insight that her own lived experience brings to her reading of the poem, stating,

It is this common bond of blindness which should give me an especial understanding of the autobiographical passages in Milton’s poetry. This understanding or interpretation may not be that of scholars, yet its value, in part at least, is in the fact that, when I read what Milton has written concerning his blindness, I know, not by hearsay or observation, but by actual experience, something of his emotion. (51)

This emotion is mixed, as the sonnet “permits of sorrow, of spiritual conflict, and of the calm that follows storm” (54). Calling the poem a “marvellous epitome of personal defeat and ultimate triumph,” Brown further relates its draw by explaining, “The sonnet would cease to hold its fascination if I felt Milton was either superhuman or cringing, because I know the restraint necessitated by blindness, because I too have had to bow in submission to the inevitable” (53). Brown’s reading, as Mitchell and Snyder aver, takes “on an openly essentialist claim to her understanding of Milton’s verse,” in which she “acknowledges the power that disabled experience can lend to interpretations of disability” (*Narrative Prosthesis* 31). Experience of disability can make for better scholarship, for as Mitchell and Snyder argue, “From a disability vantage, with a decidedly ‘contemporary’ inversion of ‘able’ rhetoric, Brown asks disability questions of Milton’s poetics—a method that results in fresh and

compelling interpretations” (31). Brown’s scholarship offers an early example of what Arseli Dokumaci calls disability as method, which she defines as follows: “Disability as method names a creative approach through which research methods are informed by, modeled after, and tailored to the situated knowledges of disabled people” (*Activist Affordances* 10).⁵⁰ Brown and I are among the countless blind people who have read this sonnet, and though being blind does not necessarily make us better readers of the poem, it illustrates the creation of a community of disabled writers and readers based in the crip authority of the past.

Whereas Sonnet 22 ultimately portrays blindness positively by crippling disability into a militaristic model of advantage, in Sonnet 19 Milton explores more somber aspects of his disability in a spiritually authorized mode. This sonnet resignifies disability as crip authority in a more nuanced and soft manner than Milton’s defiant political writings. The sonnet mines the emotional complexity of suffering that consolation patterns—particularly in the Psalms. Most early modern people thought the Psalms were composed by King David, who was a political leader and a divinely inspired poet. Milton was no exception to this assumption.⁵¹ The Psalms consist of 150 poems treating human emotions and the relationship with God. The Psalms focus on lamentation or complaint: they ask about the “why” and the “how long” of suffering. In terms of their prosody, Hebrew psalms did not have accentual syllabic meter or rhyme like many Renaissance English forms. Abrupt, often jarring exclamations characterize the moments of deepest despair. Parataxis and parallelism give psalms poetic structure and rhythm. Milton’s earliest works were psalm paraphrases.⁵² He translated a score of psalms from Hebrew into various English metrical forms.⁵³ Milton and other English translators use irregular meter of lines, enjambment, and atypical caesuras with strong punctuation to capture psalms’ emotions in English. Mary Ann Radzinowicz suggests that Milton was most attracted to the Psalms’ parallelism and their rhythm. She explains that Milton “thought Hebrew verse observed an ancient freedom, privileging rhythm over metre” and that his translation “does not echo the words of previous translations; it imitates the parallelism of biblical poetry and its stress–rhythms” (“How Milton Read” 210).⁵⁴ Radzinowicz believes that “the pleasures of the ear in . . . psalmic virtuosity doubtless attracted Milton” to conduct his translations of *Psalms* 1–9, “but I think it probable, too, that he found in Psalms an assuagement of the pain of his blindness” (*Milton’s Epics* 84). Radzinowicz recognizes Milton’s attraction to the Psalms as a model for lamentation in his epics. They also inspire Sonnet 19, as Marian Studley noted almost one hundred years ago.

What remains to be explored is how this psalmic discourse contributes to Milton's consolation of blindness in crip authority.

In Sonnet 19, Milton uses psalmic allusions and rhythm to lament and offer consolation. In particular, *Ps.* 88 and *Ps.* 6, which Milton translated and which appeared in the same 1673 edition of poems as Sonnet 19, and *Ps.* 130, which Milton refers to on several occasions, inform the sonnet's spiritual consolation. Like Sonnet 22, Sonnet 19 is Petrarchan with a traditional octave and sestet rhyme scheme. However, this poem expresses more anguish and doubt about blindness than Sonnet 22.

Sonnet 19 and Milton's translations of *Ps.* 88 and *Ps.* 6 lament aging with blindness. The opening of Sonnet 19, "When I consider how my light is spent" (1, 157), ruminates on the speaker's dwindling light, where light is polysemous. The word "light" signifies both life and sight. Age and blindness multiply the speaker's disabilities, and the style of the poem reflects this difficulty. Similarly, the psalmist of *Ps.* 88:13 worries over his "spent" life, crying out, "But I to thee O Lord do cry / {*Ere yet my life be spent*}" (122). Milton marks his variations from the source language of *Ps.* 88, such as his addition of the phrase "{*Ere yet my life be spent*}" with italics, which I place in braces to make the italics more legible for those using screen readers. This Miltonic variation to the psalm may be echoed in the sonnet's consideration of "spent" (1, 157) life "Ere" (2, 157) half of it has passed away. Furthermore, the speaker of *Ps.* 88:9 bewails that "Mine eye grows dim and dead" (122). In Milton's translation of *Ps.* 6, the speaker also complains "Wearied I am with sighing out my days" (11, 128), and "mine eye / Through grief consumes, is waxen old and dark" (13–14, 128). Studley avers that the word "dark" in line 14 of *Ps.* 6 is Milton's addition, for "Of all the versifiers of this Psalm, he alone uses the word dark as if to express a total want of sight" (371).⁵⁵ In Sonnet 19, I suggest that the "dark" of line two may allude to the darkness of *Ps.* 6, but this could also hearken back to Milton's gloomy additions to his translation of *Ps.* 88:12, where the speaker questions the possibility of knowing God's works "in the {*gloomy*} land / Of {*dark*} oblivion" (123). The alliteration of the *w* and *d* sounds in all three poems also contributes to the woeful mood. In Sonnet 19, the speaker complains of this "dark world and wide" (2, 157), still possessing talent "which is death to hide" (2, 157). The speaker of *Ps.* 88:3 claims of "My life {*at death's uncheerful door*}" (122). In *Ps.* 6, the speaker complains, "Wearied I am" (11), "My bed I water with my tears" (13), and "mine eye . . . is waxen old" (13–14, 128). Both the sonneteer's and the psalmist's life and light have similarly dwindled.

Milton translated *Ps.* 88 and *Ps.* 6 when we know he was blind. Both of

these psalms are heavy on lament; they are light on confession or contrition. Studley observes that in Milton's translation of *Ps. 6*, "it rather seems that the poet is new to his darkness, and that he intensifies the mood of the Psalmist as he would not otherwise have done. It makes Milton more human to think that he did not all at once arrive at the serenity of the 'Sonnet on his Blindness'" (371). Projecting a smooth trajectory toward a final acceptance of disability is problematic, not least because the lived experience of disability has ups and downs. The conjecture that translating the Psalms aids Milton's transition into blindness is convincing precisely because the Psalms express both lamentation and consolation.

As Brown argues, Sonnet 19 is not simply serene. In Sonnet 19 and Milton's translations of *Ps. 88* and *Ps. 6*, the reader again encounters *asprezza*: enjambment, alliteration, open vowel sounds, and the repetition of conjunctions such as "and" all contribute to the harsh difficulty of the verse. As in the second quatrain of Sonnet 22, Sonnet 19's *asprezza* marks the speaker's fits and starts of lamentation.

As the sonnet speaker murmurs doubts, the lines veer into irregularity. For instance, by line 4, the iambic meter of Milton's sonnet breaks down with an enjambment from line 4 to 5, where the line becomes so "bent" (4, 157) that it is almost impossible to scan: "Lodged with me Useless" (4, 157)—a dactyl followed by a possible trochee—and "Though my soul more bent" (4, 157)—perhaps an anapest followed by a spondee? The word "bent" is polysemous. It changes meaning in its modification of the word "soul" in the next line (from lines 4 to 5), moving from its meaning of bent, as in crooked or irregular, to bent, as in inclined or liable to. Though this shift away from a pejorative, irregular bent to a positive bent toward service to God seems uplifting of the sonnet's mood, the speaker then doubles down on dismay with the anguished question ringing out in line 7: "Doth God exact day labour, light denied?" (157). This question itself is complicated by the possible shift in speakers. The "he" of line 6 implies that God voices this question to "chide" the speaker, until the "I" of line 8 makes the speaker of the question clear. But unlike the confident "I" of Sonnet 22, where the interjection of the first person puts an end to the diminuendo of capacity that blindness impels, this interjection, which is made "fondly" or foolishly, only casts further doubt on the physical and intellectual capacities of aging blind people. The sonnet's difficulty in fact disorients many readers, who can feel foolish about assuming that the speaker of the question is God, thereby forcing the reader to experience a lack of confidence in their abilities.⁵⁶

Unlike *Ps. 88*, which Radzinowicz calls "the most despairing in the Book

of Psalms" (*Towards* 199), *Ps.* 6 eventually resolves with God's consolation as does Sonnet 19. "Doth God exact day-labour, light denied?" The speaker "murmurs" (9, 157) until the figure of Patience interjects a message of reproach and consolation.⁵⁷ Milton depends on spiritual consolation and psalmic rhythm for his articulation of cripple authority born out of pious suffering.⁵⁸ His version of patience in this sonnet and the standing and waiting that patience demands are, in the consolation tradition, acts of resistance and fortitude.⁵⁹ Starting on line 8, Patience harangues the speaker with a rapid succession of short paratactic declarations in an enjambment that spans from lines 8 through 13 and whose disruptive rhythms—there are three caesuras per line in lines 9, 10, and 11—are more typical of the rhythm of psalms than sonnets. Patience avers that God does not need human "work or his own gifts; who best / Bear his mild yoke, they serve him best" (10–11, 157). God does not need the speaker's deeds, and service is best illustrated by those who "best / Bear his mild yoke" (10–11, 157). This echoes the bearing up of the speaker in Sonnet 22 and represents yet another mobility metaphor. This time the bearing of disability is likened to the motion of an ox that is constrained by a yoke or harness. This metaphor is reminiscent of Teresa de Cartagena's embracing of bit and bridle from *Ps.* 31 as metaphors for the beneficial constraint of her disabilities. Furthermore, God has angels to do his work, in which "Thousands at his bidding speed / And post o'er land and ocean without rest" (12–13, 158). Limitless motion may not be something that the speaker can provide as an aging, blind individual, but the speaker is no angel.

Rather than listing the things that the speaker cannot do, Patience lists the types of work that God does not need from the speaker in an *asprezza* style that careens to a final "rest" at the end of line 13. The final line closes the poem with the consoling, metrically and rhythmically regular line: "They also serve who only stand and wait" (14, 158). This line, I suggest, is an allusion to *Ps.* 130. This short penitential psalm asks in line 3, "Oh Lord, who shall stand?" and responds with waiting as a sign of service and faith in line 5: "I wait for the LORD, my soul doth wait, and in his word do I hope" (KJV). Though Milton did not translate this psalm, he does cite *Ps.* 130 several times as a proof text.

In his *De Doctrina Christiana*, Milton uses *Ps.* 130 to illustrate the role of patience and duties to God. He refers to *Ps.* 130 in chapter 3 of book 2 to exemplify "de Virtutibus ad Dei cultum pertinentibus" ("the virtues belonging to the service to god" 944; 945).⁶⁰ Milton explains that this service can be "vel internus vel externus" ("either internal or external" 944; 945). The psalm is listed to illustrate internal, or contemplative, service (946; 947). Milton cites

Ps. 130 again in a list of texts that prove his interpretation of patience, which he includes in the duties to God and defines as follows:

Patientia est qua providentiae, potentiae, et bonitatis divinae fiducia suffulti, Dei promissis acquiescimus, et quae necessario perferenda sunt mala, veluti a summo patre, bonoque nostro immissa, aequo animo perferimus.

Patience is that whereby—propped up by trust in [divine] providence, power, and goodness—we rest content in God’s promises, and bear calmly evils that must necessarily be borne, as sent by the supreme father and for our good. (954–56; 955–57)

Milton’s use of *Ps.* 130 in the *Doctrina Christiana* supports its links to Sonnet 19, both poems sharing not only major themes and language but an association with service to God and the figure of Patience as well.

Furthermore, we know from Petrarch’s dialogue 114 on pain in the *De remediis* that rejecting murmuring in favor of arming oneself with Patience and standing one’s ground against adversity are common strategies in the art of consolation more broadly. The Thomas Twyne 1597 English translation of Petrarch’s *De remediis* uses the English word “to murmur” for complaint in the dialogue on pain, in which Reason argues patience is a powerful weapon in the arsenal of consolation as follows:

[C]ui si ostenderis, murmur aut gemitum utilem tibi, levamenque aliquod mali esse, versis ultro consiliis, utrunque permiserim seu iusserim. Quod si indignatio et querele nil aliud quam accessio mali sunt, quid morbo corporis addere animi morbum iuvat, teque miseriorem fiendo facere, et illum tibi forsitan infestioem, qui labores hominum ex alto videt, patientiamque considerat, quam aut remedio compenset aut premio?

If thou canst prove, that thy murmur and complaintes doo any whyt profite thee, or asswage thy greefe, then wyll I change myne opinion, and suffer thee, or rather exhort thee to doo them both. But yf repining and complaintes be nothyng els, but an encreasing of the mischief, what shall it avayle thee to heape the sicknesse of the minde, upon the infirmitie of the bodye, and by lamentyng to make thy selfe more miserable, and him more sharpe agaynst thee, who beholdeth

the travelles of men from [o]n hygh, and consydereth theyr patience
to requite it with remedie or rewarde? (305)

Though Milton could have read Petrarch in Latin, and though Petrarch cites and borrows heavily from Cicero in this dialogue, Milton's Sonnet 19 is doubtless partaking in a long tradition of spiritual consolation that prioritizes the role of patience.

The ending of Sonnet 19 is remarkable not because it demonstrates the overcoming of disability but because it shows that the bearing of disability, the patience and know-how that it requires, is itself a form of work. In Sonnet 22, Milton values disability with intellectual labor (the writing of the *Defensio secunda*); in Sonnet 19, Milton values disability with the labor of patience. Sonnet 19's well-known allusions to the Gospel of Matthew also speak to Milton's deep concern with ableist perceptions of disability as idleness.⁶¹ Milton shares this concern and these biblical allusions with Teresa de Cartagena. Both authors refer to the parable of the talents (Sonnet 19, 3–4; Matt. 25), in which servants are given talents by their master and the servant who hides his one talent is punished, and the story of the day laborers, which Jesus pronounces before healing the blind and in which all of the workers, regardless of how much they have worked, are paid the same (Sonnet 19, 7; Matt. 20). The fact that they both reappropriate these stories to illustrate how best to bear disability is a tantalizing connection between disabled authors from different times, places, and religious backgrounds. These authors also share a predilection for consolatory exegesis, translation, and citation of the Psalms. Gospel allusions, while doubtless essential to Milton's sonnet's meaning, do not fully account for the irregularities of form it displays, the vehemence of the speaker's emotions, or for the appearance of Patience as the consoler with the last word. The Psalms, however, have the emotional and spiritual breadth to express and authorize the speaker's distress. This is important for the history of disability because the rawness of the speaker's passion and the strain against the regularity of the Petrarchan sonnet form—its stumbling *asprezza*—emblemize common human experiences and ultimately make disability, like the voicing of suffering in the Psalms, into a widespread human experience rather than an abnormal bent. Milton makes the Psalms work to render poetically both the lows and highs of the source of his crip authority. For Milton, then, crip authority derives from a resignification of his blindness as a spiritually authorized vatic mark, a venerable war wound, and from an exegetical poetics of suffering drawn from the contemplative and spiritually intimate forms of the Psalms.

Strength in Weakness or Bold Blindness

The most sustained exploration of Milton's disability appears in his *Defensio secunda*, which presents a wide range of consolations for blindness. It relates his most powerful expression of disability gain and pride. In contrast with this personal disability narrative that produces crip authority, Milton explores a far less sanguine response to blindness in his last work, *Samson Agonistes*. Whereas Milton finds consolation in the *Defensio secunda* in disability pride, community, and the embrace of weakness, Milton's character Samson is despairing, is disconsolate, and exemplifies the tragic consequences of being a supercrip. Both the *Defensio secunda* and *Samson Agonistes* are examples of writing consolation: the former illustrates when consolation works; the latter may serve to purge the negative emotions associated with unbearable disability, but at the cost of the disabled person's demise.

In the *Defensio secunda*, Milton does not feel shame or regret about his blindness, stating, “[M]e sortis meae neque pigere neque poenitere” (“I feel neither chagrin nor regret for my lot” 36). He denies that his blindness is a punishment for sin, examining himself and his deeds and finding “nullius rei” (“not a thing” 34) meriting such a punishment. He is instead convinced that his blindness brings him closer to God:

[I]mmotum atque fixum in sententia perstare; Deum iratum neque sentire, neque habere, immo maximis in rebus clementiam ejus et benignitatem erga me paternam experiri atque agnoscere in hoc praesertim, quod solante ipso atque animum confirmante in ejus divina voluntate acquiescam: quid is largitus mihi sit, quàm quid negaverit saepius cogitans.

Constant and fixed I persist in the opinion that I neither sense nor bear God's anger, that indeed in the greatest affairs I experience and discern his Fatherly mercy and beneficence towards me, and especially in this, that with his consolation strengthening my spirit I acquiesce to his divine will, thinking more often on what he has given me than what he has denied me. (36)

Here Milton rejects a negative moral model of disability. In concentrating on God's gifts, Milton does not suggest that blindness is itself a gift, but it is also not a punishment and does not stand in the way of divine blessings.

Milton also prefers his literal, physical blindness to the metaphorical,

ignorant blindness of his detractors. He explains, "Ad caecitatem denique quod attinet, malle me meam" ("Finally, as to blindness, I prefer mine" 36). In using blindness metaphors that equate blindness to ignorance, Milton turns his foes' rhetorical weapons back on them:

Vestra imis sensibus immersa nequid sani videatis aut solidi, mentem obcaecat: mea, quam objicitis, colorem tantummodo rebus et superficiem demit; quod veruni ac stabile in iis est, contemplationi mentis non adimit.

Yours, plunged in the deepest senses, obscures the mind, so you see nothing whole or solid. Mine, which you find objectionable, only detracts from the color and surface of things; what is true and stable in them is not taken away from my intellect's contemplation. (36)

This avowal is reminiscent of the consolation for blindness in Petrarch's *De remediis*, where Reason consoles Sorrow by listing things that are unpleasant to see and by encouraging Sorrow to remember, "Celum terramque non aspicias; sed celi terreque dominum spectandi facultas non eripitur: multum illa clarior est visio" ("You cannot see the sky and the earth. But you have not lost the faculty to see the Lord of Heaven and Earth. This vision is much clearer than the one you lost" *De rem.* 2. 96; 235). Consolation revalues loss as gain, and Milton links this gain with a desire for his experience of blindness, stating, "Quam multa deinde sunt quae videre nollem, quam multa quae possem libens non videre, quam pauca reliqua sunt quae videre cupiam" ("How many things there are that I do not want to see, how many things that I would cheerfully not see, how few things remain that I want to see" 36). The loss of physical sight is valuable and even desirable because it delivers the blind person from material, worldly distractions, freeing them to enjoy greater spiritual perspicacity.

Milton moves beyond his individual experience of blindness to express disability pride with others. Blind people in general, according to Milton, are favored by God and should therefore never be scorned. He compares blindness to being touched by the wings of angels and avers that it bestows inner light as follows:

Et sane haud ultima Dei cura caeci sumus; qui nos, quo minus quicquam aliud praeter ipsum cernere valemus, eo clementius atque benignius respicere dignatur. Vae qui illudit nos, vae qui laedit, execratione

publica devovendo; nos ab injuriis hominum non modo incolumes, sed penè sacros, divina lex reddidit, divinus favor; nec tam oculorum hebebetudine, quàm cœlestium alarum umbrâ has nobis fecisse tenebras videtur, factas illustrare rursus interiore ac longe praestabiliore lumine haud raro solet.

Certainly we blind are not the least of God's cares, for the less we are able to see anything other than him, consequently the more mercifully and benevolently he deigns to provide for us. Woe to him who mocks us, woe to him who injures us, deserving public execration. Divine law and divine favor have rendered us not only safe from the injuries of men, but almost sacred, nor does the dimness of our eyes render us in shadow as much as the shade of angelic wings, And it is not uncommon for these shadows to be illuminated by an inner and far superior light. (37)

Because of their sensory impairment, blind people are more closely cared for by God. In this sense, the vulnerability of blindness provides the opportunity to be protected by God. The quasi-sacred status of blind people makes their derision not only morally reprehensible but even sinful. Milton also insists on divine compensation here in the form of inner light, a concept to which he returns on several occasions across several works.

Anticipating a social model of disability, Milton insists that impairment is not the problem: "[N]on est miserum esse caecum, miserum est caecitatem non posse ferre" ("It is not miserable to be blind, it is miserable not to be able to bear it" 32). It is also a common condition. Milton asks, "[Q]uidni autem feram, quod unumquemque ita parare se oportet, ut si acciderit, non aegre ferat, quod et humanitus accidere cuivis mortalium" ("And why should I not bear something for which it is appropriate for everyone to prepare, on the contingency of its happening, something I know may perchance happen, as a part of human nature, to any mortal" 32). Milton places blindness on a continuum rather than accepting disabled and nondisabled as binary opposites. He situates it in a chronology in which most people, at one time or another, will experience impairment. It is a natural human condition that should be borne with fortitude and patience, advice that is repeated across many consolation texts, and that, he suggests, may bring advantages. This passage articulates disability futurity, in which the future includes disability, and counter-eugenic logic, which argues that disability should not be eradicated.⁶²

Milton extends crip pride to his broader community, identifying with the

infirm and finding a way to strength through weakness. Rejecting a negative characterization of disability in general, Milton affirms his membership in the community of the infirm as follows.

Sed neque ego caecis, afflictis, moerentibus, imbecillis, tametsi vos id miserum ducitis, aggregari me discurior, quandoquidem spes est, eo me propius ad misericordiam summi patris atque tutelam pertinere.

But neither do I hesitate to count myself with the blind, the afflicted, the melancholic, and the feeble, although you regard them as wretched, since there is hope that in this way I may come closer to reaching the mercy and protection of the Father Almighty. (37)

Having connected his experience to the community of the infirm, Milton adopts the Pauline motto derived from 2 Corinthians 12:9, “My Strength Is Made Perfect in Weakness” (KJV).⁶³ Milton explains, “Est quoddam per imbecillitatem, prae eunte Apostolo, ad maximas vires iter” (“There is a certain way through weakness, as the Apostle went before, to the greatest strength” 37). As he does for other biblical passages, Milton relates this verse to his own experience of disability, enacting consolatory exegesis as follows:

sim ego debilissimus, dummodo in mea debilitate immortalis ille et melior vigor eo se efficacius exerat; dummodo in meis tenebris divini vultus lumen eo clarius eluceat; tum enim infirmissimus ero simul et validissimus, caecus codem tempore et perspicacissimus; hac possim ego infirmitate consummari, hac perfici, possim in hac obscuritate sic ego irradiari.

Let me be the weakest, as long as in my weakness there may break forth all the more effectually this immortal and more healthy vigor; provided that in my darkness the light of the divine face shines the brighter. For then I will be at once the weakest and the strongest, at the same time blind and most perceptive. By this infirmity may I be completed, by this perfected, by this darkness, may I be bathed in light. (37)

Milton thus uses Paul’s reflections on his thorn in the flesh to argue for ability in blindness without denigrating disability. What Milton’s foes see as moral monstrosity, he considers a mark of God’s favor and protection. What

they see as debilitating, he considers freeing and a source of strength. He has become, like Cervantes, a *manco sano*, a healthy or complete cripple.

The fecund variation of tone and spirit with which Milton conceived of his lived experience of disability portrays it as neither wholly bad nor wholly good but follows rhythms of lamentation, consolation, and pride. Milton uses what others perceive as the adversity of his blindness to attribute himself with authority. These spiritual strategies for consolation contribute to the history of resignifying disability in crip authority. Unlike consolation for the wounded warrior, spiritual authorization is accessible to people with disabilities who were not war veterans and who were, for the most part, men. It is reminiscent of Teresa de Cartagena's valuation of disability community and strategies of consolatory exegesis. Yet it is important to recognize that Milton's capacity for cross-identification is limited. As a wealthy white man, Milton was privileged with education and economic resources that most people, much less blind people, did not have. Though Milton was a great proponent of personal freedom, the racist assumptions and images evident in his work complicate his reception by enslaved people as well as later indigenous writers and writers of color.⁶⁴ Although queer and trans readings of Milton have opened new perspectives on his attitudes toward gender and sexuality,⁶⁵ Milton's treatment of women in his works and life remains controversial.⁶⁶ Moreover, the uplifting crip pride that is on display in the *Defensio secunda* is, as the analysis of Sonnets 22 and 19 demonstrates, not a constant for Milton, who also, at times, struggled with his transition into blindness.

Milton represents an alternative to sanguine acceptance of blindness with the melancholic rejection of consolation in *Samson Agonistes* (1671).⁶⁷ This brutal play unsparingly explores the Hebrew hero Samson's despair over being blinded and enslaved in Gaza at the hands of his enemies. The word *Agonistes* in the tragedy's title emphasizes Samson's struggle with his state, since this "Greek epithet means 'struggling' or 'contending' or 'agonizing'" (Kerrigan et al., "Introduction to *Samson*" 699n1). *Samson Agonistes* is not autobiographical,⁶⁸ nor is it a disability masquerade, because Milton never presents Samson as a version of himself. Nonetheless, *Samson Agonistes* explores the experience of blindness written by a blind author and is, therefore, a disability narrative. Unlike the other writings on disability that this book investigates, however, this text explores what happens when disability consolation does not work. It tells the tragic ending of an inconsolable supercrip. Samson does not find advantage in adversity. He never connects with a community of the infirm and does not express crip pride.

Samson Agonistes is a disconcerting play. The beauty of the poetry is unde-

niable, and Milton uses many of the techniques of prosody that this chapter has already touched on to depict the depths of Samson's lamentation and complaint. Nevertheless, it is hard to bear the tragic ending, in which Samson tears down the Philistines' theater, killing the Palestinian elite and himself, especially as war in Israel and Gaza and its disabling consequences for the body-minds of its voluntary and involuntary participants occur as I write. Whether or not we accept recent assessments of Samson as a terrorist,⁶⁹ moreover, the potential to link disability with moral monstrosity, which is still prevalent in contemporary entertainment and literature, does harm to disabled people.⁷⁰

Given that Milton lived through the violence of the English civil war, it is not surprising that he captures the horror of such violence. Given that Milton ended up on the losing side of this war, blind and briefly incarcerated, it is not surprising that the story of a blind, imprisoned hero who exerts terrible revenge on his enemies might be attractive, but at what cost? Milton was aware of the potential for Samson's story to portray blindness as a moral flaw. After all, Marvell makes this association clear in his prefatory material to *Paradise Lost*. In expressing concerns about the weakness of Milton's abilities and the boldness of his intentions, Marvell avers, "(So Samson groped the temple's posts in spite) / The world o'erwhelming to revenge his sight" (lines 9–10, 287). Marvell was mistaken in his low expectations for blind people, and his negative interpretation of Samson warns of the harm that stereotypes of the blind can do. David Bolt, who is blind, recognizes the danger of "the ancient myth in which the angered Samson shakes an inhabited temple to the ground, as it defines blind rage and blind fear as so extreme and uncontrollable as to make somebody behave irrationally" (19). The metaphor of blind rage exemplifies what Bolt calls metanarratives of blindness, or stories "to which those of us who have visual impairments may often find ourselves keyed" (15), because the "metanarrative is invoked socially, in an endeavor to understand those of us who have visual impairments. It is as though in some minds, in some groups, in some social settings, people become displaced in favor of characters" (15). Marvell displaces Milton here with Samson, but it is important to remember that Milton and Samson are not the same.

One way to understand Milton's purpose in writing *Samson Agonistes* without attributing Milton with Samson's motivations is to think about the work in generic terms. The classical literary career valued epic and tragedy as the culmination of literary forms.⁷¹ Writing a tragedy is itself, according to Milton, a mark of authority. Tragedy provides material to cite as *auctoritas*. As Milton explains in his prefatory material to the play, ancient "philoso-

phers and other gravest writers, as Cicero, Plutarch, and others, frequently cite out of tragic poets,” and citing tragedy is authoritative for Christian and later writers as well, since “[t]he Apostle Paul himself thought it not unworthy to insert a verse of Euripides into the text of Holy Scripture, I Cor. 15.33, and Pareus commenting on the Revelation, divides the whole book as a tragedy, into acts distinguished each by a chorus of heavenly harpings and song between” (707). Writers of tragedy are also frequently themselves *auctores*. Ancient and modern writers “in highest dignity have labored not a little to be thought able to compose a tragedy,” including “Dionysius the elder,” “Augustus Caesar,” “Seneca the philosopher,” and “Gregory Nazianzen, a Father of the Church” (707), who all try their hand at tragedy. Writing a tragedy would thus give Milton more literary authority. Moreover, the respected closet drama form, unlike drama that is played out on the stage, “to which this work never was intended” (708), may have appealed to Milton because the form is more accessible to blind readers and because Milton would never have to oversee the play’s production.

Milton also may have turned to Samson, who is unable to moderate his despair over blindness, to moderate his own feelings, composing his play as an act of autoconsolation through writing. In defining tragedy, Milton attributes it with the power to purge negative emotions, and this remedy may have served as much for author as for audience. Milton extols tragedy’s emotional effects as follows:

Tragedy, as it was anciently composed, hath been ever held the gravest, moralest, and most profitable of all other poems: therefore said by Aristotle to be of power by raising pity and fear, or terror, to purge the mind of those and such-like passions, that is to temper and reduce them to just measure with a kind of delight, stirred up by reading or seeing those passions well imitated. Nor is nature wanting in her own effects to make good his assertion: for so in physic things of melancholic hue and quality are used against melancholy, sour against sour, salt to remove salt humors. (707)

Milton stretches Aristotelian tragic theory to fit blind readers (including himself) as well as sighted audience members, noting that purgation occurs when negative emotions are “stirred up by reading {*or seeing*} those passions well imitated” (707; italics in braces mine). He couches his concept of catharsis or purgation in Paracelsian medical terms,⁷² in which like is treated with like, implying that a play about a man who is disconsolate about blindness

might help remedy similar feelings of despair about disability on the part of readers or audience members. At the play's end, the chorus reframes the play's action in a sonnet, indicating that Samson's story should leave everyone "With peace and consolation . . . And calm of mind all passion spent" (*SA* 1757–58, 761). Yet, unlike Sophoclean tragedies with blind or blinded characters, there is no consolation for the lived experience of blindness at all in the play. Samson only finds consolation and purgation in death.

Of all of his woes, Samson's blindness is hardest for him to bear. He laments his blinding in the opening of the play, exclaiming, "O loss of sight, of thee I most complain! / Blind among enemies, O worse than chains, / Dungeon, or beggary, or decrepit age!" (67–69, 712). He bemoans his disability for over one hundred lines, resorting to the *asprezza* style with psalmic allusion and rhythm that Milton's sonnets also employ for complaint. Samson laments,

Light, the prime work of God, to me is extinct,
 And all her various objects of delight
 Annulled, which might in part my grief have eased,
 Inferior to the vilest now become
 Of man or worm; the vilest here excel me,
 They creep, yet see; I dark in light exposed
 To daily fraud, contempt, abuse and wrong,
 Within doors, or without, still as a fool,
 In power of others, never in my own;
 Scarce half I seem to live, dead more than half.
 O dark, dark, dark, amid the blaze of noon,
 Irrecoverably dark, total eclipse
 Without all hope of day! (70–82, 712)

These lines are *asprezza* in their style, they make frequent allusions to the Psalms, and they use psalmic rhythm to accentuate despair. Arguing that the play's "style, form, and mood derive from the *Psalms*" (*Toward Samson Agonistes* 188),⁷³ Radzinowicz demonstrates that "Milton not only mined the *Psalms* for telling images and phrases, he drew upon psalmic structures and brought to bear the repeated patterns of the *Psalms* in the overall shaping of the drama" (208).⁷⁴ In particular, this speech makes several allusions to *Ps.* 21,⁷⁵ as does Teresa de Cartagena in her own lament for sensory disability. Unlike Teresa, however, Samson never finds comfort or pride in his disability. As Radzinowicz avers, "Samson is dark with faithlessness; his loss of faith

arises from his loss of sight,” and Samson’s complaint not only lacks the consolation that Milton found in his own blindness, “it contradicts it” (*Toward Samson Agonistes* 19).

For the most part, Samson’s interlocutors reiterate his lamentations for blindness rather than offering him comfort. For instance, Samson likens his sensory disability to a living death in complete darkness. He complains that he is “exiled from light” (98, 712) and doomed to a fate worse than death:

To live a life half dead, a living death,
 And buried; but O yet more miserable!
 Myself my sepulcher, a moving grave,
 Buried, yet not exempt
 By privilege of death and burial
 From worst of other evils, pains and wrongs. (100–105, 713)

Julia Miele Rodas comments on the weight of this passage in her examination of metaphorical meanings of blindness, noting that Samson supports the notion that “blind men, we are taught to believe, live in darkness, in a pit, a prison, a tomb, set apart from light and from the seeing World” (127). The play relentlessly reinforces this negative characterization of blindness. When the Chorus first comes upon Samson, they gawk at his condition and also compare his blindness to a living death:

Which shall I first bewail,
 Thy bondage or lost sight,
 Prison within prison
 Inseparably dark?
 Thou art become (O worst imprisonment!)
 The dungeon of thyself; thy soul
 (Which men enjoying sight oft without cause complain)
 Imprisoned now indeed,
 In real darkness of the body dwells,
 Shut up from outward light
 To incorporate with gloomy night;
 For inward light alas
 Puts forth no visual beam. (151–63, 714–15)

The Chorus shares Samson’s ableist view of his disability as a living death. They deny the power of inner light that Milton finds in his own consola-

tions for blindness, in which blind people enjoy “interiore ac longe praestabiliore lumine” (“an inner and far superior light” *Defensio secunda* 37) than the sighted. Thus, when the Chorus wishes to console Samson, stating, “Counsel or consolation we may bring, / Salve to thy sores; apt words have power to ’suage / The tumors of a troubled mind, / And are as balm to festered wounds” (184–86, 715), their ableism prevents them from finding advantages in Samson’s disability. Their attempts at consolation are therefore at best incomplete and ultimately unsuccessful.

Even Samson’s father, Manoa, fails to offer Samson consolation for blindness. In his dialogue with his father, Samson, like the speaker of Sonnet 19, is worried that blindness will prevent him from performing work and service to God.⁷⁶

Now blind, disheartened, shamed, dishonored, quelled,
To what can I be useful, wherein serve
My nation, and the work from Heav’n imposed,
But to sit idle on the household hearth,
A burdenous drone; to visitants a gaze,
Or pitied object, these redundant locks
Robustious to no purpose clust’ring down,
Vain monument of strength; till length of years
And sedentary numbness craze my limbs
To a contemptible old age obscure. (563–72, 727)

Although Samson does perform work in the prison, it is not for his people or his God.⁷⁷ Samson’s complaint bemoans that his blindness prevents him from being “useful” to “serve” God, which reflects the angst of Sonnet 19’s octave, in which the speaker worries that his “talent” (3) is now “Lodged with me useless” (4) due to blindness. Both the poem’s octave and Samson’s speech figure disability as idleness, and Samson reiterates that his disability is akin to suspended animation.

Rather than helping Samson to bear up under disability as does the figure of Patience in Sonnet 19, however, Manoa agrees with Samson’s low expectations for blind people. He concurs that blindness is akin to idleness, predicting that his son will “at home lie bed-rid, not only idle, / Inglorious, unemployed, with age outworn” (579–80, 727). All Manoa can hope for is a miraculous restoration of sight, in which God might “Cause light again within thy eyes to spring, / Wherewith to serve him better than thou hast” (584–85, 727). Manoa cannot conceive of blindness as anything other than

useless. In his final attempt to ransom Samson, his highest hope for his son is another kind of living death, in which “It shall be my delight to tend his eyes, / And view him sitting in the house, ennobled / With all those high exploits by him achieved, / And on his shoulders waving down those locks, / That of a nation armed the strength contained” (1491–95, 753). Manoa dreams of memorializing Samson even before he is dead. These lines are a grim reflection of Samson’s fear of being a “Vain monument to strength” (570, 727) in which he would become “to visitants a gaze / Or pitied object” (567–68, 727) with his “redundant locks / Robustious to no purpose clust’ring down” (568–69, 727). Manoa’s plan for Samson would ensure the living death that Samson fears.

The only person in the play who offers consolation for blindness is the person Samson can trust least, his wife, Dalila, to whom Samson revealed the source of his strength and who betrayed that secret to his enemies. Dalila asks Samson for forgiveness and observes that although “sight be lost, / Life yet hath many solaces, enjoyed / Where other senses want not their delights / At home in leisure and domestic ease, / Exempt from many a care and chance to which / Eyesight exposes daily men abroad” (914–19, 736–37). Emphasizing the delights that senses other than sight can provide to the blind is a common consolatory strategy that Milton might have found in, for example, Cicero’s *Tusculan Disputations*. Dalila proposes to free Samson from captivity and to bring him home, “where my redoubled love and care / With nursing diligence, to me glad office, / May ever tend about thee to old age / With all things grateful cheered, and so supplied, / That what by me thou hast lost thou least shalt miss” (923–27, 737). Dalila’s proffered care may provide {her} with comfort, but it still represents blindness as a deficit.⁷⁸ Moreover, Samson cannot trust Dalila and therefore rejects her care, stating, “No, no, of my condition take no care” (928, 727). Samson worries that blindness is infantilizing and will therefore leave him powerless in Dalila’s hands. He asks, “How wouldst thou use me now, blind, and thereby / Deceiveable, in most things as a child / Helpless, thence easily contemned, and scorned, / And last neglected?” (941–44, 737). Samson expresses legitimate fear of being abused by an untrustworthy caregiver, but he also internalizes the stereotype that disability renders the disabled person childlike.

Finally, the giant Harapha, who would have liked to challenge Samson to combat before his blinding, has no intention of consoling Samson. Harapha states, “I come not Samson, to condole thy chance” (1076, 742). As Pasquale Toscano convincingly argues, Samson’s realization of his returning physical

strength and request to fight with Harapha in “some narrow place enclosed” (1617, 742) can be likened to requests for accommodation, “a moment of wish-making that, if realized, might have led away from the carnage that follows: when Samson musters the fanciful optimism, required of disabled people still today, to imagine how they might participate in a world designed for able bodies” (“Access” n.p.). The denial of Samson’s request for accommodation further illustrates the societal scorn for blindness that Samson suffers. None of Samson’s interlocutors offer convincing disability consolation. As Toscano observes, Samson’s disappointed father, Manoa, his untrustworthy wife, Dalila, and his disgusted opponent Harapha equate Samson’s blindness to “a curable problem, charity case, and disqualifying embarrassment” (“Access” n.p.). It is no wonder then that Samson is not consoled.

Samson does use low expectations of his blindness to catch his enemies off-guard in the Philistines’ theater, which could be considered a form of disability *metis*.⁷⁹ The messenger who describes Samson’s final act explains, “At length for intermission sake they led him / Between the pillars; he his guide requested . . . / As overtired to let him lean a while / With both his arms on those two massy pillars / That to the archèd roof gave main support. / He unsuspecting led him” (1629–35, 757). The abundance of anastrophe (i.e., unusual word placement) in these lines—the position of “his guide” and “unsuspecting”—makes for an *asprezza* style that emphasizes Samson’s trickiness and the guide’s gullibility for underestimating him. Samson’s guile, however, only allows him to make a supercrip display of strength in a moment of tremendous violence and destruction that costs him his life. Samson’s story reads as a failed overcoming narrative, in which Samson’s efforts destroy him. As Manoa exclaims of Samson’s actions, “O lastly over-strong against thyself!” (1590, 755).

Whereas Milton’s crip authority in his personal writings grows out of his understanding of disability gain and pride in being part of a community of the infirm, Samson’s reckoning with his disability remains a lonely struggle until the bitter end. Unlike Milton, who feels “neque pigere neque poenitere” (“neither chagrin nor regret” *Defensio secunda* 36) for blindness and does not believe his blindness to be a punishment from God, stating, “Deum iratum neque sentire, neque habere” (“I neither sense nor bear God’s anger” *Defensio secunda* 36), Samson internalizes his blinding as a mark of his extraordinary inequality. Asking, “Whom have I to complain of but myself?” (*SA* 46, 711), he attributes his blindness to his own fault, “Sole author I, sole cause” (376, 721). In expressing his “sense of Heav’ns desertion” (632, 728), Samson remembers

God's favor toward him in the past, when "I was his nursling once and choice delight, / His destined from the womb, / Promised by Heavenly message twice descending. / Under his special eye" (633–36, 728–29). Samson contrasts this past divine favor with the present, lamenting that God "now hath cast me off as never known, / And to those cruel enemies, / Whom I by his appointment had provoked, / Left me all helpless with th' irreparable loss / Of sight, reserved alive to be repeated / The subject of their cruelty, or scorn" (641–46, 729). Samson cannot comfort himself with a community of fellow sufferers in part because of his belief in his "special" (636, 729) status. His enemies only treat his blindness with scorn, and his allies provide no examples of other blind people who have borne their blindness well.

There is no mention whatsoever of any other blind people other than Samson in the play. Bereft of the authority and exemplarity of consolation, the only thing that Samson hopes for at this point and the only thing for which he prays is death: "This one prayer yet remains, might I be heard, / No long petition, speedy death, / The close of all my miseries, and the balm" (649–51, 729). Samson's desire for death exemplifies what Bolt identifies as a metanarrative of blindness in which "death is preferable to life with a visual impairment" (114). In contrast with Milton's personal writings about blindness and disability, in which he finds consolation in disability futurity, community, and pride, Samson only finds relief for disability in his own demise. Samson's outcome reflects a more somber side of the consolation tradition, in which Stoical remonstrances for complaints and the medieval contemptus mundi tradition advise that death will remedy all ills, yet it also denies Samson consolation in life.⁸⁰

Abandoned and isolated, Samson is disconsolate and has given over completely to despair, which the play attributes to melancholy. Upon first viewing Samson, the Chorus bemoans, "See how he lies at random, carelessly diffused, / With languished head unpropped, / As one past hope, abandoned, / And by himself given over" (118–21, 713). Manoa also notes his son's "anguish of the mind and humors black" (600, 728). Furthermore, Samson says of himself:

My griefs not only pain me
As a ling'ring disease,
But finding no redress, ferment and rage,
Nor less than wounds immedicable
Rankle, and fester, and gangrene,
To black mortification. (618–22, 728)

The unpropped head, black humors, and morbidity of Samson's impassioned disease are all markers of uncontrolled, extreme melancholy, which, according to Robert Burton and other writers on the subject, can easily lead to despair and suicide.⁸¹ Samson proposes "death's benumbing opium as my only cure" (628, 728), and he does not purge these negative emotions in life. Lynn Veach Sadler suggests that Samson suffers from "Burtonian melancholy" (90), and although "Samson is treated with the Paracelsian over-plus until he surfeits on despair" (104), this does not provide a remedy for Samson. The tragic form promises a homeopathic remedy for melancholic readers or audience members, but Samson remains disconsolate. The Chorus reflects on Samson's inconsolable state, musing:

Many are the sayings of the wise
In ancient and in modern books enrolled,
Extolling patience as the truest fortitude,
And to the bearing well of all calamities,
All chances incident to man's frail life;
Consolatories writ
With studied argument, and much persuasion sought
Lenient of grief and anxious thought;
But with th' afflicted in his pangs their sound
Little prevails, or rather seems a tune,
Harsh, and of dissonant mood from his complaint,
Unless he feel within
Some source of consolation from above. (653–65, 729)

Consolation is never a one-size-fits-all concern. From Cicero to Henry Peacham, writers' advice for giving consolation warns that the consoler must be careful in their choice of consolatory strategy. Otherwise, the person in need of consolation will reject attempts at consolation.⁸² Yet the chorus's failure to console Samson results from their own inability to find any advantage in the adversity of blindness, even though Samson makes clear that his blindness is his most grievous ill, for which he needs the most consolation. In this sense, the failure to console Samson is a failure of his society's ableism.

The only possible glimmer of consolation for blindness in the play somewhat resembles Milton's autoconsolation of inner light, but in *Samson Agonistes* this light is untimely and harmful. Responding to the messenger's description of Samson's destruction of the theater, the Chorus likens him to a fiery

dragon, crying out, “But he though blind of sight, / Despised and thought extinguished quite, / With inward eyes illuminated / His fiery virtue roused / From under ashes into sudden flame” (1648–52, 758). The Chorus utters this consolation after Samson’s death—too late to serve Samson. This inner light, like dragon fire, emanates from within Samson to incinerate his enemies, but it also incinerates Samson. This fiery light brings to mind the early modern concept of adustian, in which humors burn within the body, erupting into the most violent form of melancholy. *Samson Agonistes* never depicts blindness as an enabling superpower, even when Samson turns supercrip.

Moreover, Samson’s memorial, like Milton’s monument in the church of St Giles, foregoes mention of his disability. As Joe Moshenska has recently observed, “Building a monument is an act of collective remembrance that is also an act of collective forgetting: a forgetting of doubts, debates, conflicts, buried beneath a marble heap of apparent unanimity” (359). Samson’s memorialization forgets his disability. Manoa relates that he will bring his son’s body “Home to his father’s house: there will I build him / A monument, and plant it round with shade / Of laurel ever green, and branching palm, / With all his trophies hung, and acts enrolled / In copious legend, or sweet lyric song” (1733–37, 760).⁸³ This monument to Samson, in which his “acts” will be “enrolled,” or recorded, “In copious legend, or sweet lyric song” (1736–37), is no more effective consolation or valuation of blindness in this play than the consolations “In ancient and in modern books enrolled” (654, 729), to which the Chorus refers but never resorts.⁸⁴ In Milton’s version of Samson’s story, Samson exemplifies what happens when consolation for blindness is denied. For Petrarch, Samson exemplifies militaristic consolation for blindness (*De rem.* 2. 96; 238); for Marvell, Samson is a monstrous example of disability leading to spite and vengefulness (“On Mr. Milton’s *Paradise Lost*” 9–10, 287). Samson’s disability narrative may provide writers with *auctoritas*, or an authorized example to cite, but Samson, who is not an *auctor*, does not gain crip authority from his blindness, which he only ever repines.

Milton, unlike Samson, had access to many forms of consolation—ancient and modern. He also was fortunate in his community of friends and consoling authorities, who supported him in his blindness. Petrarch, Teresa de Cartagena, Cervantes, Burton, and Milton all draw from the font of consolation to forge raw and moving disability narratives. They depict their experiences of disability as a culturally authorized, human experience. Recovering their voices as disability narrative enhances our archive of disability representation and adds social realism to the depiction of disability in the past. It enables us to recognize communities of crip readers and scholars who have

received these canonical works as statements about the value of disability. It thus provides us with historical models of disability gain and ultimately helps us to crip the Renaissance. Although most of the blind figures whom Milton cites were not themselves writers, Milton was aware of blind authors, and, as the next chapter explores, the blind author Giovanni Paolo Lomazzo may have helped Milton to “sing darkling” (*PL* 3, 59) and certainly shows others to paint with crip pride.

Six

Styling Disability

Lomazzo, Mannerism, and Crip Touches Across Time



In his brief autobiography, *Vita*, which appears at the end of his poetry collected as *Rime* (1587),¹ the blind Milanese painter and art theorist Giovanni Paolo Lomazzo (1538–1592) narrates his life.² Lomazzo relates details about his birth, family, and education and presents a descriptive list of paintings that he executed. Lomazzo then discloses his blindness as follows:

[P]er grave accidente gli occhi miei
Chiusi e perdei l'amata e cara luce,
Che mi fece restar fuor di me stesso.

By a serious accident my eyes
Were Closed and I lost the beloved and dear light,
Which left me beside myself. (*Vita* 637)

Lomazzo characterizes his onset of blindness as the result of a serious accident rather than a moral failing or punishment from God. Nevertheless, he gives this accident a prodigious twist, indicating that his blindness was foretold: “Sì come avea predetto il gran Cardano, / Medico e matematico pregiato” (“Just as the great Cardano had predicted, / The valuable Physician and mathematician”), and as “il famoso astrologo [Girolamo] Vicenza . . . Predisse anch'egli molto tempo inanzi” (“the famous astrologer [Girolamo] Vicenza . . . Also predicted a long time before” *Vita* 637). Lomazzo's disability narrative thus represents blindness as a marvel and demonstrates his



Figure 5: Annibale Fontana, Giovanni Paolo Lomazzo (obverse), after 1571, bronze portrait medal, 2" diameter, Creative Commons License Zero, Samuel H. Kress Collection. Courtesy National Gallery of Art, Washington, DC.

membership in a community of supportive and illustrious men. Lomazzo wrote laudatory verses to Cardano and Vicenza, who were both astrologers.³ It is possible that Cardano's books of consolation—which included consolation for blindness and other disabilities—as well as his convictions that blind people could use technology to write and could be educated provided Lomazzo with comfort.⁴ Vicenza was the official astrologer for the Milanese Accademia della Valle di Blenio,⁵ of which Lomazzo was president. Furthermore, Lomazzo made portraits of both great men: Cardano, "Il qual ritrassi con sua sfera e libri" ("Who I portrayed with his sphere and books"), and Vicenza, "Che parimente fu da me ritratto" ("Who likewise was portrayed by me" *Vita* 637).⁶ Lomazzo increases his authority by tying himself to these



Figure 6: Annibale Fontana, Lomazzo Bowing to Mercury and Fortune (reverse), bronze portrait medal, 2" diameter, Creative Commons Zero, Samuel H. Kress Collection. Courtesy National Gallery of Art, Washington, DC.

figures through his own artistic talent and their social support and understanding of his blindness.

Although his blindness is upsetting, Lomazzo accepts his situation and finds consolation in art. Resigning himself to his fate, Lomazzo states further on, “Con molti mali et assai beni ancora, / Di quai parte ne lascio, e parte seguo, / Al eterno voler di Dio conforme” (“With many evils and many goods still, / Part of which I leave, and part I follow, / Conforming to the eternal will of God” *Vita* 637). Lomazzo accepts the will of God and that of “la fortune” (“fortune”), written in the “cieli” (“heavens”) to which “m’inchinava” (“I bow” 637). Lomazzo then refers to a “medaglia” (“medal” 639), which the Milanese sculptor and engraver Annibale Fontana (1540–1587) cast for him “In questa cecitate” (“In this blindness” 638).⁷

The Roman portrait coins of antiquity that Petrarch admired inspired the invention of the portrait medals of the Renaissance.⁸ Portrait medals had social, mnemonic, and emotional significance for sitters and recipients, and they appealed to multiple senses. They contributed to the authority of the sitter, because they “exalted the individual in indelible materials (thereby ensuring immortality) while harking back to classical Roman prototypes” (Flaten, “Identity” 59). They could be cast or struck in precious or alloy metal and were often “cast in multiples and distributed amongst other members of society” (R. Howard 293). Portrait medals usually present a portrait on the obverse or front side and a personal allegorical scene with motto on the reverse or backside that functions much like a personal impresa. As Rebecca Howard relates, an early modern person might encounter such a medallion in a multisensory manner by holding it in their hands, “where they might first notice the size of the object—sometimes small enough to hold between the fingers, sometimes large enough to cover the palm” (294). They could “note the weight and even the temperature of the object—having just picked it up, the metal would feel cold against their skin. As they bring the object closer to their face to thoroughly examine the raised surfaces, they might even pick up its metallic scent” (294). The tactile element of these objects is significant, for “studying the medallion they run their fingers over the surface of both sides, turning the object back and forth as they experience the varying levels of relief. Through this multisensory viewing, the three-dimensionality of the medallion is amplified” (294). Fontana’s cast of Lomazzo’s portrait medal not only enhances Lomazzo’s authority; it does so in a manner that was accessible to Lomazzo and other potential, blind recipients or “viewers” of the work.

Fontana’s medal might have served as a consolation for Lomazzo, who could no longer see but now could feel his own self-portrait.⁹ Lomazzo tells us that the medal Fontana struck for him after he became blind is based on Lomazzo’s own “rotondo e grande” (“round and large” 639) self-portrait (now held at the Kunsthistorisches Museum in Vienna),¹⁰ which Lomazzo executed in his youth (ca. 1555–1560).¹¹ Like Lomazzo’s self-portrait, Fontana’s portrait medal’s obverse depicts a classical profile portrait of Lomazzo facing left. Unlike Lomazzo’s painted self-portrait, Lomazzo’s features are heavier and more distinct, which could reflect his age or could have made his features more discernable to the touch. As in the painted self-portrait, Lomazzo has curly hair and a beard. He wears a tunic tied over one shoulder revealing the other shoulder and prominent clavicle. On the reverse of the medal, Mercury presents Lomazzo to Fortune, to whom Lomazzo bows, much as Lomazzo indicates in his *Vita* that he “*inchinava*,” or bowed, to his Fortune of blindness (637). Lomazzo is presented full length, again wearing a knotted tunic.

Mercury, whose astrological influences include strengths in art and poetry, is depicted nude but for a loincloth and winged helmet carrying a caduceus. Fortune appears nude, perched on a mound of earth, and holds up a cloth like a sail over and behind her head, indicating how easily fortune, like the wind, can change. The Latin inscription around the medal's edge reads "UTRI-USQUE" ("either sort"), which serves as Lomazzo's motto and appears in the title of Petrarch's work of consolation *De remediis utriusque fortunae*. In other words, Lomazzo accepts his fate of blindness, be it good or bad.

I open this chapter with Lomazzo's disability disclosure and how it touches on this medal—cast for Lomazzo in his marvelous blindness—to emphasize how the history of art might bear a crip reverse—constantly present though not often chosen for display—that can provide crip touches across time and another avenue for discovering crip authority.¹² Produced in large numbers and shared widely in the Renaissance, portrait medals have received less scholarly attention than other small-format, portable forms such as the painted portrait miniature. Yet they could provide clues about the history of touch in the experience of art and how that experience might be enhanced by blind cripistemology. Today, gaining permission to touch art in museums is sometimes granted as an accommodation for blind people. Nevertheless, as Kleege and others suggest, "Blind people who are granted this exceptional access could join with the professionals who regularly handle art works—conservators, exhibit installers, not to mention artists themselves—to add another category of aesthetic value" (*More Than Meets the Eye* 72).¹³ Including the perspectives of blind "viewers" in the experience of art and the history of that experience provides, moreover, another example of what Dokumaci calls disability as method.

Crip authority permeates Lomazzo's disability narrative and art theory. Along with writing about his experience of blindness in his *Vita*, he discloses his disability in his two works of art theory, *Trattato dell'arte della pittura . . .* (1584) (henceforth *Trattato*) and *Idea del tempio della pittura* (1590) (henceforth *Idea*).¹⁴ Lomazzo consoles himself for his blindness and finds crip authority in elaborating a Mannerist theory of art that benefits from disability gain, cripistemology, and disability as method.

Lomazzo is best known today for his theorization of Mannerism and his formulation of the sister arts.¹⁵ His experience of disability contributes to his authority on these matters. For Lomazzo, Mannerism prioritizes stylistic peculiarities, or *maniera*, based on the diverse body-minds of individual artists, including artists who, like Lomazzo, were melancholic. Furthermore, Lomazzo embraces a *concetto*, or idea of the subject of representation that

deemphasizes the sense of sight and emphasizes the artist's imagination. Unlike the physical sense of sight, the artist's inner sight is not constrained to what appears in nature and can, therefore, focus on wayward elements of representation, such as fanciful creatures that do not exist or abstracted methods for representing motion and emotion. Lomazzo's theorization of the grotesque values deviation from the norm and celebrates what we now think of as disability aesthetics. Lomazzo's blindness does not prevent him from theorizing painting; it contributes to the fertility of his own imagination.

The *paragone*, or contest between various art forms including painting, sculpture, and poetry, was a topic of great interest to the ancients, and Lomazzo brings this interrelation to the fore in his concept of the sister arts, particularly with his insistence on the tight relation between painting and poetry. This relation enables the blind poet and painter to exemplify his theory not with illustrative images but with examples taken from literature. Although his evocation of the sister arts presents them as impaired when separate, his ekphrastic practice demonstrates their potential for interdependence and mutual disability gain. Lomazzo's ekphrastic mode of instruction extends to his art of memory. He constructs a verbal memory theater to organize and remember the talents and works of exemplary painters. Lomazzo's blindness, in other words, helps make visual art legible and even teachable to readers who could not view works of art themselves.

Touching on Lomazzo's Blindness

By the age of thirty-two or thirty-three, which would have been in 1571 or 1572, Lomazzo was no longer able to paint. The occasional references to Lomazzo's blindness in scholarship tend to represent it as a curiosity or a curse. Lomazzo's own characterization of his disability and how it has been received by his peers and subsequent translators, editors, and scholars has not yet received attention. We do not know what caused Lomazzo's blindness, and we do not know how much he could see or how complete or partial his vision might have been. As with John Milton, retrospective diagnosis should be set aside in favor of Lomazzo's own disability narrative. Lomazzo's comments on his blindness can be found throughout the works he published after he went blind.¹⁶ His relation of his blindness in the *Vita* and comments interspersed throughout other of his works show a pattern of lamentation and consolation.

Lomazzo represents the onset of his blindness as untimely, and he laments that it put an end to his practical career as a painter. In the *Vita*, he explains,

Ma questo fu il dolor ch'in quella etade,
 Che fiori dovea l'arte, ciò m'avenne.
 Però che fu per mia infelice sorte
 Ne gl'anni trentatre de la mia etade:
 Ch'allora il tempo era d'esprimer l'arte
 Co' suoi veri color, ch'in gioventute
 Non seppi, bench'ardente era il desio.
 Ma nel età virile il tutto arei
 Fatto con ragion vere e salde e ferme:
 Che arei appresso oprando spesso il stile.

Yet this was the sorrow—in the time of life
 When art should have flourished—that befell me.
 All the same it was by my unhappy lot
 In the thirty-third year of my age:
 In a time meant for me to convey art
 With its true colors, which in youth I knew not,
 Although ardent was my desire.
 But in manhood everything would have been done with reason, steadfast
 and firm,
 Which I would have learned after often practicing the style. (637)

Lomazzo indicates that blindness interrupts his visual art practice in mid-career. He had already emphasized this untimeliness in his disclosure of blindness in the *Trattato*.¹⁷ Later on in his *Idea*, Lomazzo again refers to the temporal significance of his blindness, “essendo rimasto cieco nel più bel verde dell'età mia, quando appena ero aggiunto à trenta trè anni” (“being left blind in the most beautiful verdure of my years, when I was only just thirty-three” 244; trans. mine). The use of green or verdant images in a life interrupted figures blindness as a killing frost, something that, while it can and does happen, is nonetheless devastating to a tender and vulnerable young plant's ability to bloom and thrive.¹⁸ Lomazzo's imagery here has the potential to represent blindness as deadly, which Bolt identifies as a damaging metanarrative of blindness (111–25).

If Giorgio Vasari (1511–1572)—a contemporary of Lomazzo and the most famous biographer of Italian Renaissance painters—had been writing about Lomazzo's life, the story probably would have ended here. Vasari considers blindness a death blow to an artist's productive life. In book 3 of his *Lives*, Vasari narrates the life of Piero della Francesca—aka Piero Borghese

(1416–1492)—whose career as a painter was halted by blindness and who Vasari depicts in the most tragic of terms. He includes Borghese with those who are “[t]ruly unhappy”—artists who are “hindered by infirmity and sometimes by death from carrying to perfection the works that they have begun” (vol. 3, 17). Even worse, Vasari observes that being forced to leave their work “all but finished or in a fair way to completion” (17), unscrupulous competitors steal the attribution of these unfortunates’ works. This is the tragic tale of Piero della Francesca, a painter and writer of art theory, who, despite “having been held a rare master of the difficulties of drawing regular bodies, as well as of arithmetic and geometry,” was unable—“being overtaken in his old age by the infirmity of blindness, and finally by the close of his life—to bring to light his noble labours and the many books written by him” (17). According to Vasari, Borghese’s own student “was impious and malignant enough to seek to blot out the name of his teacher, and to usurp for himself the honour that was due to the other, publishing under his own name, Fra Luca dal Borgo, all the labours of that good old man” (17). For Vasari, blindness is a tragedy that ends the career of the artist and leaves them and their works vulnerable to fraud.

Nevertheless, Lomazzo insists that blindness does not end his creative life. His blindness does not prevent him from continuing to work; it pushes him to work differently. As do other disabled authors in this study, Lomazzo makes clear that disability in no way leads to idleness:

Ma se la cruda Sorte mi fe’ privo
De gl’occhi, pur non mai ozioso volsi
Stare: ma dièimi di Pittura a l’opra,
E quella de i *Grotteschi* ch’or vien fori.

Yet though raw chance deprived me
Of my eyes, I never stayed idle:
But I gave myself over to composing the work on painting,
And to that of the *Grotteschi* which has come to pass. (*Vita* 638)

Lomazzo denies that disability has made him “ozioso” (“idle”). He adduces the publication of the *Trattato* and the volume *Rime*, to which the *Vita* is appended, as evidence of his continuing ability to work.

Furthermore, Lomazzo takes comfort in the fact that blindness beneficially leads him to more theoretical work, illustrating disability gain. In the larger context of his continued work, Lomazzo considers his blindness another important step in his development as an artist as follows:

A quest'arte essendomi io applicato insin da fanciullo et in lei continuamente essercitomi, ora riducendo in pratica quanto dalla teorica e dalla contemplazion di essa mi era posto inanzi, infin che mi è stato concesso goder la luce de gl'occhi, et ora con la teorica, dopo la perdita della luce, mi è caduto in pensiero di raccorre tutto quello che e leggendo e praticando ho essercitato intorno a lei.

I have devoted myself to this art since I was a child and have continued to exercise it by putting into practice what theory and contemplation proposed when I [still enjoyed the light of my eyes. And in applying myself to theory, after having lost this light, the idea occurred to me to collect everything I had experienced in painting through reading and practice]. (*Idea* 245; 47)

In this passage Lomazzo indicates that blindness does not bring a total halt to his work as a painter; rather, blindness turns his work in a new direction. Lomazzo's theoretical work is an extension of its practice. Because of his blindness, "tutto rivolto alla teorica, hò atteso solamente ad ampliar esse regole e osservazioni, con studio continuo e faticoso, mà non però mai grave, anzi giocondo sempre e dilettevole" ("I turned entirely to theory, to which I dedicated myself solely to expanding these rules and observations, with continual and strenuous study, but all the same never too serious, on the contrary always cheerful and delightful" *Idea* 244). Rather than expressing sorrow for the lost opportunity to develop his skills as a painter, Lomazzo welcomes the difficult but also delightful work of composing theory.

Other models for depicting disabled artists' lives with disability gain existed in Lomazzo's time. Lomazzo was familiar with the writings of Leon Battista Alberti (1404–1472),¹⁹ who in his own *Vita* (*writing about himself in the third person*) explains how in the midst of his legal studies he was "overcome by a very serious illness" (217). This illness impaired his cognition such that his memory was compromised to the point that "[o]n occasions the names of his closest relatives and friends would not come to him, even though he regularly frequented them (yet he had an amazingly tenacious memory for things he had seen)" (217). Similarly to Lomazzo, Alberti's disability opens him to other kinds of work, for although "he abandoned those studies which rely most heavily on memory, just when he was in his prime," he then "turned, at the age of twenty-four, to natural philosophy and mathematics; for he was confident that he could cope with these subjects adequately, since he realized that they demanded more of one's intelligence than of one's memory" (217). In other words, the cognitive impairment that was brought on by Alberti's

illness made him into what we might now call a more visual learner and drew him down the path of mathematics and, eventually, to painting. While Alberti loses some of his ability with words and the memory that literary practice demanded in his time, he indicates that he gains in his ability to work with images and the disciplines that require this facility.

Lomazzo, like Alberti, finds advantage in his disability. Lomazzo argues that his blindness has made him a better art theorist by forcing him to focus on inner sight, which is essential to Lomazzo's concept of invention. In his disclosure of blindness in the *Trattato*, Lomazzo explains:

Il desiderio naturale che ho d'ampliare questa arte della pittura, nella sono allevato e cresciuto dalla mia puerizia infino all'età di trenta due anni, nella quale perdei la luce, e dopoi fino a questa età, speculandola, mi ha svegliato gl'occhi dell'intelletto et assottigliatolo di modo che potessi investigar cose tale, le quali spero non doveranno dispiacere, se non a tutti, almanco a gli studiosi di questa mia professione, per non essere state mai dichiarate prima da alcuno in questo modo.

The natural desire I have to augment this art of painting, in which I was educated and raised from my childhood up to the age of thirty two, when I lost the light, and speculating on it from then until this age, woke me to the sight of the intellect and sharpened it so that I could investigate such matters which I hope will not displease, if not everyone, at least the scholars of this profession of mine, as never having been declared before by anyone in this manner. (*Trattato* 260)

Lomazzo's declaration of his ability to convey his art is confident. He does not express doubts about the utility of the endeavor, and his blindness only adds to his authority as an artist.

Emphasis on the inner senses fits well with the Neoplatonic theories of the *concetto*, or the idea of art that Lomazzo espouses in his treatises, in which physical vision is detrimental to the creative process. Lomazzo promotes a model of artistic inspiration in which the inner and not the outer senses receive a divinely inspired *concetto*, or idea of the work.²⁰ Physical hearing and sight are, according to Lomazzo, distractions that the artist should avoid in the creative process. The artist should “fuggir gli strepiti, e massime l'occasioni di vedere” (“flee clamorous noise, and most of all occasions for seeing” *Trattato* 417). Lomazzo cites examples of alleged self-blinding for this purpose, stating, “Omero, Democrito e Platone da se stessi si privarono della luce de gl'occhi per meglio e più sottilmente investigare la natura di quello che nella

sua mente concetto et imaginato s'avevano" ("Homer, Democritus and Plato deprived themselves of the light of their eyes to better and more subtly investigate the nature of what they had conceived and imagined in their minds" *Trattato* 417). Though likely spurious, stories of these figures' self-blinding are frequently included in consolations for the blind (e.g., Petrarch, *De rem.* 2. 96), and Lomazzo evidently considers them authoritative. Fleeing the physical senses is important for not only the conception but also the initial execution of the *concetto*. Jean Julia Chai paraphrases Lomazzo's advice to muffle the physical senses as much as possible to capture the *concetto* as follows:

The form must be allowed to "quietly" (*chetamente*) emerge with the thinnest lines of watercolor or chalk on tinted paper, avoiding materials of high contrast, such as dark black ink on white paper or anything visually jarring that might confuse or "tire the brain." . . . As figurative conception demands the utmost silence and darkness, so its materialization asks for the subtlest, faintest lines to articulate the fragile new form, as if physically replaying the delicate process of discernment that occurred in the mind. ("Introduction" 19)²¹

Lomazzo advises painters to focus on inner rather than physical senses in the conception and even in the initial sketches for their works, a practice that Lomazzo may have been able to continue even in his blindness.²² His ability to give advice on this matter is only enhanced by the inner sight he believes to be a recompense for his vision loss.

The paratextual poems dedicated to Lomazzo in his works further bolster his crip authority. These poems echo and amplify Lomazzo's belief in the enhancement of inner vision in blindness. For instance, a sonnet by Giuliano Goselini (1525–1587) indicates that Lomazzo was such a fine painter that he rivaled "Natura" ("Nature"), who, "dal suo pennel vinta" ("defeated by his brush"), took away his sight in spite but compensated him "con la vista interna" ("with inner sight" *Trattato* sig. A3v).²³ Similarly, in a Latin epigram, Sigismundus Folanus (d. 1592) praises Lomazzo's "menti lux" ("light of the mind") over that "oculis" ("of the eyes" sig. A5r).²⁴ The paratextual material to Lomazzo's works also compares him to illustrious blind figures, such as Homer and Tiresias, which, as the previous chapter on Milton illustrates, is a commonplace consolation for blindness in the period. It is probable, as Barbara Tramelli has suggested (*Giovanni Paolo Lomazzo* 78–79), that Lomazzo's friends and

fellow members of the Accademia de la Val del Blenio, which Lomazzo continued to lead after the onset of his blindness, might have aided him in the publication of his work. It is certainly the case that their friendship would have provided him with consolation.

Lomazzo increases his awareness of inner sight and ties it to spiritual consolation in the *Idea*, where he exercises a strategic humility topos and places his faith in God to compensate for any physical lack of sight:

[I]o non ho dubitato di pormi a questa impresa, confidatomi in Dio, che mosso dalle preghiere da me portegli con umile et acceso affetto, adempirà della sua grazia il mio diffetto, sì che in qualche parte potrà adombrare e colorare questo disegno.

I did not hesitate to undertake this enterprise, entrusting myself to God, [who moved by prayers offered by me in all humility and fervent passion will redeem my infirmity through his grace, such that I will in a manner shade and color in this design]. (*Idea* 245; 47)

This passage exhibits the strategic expression of humility that this study has frequently observed in early modern disability narratives. Lomazzo also finds spiritual strength in his disability. God, before whom Lomazzo is humble, will compensate for his loss of physical sight by showing him grace and guiding his endeavor. Lomazzo figures God as a sighted painter helping to guide Lomazzo's brush to shade and color Lomazzo's own design. Much like Teresa de Cartagena, Lomazzo humbly figures his disability as contributing to his closeness with God, and he protects his own work by attributing it to God's grace.

To stave off ableist criticism, disabled authors frequently embrace composite models of imitation. In the *Idea*, Lomazzo indicates worry over possible scrutiny and resorts to the apian model of imitation to express his indebtedness to his sources. Noting how others are brought to ridicule for their efforts, Lomazzo indicates that he fears the same will happen to him and that "molti lacereranno queste mie fatiche" ("many will tear apart these efforts of mine" *Idea* 262; 59). As a proleptic defense for such criticism when addressing his readers, Lomazzo accordingly says he will follow the honeybee's mode of gathering and processing sources. Lomazzo's ideal reader

vedrà con diletto, senza alcuna fatica sua, quello che io, se non con lunghissimo tempo e con faticosa, né mai intermessa osservazione,

volando a guisa d'ape sollecita et industriosa intorno a tutte le più lodate opere di pitture et a tutti i libri dove io congetturassi potersi trovare alcuna cosa appartenente all'arte,

will delight in seeing[, without any effort], what I have been able to collect with much time and laborious, incessant observation, hovering like an industrious and solicitous bee around the most laudable paintings and books where I [conjectured] something might be found concerning art. (248; 48)

Lomazzo makes his work effortlessly accessible “a gli occhi altrui” (“to the eyes of others” 248; trans. mine), and he hopes his efforts will be “lette e giudicate” (“read and judged”) with “la qual candidezza” (“the same candor”) and that his works will “non frodandole di quella poca lode, la quale io so che sola gli si debbe, cioè di diligenza e di desiderio di giovare con tutte le forze mie a gli amatori della pittura” (“not be denied the modest praise I know they deserve, if for nothing but my diligence and desire to be useful with all my force to admirers of painting” *Idea* 248; 48). Lomazzo simply asks that readers give him the same respect he gives his own diverse sources and to remember “con quanta candidezza senza invidiare le lode dovute altrui, io ho fatto menzione di tutti quelli che hanno dato lume a quest'arte” (“with what candor, free from jealousy, I have duly praised all those who have enlightened this art” 248; 48). Lomazzo's anxiety about the reception of his work is, of course, a usual concern for artists and writers, but his disability makes his situation more precarious.

Lomazzo's disability is certainly a liability for his initial reception in England, where perceived errors in Lomazzo's work are blamed on his blindness. Richard Haydock (1569/70–ca. 1642), the English translator of the *Treatato*, first compares Lomazzo favorably to ancient painters and philosophers, thereby augmenting Lomazzo's authority. Yet he finds the fact that Lomazzo was able to write when blind shocking as follows:

[W]hat soever his practize was (any token wherof my selfe could never bee so happy as to see) surely for his profound knowledge and deepe skill in the Arte, I speake confidently, hee was equall with, if not superior to Apelles, or any of the ancient: truly shewing himself another Aristotle, by compiling this most absolute body of the Arte: partly out of the writings of other men who had written of severall parts therof,

and partly out of his owne experience, which howe it could proove so great may seeme very strange, when you shall consider, that he was deprived of his sight at the 33 yeare of age. (sig. A2v)

Lomazzo's disability may not prevent him from acquiring the authority of the ancient painter "Apelles" and becoming "another Aristotle" for setting down the art of painting, but, according to Haydock, this is a "very strange" exception to the rule of the capacities of blind people. Here Haydock maliciously wonders at Lomazzo's ability to write about art when blind, while he uncritically admits that he has never seen Lomazzo's work.

Furthermore, much like Richard Bentley does for Milton's *Paradise Lost*, Haydock attributes errors in the *Trattato* to Lomazzo's disability, and he further demeans Lomazzo by depicting blindness as causing slack-jawed and senseless errors. Haydock scorns Lomazzo's blindness, insulting him as follows:

I tolde you before that mine Auctour was blind, and therefore no marveile if he swall[ow]ed so many flies of presse-erreurs; some superficial & light, some substantiall and material: partly in the calculations, . . . partly in the precepts and discourses, where words and peeces of sentences (in likelihood interlined in the manuscript) are often either left out, or wrongly placed, . . . all which I hope I have restored so neere to the Auctours meaning, that if I have not attained it wholly, yet I presume I have not swarved much from the subject. (sig. A24r)

Here blindness equates to a revolting and complete lack of literal taste and discernment. Yet for Haydock, it would seem that flies are delicious, as he swallows plenty of them in his own, imperfect translation of Lomazzo. Haydock also occludes passages, some for fear of idolatrous content²⁵ and some without comment, and simply halts his translation, omitting the entirety of the final two books of the treatise (which make up roughly a third of the content). Haydock himself avers that he at first works from a corrupted copy of the *Trattato* that was possibly damaged in a shipwreck.²⁶ The larger problem here is that, without dragging out examples, this ableist editorial and scholarly practice persists in Lomazzo studies, even when scholars take Haydock to task for his own flaws. To be fair, the text of the *Trattato* is not a joy to read. As Gerald Ackerman avers, the book was "badly printed" (318). It is dense and full of circuitous paths. None of Lomazzo's printed books are without printer

errors, but this is true for many Renaissance authors. As Horace's sententious statement in his *Ars Poetica* line 359 avers, "even Homer nods," meaning that even the most capable writers can make mistakes. Moreover, Lomazzo's language can be confounding. Lomazzo self-consciously embraced linguistic diversity and wrote grotesque poems that were deliberately convoluted, playful, and obscure. Though Lomazzo's work is hard to read, perhaps the difficulty of his treatises should not be solely attributed to print disability.

Lomazzo's work had a tangible influence in the Renaissance,²⁷ including on authors who were themselves disabled or took an interest in the lives of disabled people. Frederick de Armas and Victoria Pineda argue for the indirect influence of Lomazzo on Cervantes's conceptions of the grotesque and the passions, respectively (de Armas, "Nero's Golden House"; Pineda).²⁸ Robert Burton cites Lomazzo's *Trattato (Anatomy 3, 226)*, and his brother William Burton (1575–1645) was familiar with it as well.²⁹ The physician, polymath, and advocate for Deaf rights and education John Bulwer (1606–1656) cites Lomazzo in his treatise on hand gestures (*Chirologia 216*) and may have drawn on Lomazzo for his use of the word "motist," or one who is expert in communicating with movement, including sign language.³⁰ It has also been suggested that Milton may have drawn on Lomazzo for the concept and figuration of landscape in *Paradise Lost*.³¹ His melancholic pose of Samson in *Samson Agonistes*, whom the chorus observes "lies at random, carelessly diffused, / With languished head unpropped" (*SA 118–19, 713*), conforms with Lomazzo's instructions for figuring melancholy with actions "slow, heavie, and restrained" and to position the "partes of the body, by making them hang, and decline" (*Trattato* trans. Haydock sig. Aa6v.).³² Certainly, Lomazzo's Mannerist art theory has been his most recognized legacy, and this theory is also inflected with his lived experience of disability.

Maniera, Crip-Style

Art historians recognize Lomazzo as an authority, if not *the* authority, on Italian Mannerism. Julius von Schlosser (1866–1938) famously called Lomazzo's *Trattato* Mannerism's "vera Bibbia" ("true Bible" 395).³³ Like the author of its "Bible," Mannerism has been called "untidy" (Shearman 16). After its heyday in the sixteenth century, it was at times considered "perverse and decadent" (16). It was reassessed in the early twentieth century as "strange and fascinating" and even sometimes "beautiful" (16). All agree that the term "Mannerism" derives from the Italian word *maniera*—style or manner—as applied to artworks and their artists by writers on art from Vasari to Lomazzo

and beyond. Yet, in speaking of Mannerism's origins in the word *maniera*, John Shearman avers that "there were two sides to this coin" and that "it was understood that *maniera*, whether in people or works of art, entailed a refinement of and abstraction from nature and this might or might not be a good thing" (18).

Mannerism, as theorized by Lomazzo, embraces the particularities of the artist, encouraging them to discover and embrace their own style that springs from a variety of circumstances, from the astrological to the humoral. As Martin Kemp observes, Lomazzo's theory is an extension of Neoplatonic concepts of "auto-mimesis, or, to use the contemporary catchphrase, *ogni dipintore dipinge se*" (10). Auto-mimesis can spark fear that artists might replicate disabilities in their own art in a manner akin to fears over the monstrous imagination. For instance, Leonardo da Vinci (1452–1519) worries that if the painter "is ill-proportioned, his figures will be likewise; and if he is mad, this will be shown conspicuously in his narratives, in which his figures will be the enemies of reason" (Leonardo, ct. Kemp 11).³⁴ Lomazzo's appreciation for variation eschews these fears in favor of a Mannerist tolerance for the strange and even monstrous.

Lomazzo bases his theory of *maniera* of style on an overall appreciation for the variability of human body-minds. He finds delight in such diversity, appreciating

nel mondo quella differenza tanto grata a gl'occhi nostri di tanti uomini particolari (la qual differenza fanno le sette particolarità che chiamano i filosofi individuanti, che sono sette accidenti sostanziali che causano la individuazione e singolarità ne la sostanza e sono cagione di tanta diversità e bellezza.

that diversity in the world that so pleases our eyes of so many particular people (which variety is caused by the seven particularities that philosophers call substantial accidents which cause individuation and singularity in the substance and are the cause of so much diversity and beauty. (*Trattato* 31; trans. mine)

Lomazzo goes on to elaborate seven major kinds of diverse talents, which he illustrates in the *Idea* with seven excellent practitioners whose styles are born out of their astrological, terrestrial, and humoral influences.³⁵ Again, Lomazzo places value on diversity in this formulation, stating that artists "sono pervenuti al colmo dell'eccellenza, nondimeno in alcuno non si scorti

ge una medesima maniera, ma varie tutte e fra sé l'une dall'altre differenti” (“who have reached the apogee of excellence . . . did not reach it in the same manner, but all with different manners, dissimilar from one another” *Idea* 252; 51). As several scholars have argued,³⁶ Lomazzo’s move away from a singular ideal of imitation to a multiplicity of possible good styles is one of his most important contributions to Mannerism. It is also more accommodating of disabled artists, subjects, and disability aesthetics.

Mannerism is just as much about the body-mind of the artist as it is about the work of art, and this potentially includes disabled artists as well as subjects. As Katherine Park and Loraine Daston observe,

Within the aesthetic of Mannerism, which emphasized invention and technical virtuosity, artists (like poets) provoked audiences to wonder not only by depicting marvels in their works, but also by the extraordinary force of imagination with which they did so: the artist or poet himself became the marvel, not the work. . . . Such an aesthetic saw even monsters as works of art, awakening wonder in onlookers by their rarity and oddity, as well as by the ingenuity of their maker. Human monsters who survived to adulthood were often commemorated in admiring woodcuts, copper engravings, and verse, and some of those who ended up at court were subjects of official portraiture. (210–11)

Mannerism appreciates the marvelous and the monstrous, which I have argued are two sides of the coin of disability in premodernity (Bearden, *Monstrous Kinds*). Lomazzo’s valuation of disability as a source of creativity in artists’ *maniera* is evident in his estimation of melancholic artists; his encouragement of art that exudes marvelous monstrosity is apparent in his formulation of the grotesque.

Melancholic *Maniera*

Lomazzo recognizes what have been called the two faces of melancholy, or what Burton refers to as its sweet and sour qualities, and he emphasizes its genial aspects as a source of creativity for himself and other artists. As chapter 4 of this study explores in more depth, melancholy is an early modern form of mental disability with poles of brilliant creativity contrasted with extreme madness or suicidal despair. In the astrological parlance of the time, the

planet Saturn was responsible for melancholy, and Lomazzo details Saturn's influence in his guidance for how to represent melancholy in art. According to Lomazzo, Saturn's influences are "in parte buoni et in parte, secondo la disposizion di chi gli riceve, sono rei, come piante e malencolie" ("partly good, and partlie bad, according to the disposition of him that receiveth them, as weeping [and] melancholy" *Trattato* 108; sig. Bb3v). He avers that Saturn is foremost of the planets and characterizes its sway as

sapiente, intelligente, ingenipso, seme di profondità, autore della contemplazione secreta, impressore di gran pensieri ne i corpi umani, distruttore e conservatore, sovertitor della forza e potestà custode delle cose ascoste, però che le fa perdere e trovare.

Wise, Intelligent, Ingenious, the seed of great profundity, the auctor of secret contemplation, the imprinter of weighty thoughts in men, a destroyer and preserver, the subverter of power and might, the keeper of hidden things, and the auctor of finding and loosing. (*Trattato* 108; sig. Bb 3r)

Lomazzo does not depict melancholy as entirely good or bad. His advice on how to paint its characteristics in the *Trattato* conforms with the melancholic pose popularized in Dürer's *Melencolia I* (see fig. 3 in chap. 4 of this study). The person suffering from melancholy should be depicted with a dark or yellowish complexion (105; sig. Aa3v–sig. Bb1r), their movements should be heavy and slow (105; sig. Aa6v), and with drooping posture drawn downward to the Earth, sometimes with the hand propping the head (113–14; sig. Cc1r).³⁷

Lomazzo represents his own *maniera* as Saturnine or melancholic.³⁸ In his *Vita*, for instance, he refers to his work as "Saturnia arte" ("Saturnine art" *Rime* 627). In his sonnet to the medal that Fontana cast for him, Lomazzo describes the source of his own artistic inspiration as "furia di luna" ("lunar furor" *Rime* 93). James Lynch suggests that this lunar furor refers to "the 'divine frenzy' connected with Melancholy" ("G.P. Lomazzo" 195). According to Lynch, Lomazzo also represents himself as melancholic in an allegorical self-portrait now held in the Pinacoteca Brera Museum,³⁹ in which Lomazzo depicts himself as the president of the Accademia de Valle Di Blenio with costume and props symbolic of this position. Noting parallels between elements of this self-portrait and the objects depicted in Dürer's *Melencolia I*, Lynch states, "This welter of complex elements, however, is

pervaded by one dominant mood—depression. The features of Lomazzo are darkened by an expressive sadness, which is intensified through the dull somber tones of the brushwork” (194). Lynch believes “the ultimate meaning of our strange picture” to be “an allegory of Melancholy, derived basically from ideas of Albrecht Dürer and Marsilio Ficino” (194). Lomazzo was indeed a close reader of Ficino and was familiar with Dürer’s work. Lynch concludes that “as an artist and writer overwhelmed by a preponderance of the black humor,” Lomazzo “is blighted,” but “by way of recompense, on the other hand, Melancholy confers upon him the gifts and privileges of genius” (195).⁴⁰ Lomazzo’s self-portrait can be interpreted in various ways, but Lynch’s argument that it may represent the two faces of melancholy is convincing and fits with Lomazzo’s writing on the topic, providing further evidence that Lomazzo was melancholic.

Overall, Lomazzo’s Mannerist theory includes melancholy as a variation on *maniera* that has advantages.⁴¹ In his *Idea*, Lomazzo includes the Saturnian style as one of his seven examples of excellence. In particular, Lomazzo gives the Saturnine Michelangelo pride of place among the seven governors of painting and praises the outcome of his melancholic *maniera* above all others. In speaking of the variety of forms that different *maniera* produce, Lomazzo assigns animals to each of the seven artists who represent the diverse kinds of excellence in painting (*Idea* 292; 90–91). For Michelangelo, Lomazzo chooses an animal that will represent his melancholic *maniera*:

A Michel Angelo dunque ho dato il drago, di natura terribile, tardo e prudente. Perché egli ha dato alle figure sue una forma terribile cavata da i profondi secreti dell’anatomia, da pochissimi altri intesi, tarda, ma piena di dignità e maestà, con le arie e gli ai’fetti maninconici, quali sono degli uomini dati allo studio et alla contemplazione. E perché egli era tale ancora ne i suoi costumi, si può dire che sia stato fra i pittori come un Socrate.

So I gave to Michelangelo the dragon, whose nature is terrifying, slow, and prudent, because he gave his figures a terrifying form, derived from the profound secrets of anatomy comprehensible to very few. This form [of figuration] appears slow but filled with dignity and majesty, having melancholic airs and expressions resembling those of men devoted to study and contemplation. Since Michelangelo himself was like this, even in his comportment, it can be said that he was like a Socrates among painters. (91)

The dragon is a fearsome creature, but it is also a noble symbol for melancholy. Here, Lomazzo dignifies melancholy and emphasizes its positive affect on Michelangelo's painting. As Alessandra Ruffino suggests, "[M]alinconia dell'uomo di genio trova in Lomazzo un ottimo custode" ("The melancholy of the man of genius finds an excellent guardian in Lomazzo" *Rime* "Introduction" x). By favoring Michelangelo's melancholic *maniera*, moreover, Lomazzo gains crip authority for his own Saturnine style. Lomazzo believes that one's *maniera* comes from a natural conformity with one or another governor's style (*Idea* 292; 91). Lomazzo's preference for Michelangelo's melancholic *maniera* is thus another indication that this is Lomazzo's own, authoritative melancholic style.

Grotesques and Marvelous Disability Aesthetics

Lomazzo produces one of the most robust theorizations of the grotesque in the period. He grants it ancient authority and its own aesthetic value, based precisely in its strange and monstrous qualities. He also claims the grotesque as an important element of his own *maniera* in both painting and poetry. In his production and praise of grotesques, Lomazzo articulates a precursor to Tobin Siebers's concept of disability aesthetics (*Disability Aesthetics*). Keeping the scope of his study to modernity, Siebers explains, "Disability aesthetics names the emergence of disability in modern art as a significant presence, one that shapes modern art in new ways and creates a space for the development of disabled artists and subjects" (1). Siebers asserts that "aesthetics tracks the sensations that some bodies feel in the presence of other bodies" and adds that aesthetics "posits the human body and its affective relation to other bodies as foundational to the appearance of the beautiful—and to such a powerful extent that aesthetics suppresses its underlying corporeality only with difficulty" (1). Although aesthetic theory postdates the early modern period, its focus on the body and sensation relates well to Lomazzo's sense that the presence of bizarre or disabled bodies in the grotesque produces *maraviglia*, or the marvelous. Lomazzo's conceptualization of the grotesque produces what we might call a crip aesthetic, because of its transgressive and resignifying playfulness, which also fits well with M. M. Bakhtin's theorization of the grotesque in *Rabelais and His World* as part of the carnivalesque.⁴² That said, I use the term "disability aesthetics" here instead of "crip aesthetics" to acknowledge Siebers's fundamental contribution to this field and because this is the recognized term that other scholars working in premodernity have used to frame their own excavations of disability's history of representation

in art.⁴³ Rather than presuming that disability aesthetics only emerges in modernity, attention to the work of disabled artists and theorists such as Lomazzo unearths disability aesthetics in premodernity.

Although the word “grotesque” can be used pejoratively to denigrate people with disabilities,⁴⁴ the term originated in the Renaissance to describe the marvelous antique paintings that were discovered in underground Roman ruins. After its rediscovery around 1479, poets and painters made pilgrimages to the cave-like Domus Auria (built after 64 CE) to see the bizarrely beautiful fresco paintings of thickly intertwined and combined plant, animal, and human forms and artifacts that they called grotesques based on the word *grote*, or cave.⁴⁵ Lomazzo himself most likely viewed these paintings on a trip he took to Rome, where he went “[p]er veder le pitture et anticaglie” (“to see the paintings and antiquities” *Rime* 533).

In Lomazzo’s time, the grotesque was not without its detractors, who condemned its form and content as morally suspect and deviant.⁴⁶ Lomazzo was certainly aware of the commentary of Daniele Barbaro (1556–1562) on Vitruvius’s condemnation of grotesques. Barbaro argues that painting is “corrotti e guasti” (“corrupted and spoiled” Barocchi 2630) by grotesques because “nelle coperte de i muri si dipingono più presto i mostri che le certe imagini prese da determinate cose” (“on the wall surfaces monsters are painted more readily than certain images taken from determinate things” 2630). Commenting on Vitruvius’s objections to grotesques, Barbaro makes his case against the grotesque on moral and aesthetic grounds with a negative view of the grotesque’s celebration of monstrosity.⁴⁷

Furthermore, affinity for the creation of grotesque art might itself indicate mental atypicality or deviance. Although Vasari did not condemn all grotesques, he criticizes the painter Piero di Cosimo’s affinity for grotesques, which he argues manifests in Cosimo’s atypical personal behavior and ultimately limits his success as a painter.⁴⁸ After the death of his master, Cosimo

kept himself constantly shut up, and would not let himself be seen at work, leading the life of a man who was less man than beast. He would never have his rooms swept, he would only eat when hunger came to him, and he would not let his garden be worked or his fruit-trees pruned; nay, he allowed his vines to grow, and the shoots to trail over the ground, nor were his fig-trees ever trimmed, or any other trees, for it pleased him to see everything wild, like his own nature; and he declared that Nature’s own things should be left to her to look

after, without lifting a hand to them. He set himself often to observe such animals, plants, or other things as Nature at times creates out of caprice, or by chance; in which he found a pleasure and satisfaction that drove him quite out of his mind with delight. . . . He would sometimes stop to gaze at a wall against which sick people had been for a long time discharging their spittle, and from this he would picture to himself battles of horsemen, and the most fantastic cities and widest landscapes that were ever seen; and he did the same with the clouds in the sky. (vol. iv, 126)

According to Vasari, Cosimo finds beauty in what others perceive as disgusting disorder, including the effluvia of unkempt sick or disabled plant, animal, and human bodies. His work is filled with monsters, grotesques, and lugubrious images of death and the dying. As Karen Hope Goodchild argues, Vasari defames Cosimo's affinity for the grotesque in grotesque terms.⁴⁹ Lamenting Cosimo's atypical behavior, Vasari avers, "If Piero had not been so solitary, and had taken more care of himself in his way of living than he did, he would have made known the greatness of his intellect in such a way that he would have been revered, whereas, by reason of his uncouth ways, he was rather held to be a madman" (vol. iv, 127). Yet Vasari also concedes that "in the end he did no harm save to himself alone, while his works were beneficial and useful to his art" (vol. iv, 127). Vasari's anecdotes about Cosimo's behavior turn out to be questionable according to Goodchild, but they reflect a simultaneous fear and fascination both with the grotesque and with Cosimo's supposed mental disability.⁵⁰

In the *Trattato*,⁵¹ Lomazzo defends and authorizes grotesque painting by associating it with the ancient painting found in caves and by likening its marvelous signifying power to hieroglyphics and emblems.⁵² He defends the semantic power of the grotesque, averring

ch'egli è parere di molti dotti ed esperti nelle lettere, che queste grottesche, non solo siano così dette dalle grotte, perché gli antichi vi solessero talvolta ricoverarsi nascostamente per piacere e diletto con qualche sua amata; ma perché a proposito venivano fatte non altrimenti che enimmì, o cifere, o figure egizie, dimandate ieroglifici, per significare alcun concetto o pensiero sotto altre figure, come noi usiamo negli emblemi e nelle imprese. E per me credo che ciò fosse perché non ci è via più accomodata, per disegnare over mostrare qual concetto si voglia, della grottesca.

that it is the opinion of many scholars and experts in literature, that these grotesques are not only called this due to the caves, because the ancients sometimes used to shelter themselves there secretly with their lovers for pleasure and delight; but because they were made for nothing other than the purpose of enigmas, or ciphers, or Egyptian figures, called hieroglyphs, to signify some hidden concept or thought under other figures, as we use in emblems and *imprese*. And as for me I believe that this was because there is no more suitable way to draw or show whatever concept you want than with the grotesque. (369)

Lomazzo dignifies the grotesque not only by giving it an ancient origin but also by comparing it with foreign and venerable Egyptian hieroglyphs and with his own cultural material practice of crafting emblems and *imprese*.⁵³ All of these comparisons are to media that combine the visual and the verbal to make them more than the sum of their parts, enhancing the marvelous nature of the content.

The grotesque's authoritative, ancient origin and complex semiotics license it to encompass a free variety of forms. Lomazzo indicates that the grotesque allows the representation of

sacrifici, trofei, istromenti, gradi concavi, conversi, in giro e pendenti e rilevati; et oltre di ciò tutti gli animali, fogliami, arbori, figure, uccelli, sassi, monti, fiumi, campi, cieli, tempeste, saette, tuoni, frondi, fiori, frutti, lucerne, candelieri accesi, chimere, mostri et, in somma, tutto quello che si può trovare et immaginare.

offerings, trophies, instruments, concave, convex, and spiral staircases, both descending and ascending; in addition to all kinds of animals, foliage, trees, figures, birds, boulders, mountains, rivers, fields, heavens, storms, lightning bolts, thunderclaps, fronds, flowers, fruits, lamps, burning candelabra, chimeras, monsters and, in sum, all that can be found or imagined. (*Trattato* 369)

This variety of subject matter, which Lomazzo licenses with its origins and symbolic power, gives the artist freedom. Nevertheless, the grotesque is held together in its strange variety by what Lomazzo insists is its own authoritative, pleasing arrangement and form that creates a kind of orderly disorder. Grotesques are put to use for “libertà” (“freedom”), “and per dilettere vogliono essere fondate in su l’autorità dell’arte” (“in order to delight

they must be founded on the authority of art” 369). Lomazzo advises one should compose grotesques in “i vacui” (368)—hollow places or voids—and that they should have “verisimilitudine” (“verisimilitude” 369) by being balanced in their placement and scale. The grotesque delights through its interlaced extensions through space with strange intertwining and juxtapositions of plants, animals, objects, architectural features, and monsters (human and imaginary) in a manner that is at the same time rational and bizarre. To make grotesques pleasing, the artist must know how to make things “dalla natura disordinata all’ordinata” (“of a disordered nature orderly” 370).⁵⁴ For Lomazzo, in other words, the successful composer of grotesques must know how to make a kind of pleasing order out of what is naturally disordered. This reflects Siebers’s insistence that “disability aesthetics embraces beauty that seems by traditional standards to be broken, and yet it is not less beautiful, but more so, as a result” (*Disability Aesthetics* 3).⁵⁵ The grotesque occupies the voids—“i vacui”—in a manner that is not linear or symmetrical but recursive and counterbalanced and yet, in its own way, beautiful. Lomazzo delights in the monstrous human forms that make up a component of his concept of the grotesque. Though the arrangement of grotesques may follow its own kind of rules, its subjects, including people with atypical bodies, are free of strictures and, at the same time, pleasing. The grotesque includes the representation of people with physical disabilities, or so-called human monsters.⁵⁶ In his chapter “Della forma de gl’uomini monstruosi” (“On the form of human monsters” *Trattato* 552), Lomazzo advises the painter that because Nature herself does not abide by any “lege o regola,” (“law or standard” 552) in the creation of monsters, it is not possible for Lomazzo to provide strict laws or standards for their representation. He can only provide examples of such people with which “il pittore possa conformarsi” (“the painter can conform” 552).⁵⁷ Lomazzo does adhere to the generic conventions of wonder books in listing human monsters,⁵⁸ describing in chronological order with birth places and dates the appearance of human monsters from conjoined twins to apparent human-animal hybrids. He details people with superfluous bodies, limbs, and other organs; with missing limbs and organs; with intersex bodies; and with body parts strangely arranged or placed, as well as monsters who seem to combine nonhuman animal and human anatomy. Lomazzo shows no disgust for these people; on the contrary, among these examples he finds one child “in due corpi perfetti” (“in two perfect bodies” *Trattato* 552), another monster “bellissimo” (“most beautiful” 553), who among other human monsters is depicted by Leonardo da Vinci,⁵⁹ and yet another “bellissimo fanciullo” (“beautiful child” 553) sculpted or engraved by Francesco Borella (active 1569–

90).⁶⁰ Here Lomazzo indicates that people with atypical bodies are a wonder to behold and worth representing in the visual arts. Because of its bizarre nature and inclusion of disabled figures, the grotesque creates what Siebers calls “a space for the development of disabled artists and subjects” (*Disability Aesthetics* 1).

Lomazzo goes on to celebrate the diversity of the human form with a litany of marvelously monstrous peoples from foreign lands, drawing on Pliny’s races of monsters among other, later sources. He depicts these people with “splendore Maraviglioso” (“marvelous splendor” 553) that is appropriate for their own people and lands. Lomazzo concludes this chapter by indirectly citing Saint Augustine’s *City of God*, which affirms that God, knowing all of the parts of the universe that he created, “nondimeno volle eziandio produrre molti uomini mostruosi nel mondo” (“still wished to bring about many monstrous men in the world” 554).⁶¹ Lomazzo anticipates disability aesthetics, in which “disability does not express defect, degeneration, or deviancy in modern art. Rather, disability enlarges our vision of human variation and difference, and puts forward perspectives that test presuppositions dear to the history of aesthetics” (Siebers, *Disability Aesthetics* 3). Although Lomazzo does not include blind people, or himself for that matter, among his catalog of human monsters, his delight in their diversity and variety reflects his appreciation of the different *maniera* that different artists bring to their work, and he describes them as being worthy of artistic representation and sanctioned by God.

The delight in human variety that Lomazzo expresses in the context of grotesque human monsters is impossible to reconcile with other aspects of Lomazzo’s work, where he readily reproduces what were authoritative but very harmful stereotypes of his time to distinguish the appearance and movements of different peoples in painting. For instance, in his advice on how to paint the movements of peoples from different nations, he starts with a list of the stereotypes of European nations that include both positive and negative aspects and then goes on to suggest that

lo Scita si rappresenterà con moti orribili e crudeli, in modo che si giudichi lui essere omicidiale et assassino, et il Giudeo di moti malvagi e pertinaci, il Greco di moti pensosi e fraudolenti, l’Asiatico di moti dissoluti e lussuriosi, il Turco di moti austeri e rozzi, ben che siano poi particolari del Tartaro. Così l’Indo si formerà tardo, l’Arabo pigro, l’Egizio instabile et insomma tutte le altre nazioni, delle quali tratta

distesamente Ermete dove divide tutta la terra in sette parti, dimandate climi, hanno d'averè i suoi moti secondo che egli ci insegna.

a Scythian is portrayed with horrible and cruel movements, making him seem like a murderer or assassin; a Jew, with evil, tenacious movements; a Greek, pensive, fraudulent ones; an Asian, dissolute, voluptuous ones; and a Turk, crude, austere movements, even though these also characterize a Tartar. Similarly, an Indian is depicted as slow, an Arab as lazy, an Egyptian as unstable, and so on, with all the other nations that Hermes treats extensively when he divides the whole earth into seven parts called climates, whose peoples receive their movements as he indicates. (*Idea* 321; 122)

Whereas Lomazzo contradicts authorities, such as Barbaro's commentary on Vitruvius, to champion the grotesque, and whereas he happily engages with the wonder book tradition to elevate monstrous human bodies, both domestic and foreign, he does not always extend his appreciation of diversity to all groups. He does not challenge the national and religious behavioral and physical stereotypes that were propagated by climate theory and were reflected in the hermetic tradition supposedly authored by Hermes Trismegistus and other producers of the accepted, though clearly biased, geohumeral wisdom of his day.⁶² Lomazzo's openness is regrettably limited, and his advice here does harm, but this should not prevent us from recognizing his contributions to our understanding of disability gain.

For Lomazzo, grotesque painting and poetry and the human monsters they sometimes represent spring from the same fantastic inspiration, such that his blindness does not preclude him from composing grotesques.⁶³ Including "grotteschi" ("grotesques" *Rime* 530) in the catalog of works that he executed as a painter, Lomazzo makes clear the close relation between this mode of painting and his own style of poetry, noting that grotesques "non son fatti a studio, ma a natura" ("are not made by study, but by nature") and require "gran furia" ("grand [artistic] furor" *Rime* 638).⁶⁴ Lomazzo practiced this talent from a young age, explaining in his *Vita* as follows:

spiegando in versi
E in prosa tutti i miei varied concetti,
Che strani mi venian, qual recar suole
La lieta gioventude; e così scrissi

In rima i miei *Grotteschi*, dove espressi
 Molti caprizzi ch'avea in cor concetti;
 A' quai poi cieco ancor molti n'aggiunsi.
 Et io vi feci già di stran caprizzi,
 Che forsi in breve si daranno fora.

I began to expound in verse
 And in prose all my varied concepts,
 that strangely struck me, those brought about in carefree youth;
 and I wrote in such a manner
 in *Rime* my grotesques, where I expressed
 Many caprices which I had conceived;
 And again I added many after being blind. (*Rime* 629)

Blindness does not curtail Lomazzo's ability to write grotesque poetry. The "gran furia" required for inventing grotesques springs from the artist's fantasy and not from the physical senses. Lomazzo himself insists that his blindness has only enhanced his inner sight. Furthermore, Lomazzo not only painted and drew grotesques before his vision loss,⁶⁵ but he was called on in his blindness by the patron Pirro Visconti Borromeo (1560–1604) to consult on the creation of grotesques in his villa in Lainate on the outskirts of Milan, demonstrating that Lomazzo was considered an authority on grotesques even in his blindness.⁶⁶

Enabling the Sister Arts

As far back as the quote attributed by Plutarch to Simonides in his *Moralia* that "Painting is mute poetry and Poetry a speaking picture" ("De gloria" 501), it has been commonplace to compare the verbal and visual arts in the Western tradition.⁶⁷ While Plutarch uses the comparison to comment on the most effective way to write history, Horace uses his injunction *ut pictura poesis* (*Ars Poetica* line 361)—just as in painting, so too in poetry—for a more wide-ranging commentary on how to write fiction with attention to drama. In the second sophistic (first through third centuries CE), sophists (traveling teachers of rhetoric) such as Philostratus the Elder (ca. 170–ca. 247 CE) and the younger (ca. 190–ca. 230 CE), along with Lucian of Samosata (ca. 125–ca. 180 CE), self-consciously played with verbal and visual relations in their ekphrastic works to show off their own verbal skills. In the Renaissance, these ancient comparisons became the

basis for the *paragone*, or competition between the arts, in which painting and poetry are sometimes called the sister arts to characterize their interrelation. As Leonard Barkan observes, comparisons of the arts are made to different ends:

Word-and-image is a crux, a shell game, an act of evasion, an attempt to promote one discourse at the expense of another, a particularly persistent skirmish in long-running wars for cultural prestige among different aesthetic and intellectual enterprises. At the same time, to put the matter more positively, word-and-image is an empowering device that has been used to enable makers of text and makers of pictures both to theorize and to practice their craft. (xv)

Comparisons of painting and poetry are, I suggest, literally enabling for Lomazzo. As a poet and a painter, Lomazzo is supremely interested in how the verbal and the visual complement each other. Lomazzo's blindness, moreover, gives him insight into the relationship between painting and poetry. The physical senses are not the basis of creativity in either art, and interdependent sensory disability frames their comparison. Moreover, Lomazzo cites his blindness as a reason for the ekphrastic nature of his writing, as he can no longer see to create visual examples of the techniques and styles he describes. This highly ekphrastic style itself becomes a part of his own *maniera*, or manner, of writing and of remembering the works that he once could see. Lomazzo constructs an extensive memory theater to describe the body-minds and works of his favorite artists in the *Idea*. This ekphrastic mode of writing, moreover, provides a point of access to works of visual art for those who could not and cannot see them for themselves.

Both painting and poetry, according to Lomazzo, require an inner creativity that is not tied to the physical senses. This "dono divino" ("divine gift") is shared by poets and painters, "[i]mperoché questa parte peculiarmente la pittura si paragona alla poesia" ("insomuch as herein alone consisteth the comparison betweene *Painting* and *Poetrie*" *Trattato* 98; sig. Aa 3r.). In particular,

Che si con poeta fa di mestiero ch'insieme con l'eccellenza dell'ingegno abbia certo derio et una inclinazione di volontà, onde sia mosso a poetare, il che chiama gl'antichi furor d'Apollo e delle muse, così ancora al pittore conviene con le altre parti che si gli ricercano, abbi cognizione e forza d'espir moti principali, quasi come ingenerata seco et accresciuta con lui sino dall' scie.

For as it is required in a Poet, that besides the excellencie of his witte, he shoulde moreover be furnished with a certaine propension and inclination of will, inciting and mooving him to versifie, (which the ancient called the *Furie* of *Apollo* and the *Muses*.) So likewise a Painter ought, together with those naturall partes which are required at his handes, to be furnished with a naturall dexteritie and inborne sleight of expressing the *principall motions*, even from his cradle. (*Trattato* 98; sig. Aa3r)

The poet's and painter's arts are linked by a theocentric model of inspiration, in which the *concetto*, or idea of the work, is God-given, but so too is the talent for conceiving of the work. Again, this mode of inspiration is related to the fantasy and inner senses and not to the physical senses.

Yet painting and poetry are further linked by their complementary strengths and weaknesses, which Lomazzo, drawing on ancient precedents, likens to impairment:

[M]assime che cosi nel dipingere, come nel poetare, vi corre il furor di Apolline, e l'uno e l'altro ha per oggetto i fatti illustri e le lodi de gl'Eroi da rappresentare. Onde soleva dire alcuno che la poesia era una pittura parlante e la pittura era una poesia mutola. Anzi pare, per non so quale conseguenza, che non possa essere pittore che insieme anco non abbia qualche spirito di poesia; e di rado s'è ritrovato pittore che abbia potuto alcuna cosa dipingere, che subito ancora non sia stato indotto dal genio naturale a cantarla puramente in versi, ancora che per avventura non sapesse leggere né scrivere.

Of most importance is that in painting, as in poetry there flows the Apolline furor, and the one and the other have as their object of representation illustrious deeds and praises of heroes. Hence some used to say that poetry was a speaking painting and painting was mute poetry. It seems even, for I know not what consequence, that no painter exists who at the same time doesn't have some spirit of poetry; and rarely has there been found a painter who could paint anything, who was not immediately induced by natural genius to sing it purely in verse, even if by chance he could not read or write. (245)

Although poetry and painting share the same Apollonian, divine source of inspiration, they are granted different abilities. Lomazzo here cites Simo-

nides's famous simile that uses sensory disability to characterize the interdependence of the two arts (Plutarch 500; 501). Yet this simile is lopsided because it prioritizes poetry over painting and the ability to speak over the ability to see. If poetry is a speaking picture, and painting mute poetry, how might the relation be extended in terms of the other senses? Would painting be sighted and poetry blind? Is sculpture a feeling art, where poetry and painting are numb?⁶⁸ Lomazzo does not question the simile he cites, but he does make more comparisons between the arts.

Lomazzo likens poetry and painting not just to sisters but to twins born from the same pregnancy, and he restates Simonides's citation to make their interdependence more apparent as follows:

[T]anta esser la conformità della poesia con la pittura che, quasi nate ad un parto, l'una pittura loquace e l'altra poesia mutola s'appellarono e perciò che di rado è ch'ingegno atto et inclinato a qual s'è l'una di esse, non si stenda e non si compiacia in gran maniera dell'altra parimente.

Such is the correspondence of poetry with painting that, they almost sprang from one birth, being called the one loquacious painting and the other mute poetry and therefore it is rarely the case that an intellect suited and inclined to the one does not indulge or take great pleasure equally with grand style in the other. (*Trattato* 420)

Given Lomazzo's emphasis on the expressive capacities of gesture in the visual arts, calling painting mute does not necessarily make it less communicative than poetry; their capacities rather complement each other. Here Lomazzo extends the affinity between poetry and painting to his concept of the *maniera*, or style, of the artist. Painters and poets are attracted to each other's arts and tend to have the same "gran maniera," or great or excellent style, in both (420). Along with the "generale" ("general") affinity between painters and poets, Lomazzo avers that "particolare" ("particular" 246) affinities arise, such that "un pittore ha avuto naturalmente un genio più conforme ad un poeta che ad un altro; e nel suo operare ha seguito quello" ("one painter naturally has had a genius more in conformity with one poet than another and has followed this in their work" 246). Enumerating contemporary examples, Lomazzo states that Leonardo expressed the "moti e decori" ("movements and decorum") of Homer; Polidoro the "grandezza e furia" ("splendor and furor") of Virgil; Michelangelo the "l'oscurezza profonda" ("profound

obscurity”) of Dante; Raphael the “pura maestà” (“pure majesty”) of Petrarch; Andrea Mantegna the “l’acuta prudenza” (“subtle prudence”) of Sannazaro; Titian the “varietà” (“diversity”) of Ariosto; and Gaudenzio the “devozione” (“devotion”) one finds expressed in the saints’ lives (*Trattato* 246). The idea that poets and painters share talents across media and that this is reflected in their *maniera* lines up well with Lomazzo’s own facility in grotesque painting and poetry.

Lomazzo’s art is supremely ekphrastic. Although the use of ekphrasis to write about visual art was common in Lomazzo’s time,⁶⁹ his use of ekphrasis is especially evident in the later books of the *Trattato*, where Lomazzo tells the painter how to paint all manner of content. His visual memory is impressive, and he resorts to the art of memory to keep his inner vision fresh. Lomazzo famously organizes the *Idea* around a central memory theater, with which he organizes the seven governors, or exemplary artists, their *maniera*, and seemingly endless examples of painters and works in those styles along with architectural elements that organize and prioritize the seven parts or elements of painting. Lomazzo describes his *Tempio*, or temple, of painting as follows:

In quella guisa che questo mondo è retto e governato da sette pianeti, come da sette colonne, le quali pigliando ciascuna la sua luce da la prima luce, che è Iddio, la vanno poi qua giù appartatamente infondendo, a beneficio di tutte le create cose, sarà parimenti questo mio Tempio di Pittura sostenuto e retto da sette governatori, come da sette colonne, et imitarò in ciò Giulio Camillo nella idea del suo teatro, ancora che troppo umile e rozza sia questa mia a petto a quella fabrica. Io ho adunque eletto prima i governatori del tempio, i quali tanti sono, quante colonne e governatori sono ne i cieli. Quindi, a sembianza di colonne, gli ho collocati tutti in figura circolare, ugualmente distanti in su i piedistalli. Sopra loro stanno l’architrave, il fregio et il cornicione, tutti in giro settenario e sopra questi è il volto, che finisce al foro settenario della lanterna. Dalla quale discende la luce e lo splendore che alluma ugualmente tutto il tempio, il quale è circondato da sette pareti intorno tra l’uno governatore e l’altro, tutti uguali, e nel volto finiscono al foro della lanterna.

As this world is directed and governed by seven planets, like seven columns, each drawing its light from the primordial light, that is, God, and in turn separately diffusing it here below to the benefit of all created things, so my Temple of Painting is similarly supported

and directed by seven governors, like seven columns. In this I imitate Giulio Camillo in the Idea of his Theater, although compared to that construction, mine is much humbler and cruder. So I first selected the governors of the temple, as many in number as there are columns and governors in the heavens. Then I arranged them so as to resemble columns, all in a circle, equidistant from one another on their pedestals. On top of them are posed the architrave, frieze, and cornice, all in a circle divided by sevenths; the vault rises above, terminating in a lantern with seven openings. From it, light and splendor descend, equally illuminating the whole temple which is surrounded by seven equal walls, extending around one governor after another, and reaching, in the vault, to the lantern openings. (278; 75)

As Chai observes, “The mnemonic image of the Temple may very well have been the inspiration of a blind man, serving as a reminder and visually organizing the theoretical structure of painting in his mind’s eye” (“Introduction” 5). Inspired by the actual theater that Giulio Camillo (1480–1544) built to instantiate his mnemonic technique of assigning places in an imaginary structure for each thing he wished to remember,⁷⁰ Lomazzo’s temple gives him a cognitive structure for remembering the art that he describes and can no longer see.⁷¹ The mnemonic temple also functions as a key for the reader to discover their own *maniera*. Lomazzo emphasizes that painters and all artists should endeavor to “conosca il suo genio” (“know his own [talent]”) and “deve darsi ad imitar la maniera di quelli che se gli conformano” (“he must devote himself to imitating the style [*maniera*] of those whose Imitation must confirm conform to it” *Idea* 253; 53). As Chai suggests, “The Temple of Painting is more than a mere mnemonic device. It not only displays the whole range of artistic styles but also encourages the novice—using discernment (or *discrezione*)—to determine his own manner, expressive of his own temperament” (“Introduction” 3). Lomazzo’s onset of blindness made it necessary for him to illustrate his ideas in his works of art theory with words. The detailed descriptions and thick references to illustrative passages from the poets become a crucial feature of Lomazzo’s own style, and that highly ekphrastic style itself helps others to determine their own.

Lomazzo’s ekphrastic practice, culminating in his memory theater, is, I suggest, a form of access. Whereas Robert Burton recommended ekphrasis as a therapy for mental disability, ekphrasis is for Lomazzo a form of disability access. As Dolmage observes, “We should understand ekphrasis as a way to make visual mediums and information accessible to people with visual

impairments, or, moreover, a way to add rhetorical value to images by using words to work through them. An example would be the ‘visual descriptions’ used at art galleries and performances” (*Disability Rhetoric* 129). The museum professionals who create audio descriptions of works of art (a practice that is beneficial to both blind and sighted visitors)⁷² draw on a long tradition of writing about art, including Lomazzo’s ekphrastic *maniera* of word painting. As Chai observes of Lomazzo’s contribution to Mannerism, “It is precisely this shift from representation to self-expression that makes the present treatise so important: it illustrates a transfer in interest toward the artist himself. By the mid-sixteenth century, the painted subject becomes increasingly a pretext for self-representation and hence affirmation of the artist” (4). In Lomazzo’s case, this “affirmation of the artist” includes at minimum one disabled artist, namely, Lomazzo. This chapter has sought to demonstrate that part of why Lomazzo’s work is so authoritative is because of—rather than in spite of—his blindness.

Crip Conclusions

In the Roman city of Herculaneum, which was destroyed by the eruption of Mount Vesuvius in 79 CE, there is a mural of a blind man with a guide dog.⁷³ Blind people and their guides have been a part of Western culture since antiquity, and they are an underappreciated part of art history as well. Lomazzo offers us more crip touches across time by describing an image of a blind man with a guide dog in the context of his discussion of how to paint the movement of inanimate things to which force is applied in the *Trattato*. When depicting insensate things,

come il tremolar delle piume, dell’ali e de penacchi, il torcere delle Corde, de’legami, il volar delle paglie, della polve e di simili cose s’hanno da mostrare secondo la violenza che gli vien fatta; acciò che non si dia ansa ad alcuno, per goffo che sia, di tassare e mordere una pittura per altro eccellente, sí come si fece poco tempo fa d’una medaglia d’un buono statovario, il quale nel rovescio di quella, dove aveva ritratto Michel Angelo, aveva fatto un povero guidato da un cane legato con una corda al collo, la quale si vedeva tutta stesa e diritta a guisa d’un bastone, senza calata alcuna; il che diede occasione sino ad un fanciullo di motteggiarla e dire che se quel cane così fortemente, o si sarebbe affocato, o non averebbe potuto gir piú oltre, con tanto riso d’alcuni pittori che erano meco, che ne furono per scoppiare.



Figure 7: Leone Leoni, Michelangelo Buonarroti (obverse), 1560/1561, bronze portrait medal, later casting, 2 5/16" diameter, Creative Commons Zero, Samuel H. Kress Collection. Courtesy National Gallery of Art, Washington, DC.

[such] as quivering of fethers, of winges, and plumes: the wreathing of ropes, the knottes of bandes, flying of strawes, dust &c. must be expressed according to the violence donne unto them: to the ende there may none occasion be given unto the meanest, to taxe and carpe at painters (otherwise most excellent) as not longe since fell out, in the worke of a good Carver; who, in the [reverse] where hee had carved [Michelangelo], made a blinde begger, led by a dogge tyed with a stringe about his necke, which seemed to be so stretched, that it was as stiffe as a staffe, without any bowing: which gave occasion to a wag-gish boy, to scoffe at it, saying; that if the dogge had strayned the stringe so harde, hee had either binne strangled, or not able to goe any



Figure 8: Leone Leoni, Blind Man with a Staff and Water-Flask, Led by a Dog (reverse), 1560/1561, bronze portrait medal, later casting, 2 5/16" diameter, Creative Commons Zero, Samuel H. Kress Collection. Courtesy National Gallery of Art, Washington, DC.

farther. Which caused certaine painters which were with me, to breake out into an extreame laughter. (162; sig. Hh4r)

From the sitpoint of his blindness,⁷⁴ Lomazzo tells a story from his past, in which he views an extant portrait medal of Michelangelo cast by Leone Leoni, who apparently “had knowledge of Lomazzo’s work and literary achievements” (Tramelli, *Giovanni Paolo Lomazzo’s* 193). Lomazzo could have known Leoni through their mutual friend Giuliano Goselini (196), who in turn had written poems praising Lomazzo’s inner sight. The medal commemorates Michelangelo’s eighty-eighth birthday (ca. 1561). Michelangelo is

depicted in profile on the portrait medal's obverse. On the medal's reverse, which graces the cover of this book, Michelangelo is pictured as a blind pilgrim or, as Lomazzo has it, *povero*, poor man or beggar. He carries a water flask, rosary, and staff. He is guided by a dog on a leash. Around the rim of the reverse is a citation of *Ps. 50:15*.⁷⁵ *Ps. 50* is the most famous of the Penitential Psalms, which feature so often in consolations for disability and which blind beggars frequently sang in the period (Costley King'oo; Gomis).

Lomazzo, the blind painter, brings before our mind's eye a medal that itself depicts an authoritative painter as blind. Michelangelo, who was apparently pleased with the medal, might have had many reasons to appreciate this representation. He may have, as did Lomazzo, believed that blind people were blessed with inner sight and were favored by God. Like most people, his vision may have declined with age. He might have also remembered his own, temporary experience of blindness after painting the vault of the Sistine Chapel, which he painted in an awkward position with toxic pigments drizzling into his eyes.⁷⁶ Although Michelangelo's vision returned after this experience, he may have experienced some gain in his fleeting time of vision loss. One thing is certain: The initial form of the medal that Lomazzo viewed with his artist friends, in which blind know-how burbles up in laughter at the incorrect, ungiving depiction of the guide dog's leash, gives us a window into a world that was familiar enough with blind people and their guides to make this sort of joke. As disabled people know very well, and temporarily able people can probably guess, we are not always on the receiving end of jokes. In this case, the sculptor Leoni apparently took the ribbing to heart, because extant castings of the medal represent the guide dog's leash with more give.

Because Michelangelo is such a famous artist, this medal is better known and more widely reproduced (though not much more studied) than the one executed for Lomazzo by Fontana. In fact, while searching for an image of the Michelangelo medal with a Creative Commons license, I came across a nineteenth-century electrotype copy for sale on eBay from a vendor in Lithuania. Since I had an anniversary coming up (and since the cost of this replica was less than the sky-high cost of permissions and reproductions these days), I requested it as a gift. Though I was able to track my package across the sea, over half of my continent, and through customs, I am unaware of its provenance and hence of its previous journeys; I do wonder if I am the first blind person to own or handle it.

I have the medal on the coffee table in front of me, and I have my guide dog at my feet. The medal is about the size of a US silver dollar, though heavier. It fits easily into the hollow of my palm (I have small hands). The

medal warms up very quickly in my hand, probably because of the conductive properties of the copper that was used to make the replica in the electrotype process. I cannot smell anything wafting from it, metallic or not, and for now at least, I would rather not try to taste it. I suspect the relief is not as deep on the replica as it would be on an original casting, but the figures are discernable to the touch, nonetheless. On the obverse, Michelangelo's portrait is easy to orient, the outline of his smooth shoulder gives way to his finely textured hair and beard. The face is not discernable in much detail, and, at least on my copy, his nose does not appear to be particularly flat, which is how he is sometimes represented, reputedly having had a badly broken nose. The engraving of his name and the notation of his eighty-eighth birthday on the obverse escape my detection. On the reverse, the full-length figure of the blind man with his straight staff inclined slightly forward in the direction of travel is easy to feel. I cannot feel the turban he wears on his head, though the top of his head feels smooth in contrast to the fine detailing of hair that is present on the obverse portrait. Nor can I feel the "flask, soft pouch and rosary" (Cohen 85) that he carries. I can discern the torsion of the man's body, with which I am familiar from working with my own guide dog on my left side.⁷⁷ This action almost twists us into what Lomazzo (and Michelangelo before him) called a *figura serpentinata*, or pyramidal serpentine figure, the twisting flame-like execution of which could capture a Mannerist, abstracted sense of motion in the still life of painting. I am not sure if I would have noticed this "contorted pose" (Cohen 83) if I had not read about it in a description and if I had not already known that working with a dog can twist our bodies in this way. Knowing what to feel for, the strange twist of the pose is palpable. The curve of tree branches in the background and "muscular anatomy" (Cohen 83) that the blind man apparently displays are not at all present to my touch, and the motto on the rim again just feels like shallow, irregular ridges. Last but definitely not least, the guide dog emerges to my touch. The slight downward curve of the leash is easily distinguishable, as is the perky upward curve of the dog's tail, which always reads to me as alert excitement to work. As Cohen suggests, "This sprightly canine appears to be the kind of setter or spaniel that was currently adopted as a family pet and also aided in hunting" (90). The guide dog's pose makes me think it is moving, with each of its four legs easily distinguishable, as during a walk or trot, and with its head erect and ready for action.

When scholars speak about this medal, they tend to gloss over the fact that Michelangelo condoned a representation of himself as blind or else can conceive of it only in allegorical terms.⁷⁸ As Cohen argues in attempting

to discover “whether or not Michelangelo had a decisive role in inventing the allegory,” documentation of Michelangelo’s meetings and collaboration with Leoni “confirms that they were collaborating to some degree” (85). She goes on to produce “evidence that Michelangelo not only devised the visual allegory but also selected the biblical inscription” (85). Though I do not disagree with Cohen’s interpretation of the reverse as representing a desire for spiritual healing, Michelangelo’s experience of vision loss makes his depiction as blind more than metaphorical. While painting images of God and man in the Sistine Chapel, argues Cohen, Michelangelo would have heard, as part of the liturgical ceremonies, a madrigal setting of *Ps. 50* as arranged by Costanzo Festa (ca. 1490–1545), “a prolific composer of liturgical music as well as a singer, who had also set music to one of Michelangelo’s madrigals” (90). As his vision was impaired in this process, he may have had a profound reflection on disability, the frailness of the flesh, and the divine.

Drawing on Jackie Leach Scully’s concept of reconstructive narratives (128), Rosemarie Garland-Thomson discusses how people with disabilities have drawn on the conventions of Renaissance portraiture to reconstruct the representation of their disabilities with “dignity and authority” (“Picturing People” 24). Lomazzo’s art and theory show that people with disabilities were constructing authoritative disability narratives in art at the same time as these ennobling conventions were being created. As Garland-Thomson avers, “Being the subject of a public portrait symbolizes membership in a high status group, literally framing the subject as an appropriate member of the public sphere who is worthy of contemplation and commemoration” (24). The practice of using portraiture to grant dignity and artistic authority to disabled subjects was, as this chapter argues, already evident in the Renaissance. In the case of the two portrait medals that frame this chapter, that authority could be conveyed just as easily by touch and the other senses as by vision, making the portrait medal and Lomazzo’s touching descriptions yet another crip authority for telling disability narratives.

Coda



Readers of my previous books, which emphasize global exchange in the early modern period from Mexico to the Ottoman Empire and beyond, might well ask why the geographical scope of this book keeps close to continental Europe and the British Isles. The answer to this question is simple. My choice of the scope of the book sprang out of a provocative conversation with a dear mentor, and my aim was to crip the Renaissance. When discussing the book at early stages with Susan Stanford Friedman, a tough, very smart woman who relentlessly supported my work at the University of Wisconsin, I proposed recovering the voices of disabled writers and their relationship with consolation. As I wound up my pitch and began listing authors such as the Mexican mestizo hunchback playwright Juan Ruiz de Alarcón and other disabled writers from non-European backgrounds alongside authors such as Cervantes and Milton, Susan stopped me. She said, “Elizabeth, why not just show how disability has always been a crucial part of the advent of Western modernity?” When I thought about how meticulously literary critics, historians, and art historians have glossed over or ignored the presence of disability in this history—when disability’s centrality is so obvious to me—I could not argue with Susan.

Disability largely has been omitted from the story we tell about Western literature and early modernity in part because institutions of higher education are responsible for what David Bolt has called avoidance in the academy. Conducting an informal survey of the presence of disability studies—focused programs or centers (much less departments) in elite universities, I found that not a single Ivy League school (nor Stanford) has more than a working or reading group in disability studies. This despite documented student inter-

est and demands for their universities to fund such programs.¹ To be clear, I do not imply that critical disability studies in early periods does not happen at these schools and countless others where it is grassroots, self-starting, and largely denied funding beyond an ad hoc basis. Yet all of these universities fund programs or centers in early modern or Renaissance studies.

How can we understand the Renaissance, Humanism, and their good and bad consequences if we do not recognize that the experience of disability was very familiar, and at times intimately familiar, to the people who brought about the Humanism and the literature and art that many of us study and teach? When scholarly institutions do not support disability studies, those of us doing the work often find our work underrecognized or perceived to be unimportant. It is also the case that the service that the very few discernably disabled university faculty and staff perform for students and colleagues in the form of mentorship and other kinds of diversity work frequently goes unacknowledged. Students who do have the opportunity to pursue certificates or, more rarely still, majors in disability studies often have to make classes without much disability-related content fit their requirements. Medical humanities courses that do not always move beyond a medical model of disability, which is harmful to people with disabilities, are held up as demonstrations of diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) in the curriculum. Yet disability is not always treated with dignity in these contexts. As David Mitchell, Sharon Snyder, and Linda Ware argue, prioritizing disability in our pedagogy creates curricular cripistemologies, which “foreground disability-based content, offering important social options for constructing alternative ethical frameworks for living. An alternative ethical framework results in the creation of useable maps that, from a curricular cripistemological standpoint, are otherwise absent from normative curricular content” (38). This pedagogical approach “re-imagin[es] our relationship to devalued forms of embodiment in order to better speak to the political dilemmas of contemporary experience” (38). At the same time, curricular cripistemology “is neither a discourse of ‘specialness’ wherein we learn to value disabled people as ‘human’ when we discover them scraping out an existence alongside others” (39). Nor does it find “the value of disability guaranteed in overcoming obstacles of social making wherein disabled peoples’ incapacities are offset by the compensatory qualities of an otherwise extraordinary body” (39). Nor does it “discover disability as an opportunity for political correctness wherein all bodies are valued for the ‘diversity’ they provide in a relativistic equation of multicultural differences” (39). Disability studies in the academy is not just about DEI. Disability is rarely even called out in DEI initiatives. As this

book has attempted to demonstrate, Disability as method and cripistemology enable better scholarship, and it is my conviction that including disability studies in the curriculum can only improve learning outcomes.

Rather than taking the chronological and geographical scope of this book as a limit, then, I encourage other scholars to consider how non-Western traditions of consolation might have provided authors outside of Europe or from minoritized groups with crip authority, comfort, and community across time. For readers already passionate about the importance of disability to all of our histories, thinking through the value of consolation to the way we tell our own stories of disability and knowing that there have been many great writers who have done so before us will inspire more such work with a wider scope. Most premodern cultures have consolatory traditions, and good work is being done on premodern histories of disability in places outside of Europe. It is also the case that early modern studies has engaged for quite some time with gender, sexuality, race, indigenous, and religious identity. Early modern disability studies asks and should continue to ask how disability drifts, touches, results from, harms, or enhances these lived experiences. This book also invites Petrarch scholars, or Cervantes scholars, or Miltonists, or art historians of, for instance, Mannerism to read the book, even if they come to it with no prior knowledge of disability studies. First, I hope they come to the book because they love the authors and artists it treats, and second, I hope they might finish the book with a greater appreciation of the centrality, complexity, and fruitfulness of disability to the authors and artists they study.

It will be helpful here to draw the reader's attention back to Petrarch's ascent of Mont Ventoux and the lessons it can teach us about mountain climbing as emblematic of overcoming disability. Even when an author makes plain the brilliance of their imperfection, their path can be wrenched straight to fit the model of overcoming with which so many of us struggle. In the most confounding reading of the ascent of Mont Ventoux I have encountered, Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. alludes to the letter in a graduation speech for the College of the Holy Cross in Massachusetts in 2007 to encourage students to overcome adversities, including disabilities.

The speech itself starts well enough with a quip about the justice's ability to recognize "nice robes" and a pun on how "indebted" the students are for their education (Roberts n.p.), but the talk quickly turns to the college's having been founded on a hilltop, about which Chief Justice Roberts comments, "We live by climbing hills and mountains." He goes on to remark that thinking of this brought to mind "the original Renaissance man, Francesco

Petrarch,” who he suggests “would have felt at home here at Holy Cross. He was a person of faith. He had a love of learning. And being more than six feet tall, he could have made the basketball team.” Petrarch was not six feet tall. This is, of course, a joke meant to draw in an audience that Roberts assumes is more interested in the Final Four than sestinas (an assumption with which it is difficult to argue). Nevertheless, instead of possessing a kernel of truth, which makes for the best jokes, Roberts’s quip is based on an error. I cannot corroborate this strapping image of Petrarch. Surely such height would have been extraordinary and commented upon in Petrarch’s time? In all of my reading of Petrarch’s letters and accounts of his life, moreover, I do not find much reference to exercise beyond his beloved walks in Vaucluse and the errant mountain climbing expedition. It would seem he was, moreover, rather uncoordinated. Petrarch humorously relates how he managed to trip over a volume of Cicero he was using as a doorstop so many times that the wound became gravely infected. Perhaps Chief Justice Roberts confused Petrarch with Alberti, who is often taught in anthologies alongside Petrarch as a founding father of the Renaissance and who was most proud of his physique and athletic ability. Alberti was also, as the previous chapter details, frank about the cognitive disability in the form of memory loss that he experienced after a grave illness in his youth. Rather than overcoming his problems with memory, Alberti took a different path, just as Petrarch, as chapter 1 of this book demonstrates, was resistant to cure and found authority in his lived experience of disability.

Beyond the misrepresentation of Petrarch’s physique—we all make mistakes—I take issue with Roberts’s use of Petrarch’s climb as an allegory for overcoming all obstacles, to keep on going no matter what. He acknowledges Petrarch’s sortilege of Augustine, but he interprets it as a further victory, in which “his physical climb became a spiritual one as well.” Relating the letter back to his audience, Chief Justice Roberts states:

Graduates, you have been educated on a hilltop. But now you go out to climb mountains. Some of these mountains will be of your own choosing—goals, ambitions, desires. Other mountains will choose you—crises, handicaps, setbacks. Either way, if you would get to the top, you have to climb. No human ingenuity can alter that reality. And when you reach the summit, what you will find are more mountains. This college should have taught you, as Petrarch learned, that if you do not progress internally along the way, the climbing will not be worth much in the end. (Roberts n.p.)

This motivational speech omits the fact that Petrarch considered the ascent a failure, even though he summited the peak. The advice that life is hard, just keep climbing and you will get there, is not surprising to those of us with disabilities in the US, given that Roberts's advocacy and decisions have, over the course of his career, eroded the protections of the Americans with Disabilities Act.² The message of Chief Justice Roberts's reading of Petrarch says to people with disabilities, do get on with getting over it. Roberts's reading downplays the possibility of failure or the allowance for that circuitous spiritual path that was taken by both Augustine and Petrarch in different times, places, and contexts. Instead, Roberts reads the episode as a conversion story about pluck that will inspire these college graduates to soldier on in the face of all the adversity that they doubtless will face.

Rather than comparing Petrarch's ascent to a pep rally, I propose we think of Petrarch alongside the compelling disability narratives of Eli Clare to understand what Petrarch offers to his crip posterity. Clare returns repeatedly to the image of mountain climbing when working through the challenges and joys of life with disabilities. In *Exile and Pride*, Clare questions the over-coming story that Petrarch also resists. Clare ruefully asks:

How many of us have struggled up the mountain, measured ourselves against it, failed up there, lived in its shadow? We've hit our heads on glass ceilings, tried to climb the class ladder, lost fights against assimilation, scrambled toward that phantom called normality. We hear from the summit that the world is grand from up there, that we live down here at the bottom because we are lazy, stupid, weak, and ugly. We decide to climb that mountain, or make a pact that our children will climb it. The climbing turns out to be unimaginably difficult. We are afraid; every time we look ahead we can find nothing remotely familiar or comfortable. We lose the trail. Our wheelchairs get stuck. We speak the wrong languages with the wrong accents, wear the wrong clothes, carry our bodies the wrong ways, ask the wrong questions, love the wrong people. And it's goddamn lonely up there on the mountain. We decide to stop climbing and build a new house right where we are. Or we decide to climb back down to the people we love, where the food, the clothes, the dirt, the sidewalk, the steaming asphalt under our feet, our crutches, all feel right. Or we find the path again, decide to continue climbing only to have the very people who told us how wonderful life is at the summit booby-trap the trail. They burn the bridge over the impassable canyon. . . . Maybe we get to the summit, but probably not. And the price we pay is huge. (1)

This recounting of the harm that the call (and the desire) to overcome at all costs rings true. It questions how useful overcoming really is, if it is even possible. Clare's thoughts on overcoming as a disabled, genderqueer person from a working-class background are authoritative for queer and crip theory.

To my ear, nonetheless, Clare's disability narrative is at its most poignant when he allows the sweet and the sour of disability experience to jostle. In *Exile and Pride*, Clare tells the story of attempting to climb an actual mountain (Mount Adams) in New Hampshire with a friend and failing to do so due to his disability. Expressing his desire to ascend "to lichen-covered granite, up to the sun-drenched cap where the mountains all tumble out toward the hazy blue horizon" (5), he is devastated when he must turn back due to his disability. Unable to continue, "I cry, maybe for the first time, over something I want to do, had many reasons to believe I could, but really can't. I cry hard" (5). Clare does not hold back on how huge the cost of this failure was for him. Yet he also takes consolation in his own way of climbing when he revisits the story in *Brilliant Imperfection*. In this reflection, Clare wonders at the mountain's secrets that his crip way of descending reveals as follows:

On mountain trails, I yearn to fly downhill, feet touching ground, pushing off, smooth and fluid. Instead on steep stretches I drop down onto my butt and slide along using both my hands and feet, for a moment becoming a four-legged animal. Only then do I see the swirl marks that glaciers left in the granite, tiny orange newts climbing among the tree roots, otherworldly fungi growing on rotten logs. My shaky balance gives me this intimacy with the mountain. (88)

Clare's cripistemology is based on a practical need to move differently down the mountainside. It makes for a different experience, but one that has its own pleasures. Clare's wrangling with mountains, both theoretical and material, expresses both the advantages and the disadvantages of living with a disability. For disabled readers, it tells a familiar story, a version of which most of us share, but one that is rarely used to explain crip creativity.

People with disabilities who wish to become artists or writers confront challenging origin stories for creativity. One unreasonable demand placed on artists of both visual and verbal arts since antiquity is the expectation that they be super-able in all the things they profess to represent. From Plato's stipulation that the visual and verbal artist should be capable of doing everything they imitate in the *Republic* to Horace's insistence that poets and playwrights be a jack of all trades in the *Ars Poetica*, the standard of being able to do what one represents in art is an impossible ideal. Along with this

fantasy of superability being attached to creativity, the creative capacities of authors and artists have also always included creative talent as a supernaturally granted recompense for disability. Homer's alleged blindness, Aesop's supposed physical deformity, and the Platonic observation that in fact all poets are mad also rely on supernatural intervention. This kind of compensation does not grow out of placing value on disability per se.

Tracing how disabled authors and artists themselves find value in their experience of disability by discovering crip authority in the past can help us to move beyond this binary of superability and supernatural compensation. The crip authority that the writers of this study express in their disability narratives draws on consolation literature for rhetorical, spiritual, and medical modes of valuing disability. Consolation literature, in other words, gives writers an authorized form in which to write about mental and physical impairment. The lived experience of disability has theoretical, cripistemological, and communal value, or as Tobin Siebers explains:

Narratives about disability identity are theoretical because they posit a different experience that clashes with how social existence is usually constructed and recorded. They are practical because they often contain solutions to problems experienced by disabled and nondisabled people alike. They are political because they offer a basis for identity politics, allowing people with different disabilities to tell a story about their common cause. ("Disability as Masquerade" 8)

Crip authority similarly has theoretical, practical, and communal value. Writing with crip authority resignifies ableist views of disabilities with disability gain; it underscores the value of disability know-how such as disability *metis*, cripistemology, work, or masquerade; and it celebrates disability pride with a community of disabled readers across time and space.

The idea of the author is not dead in the Renaissance, even though all Renaissance authors are long dead. Many of them lived with mental and physical impairments, and many of them wrote about their brilliant imperfections. Several of the authors examined here play self-consciously with the idea of authorship in the satirical humanist mode. Putting on the mask of another authorial persona is a fundamental element of humanist style, be it the female body of folly (Erasmus, *In Praise of Folly*) or a communist Portuguese sailor who divests himself of family ties (More, *Utopia*). Cervantes's prologue to *Don Quijote* part I reveals the real author of the work not to be the melancholy figure we meet pendant at his desk in a posture that, thanks

in part to Dürer, we associate with a melancholic mind. This narrator reveals that the “real” author of the work is Side Hamete Benengeli, a Morisco, whose comments and opinions are thence sprinkled through the body of the text. Robert Burton dons the mask of Democritus Junior only to let it slip. We can ask ourselves what this authorial play accomplishes, and though it may be a way to deflect potential blame—the “who me?” of rhetorical ethos—it also makes plain the presence of an author and indeed forces us to think about what authorship means. One thing is certain in Renaissance literature in art: the creators of the works we so cherish had body-minds, and those body-minds helped them to their knowledge of the world, albeit along sometimes circuitous paths.

Disability marks the commencement of the Renaissance as well as its commemoration. The history of art in Renaissance Italy begins in part with the advent of printed books celebrating artists’ lives, the most famous example being Giorgio Vasari’s *Le Vite de’ più eccellenti pittori, scultori, e architettori* (*The Lives of the Most Excellent Painters, Sculptors, and Architects*) (1550/68). The second edition of Vasari’s work included images of the artists (when possible) alongside their biographical entries.³ This biographical genre still exerts a profound influence on the canon of Western Renaissance art, even if art historians no longer consider these texts a substitute for historical research. Artists’ lives typically include images of the artist; biographical details such as date and place of birth and death; omens or prophetic dreams associated with their birth, life, or death; extraordinary artistic education and abilities; a catalog and verbal description of works; and a peppering of anecdotes that reveal personal attributes of the artists. Time and space are organized around the emergence of these great artists, and their social significance and alteration of the world around them is hardly short of supernatural. These narrative conventions echo the relation of marvelous prodigies and monsters in the genre of the wonder book that also made famous the existence of so-called human monsters. Indeed, the personal attributes of many of the artists whom Vasari extols include mental and physical disabilities. What happens when the author of the life themselves is disabled? What if the words and images can tell us, have been telling us all along, that disability is a valuable part of Western European cultural history that we have at best ignored? How do we get back in touch with disabled authors and artists of the past?

One opportunity for creating cripp touches across time came to me when I discovered Lomazzo’s mention of the portrait medallion that he asked Fontana to cast for him and realized that one of these medals is held in the Kress Collection at the National Gallery in Washington, DC. A dear friend,

hearing me wax rhapsodic about how interesting it would be to handle such a medal, suggested that I should request to examine it for my research. The fact that I did not think of this myself is not due to a lack of imagination. Museums differ in their approach to fielding research questions, and though many museums have access policies that include formalized touch tours for the blind, approaching a museum as a researcher who is also blind is another matter. I was able, through back channels, to contact Alison Luchs, the excellent curator of the Kress's premodern sculpture collection. I shared my chapter on Lomazzo with her, and we set up a visit.

This is how my guide dog, Yogi, my spouse, Michael, and I found ourselves at the service entrance to the National Gallery early one morning last May. The parking lot and entrance were undergoing construction with diverging paths and a gauntlet of spiky cones. Although I am confident that Yogi was up for the challenge, as our training included navigating many such devilish obstacle courses cannily devised by Seeing Eye trainers, I was happy to take Michael's arm. We were all relieved when Dr. Luchs greeted us outside and led us through the equally labyrinthine back corridors of the museum to the registrar's office, where we all (except Yogi) received lanyards with name tags. We then made our way past the conservator's workshop that smells of wax, resin, and dust to the gallery that holds the impressive collection of portrait medals. There we met the armorer, David Smith. In a stroke of good fortune, the Kress copy of Michelangelo's portrait medal is held in the same case as Lomazzo's. The armorer kindly removed the Fontana and the Michelangelo medals from their locked glass containers for me to examine over a gurney, and I donned my latex gloves. These gloves were, as I had feared, an impediment to feeling the medals in great detail. My electrotype copy of the Michelangelo medal is actually struck in deeper relief than the National Gallery's casting. Both medals were larger than I had imagined, and they were rather heavier than my copy.

What amazed me about this visit was not the many barriers to entrance and access that the museum posed. In the quiet, cool space of the gallery, Dr. Luchs and I touched, discussed, and compared impressions about the medals. It was an equal exchange, both of us passionate about these objects and both of us agreeing that we had learned a great deal about the medals from our conversation. After about half an hour, I paused to ask, "What other disability treasures does this collection hold?" to which Dr. Luchs responded, "Nobody has ever asked that question." Our discussion has led to further communication with other curators and access coordinators who are interested in thinking about how the Kress Collection could be made more

accessible to disabled patrons and scholars. What struck me most about this encounter was that my thoughts on the medals—both as a scholar and as a disabled woman—were appreciated for what they are: sources of knowledge and expertise. As we departed the gallery, footfalls and voices of the visitors who had just gained entrance to the museum began to join our own. Dr. Luchs pointed out a few of her favorite pieces, including a self-portrait done in marble relief by none other than Alberti, replete with his personal emblem of the winged eye. I very much wanted to feel how Alberti executed the art of visual perspective—for which he is famous—on this particular piece, but that will have to wait for another time.

Notes



Introduction

1. Reasons for not recognizing past disability narratives as such include the inaccessibility of early texts, reluctance to connect between premodern and contemporary disability, or, perhaps most problematically, the fame of their authors. As Davis puts it, “Successful disabled people—the Julius Caesars, the Itzhak Perlmans, the Sarah Bernhardts—have their disability erased by their success” (*Enforcing* 9).

2. The term “disability gain” has wide use in disability studies and activist communities. It was first coined in a talk by Garland-Thomson, “Disability Gain.”

3. See Bearden, *Monstrous Kinds*, which connects early modern monstrosity and disability. I make frequent references back to this work, out of which this project springs.

4. The American cultural model of disability distinguishes impairment and disability: impairment refers to a body-mind variation or atypicality, whereas disability is socially produced. In the cultural model, the two terms are mutually constitutive and dependent on cultural context, which can change across time and space. This model acknowledges that some impairments can be negative for the person who experiences them independent from their environment or society and that some impairments are enabling in some contexts. For further definition and history of the model, see Snyder and Mitchell, *Cultural Locations* 4–11.

5. To make my writing more welcoming, I occasionally sum up complicated ideas with less complicated language. I also sometimes enunciate capitalization, punctuation, and other marks to make my meaning more legible for people who, like me, use adaptive software to write and read. The idea that “plain” English language is more accessible than complex or errant language is today, as it was in the English Enlightenment’s call for a plain style, caught up in efforts to norm, racialize, and exclude authors and readers. For compelling considerations of the power of plain language to disable and enable authors and readers, see Chen and Acton, respectively.

6. The word “disability” was not used exclusively to denote the cultural production of mental and physical disability in the English Renaissance, when other words such as “monstrosity” and “deformity” were also used in this way. Multiple words are also used in English, much less other languages, to signify disability as a category in the twentieth and, indeed, twenty-first century, in which words like “cripple,” “invalid,” or “handicapped” are used in disability categorization. The word “disability” was used in early modern England—in legal and broader social contexts—to encompass many kinds of physical and mental impairments. For more on this question of historicizing semantics, see Freeman Loftis 1–17; Row-Heyveld 1–37; Hobgood and Wood, “Ethical Staring,” “Disability in Early Modern Literature,” “Introduction”; Bearden, *Monstrous Kinds* 1–30; Chess. For disability in languages other than English, see McRuer, “Crip World-Making.”

7. Couser distinguishes disability life writing from other autobiographical forms, and Mintz’s work on disability narrative is especially useful for analyzing early modern writers. See Couser, esp. *Recovering Bodies*; Mintz, *Unruly Bodies*. For narrative in disability studies more broadly, see Mitchell and Snyder, “Narrative.”

8. Linton explains that ableism “includes the idea that a person’s abilities or characteristics are determined by disability or that people with disabilities as a group are inferior to nondisabled people” (9). For ableism in early modern literary traditions, see esp. Hobgood, *Beholding*.

9. While I do not espouse Dunn’s grand narrative of the fruition of the individual authorial voice in the Renaissance, his work on the use of self-authorization in the rhetorical tradition of the *exordium* and its subsequent development in the early modern genre of the preface is useful for my purposes.

10. Mills and Sanchez’s collection (*Crip Authorship*) appeared near the completion of this study. Although my project sits comfortably within their theoretical framework, my work adds a historical perspective that is absent from their collection and helps us to discern crip tactics in the history of disabled people’s efforts to find the authority to write in the past.

11. For crip theory’s relationship with queer theory, see Sandahl; McRuer, *Crip Theory*. For crip theory’s relationship with feminist and queer theory, see Kafer. For queer crip-of-color scholarly and activist work, see Kafai, *Crip Kinship*. For a call to make disability studies more open and welcoming to fat and IPOC people through crip identification, see Schalk, “Coming to Claim.” I agree with Schalk that “disidentification can be used by minoritarian subjects to disidentify with other minoritarian subjects, communities, and/or representations and that this kind of disidentifying process among/across/between minoritarian subjects can allow for coalitional theory and political solidarity” (“Coming to Claim” n.p.).

12. For a discussion of the transgressive use of the word “crip” as noun, adjective, and verb with an emphasis on its global political appeal, see McRuer, *Crip Times* 19–24.

13. For a discussion and bibliography of contemporary challenges to authorship for disabled people, especially in terms of composition standards, publishing practices, and copyright restrictions, see Mills and Sanchez, “Introduction.”

14. I use the Latin term *consolatio* to refer to the genre so as to differentiate it from the act of consolation as a noun.

15. Use of the modesty topos in crafting ethos in an *exordium* certainly could be used by speakers in other oppressed subject positions who, like people with disabilities, find themselves in a “bad case” for capturing the benevolence of their audience. E.g., it was used in the early modern period by women. See Bennett, *Rhetoric* 99–126, “Meditation”; Pender; and my discussion of An Collins below.

16. Cicero’s lost autoconsolation for the death of his daughter was cited extensively in antiquity and drew heavily on the work of Crantor, which was also lost.

17. For more on Cicero’s formulation of blindness here, see Laes, *Disabilities and the Disabled* 80–113.

18. For traditional attitudes toward disability in the Judeo-Christian tradition, see Stiker 23–37; Eiesland esp. 68–74.

19. For liberation theology and the suffering body of Christ as disability, see Eiesland. For disability and poverty in liberation theology, see Danforth. For a critical take on the liberal subject as prerequisite in liberation theology and images of the Virgin Mary as an ethics of care, see Garland-Thomson, “Disability Liberation Theology.” For a biblical studies perspective on disability and the Bible with a focus on Pauline discourse, see Abl.

20. E.g., Cartagena and Milton, both of whom will be treated in chapters to follow.

21. Early modern translations and editions of Boethius are numerous. Both Chaucer and Queen Elizabeth I made translations. For more on the reception of Boethius in the Renaissance, see Kaylor and Phillips. For the influence of Boethius and consolation more broadly on the tradition of prison writing, see Zim.

22. The seven Psalms included in this group are numbers 6, 31, 37, 50, 101, 129, and 142 in the Hebrew Masoretic and most Protestant Bibles. For the establishment of this grouping as a genre and its interpretation as penitential, see Costley King’oo 1–24.

23. For these brotherhoods in Spain with details about their ties to church, state, and self-regulation, see Gomis.

24. Little is known of Collins’s biography. For a recent assessment of scholarship including a bibliography, see W. Howard, “Introduction.” For a disability studies perspective on Collins’s use of devotional poetry as prosthesis, see Roden.

25. Bennett briefly associates Collins’s illness with her construction of ethos in *Rhetoric* 105–6.

26. Mintz argues from a feminist disability studies perspective that Collins’s poetry produces “disability subjectivity, a sense of self worked out according to, rather than in spite of, the specifics of her corporeal experience” (“An Collins” 56).

27. Mintz traces the metaphorical use of the word “cross” for disability in Collins’s poetry, in which “to be like Christ on the cross is to be disabled: wounded, ruptured, broken” (“An Collins” 59). She relates this usage to Eiesland’s positive theological valuation of disability’s likeness to the disability of Christ.

28. Collins makes reference to at minimum the following Psalms: 8, 16, 18–19,

26–28, 30, 34, 42, 51, 61, 66, 71, 78, 84, 119, 141, 145. For more on Collins and psalmic discourse, see Hannay.

29. Though I agree overall with Mintz that Collins resists a moralizing model of disability that would equate her disability with moral shortcomings, Collins does occasionally waver in this position, and she does cast aspersions against other people who do not find the same comfort as does she in religious consolation, e.g., “Another Song exciting to spirituall Mirth, The Winter being over” (Collins 49–51).

30. Cardano was a famous mathematician, inventor, and astrologer as well as respected physician. For his contributions to Renaissance astrology, see Grafton. For his contributions to medicine, see Siraisi.

31. Scholarship by James Bromley, Simone Chess, Farr, and Hobgood, *Beholding*, is especially useful for exploring the relation between early modern queer and crip discourse. For a recent overview of early modern trans theory with reference to disability studies and crip theory, see Chess et al.

32. Garland-Thomson also notes how Leslie Fiedler’s concept of “extravagant” embodiment in transgressive encounters with freak shows could be considered a narrative resource for disability conservation. See Garland-Thomson, “The Case for Conserving” 344.

Chapter 1

1. Scholars disagree on the veracity of the account and date of composition. E.g., Billanovich in “Petrarca e il Ventoso” argues it is fiction perhaps written later in life; V. Rossi and Baron assert its historicity written after the ascent; Wilkins believes it is a true story revised for publication.

2. I use the Rossi and Bosco Latin and consult the Dotti facing-page Italian translation of Petrarch’s familiar letters. I cite the Bernardo translation with its book, chapter, section, and page numbers.

3. For bibliography on Petrarch as the father of Humanism, see Ascoli and Falkeid. For the letter as evidence of Petrarch’s modernity, see Burckhardt; Kristeller and Randall; Mommsen; Greene, “The Flexibility.” For its debts to medieval thought and Augustinian allegorical significance, see Durling; Kahn; O’Connell; Robbins; Quillen, *Rereading*. For the letter as liminal between medieval and early modern thought, see Blumenberg 341–544; Ascoli 21–58. For postmodern assessments of Petrarch as fragmented subject, see Mazzotta; Falkeid.

4. Petrarch wrote several consolatory texts. For consolation in the *De otio religioso* (1347), see McClure 47–49; in the *Bucolicum carmen* (1357), see Zak, “The Ethics”; in Petrarch’s *Psalmi penitentiales* (1337), see Matter. I focus on Petrarch’s *Secretum* and the *De remediis* in this chapter for two reasons: first, their intertextual relations with each other and with *Fam.* 4. 1; second, their influence on the other disability narratives examined in this project. The *Secretum* was published posthumously. Most scholars agree with Rico’s start date of 1347 with revisions until 1353. See Rico 9–16; Baron, *Petrarch’s “Secretum”* 72–86. He began *De remediis* in Milan

in 1354. It was finished by 1366. See Wilkins 65–72. Precise dating of composition is not essential to my argument, as Petrarch does not attribute his sustained mental disability to a single event.

5. Reiss's view that Petrarch exemplifies a dispersed, passible model of personhood influences my evaluation of Petrarchan interdependence and vulnerability. Though Reiss does not address Petrarch's mental disability, his assessments are compatible with a disability studies perspective. See esp. Reiss, *Mirages* 303–30.

6. The cited version of the website can be found at the following URL: <https://web.archive.org/web/20200421141632/https://erikweihenmayer.com/>.

7. See Livy 40.21–22.

8. For Petrarch and philology, see Quillen, *Rereading* 7–14; Turner 34–39.

9. Petrarch's edition of Livy was not complete or without error. Lorenzo Valla (ca. 1407–1457) flags errors in Petrarch's manuscript edition. The edited manuscript of Livy with sections transcribed by Petrarch and with his and Valla's marginal comments is housed in the British Library, Harley ms. 2493. For Petrarch's Livy, see Billanovich, "Petrarch and the Textual"; Reynolds 205–14.

10. Stemmatology is part of the Lachmann method. It relies on identifying common errors to trace textual genealogies or trees. For this method and the use of manuscript variants, see Timpanaro; for philology as itself errant, see Gurd. Thanks to Emily Loney and to Jordan Zweck for assistance on this topic.

11. See Lerer 15–54.

12. Falkeid also notes that Livy depicts Philip's ascent as a failure. See Falkeid 11.

13. For error's significance in French Petrarchism, see Rigolot, *L'Erreur* 79–108. For its influence on Italian, French, and English Renaissance poetry, see Greene, *The Light*; for French, English, and Iberian reception, see Kennedy.

14. Rigolot's esteem for Petrarch's error as productive and inspiring to later writers differs from what Robbins calls his "logic of error," which simply functions to "negatively anticipate the right kind of turning" (536).

15. Petrarch's search for climbing companions with moderate physical and mental traits reflects the *mediocrità* later elaborated in *Il Cortegiano* by Baldesar Castiglione (1478–1529). For *mediocrità*, disability, and "norming effects," see Bearden, *Monstrous Kinds* 33–78.

16. The natural philosopher Jean Buridan (ca. 1301–ca. 1359) climbed Mont Ventoux before Petrarch to gather meteorological data. See Thijssen.

17. The shepherd harkens back to the Stoic tradition of the wise interpreter, who cautions travelers faced with a trial and serves as a harbinger of error. For example, the figure of Genius in the ekphrastic Stoic treatise *Pinax Cebetem* (*Tablet of Cebes*) warns of inevitable error in climbing the mountain of life, which is populated in the treatise by allegorical figures who tempt the errant climber from the correct path.

18. Kinney notes that Petrarch's impulse comes from within, which differs from Augustine's motivation to perform sortilege on scripture in *The Confessions*, where he hears nearby children chant: "Tolle, lege" ("Take up and read"). See Kinney 313–15.

19. For intimacy in Petrarch's letters, see Eden.
20. See Augustine 10. 8; 158. This passage occurs in his discussion of memory and the senses.
21. Augustine's sortilege of scripture inspires his conversion. See Augustine 8. 7; 153.
22. Augustine reacts to his own sortilege with joy: "At once, with the last words of this sentence, it was as if a light of relief from all anxiety flooded into my heart. All the shadows of doubt were dispelled" (8. 7; 158).
23. Miller discusses the passage in the context of Spenserian versions of Platonic love. He views the sortilege as a "moment of revulsion" (79), which "can be found in any narrative of transcendence, whether it appears as a humiliation of the self and personal body, as a visionary blindness to nature, or as a revulsion from the things of the natural world" (76). See Miller 76–79.
24. Falkeid suggests that Petrarch's sortilege amounts to a "humility contest with Augustine" (18) and that "the quest for the self fails right at the moment the self is to be grasped. The self is evasive and dissolves—into nothing" (20).
25. The spring spurts from a 750-foot limestone cliff. Water flows from an underground basin fed by runoff from Mont Ventoux.
26. I cite the Latin original of the letters of old age from the Dotti facing-page translation. I cite the Bernardo English translation using its book, letter, section, and page numbers.
27. Petrarch's interest in hydrology appears in his unsuccessful attempts to cultivate a meadow that was frequently flooded by the river Sorgue.
28. See also Colie's Petrarchan sonnet on the impasse of love, titled "Petrarch's Vaucluse," where she uses aqueous images to express emotional strife, writing: "Love's signature to triumph, truce before, / After, and at its end—all this great roar / And cataract of stillest love we pour / To one another. This is all we do / Or can do, undo, try to do again" ("Atlantic Wall" lines 6–10, 45).
29. Colie's powerful scholarship on Renaissance poetry and thought is still highly influential. She is less well known for her poetry. As I explore elsewhere, Colie's correspondence with Hannah Arendt discloses that she was not unacquainted with love-melancholy. Her life was cut short when she drowned near her home in Lyme, Connecticut.
30. For women poets who adapt Petrarchan forms and for a bibliography on this huge topic, see Jones.
31. For the *Secretum* as autobiography or "ego-document," see Burke, "Representations." For a bibliography on this topic and the *Secretum* as self-writing, see Zak, *Petrarch's*.
32. McClure's remains the best assessment of Petrarch's consolatory work. Zak recently characterizes Petrarch's modes of consolation as "authoritarian and monolithic" (Boccaccio 185), with which I disagree. In differentiating Boccaccio from this characterization of Petrarchan consolation, Zak does not fully take into account the *Secretum* and the *De remediis*, which clearly influenced Boccaccio's views on consolatory technique and content.

33. Petrarch revived the Ciceronian dialogue, in which historical persons speak in a fictional exchange. He learned this form from Cicero, who learned it from Plato (*Sec. Proem* 4. 5; 8). For his adoption of the Ciceronian form, see Marsh. For use of dialogue in the *Secretum* and *De remediis*, see Brovia.

34. I use the Carrara Latin edition of the *Secretum*. I cite the Nichols English translation by book, chapter, section, and page numbers. I also consulted the Quillen translation and the Dotti facing-page Italian translation.

35. Truth's palace, to which she refers, is absent from the extant version of the *Africa*. Remnants of this description may constitute what is now Syphax's palace, *Africa* III. lines 87–264; 44–50. See Fenzi; Fleming 165–67.

36. The Latin term *aegritudo* translates as sickness, grief, affliction, melancholy (Lewis).

37. As Pierre de Nolhac stated over one hundred years ago, “[L]es Tusculanes sont l’ouvrage philosophique que Petrarque a le plus souvent cite” (“The Tusculan Disputations is the philosophical work that Petrarch cites most frequently” 247; trans. mine).

38. E.g., for *molestiam*, Franciscus’s meditation on death only brings him “molestias terroresque” (“anguish and terror” *Sec.* 1. 12. 4; 28–29); for *solicitududo*, Augustinus asks, “[Q]uorsum he sollicitudines et exedentes animum cure?” (“To what end do these troubles vex your mind?” 2. 5. 4; 45), and at the beginning of the third day, Franciscus prematurely concedes that Augustinus’s conversation has “magna sollicitudinum mearum parte liberatum” (“freed [me] from most of my worries” 3. 1. 1; 78); for *angor*, in listing woes of human adversity, Franciscus laments that many are “perpetuis premit angoribus” (“weighed down by continual anguish” 1. 2. 1; 11), and he uses this word to disclose mental disability (2. 13. 1; 60).

39. See Cicero, *Tusc. disp.* 3. 11; 255; and see Petrarch, *Sec.* 1. 15. 2–3; 32. For the four perturbations and Petrarch’s reliance on Cicero for their definitions, see Panizza 119–20; Huss.

40. For Petrarch’s wound imagery as constitutive of the self, see Torre.

41. Seneca’s *Epist. Ad Luc.* influence Petrarch’s concept of *aegritudo*, reinforcing points made in the *Tranq. Anim.* For Petrarch’s consolatory familiar letters in the Senecan style as self-writing, see Zak, esp. *Petrarch’s* 98–105; for Cicero’s influence on Petrarch’s intimate epistolary style, see Eden 49–72.

42. For effects of travel on disabled people in the Renaissance, see Bearden, *Monstrous Kinds*, esp. 21–28, 109–78.

43. Franciscus sums up Augustinus’s advice on travel as follows: “[I]mparato animo peregrinationes nil conferunt, paratum sanant, sanumque custodiunt” (“Travel does not benefit an unprepared mind; it heals a mind that is prepared; it preserves the health of a mind that is already healthy” *Sec.* 3. 4–5; 97).

44. Based on similarity of discussion of urban life, the letter is likely Seneca *Epist. Lucil.* 56.

45. For acedia in the Middle Ages, see Wenzel, *The Sin*; for its relation to melancholy and ennui, see Kuhn. For its use by Petrarch, see Wenzel, “Petrarch’s”; Zampini.

46. Petrarch's disability occurred outside the monastic context to which some aspects of acedia pertain. He took minor clerical orders and accepted benefices for financial support. He was not a monk.

47. For acedia, see Evagrius; Cassian. Petrarch may not have known these sources, but acedia was "part of the religious instruction which the church periodically administered to the lay folk" (Wenzel, "Petrarch's" 42).

48. Acedia's effects are numerous: "It denoted sorrow, weariness, or negligence about spiritual goods and included a wide variety of faults, ranging from non-attendance of Sunday mass to lack of joy in prayer and despair at one's salvation" (Wenzel, "Petrarch's" 41–42).

49. E.g., *Sec.* 1. 15. 10–13; 34–35.

50. For Petrarch and the *contemptus mundi* tradition, see McClure 22–29.

51. E.g., Wells xxv–xxix.

52. Petrarch never uses the late Latin word *melancholia* in the *Secretum*. See McClure 25.

53. For Augustine's reading advice and the art of memory, see Carruthers 203–25.

54. Franciscus refers to Virgil, *Aen.* 1. lines 75–90; 5.

55. Torre likens this reading practice to Foucault's technologies of the self, which "permit individuals to effect by their own means, or with the help of others, a certain number of operations on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct, and way of being, so as to transform themselves in order to attain a certain state of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection, or immortality" (Foucault 225, ct. Torre 82). Zak also uses Foucault's theory to characterize Petrarch's self-writing: See Zak, *Petrarch's*. I have reservations about using Foucault's theory here because consolatory reading and writing in the *Secretum* is prosthetic and palliative rather than normative and disciplinary, which the Foucauldian theory implies.

56. Disability studies inflects prosthesis in various ways. For prosthesis as indicative of lack and for its narrative function, see Mitchell and Snyder, *Narrative Prosthesis* 6–10; for prosthesis as generative of disability knowledge, see Dolmage, *Disability* 106–17.

57. This passage is reminiscent of the opening of the proem to book 2 of *De rerum natura* by Lucretius. Thanks to Yasmin Haskell for this observation.

58. Petrarch's story about disability in the *Secretum* thus differs significantly from representations of disability that David Mitchell and Sharon Snyder condemn and call narrative prosthesis, in which disability simply serves as a narrative hook to draw in the reader before it is cured or otherwise done away with (*Narrative Prosthesis*). Petrarch's difference thus illustrates again how past models of disability can serve as a narrative resource for today's disabled and nondisabled writers.

59. The form's history is relevant. David Marsh observes that two figures "shape decisively the course of the tradition. The first, St. Augustine, marks the end of the classical Ciceronian dialogue in the fourth century, and the second, Petrarch, initiates the dialogue's revival in the fourteenth century" (1).

60. For Petrarch, the will, and Stoicism, see Trinkaus 36–43. Quillen shows

that voluntarism without grace is not Augustinian. For Petrarch's "reinvention" of Augustine, see Quillen, *Rereading* 182–216.

61. This outcome reflects Petrarch's sources. Cicero was a skeptical Stoic and "never resolved to what extent mental illness and its cure were matters of the will" (Panizza 120). A similar dynamic of resistance arises from Augustine's admonition to contemplate death in horrifying detail (1. 8. 4–11; 21–26). On contemplation of death, "Petrarch found that this therapy by aversion . . . made his anxiety and depression worse" (Panizza 125).

62. The citation comes from Cicero's *De Sen.* 83. Augustine's calling this abuse corresponds to the rhetorical term *abusio*, in Greek *catachresis*, which is a figure of substitution and classified as a rhetorical vice.

63. The comparison may come from Cicero, *Tusc. Disp.* 3. 16; 301, which cites Homer's description of Bellerophon among other heroic figures who resort to solitude during mental distress. The reference might also come from the *Problemata*, a text thought to be by Aristotle, which Seneca cites in the *Tranq. Anim.*

64. I use the Latin from the Carraud facing-page translation. I also consult the Spiccia Interbooks online edition and the 1595 edition held at the University of Wisconsin–Madison, Special Collections Vault Duveen D 1318. I cite the Rawski English translation by book, dialogue, and page numbers.

65. For the *De remediis*'s manuscript history, translation, and print distribution, see Mann; Diekstra; Rawski, "Introduction to the Commentary" xv–xvi. For its illustration in manuscript and print, see Trapp 118–70.

66. As in the *Secretum*, the strongest influence on the *De remediis* is Cicero's *Tusculan Disputations*. For Petrarch's sources in the *De remediis*, see Rawski, "Petrarch's Scholarship," which quantifies the influence of Cicero's *Tusc. Disp.* as paramount.

67. The pseudo-Senecan text is now attributed to Martin of Braga (ca. 520–580). As Diekstra observes, "Petrarch's work is of much larger scope, and Seneca's work is in comparison not more than a skeleton frame" (35). For the pseudo-Senecan text as consolation, a modern edition, and an English translation, see Palmer.

68. For the Stoic concept of the four passions in the *De remediis*, see Huss.

69. For Fortune in the *De remediis*, see Kircher; Heitmann.

70. For Petrarch's debts to Heraclitus, see Françon.

71. For Petrarch on medicine, see Berte et al.; for medicine in the *De remediis*, see McClure 49–52.

72. Though he rejects medicalization, Petrarch inveighs against physicians with blindness metaphors of ignorance, which are harmful to blind people. For Petrarch's antimicrobial attitudes, see Singer 54–78. For the influence of his invectives on later criticisms of medicine in the Renaissance, see Carlino.

73. One can translate the Latin *gravitates* as sickness or illness. I agree with Rawski's translation of the word as "dignity," because of Petrarch's emphasis on Azzo's poise. For the idea that enduring or *sprezzando* ("disdaining") disability is dignified, see Bearden, *Monstrous Kinds* 54–59.

74. Petrarch does not use the word *accidia*, or *acedia*, in the *De remediis*, which was pitched to lay readers.

75. For fluctuations of mind, see *De rem.* 1. 90; 2. 75. For world-weariness, see 2. 98.

76. Metaphors from Cicero and Seneca console the mind in the *De remediis*. For military metaphors, see, e.g., 1. Preface; 10 and 2. 75. For storm metaphors, see, e.g., 2. Preface; 12, 1. 90, and 2. 75. For shipwreck metaphors, see 1. 54 and 2. 75.

77. In “*Tedium Vite*” (“World Weariness”), Reason advises, “*Propellenda tedia cogitationibus letis ac spe bona, et amicorum bona solatio, et librorum et delectationum honestarum alterna varietate atque exercitiis iucundis*” (“Such loathing should be counteracted by happy thoughts and good cheer, the comfort of close friends and books, a variety of wholesome delights and pleasant exercise” 2. 98; 242). The society of good books and good friends is thus also necessary to mental health and supports the idea that Petrarch’s concept of personhood is interdependent.

78. The citations are to Virgil, *Georg.* 1. 5–6; Horace, *Carmen saec.* 1–2. For Petrarch’s citation of authorities in this passage, see Rawski, *Book II* 362–68.

79. For Pliny’s influence on representations of disability, including races of monsters, see Bearden, *Monstrous Kinds* 11–12. For nature’s creative compensations for disability, see Bearden, *Monstrous Kinds* 83–90.

80. There is no standard, Latin edition, or modern English translation of Petrarch’s *Psalmi*. Rawski notes the fourth psalm’s relevance to this passage, quotes it in full, and translates it. See Rawski, *Book II* 368–70.

81. Though I do not analyze Petrarch’s psalms in depth, they have close ties to the *Secretum* and the *De remediis*. E.g., the fourth psalm lists “things God has made for him, Francesco: the sky, the stars, the seasons; the sun, the moon, days and nights, light and darkness, air, earth, water, mountains and seas, and all placed under the feet of men, because God loves us” (Matter 226).

82. For more on Psalms as spiritual consolation for disability, see the introduction to this study, chapter 2, and chapter 5.

83. For Petrarch’s exultation and desire for the resurrected body, see Gragnolati and Southerden.

84. The speech is drawn in part from Gaius Aurelius Cotta’s speech on creation in Cicero’s *Nat. Deor.* 2. 96–105; 217–23.

85. For Plato’s writings on sex with which Petrarch was most likely familiar, see the commentary by Rawski, *Book I* 296–99.

86. To the remedy of a change of location that Augustine proposes in the *Secretum*, Reason adds avoiding calling to mind the image of the beloved, occupying yourself with other matters, intensely reflecting on how degrading love is, and finally admitting that Joy’s love is sensual and not divine (1. 69; 204). If these remedies falter, Reason suggests that Joy try the dubious remedies of loving all equally or else driving one love out with another (1. 69; 205).

87. Other dialogues that treat fame or glory include *De rem.* 1. 90, 2. 88.

88. Melancholy’s history differs from that of *aegritudo* and *acedia*, which can be experienced by anyone. Melancholy comes with assumptions about humoral predisposition and imbalance, particularly that of black bile.

89. My reading of disability discourse in the *De remediis* is far from exhaustive. In subsequent chapters, dialogues that exert influence on other disabled authors receive more in-depth analysis.

90. The humor of repetition with variation is hard to illustrate without performance, when it's "All in the Timing" (David Ives, 1994).

91. For Sorrow's logical besting of Reason in this dialogue, see Huss 65–76.

92. See Virgil, *Eclog.* 8. 63. See Rawski, *Book II* 423–24.

Chapter 2

1. The influence of Petrarch's *De remediis* on the literary culture of Iberian conversos is strong. For the *De remediis* and Fernando de Rojas's *Celestina*, see Fothergill-Payne, esp. 96–16; Deyermund, *The Petrarchan*. Francisco de Madrid, who was likely a *converso*, translated the *De remediis* into Spanish. For de Madrid as a *converso*, see Russel. Alonso Núñez de Reinoso (1518–1567) was also influenced by the treatise. For the *De remediis* and Núñez de Reinoso, see C. Rose 104–6, 118–22.

2. I follow the convention of capitalizing "Deaf" to indicate membership in Deaf culture and community, which may or may not include the ability to sign, and lowercasing "deaf" to designate the sensory impairment. I designate Teresa as Deaf because of her own strong sense of community with her deaf and disabled readers. I call her disabled because her physical impairments included chronic pain as well as deafness and because she embraces her experience as a part of a community of the infirm. For a history of deafness in Spain, see Plann; Scarborough. For medieval European attitudes toward deafness and Deaf communication, see Singer, "Deafness"; Hsy, "Symptom." For early modern attitudes toward signing and other capacities of Deaf people in Europe and beyond, see Bearden, *Monstrous Kinds* 79–108, 141–78.

3. Teresa was not, as some have stated, the first woman to write consolation at all. E.g., Christine de Pizan writes *Le chemin du long estude* (1402) and *La Mutacion de Fortune* (1403) to console herself for the death of her husband. She also writes the third part of *Le Livre de L'advison de Christine* (1405), which is a self-consolation in the style of Boethius, and *Epistre de la prison de vie Humaine* (1418), which consoled women who lose family members to war. For the influence of Petrarch's *De remediis* on Christine, see Walters.

4. The only known manuscript containing Teresa's works is held at the Biblioteca del Real Monasterio de San Lorenzo de El Escorial, MS. h. III.24. For codicology of the manuscript, see Castro Ponce 73–83. I cite the Hutton Spanish edition and consult the Castro Ponce and BIESES online editions of Teresa's works. I cite and modify in brackets the Seidenspinner-Núñez English translation. Selections of her work appear in translation in Fraser's anthology of primary documents on deafness in Spain, and a modernized Spanish edition was edited by Gallego Fernández de Aránguiz and Navarro Durán.

5. In a petition of May 2, 1449, to Pope Nicolas V, Vatican Secret Archives, *Registra Supplicationum* 436, fol. 145, Teresa's uncle Alfonso de Cartagena indicates she has not yet reached the age of twenty-five. She therefore was not born before

the spring of 1424. I cite the online Cartagena Library transcription of the Beltrán edition of this letter. Frieden first linked Alfonso de Cartagena's papal petitions to Teresa. Rivera Carretas discovered records placing Teresa as a professed nun in the convent of Santa Clara in Burgos from 1446 to 1452. See Rivera Carretas, "La Documentación." Since girls did not make holy vows before age twelve, Teresa was probably not born after 1434. Rivera Carretas also revealed that Teresa was mentioned in her father's will in 1478. See Rivera Carretas, "Teresa de Cartagena Vivía." She also found documentation suggesting that Teresa was married at some point without children. See Rivera Carretas, "La Documentación."

6. Cantera Burgos proved that Teresa belonged to the Cartagena/Santa María family based on her inclusion in her uncle Alfonso de Cartagena's will dated July 6, 1456 (537). Teresa's cousin Fray Iñigo de Mendoza's pronouncement of her father's 1478 will and other genealogical records confirm her family ties. See Rivera Carretas, "Teresa de Cartagena vivía" 763n1; Majuelo Apiñániz 133–37.

7. For more on this family connection, see Hutton 13–15.

8. For Petrarch's works in the papal library of Benedict XIII and their distribution to Aragon and Catalonia, see Brovia, "Per una storia."

9. For a more recent assessment of Alfonso de Cartagena in early humanism, see Di Camillo, "Fifteenth-Century."

10. In Alfonso de Cartagena's translation of the pseudo-Senecan text, titled *Libro contra las adversidades de la fortuna*, he omits sections on sorrow, expands somewhat on the section on blindness, and, like the source, does not address deafness, muteness, or pain. For more on this translation, see Morrás, "Repertorio" 222.

11. Morrás suggests it is possible that Alfonso de Cartagena "fuera autor de la última parte del *Libro de las mujeres ilustres* de Álvaro de Luna. . . . Su interés por el debate feminista queda bien patente en numerosas glosas a Séneca, en las que loma abierta defensa de las mujeres" ("could have been the author of the final part of *The Book of Illustrious Women* by Álvaro de Luna. . . . His interest in the debate over women's rights is well-attested in his numerous glosses of Seneca, which mount an open defense of women" "Repertorio" 235).

12. The petition of April 6, 1449, is housed in Vatican Secret Archives, *Registra Supplicationum* 436, fols. 114v–115. I cite the online Cartagena Library transcription of the Beltrán edition.

13. For biographical details of Juana de Mendoza, including her relationship with Teresa de Cartagena, see Rivera Carretas, "Una vita en relación."

14. Amador de los Ríos includes her biography with passages from the manuscript in his 1865 *Historia crítica* with praise for the work's style; Serrano y Sanz, who is less complimentary, features short selections in his 1903 anthology of Hispanic women writers; Hutton produced the first edition of her work in 1967.

15. For a feminist overview of early Spanish women writers, including Teresa, see Cruz, "Women"; Baranda.

16. For Teresa as *conversa*, see Amrán; Díaz Márquez; Husser.

17. For Teresa and mysticism, see Cortés Timoner, "Fue levado," "Las imágenes." For possible influence of Jewish mysticism, see Díaz Márquez.

18. For Teresa and consolation, see Cammarata; Aguirre de Cárcer Casarrubios; Castro Ponce 25–44; Snow. For confessional aspects and consolation for disability, see Juárez-Almendros; Rivera Cordero.

19. Crenshaw used the term “intersectionality” in 1989 to name phenomena in legal discourse that social justice movements had already identified, especially in the context of black feminist thought. Intersectionality demonstrates how overlapping marginalized identities including race are multiple or geometric and that society and its institutions produce oppression; oppression is not produced by marginal identities per se.

20. For interlaced narratives and wondrous disability, see Bearden, *Monstrous Kinds* 25–28, 198–211.

21. Interlace can create a monstrous chronotope, in which atypical body-minds are represented with crip time and space. For interlace and the monstrous chronotope, see Bearden, *Monstrous Kinds* 198–211. For concepts of space and time in Teresa’s work with an emphasis on disability, see Rivera Cordero. For shuttling between present and past in the construction of a double or split voice in *Arboleda*, see Juárez-Almendros, “The Autobiography.”

22. For Teresa’s use of the third-person plural to forge community, see Snow 22–23; for how this creates disability community specifically, see Juárez-Almendros, “The Autobiography.”

23. For Llull and the *Arboleda*, including his *Blanquera* and *Arbre*, see Hutton 23–27; Cortés Timoner, “Las imágenes.”

24. Teresa cites Boethius on the capacity to do evil (58; 42). For Boethius in medieval Spain, see Briesemeister.

25. The advice cited from Cicero comes from *Tusc. disp.* 5. 40; 543.

26. Alfonso de Cartagena also warns that the inability to hear counsel is dangerous for Deaf people. See Cartagena and Sánchez de Arévalo 2. 32; 102.

27. Hutton proposes Luna’s *Libro de las consolaciones de la vida humana*, written during his exile from the papacy, as a source for Teresa’s concept of consolatory reading. Luna relates that the *sabio*, or wise person, “nunca puede estar solo; ca . . . tiene libros, de los cuales saca buenos enxemplos” (“is never alone; since . . . he has books from which to draw good examples” 583). This advice applies to Teresa’s solitude; it does not address deafness specifically. Petrarch’s *De remediis*, which Luna knew, prescribes reading as a consolation for deafness. Brovia observes that Luna was “sicuro lettore del *De remediis*, di cui teneva una copia nella cassa dei libri da recare con sé durante i viaggi” (“certainly a reader of *De remediis*, of which he kept a copy in a chest of books to accompany him during travel” “Per una storia” 20). For the influence of Luna on Teresa, see Hutton 17–23; Castro Ponce 34–44.

28. Rivera Cordero draws on Toombs’s phenomenological concept of lived disability and embodied space to argue that Teresa uses embodied spatial metaphors. Hsy applies her concept of embodied metaphor to Teresa’s metaphors of communication with an emphasis on gesture as a form of Deaf Gain. In both cases, embodied metaphors differ from David Mitchell and Sharon Snyder’s fundamental concept of the materiality of metaphor, in which the disabled body stands in as

a figurative shortcut for negative cultural phenomena, such as the disabled body standing in for the unfit state. For materiality of metaphor, see Mitchell and Snyder, *Narrative Prosthesis* 47–64.

29. According to Mudge et al., “Grafting can be defined as the natural or deliberate fusion of plant parts so that vascular continuity is established between them. . . . The resulting genetically composite organism functions as a single plant. Two adjacent intact plants or different branches of the same plant can become naturally or intentionally grafted together” (439). Humans have grafted plants intentionally since at least the first millennium BCE. In intentional grafting, or “detached scion grafting,” a scion, or “the shoot piece or bud cut from a donor plant,” is inserted into a hole in “the upper portion of the grafted plant,” which is called the “stock, under stock, or rootstock” (439).

30. For grafting metaphors and marvelous monstrosity, see Bearden, *Monstrous Kinds* 106–7.

31. Consumption and distribution of food, as Bynum has argued, is central to women’s spirituality in the late Middle Ages. Teresa recommends moderate consumption over the fasting that mystics of her time favored. For rejection of moderate food consumption by mystics, see Bynum 237–43.

32. To make Fox’s text more accessible, I have exceeded my usual practice of regularizing the letters *i* and *j*, *u* and *v*, and have regularized spelling of especially difficult words in brackets.

33. Pigman argues that Senecan bees can illustrate both “transformative imitation” and “non-transformative following, gathering, or borrowing” (3).

34. Alfonso de Cartagena translated Seneca’s *Epist. Ad Luc.* 88, which treats the liberal arts. He was familiar with Seneca’s letters. For his translations of Seneca, see Morrás, “Repertorio” 221–22. Petrarch analyzes Seneca’s letter 84 at some length in *Fam.* 1. 8, and he uses Seneca’s digestive metaphor in a similar way to Teresa in *Fam.* 22. 2. For more on Petrarch’s transformative, Senecan metaphors for composition, see Pigman; Burrow 139–68.

35. For Pauline spiritual consolation, see the introduction to this study. For Paul and disability theology, see Eiesland esp. 68–74; Albl.

36. Several critics claim that Teresa never draws on the suffering of Christ as an example for her own suffering. Teresa does frame her disability with the Psalms and scripture that do not directly treat Christ’s suffering the vast majority of the time. However, Teresa does state in *Admiración* that she follows in the footsteps of Christ in order to perceive (through senses other than hearing) the aroma of his healing powers, stating that she follows “al Salvador non con pasos corporales, mas con los afectos del ánima, corriendo en el olor de los enguertos suyos que son las sus preciosas llagas, de las quales Él, por su grant caridad, quiso ser unguido e quiere unguir a los que pa[ra]sí escoje” (“my Savior not with physical footsteps, but with the affections of my soul, pursuing the scent of His ointments that anoint His precious wounds, with which He, in His great charity, wishes to anoint those whom He chooses for Himself” 137; 109).

37. These three images are significant for Teresa’s use of consolatory writing,

embodied metaphor, and crip exegesis. Teresa also reframes her disabilities in this section of the *Arboleda* with images of abandoning the paternal household, paternal corporal punishment, and sadness as a spur to devotion. For more on these images, see Ellis; Surtz, “Image Patterns.”

38. For deafness as protection against worldly chatter, see Petrarch, *De rem.* 2. 97; Luna 600.

39. For muteness as protection against idle talk, see Petrarch, *De rem.* 2. 103; Luna 600.

40. For the ear of the soul, see Petrarch, *De rem.* 2. 97; Luna 600. For the tongue of the soul, see Petrarch, *De rem.* 2. 103; Luna 600.

41. For Cistercian manual signs, see Bruce; Barakat; Farrar. For Spain and Deaf education, see Plann.

42. On limitations of speech, the rules stipulate “that ye kepe and refraine youre mouthe from all evill and shrewde speche and co[m]municacion,” “love not to use many wordes nor moche speche,” and “speke not nor use no words that be inutile vaine trifeling idle or provokinge la[u]ghter” (Collett et al. 99).

43. Bruce lists Latin vocabulary for monastic signs including the terms used by Alfonso de Cartagena: “The most common word for an individual hand sign was *signum* (‘sign’). Less common was *nutus* (literally ‘nod,’ but usually employed in its widest sense as (‘indicator’))” (10). He adds that “verbs and phrases for the act of making monastic signs included *significare*, *signo petere*, *signo facere*, *per signa insinuari*, *indiciis indicare* and *nutibus ostendere*” (10).

44. For the Psalms as spiritual consolation for disability, see the introduction to this study.

45. Conde identifies the Psalms as the most cited work in both the *Arboleda* and *Admiración*. For Teresa and the Psalms, see Conde, “La ortodoxia”; Pearson.

46. Fourfold exegesis of biblical texts explicates the literal (or historical), allegorical, moral (or tropological), and anagogical senses of scripture. For an overview of this complex tradition, see Lubac 1–14.

47. For translation of the senses, see Bearden, *Monstrous Kinds* 104–7. For translation gain, see Bassnett, “Gained in Translation.”

48. I can say from experience that guide dog and handler teams also rely on the harness and leash for mutual tactile communication and guidance.

49. The reference to *Ps.* 31:9 is not identified in Rawski’s commentary.

50. For the banquet of the senses as relates to the sensorium in early modern poetry, see Gabler 144–90. For its significance for sensory disability and the interrelation or translation of the senses, see Bearden, *Monstrous Kinds* 83–90.

51. Morrás estimates that the conversation was recorded in 1440, which means Teresa could have read it before composing *Arboleda*. See Cartagena and Sánchez de Arévalo 63.

52. Teresa also cites Revelations 19:9, which uses the image of the feast of the lamb.

53. To illustrate that it is natural not to desire impairment, Teresa cites Tobias 5:11–12, where Tobias states that he does not wish to be blind.

54. For medical consolation, see the introduction to this study.

55. Teresa also compares the experience of disability to agricultural labor, which crosses class divides and emphasizes how strenuous disability work can be. Teresa states that an infirm person “afana más estando en la cama que un labrador que desde la mañana a la noche no desanpara de su mano el a[l]çada” (“[labors more in his sick bed] than a worker who keeps his hand to his hoe from morning to night” 80; 62).

56. Swan developed this classroom exercise, where he asks students to list the first examples that come to mind in the category of person with a disability.

57. Disability activists and scholars recognize the paternalism of pity in its casting of the disabled person as tragic object. See, e.g., Shapiro 12–40; Hughes 70–72.

58. Majuelo Apiñániz and I concur that ignoring Teresa’s statement about the timing of her onset of deafness is confounding. Majuelo Apiñániz is the only other scholar I know who discards Seidenspinner-Núñez and Kim’s dating. She does not challenge their assumptions about the capacities of deaf people to work.

59. Alfonso de Cartagena’s role as intercessor exemplifies interdependent paths of supplication in disability accommodation requests. Dubourg explains that the presence of intercessors “testifies to the hierarchy’s control and/or support of subordinates, as well as revealing a particular petitioner’s inclusion or exclusion from solidarity networks”; in other words, “it reveals a chain of interdependent relationships: those between supplicants and the influential personalities to whom they appealed for help; and those between powerful intercessors and the Pope, with whom they must maintain privileged links in order for the intercession to be effective” (44). For intercessors in the petition process, see Dubourg 43–46.

60. As of yet, there is no documented evidence that Teresa ever did move to a new convent. Scholars propose several reasons for the requested move. Teresa may have wished to move due to reforms of Franciscan orders that limited access to education, increasingly violent discrimination against conversos, or (before Seidenspinner-Núñez and Kim’s problematic dating of Teresa’s deafness) a preference for an order that utilized manual signs more than the Franciscans.

61. Seidenspinner-Núñez and Kim presume there were stipulations against deaf people taking on leadership positions in convents, of which they produce no evidence. There were plenty of offices—some of which Seidenspinner-Núñez and Kim list in a footnote—such as librarian, which a person of Teresa’s talents could have performed, even without disability-related accommodations.

62. Other disabled and deaf nuns held conventual positions in the early modern period. See esp. Strocchia “Disability Histories.” In an email on Apr. 30, 2023, Sharon Strocchia kindly shared with me an entry on Archangela Gucci (ca. 1540–1592) (from the Archivio di Stato, Florence. San Jacopo di Ripoli. Vol. 23. *Croniche segnato A*, 1508–1778, 141v, 4 Aug. 1592) that states that “fu sana d’assai e fece tutti quegli ufiti che potete fare purchè era sorda molto bene” (“she was reasonably healthy and performed all the duties [or offices] that she was able to very well, despite being deaf” trans. Strocchia). Fiammetta Frescobaldi (1523–1586), who

was lame, was the official chronicler for her Dominican convent in Florence and also wrote and translated many works. For more on Frescobaldi, see Weaver.

63. Transfers, even between orders, on the basis of disability were commonplace in Teresa's time. Thomas Aquinas tolerated changing orders "in the search for a more perfect religious life; to join a stricter order; or because of impairment or ill health," and transferring orders "became so commonplace in the thirteenth and fourteenth century that the papacy felt compelled to intervene to ensure that they were carried out in accordance with the rules" (Dubourg 215).

64. Teresa may also reveal personal knowledge of this papal dispensation process in *Admiración*, where she makes the following observation about pontifical power: "[C]a [a] los perlados de la Iglesia da poder para que puedan dar e proveer de beneficios e gracias a todo el estado clerical, e así mesmo al reglar, pero sienpre reservan en sí algunos casos e divinidades como especiales e singulares para que otro alguno no pueda dispensar en ellos, sino solamente Su Santidad" ("For he gives power to the prelates of the Church to grant and provide benefits and privileges to all the clerical estate and to the religious orders as well, but he always reserves for himself certain cases and dignities as special and singular so that no one else can dispense them except His Holiness alone" 123; 98).

65. This is likely a reference to Diego de Anaya Maldonado (1357–1438).

66. Curtius notes the use of the modesty topos in the *exordium*, or opening of speeches, where "it behooved the orator to put his hearers in a favorable, attentive, and tractable state of mind. How do this? First, through a modest presence. But one has to draw attention to this modesty oneself. Thus it becomes affected" (83). For more on this topos in secular and spiritual texts, see Curtius 83–85. For the use of disability specifically in the humility or modesty topos, see the introduction to this study.

67. For disability disclosure in the humility topos as a rhetorical strategy and consolatory remedy, see the introduction to this study.

68. This is not to say that Teresa knew Cicero's advice directly, though she could have. Alfonso de Cartagena translated Cicero's *De inventione*, in which this advice appears. He makes use of the humility topos in his own prologue to the translation. See Cartagena, trans., "*La rethórica*" 25–26. The *Rhetorica ad Herennium* was translated by Enrique de Villena in 1427. Villena, who was friends with several of Teresa's family members and acquaintances, also wrote a work of consolation, *Tra-tado de consolación* (ca. 1423), which might have been available to Teresa but which mostly is concerned with consolations for death and does not provide consolation for deafness or muteness. For more on Villena's treatise, see Carr.

69. For Teresa's use of the modesty topos as strategic, see Cammarata; Conde, "Self-Fashioning"; Corry.

70. Teresa elsewhere downplays the value of university education compared with experience of disability. E.g., she adduces the example of Job, who does not get his master's degree in patience in the universities of Paris or Salamanca (96; 75).

71. *Ps.* 21:7 reads: "Ego autem sum vermis, et non homo; opprobrium hominum, et abjectio plebis" ("But I am a worm, and no man: the reproach of men, and the outcast of the people" Vulgate.net).

72. Teresa admirably defends the capacities of women with further evidence of the reciprocity of their everyday abilities with those of men and with examples, such as that of the biblical hero Judith, to show that God can enable women to do things that they are not commonly believed to be capable of doing.

73. When Petrarch advises how to imitate the ancients, he warns to avoid simply copying like an ape (*Fam.* 23. 19; 302), or outright theft, as the crow absconds with the feathers of other birds (*Fam.* 22. 2; 213).

74. For a compelling epistolary reimagining of the plagiarism incident in Keller's life, see Kleege, *Blind Rage* 1–44.

Chapter 3

1. For an early version of this chapter with an emphasis on disability and monstrosity as source of crip authority and generic experimentation, see Bearden, “Monstrous Births and Crip Authority.” Scholars who influence my thinking on this topic include Miñana, Castillo, Rio Parra, and de Armas Wilson. Their work on monstrosity recognizes Cervantes's resistance of formal and bodily norms.

2. For an account of this discovery told from the perspective of the archeologists, see Greyfriars Research Team.

3. The 3D model of King Richard III's grave can be found at the following URL: <https://sketchfab.com/3d-models/king-richard-iiiis-grave-00d23c7defd0476db1a36c08728fa60f>.

4. Cervantes's characters Don Quijote in *Don Quijote*, Tomás Rodaja in *El licenciado Vidriera*, and, to a lesser extent, Campuzano in *El casamiento engañoso* and *El coloquio de los perros* have received the most attention in regard to early modern discourses of madness. See Ife; Alonso Fernández; Shuger. Juárez-Almendros takes a feminist disability studies approach in her analysis of Cervantine female characters who are aged and/or infected with venereal disease. See Juárez-Almendros, *Disabled Bodies* 64–71, 93–101.

5. Clare defines the dehumanizing nature of the medical model as follows: “This model defines disability as a personal problem, curable and/or treatable by the medical establishment, which in turn has led to the wholesale medicalization of disabled people” (*Exile and Pride* 96).

6. For an overview of the history of the disability rights movement, see Paterson; for the influence of wounded war veterans on this history, see Gerber.

7. Although it does not address disability directly, Martínez's examination of early modern Spanish soldiers' homecomings has been useful for my argument: see Martínez 167–208. For Cervantes's depiction of soldiers in his fiction, see Rupp.

8. Cervantes, along with having a disabled hand and wounded chest, may also have stuttered. See Beusterien.

9. For the historical significance of the battle, which was overblown by Christians at the time, see Hess; for a creative imagining of Cervantes's role in the battle based on historical sources, see Egginton.

10. The letter, which was first thought to be a forgery, is now accepted as the

work of Cervantes and details his participation in the battle and his wounding. For the letter's provenance, see Gonzales Sánchez-Molero; for a general assessment and bibliography, see Sáez 40–47.

11. For Cervantes's captivity in Algiers and the traces it left in his fiction, see Garcés.

12. After his release from captivity, moreover, Cervantes mentions his wounding in a petition to the Council of the Indies in 1590, reminding the state of his participation in “la Batalla Naval, donde le dieron muchas heridas, de las cuales perdió una mano de un arcabuzazo” (“the naval battle, where many wounds were received, including the loss of a hand to an arquebus shot” *ct.* Canavaggio, *Cervantes* 223).

13. Rendall mentions that the lack of a portrait was unusual enough for Cervantes to comment on it here. See Rendall 143. For more on the printed author portrait, see How; Burke, “Reflections,” “Representations.”

14. Cervantes also indicates in this prologue that a portrait of him by Don Juan de Jáuregui (1583–1641), which is lost, would have been his preferred model for a portrait engraving. No portraits of Cervantes drawn from life exist.

15. For emblematic creation and interpretation, ekphrasis, and the expression of ethos, see Bearden, *The Emblematics of the Self*.

16. As noted in chapter 2 of this study, Teresa de Cartagena imagines the outward signs of infirmity as a coat of arms for the infirm. For inclusion of disability in painted portraits, see Tait's discussion of portraits of Henry Danvers, First Earl of Danby (1573–1643), which do depict his scars and other war wounds.

17. For the tradition of melding of arms and letters in early modern Spanish literary and military practices, see, respectively, Cruz, “Arms Versus Letters”; Martínez 12–53.

18. For the transmission history of the *De remediis* in Spain, see Gómez. Francisco de Madrid's Spanish translation was printed in six editions from 1510 to 1534. He apparently undertook the translation to help alleviate his own experience of illness: see Russell; Arroyo Rodríguez 57–60. Gómez also analyzes the imitations and partial translation of Petrarch by Pedro de Medina (1555) and Fray Francisco de Avila (1576).

19. For the autobiographical aspects of *Viaje*, see Canavaggio, “La dimension autobiografica.”

20. Cervantes highlights the “rare invention” of his literary production on several occasions. For the significance of this quality in Cervantes's works, see Blasco Pascual.

21. As Martin argues, early modern Spanish authors turned satirical Italian poetic forms to their own burlesque purposes in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The authors that composed Cervantes's literary community were especially sharp in their ad hominem poetic attacks on other poets. For satirical poetic exchange between Cervantes and his contemporaries, especially in the form of the *sonetada*, see Martin, *Cervantes and the Burlesque* 147–66.

22. As elsewhere in this study, I place italic words in braces here to emphasize them to those using screen readers or other text-to-speech technologies.

23. Early modern Spanish attitudes toward soldiers and military veterans varied as they do today. For the legal stipulations in the *Siete partidas*, or medieval legal code, for granting pensions to disabled veterans in Spain, see Scarborough 35–36. For the living conditions of Spanish soldiers from 1500 to 1700 with a bottom-up approach, see White.

24. Kafer advocates disability futurity as a way to combat how concepts of the future have been “deployed in the service of compulsory able-bodiedness and able-mindedness” (27). For disability futurity in early modern discourses of disability, monstrosity, and print culture, see Bearden, *Monstrous Kinds* 179–227.

25. For honor in early modern Spain with an emphasis on military identity, see Harden 15–19.

26. Harden makes this claim in her analysis of the *Vida y trabajos* (1603), a military autobiography of Jerónimo de Pasamonte (1553–fl. 1605), who was visually impaired and was wounded both in active military duty and while a captive in Algiers. Although she does not connect this claim with Cervantes’s disability, she does make observations about the overlapping history of captivity between the two authors: see Harden 80–108.

27. The bibliography of scholarship treating Cervantine authorial distancing and play is large, but for the historical context of intellectual property law and authorship, see Biggs; for a narratological assessment, see Parr.

28. For Cervantes’s sense of humor, see Martin, “Humor.”

29. For an overview of votives across time and cultures with an emphasis on their materiality, see Weinryb. For the tradition of votive offerings for the alleviation of disability in antiquity, see Horn; Trentin.

30. Catholics around the world make ex-voto offerings—including anatomical models and images—to this day. See Weinryb; Garnett and Rosser; Laven, “Recording.” Because most Protestant sects rejected Marian worship, including intercessory prayers to the Virgin, votive offerings were not generally approved by reform doctrine. Nonetheless, the practice of this rejection varied in its severity. For instance, Luther’s attitude was more forgiving compared with Zwingli and Calvin. For the history of the Cult of Mary and variations in the persistence of Marian worship in Protestant cities, see Heal. For the Calvinist attitude to votives, see Watt 50, 144, 149.

31. For the ways in which ex-votos were personalized with the aid of early modern technologies of legal documentation, print, and portraiture, see Laven, “Recording.”

32. Most scholars focus on retrospective diagnosis or cultural contexts of the protagonist’s madness. For Erasmian influences, see Forcione, *Cervantes and the Humanist* 225–316. For studies of Cervantes’s possible medical sources, see Heiple; López Muñoz et al. For a comparison of madness in this story and *Don Quijote* with an emphasis on contemporary historical records of similar cases, see Shuger 154–62.

33. Reiss identifies Vidriera’s type of melancholy brought on by overstudy and a dry predisposition as “melancholia adusta” (*Mirages* 40), and it is the intoxication resulting from the love potion that pushes this predisposition into his particular delusion.

34. For this delusion in the early modern period, see Reiss, *Mirages* 26–64; Speak.

35. Scholars who find the structure problematic include A. Singer; Atkinson.

36. For the plain style as a means to creating verisimilitude in early modern travel narratives, see Borge 122–47. Borge argues that this plain style enhances authority that was also established in the humility topos and insistence on eyewitness accounts.

37. For Montaigne's visit to the shrine, including a detailed description of the ex-votos and their vendors as well as his own votive offering, see Montaigne 197–201. For his engagement with the process of designing his ex-voto, see Jacobs 143–44.

38. To maintain this distance and protect his body, Tomás resorts to wearing loose garments, sleeping and walking where no objects might fall on him, and following a restricted diet, among other eccentric behaviors: see Cervantes, *Novelas* 53–54.

39. For more on this phenomenon, see Bearden, *Monstrous Kinds* esp. chaps. 2, 3, and 5. See also Río Parra.

40. The royal court was housed at Valladolid from 1601 to 1606.

41. This could be a reference to one of the followers of methods developed by Pedro Ponce de León (1520–1584). Deaf educators of the time included Juan Pablo Bonet (1560–1620) and Manuel Ramírez de Carrión (1579–1652), but as there are marriage records for both men, and they were not Hieronymites, the reference to the Hieronymite who cures Tomás is probably not a direct allusion to either of these men.

42. Cervantistas tend to evaluate the Guadalupe episode from Christian or feminist perspectives. Childers 89–105 considers it in a transnational and feminist light with an emphasis on the Virgin's reputation for protecting the weak (which relates to my argument here) and the valorization of cosmopolitan forms of pilgrimage. For Cervantes's possible further composition of poetry praising the Virgin, see Atencia Requena.

43. Garnett and Rosser cite a similar reported reaction in a shrine in Altötting in Bavaria where “when one stood surrounded by all the traces of those who, as their wax and other ex votos testified, had been helped by the image, it seemed as though they were all actually present” (54).

44. Gaylord treats the passage from El Pinciano in “Cervantes' Portrait of the Artist” and returns briefly to it again in “Cervantes' Portraits and Literary Theory.” She does not make a connection with early modern disability studies, which was in its infancy when she wrote these articles, but her insights struck a real chord when I came across them while completing this chapter's revisions.

Chapter 4

1. This illustration appears in chapter 1 of part 1 of *Don Quijote*.

2. Burton revised the work repeatedly, with editions appearing in 1621, 1624, 1626, 1628, 1632, 1638, and 1651. For an overview of the additions, see Babb, *San-*

ity 13–29. I cite the Clarendon edition with volume and page numbers, and I insert translations of texts in brackets when Burton does not provide in-line translations.

3. Most scholars agree that Don Quijote has a virulent form of melancholy. For a review of scholarship on mental disability in *Don Quijote*, see Shuger 3–6. For retrospective diagnosis of the Don from a medicalized, psychopathological standpoint, see Alonso Fernández. For a psychoanalytical perspective, see Cruz, “Psyche and Gender.”

4. For the melancholic iconography of *DQ*’s narrator’s posture and its resemblance to Dürer’s *Melencolia I*, see Laguna, who states “as in Dürer’s illustration, *Don Quijote*’s author is presented in the midst of the creative impasse with which melancholy was associated in the 1500s” (44).

5. De Armas shows how the melancholic pose in the prologue to *DQ* may have been influential on another disabled author, Paul Scarron (1610–1660).

6. The polyhedron on the left side of the image features in several of Dürer’s drawings, though its meaning is unclear. The four-by-four reticulated square set in the wall above the female figure of melancholy is a magic square, in which the sum of numbers along all rows, columns, and diagonals is the same. This particular magic square was known as a Jupiter square, the influence of Jupiter apparently counteracting the melancholic influence of Saturn. Thanks to James Maynard for a pleasant discussion of *Melencolia I*, polyhedrons, and magic squares.

7. Melancholy has a long and complicated history. For overviews of this history in the West, see Starobinski; Klibansky et al.; Jackson; Gowland, “The Problem.” For melancholy in early modern England, see Babb, *The Elizabethan*; Lyons; Trevor.

8. As indicated in chapter 1 of this study, Petrarch eschews the term “melancholy” in favor of “*aegritudo*” and “*acedia*” to name his own mental disability. For a discussion of the differences and overlaps between *acedia* and melancholy, see Brann, “Is *Acedia* Melancholy?”

9. The four humors corresponded with four physiological types. A predominance of blood, which is hot and moist, results in a sanguine person. Phlegm, which is cold and moist, predominates in a phlegmatic person. Yellow bile or cholera, which is dry and can be hot or cold, holds sway over the choleric person. Finally, black bile or melancholy, which is cold and dry, is dominant in a melancholic person. This is an oversimplification of what was a varied and integrative understanding of human physiology. For the development of the doctrine of the four humors with an emphasis on melancholy, see Klibansky et al. 1–15.

10. For the role of black bile in producing melancholy and its racialization, see Floyd-Wilson esp. 67–74. I have not been able to consult the dissertation of Justin Shaw, who works on the intersections of race, disability, and melancholy. I refer the reader to an excellent recent interview, where Shaw reflects on the slippery constructs of melancholy and race across time. See Shaw, “Interview.”

11. See Floyd-Wilson 23–47.

12. For *adustion* as it relates to melancholy and early modern disability, see Hobgood and Wood, “Early Modern Literature” 37–39.

13. For the production of disability and the “norming effects” of variation from kind in the Renaissance, see Bearden, *Monstrous Kinds* 33–77.

14. For Saturn and Melancholy, see Klibansky et al.

15. For Burton’s astrological manuscript, see Bamborough and Eade.

16. For Burton’s marginalia in his own copy of Erasmus’s *In Praise of Folly*, see Colie, “Some Notes.”

17. For the metaphor of the *theatrum mundi* from antiquity through modernity, see Curtius 138–44; Quiring. For Burton’s use of the metaphor with an emphasis on performance as knowledge, see West.

18. Interpretations of Burton’s choice of Democritus Junior include a desire to speak more freely, Babb, *Sanity* 37; the conventions of epideictic rhetoric, Gowland “Rhetorical Structure”; Democritus’s philosophical views Gowland, *The Worlds* 8–21; the remedy of curative laughter, Lund, *Melancholy* 152–58; a burlesque avoidance of Puritan demands for exact accountings of the self, Shirilan 33–43.

19. Siebers explains that casting able-bodied actors in disabled roles “renders disability invisible because able-bodied people substitute for people with disabilities, similar to white performers who put on blackface at minstrel shows or to straight actors who play ‘fag’ to bad comic effect. As a result, the audience perceives the disabled body as a sign of the acting abilities of the performer—the more disabled the character, the greater the ability of the actor” (“Disability as Masquerade” 18). For crippling up in contemporary theater, see Koppers, *Theater*; in early modern theater, see Schaap Williams, *Unfixable* esp. 7–9.

20. Democritus was known as the laughing philosopher as opposed to the crying philosopher Heraclitus, whose concept of strife pervades the preface to the second book of Petrarch’s *De remediis*. Petrarch muses on Democritus and Heraclitus throughout his works. See, e.g., Françon. Burton knew the *De remediis*, and he would have known that Erasmus calls Thomas More Democritus in his dedicatory epistle to *In Praise of Folly*.

21. Burton authored a now lost Latin comedy called *Alba*, which was performed at Christ Church in Oxford for King James I in 1605, and another Latin comedy called *Philosophaster* (1615). For more on these plays, see Gowland, *The Worlds* 6–7.

22. For the English theater’s affect on audiences, including alleviation or exacerbation of emotional excess, see Craik and Pollard.

23. Guarini defines tragicomedy as “imitare con apparato cenic un azione finta et mista di tutte quelle parti Tragiche, & Comiche che verisimilmente, & con decoro possano star insieme corrette sotto una sola forma drammatica, per fine di purgar col diletto la mestizia de gli ascoltanti” (“to imitate through a stage spectacle an invented action, combining all those tragic and comic parts which can be put together in a verisimilar way and with decorum, organized under a single dramatic form, to the end of purging by means of pleasure the sadness of the listeners” Guarini, *Verrato Secondo* 1588 29v., ct. and trans. Weinberg 66 1n54). Tragicomedy aims “purgar gli animi dal male affetto della maninconia” (“to purge [spectator’s] minds of the evil feeling of melancholy” Guarini, *Verrato Secondo* 1588 27, ct. and trans. Weinberg 1080n11).

24. For the influence of Guarini's concept of tragicomic temperance on English tragicomedy, see Yoch.

25. Gill sums up twentieth-century sociological models of disability including theories of stigma, demand for adjustment, and liminality. She juxtaposes these theories with the subjective experiences of people with disabilities to prioritize the lived experience of disability.

26. Siebers argues that disability masquerade plays up disability to sidestep stigma: "The masquerade represents an alternative method of managing social stigma through disguise, one relying not on the imitation of a dominant social role but on the assumption of an identity marked as stigmatized, marginal, or inferior" ("Disability as Masquerade" 6).

27. Speaking of Burton's position at Oxford, Bamborough observes, "Christ Church, as a Royal foundation, was regarded as the leading college in Oxford, and was a society of perhaps some 250–300 members, with a lively social as well as a vigorous academic life. We may presume that Burton played his part in its academic activities, giving the lectures required of him during his period of 'necessary regency' immediately after taking his M.A. and having pupils assigned to him as tutor" ("Introduction" xvi)

28. See Kiessling, *The Library*, "The Library of Robert Burton: Addenda," "The Library of Robert Burton: New Discoveries."

29. Burton makes reference to his own birthplace and other family property in all editions, e.g., *Anatomy* 2, 224.

30. According to the commentators, 4, 9, Burton cites the story of Democritus's self-blinding from Sabellicus, *Exempla* I, 1514, fol. Xiir. The story also appears in Petrarch, *De rem.* 2. 96; 237 in Reason's consolation for blindness. Burton repeats the claim about Democritus being blind in his own consolation for blindness, 2, 133.

31. Burton paraphrases the story about Democritus from the "letter to Damagetos," which was wrongly attributed to Hippocrates and published in Latin translation in the works of Hippocrates by Fabio Calvo in 1525. See Klibansky, "Preface to the German Edition" xix–xx; Gowland, *The Worlds* 9–11.

32. For more on the *Anatomy* as a work of consolation, see Lievsay; Colie, *Paradoxia* 437–40; McClure 165; Gowland, "Consolations"; Shirilan 137–76; Lund, *A User's* 216–19.

33. The commentators on Burton observe, 4, 19, that the reference to Cardano here is to the *De utilitate ex adversis capienda* (1561), which Cardano completed after his son was executed for murder.

34. For a list of Burton's citations of Petrarch in each edition of the *Anatomy*, see Boswell and McMurry, entry nos. 689, 736, 798, 850, 906, 951, 1058, 1069, 1151, 1297.

35. For Burton's work as a ludic, subversive cento, see Shirilan.

36. Macrobius, who lifts language describing the apian metaphor of imitation from Seneca, was taken to task for plagiarism by Petrarch in *Fam.* 1. 8. 3.

37. Burton owned copies of works by and about Paracelsus. See Keasling, *The*

Library of Robert Burton entry nos. 1194–95, 226. Paracelsus, though he did not break entirely from the Galenic, humorally based conception of physiology, emphasized contagion, chemistry, and astrological influences on the body, and he investigated toxicology, his consideration of curative powers of toxins, such as venom, being most relevant in this passage. For Paracelsus's medical theory, see P. Rossi, *The Birth* 139–47.

38. Burton follows this passage with a comparison of reading the work to a journey with ups and downs. See Burton 1, 17.

39. Fox picks up on the branching and often circuitous aspect of Burton's style by suggesting that the architecture of the work can be called "gothic," as shown in the "involutions, the logical balances and imbalances, the far-flung relationships of ideas which characterize the *Anatomy*" (*The Tangled Chain* 27).

40. As Haskell observes, "The part most spectacularly affected in hypochondriac melancholy was the imagination, and in its extreme form the disease could reduce men—and it was usually men—to the belief that they were cardinals, emperors, or simply irresistibly handsome; less happily, that they were made of clay or glass, that they had animals living in their bodies, or even that they had been transformed into birds or beasts" ("Introduction" 2).

41. For the relationship between ekphrasis and early modern English theater, see Altman.

42. In its critical history, ekphrasis has been defined as strictly as the description of an extant work of visual art and as loosely as vivid description. Heffernan's definition avoids limiting ekphrasis to descriptions of the plastic arts, which limitation Webb observes was not imposed in antiquity. It also makes room for intertextual and intermedial elements of ekphrasis that would have been familiar to early modern writers such as Burton. For an overview of the term, see Zeitlin; for its emblematic function in self-expression in early modern literature, see Bearden, *The Emblematics* 1–18, 36–46.

43. For ekphrasis and the production of *enargeia* with its effects on the fantasia or imagination, see Webb 87–105.

44. Goldhill asks us to pay more attention to the emotional affect inspired by ekphrasis, noting its potentially dangerous power to, as Longinus suggests, enslave the listener.

45. The commentators on Burton note his use of Plutarch's citation of Simonides in *Glor. Athen.* 3. See Burton 5n32, 176–77.

46. For a complementary argument that images could be used as therapy for melancholy with brief mention of Burton and emphasis on Dürer's *Melencolia I*, see Merback esp. 75–120. Although I came to my conclusions about Burton's ekphrastic therapy independently from Merback, his work is a welcome addition to knowledge on this topic.

47. Along with adding the pictorial engravings, Burton also changed the motto of the work found under the title from Macrobius's "Omne meum, Nihil meum, 'tis all mine and none mine" (1, 11), which he sites in the preface, to Horace's saying from the *Ars poetica* 343, "Omne tulit punctum, qui miscuit utile dulci" ("All votes

to him the first place shall assign / Who with the sweet the useful can combine” 3, 5), which he cites and translates in the discussion of literature in love melancholy.

48. For correspondences between the depicted scenes and further descriptions in the body of Burton’s text, see Mueller. Corbett and Lightbown identify and describe at some length the scenes with their labels as 1. “Democritus: Abderites,” 2. “Zelotipia (Jealousy),” 3. “Solitudo” or solitude (191), 4. “Anamorato” or the lover, 5. “Hypocondriacus” or windy melancholy, 6. “Superstitiosus, a monk or friar,” 7. “Maniacus, a madman,” 8. “Borago” or the herb borage, 9. “Helleborus” or hellebore, and 10. Burton’s self-portrait with his coat of arms (192).

49. Burton refers to the emblems of Andrea Alciato and Joachim Camerarius on multiple occasions throughout the *Anatomy* to illustrate his points.

50. Burton only devotes one octave to scenes 8 and 9 together depicting plants. He devotes two octaves to scene 10, which describes his own portrait.

51. Corbett and Lightbown note the following differences between the engraving and the verbal description in the “Argument of the Frontispiece”: “The bulls specified in the verses in scene 2 and the column in scene 4 are omitted; the bats specified in 3 are wrongly included in 2; the verse about 6 does not prescribe a monk nor friar; the representation of the madman does not tally very faithfully with the poem. The poem makes it clear that the title-page was devised by Burton but in view of the differences noted it would seem that he was not able to supervise the engraver, who evidently worked on the basis of indications sent from Oxford, where Burton, unaware that his instructions were not being followed to the letter, wrote the explanatory verses without having seen the finished work” (195).

52. For illustrations in wonder books as relates to the crip representation of disability in the Renaissance, see Bearden, *Monstrous Kinds* 179–227.

53. As Haskell helpfully summarizes, Burton considers madness “a more vehement and violent form of melancholy, without fever, excluding altered states induced by psychotropic drugs (henbane, nightshade, wine, etc.) but including ecstasies, revelations, poetical and prophetic furies, demonic obsession and possession, dancing manias, lycanthropy, and hydrophobia (rabies)” (“Introduction” 3).

54. I cite the line numbers of the “Author’s Abstract to Melancholy” for the reader’s convenience. The poem spans 1, lxix–lxx.

55. Other scholars that support Warton’s view of Burton’s influence include Kuhn; Lund.

Chapter 5

1. I cite the Latin text of Milton’s letters with page numbers from the Haan edition. I also consulted the edition of the letters in Kerrigan et al., *The Complete Poetry and Essential Prose*. I cite book, line, and page numbers of Milton’s poetry and the prefatory materials for *PL* and *SA* from the Kerrigan et al. edition. I cite the Latin and English of *Doctrina Christiana* from the Hale and Cullington edition in facing-page translation. Unless otherwise indicated, translations from Latin are my own.

2. For more on the Colloredo twins, see Bearden, *Monstrous Kinds* 215–34; Baratta 182–201.

3. Milton's disinterment took place in 1790, seven years after the theft of Charles Byrne's body. Neve relates that a certain Dr. Dyson who was trained by the "late Dr. Hunter" (45–46) was one of the physicians who viewed and plundered Milton's corpse. He determined that it was indeed the body of a man, Milton's propensity for wearing his hair long having given rise to speculation that the corpse was female. Dyson may have been trained by William Hunter (1718–1783), John Hunter's older brother.

4. For the display of Byrne's body from a disability studies perspective, see Dreger. For the decision to remove Byrne's body from display, see Solly.

5. E.g., in *Mansus*, a poem dedicated to Giovanni Battista Manso, who was the Patron of Torquato Tasso, Milton wishes that after his own death a similar protector might lay his body to rest: "My limbs, unstrung by livid death, he would take care to compose in a small urn; and perhaps he might transpose my features into marble, binding the hair with a Paphian wreath of myrtle or a Parnassian one of laurel, and I will rest in secure peace" (89–93, 232).

6. For more on this event and the pamphlets surrounding it, see Clymer; Read.

7. Milton was also honored with a monument in "poets' corner" in Westminster Abbey, which also omits his blindness and political leanings. A later memorial in stained glass in the abbey does display an image of Milton dictating to an amanuensis in a series of images about Milton's life.

8. For the publication history of *PL*, see Kerrigan et al., "Introduction to *Paradise Lost*," which discusses the Bentley edition.

9. Points and point refer to punctuation. See "point v. 1."

10. Although I write and read independently with adaptive technology, I always have another person proof my published work, as does everyone who works with a press. I am grateful especially for the copy edits for this study supplied by Anne Taylor, who has saved me from many errors. There are tools I can use to proof formatting, spelling, etc., but this does take me longer than other writers to do.

11. For Teresa de Cartagena's concepts of malicious ignorance and malicious wonder, see chap. 2 of this study.

12. As Wittreich argues in "Perplexing," Marvell's poem can also be read as a response to Milton's and Marvell's critics such as Samuel Parker (1640–1689) and Richard Leigh (ca. 1649–1728). Wittreich does not, however, address the fact that Marvell depicts Milton as an exception to the rule of negative moral models of blindness.

13. Marvell also explains Milton's writing capacity as a compensation for blindness, in which "Just heaven thee, like Tiresias, to requite, / Rewards with prophecy thy loss of sight" (43–44, 288). Although this is perhaps preferable to a negative moral model, it still reenforces the idea that blindness is necessarily bad and in need of recompense.

14. Some scholars suggest that rather than writing poetry with vivid visual

images, Milton writes poetry that is sublime. Although Milton's poetry can be sublime, the ancient theory of the sublime with which Milton was familiar requires *enargeia*, or bringing an image vividly before the mind's eye. See esp. book 15 of Longinus 60–63.

15. For Milton's images as an example of disability aesthetics and prosthesis, see Swarbrick.

16. Although I do not agree with all of Fallon's conclusions, his learned study of Miltonic self-representation and authority is useful for my thinking through the difference that disability makes in how we represent ourselves and our authority.

17. This point does not contradict the blind writer Jorge Luis Borges's often cited observation that Milton's blindness was voluntary. See Borges 117. Although Milton claims that he volunteered to continue work on the *Defensio secunda* even though he knew it would hasten his blindness, he does not voluntarily disclose his disability unless prompted.

18. This term refers to a loss of vision without visible outward change to the appearance of the eyes. Attempts on the part of modern scholars to diagnose Milton's specific eye condition are dubious at best, medicalizing, and therefore impertinent to the aims of this chapter.

19. "Methought I saw my late espoused saint" (henceforth Sonnet 23) is often grouped with Milton's sonnets on blindness. The sonnet's main thrust, however, is mourning and consolation for the death of a spouse. Although I enhance my analysis of Sonnet 22 with Sonnet 23's representation of the inability to see the beloved's face, blindness is less central to Sonnet 23 than the speaker's attempt to console himself for death.

20. For the numbering of Milton's sonnets and their publication history, see Kerrigan et al., "Introduction to English and Italian Sonnets."

21. Most scholarship on Milton's use of consolation considers its role in elegy. For consolation in Milton's elegies, see Allen 40–70. For consolation in *PL*, see Astell; Watkins. The most extensive investigation of Miltonian consolation remains Sadler, *The Theme of Consolation*.

22. Much ink has been spilled on trying to diagnose Milton's exact cause of blindness. For an account of the hideous ocular treatments that were available to Milton and why he might have foresworn medical intervention, see Hanford.

23. For a reading of Milton's description of his vision as it relates to the "darkness visible" (1. 63) of Hell in *Paradise Lost*, see Godin 80.

24. Brown compares Milton's account of the onset of his blindness with that of Booth Tarkington (1869–1946). See Brown, *Milton's* 105–6.

25. Milton cites Ap. Rhod., *Argon.* 2.205–8. He also compares himself in *PL* with Phineas and other blind "Prophets old" (*PL* III, 36, 361).

26. Petrarch's dialogue is closely modeled on the one on blindness in Cicero's *Tusculan Disputations*, which Milton may have read as well.

27. Although this verse may seem simply a memento mori, it is followed with a verse that makes clear it is not wrong to enjoy life, including one's eyesight: "Rejoice, O young man, in thy youth; and let thy heart cheer thee in the days of

thy youth, and walk in the ways of thine heart, and in the sight of thine eyes” (KJV Eccles. 11:9).

28. See Cicero, *Tusc. Disp.* 5; 537–41; Petrarch, *De rem.* 2. 96. Milton may also be thinking of Boethius’s *Consolation of Philosophy* when he discusses friendship as a consolation. For Boethius as a source of consolation for Milton, see Sadler 93–104.

29. Milton returns to this passage again at the point of Jesus’s recognition of Satan in *Paradise Regained*. See PR 1, 346–50, 645.

30. This positive characterization of sighted guides differs from the vernacular literary tradition of portraying guides for the blind as tricksters or traitors, such as Lazarillo in *Lazarillo de Tormes*. For more on representations of wicked guides for the blind in medieval and early modern literature, see Wheatly 90–128.

31. For the suggestion that this comparison means Milton believed his sight could return, see Garrison 274. Nonetheless, Milton’s overall attitude toward cure in this letter is ambivalent. More problematically, this image also calls to mind the biblical hero Samson, whom Petrarch evinces as having militaristic compensations for blindness (*De rem.* 2. 96; 238), and whom Milton will later portray in *Samson Agonistes*, where Samson’s blindness is transformed into monstrous military triumph while on an enforced holiday from his work as a slave in Gaza.

32. The treatise was written by the royalist Peter du Moulin, but Milton mistakenly believed the author to be Alexander More (1616–1670), who was the editor of the work. For more on the *Regii* and how it fits into the invective pamphlet exchange that included Milton’s First defense and Second defense, see Worden.

33. Likening Milton to an African monster adds to the disability drift that is also evident in Jane’s invective.

34. For the sonnet form and its history, see Cavanagh et al. 3018–21.

35. For an analysis of how disability is central to Castiglione’s concept of *sprezzatura* and how *sprezzatura* contributes to disability passing and prosthesis, see esp. Bearden, *Monstrous Kinds* 54–59.

36. For *asprezza* in Milton’s sonnets, see Leonard; Prince. For Tasso’s influence on Milton’s use of *asprezza*, see Prince; Brand. For a recent discussion of *asprezza* and *PL*, see Moshenska.

37. Whereas *consolatio* texts might be thought of as early modern versions of self-help books, institute texts could be thought of as how-to books for manners and comportment. For the role of institute texts and norming disability, see Bearden, *Monstrous Kinds* chap. 1.

38. See chap. 1 of this study for further discussion of Petrarch and disability dignity.

39. In a misogynist move, Reason counts not being able to see the faces of women as an advantage. See *De rem.* 2. 96; 236.

40. See chap. 2 of this study for Teresa de Cartagena’s use of embodied metaphors for sensory disability. In his outstanding crip reading of *Paradise Lost*, Toscano reads Satan’s passage from Hell (*PL* 1, 292–99) as akin to the gate of a blind or mobility-impaired person with a cane. See Toscano, “A Time and Place.” Duran also touches on mobility impairment as relates to this poem.

41. Although she does not bring up the concept of sighted guides, my reading of this section of the sonnet concurs with that of Duran, who avers, “The narrator’s belief in the right-ness of his governmental contributions ‘supports’ him intellectually as much as his prosthetic friend Cyriack does physically” (150).

42. For a study of cripp heroism in *PL* and *SA*, see Toscano, “A Time and Place.”

43. Although Milton reports that he was adept at wielding a sword before his onset of blindness, he never did battle.

44. Along with the other consolations for blindness that this study treats, Puteanus’s *Caecitatis consolatio* (1609) and Huygens’s *Ooghentroost* (1647) might have been available to Milton and merit further study. For more on these consolations for blindness, see Landtsheer.

45. For Timoleon as an example for consoling blindness, see Hakewill 156; Burton 2, 133.

46. For Appius Claudius as an example for consoling blindness, see Cicero, *Tusc. Disp.* 5, 38, 536. See Petrarch, *De rem.* 2. 96; 297, *Fam.* 2. 6; 90–91 and *Fam.* 6. 3; 300, *Sen.* 1. 5; 24, *Sec.* 3. 105. See also Hakewill 158; Burton 2, 133.

47. Milton could have read about Ziska in Fox’s *Acts and Monuments* 646–48. Ziska also exemplifies a blind person who serves the commonwealth in Hakewill 156.

48. Milton cites Euripides where Orestes agrees to be led by Pylades “Orestes: Vade gubernaculum mei pedis. Pylades: per gratam mihi habens curam” (“Orestes: Go as the helm to my feet. Pylades: For me this is a welcome task” 38) and “Da manum ministro amico” (“Give your hand to your caregiver”). He cites Seneca’s *Hercules Furens*, where Theseus states, “Da collo manum tuam, ductor autem vie ero tibi ego” (“Rest your hand on my neck, and I will be your guide” 38).

49. Dhar avers that her article “will not closely engage with disability studies” (76), and her reading focuses on how blindness produces what she calls Milton’s “blind language,” which she argues “owes its existence to a lack, a want, an absence, a memory, and a longing” (75). Dhar’s analysis of the capacities of Milton as a “differently-abled” poet are valuable, though they do not line up well with my own reading of Miltonic disability consolation, in which lamentation is counterpoised with disability gain.

50. Dokumaci coins this term “disability as method” to celebrate disabled people’s astute and artful way of living and how that art, if taken as a method, can critique dominant ableist ways of being. In this instance, Brown’s lived experience of blindness not only allows her to read Milton’s poem differently but also calls into question previous, ableist interpretations. Conceiving of disability as method is similar to crippistemology but places emphasis on the ecologies in which disabled people dwell and the activism of their creative responses to their environments. See also Dokumaci, “Disability as Method.”

51. For Milton’s attribution of the Psalms to King David, see Radzinowicz, *Milton’s Epics* 3–4.

52. Milton’s earliest known works are his translations of *Ps.* 114 and *Ps.* 136, which he reports he undertook at age fifteen. He translates *Psalms* 80–88 in April 1648, and he translated *Ps.* 1–8 in August 1654.

53. For Milton's life-long commitment to translation, paraphrase, and interpretation of the Psalms, see Radzinowicz, *Milton's Epics* esp. i–xiv.

54. For more on Milton's estimation of psalmic form and his translation of the form into English, see esp. Radzinowicz, *Milton's Epics* 81–129. For a reading of Milton's translations of *Psalms* 80–88 and 1–8 as conceiving blindness as loss, see Dhar.

55. Although Studley and Brown did not pursue this line of inquiry into the influence of *Ps.* 6 on Sonnet 19 further, their thinking influenced my own.

56. Reading practices of people with low vision may have influenced Milton's propensity to play out meaning across lines of verse. For sighted readers, the eye jumps quickly (20–200 milliseconds) from one line of text to the next in an eye movement called a saccade. People with low vision or who have other print disabilities do not conform to this norm. Adaptive reading techniques that Milton could have used, such as drawing a blank piece of paper down the page to cover the lines below the one being read or using a magnifying glass make for a longer delay between reading lines. On the other hand, if a text is read aloud without slight pauses at line endings, line endings disappear altogether for a blind listener. I simply wonder if Milton, who had partial vision for ten years before no longer being able to read print, did not become more aware of the semiotic power of line endings as a result of using similar reading techniques. His choice of polysemous words that change meanings across lines, delayed speaker attributions, and fondness for enjambment certainly emphasize this suspended play of meaning across the line.

57. Duran takes a Foucauldian approach to the figure of Patience, averring that the sonnet “participates in the ‘discursive formation’ of the patient disabled, the aberrant yet docile body so desired within the ‘government of disability’” (147). I disagree with this interpretation, because Patience and even disability itself is work, which the sonnet's ending confirms.

58. I thank Allison Hobgood and Joanna Picciotto for feedback on my connecting Milton's translation of this Psalm with this sonnet at talks delivered in 2013 at Willamette University and in 2017 at the University of California, Berkeley, respectively. My thoughts on Milton have been long in the making.

59. For Milton's formulation of patience as it relates to his experience of blindness in this sonnet and his later works, see Baumgartner.

60. Although several scholars have doubted Milton's authorship of *Doctrina Christiana*, the vast majority now accept this attribution.

61. For a reading of these allusions in the context of blindness specifically, see Duran.

62. For disability futurity, see Kafer, *Feminist, Queer, Crip*. For counter-eugenic logic and conserving disability, see Garland-Thomson, “The Case for Conserving.” For a discussion of disability futurity and counter-eugenic logic as expressions of civility in the Renaissance with an emphasis on conduct literature, see Bearden, *Monstrous Kinds* 59–77.

63. The Pauline motto, though not adopted by Teresa de Cartagena per se, is also central to her construction of spiritual crip authority.

64. For the growing scholarship on Milton's representation of race along with

the ways in which later Indigenous Peoples and People of Color (IPOC) writers have used Milton's work to their advantage, see Wilburn. For Phillis Wheatley's and Olaudah Equiano's reception of Milton, see Toscano, "Access, Accommodation."

65. For why Milton matters to LGBT* studies and religious studies, see Sanchez, "Milton's Genderqueer."

66. Scholars have disagreed on the extent to which Milton's work is misogynist, profeminist, or feminist. For a helpful summation of the scholarship on this subject and a new reading of several of Milton's female characters, see Lewalski, "Milton on Women." Judging Milton's attitude toward women is beyond the scope of this chapter, but as relates to his blindness, accusations that Milton mistreated his daughters in their role as readers is based on patchy evidence. Working with a reader or amanuensis does, however, require a great deal of patience, and Milton does write about the difficulty of attaining to patience (e.g., in Sonnet 19).

67. *Samson Agonistes* is a tragedy based on the biblical character Samson from the book of Judges. For the genre and for the date of composition, which is debated, see Kerrigan et al. "Introduction to *Samson Agonistes*."

68. The degree to which scholars associate Milton with his character Samson roughly corresponds with the degree to which they approve of Samson. Scholars in the nineteenth century linked Milton's biography with his blind hero: e.g., Masson. In the later twentieth century and into the twenty-first, scholars are more critical of the character Samson and often deny an autobiographical link to Milton, e.g., Witreich, *Interpreting*. For a helpful summary and bibliography of the critical camps for and against Samson as a figure for Milton, see Anderson 186–94.

69. See Karrey; Mohamed; Herman.

70. For the harm that negative imagery in representation does to disabled people, see Mitchell and Snyder, *Narrative Prosthesis* 17–21.

71. For *Samson Agonistes* as the culmination of the path of Milton's literary career in terms of Virgilian *rota* or Ovidian *cursus*, see Kilgour.

72. As Kerrigan et al. note in their commentary, "The analogy between tragic catharsis and homeopathic cures" (707n2) has precedence in Minturno, *De Poeta* (1563); Guarini, *Il Compendio della Poesia Tragicomica* (1601).

73. For analysis of the Psalms in *SA*, see Radzinowicz, *Toward Samson Agonistes* 188–227; for her catalog of the play's references to the Psalms, see her "Psalm Appendix B" in *Toward Samson Agonistes* 368–87.

74. Although I concur with Radzinowicz's estimation of the significance of the Psalms in *SA*, my assessment of the play's regenerative power is less optimistic than hers, in part because of the disturbing, negative image of the lived experience of disability that it portrays.

75. For Samson's allusions to *Ps.* 22, see Radzinowicz, *Toward Samson Agonistes* 20–21.

76. In a recent talk, Colby Gordon observes that *SA* is "relentlessly obsessed with work" and argues that the mayhem of Samson's wounding questions gendered expectations for the capacity to work specifically.

77. When the Chorus accuses Samson of serving the Philistines with his

strength, he objects that he works “Not in their idol-worship, but by labor / Honest and lawful to deserve my food / Of those who have me in their civil power” (1365–67, 749).

78. For a reading of the tensions between disabled and nondisabled characters in *Samson*, see Mintz, “Dalila’s Touch.” My reading of Dalila’s offer of care differs from that of Mintz, who interprets Dalila’s actions as a failed attempt at intersubjective recognition.

79. For more on disability *metis*, see Dolmage, *Disability Rhetoric*.

80. In the context of the history of disability representation, Toscano notes that *Samson Agonistes* exemplifies narrative prosthesis, in which disabled characters serve as props to draw in the reader in stories that end with the demise of disability. For narrative prosthesis, see Mitchell and Snyder, *Narrative Prosthesis*.

81. For Samson’s melancholy despair with an emphasis on gender and sexuality, see Daniel 200–228. For a study of the metanarrative of blindness as mourning and melancholy with the tragic end of suicide in twentieth-century literature, see Bolt, *The Metanarrative* 111–25.

82. E.g., Sorrow resists Reason’s consolation in Petrarch’s dialogue 114 on pain in the *De remediis*.

83. As Moshenska has noted, Manoa’s imagined monument for Samson has similarities with the memorial that Milton as a young, sighted man imagines for himself with marble, myrtle, and laurel (*Mansus* 89–93, 232).

84. Despite the Chorus’s awareness of ancient and modern consolation texts, the book of Judges, from which Milton takes Samson’s story, would have predated these sources for consolation.

Chapter 6

1. For Lomazzo’s biographical details, see Tramelli, *Giovanni Paolo Lomazzo* 17–36. I cite the Rufino edition of the *Vita* found in *Rime*; translations are mine.

2. Lomazzo’s *Vita* reflects the biographical genre of artists’ lives that was made famous by Lomazzo’s contemporary, Giorgio Vasari, and that Soussloff argues was based on the earlier genre of poets’ lives. See Soussloff “Lives of Poets and Painters.” To my knowledge, the presence of disability disclosure in these genres of life writing has not garnered much if any critical attention.

3. Lomazzo writes about Cardano in two poems: first, a poem in which he relates a visit to Cardano’s study and lists the books that Cardano most esteems (*Rime* 157); in the second, Lomazzo praises Cardano as having knowledge rivaling the ancients (*Rime* 195). For Lomazzo and Cardano, see Tramelli, “Due Poesie.” Lomazzo also writes a poem to Vicenza on the topic of astrology (*Rime* 160).

4. Cardano writes a consolation for blindness in his *De utilitate* that echoes similar consolations written by ancients such as Cicero and moderns such as Petrarch. See Cardano, *De utilitate* 260–67. In his *De utilitate*, Cardano recommends that blind people can use a stylus to trace letters engraved on a brass tablet covered in a thin layer of wax to learn to read and write. Once the blind person

practices writing enough on wax, they could write normally, but they would need letters to be embossed or engraved to read them by feel. See Cardano, *De utilitate* 876. Lomazzo would have already known how to read and write, of course, but methods for reading and writing by touch were available.

5. Lomazzo's academy admitted a wide variety of members including poets, visual artists, mathematicians, and trades workers. They modeled their rules and customs on humble wine porters from the Blenio valley and created a cryptic language called Bleniese based on the porters' dialect. The academy is chiefly known through the publication of a collection of their poetry called *Rabisch* (Arabesques), which was edited by Lomazzo and published in Milan in 1589. For more on the academy, see Tramelli, "Artists and Knowledge"; Paiva de Toledo, "The Academy"; Lomazzo, *Rabisch*; Lynch, "Lomazzo and the Academy."

6. Neither of these portraits survive. For a recent assessment of Lomazzo's artistic career with a helpful bibliography, see Pavesi.

7. Lomazzo was friends and worked with Fontana from before his onset of blindness. For Lomazzo's characterization of Fontana's skills, see *Trattato* 538; *Idea* 370. Lomazzo also writes a sonnet that mentions the medal Fontana made for him, indicating that the figure of Fortune also symbolizes prudence. For this sonnet, see *Rime* 93.

8. For an introduction to portrait medals and their history, including Petrarch's role in their development, see Scher. For an overview of medals in the Renaissance—their inception, function, and dissemination—as well as a recent bibliography of their study, see Flaten, "Renaissance Medals." For how these medals were displayed, see Flaten "Identity," and for how they may have been an aid to memory, see R. Howard.

9. Cardano lists the ability to identify coins by feel as a consolation for blindness. See *De utilitate* 263.

10. A high-resolution image of this painting in the public domain can be found on Wikimedia Commons: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Giovanni_Paolo_Lomazzo_-_Selbstbildnis_-_GG_342_-_Kunsthistorisches_Museum.jpg.

11. For more on Lomazzo's self-portraits and the medals that were made for him, see Pavesi; Lynch, "G. P. Lomazzo's Self Portrait."

12. As does Koppers, I draw on Dinshaw's concept of "queer touches across time" to emphasize the fellow feeling of disability experience now and reaching back into the past. Dinshaw avers that "queer histories are made of affective relations" and "such histories manifest by juxtaposition, by making entities past and present touch" (*Getting Medieval* 12). Koppers extends Dinshaw's formulation of "touch history" to "crip culture: calling into imaginary being a cultural formation by projecting backwards, finding moments where a witnessing sensibility can locate fantastical identifications in the lacunae of the past, a *fellowship*, strange yet recognizable" (*Disability Culture* 153–54). I have also found Randolph useful for background on the sense of touch in the experience of gender and art in the Renaissance.

13. For a useful collection of essays on the relationship between disability and museums, see Sandell et al.

14. I cite the Ciardi editions of the *Trattato* and *Idea*. Except for sections of the work that Haydock does not translate (including the final two books of the treatise), I use the Haydock English translation of the *Trattato* with changes to his translations in brackets. I indicate when translations are my own with “trans. mine” in the parenthetical citation. I use the Chai English translation of the *Idea*, occasionally altering her translation with my changes in brackets. I cite and translate dedicatory poems from the *Trattato* and *Idea* (which are not included in modern editions) from the 1584 and 1590 editions, respectively.

15. Lomazzo’s two treatises on art theory were first brought to wide attention by Panofsky. For bibliography of studies on Lomazzo focused on his contribution to art history, see Tramelli, *Giovanni Paolo Lomazzo’s* 1–16; Chai, “Introduction: Lomazzo Studies.”

16. Lomazzo’s works, in chronological order, are his *Libro del sogni* (ca. 1563), which exists in an autograph manuscript and predates his blindness; *Trattato* (1584), which he began while sighted and completed when blind; *Rime* (1587), which, like the rest of his works, he completed while blind; *Rabisch* (1589); *Idea* (1590); and *Della forma delle muse* (1591).

17. In the *Trattato*, Lomazzo twice mentions that his blindness occurs when he is thirty-two. See *Trattato* 260, 589. Haydock’s translation does not extend to either of these disclosures, to which I will return.

18. Whereas the shapes of Renaissance European writers’ careers were modeled on authoritative classical examples of Virgilian or Ovidian *cursus* or *rota*, painters framed their careers on what they knew of classical examples such as Apelles or Zeuxis, whose art was for the most part only extant in words. Painters might advance their careers with works that illustrated their mastery of design and technique, such as Lomazzo’s wished-for development of color.

19. Lomazzo mentions Alberti on several occasions, e.g., *Idea* 277. For Lomazzo’s engagement with Alberti, especially as regards perspective, see Tramelli, *Giovanni Paolo Lomazzo* 128–73.

20. For Lomazzo’s formulation of the *concetto*, see, e.g., Ackerman; Bergmann, *Art Inscribed* 78–79.

21. Chai refers here to Lomazzo’s comments in the *Trattato* 415–17. See also Lomazzo’s preference for painting over sculpture because painting allows the artist to realize the idea they conceive in their mind without as many sensory distractions such as the noise of sculpting, e.g., *Trattato* 139–40; sig. Ff1 r. For the role of inner sight in creating things that solely exist in the imagination, see Lomazzo, *Idea* 270–71; 68–69.

22. It is important to remember that blindness occurs on a spectrum and that even if Lomazzo totally lost the ability to paint, he might have been able for at least some time to make the kinds of blurry sketches that he recommends for putting a *concetto* on paper. In my own experience of vision loss, I was able (in the correct light) to work in pastel, pencil, and charcoal after I could no longer paint.

23. Gosellini was a poet, member of the Accademia del Valle di Blenio, and a friend of Lomazzo. For more on his relationship with Lomazzo, see Tramelli, *Giovanni Paolo Lomazzo* 21; Paiva de Toledo, “A Reflection” 891.

24. Folianus writes a similar Latin poem to Lomazzo in the prefatory material for *Idea* sig. a3r., which also distinguishes the light of the mind of the painter favorably in contrast with physical eyesight.

25. For Haydock’s omissions in translation as they relate to Protestant iconoclasm, see Pope-Hennessy; Gilman 13–14. Haydock was apparently a Puritan. Other than being a translator of Lomazzo, he is best known for having pretended to preach puritanical sermons in his sleep at Oxford. When examined and called out on his ruse by King James, he confessed that he had started the practice as a therapy for a life-long stutter and that the whole thing had gotten out of hand. Haydock may have preferred to be considered a prodigy than to disclose a speech impairment. For this story and Haydock’s confession, see Bakewell.

26. For Haydock’s copies of Lomazzo’s *Trattato* and their influence on the Sidney Circle, see Gent; Marr.

27. The *Trattato* enjoyed two reprints, and Lomazzo was able to publish his work continuously through 1591, shortly before his death. For his aesthetic influence in Italy and beyond, see esp. Tantardini and Norris. For his influence on art theory in England on authors such as Peacham, Scott, Hilliard, Dryden, and Hogarth, see Hard, “Some Interrelations”; “Richard Haydock”; Pope-Hennessy; Semler. For his influence on Bulwer as a motist, see Wollock, and on English theater and theatrical gesture, see Korda.

28. Milan was under Spanish Hapsburg control starting in 1556 and was a hub for trade exports across Europe. For Lomazzo’s influence on Spanish art theory in the seventeenth century through his citation in the works of Vicente Carducho [Carduccio] (ca. 1576–1638), see Albero Muñoz. For his influence on Spanish concepts of the grotesque, see Manrique Ara.

29. For William Burton’s familiarity with Lomazzo, see Hard, “Richard Haydock” 754.

30. Bulwer focuses on the expertise of Deaf people as motists throughout his *Philocophus*. For Bulwer’s possible debt to Lomazzo for this word, see Wollock; Korda.

31. For Lomazzo’s influence on English concepts of landscape, including Milton’s use of landscape in *PL*, see Chambers.

32. Given Milton’s facility with Italian, Milton may have been familiar with the seventh book of Lomazzo’s *Trattato*, which advises how to depict the world—starting in the Heavens and ending in the underworld.

33. Debates about the definition of Mannerism, which are plenteous, are beyond the scope of this chapter. Shearman and Bosche have been particularly useful for my thinking on the subject. See also Schlosser; Friedlaender.

34. I have been unable to consult Kemp’s source here, which he notes as Vatican, Codex Urbinas Latinus, fol. 44v, *Treatise on Painting by Leonardo da Vinci*, ed. A. P. McMahon, 2 vols. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956).

35. Kemp sums up Lomazzo's sevenfold types as follows: "In Lomazzo's astrological terms the hot-dry qualities of fire correspond to the bellicose complexion of the choleric Mars, the hot-moist qualities of air to the sanguine radiance of Jupiter, the cold-moist qualities of water to the sober meekness of the phlegmatic moon, and the cold-dry qualities of earth to the unsettling profundities of the melancholic Saturn. The remaining three planets, the sun, Venus and Mercury, express their particular characters in a compound manner. . . . Since each of the artists takes his fundamental complexion from one of the planets—Michelangelo from Saturn, Gaudenzio from Jupiter, Polidoro from Mars, Leonardo from the sun, Raphael from Venus, Mantegna from Mercury and Titian from the moon—the great artists are built inextricably into the cosmological system" (21).

36. See Klein; Kemp; Maspoli Genetelli.

37. Lomazzo's most famous example of how to paint melancholic figures can be found in his recommendation for depicting Adam and Eve after the Fall. See *Trattato* 128.

38. Ruffino also argues that Lomazzo was melancholic. See Ruffino ix–x.

39. A high-resolution image of Lomazzo's *Self-Portrait as Abbot of the Accademia della Val di Blenio* can be found at the Brera's website: pinacotecabrera.org/en/collezione-online/opere/autoritratto-in-veste-di-abate-dellaccademia-della-valle-di-blenio/.

40. Based on the birth date and time provided in Lomazzo's *Vita*, Lynch relates that, "in an adventurous spirit" ("G. P. Lomazzo's" 196), he asked a colleague with expertise in early modern astrology cast Lomazzo's horoscope. It was dominated by Saturn and Mercury, Saturn being associated with melancholy and Mercury with facility in the arts. Given his friendships with Cardano and Vincenza, Lomazzo would have been aware of these planetary influences on his chart.

41. Lomazzo's attitude toward melancholy is more positive than that of many of his contemporaries. As Britton observes, "Unlike Vasari, Lomazzo clearly saw no need to shield any artist from association with melancholy. He did not sit in judgment of Saturnians" (673).

42. For the grotesque as transgression in early modernity with an emphasis on Bakhtin's concept of the carnivalesque, see Stalibrass and White.

43. For other scholarship that uncovers disability aesthetics in the past and in a more global cultural context than this book encompasses, see Watson and Hiles; Millett-Gallant and Howie; Hobgood, *Beholding*; Bearden, *Monstrous Kinds* chap. 5; Richardson.

44. In reclaiming the grotesque as evidence of premodern disability aesthetics, I take seriously Garland-Thomson's reservations that the grotesque has been used in modernity to interpret "disabled figures as fashioned corporeal others whose bodies carry social meaning," and I keep in mind "that representation informs the identity—and often the fate—of real people with extraordinary bodies" (*Extraordinary* 15).

45. For the rediscovery of the Domus Auria and its influence on the Renaissance concept of the grotesque, see Squire. Many other ancient ruins and crypts

were notable attractions for their grotesque art in the Renaissance. For instance, the painter and architect Pirro Ligorio (1512–83) offers what amounts to a *Let's Go*-style list of grotesque attractions in Rome in his work praising the grotesque. For Ligorio, see Barocchi 2666–91.

46. For debates over the grotesque, see Barocchi 2617–701.

47. Lomazzo opens his chapter on the grotesque by citing and refuting Barbero. See *Trattato* 368.

48. For Vasari's pejorative assessment of Cosimo's behavior as abnormal, and how the historical record contradicts Vasari, see Goodchild.

49. According to Goodchild, Vasari may have found sources for the behavior he attributes to Cosimo from burlesque poetry made famous by Italian poets such as Doni and Bronzino, whose model of grotesque poetry was an inspiration for Lomazzo's own grotesque poetic style.

50. The tendency to both revere and revile mental disability is a complicated aspect of the social construction of mental disability that this study further explores in the representation of Tomás in Cervantes's *Glass Graduate* and in the figure of Democritus in his garden, as depicted by Robert Burton.

51. Grotesques were sometimes associated with foreign art by Europeans. For grotesques in European and precolonial American art, see Gruzinski, *Mestizo Mind* 107–20. For Lomazzo's defense of grotesques in the larger context of Renaissance art, see Isella; for the similarities of his affinity for the grotesque with Montaigne, see Bertolini.

52. In his *Rime*, where he further theorizes the relationship between grotesque painting and poetry, Lomazzo also relates a cavernous origin story for “bizar Grottesco” (“the bizarre grotesque”) from “Fra cavi” (“amidst the hollow places” *Rime* 10–11).

53. For the link between Lomazzo's theory of the grotesque and his focus on bimedral modes such as emblems and *impres*e, see Manrique Ara; Maspoli Genetelli.

54. This turn of phrase is reminiscent of the description of many so-called human monsters in the Renaissance. E.g., in his translation of Boaistuau, Edward Fenton (d. 1603) refers to a set of conjoined twins as possessing a kind of “unnatural order” (15). For more on the relation between the natural and the monstrous in the representation of human monsters in wonder books, see Bearden, *Monstrous Kinds* 179–227.

55. Another possible example of disability aesthetics is Lomazzo's well-known definition of the *figura serpentinata*, or serpentine figure, that Michelangelo recommends to create a sense of movement. The flame-like pyramidal form achieves the semblance of the kinetic in a strange and pleasing manner. Lomazzo does not link the *figura serpentinata* to the representation of disability per se, but further investigation may be merited. For Lomazzo's formulation of the *figura serpentinata*, see *Trattato* 29–30, trans. Haydock sig. b3r; *Trattato* 258; not translated by Haydock. For the form more broadly, see Summers.

56. For the overlap of the grotesque and the representation of monsters, espe-

cially as relates to Renaissance garden design (with which Lomazzo was involved), see Morgan.

57. Lomazzo will later include human monsters in his concept of *euritmia*, or harmonious design. See *Idea* 300; 97.

58. Although Ciardi suggests in his commentary on the *Trattato* that Lomazzo may have drawn on the *Monstrorum Historia* (1642) by the Bolognese naturalist and collector Ulisse Aldrovandi (1522–1605) for his list of examples of human monsters, Lomazzo could have drawn on a wide selection of wonder books such as his friend Cardano's *De Rerum Varietate* (1581) or Konrad Lycosthenes's widely translated *Prodigiorum ac ostentorum chronicon* (1557). Confirming a particular source for Lomazzo is beyond the scope of this chapter, but the profusion of representations of human monsters in Lomazzo's time in verbal and visual media contributes to their authoritative presence in art as a precursor to disability aesthetics.

59. Lomazzo discusses Leonardo's special talent for the grotesque on numerous occasions, including his so-called grotesque heads, which depict disabled people, apparently drawn from life. E.g., *Idea* 259, trans. Chai 58; 285, trans. Chai 84; 290, trans. Chai 89. For Leonardo's grotesques and Lomazzo's engagement with them, see Kwakkelstein.

60. See *Trattato* 553n1 for this identification.

61. In his commentary on the *Trattato*, 554n4, Ciardi indicates that the citation is paraphrased from Aldrovandi. The passage that Aldrovandi and Lomazzo cite may be from Augustine, *City of God* 57.

62. Hermes Trismegistus was a legendary ancient Greek authority that people in Lomazzo's time took as real.

63. For Lomazzo's formulation of grotesque inspiration as dependent on the interrelation of painting and poetry with an emphasis on the painter's imagination as verisimilar, see Martinelli; Manrique Ara; Maspoli Genetelli. For Lomazzo's grotesque poetry more broadly, see Isella; Bertoni.

64. Lomazzo also makes the point that in the *Trattato* “hanno da concorrere insieme giuntamente furia naturale et arte” (“both natural furor and art must combine together” 369) in the creation of grotesques.

65. Lomazzo includes painting of grotesques in his catalog of work in his *Vita*. He also drew several so-called grotesque heads, including *The Executioner*, ca. 1568, held in the Biblioteca Ambrosiana, Milan. For the attribution of this work to Lomazzo, see Pavesi. For exciting work on new attribution of various grotesque heads to Lomazzo, see Tantardini, “Lomazzo's Grotesque Heads.”

66. For more on Lomazzo's role in the renovations of the villa, see Tramelli, *Giovanni Paolo Lomazzo* 63–75. For the influence of his grotesque style on later sculptors, see Sanvito.

67. The bibliography on comparisons of the arts in the Western tradition alone is huge. For word-image comparison with a focus on antiquity and the Renaissance, see Barkan, *Mute Poetry*. For this tradition more broadly and with a philosophical focus, see W. J. T. Mitchell, *Picture Theory; What Do Pictures Want?*.

68. Lomazzo compares painting and sculpture; see *Trattato* 139–40, trans.

Haydock sig. Ee6v–sig. Ff1r. He decides that sculpture is lesser-than painting, calling painting the aunt of sculpture, because sculpture demands more physical labor. He indicates that he derives this argument from Leonardo. For Lomazzo’s treatment of the relative merits of painting and sculpture, see Ragazzi.

69. Vasari’s *Lives* is famously ekphrastic. See Alpers for Vasari’s use of ekphrasis. For ekphrasis in the rhetoric of art history more broadly, see Eck.

70. For more on Camillo’s memory theater, see Bolzoni xiii–xxiv. Bolzoni helpfully sums up the art of memory as follows: “The idea is to establish an ordered route of places in the mind. To each is assigned through an interplay of associations an image related to the thing to be remembered. Whenever necessary, a practitioner of this art retraces the places of his memory and finds the images that will reactivate the interplay of associations. The recollections linked to those associations are thus brought forth. There is memory of things and concepts (*memoria rerum*) as well as memory of words (*memoria verborum*). The technique has been called the art of memory, artificial memory, or *local* memory” (xvii).

71. For more on Lomazzo’s memory theater in the context of the history of rhetoric, see Hermans.

72. For an overview of and best practices for audio description (AD), see J. Snyder.

73. For a photograph of this image, consult A. Maiuri, *Roman Painting*, Milan, Skira, 1953, Plate 78. p. 140. Thanks to Rebecca Benefiel for this reference.

74. Sitpoint, as opposed to standpoint or viewpoint, indicates the perspective of disabled folk without the prioritization of the ability to stand or see, as defined by Garland-Thomson.

75. “Docebo iniquos vias tuas, et impii ad te convertentur” (Ps. 50:15 Vulgate.net).

76. For Michelangelo’s temporary eye disease, see Gallenga et al.

77. The asymmetrical pull of a guide dog takes getting used to; core muscle strength is important. Also, guide dog handlers tend to work dogs with their non-dominant hand to keep the dominant hand free for other tasks. Thanks, as always, to my excellent trainers at The Seeing Eye®, who taught me all I know about dog guide handling.

78. Barolsky views the image of the blind man with guide dog as an allegory of the pilgrimage of life with reference to the blinding of St. Paul and an identification with King David, who was thought to be the author of the Psalms. Fenichel also sees the reverse as an allegory for David. Cohen considers it a reference to Dante’s allegorical formulations of blindness in the *Divine Comedy* and a desire for spiritual healing.

Coda

1. E.g., Andrew Q. Kang writes in the *Harvard Crimson*: “For a discipline that seeks to understand the experiences of up to one-in-four Americans and 1.3 billion people worldwide, there is a glaring lack of disability education on Harvard’s

campus”; Miranda Wollen and Maddie Corson lament in the *Yale Daily News* that “Ivy League schools have lagged behind in offering organized disability studies programming: Princeton and Yale only have working groups, the University of Pennsylvania allows women’s, gender and sexuality studies majors to ‘concentrate’ in Health and Disability.” Brown, Columbia, Cornell, and Dartmouth also only have working groups or reading groups in disability studies.

2. Before becoming a Supreme Court justice, Roberts served as corporate counsel for Toyota in *Williams v. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc.*, 224 F.3d 840 (2000), which substantially limited the protections of the Americans with Disabilities Act for disabled people. More recently, he authored the majority opinion limiting damages that can be sought for disability discrimination in *Cummings v. Premier Rehab Keller, P.L.L.C.* 20–219 (2022). In *Andrew F. v. Douglas County School District*, 137 S.Ct. 988 (2017), Chief Justice Roberts’s majority opinion helped to define more clearly the standards for academic progress in Individualized Education Programs, but this decision also increases the availability of private school vouchers for disabled students, which some special education advocates consider problematic for students in public schools.

3. Soussloff suggests that, rather than being based on ancient examples of lives of famous men and women by venerable authors such as Plutarch and Pliny, and rather than following the model of Christian biography exemplified in Augustine’s *Confessions* and Saints’ Lives, lives of the artists in the Renaissance tend to be based on earlier lives of the poets.

Works Cited



- Ackerman, Gerald M. "Lomazzo's Treatise on Painting." *Art Bulletin* 49.4 (Dec. 1967): 317–26.
- Acton, Kelsie. "Plain Language for Disability Culture." *Crip Authorship*. Ed. Mills and Sanchez. 58–72.
- Adams, Rachel, Benjamin Reiss, and David Serlin, eds. *Keywords for Disability Studies*. New York: New York University Press, 2015.
- Aguirre de Cárcer Casarrubios, Luisa Fernanda. "Teresa de Cartagena, la escritura de la soledad." *Autoras y protagonistas: I Encuentro entre el Instituto Universitario de Estudios de la Mujer y la New York University en Madrid*. Ed. E. Postigo Castellanos and P. Pérez Cantó. Madrid: Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, 2000. 123–36.
- Albero Muñoz, María del Mar. "Libros doctos para un perfecto pintor: La bibliografía esencial para los estudios de pintura según Carducho." *Cuadernos de Arte e Iconografía* 22.44 (2013): 375–400.
- Alberti, Leon Battista. *Autobiographical and Biographical Writings*. Trans. M. L. McLaughlin. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2023.
- Albl, Martin. "For Whenever I Am Weak, I Am Strong": Disability in Paul's *Epistles*." *This Abled Body: Rethinking Disabilities in Biblical Studies*. Ed. H. Avalos et al. Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2007. 145–61.
- Albrecht, Gary L., Katherine D. Seelman, and Michael Bury. *Handbook of Disability Studies*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2001.
- Allen, Don Cameron. *The Harmonious Vision: Studies in Milton's Poetry*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1954.
- Alonso Fernández, Francisco. "Dos especies de psicopatológicas: Don Quijote y el licenciado Vidriera." *Torre de los lujanes* 56 (2005): 45–62.
- Alpers, Svetlana L. "Ekphrasis and Aesthetic Attitudes in Vasari's *Lives*." *JWCI* 23.3–4 (July–Dec. 1960): 190–215.
- Altman, Joel B. "Ekphrasis." *Early Modern Theatricality*. Ed. H. S. Turner. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. 270–90.

- Amador de los Ríos, José. *Historia crítica de la literatura española*. Vol. 7. Madrid: Joaquín Muñoz, 1865.
- Amrán, Rica. "Acerca de Teresa de Cartagena y *La arboleda de los enfermos*: Algunas puntualizaciones, preguntas e hipótesis." *Pasados y presente: Estudios para el profesor Ricardo García Cárcel*. Ed. R. M. Alabrús Iglesias et al. Barcelona: Universidad Autónoma de Barcelona, 2020. 569–82.
- Anderson, David K. *Martyrs and Players in Early Modern England: Tragedy, Religion and Violence on Stage*. New York: Routledge, 2016.
- Anonymous (attrib. Marcus Tullius Cicero). [*Rhetorica ad Herennium*]. *Ad C. Herennium de ratione dicendi*. Trans. H. Caplan. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1954.
- "antic, adj., sense 2.a." *OED*, Oxford University Press, July 2023, <https://doi.org/10.1093/OED/2866485330>
- Aristophanes. *Frogs*. Trans. M. Dillon. *Perseus Digital Library Project*. <http://data.perseus.org/citations/urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0019.tlg009.perseus-eng1:1-37>
- Aristotle. *On Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse*. Ed., trans., introd., and notes G. A. Kennedy. New York: Oxford University Press, 1991.
- Arroyo Rodríguez, Luis Antonio. *Alonso Fernández de Madrid: Arcediano del Alcor y la "Silva Palentina"*. Palencia, ES: Institución Tello Téllez de Meneses, 1993.
- Ascoli, Albert R. *A Local Habitation and a Name: Imagining Histories in the Italian Renaissance*. New York: Fordham University Press, 2011.
- Ascoli, Albert R., and Unn Falkeid, eds. *The Cambridge Companion to Petrarch*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015.
- Ascoli, Albert R., and Unn Falkeid. "Introduction." *The Cambridge Companion to Petrarch*. Ed. Ascoli and Falkeid. 1–10.
- Astell, Ann W. "The Medieval 'Consolatio' and the Conclusion of 'Paradise Lost.'" *Studies in Philology* 82.4 (1985): 477–92.
- Atencia Requena, Fructuoso. "El auto o comedia de la Soberana Virgen de Guadalupe y de sus milagros y grandezas: Descripción y estudio bibliográfico de dos testimonios de una obra atribuida a Cervantes." *Hipogrifo* 8.1 (2020): 345–58.
- Atkinson, William C. "Cervantes, El Pinciano, and the *Novelas ejemplares*." *Hispanic Review* 16.3 (July 1948): 189–208.
- Augustine of Hippo. *City of God*. Trans. W. M. Green. Vol. 7. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1972.
- Augustine of Hippo. *St. Augustine's Confessions*. Trans. H. Chadwick. Oxford: Oxford World's Classics, 1991.
- Avellaneda, Alonso Fernández de. *El ingenioso hidalgo Don Quijote de La Mancha*. Ed. L. Gómez Canseco. Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva, 2000.
- Babb, Lawrence. *The Elizabethan Malady: A Study of Melancholia in English Literature from 1580 to 1642*. East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1951.
- Babb, Lawrence. *Sanity in Bedlum: A Study of Robert Burton's Anatomy of Melancholy*. East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1959.
- Bakewell, Sarah. "Haydock, Richard (1569/70–c. 1642), physician." *ODNB*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, Nov. 11, 2021.

- Bamborough, John B. "Burton and Cardon." *English Renaissance Studies Presented to Dame Helen Gardner in Honour of Her Seventieth Birthday*. Ed. J. Carrey. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980. 180–93.
- Bamborough, John B. "Burton, Robert (1577–1640), writer." *ODNB*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, Oct. 8, 2009.
- Bamborough, John B. "Introduction." *The Anatomy of Melancholy*. By Burton. Vol. 1. i–xxxvi.
- Bamborough, John B., and J. C. Eade. "Burton's Astrological Notebook." *Review of English Studies* 32.127 (Aug. 1981): 267–83.
- Barakat, Robert. "Cistercian Sign Language." *Monastic Sign Languages*. Ed. J. Umiker-Sebeok and T. Sebeok. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 1987.
- Baranda, Nieves. "Through Women's Eyes: The Appropriation of Male Discourse by Three Medieval Women Authors." *A Companion to Spanish Women's Studies*. Ed. X. de Ros and G. Hazbun. Suffolk: Tamesis, 2011. 81–96.
- Baratta, Luca. *"A Marvelous and Strange Event": Racconti di nascite mostruose nell'Inghilterra della prima età moderna*. Florence: Florence University Press, 2016.
- Barkan, Leonard. *Mute Poetry, Speaking Pictures*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013.
- Barker, Clare, and Stuart Murray, eds. *The Cambridge Companion to Literature and Disability*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018.
- Barocchi, Paola. *Scritti d'arte del Cinquecento*. Vol. 2. Milan: R. Ricciardi, 1977.
- Barolsky, Robert. *Michelangelo's Nose: A Myth and Its Maker*. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1990.
- Baron, Hans. *Petrarch's "Secretum," Its Making and Its Meaning*. Cambridge, MA: Medieval Academy of America, 1985.
- Bassnett, Susan. "Gained in Translation." *Topics in Translation: Reflections on Translation*. Bristol: Channel View Publications, 2011. 118–19.
- Bassnett, Susan. *Translation Studies*. 2nd ed. New York: Routledge, 1996.
- Bauman, H-Dirksen L., and Joseph J. Murray. "Deaf Studies in the Twenty-First Century: 'Deaf-Gain' and the Future of Human Diversity." *Disability Studies Reader*. 4th ed. Ed. Davis. New York: Routledge, 2016. 246–61.
- Baumgartner, Paul R. "Milton and Patience." *Studies in Philology* 60.2 (Apr. 1963): 203–13.
- Bearden, Elizabeth B. *The Emblematics of the Self: Ekphrasis and Identity in Renaissance Imitations of Greek Romance*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2012.
- Bearden, Elizabeth B. "Monstrous Births and Crip Authority: Cervantes, Disability, and the *Persiles*." *eHumanista/Cervantes* 5; "Si ya por atrevido no sale con las manos en la cabeza": *El legado poético del Persiles cuatrocientos años después*. Ed. M. Alcalá Galán. Santa Barbara: University of Santa Barbara, 2016.
- Bearden, Elizabeth B. *Monstrous Kinds: Body, Space, and Narrative in Renaissance Representations of Disability*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2019.
- Beltrán de Heredia, Vicente. *Bulario de la Universidad de Salamanca (1219–1549)*. 3 vols. Salamanca, ES: University of Salamanca, 1966–67.

- Bennett, Lyn. "Meditation and Rhetoric in 'The Discourse.'" *An Collins and the Historical Imagination*. Ed. W. S. Howard. 39–52.
- Bennett, Lyn. *Rhetoric, Medicine, and the Woman Writer, 1600–1700*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018.
- Bentley, Richard. "The Preface." Milton's *Paradise Lost: A New Edition*, by Richard Bentley D. D. London: J. Tonson and J. Poulson, 1732.
- Bergmann, Emilie L. *Art Inscribed: Essays on Ekphrasis in Spanish Golden Age Poetry*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979.
- Bergmann, Emilie L. "Spain's Women Humanists." *The Routledge Research Companion to Early Modern Spanish Women Writers*. Ed. A. J. Cruz and N. Baranda. New York: Routledge, 2018. 219–35.
- Berne, Patty. "Foreword." *Crip Kinship*. By Kafai. 7–10.
- Berte, Monica, Vincenzo Fera, and Tiziana Peconti, eds. *Petrarca e la medicina*. Messina, IT: Centro interdipartimentale di studi umanistici, 2006.
- Bertolini, Luisa. "L'estetica del grottesco nelle Rime di Giovan Paolo Lomazzo." *Fillide* 24 (Apr. 2022): 1–15.
- Beusterien, John. "Did Cervantes Stutter?" *Cervantes* 29.1 (2009): 209–20.
- Biggs, H. Parkman. "Jousting at Windmills: Cervantes and the Quixotic Fight for Authorial Control." *Marquette Intellectual Property Law Review* 22.2 (Summer 2018): 213–30.
- Billanovich, Giuseppe. "Petrarca e il Ventoso." *Italia medioevale e umanistica* 9 (1966): 389–401.
- Billanovich, Giuseppe. "Petrarch and the Textual Tradition of Livy." *JWCI* 14 (1951): 137–208.
- "black dog, n., sense 2." *OED*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, July 2023.
- Blasco Pascual, Francisco Javier. "Cervantes Creador: 'La rara invención.'" *Retrato de Miguel de Cervantes Saavedra*. Ed. F. Sevilla Arroyo. Guanajuato, MX: Museo Iconográfico del Quijote, 2011. 315–63.
- Blumenberg, Hans. *The Legitimacy of the Modern Age*. Trans. R. M. Wallace. 2nd ed. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1983.
- Boaistuau, Pierre. *Certaines secretes wonders of nature containing a descriptio[n] of sundry strange things, sem'ing monstrous in our eyes and lodgement, bicause we are not priuie to the reasons of them . . .* Trans. E. Fenton. London: Henry Bynneman, 1569.
- Bolt, David. *The Metanarrative of Blindness*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2014.
- Bolzonni, Lina. *The Gallery of Memory: Literary and Iconographic Models in the Age of the Printing Press*. Trans. J. Parzen. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001.
- Bondi, Fabrizio, Massimo Stella, and Andrea Torre, eds. *The Wounded Body: Memory, Language and the Self from Petrarch to Shakespeare*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2022.
- Borge, Francisco J. "A New World for a New Nation: The Promotion of America in Early Modern England." PhD diss., University of Massachusetts–Amherst, 2002.

- Borges, Jorge Luis. *Seven Nights*. Trans. E. Weinberger. New York: New Directions, 2009.
- Bosch, Lynette F. M. *Mannerism, Spirituality and Cognition: The Art of Enargeia*. New York: Routledge, 2020.
- Boswell, Jackson Campbell, and Gordon Mcmurry. *Petrarch's English Laurels, 1475–1700*. New York: Routledge, 2016.
- Brand, Charles Peter. *Torquato Tasso: A Study of the Poet and of His Contribution to English Literature*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965.
- Brann, Noel L. "Is Acedia Melancholy? A Re-examination of This Question in the Light of Fra Battista da Crema's 'Della cognitione et vittoria di se stesso' (1531)." *Journal of the History of Medicine and Allied Sciences* 34.2 (Apr. 1979): 180–99.
- Briesemeister, Dietrich. "The *Consolatio Philosophiae* of Boethius in Medieval Spain." *JWCI* 53 (1990): 61–70.
- Britton, Piers. "Mio malinconico, o vero . . . mio pazzo': Michelangelo, Vasari, and the Problem of Artists' Melancholy in Sixteenth-Century Italy." *Sixteenth Century Journal* 34.3 (Fall 2003): 653–75.
- Brovia, Romana. "Per una storia del petrarchismo latino: Il caso del *De remediis utriusque fortune* in Francia (secoli XIV-XV)." *Fourteenth-Century Classicism: Petrarch and Bernat Metge*. Ed. L. Cabré Ollé, A. Coroleu Lletget, and J. Kraye. London: Warburg Institute, 2012. 15–28.
- Brovia, Romana. "Psicomachie petrarchesche: Comunita in dialogotra *Secretum e De remediis*." *Petrarchan Passions*. Ed. Huss et al. 79–100.
- Brown, Eleanor Gertrude. *Milton's Blindness*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1934.
- Bruce, Scott G. *Silence and Sign Language in Medieval Monasticism: The Cluniac Tradition c. 900–1200*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.
- Brueggemann, Brenda Jo. "Deaf, She Wrote: Mapping Deaf Women's Autobiography." *PMLA* 120.2 (2005): 577–83.
- Bulwer, John. *Chirologia: Or the Natural Language of the Hand; Chironomia: Or the Art of Manual Rhetoric*. Ed. J. W. Cleary. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1974.
- Bulwer, John. *Philocophus, or the Deafe and Dumbe Mans Friend . . .* London: Humphrey Moseley, 1648.
- Burckhardt, Jacob. *The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy*. Trans. S. G. C. Middledmore. New York: Modern Library, 2002.
- Burke, Peter. "Reflections on the Frontispiece Author Portrait in the Renaissance." *Bildnis und Image: Das Portrait zwischen Intention und Rezeption*. Ed. A. Kostler and E. Seidl. Koln: Bohlau, 1998. 151–62.
- Burke, Peter. "Representations of the Self from Petrarch to Descartes." *Rewriting the Self: Histories from the Renaissance to the Present*. Ed. R. Porter. London: Routledge, 1997. 17–28.
- Burrow, Colin. *Imitating Authors: Plato to Futurity*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2019.
- Burton, Robert. *The Anatomy of Melancholy*. Ed. N. K. Kiesling, T. C. Faulkner, R.

- A. Blair, J. B. Bamborough, and M. Dodsworth. 6 vols. Oxford: Clarendon, 1989–2000.
- Bynum, Caroline Walker. *Holy Feast and Holy Fast: The Religious Significance of Food to Medieval Women*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988.
- Cammarata, Joan F. "Teresa De Cartagena: Writing from a Silent Space in a Silent World." *Monographic Review/Revista Monografica* 16 (2000): 38–51.
- Canavaggio, Jean. *Cervantes*. Trans. M. Fernández Alonso de Arño. Madrid: Espasa Calpe, 2003.
- Canavaggio, Jean. "La dimensión autobiográfica del *Viaje del Parnaso*." *Cervantes* 1.1–2 (1981): 29–41.
- Cantera Burgos, Francisco. *Alvar García de Santa María y su familia de conversos: Historia de la Judería de Burgos y de sus conversos más egregios*. Madrid: Institute Arias Montano, 1952.
- Cardano, Girolamo. *Cardan his three books Of consolation Englishd* . . . London: B. Aylmer and S. Crouch, 1683.
- Cardano, Girolamo. *Cardanus comferte translated into Englishe. And published by commaundement of the right honourable the Earle of Oxenford*. Trans. T. Bedingfield. London: T. Marshe, 1573.
- Cardano, Girolamo. *De Consolatione, Libri tres*. Venice: Hieronymus Scotus, 1542.
- Cardano, Girolamo. [*De Subtilitate*]. *The De subtilitate of Girolamo Cardano*. 2 vols. Ed. J. M. Forrester. Tempe: Arizona Center for Medieval and Renaissance Studies, 2013.
- Cardano, Girolamo. [*De utilitate*]. *Hierronymy Cardani Mediolanensis Medici, de utilitate ex adversis capienda* . . . Basel, CH: H. Petri, 1561.
- Carlino, Andrea. "Petrarch and the Early Modern Critics of Medicine." *Journal of Medieval and Early Modern Studies* 35.3 (2005): 559–82.
- Carr, Dereck Cooper. "Enrique de Villena, *El tratado de la consolación*: A Critical Edition with Introductory Study and Notes." PhD diss., University of British Columbia, 1971.
- Carruthers, Mary. *Book of Memory: A Study of Memory in Medieval Culture*. 2nd ed. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008.
- Carson, Anne. *Eros the Bittersweet: An Essay*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986.
- Cartagena, Alfonso de, trans. "*La rethórica de Tulio*." *En la teoría y en la práctica de la traducción: La experiencia de los traductores castellanos a la luz de los textos (Siglos XIV–XVI)*. By M. I. Páiz Hernández. Salamanca, ES: Seminario de Estudios Medievales y Renacentistas 9, 1998. 27–33.
- Cartagena, Alfonso de. "Libro que fizo Séneca a su amigo Galión contra las adversidades de la Fortuna." Ed. and introd. R. F. Pousa. *Escorial* 27 (1943): 73–82.
- Cartagena, Alfonso de. "Petition from Alfonso de Cartagena to Pope Nicolás V." Apr. 6, 1449. Ed. V. Beltrán de Heredia. Vatican Secret Archives, *Registra Supplicationum* 436, fols. 114v–115. *Cartagena Library* (<https://bibliotecacartagena.net/en/documentum/3-de-abril-de-1449-av-reg-suppl-436-fols-114v-115>). Requested June 21, 2023.

- Cartagena, Alfonso de. "Petition from Alfonso de Cartagena to Pope Nicolás V." May 2, 1449. Ed. V. Beltrán de Heredia. Vatican Secret Archives, *Registra Supplicationum* 436, fol. 145. *Cartagena Library* (<https://bibliotecacartagena.net/en/documentum/2-de-mayo-de-1449-av-reg-suppl-436-fol-145>). Requested June 21, 2023.
- Cartagena, Alfonso de, and Rodrigo Sánchez de Arévalo. "De questionibus ortolanis." "Una cuestión disputada: Viejas y nuevas formas en el siglo XV a propósito de un opúsculo inédito de Rodrigo Sánchez de Arévalo y Alfonso de Cartagena." Ed. and introd. M. Morrás. *Atalaya, Revue Française d'Études Médiévales Hispaniques* 7 (1996): 63–102.
- Cartagena, Teresa de. *Arboleda de los enfermos y Admiración Operum Dei*. Ed. L. J. Hutton. Madrid: Real Academia Española, 1967.
- Cartagena, Teresa de. *The Writings of Teresa de Cartagena*. Trans. and ed. D. Seidenspinner-Nunez. Cambridge: D. S. Brewer, 1998.
- Cascardi, Anthony J., ed. *The Cambridge Companion to Cervantes*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.
- Cassian, John. *The Institutes*. Ed. B. Ramsey. New York: Newman Press, 2000.
- Cassirer, Ernst, Paul Oskar Kristeller, and John Herman Randall Jr., eds. *Petrarca, Valla, Ficino, Pico, Pomponazzi, Vives: The Renaissance Philosophy of Man*. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1971. Reprint.
- Castillo, David R. *Baroque Horrors: Roots of the Fantastic in the Age of Curiosities*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2010.
- Castro Ponce, Clara. "Teresa de Cartagena: *Arboleda de los enfermos y Admiración operum Dei*: Edición crítica singular." PhD diss., Brown University, 2001.
- Cavanagh, Clare, et al., eds. *The Princeton Encyclopedia of Poetry and Poetics*. 4th ed. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014.
- Cervantes Saavedra, Miguel de. *Don Quijote de la Mancha*. Ed. F. Rico. 2 vols. Barcelona: Instituto Miguel de Cervantes, 1998.
- Cervantes Saavedra, Miguel de. *Don Quixote de la Mancha*. Trans. L. Viardot. 2 vols. Paris: Hachette and Co; London: Cassell and Co. Fol. 370.
- Cervantes Saavedra, Miguel de. "Epístola a Mateo Vázquez." *Miguel de Cervantes: Poesías*. Ed. A. J. Sáez. Madrid: Cátedra, 2016. 221–31.
- Cervantes Saavedra, Miguel de. *Los trabajos de Persiles y Sigismunda*. Ed. C. R. Muñoz Sánchez. Barcelona: Cátedra, 2004.
- Cervantes Saavedra, Miguel de. *Novelas ejemplares*. Ed. H. Sieber. 2 vols. Madrid: Cátedra, 2004.
- Cervantes Saavedra, Miguel de. *The Trials of Persiles and Sigismunda: A Northern Story*. Trans. C. Richmond Weller and C. A. Colahan. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989.
- Cervantes Saavedra, Miguel de. *Viaje del Parnaso y poesías varias*. Ed. E. L. Rivers. Madrid: Espasa-Calpe, 1991.
- Chai, Jean Julia. "Introduction." *Idea of the Temple of Painting*. By Lomazzo. 1–41.
- Chai, Jean Julia. "Introduction: Lomazzo Studies; Getting the Whole Picture." *Lomazzo's Aesthetic Principles*. Ed. Tantardini and Norris. 1–17.

- Chambers, Douglas. "Discovering in wide lantskip": 'Paradise Lost' and the Tradition of Landscape Description in the Seventeenth Century." *Journal of Garden History* 5.1 (1985): 15–31.
- Chapelle Wojciehowski, Hanna. "Petrarch and the Vaucluse: Building a Virtual Community through Place Attachment." *Petrarchan Passions*. Ed. Huss et al. 7–26.
- Chen, Mel Y. "Chronic Illness, Slowness, and the Time of Writing." *Crip Authorship*. Ed. Mills and Sanchez. 33–37.
- Cheney, Patrick Gerard, and Frederick A. de Armas. *European Literary Careers: The Author from Antiquity to the Renaissance*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002.
- Chess, Simone. "Atypical Bodies." *A Cultural History of Disability in the Renaissance*. Vol. 3. Ed. S. Anderson and L. Haydon. New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2020. 19–40.
- Chess, Simone, Colby Gordon, and Will Fisher. "Introduction: Early Modern Trans Studies." *Journal for Early Modern Cultural Studies* 19.4 (2019): 1–25.
- Childers, William. *Transnational Cervantes*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006.
- Cicero, Marcus Tullius. *De inventione. De optimo genere oratorum. Topica*. Trans. H. M. Hubbell. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1949.
- Cicero, Marcus Tullius. [*De Natura Deorum*.] *On the Nature of the Gods. Academics*. Trans. H. Rackham. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1933.
- Cicero, Marcus Tullius. *Tusculan Disputations (ca. 45 BCE)*. Trans. J. E. King. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1927.
- Clare, Eli. *Brilliant Imperfection: Grappling with Cure*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2017.
- Clare, Eli. *Exile and Pride: Disability, Queerness, and Liberation*. Durham: Duke University Press, 2015.
- Clifton, Shane. *Crippled Grace: Disability, Virtue Ethics, and the Good Life*. Waco, TX: Baylor University Press, 2018.
- Clymer, Lorna. "Cromwell's Head and Milton's Hair: Corpse Theory in Spectacular Bodies of the Interregnum." *Eighteenth Century* 40.2 (Summer 1999): 91–112.
- Cohen, Simona. "Michelangelo's Portrait Medal: The Blind Pilgrim and His Dog." *Artibus et Historiae* 84 (2021): 83–97.
- Colie, Rosalie L. *Atlantic Wall and Other Poems*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974.
- Colie, Rosalie L. *Paradoxia Epidemica: The Renaissance Tradition of Paradox*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966.
- Colie, Rosalie L. "Some Notes on Burton's Erasmus." *RQ* 20.3 (1967): 335–41.
- Collett, Barry, Anne Lake Prescott, and Betty S. Travitsky, eds. *Female Monastic Life in Early Tudor England: With an Edition of Richard Fox's Translation of the Benedictine Rule for Women 1517*. New York: Routledge, 2016.
- Collins, An. *Divine Songs and Meditations*. Ed. S. Gottlieb. Tempe, AZ: Medieval & Renaissance Texts & Studies, 1996.

- Conde, Juan-Carlos. "La Ortodoxia de una Heterodoxa: Teresa de Cartagena y la Biblia." *Hispania Sacra* 72.145 (Spring 2020): 115–23.
- Conde, Juan-Carlos. "Self-Fashioning and the Intersectional Self: Teresa de Cartagena by Teresa de Cartagena." *Romanistisches Jahrbuch* 72.1 (2021): 388–420.
- Corbett, Margery, and Ronald Lightbown. *The Comely Frontispiece: The Emblematic Title-Page in England, 1550–1660*. London: Routledge, 1979.
- Corry, Jennifer. M. "Some Observations on Teresa de Cartagena's Humble Disclaimers." *Quaderni ibero-americani* 95 (2004): 5–14.
- Cortés Timoner, María del Mar. "Fue levado mi entendimiento': Teresa de Cartagena y la escritura mística en femenino." *Scripta* 8 (2016): 148–63.
- Cortés Timoner, María del Mar. "Las imágenes del árbol y de la arboleda en los tratados de Teresa de Cartagena." *Actas del IX Congreso Internacional de la Asociación Hispánica de Literatura Medieval (A Coruña, 18–22 de septiembre de 2001)*. Vol. 2. Ed. C. Parrilla and M. Pampín. A Corruña, ES: Toxosoutos, 2005. 157–70.
- Costley King'oo, Clare. *Miserere mei: The Penitential Psalms in Late Medieval and Early Modern England*. South Bend, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2012.
- Couser, G. Thomas. *Recovering Bodies: Illness, Disability, and Life Writing*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1997.
- Couser, G. Thomas. *Vulnerable Subjects: Ethics and Life Writing*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004.
- Covarrubias Horozco, Sebastián de. "Manco." *Tesoro de la lengua castellana o española*. Ed. I. Arellano and R. Zafra. Madrid: Iberoamericana, 2006.
- Craik, Katharine A., and Tanya Pollard. "Introduction: Imagining Audiences." *Shakespearean Sensations: Experiencing Literature in Early Modern England*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013. 1–26.
- Crenshaw, Kimberlé Williams. "Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics." *University of Chicago Legal Forum* 1.8 (1989): 139–67.
- Cruz, Ann J. "Arms Versus Letters: The Poetics of War and the Career of the Poet in Early Modern Spain." *European Literary Careers*. Ed. Cheney and de Armas. 186–205.
- Cruz, Anne J. "Psyche and Gender in Cervantes." *The Cambridge Companion to Cervantes*. Ed. Cascardi. 186–205.
- Cruz, Anne J. "Women Writers of Early Modern Spain: A Feminist Overview." *Caplletra* 67 (2019): 129–43.
- Curtius, Ernst Robert. *European Literature and the Latin Middle Ages*. Introd. C. Burrow. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013.
- Danforth, Scot. "Liberation Theology of Disability and the Option for the Poor." *DSQ* 25.3 (Summer 2005): n.p.
- Daniel, Drew. *The Melancholy Assemblage: Affect and Epistemology in the English Renaissance*. New York: Fordham University Press, 2013.
- Daston, Lorraine, and Katharine Park. *Wonders and the Order of Nature, 1150–1750*. New York: Zone Books, 1998.

- Davis, Lennard J. *Enforcing Normalcy: Disability, Deafness, and the Body*. New York: Verso, 1995.
- De Armas, Frederick A. "Cervantes and the Virgilian Wheel: The Portrayal of a Literary Career." *European Literary Careers*: Ed. Cheney and de Armas. 268–85.
- De Armas, Frederick A. "Nero's Golden House: Italian Art and the Grotesque in *Don Quijote*, Part II." *Cervantes* 24.1 (Spring 2004): 143–71.
- De Armas, Frederick A. "Saturnine and Parodic Sunrises: *Don Quijote* and *Le Roman Comique*." *Neophilologus* 105.2 (2021): 161–76.
- De Armas, Frederick A. "Saturnine Texts and Parodic Sunrises: *Don Quixote* and *Le Roman Comique*." *Neophilologus* 105.2 (2021): 161–76.
- De Armas Wilson, Diana. *Allegories of Love: Cervantes's "Persiles" and "Sigismunda"*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991.
- Deyermund, Alan. "El convento de dolencias: The Works of Teresa de Cartagena." *Journal of Hispanic Philology* 1 (1976): 19–29.
- Deyermund, Alan. *The Petrarchan Sources of La Celestina*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975.
- Dhar, Amrita. "Toward Blind Language: John Milton Writing, 1648–1656." *Milton Studies* 60.1–2 (2018): 75–107.
- Di Camillo, Ottavio. *El humanismo castellano del siglo XV*. Trans. M. Lloris. Valencia: Fernando Torres Editor, 1976.
- Di Camillo, Ottavio. "Fifteenth-Century Spanish Humanism: Thirty-Five Years Later." *La Coronica* 39.1 (Fall 2010): 19–66.
- Díaz Márquez, Ilse. "'Ynclinando la oreja del mi entendimiento'. Simbología mística en *Arboleda de los enfermos* de Teresa de Cartagena." *Medievalia* 52.1 (2020): 59–76.
- Diekstra, F. N. M. "Introduction." *A Dialogue Between Reason and Adversity: A Late Middle English Version of Petrarch's De remediis*. Ed. F. N. M. Diekstra. Groningen, NL: Van Gorcum, 1968. 1–63.
- Dinshaw, Carolyn. *Getting Medieval: Sexualities and Communities, Pre- and Post-modern*. Durham: Duke University Press, 1999.
- Dobransky, Stephen B. *Milton's Visual Imagination: Imagery in Paradise Lost*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015.
- Dokumacı, Arseli. *Activist Affordances: How Disabled People Improvise More Habitable Worlds*. Durham: Duke University Press, 2023.
- Dokumacı, Arseli. "Disability as Method: Interventions in the Habitus of Ableism through Media-Creation." *DSQ* 38.3 (2018).
- Dolmage, Jay T. *Academic Ablism: Disability and Higher Education*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2017.
- Dolmage, Jay T. *Disability Rhetoric*. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2014.
- Dolmage, Jay T., and Allison P. Hobgood. "An Afterward: Thinking through Care." *Pedagogy* 15.3 (Oct. 2015): 559–67.
- Dotti, Ugo. *Vita di Petrarca*. Rome: Editori Laterza, 1992.
- Dreger, Alice Domurat. "Freeing the Irish Giant." *One of Us: Conjoined Twins and the Future of Normal*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004. 113–41.

- Dubourg, Ninon. *Disabled Clerics in the Late Middle Ages: Un/suitable for Divine Service?* Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2023.
- Dunn, Kevin. *Pretexts of Authority: The Rhetoric of Authority in the Renaissance Preface*. Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1994.
- Duran, Angelica. "The Blind Bard: According to John Milton and His Contemporaries." *Mosaic* 46.3 (Sept. 2013): 141–57.
- Durling, Robert M. "The Ascent of Mt. Ventoux and the Crisis of Allegory." *Italian Quarterly* 18 (1974): 7–28.
- Eck, Caroline van. *Classical Rhetoric and the Visual Arts in Early Modern Europe*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007.
- Eden, Kathy. *The Renaissance Rediscovery of Intimacy*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012.
- Edwards, Robert R. "Petrarchan Narratives: Representation and Hermeneutics." *Modern Language Narrative* 130.1 (Jan. 2015): 1–23.
- Egginton, William. *The Man Who Invented Fiction: How Cervantes Ushered in the Modern World*. New York: Bloomsbury, 2016.
- Eiesland, Nancy L. *The Disabled God: Towards a Liberatory Theology of Disability*. Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1994.
- Ellis, D. S. "Unifying Imagery in the Works of Teresa de Cartagena." *Journal of Hispanic Philology* 17 (1992): 455–53.
- Enenkel, Karl A. E. "Petarca, Francesco." *Brill's Encyclopaedia of the Neo-Latin World*. Ed. C. Kallendorf. Accessed September 10, 2021. http://dx.doi.org.ezproxy.library.wisc.edu/10.1163/9789004271296_enlo_B9789004271029_0099
- Engel, William. "Emblems and Sententiae in Seventeenth Century Prose: Mystical and Literary Design in Robert Burton and Thomas Browne." PhD diss., University of California, Berkeley, 1987.
- Erasmus, Desiderius. *De copia. Collected Works of Erasmus: Literary and Educational Writings De copia / De ratione studii*. Ed. C. R. Thompson and trans. B. I. Knott. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1978. 279–661.
- Evagrius, Ponticus. *Ad Monachos*. Ed. and Trans. J. Driscoll. New York: Newman Press, 2003.
- Falkeid, Unn. "Petarch, Mont Ventoux and the Modern Self." *Forum Italicum* 43.1 (2009): 5–29.
- Fallon, Stephen M. *Milton's Peculiar Grace: Self-Representation and Authority*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007.
- Farr, Jason S. *Novel Bodies: Disability and Sexuality in Eighteenth-Century British Literature*. Lewisburg, PA: Bucknell University Press, 2019.
- Farrar, Abraham. "Historical Introduction." *Simplification of the Letters of the Alphabet and Method of Teaching Deaf-Mutes to Speak*. By Bonet. 3–58.
- Fenichel, Emily A. "Penance and Proselytizing in Michelangelo's Portrait Medal." *Artibus et Historiae* 37.73 (2016): 125–38.
- Fenzi, Enrico. "Dall' 'Africa' al 'Secretum': Nuove Ipotesi sul 'Sogno di Scipione' e sulla composizione del poema." *Il Petrarca ad Arquà*. Ed. G. Billanovich and G. Frasso. Padua, Antenore, 1975. 61–115.

- Flaten, Arne R. "Identity and the Display of *Medaglie* in Renaissance and Baroque Europe." *Word & Image* 19.1-2 (2003): 59-73.
- Flaten, Arne R. "Renaissance Medals." *RQ* 71.2 (2018): 645-56.
- Fleming, John V. *Reason and the Lover*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982.
- Floyd-Wilson, Mary. *English Ethnicity and Race in Early Modern Drama*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003.
- Forcione, Alban K. *Cervantes and the Humanist Vision: A Study of Four "Exemplary Novels"*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982.
- Forcione, Alban K. *Cervantes's Christian Romance: A Study of "Persiles y Sigismunda"*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972.
- Fothergill-Payne, Louise. *Seneca and Celestina*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988.
- Foucault, Michel. *Technologies of the Self: Ethics, Subjectivity, and Truth*. Ed. P. Rabinow and trans. R. Hurley. New York: New Press, 1997. 223-52.
- Fox, John. *Actes and monuments of matters most speciall and memorable, happenyng in the Church*. Vol. 1. London: J. Day, 1583.
- Fox, Ruth A. *The Tangled Chain: The Structure of Disorder in the Anatomy of Melancholy*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976.
- Françon, Marcel. "Petraich: Disciple of Heraclitus." *Speculum* 11.2 (Apr. 1936): 265-71.
- Frank, Arthur W. *The Wounded Storyteller: Body, Illness, and Ethics*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995.
- Fraser, Benjamin. *Deaf History and Culture in Spain: A Reader of Primary Documents*. Washington, DC: Gallaudet University Press, 2009.
- Fraye, Lauren. "The Reason Cervantes Asked to Be Buried under a Convent." *NPR*, June 24, 2015. Accessed March 9, 2016. <https://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2015/06/24/417117826/the-reason-cervantes-asked-to-be-buried-under-a-convent>
- Freeman Loftis, Sonya. *Shakespeare and Disability Studies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021.
- Friedlaender, Walter. *Mannerism and Anti-Mannerism in Italian Painting*. Introd. D. Posner. New York: Schocken Books, 1973.
- Gabler, Keith. "Feeling Lines: The Elizabethan Epyllion and the Early Modern Sensorium." PhD diss., University of Wisconsin-Madison, 2023.
- Gallenga, P. E., et al. "Michelangelo's Eye Disease." *Medical Hypotheses* 78.6 (2012): 757-59.
- Garcés, María Antonia. *Cervantes in Algiers: A Captive's Tale*. Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 2002.
- García Santo Tomás, Enrique. "Ruptured Narratives: Tracing Defeat in Diego Duque de Estrada's *Comentarios del desengañado de sí mismo* (1614-1645)." *eHumanista* 17 (2011): n.p.
- Garland-Thomson, Rosemarie. "The Case for Conserving Disability." *Bioethical Inquiry* 9.3 (Sept. 2012): 339-55.
- Garland-Thomson, Rosemarie. "Disability Gain." Paper presented at Avoidance in/

- and the Academy: The International Conference on Disability, Culture, and Education. Liverpool Hope University, Sept. 11, 2013.
- Garland-Thomson, Rosemarie. "Disability Liberation Theology." *The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Disability*. Ed. A. Cureton and D. T. Wasserman. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020. 100–22.
- Garland-Thomson, Rosemarie. *Extraordinary Bodies: Figuring Physical Disability in American Culture and Literature*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1997.
- Garland-Thomson, Rosemarie. "Picturing People with Disabilities: Classical Portraiture as Reconstructive Narrative." *Re-Presenting Disability*. Ed. Sandell et al. 23–40.
- Garnett, Jane, and Gervace Rosser. "The Ex Voto between Domestic and Public Space: From Personal Testimony to Collective Memory." *Domestic Devotions in Early Modern Italy*. Ed. M. Corry et al. Boston: Brill, 2018. 45–62.
- Garrison, John S. "Blindness and Posthuman Sexuality in *Paradise Lost*." *Monstrosity, Disability, and the Posthuman in the Medieval and Early Modern World*. Ed. R. H. Godden and A. S. Mittman. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019. 269–84.
- Gaylord, Mary Malcolm. "Cervantes' Portrait of the Artist." *Cervantes* 3.2 (1983): 83–102.
- Gaylord, Mary Malcolm. "Cervantes' Portraits and Literary Theory in the Text of Fiction." *Cervantes* 6.1 (1986): 57–80.
- Gent, Lucy. "Haydock's Copy of Lomazzo's *Trattato*." *The Library, 6th series* 1.1 (1979): 78–81.
- Gerber, David A. "Disabled Veterans and the Wounds of War." *The Oxford Handbook of Disability History*. Ed. Rembis et al. 477–502.
- Gill, Carol J. "Divided Understandings: The Social Experience of Disability." *Handbook of Disability Studies*. Ed. Albrecht et al. 351–72.
- Gilman, Ernest. *Iconoclasm and Poetry in the English Reformation: Down Went Dagon*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986.
- Godin, M. Leona. *There Plant Eyes: A Personal and Cultural History of Blindness*. New York: Vintage Books, 2021.
- Goldhill, Simon. "What Is Ekphrasis For?" *Classical Philology* 102.1 (2007): 1–19.
- Gómez, Jesús. "Dos consideraciones sobre la presencia de Petrarca en España y el diálogo *De remediis utriusque fortunae*." *Dicenda: Cuadernos de Filología Hispánica* 9 (1990): 139–49.
- Gomis, Juan. "Pious Voices: Blind Spanish Prayer Singers." *Renaissance Studies* 33.1 (Feb. 2019): 42–63.
- Gonzales Sánchez-Molero, José Luis. *La epístola a Mateo Vázquez: Historia de una polémica literaria en torno a Cervantes*. Alcalá de Henares, ES: Centro Estudios Cervantinos, 2010.
- Goodchild, Karen Hope. "The Bizarre as Burlesque in Giorgio Vasari's Biography of Piero di Cosimo." *Explorations in Renaissance Culture* 32.2 (2006): 190–203.
- Gordon, Colby. "Trans Mayhem in *Samson Agonistes*." University of Toronto, Toronto, CA. Dec. 4, 2020.
- Gottlieb, Sidney. "Introduction." *Divine Songs and Meditations*. By Collins. vii–xviii.

- Gowland, Angus. "Consolations for Melancholy in Renaissance Humanism." *Society and Politics* 6.1 (2012): 10–38.
- Gowland, Angus. "The Problem of Early Modern Melancholy." *Past & Present* 191 (2006): 77–120.
- Gowland, Angus. "Rhetorical Structure and Function in *The Anatomy of Melancholy*." *Rhetorica: A Journal of the History of Rhetoric* 19.1 (2001): 1–48.
- Gowland, Angus. *The Worlds of Renaissance Melancholy: Robert Burton in Context*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
- Grafton, Anthony. *Cardano's Cosmos: The Worlds and Works of a Renaissance Astrologer*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001.
- Gragnotati, Manuele, and Francesca Southerden. "Body: Dante's and Petrarch's Lyric Eschatologies." *Possibilities of Lyric: Reading Petrarch in Dialogue. Cultural Inquiry* 18. Berlin: ICI Berlin Press, 2020. 135–62.
- Greene, Thomas. "The Flexibility of the Self in Renaissance Literature." *The Disciplines of Criticism: Essays in Literary Theory, Interpretation, and History*. Ed. P. Demetz, T. Greene, and L. Nelson Jr. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968. 241–64.
- Greene, Thomas. *The Light in Troy: Imitation and Discovery in Renaissance Poetry*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983.
- Greyfriars Research Team. *The Bones of a King: Richard III Rediscovered*. Chichester, UK: Wiley & Sons, 2015.
- Gruzinski, Serge. *The Mestizo Mind: The Intellectual Dynamics of Colonization and Globalization*. Trans. D. Dusinberre. New York: Routledge, 2002.
- Gurd, Sean. "Introduction." *Philology and Its Histories*. Ed. S. Gurd. Columbus: The Ohio State University Press, 2010. 1–19.
- Hadot, Pierre. *The Veil of Isis: An Essay on the History of the Idea of Nature*. Trans. M. Chase. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006.
- Hakewill, George. *The Vanity of the Eye . . .* Oxford: J. Barnes, 1608.
- Hanford, James H. "John Milton Forswears Physic." *Bulletin of the Medical Library Association* 32.1 (1944): 23–34.
- Hannay, Margaret P. "'So May I With the Psalmist Truly Say': Early Modern Englishwomen's Psalm Discourse." *Write or Be Written: Early Modern Women Poets and Cultural Constraints*. Ed. B. Smith and U. Appelt. Burlington: Ashgate, 2001. 105–34.
- Hard, Frederick. "Richard Haydock and Alexander Browne: Two Half-Forgotten Writers on the Art of Painting." *PMLA* 55.3 (Sept. 1940): 727–41.
- Hard, Frederick. "Some Interrelations Between the Literary and the Plastic Arts in 16th and 17th Century England." *College Art Journal* 10.3 (Spring 1951): 233–43.
- Harden, Faith S. *Arms and Letters: Military Life Writing in Early Modern Spain*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2020.
- Harrison, Sunny. "How to Make a Warhorse: Violence and Behavioural Control in Late-Medieval Hippiatric Treatises." *Journal of Medieval History* 48.3 (2022): 347–67.
- Haskell, Yasmin A. "Introduction." *Diseases of the Imagination and Imaginary Dis-*

- ease in the Early Modern Period*. Ed. Y. A. Haskell. Turnhout, BE: Brepols, 2011. 1–17.
- Heal, Bridget. *The Cult of the Virgin Mary in Early Modern Germany: Protestant and Catholic Piety, 1500–1648*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.
- Heffernan, James A. *Museum of Words: The Poetics of Ekphrasis from Homer to Ashbery*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004.
- Heiple, Daniel L. “El licenciado Vidriera y el humor tradicional del loco.” *Hispania* 66.1 (Mar. 1983): 17–20.
- Heitmann, Klaus. *Fortuna und Virtus: Eine Studie zu Petrarcas Lebensweisheit*. Köln: Böhlau, 1958.
- Herman, Peter C. “Samson among the Terrorologists.” *Terrorism and Literature*. Ed. P. C. Herman. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018. 486–504.
- Hermans, Lex. “Reading Rhetoric: Oratory in Gian Paolo Lomazzo’s Treatises on the Art of Painting.” *The Artist as a Reader: On Education and Non-Education of Early Modern Artists*. Ed. H. Damm, M. Thimann, and C. Zittel. Boston: Brill, 2013. 241–58.
- Hess, Andrew C. “The Battle of Lepanto and Its Place in Mediterranean History.” *Past & Present* 57 (Nov. 1972): 53–73.
- Hobgood, Allison P. *Beholding Disability in the English Renaissance*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2021.
- Hobgood, Allison P. “Teeth Before Eyes: Illness and Invisibility in Shakespeare’s *Richard III*.” *Disability, Health, and Happiness in Shakespeare*. Ed. S. Iyengar. New York: Routledge, 2015. 23–40.
- Hobgood, Allison P., and David Houston Wood. “Disabled Shakespeares: Introduction.” *DSQ* 29.4 (Fall 2009): n.p.
- Hobgood, Allison P., and David Houston Wood. “Early Modern Literature and Disability Studies.” *The Cambridge Companion to Literature and Disability*. Ed. Barker and Murray. 32–46.
- Hobgood, Allison P., and David Houston Wood. “Ethical Staring: Disabling the English Renaissance.” *Recovering Disability in Early Modern England*. Ed. D. Houston Wood and A. P. Hobgood. Columbus: The Ohio State University Press, 2013. 1–22.
- Hollander, John. *The Figure of Echo: A Mode of Allusion in Milton and After*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981.
- Horn, Cornelia B. “A Nexus of Disability in Ancient Greek Miracle Stories: A Comparison of Accounts of Blindness from the Asklepeion in Epidaurus.” *Disabilities in Roman Antiquity*. Ed. Laes et al. 115–43.
- Howard, Rebecca M. “The Sitter’s Impression: Memory and Early Modern Portrait Medallions.” *Journal of Material Culture* 24.3 (2019): 293–312.
- Howard, W. Scott, ed. *An Collins and the Historical Imagination*. Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2014.
- Howard, W. Scott. “Introduction: Imagining An Collins.” *An Collins and the Historical Imagination*. Ed. W. S. Howard. 1–22.
- Howe, Sarah. “The Authority of Presence: The Development of the English Author

- Portrait, 1500–1640.” *Papers of the Bibliographic Society of America* 102.4 (Dec. 2008): 465–99.
- Hsy, Jonathan. “Disability.” *The Cambridge Companion to the Body in Literature*. Ed. D. Hillman and U. Maude. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015. 24–40.
- Hsy, Jonathan. “Symptom and Surface: Disruptive Deafness and Medieval Medical Authority.” *Bioethical Inquiry* 13 (2016): 477–83.
- Hughes, Bill. “Fear, Pity, and Disgust: Emotions and the Non-Disabled Imaginary.” *Routledge Handbook of Disability Studies*. Ed. N. Watson, A. Roulstone, and C. Thomas. New York: Routledge, 2012. 66–77.
- Huss, Bernhard. “Affectivities of Reason, Rationality of Affects: Strategies of Community-Building in Petrarch’s *De remediis utriusque fortune*.” *Petrarchan Passions*. Ed. Huss et al. Berlin: Freie Universität, 2022. 62–78.
- Huss, Bernhard, Timothy Kircher, and Gur Zak, eds. *Petrarchan Passions: Affects and Community-Formation in the Renaissance World*. Berlin: Freie Universität, 2022.
- Hussar, James. “The Jewish Roots of Teresa de Cartagena’s *Arboleda de los enfermos*.” *La corónica* 35.1 (2006): 151–69.
- Hutton, Lewis J. “Introducción.” *Arboleda de los enfermos y Admiración Operum Dey*. Ed. Lewis Joseph Hutton. By Cartagena. Madrid, 1949. 7–36.
- Ife, Barry. “Sickness and Health in the Work of Cervantes.” *Clinical Medicine* 7.6 (Dec. 2007): 608–10.
- Isella, Dante. *Rabisch: Giovan Paolo Lomazzo e i Facchini della Val di Blenio*. Torino, IT: Einaudi, 1993.
- Ivanič, S., et al., eds. *Religious Materiality in the Early Modern World*. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2019.
- Jackson, Stanley W. *Melancholia and Depression: From Hippocratic Times to Modern Times*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1986.
- Jacobs, Fredrika. “Humble Offerings: Votive Panel Paintings in Early Modern Italy.” *Ex Voto: Votive Offerings Across Cultures*. Ed. Weinryb. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015. 140–65.
- Jane, Joseph. *Salmasius his dissection and confutation of the diabolical rebel Milton in his impious doctrines of falshood, maxims of policies, and destructive principles of hypocrisie, insolences, invectives, injustice, cruelties and calumnies, against His Gracious Sovereign King Charles I. . .* London: Printed for J. G. B., 1660.
- Jarecki, Walter. “Die Ars Signorum Cisterciensium im Rahmen der metrischen Signa-listen.” *Revue Bénédictine* 98.3/4 (1988): 329–99.
- Johnson, Mary Lisa, and Robert McRuer. “Cripistemologies: Introduction.” *Journal of Literary and Cultural Disability Studies* 8.2 (2014): 127–47.
- Jones, Ann Rosylind. “Female Petrarchists.” *The Cambridge Companion to Petrarch*. Ed. Ascoli and Falkeid. 201–9.
- Juárez-Almendros, Encarnación. “The Autobiography of the Aching Body in Teresa de Cartagena’s *Arboleda de los enfermos*.” *Disability Studies*. Ed. Snyder, Brueggemann, and Garland-Thomson. 131–43.
- Juárez-Almendros, Encarnación. *Disabled Bodies in Early Modern Spanish Litera-*

- ture: *Prostitutes, Aging Women and Saints*. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2017.
- Kafer, Allison. *Feminist, Queer, Crip*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013.
- Kafer, Allison, and Eunjung Kim. "Disability and the Edges of Intersectionality." *Cambridge Companion to Literature and Disability*. Ed. Barker and Murray. 123–37.
- Kafai, Shayda. *Crip Kinship: The Disability Justice and Art Activism of Sins Invalid*. Vancouver: Arsenal Pulp Press, 2021.
- Kahn, Victoria. "The Figure of the Reader in Petrarch's *Secretum*." *PMLA* 100.2 (Mar. 1985): 154–66.
- Kang, Andrew Q. "Disability Studies and Ethnic Studies Go Hand in Hand." *Harvard Crimson*, Mar. 20, 2024.
- Karey, John. "A Work in Praise of Terrorism? September 11 and *Samson Agonistes*." *Times Literary Supplement*, Sept. 6, 2002, 15–16.
- Kaylor, Noel Harold, Jr., and Philip Edward Phillips, eds. *Vernacular Traditions of Boethius's Consolatio Philosophiae*. Kalamazoo, MI: Medieval Institute Publications, 2015.
- Keller, Helen. *The Story of My Life*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2005.
- Kemp, Martin. "'Equal excellences': Lomazzo and the Explanation of Individual Style in the Visual Arts." *Renaissance Studies* 1.1 (Mar. 1987): 1–26.
- Kennedy, William J. "Iberian, French, and English Petrarchisms." *The Cambridge Companion to Petrarch*. Ed. Ascoli and Falkeid. 210–18.
- Kerrigan, William, et al. "Introduction to English and Italian Sonnets." *The Complete Poetry and Essential Prose*. By Milton. 135–38.
- Kerrigan, William, et al. "Introduction to *Paradise Lost*." *The Complete Poetry and Essential Prose*. By Milton. 251–54.
- Kerrigan, William, et al. "Introduction to *Samson Agonistes*." *The Complete Poetry and Essential Prose*. By Milton. 699–705.
- Kierdorf, Wilhelm. "Consolation as a Literary Genre." *Brill's New Pauly: Antiquity*. Ed. H. Cancik and H. Schneider. Cologne: Brill Online, 2006. Accessed September 21, 2017. http://dx.doi.org.ezproxy.library.wisc.edu/10.1163/1574-9347_bnp_e619600
- Kiessling, Nicolas K. *The Library of Robert Burton*. Oxford: Oxford Bibliographical Society, 1988.
- Kiessling, Nicolas K. "The Library of Robert Burton: Addenda and Corrigenda." *Book Collector* 40 (1991): 104–7.
- Kiessling, Nicolas K. "The Library of Robert Burton: New Discoveries." *Book Collector* 45 (1996): 171–79.
- Kilgour, Maggie. "New Spins on Old *Rota*: Virgil, Ovid, Milton." *Classical Literary Careers and Their Reception*. Ed. H. Moore and P. Hardie. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010. 179–96.
- Kim, Yonsoo. "Teresa de Cartagena's Illness and Disability as Embodied Knowledge." *Romanic Review* 113.1 (2022): 131–49.
- Kinney, Arthur F. *Continental Humanist Poetics: Studies in Erasmus, Castiglione,*

- Marguerite de Navarre, Rabelais, and Cervantes. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1989.
- Kircher, Timothy. "On the Two Faces of Fortune: *De remediis utriusque fortune*." *Petrarch: A Critical Guide to the Complete Works*. Ed. Kirkham and Maggi. 245–53.
- Kirkham, Victoria, and Armando Maggi, eds. *Petrarch: A Critical Guide to the Complete Works*. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2009.
- Kleege, Georgina. *Blind Rage: Letters to Helen Keller*. Washington, DC: Gallaudet University Press, 2006.
- Kleege, Georgina. *More Than Meets the Eye: What Blindness Brings to Art*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2018.
- Kleege, Georgina. *Sight Unseen*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999.
- Klein, Robert. "Les Sept Gouverneurs de l'Art' selon Lomazzo." *Arte Lombarda* 4.2 (1959): 277–87.
- Klibansky, Raymond. "Preface to the German Edition." *Saturn and Melancholy*. By Klibansky et al. xiii–xxviii.
- Klibansky, Raymond, Erwin Panofsky, and Fritz Saxl. *Saturn and Melancholy: Studies in the History of Natural Philosophy, Religion and Art*. Ed. P. Despoix and G. Lereux and foreword W. Sherman. Chicago: McGill/Queens University Press, 2019. Reprint.
- Korda, Natasha. "Shakespeare's Motists." *Playing and Playgoing in Early Modern England: Actor, Audience and Performance*. Ed. S. Smith and E. Whipday. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2022. 18–36.
- Kristeller, Paul Oskar, and John Herman Randall Jr. "General Introduction." *The Renaissance Philosophy of Man*. Ed. Cassirer et al. 1–20.
- Kuhn, Reinhard C. *The Demon of Noontide: Ennui in Western Literature*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976.
- Kuppers, Petra. *Disability Culture and Community Performance: Find a Strange and Twisted Shape*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011.
- Kuppers, Petra. *Theater and Disability*. London: Palgrave, 2017.
- Kuusisto, Stephen. *Planet of the Blind: A Memoir*. New York: Dell Publishing, 1998.
- Kuuliala, Jenni. "Infirmity in Monastic Rules." *Disability in Antiquity*. Ed. Laes. 342–55.
- Kwakkelstein, Michael W. "Leonardo da Vinci's Grotesque Heads and the Breaking of the Physiognomic Mould." *JWCI* 54 (1991): 127–36.
- Laes, Christian. *Disabilities and the Disabled in the Roman World: A Social and Cultural History*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018.
- Laes, Christian, ed. *Disability in Antiquity*. New York: Routledge, 2017.
- Laes, Christian. "Introduction: Disabilities in the Ancient World—Past, Present and Future." *Disability in Antiquity*. Ed. Laes. 1–21.
- Laes, Christian, C. F. Goodey, and M. Lynn Rose, eds. *Disabilities in Roman Antiquity: Disparate Bodies A Capite ad Calcem*. Boston: Brill, 2013.
- Laguna, Ana María G. *Cervantes and the Pictorial Imagination: A Study on the Power of Images and Images of Power in Works by Cervantes*. Lewisburg, PA: Bucknell University Press, 2009.
- Landtsheer, Jeanine de. "Erycius Puteanus's 'Caecitatis consolatio' (1609) and Con-

- stantijn Huygens's 'Ooghentroost' (1647)." *Humanistica Lovaniensia* 49 (2000): 209–29.
- Laven, Mary. "Recording Miracles in Renaissance Italy." *Past & Present* 211.11 (Nov. 2016): 191–212.
- Laven, Mary. "Wax versus Wood: The Material of Votive Offerings in Early Modern Italy." *Religious Materiality in the Early Modern World*. Ed. Ivanič et al. 35–47.
- Leonard, John. "The Troubled, Quiet Endings of Milton's English Sonnets." *The Oxford Handbook of Milton*. Ed. N. McDowell and N. Smith. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011. 136–52.
- Lerer, Seth. *Error and the Academic Self: The Scholarly Imagination, Medieval to Modern*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2002.
- Lewalski, Barbara Kiefer. *The Life of John Milton: A Critical Biography, Revised Edition*. Oxford: Blackwell, 2003.
- Lewalski, Barbara Kiefer. "Milton on Women—Yet Again." *Problems for Feminist Criticism* (RLE Feminist Theory). Ed. S. Minogue. New York: Routledge, 2012. 46–69.
- Lewis, Charlton T. *An Elementary Latin Dictionary*. New York: American Book Company, 1890.
- Lewis, Victoria Ann. "Crip." *Keywords for Disability Studies*. Ed. Adams et al. 46.
- Liesay, John L. "Robert Burton's *De consolatione*." *South Atlantic Quarterly* 55.3 (1956): 329–36.
- Linton, Simi. *Claiming Disability: Knowledge and Identity*. New York: New York University Press, 1998.
- Livy. *History of Rome by Titus Livius, books thirty-seven to the end, with the epitomes and fragments of the lost books*. Trans. W. A. McDevitte. London: Henry G. Bohn, John Child and Son, 1850. Perseus.tufts.edu. Accessed Nov. 30, 2021. <http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=urn:cts:latinLit:phi0914.phi00140.perseus-eng2:21>
- Lomazzo, Giovanni Paolo. *Idea of the Temple of Painting*. Ed. and trans. J. J. Chai. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2013.
- Lomazzo, Giovanni Paolo. *Idea del tempio della pittura. Scritti sul Arti*. Vol. 1. Ed. R. P. Ciardi. Florence: Marchi & Bertolli, 1973. 242–374.
- Lomazzo, Giovanni Paolo. *Rabisch [Arabeschi dell'Accademia del Compare Zavargna, Abate della Valle di Blenio e di tutti i suoi fedeli soggetti, con la licenza della Vallata]*. Ed. D. Isella. Turin: Einaudi, 1993.
- Lomazzo, Giovanni Paolo. *Rime ad imitazione de I groteschi usati da pittori con la vita del autore*. Ed. A. Rufino. Rome: Vecchiardi, 2002.
- Lomazzo, Giovanni Paolo. *A Tracte Containing the Artes of Curious Paintinge Carvinge Buildinge Written First in Italian by Jo: Paul Lomatius Painter of Milan and Englished by R.H Student in Physik*. Trans. R. Haydock. Oxford: J. Barnes, 1598.
- Lomazzo, Giovanni Paolo. *Trattato dell'arte della pittura, Scoltura, et architettura. Scritti sul Arti*. Vol. 2. Ed. R. P. Ciardi. Florence, 1974. 9–589.
- Longinus (attrib.). "On the Sublime." *Criticism: Major Statements*. Ed. C. Kaplan and W. Davis Anderson. 4th ed. New York: Bedford St. Martin's, 2000. 47–83.

- López Muñoz, Francisco, Cecilio Álamo, and Pilar García García. "The Mad and the Demented in the Literary Works of Cervantes: On Cervantes' Sources of Medical Information about Neuropsychiatry." *Revista de Neurología* 46.8 (Apr. 2008): 489–501.
- López Pinciano, Alonso. [El Pinciano.] *Philosophia antiqua poética*. Ed. A. Carballo Picazo. 3 vols. Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, Instituto Miguel de Cervantes, 1953.
- Love, Genevieve. *Early Modern Theatre and the Figure of Disability*. London: Bloomsbury, 2018.
- Lubac, Henri de. *Medieval Exegesis*. Vol. 1. Trans. M. Sebanc. Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing, 1998.
- Luna, Pedro de. "Libro de las consolaciones de la vida humana." *Escritores en prosa anteriores al siglo XV*. Vol. 51. Ed. P. de Gayangos. Madrid: Rivadeneyra, 1860. 561–602.
- Lund, Mary Ann. *Melancholy, Medicine and Religion in Early Modern England: Reading "The Anatomy of Melancholy"*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.
- Lund, Mary Ann. *A User's Guide to Melancholy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021.
- Lynch, James B. "G. P. Lomazzo's Self Portrait." *Gazette des beaux-arts* 64 (1964): 184–97.
- Lynch, James B. "Lomazzo and the Accademia della Valle di Bregno." *Art Bulletin* 48.2 (1966): 210–11.
- Lyons, Bridget Gellert. *Voices of Melancholy: Studies in Literary Treatments of Melancholy in Renaissance England*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1971.
- Majuelo Apiñániz, Miriam. "Teresa de Cartagena: La obra de una mujer castellana del siglo XV." PhD diss., Universidad Euskal Herriko del País Vasco, 2008.
- Mann, Nicholas. "The Manuscripts of Petrarch's *De remediis*: A Checklist." *Italia Medioevale e Umanistica* 14 (1971): 57–90.
- Manrique Ara, María Elena. "Alabanza del arte grotesco y del artista menestral en la Accademia della Val di Blenio, por Giovanni Paolo Lomazzo: Aproximación teórica, antología y traducción de sus poemas." *Locus amoenus* 8 (2006): 133–45.
- Marr, Alexander. "Pregnant Wit: *Ingegno* in Renaissance England." *British Art Studies* 1 (2015): n.p.
- Marsh, David. *The Quattrocento Dialogue: Classical Tradition and Humanist Innovation*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980. 1–24.
- Martin, Adrienne Laskier. *Cervantes and the Burlesque Sonnet*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991. <http://ark.cdlib.org/ark:/13030/ft4870069m/>
- Martin, Adrienne Laskier. "Humor and Violence in Cervantes." *The Cambridge Companion to Cervantes*. Ed. Cascardi. 160–85.
- Martinelli, Cecilia. "La teoria delle grottesche nel *Trattato* di Giovan Paolo Lomazzo." *Eidos rivista di arti, letteratura e musica* 6.10 (1992): 40–46.
- Martínez, Miguel. *Front Lines: Soldiers' Writing in the Early Modern Hispanic World*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016.
- Maspoli Genetelli, Silvia. "La Pluralità Estetica Di Giovan Paolo Lomazzo." *Filo-*

- sofo e le grottesche: La pluralità dell'esperienza estetica in Montaigne, Lomazzo e Bruno*. Rome: Antenor, 2006. 163–239.
- Masson, David. "Introduction to *Samson Agonistes*." *Milton's Poetical Works*. Ed. D. Masson. Vol. 3. London: Macmillan, 1874. Reprint 1910. 81–92.
- Matter, Ann E. "Petrarch's Personal Psalms (*Psalmi penitentiales*)." *Petrarch: A Critical Guide to the Complete Works*. Ed. Kirkham and Maggi. 219–28.
- Mazzotta, Giuseppe. *The Worlds of Petrarch*. Durham: Duke University Press, 1993.
- McClure, George W. *Sorrow and Consolation in Italian Humanism*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991.
- McRuer, Robert. *Crip Theory: Cultural Signs of Queerness and Disability*. New York: New York University Press, 2006.
- McRuer, Robert. *Crip Times: Disability, Globalization, and Resistance*. New York: New York University Press, 2017.
- McRuer, Robert. "Crip World-Making." *Crip Authorship*. Ed. Mills and Sanchez. 274–81.
- Merback, Mitchell B. *Perfection's Therapy: An Essay on Albrecht Dürer's Melancholia I*. New York: Zone Books, 2017.
- Miller, David Lee. *The Poem's Two Bodies: The Poetics of the 1590 Faerie Queen*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988.
- Millett-Gallant, Ann, and Elizabeth Howie, eds. *Disability and Art History*. New York: Routledge, 2017.
- Mills, Mara, and Rebecca Sanchez, eds. *Crip Authorship: Disability as Method*. New York: New York University Press, 2023.
- Mills, Mara, and Rebecca Sanchez. "Introduction: On Crip Authorship and Disability as Method." *Crip Authorship: Disability as Method*. Ed. Mills and Sanchez. 1–22.
- Milton, John. *The Complete Poetry and Essential Prose of John Milton*. Ed. W. Kerrigan et al. New York: Random House, 2007.
- Milton, John. *De Doctrina Christiana. The Complete Works of John Milton*. Vol. 8. Trans., intro., notes, and commentary J. K. Hale and J. D. Cullington; additional materials G. Campbell and T. N. Corns. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012.
- Milton, John. [*Defensio secunda*] *Defensio secunda pro populo Anglicano . . .* The Hague: A. Vlacq, 1654.
- Milton, John. *Epistolarum Familiarium Liber Unus and Uncollected Letters*. Ed. and trans. E. Haan. Leuven, BE: Leuven University Press, 2019.
- Miñana, Rogelio. *Monstruos que hablan: El discurso de la monstruosidad en Cervantes*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007.
- Minnis, Alastair. *Medieval Theory of Authorship: Scholastic Literary Attitudes in the Later Middle Ages*. 2nd ed. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009.
- Mintz, Susannah B. "An Collins and the Disabled Self." *An Collins and the Historical Imagination*. Ed. Howard. 53–70.
- Mintz, Susannah B. "Dalila's Touch." *Threshold Poetics: Milton and Intersubjectivity*. Wilmington: University of Delaware Press, 2003. 176–207.

- Mintz, Susannah B. "Ordinary Vessels: Disability Narratives and Representations of Faith." *DSQ* 26.3 (2006): n.p.
- Mintz, Susannah B. *Unruly Bodies: Life Writing by Women with Disabilities*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007.
- Mitchell, David T., and Sharon L. Snyder. "Narrative." *Keywords for Disability Studies*. Ed. Adams et al. 126.
- Mitchell, David T., and Sharon L. Snyder. *Narrative Prosthesis: Disability and the Dependencies of Discourse*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000.
- Mitchell, David T., Sharon Snyder, and Linda Ware. "[Every] Child Left Behind': Curricular Cripistemologies and the Crip/Queer Art of Failure." *JLCDS* 8.3 (2014): 295–313.
- Mitchell, W. J. Thomas. *Picture Theory: Essays on Verbal and Visual Representation*. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1994.
- Mitchell, W. J. Thomas. *What Do Pictures Want? The Lives and Loves of Images*. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2005.
- Mohamed, Feisal. *Milton and the Post-Secular Present: Ethics, Politics, Terrorism*. Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2011.
- Mommsen, Theodor E. "Petrarch's Conception of the Dark Ages." *Speculum* 2 (1942): 226–42.
- Montaigne, Michel de. *Journal of Montaigne's Travel Through Italy: By Way of Switzerland and Germany in 1580 and 1581*. Ed. and trans. W. G. Waters. Vol. 2. London: John Murray, 1903.
- Morgan, Luke. *The Monster in the Garden: The Grotesque and the Gigantic in Renaissance Landscape Design*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015.
- Morrás, María. "Latinismos e literalidad en el origen de clasicismo vernáculo: Las ideas de Alfonso de Cartagena (ca. 1384–1456)." *Alicante: Biblioteca Virtual Miguel de Cervantes*, 2020. 35–58.
- Morrás, María. "Repertorio de obras, mss. y documentos de Alfonso de Cartagena (ca. 1384–1456)." *Boletín de la Asociación Hispánica de Literatura Medieval* 5 (1991): 213–48.
- Morrás, María, ed. and introd. "Una cuestión disputada: Viejas y nuevas formas en el siglo XV a propósito de un opúsculo inédito de Rodrigo Sánchez de Arévalo y Alfonso de Cartagena." *Atalaya, Revue Française d'Études Médiévales Hispaniques* 7 (1996): 63–102.
- Moshenska, Joe. *Making Darkness Light: A Life of John Milton*. New York: Basic Books, 2021.
- Moulin, Peter du. *Regii sanguinis clamor ad coelum adversus parricidas Anglicanos*. The Hague: A. More, 1652.
- Mudge, Ken, et al. "A History of Grafting." *Horticultural Reviews* 35 (2009): 437–93.
- Mueller, William R. "Robert Burton's Frontispiece." *PMLA* 64.5 (1949): 1074–88.
- "Nepal Bans Blind People and Double Amputees from Climbing Everest." *The Guardian*, Dec. 30, 2017. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/dec/30/mount-everest-nepal-ban-blind-people-and-disabled>
- Neve, Philip. *A narrative of the disinterment of Milton's coffin, in the parish-church of St. Giles, Cripplegate, on Wednesday, 4th of August, 1790; and of the Treatment of the*

- Corpse, During that and the Following Day*. 2nd ed. London: Printed for T. and J. Egerton, Whitehall, 1790.
- Nolhac, Pierre de. *Petrarque et l'Humanisme*. Vol. 1. Paris: H. Champion, 1907.
- O'Connell, Michael. "Authority and the Experience of Truth in Petrarch's Ascent of Mount Ventoux." *Philological Quarterly* 62.4 (1983): 507–20.
- Ott, Katherine. "Prosthesis." *Keywords for Disability*. Ed. Adams et al. 140–43.
- Paiva de Toledo, Gabriela. "The Academy of the Blenio Valley: Self-Fashioning Identity in the Milanese *Cinquecento*." *Figura: Studies in the Classical Tradition* 6.1 (2018): 195–209.
- Palmer, Ralph Graham. *Seneca's De remediis fortunorum and the Elizabethans*. Trans. R. Whytynnton. Chicago: Institute of Elizabethan Studies, 1953.
- Panizza, Letizia A. "Stoic Psychotherapy in the Middle Ages and Renaissance: Petrarch's *De remediis*." *The Erotics of Consolation: Desire and Distance in the Late Middle Ages*. Ed. C. E. Leglu and S. J. Milner. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008. 117–39.
- Panofsky, Erwin. *Idea: Ein Beitrag zur Begriffsgeschichte der älteren Kunsttheorie*. Leipzig-Berlin: Studien der Bibliothek Warburg, 1924.
- Parr, James A. *Don Quijote: An Anatomy of Subversive Discourse*. Newark, DE: Juan de la Cuesta, 1988.
- Patterson, Lindsey. "The Disability Rights Movement in the United States." *The Oxford Handbook of Disability History*. Ed. Rembis et al. 439–58.
- Pavesi, Mauro. "New Light on Lomazzo's Artistic Career." *Lomazzo's Aesthetic Principles*. Ed. Tantardini and Norris. 41–62.
- Peacham, Henry. *The Garden of Eloquence (1593)*. Delmar, NY: Scholars' Facsimiles & Reprints. 1977.
- Pearson, Hilary E. "Teresa De Cartagena: A Late Medieval Woman's Theological Approach to Disability." PhD diss., Oxford University, 2011.
- Pender, Patricia. *Early Modern Women's Writing and the Rhetoric of Modesty*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012.
- Petrarca, Francesco. *De los remedios co[n]tra [pro]squera [et] aduersa fortuna*. Trans. F. de Madrid. Seville, ES: Jacobo Cro[m]berger, 1513. Biblioteca Virtual del Patrimonio Bibliográfico. <http://bvpb.mcu.es/es/consulta/registro.do?id=451873>
- Petrarca, Francesco [Petrarch]. *De remediis utriusque fortunae*. Ed. R. Spiccia. *Interbooks-Letteratura Italiana e straniera*. <http://www.interbooks.eu//poesia/trcento/francescopetrarca/deremediisutrisquefortune.html>
- Petrarca, Francesco. *De remediis utriusque Fortunae: libri duo: cum indicibus locupletissimis*. University of Wisconsin–Madison, Special Collections Vault Duveen D 1318. Bern, SZ: Excudebat Ioannes le Preux, 1595.
- Petrarca, Francesco [Petrarch]. *Le Familiari*. Ed. V. Rossi and U. Bosco. 4 vols. Florence: G. C. Sansoni, 1933–42.
- Petrarca, Francesco [Petrarch]. *Les remèdes aux deux fortunes*. Ed. and trans. C. Carraud. 2 vols. Grenebole: Éditions Jérôme Millon, 2002.
- Petrarca, Francesco [Petrarch]. *Letters of Old Age (Rerum senilium libri)*. Trans. A. S. Bernardo, S. Levin, and R. A. Bernardo. 2 vols. New York: Italica Press, 2005.

- Petrarca, Francesco [Petrarch]. *Letters on Familiar Matters (rerum familiarum libri)*. Ed. and trans. A. S. Bernardo. 3 vols. New York: Italica Press, 2005.
- Petrarca, Francesco [Petrarch]. *Lyric Poems: The Rime Sparse and Other Poems*. Trans. R. M. Durling. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1976.
- Petrarca, Francesco [Petrarch]. *Petrarch's Africa*. Trans. T. G. Bergin and A. L. Wilson. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977.
- Petrarca, Francesco [Petrarch]. *Petrarch's Remedies for Fortune Fair and Foul: A Modern Translation of De remediis utriusque fortunae with a Commentary in Five Volumes*. Trans. C. H. Rawski. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991.
- Petrarca, Francesco. [Petrarch]. *Phisicke against fortune, aswell prosperous, as aduerse conteyned in two bookes . . .* Trans. T. Twyne. London: Printed by [T. Dawson for] R. watkyns, 1579.
- Petrarca, Francesco [Petrarch]. [*Rerum familiarum libri*] *Le familiari*. Ed. U. Dotti. 3 vols. Rome: Archivio Guido Izzo, 1991.
- Petrarca, Francesco [Petrarch]. [*Rerum senilium libri*] *Le senili*. 3 vols. Ed. and trans. U. Dotti, F. Audisi and E. Nota. Racconigi, IT: Aragno, 2004–10.
- Petrarca, Francesco [Petrarch]. *Secretum*. Trans. J. G. Nichols. London: One World Classics, 2010.
- Petrarca, Francesco [Petrarch]. *Secretum*. Ed. and trans. U. Dotti. Rome: Archivio Guido Izzi, 1993.
- Petrarca, Francesco [Petrarch]. *Secretum*. Ed. E. Carrara. *Prose*. Ed. G. Martellotti et al. Milan and Naples: Ricciardi, 1955. Reprint, Turin, IT: Einaudi, 1977. 21–215.
- Pigman, G. W., III. "Versions of Imitation in the Renaissance." *RQ* 33.1 (Spring 1980): 1–32.
- Pineta, Victoria. "Gestualidad y retórica de las pasiones en las Novelas ejemplares: De Giraldo y Tasso a Cervantes." *Crítica del texto* 20.3 (2017): 161–83.
- Plann, Susan. *A Silent Minority: Deaf Education in Spain, 1550–1835*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997.
- Pliny the Elder. *The Natural History of Pliny*. Vol. 2. Trans. J. Bostok and H. T. Riley. London: H. G. Bohn, 1855.
- Plutarch. "De gloria Atheniensium." *Moralia*. Trans. F. C. Babbitt. Vol. 4. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1936. 489–527.
- "point, v.¹, sense II." *OED*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2023. <https://doi.org/10.1093/OED/6119707703>.
- Pope-Hennessy, John. "Nicholas Hilliard and Mannerist Art Theory." *JWCI* 6 (1943): 89–100.
- Price, Margaret. *Mad at School: Rhetorics of Mental Disability and Academic Life*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2011.
- Prince, F. T. *The Italian Element in Milton's Verse*. Oxford: Clarendon, 1954.
- Quillen, Carol Everhart. "Preface." *The Secret*. By Francesco Petrarca. Ed. and introd. C. E. Quillen and trans. W. Draper. New York: Bedford St. Martin's, 2003. vii–ix.
- Quillen, Carol Everhart. *Rereading the Renaissance: Petrarch, Augustine, and the Language of Humanism*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1998.

- Quintilian, Marcus Tullius. *Institutio oratoria*. Trans. H. E. Butler. Vol. 2. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1920.
- Quintilian, Marcus Tullius. *The Orator's Education*. Ed. and trans. D. A. (Burton) Russell. Vol. 3: Books 6–8. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002.
- Quiring, Björn. "Introduction." *If Then the World a Theatre Present . . . : Revisions of the Theatrum Mundi Metaphor in Early Modern England*. Ed. B. Quiring. Boston: De Gruyter, 2014. 1–24.
- Radzinowicz, Mary Ann. "How Milton Read the Bible: The Case of *Paradise Regained*." *The Cambridge Companion to Milton*. Ed. D. Danielson. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999. 202–18.
- Radzinowicz, Mary Ann. *Milton's Epics and the Book of Psalms*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989.
- Radzinowicz, Mary Ann. *Toward Samson Agonistes: The Growth of Milton's Mind*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978.
- Ragazzi, Alexandre. "Ancora il 'paragone' tra pittura e scultura: I modelli plastici ausiliari e una possibilità di conciliazione." *Ricerche di storia dell'arte* 2.3 (2013): 137–50.
- Randolph, Adrian W. B. *Touching Objects: Intimate Experiences of Fifteenth-Century Italian Art*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014.
- Rawski, Conrad H. "Book I Remedies for Prosperity: Commentary." *Petrarch's Remedies for Fortune Fair and Foul*. By Petrarch. Vol. 2.
- Rawski, Conrad H. "Book II Remedies for Adversity: Commentary." *Petrarch's Remedies for Fortune Fair and Foul*. By Petrarch. Vol. 4.
- Rawski, Conrad H. "Introduction to the Commentary." *Petrarch's Remedies for Fortune Fair and Foul*. By Petrarch. Vol. 2. xv–lxv.
- Rawski, Conrad H. "Petrarch's Scholarship in the *De remediis utriusque fortunae*: A Preliminary Inquiry." *The Classics in the Middle Ages: Papers of the Twentieth Annual Conference of the Center for Medieval and Early Renaissance Studies*. Ed. A. S. Bernardo and S. Levin. Binghamton: Center for Medieval and Early Modern Studies, 1990. 282–314.
- Read, Allen Walker. "The Disinterment of Milton's Remains." *PMLA* 45.4 (Dec. 1930): 1050–68.
- Reiss, Timothy J. *Against Autonomy: Global Dialectics of Cultural Exchange*. Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2002.
- Reiss, Timothy J. *Mirages of the Self: Patterns of Personhood in Ancient and Early Modern Europe*. Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2002.
- Rembis, Michael, Catherine J. Kudlick, and Kim E. Nielsen, eds. *The Oxford Handbook of Disability History*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018.
- Remensnyder, Amy G. "Christian Captives, Muslim Maidens, and Mary." *Speculum* 82 (2007): 642–77.
- Rendall, Steven. "The Portrait of the Author." *French Forum* 13.2 (May 1988): 143–51.
- Reynolds, L. D. "Livius." *Texts and Transmission: A Survey of the Latin Classics*. Ed. L. D. Reynolds. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983.
- Richardson, Kristina L. *Difference and Disability in the Medieval Islamic World: Blighted Bodies*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2012.

- Rico, Francisco. *Vida u obra de Petrarca, Vol. 1, Lectura del Secretum*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1974.
- Rigolot, François. *L'Erreur de la Renaissance: Perspectives Littéraires*. Paris: Honoré Champion Éditeur, 2002.
- Rigolot, François. "The Renaissance Fascination with Error: Mannerism and Early Modern Poetry." *RQ* 57 (2004): 1219–34.
- Río Parra, Elena Del. *Una era de monstruos: Representaciones de lo deforme in el Siglo de Oro español*. Pamplona: Iberoamericana-Vervuet, 2003.
- Rivera Carretas, María-Milagros. "La documentación de Teresa de Cartagena en Santa Clara de Burgos (1446–1452) y otros datos." *La corona Catalanoaragonesa, l'Islam i el món mediterrani: Estudis d'història medieval en homenatge a la Doctora Maria Teresa Ferrer i Mallol*. Ed. J. Mutgé i Vives, R. Salicrú i Lluch, and C. Vela Aulesa. Barcelona: Institución Milá i Fontanals Departament de Ciències Històriques-estudis medievals, 2013. 603–15.
- Rivera Carretas, María-Milagros. "Teresa de Cartagena vivía en 1478." *Estudios en memoria del profesor Dr. Carlos Sáez*. Ed. M. del Val Gonzalez de la Pena. Alcalá de Henares: Universidad de Alcalá, 2007. 763–72.
- Rivera Carretas, María-Milagros. "Una vita en relación: Juana de Mendoza con Gómez Manrique, Isabel la Católica y Teresa de Cartagena." *Vidas de mujeres del Renacimiento* (2008): 103–29.
- Rivera Cordero, Victoria. "Spatializing Illness: Embodied Deafness in Teresa de Cartagena's *Arboleda de los enfermos*." *La Coronica* 37.2 (Spring 2009): 61–77.
- Robbins, Jill. "Petrarch Reading Augustine: 'The Ascent of Mont Ventoux.'" *Philological Quarterly* 64.4 (Autumn 1985): 533–53.
- Roberts, John G., Jr. "2007 Commencement Address: John G. Roberts, Jr., Chief Justice of the United States." *CrossWorks: Commencement Addresses* 9 (2007).
- Rodas, Julia Miele. "On Blindness." *JLCDS* 3.2 (2009): 115–30.
- Roden, Katey E. "Prosthesizing the Soul: Reading, Seeing, and Feeling in Seventeenth-Century Devotion." PhD diss., University of Massachusetts–Amherst, 2016.
- Rose, Constance Hubbard. *Alonso Núñez de Reinoso: Lament of a Sixteenth-Century Exile*. Rutherford, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1971.
- Rose, Sarah F. "Work." *Keywords*. Ed. Adams et al.
- Rossi, Paolo. *The Birth of Modern Science*. Trans. C. De Nardi Ipsen. Oxford: Blackwell, 2001.
- Rossi, Vittorio. "Sulla formazione dell raccolte epistolary petrarchesche." *Annale Catedre Petrarchescha* 3 (1932): 68–73.
- Round, Nicholas G. "'Perdóneme Séneca': The Translational Practices of Alonso de Cartagena." *Bulletin of Hispanic Studies* 75.1 (1998): 17–29.
- Row-Heyveld, Lindsey. *Dissembling Disability in Early Modern English Drama*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018.
- Ruffino, Alessandra. "Introduzione." *Rime*. By Lomazzo. v–xxxiv.
- Rupp, Stephen. *Heroic Forms: Cervantes and the Literature of War*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2014.
- Russell, Peter. E. "Francisco de Madrid y su traducción *De remediis* de Petrarca."

- Estudios de la literatura y arte: Dedicados al profesor Emilio Orozco Díaz*. Ed. A. Soria Ortega, et al. Vol. 3. Granada: Universidad de Granada, 1979. 203–30.
- Sadler, Lynne Veach. *The Theme of Consolation in Samson Agonistes: Regeneration and Typology*. Salzburg: University of Salzburg, 1979.
- Sáez, Adrián J. "Introducción." *Miguel de Cervantes: Poesías*. By Cervantes. i–x.
- Sampson, Alden. *Studies in Milton and an Essay on Poetry*. New York: Moffat, Yard & Company, 1913.
- Sanchez, Melissa E. "Milton's Genderqueer Christianity." *Milton Studies* 62. 2 (2020): 306–22.
- Sandahl, Carrie. "Queering the Crip or Crippling the Queer? Intersections of Queer and Crip Identities in Solo Autobiographical Performance." *GLQ* 9.1–2 (2003): 25–56.
- Sandahl, Carrie, and Philip Auslander, eds. "Introduction: Disability Studies in Commotion with Performance Studies." *Bodies in Co-Motion*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2005. 1–12.
- Sandell, Richard, Jocelyn Dodd, and Rosemarie Garland-Thomson, eds. *Re-presenting Disability: Activism and Agency in the Museum*. New York: Routledge, 2010.
- Sanvito, Paolo. "Lomazzo's Influence on Decorative Patterns in Sculptural Workshops before and after 1600." *Lomazzo's Aesthetic Principles*. Ed. Tantardini and Norris. 152–70.
- Scarborough, Connie. *Viewing Disability in Medieval Spanish Texts: Disgraced or Graced*. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2018.
- Schalk, Sami. "Coming to Claim Crip: Disidentification with/in Disability Studies." *DSQ* 33.2 (Spring 2013): n.p.
- Schalk, Sami. "Experience, Reading, and Writing: Octavia E. Butler as an Author of Disability Literature." *Palimpsest* 6.2 (2017): 153–77.
- Scher, Stephen K. "Introduction." *The Currency of Fame: Portrait Medals in the Renaissance*. Ed. S. K. Scher. New York: Harry N. Abrams, 1994. 13–30.
- Schlosser, Julius von. *La letteratura artistica: Manuale delle fonti della storia dell'arte moderna*. Trans. F. Rossi. Florence, 1964.
- Scully, Jackie Leach. *Disability Bioethics: Moral Bodies, Moral Difference*. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2008.
- Seidenspinner-Núñez, Dayle, and Yonsoo Kim. "Historicizing Teresa: Reflections on New Documents Regarding Sor Teresa de Cartagena." *La corónica* 32.2 (2004): 121–50.
- Semler, L. E. "Breaking the Ice to Invention: Henry Peacham's *The Art of Drawing* (1606)." *Sixteenth Century Journal* 35.3 (2004): 735–50.
- Seneca, Lucius Annaeus. *De tranquillitate animi. Seneca, Moral Essays*. Vol. 2. Trans. J. W. Basor. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1932. 202–85.
- Seneca, Lucius Annaeus. *The Epistles of Seneca: L. Annaei Senecae ad Lucilium epistulae*. Trans. R. M. Gummere. Vol. 2. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1920.
- Serrano y Sanz, Manuel. *Apuntes para una biblioteca de escritoras españolas*. Vol. 1. Madrid: Sucesores de Rivadeneyra, 1903. 218–33.

- Shakespeare, William. *The Norton Shakespeare: Volume I, Early Plays and Poems*. Ed. S. Greenblatt et al. 2nd ed. New York: Norton, 2008.
- Shapiro, Joseph P. *No Pity*. New York: Three Rivers Press, 1994.
- Shaw, Justin. "Interview with Justin Shaw by Jennifer Williams." *Black Shakespeare(ans) Database*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2021.
- Shearman, John. *Mannerism*. New York: Penguin, 1990.
- Shirilan, Stephanie. *Robert Burton and the Transformative Powers of Melancholy*. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2015.
- Shuger, Dale. *"Don Quijote" in the Archives: Madness and Literature in Early Modern Spain*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2012.
- Siebers, Tobin. *Disability Aesthetics*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2010.
- Siebers, Tobin. "Disability as Masquerade." *Literature and Medicine* 23.1 (Spring 2004): 1–22.
- Singer, Armand. "Cervantes's *Licenciado Vidriera*: Its Form and Substance." *West Virginia University Bulletin of Philological Papers* 8 (1951): 13–31.
- Singer, Julie. *Blindness and Therapy in Late Medieval French and Italian Poetry*. Cambridge: D. S. Brewer, 2011.
- Singer, Julie. "Deafness: Reading Invisible Signs." *A Cultural History of Disability in the Middle Ages*. Ed. J. Hsy, T. V. Pearman, and J. R. Eyler. London: Bloomsbury, 2020. 83–98.
- Siraisi, Nancy G. *The Clock and the Mirror: Gierolamo Cardano and Renaissance Medicine*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997.
- Snow, Joseph T. "Speaking through Many Voices: Polyphony in the Writings of Teresa de Cartagena." *Medieval Iberia: Changing Societies and Cultures in Contact and Transition*. Ed. I. A. Corfis and R. Harris-Northall. Suffolk: Tamesis, 2007. 16–29.
- Snyder, Joel. *The Visual Made Verbal. A Comprehensive Training Manual and Guide to the History and Applications of Audio Descriptions*. Arlington, VA: American Council of the Blind, 2014.
- Snyder, Sharon L., Brenda Jo Brueggemann, and Rosemarie Garland-Thomson, eds. *Disability Studies: Enabling the Humanities*. New York: Modern Language Association, 2002.
- Snyder, Sharon L., and David T. Mitchell. *Cultural Locations of Disability*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006.
- Solly, Meilan. "Why a London Museum Is Removing the Skeleton of an 'Irish Giant' from View." *Smithsonian Magazine*, July 17, 2023. www.smithsonianmag.com/smart-news/why-a-london-museum-is-removing-the-skeleton-of-an-irish-giant-from-view-180981464/
- Soussloff, Catherine M. "Lives of Painters and Poets in the Renaissance." *Word & Image* 6.2 (1990): 154–62.
- Speak, Gil. "'El licenciado Vidriera' and the Glass Men of Early Modern Europe." *The Modern Language Review* 85.4 (Oct. 1990): 850–65.
- Squire, Michael. "'Fantasies So Varied and Bizarre': The Domus Aurea, the Renaissance, and the 'Grotesque.'" *A Companion to the Neronian Age*. Ed. E. Bijckley and M. Dinter. Oxford: Blackwell, 2013. 444–64.

- Stallybrass, Peter, and Allon White. *The Politics and Poetics of Transgression*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986.
- Starobinski, Jean. *History of the Treatment of Melancholy from the Earliest Times to 1900*. Basel, CH: JR Geigy, 1962.
- Stiker, Henri-Jacques. *A History of Disability*. Trans. W. Sayers. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999.
- Strocchia, Sharon T. "Disability Histories from the Convent." *Early Modern Women: An Interdisciplinary Journal* 15.1 (2020): 74–83.
- Strocchia, Sharon T. "Greetings, and a Question about Disabled Nuns." Personal communication received by Elizabeth B. Bearden. Apr. 30, 2023.
- Studley, Marian H. "Milton and His Paraphrases of the Psalms." *Philological Quarterly* 4 (Jan. 1925): 364–72.
- Summers, David. "Maniera' and Movement: The 'Figura Serpentinata.'" *Art Quarterly* 35.3 (1972): 269–301.
- Surtz, Ronald E. "Image Patterns in Teresa de Cartagena's 'Arboleda de los enfermos.'" *LA CHISPA '87: Selected Proceedings: The Eighth Louisiana Conference on Hispanic Languages and Literatures*. Ed. G. Paolini. New Orleans: Tulane University Press, 1987. 297–304.
- Surtz, Ronald E. *Writing Women in Late Medieval and Early Modern Spain: The Mothers of Saint Teresa of Avila*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1995. 21–40.
- Swan, Jim. "Disabilities, Bodies, Voices." *Disability Studies*. Ed. Snyder et al. 283–95.
- Swarbrick, Steven. "Object-Oriented Disability: The Prosthetic Image in *Paradise Lost*." *Journal of Narrative Theory* 49.3 (2019): 323–50.
- Tait, Clodagh. "'A print in my body of this day's service': Finding Meaning in Wounding during and after the Nine Years War." *Early Modern Military Identities, 1560–1639: Reality and Representation*. Ed. M. Woodcock and C. O'Mahony. Cambridge: D. S. Brewer, 2019. 197–218.
- Tantardini, Lucia. "Lomazzo's Grotesque Heads Revisited." *Grotesque and Caricature: Leonardo to Bernini*. Ed. L. Tantardini and R. Norris. Boston: Brill, 2024. 38–54.
- Tantardini, Lucia, and Rebecca Norris, eds. *Lomazzo's Aesthetic Principles Reflected in the Art of His Time*. Foreword R. P. Ciardi and introd. J. J. Chai. Boston: Brill, 2020.
- Tasso, Torquato. *Discorsi del poema eroico. Opere di Torquato Tasso*. Vol. 3. Ed. G. Gherardini. Milan: Società Tipografica de' Classici Italiani, 1824.
- Tasso, Torquato. *Discourses on the Art of Poetry: English Translations of the Early Poetics and a Comparative Study of Their Significance*. Ed. and trans. L. F. Rhu. Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1993.
- Tasso, Torquato. *Discourses on the Heroic Poem*. Trans. I. Samuel and M. Cavalcanti. Oxford: Clarendon, 1973.
- Tasso, Torquato. *I discorsi dell'arte poetica, il padre di famiglia e l'aminta . . .* Ed. A. Solerti. Rome: Paravia, 1901.
- Teskey, Gordon. *The Poetry of John Milton*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015.

- Thijssen, J. M. M. H. "Buridan, John." *New Dictionary of Scientific Biography*. Vol. 1. Ed. N. Koertge. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 2007. 446–48.
- Tillyard, E. M. W. *Milton*. London: Chatto and Windus, 1930.
- Timpanaro, Sebastiano. *The Genesis of Lachmann's Method*. Ed. and trans. G. W. Most. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005.
- Toombs, S. Kay. "The Lived Experience of Disability." *The American Body in Context: An Anthology*. Ed. J. R. Johnston. Wilmington, DE: SR Books, 2001.
- Torre, Andrea. "Through the Wound, and What Petrarch Found There." *The Wounded Body*. Ed. Bondi et al. 69–110.
- Toscano, Pasquale S. "Access, Accommodation, and the Ableist Gaze in Milton's Samson Agonistes and Its Restoration Successors." *Milton and the Network of Disability, Embodiment, and Care*. Ed. A. Duran and P. Toscano. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Under contract.
- Toscano, Pasquale S. "A Time and Place for Us: The Promise of Crip Futurity in Milton's *Paradise Lost*." "Stand and Wait: Dynamics of Dis/ability in the Greco-Roman Epic Tradition." PhD diss., Princeton University, 2024. 175–229.
- Traister, Barbara H. "New Evidence about Burton's Melancholy?" *RQ* 29 (1976): 66–70.
- Tramelli, Barbara. "Artists and Knowledge in Sixteenth Century Milan: The Case of Lomazzo's Accademia de la Val di Blenio." *Fragmenta: Journal of the Royal Netherlands Institute in Rome* 5 (2011): 121–38.
- Tramelli, Barbara. "Due Poesie Del Pittore Giovanni Paolo Lomazzo, Ammiratore Di Cardano." *Bruniana Si Campanelliana* 16.2 (2010): 571–74.
- Tramelli, Barbara. *Giovanni Paolo Lomazzo's Trattato dell'Arte della Pittura: Color, Perspective and Anatomy*. Boston: Brill, 2017.
- Trapp, J. B. *Studies of Petrarch and His Influence*. London: Pindar Press, 2003.
- Travis, Amanda. "Disabled Climbers Ban on Everest Overturned." *Trek and Mountain*, Mar. 8, 2018. <https://trekandmountain.com/2018/03/08/disabled-climbers-ban-on-everest-overtuned/>
- Trentin, Lisa. "Exploring Visual Impairment in Ancient Rome." *Disabilities in Roman Antiquity*. Ed. Laes et al. 89–114.
- Trevor, Douglas. *The Poetics of Melancholy in Early Modern England*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.
- Trinkaus, Charles E. *The Poet as Philosopher: Petrarch and the Formation of Renaissance Consciousness*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979.
- Turner, James. *Philology: The Forgotten Origins of the Modern Humanities*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014.
- Twain, Mark. *Mark Twain's Letters*. Ed. A. Bigelow Paine. Vol. 2. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1917.
- Up*. Dir. B. Peterson. Walt Disney Pictures, 2009.
- Vasari, Giorgio. *Lives of the Most Eminent Painters, Sculptors and Architects*. Trans. G. du C. de Vere. London: Medici Society, 1912.
- Vinaver, Eugène. *The Rise of Romance*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1971.
- Virgil. *The Aeneid*. Trans. R. Fitzgerald. New York: Vintage Books, 1983.
- Walters, Lori. "'Translating' Petrarch: Cite des dames II.7.1, Jean Daudin, and Ver-

- nacular Authority." *Studies on Christine de Pizan in Honour of Angus J. Kennedy*. Ed. J. Campbell and N. Margolis. Boston: Brill, 2000. 283–97.
- Watkins, Leila. "Misery, Love, and Company: *Paradise Lost* and the Origins of Consolation." *Texas Studies in Literature and Language* 60.4 (Winter 2018): 397–422.
- Watson, Keri, and Timothy W. Hiles, eds. *The Routledge Companion to Art and Disability*. New York: Routledge, 2022.
- Watt, Jeffrey R. *The Consistory and Social Discipline in Calvin's Geneva*. Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 2020.
- Weaver, Elissa B. "Le muse in convento: La scrittura profana delle monache italiane (1450–1650)." *Donne e fede: Santità e vita religiosa in Italia*. Ed. G. Zarri and L. Scaraffia. Rome: Laterza, 1994. 253–76.
- Webb, Ruth. *Ekpbrasis, Imagination and Persuasion in Ancient Rhetorical Theory and Practice*. New York: Routledge, 2009.
- Weinberg, Bernard. *A History of Literary Criticism in the Italian Renaissance*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961.
- Weinryb, Ittai, ed. *Ex Voto: Votive Offerings across Cultures*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015.
- Weinryb, Ittai. "Introduction: Ex Voto as Material Culture." *Ex Voto*. Ed. Weinryb. 1–22.
- Wells, Marion A. *The Secret Wound: Love-Melancholy in Early Modern Romance*. Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2007.
- Wenzel, Siegfried. "Petrarch's Accidia." *Studies in the Renaissance* (1961): 36–48.
- Wenzel, Siegfried. *The Sin of Sloth: Acedia in Medieval Thought and Literature*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1967.
- West, William N. "Knowledge and Performance in the Early Modern Theatrum Mundi." *metaphorik.de* 14 (2008): n.p.
- Wheatley, Edward. *Stumbling Blocks Before the Blind: Medieval Constructions of a Disability*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2010.
- White, Lorraine. "The Experience of Spain's Early Modern Soldiers: Combat Welfare, and Violence." *War in History* 9.1 (2002): 1–38.
- Wilburn, Reginald A. "Getting 'Uppity' with Milton; or Because My Mom Politely Asked: 'Was Milton Racist?'" *Milton Studies* 62.2 (2020): 266–79.
- Wilkins, Ernest Hatch. *Life of Petrarch*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961.
- Williams, Katherine Schaap. "Demonstrable Disability." *Early Theater* 22.2 (2019): 185–98.
- Williams, Katherine Schaap. *Unfixable Forms: Disability and Performance in Early Modern England*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2021.
- Wittreich, Joseph Anthony, Jr. *Interpreting "Samson Agonistes"*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986.
- Wittreich, Joseph Anthony, Jr. "Perplexing the Explanation: Marvell's 'On Mr. Milton's *Paradise Lost*.'" *Approaches to Marvell: The York Tercentenary Lectures*. Ed. P. Brockbank et al. Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978. 280–305.
- Wolfe, Jessica. *Homer and the Question of Strife from Erasmus to Hobbes*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2015.

- Wollen, Miranda, and Maddie Corson. "Students Advocate for Official Disability Studies Program." *Yale Daily News*, Apr. 16, 2023.
- Wollock, Jeffrey. "Renaissance Philosophy: Gesture as Universal Language." *Body—Language—Communication: An International Handbook on Multimodality in Human Interaction*. Vol. 1. Ed. C. Muller et al. Boston: De Gruyter, 2013. 365–77.
- Wood, Anthony. *Athenae Oxonienses*. London, 1691.
- Wood, David Houston. "Staging Disability in Renaissance Drama." *A New Companion to Renaissance Drama*. Ed. A. F. Kinney and T. W. Hopper. New York: Wiley, 2017. 487–500.
- Worden, Blair. "Milton's *Second Defense*." *Literature and Politics in Cromwellian England: John Milton, Andrew Marvell, Marchamont*. By Worden. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. 262–88.
- Yoch, James J. "The Renaissance Dramatization of Temperance: The Italian Revival of Tragicomedy and *The Faithful Shepherdess*." *Renaissance Tragicomedy: Explorations in Genre and Politics*. Ed. N. Klein Maguire. New York: AMS Press, 1987. 114–38.
- Young, Stella. "I am not your inspiration, thank you very much." Ted Talk, June 9, 2014. https://www.ted.com/talks/stella_young_i_m_not_your_inspiration_thank_you_very_much/transcript?language=en
- Zak, Gur. *Boccaccio and the Consolation of Literature*. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 2022.
- Zak, Gur. "The Ethics and Poetics of Consolation in Petrarch's *Bucolicum carmen*." *Speculum* 91.1 (Jan. 2016): 36–62.
- Zak, Gur. *Petrarch's Humanism and the Care of the Self*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010.
- Zampini, Tania. "Melancholy and the Modern Consciousness of Francesco Petrarca: A Close Reading of Melancholy, Acedia, and Lovesickness in the *Secretum*, *Remediis utriusque fortunae* and *Canzionere*." M.A. thesis, McGill University, Aug. 2008.
- Zeitlin, Froma I. "Figure: Ekphrasis." *Greece & Rome* 60.1 (2013): 17–31.
- Zim, Rivca. *The Consolations of Writing: Literary Strategies of Resistance from Boethius to Primo Levi*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014.

Index



- ableism, 24–25, 98, 99, 110, 177, 181, 197, 203, 212–13, 217, 233, 264, 270n8
abusio, 277n62
Accademia de la Val del Blenio, 231
acedia: causes of, 33, 34, 37–38, 39, 43, 276n48; *vs.* melancholy, 278n88, 290n8; in monastic context, 276n46
Achilles (epic hero), 161, 187, 194
Ackerman, Gerald, 233
adustion, 146
aegritudo. *See* mental disability
Aeneid (Virgil), 11, 43, 187
Aesop, 264
aesthetic theory, 239
Africa (Petrarch), 44, 50, 275n35
aging, 41–42, 196
Alarcón, Juan Ruiz de, 258
Alberti, Leon Battista, 228–29, 261, 267, 303n19
Aldrovandi, Ulisse, 307n58, 307n61
Amador de los Ríos, José, 82, 281n14
Americans with Disabilities Act, 262, 309n2
Anatomy of Melancholy, The (Burton):
advice on disability disclosure, 151; as consolation, 153; cripp authority in, 20; on Don Quijote's mental disability, 142; on ekphrastic therapy, 164; errors in, 151; frontispiece to, 162, 163, 164, 168, 293n47, 294n51; front matter of, 164–65; genre of, 149, 155; identity of author of, 152; on melancholy, 144, 146, 147, 165–72; metaphor for invention, 155; modesty topos in, 151; prefatory section of, 148; reference to Cicero, 154; reference to the frogs, 160; scene of Democritus at Adbera, 166–67; sources of, 154; supercripp story, 170
Anaya Maldonado, Diego de, 285n65
Antipater of Cyrene, 8, 183
apian (bee-like) metaphor of imitation, 80, 155, 160, 231, 282n33, 292n36
Apiñániz, Majuelo, 284n58
Appius, Claudius (Caecas), 8, 195, 298n46
Arboleda de los enfermos (Teresa de Cartagena): colophon of, 73–74; concept of malicious ignorance, 118–19; consolation narrative, 73, 74, 78; creation of, 283n51; cripp authority in, 19, 99, 283n37; description of a cripp coat of arms, 118, 119, 166; emotional effects of humiliation in, 113; exegetical interpretation, 87–88; on God's grace and inspiration, 114, 116; illustration of deaf gain in, 86; image of the grove, 77; image of the moderate meal, 94;

- Arboleda de los enfermos* (Teresa de Cartagena) (*continued*)
 modesty topos in, 108; narrative structure, 73, 74–75; prologue to, 74, 108, 112; Psalmic allusions, 86–87, 89; purpose of, 73–74, 116; sources of, 78; treatment of disability, 70, 72, 74, 82–83, 86–87
- Arendt, Hannah, 274n29
- Aristippus, 6
- Aristophanes, 160
- Aristotle, 6, 210
- artistic inspiration, 21
- art of memory, 40, 52, 308n70
- art works: audio descriptions of, 252
- asprezza*, 188, 189, 190–91, 200, 201, 203, 211, 215
- astrology (astrologers), 144, 147–48, 221, 224, 235, 272n30, 290n6, 293n37, 301n3, 305n35
- Atlantic Wall and Other Poems* (Colie), 30
- atra voluptas*, 34, 38
- auctor* / *auctoritas*, 4, 209, 210, 218
- Aufidius, Attius Tullus, 8
- Augustine, Bishop of Hippo, Saint:
 advice on travel, 275n43; asceticism of, 61; *City of God*, 60, 62; *Confessions*, 28–29, 41, 44, 45–46, 273n18, 309n3; *consolatio* texts of, 12; contemplation of death, 277n61; sortilege of, 46, 273n18, 274n22, 274nn21–22
- Auslander, Philip, 149–50
- authorial alibi, 107–9
- authority, 4–5
- author portrait, 72, 122, 123, 264
- autobiography, 11, 22, 72, 128, 132
- autoconsolation (self-consolation), 14, 51, 210, 217
- auto-mimesis, 235
- Avellaneda, Alonso Fernández de, 125, 126, 127
- Avignon, France, 30, 71
- Azzo da Correggio, 54–55, 78, 190
- Babb, Lawrence, 146, 147
- Bakhtin, M. M., 239
- Bamborough, John, 149, 152, 154, 170
- banquet of the senses, 94, 283n50
- Barbaro, Daniele, 240, 245
- Barkan, Leonard, 247
- Barolsky, Robert, 308n78
- barriers to access, 25, 117
- Bauman, H-Dirksen L., 86
- Bedingfield, Thomas, 15
- Bellerophon (mythological hero), 48–49, 277n63
- Benedictine rules, 85, 110, 111–12
- Benedict XIII, Pope (aka Papa Luna), 71
- Bennett, Lyn, 13
- Bentley, Richard, 176–77, 233
- Bergmann, Emilie, 72
- Berne, Patty, 5
- Bernhardt, Sarah, 269n1
- biographical genre, 265
- Birel, Jean, 55, 56
- black bile, 146, 278n88, 290n9, 290n10
- Blenio valley, 302n5
- blindness: advantages of, 8–9, 180, 183; medical treatment of, 180–81; metaphor of ignorance, 175, 205, 277n72; metaphor of moral monstrosity, 187; nature of, 303n22; sex and, 8
- blind people: ability to work, 106–7; education for, 301n5; guides for, 192, 297n30; lived experience of, 176, 182–83; as part of Western culture, 252; permission to touch art, 224; reading and writing practices, 176, 299n56, 301n4; relation to God, 205–6
- blind rage, 209
- Bodleian Library in Oxford, 148
- body-mind interdependence, 4, 9, 16, 21, 60–61, 74, 146, 209, 224, 235–36, 247, 265
- Boethius, Anicius Manlius Severinus: *Consolation of Philosophy*, 12, 32, 76, 297n28; translations of, 271n21

- Bolt, David, 209, 216, 226, 258
- Bolzoni, Lina, 308n70
- Bonet, Juan Pablo, 289n41
- Borella, Francesco, 243
- Borges, Jorge Luis, 289n36, 296n17
- Borghese, Piero. *See* Piero della Francesca
- Borromeo, Pirro Visconti, 246
- braille, 25, 176
- Bright, Timothy: *A Treatise of Melancholie*, 155
- Bromley, James, 272n31
- Brovina, Romana, 281n27
- Brown, Eleanor Gertrude, 21, 22, 178, 196, 197–98, 200–201, 298n50, 299n55
- Bruce, Scott G., 283n42
- Brueggemann, Brenda Jo, 72, 117
- Bulwer, John, 234, 304n30
- Burckhardt, Jacob, 23, 59
- Burgos, Spain: Franciscan convent of Santa Clara in, 71, 280n5; Hospital del Rey in, 94
- Buridan, Jean, 273n16
- Burton, Robert: *Alba*, 291n21; alias of, 170; authorial play, 265; consolatory works of, 20, 153; crip authority of, 148; on Democritus, 292n31; on description of Achilles's shield, 161; disability narrative of, 1, 20, 147–48, 149, 155–56, 160, 170, 172, 218; education and employment of, 151–52; ekphrastic therapy of, 161–62, 164, 170, 251; leave of absence from Oxford, 148; on madness, 168, 294n53; melancholic character of, 147–48, 149, 150, 154, 157–58, 159–60, 170; pen name of, 20; self-portraiture of, 152, 156; sources of, 153, 156, 234; style of, 155–56, 157, 159, 170; “The Argument of the Frontispiece,” 164, 168, 294n51; *theatrum mundi* metaphor, 148; “The Author's Abstract of Melancholy,” 168–69; on viewing of work of art, 161, 162; view of melancholy, 144, 146, 158, 162, 172, 236. *See also* *Anatomy of Melancholy, The* (Burton)
- Burton, William, 234
- Bynum, Caroline Walker, 282n31
- Byrne, Charles, 174, 295n3
- Caesar, Julius, 269n1
- Camillo, Giulio, 251
- Cantera Burgos, Francisco, 281n6
- captatio benevolentiae, 6, 108
- Cardano, Girolamo: background of, 272n30; *De Rerum Varietate*, 307n58; *De utilitate ex adversis capienda*, 292n33; disability narrative of, 15, 16; strategies of medical consolation, 16–17, 221, 301n4; “To the Reader,” 15
- “caring through” disability, 102
- Cartagena, Alfonso de: debate over women's rights, 281n11; on disabilities, 81, 86, 106–7; as intercessor, 284n59; Latin vocabulary of, 283n43; metaphor for spiritual consolation, 75; *Oracional*, 75; petition to transfer Teresa to monastic orders, 103–4, 105; on Teresa's age, 279n5, 281n6; translation theory and practice of, 71, 87, 280n10, 282n34, 285n68
- Cartagena, Pedro de, 71
- Cartagena, Teresa de: ability to write, 99, 108, 112, 113–14; accusation of plagiarism, 19, 70, 72, 116–17; *Admiración operum Dey*, 19, 70, 282n36, 285n64; on analogy of the sick bed and day journey, 100–101; *Arboleda de los enfermos*, 70, 72; attitude toward disability, 86, 89, 90, 91–92, 97–98, 99, 107, 111, 119; authorial alibi of, 109; background and education of, 19, 70–71, 279–80n5, 280n6; on capacities of women, 286n72; comparison to Milton, 179, 184, 196, 201; concept of disability work, 99, 101, 102, 109, 118, 284n55; crip authority of, 19, 93, 103; deafness and muteness of, 1, 19, 70,

- Cartagena, Teresa de (*continued*)
 72, 83–84, 85, 102–3, 104, 184, 284n58, 284n60; desire for worldly things, 97; divine manual signs received by, 84–85; embodied metaphors of, 78–79, 80, 281n28, 297n40; family of, 71; feminist praise of, 72; on food consumption, 282n31; humility of, 108–10, 112–13, 117; identification with the “enfermos,” 75, 76, 79; on importance of good works, 99–100; interpretation of psalms, 86–87, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94–95, 283n53; knowledge of equestrian matters, 88–89; life in convent, 284n60, 284n61; lived experience of disability, 1, 73, 94, 284n55; on malicious ignorance, 101–2, 115; on malicious wonder, 108; on parable for disabled people, 95–97; Petrarch’s influence on, 76; reading of scripture, 89–90, 92–93; resistance to ableism, 98, 99, 104–5; resistance to humiliation and scorn, 113; rhetorical strategies of, 107–8; scholarship on, 72–73; sources of, 80–81, 93, 116–17, 281n27; style of, 82; on suffering, 81, 90–91; on two types of wonder, 114–16; on value of university education, 285n70; weakness and vulnerability of, 113–14
- Castiglione, Baldesar, 188, 190, 273n15, 297n35
- catachresis*, 277n62
- Cebes Table, 171, 273n17
- Cervantes Saavedra, Miguel de: authorial self-image of, 122–23, 140; captivity in Algiers, 20, 122, 287n11, 288n26; consolatory works of, 19–20; crip authority of, 119, 121, 128–29; criticism of, 126; descriptions of votives, 132; disability of, 1, 120, 122, 128, 133, 140–41; disinterment of remains of, 121, 173; *El licenciado Vidriera*, 131, 132–33, 160, 289n38, 289n42, 306n50; letter to Mateo Vázquez, 122, 287n10; *Los trabajos de Persiles y Sigismunda: historia setentrional*, 129, 131, 132, 137; as *manco*, 125, 126; military identity of, 122; *Novelas ejemplares*, 122, 127, 131, 132, 140, 287n14; Petrarch’s influence on, 20, 127; portraits of, 129, 130, 287nn13–14, 289n44; *prosopographia* of, 122, 123; sense of authorship of, 128; sources of, 124, 218; *Viaje del Parnaso (Voyage to Parnassus)*, 124; war wounds of, 19, 121, 124, 125, 128, 139, 286n8, 287n12
- Chai, Jean Julia, 230, 251, 252, 303n14, 303n21
- Chaucer, Geoffrey, 271n21
- Chess, Simone, 2, 272n31
- Chicago, Judy, 72
- Childers, William, 289n42
- Christ Church Cathedral, 148
- Christ Church college of Oxford University, 291n21, 292n27
- Christine de Pizan, 279n3
- Church of St Giles-without-Cripplegate, 173
- Churchyard, Thomas, 15, 16
- Ciardi, R. P., 303n14, 307n59, 307n61
- Cicero, Marcus Tullius: on *aegritudo*, 34–35, 57; on benefits of blindness, 8–9; consolatory strategies of, 9–10, 19, 54, 66, 195, 217; death of daughter, 154, 271n16; *De inventione*, 108, 285n68; discussion of physical and mental disability, 9, 66; on divine providence, 62; guidelines for capturing the audience, 7; influence of, 10, 18, 62; *Natura Deorum*, 60; *Rhetorica ad Herennium* (attrib.), 108; on self-consolation, 43; as Stoic, 277n61; as tragic poet, 210; *Tusculan Disputations*, 8, 9, 18, 34, 37, 54, 68, 76, 214
- Ciceronian dialogue, 31, 275n33, 276n59
- Cistercian Order, 85–86
- City of God* (Augustine), 60, 62
- Clare, Eli, 17, 24, 31, 286n5; *Brilliant*

- Imperfection*, 263; *Exile and Pride*, 262, 263
- clerics with disabilities, 105, 106
- Clifton, Shane, 112
- Cohen, Simona, 256–57, 308n78
- Colie, Rosalie Littell, 30–31, 153, 172, 274n29; *Atlantic Wall and Other Poems*, 30; “Petrarch’s Vauclose,” 274n28
- Collins, An: attitude toward religious consolation, 14; bodily and spiritual pain topos, 12–13; disability discourse of, 12, 14, 271nn26–27, 272n29; reference to Psalms, 13, 271n28; “Second Meditation,” 14; self-authorizing strategy, 13; “The Discourse,” 13; “To the Reader,” 13; use of modesty topos, 13–14
- Colloredo, Johannes-Baptista, 174
- Colloredo, Lazarus, 174
- compensation, 184
- compulsion to write, 64, 156
- conceit*, 224, 229, 230, 248
- Conde, Juan-Carlos, 73
- Confessions* (Augustine), 28–29, 41, 44, 45–46, 273n18
- consolation: in antiquity, 3, 6; art of, 2; biblical model of, 61, 155, 184–85, 205–6; for blindness, 301n4; definition of, 271n14; disability gain and, 17–18; distraction as, 6; friendship as, 278n77, 297n28; as literary genre, 3, 4, 10–11; medical, 6, 7, 15–17; non-Western traditions of, 260; in Renaissance literature, 6, 12, 16–17; rhetorical, 3–4, 6–11; spiritual, 6, 11–14, 190, 196–97; Stoical, 62; strategies of, 16–17, 39–40, 42–43, 54, 57–59, 60, 61; traveling for, 36, 275n43, 278n86
- Consolation of Philosophy* (Boethius), 12, 32
- consolatio* texts, 271n14, 297n37, 298n44
- consolatory exegesis, 82, 83, 92–93, 97, 110, 118, 184, 207, 208
- consolatory reading, 40–42, 44, 48, 50–51, 52, 55, 77, 278n77, 281n27
- consolatory writing, 40, 43–44, 48, 50–51, 54, 55–56, 77, 278n77, 281n27
- contemplation of death, 47, 277n61
- converso*, 71, 279n1
- Corbett, Margery, 152, 164, 294n48, 294n51
- Cordero, Rivera, 281n28
- Cosimo, Piero di, 306n49
- counter-eugenic logic, 206, 299n62
- Couser, Thomas, 3, 270n7
- Covarrubias, Sebastián de, 125
- Crantor of Soli, 271n16
- creativity: disability as source of, 5–6, 50
- Crenshaw, Kimberlé Williams, 281n19
- crip authority, 1, 2, 18–20, 53, 64, 131, 264
- crip authorship, 5–6
- cripistemology, 33, 43, 224, 259, 260, 263, 264, 298n50
- cripping up, 149, 170
- crip pride, 118–19, 180, 186, 188, 193–94, 206, 208, 219
- crip resignification, 44, 46
- crip resistance to cure, 40, 46–47, 180–81, 297n31
- crip theory, 2, 22, 263
- crip time, 159, 281n21
- Curtius, Ernst Robert, 285n66
- Cyrenaics, 6, 8, 183
- Dandolo, Enrico, Doge of Venice, 195
- Daniel, Drew, 170
- dark pleasure (*atra voluptas*), 38–39, 49
- David, King of Israel, 12, 308n78
- Davis, Lennard J., 269n1
- deaf gain, 86, 281n28
- deaf people: ability to work, 106–7, 284n58, 289n41; in convents, 284n61, 284n62; as motists, 304n30; sense of community, 279n2; sensory orientation of, 86
- De Armas, Frederick, 128, 142, 234
- De Doctrina Christiana* (Milton), 201–2

- Defensio Secunda pro populo Anglicano* (Milton): consolation in, 204–5, 208; disability gain in, 183, 193–95, 206–7, 213, 215; discussion of blindness in, 179, 188–89, 207–8; friendship theme, 195
- Democritus (Greek philosopher), 149, 184, 230, 291n20, 292n31
- Democritus Junior (Burton's alter ego): accomplishments of, 151; authority of, 152–53, 265; melancholy of, 148, 149, 150, 171; scene at Adbera, 166–67; social misperception of, 168
- De remediis fortuitorum* (Pseudo-Seneca), 52
- De remediis utriusque fortunae* (Petrarch): allusions to Augustine, 60, 62; allusions to Cicero and Seneca, 18, 57, 67, 71; consolation narrative of, 52, 54, 55–57, 61–63, 68, 78, 183–84, 186, 190, 191, 205, 281n27; cripp authority in, 18–19, 53, 64; dedication of, 55; dialogue on pain, 66, 67–68; on dignity of human beings, 54, 56, 57, 59–62; disability discourse in, 54, 60, 64–65, 66, 186, 278n74; examples of heroic suffering, 66–67; on glory, 64; influence of, 127–28; lamentation in, 67, 68, 69; on love, 62–63; mental disability theme, 52, 62; misogynist dialogues of, 68; on poetic furor and melancholy, 62–63; prefaces of, 52, 53; reception of, 69, 70; style of, 65–66; theme of error in, 53; translations of, 65, 202
- De Rerum Varietate* (Cardano), 307n58
- De tranquillitate animi* (Seneca), 34, 35, 37, 49
- De viris illustribus* (Petrarch), 50
- Deyermund, Alan, 74
- Dhar, Amrita, 298n49
- Diekstra, F. N. M., 277n67
- dignity of human beings, 53, 56, 57, 60, 62, 77, 86, 190
- Dinshaw, Carolyn, 302n12
- Diodotus, 8
- Dionigi di Borgo San Sepulcro, 23
- disability: advantages of, 8, 66; adversity of, 95; American cultural model of, 269n4; as bitter meal, 98–99; challenges of, 60; civil rights movement, 5; comparison to agricultural labor, 284n55; comparison to suffering of Christ, 11, 271n27; compensation for, 16; cultural production of, 270n6; definition of, 2, 270n6; dietary restriction and, 98; gender and, 14, 63, 68, 109, 113, 175; infirmity and, 75; lived experience of, 1, 66, 100, 101, 292n25, 295n10, 298n50; as manual sign from God, 84–85; medical model of, 15, 54, 166, 180, 259, 264, 286n5; mental *vs.* physical, 9, 270n6; militaristic compensations for, 297n31; moral model of, 47, 128, 204, 272n29; natural denial of, 96; as negative cultural phenomena, 281n28; in pedagogy, 259; as performance, 149–50; religious model of, 11–12, 81, 89; Renaissance writers on, 1–2; sense of community, 18, 279n2; social construction of, 167; sociological models of, 206, 292n25; as source of creativity, 5–6; spiritual benefits of, 82, 83–84, 92, 93–94, 96, 140; in Western literature, avoidance of, 258
- disability accommodation, 101, 102, 105, 215, 224, 284n55, 284n59, 284n61
- disability aesthetics, 21, 239–40, 243, 244, 305n44, 306n55, 307n58
- disability as method, 5, 6, 198, 224, 260, 298n50
- disability consolation, 5, 12–13, 179, 180, 208, 215
- disability dignity, 18, 54
- disability disclosure, 6, 20, 108, 224
- disability drift, 175, 177, 260, 297n33
- disability futurity, 20, 127, 180, 206, 216, 288n24, 299n62

- disability gain: compensatory logic of, 183; consolatory writings and, 15, 17–18, 20; expressions of, 17; models of, 21, 22, 180, 184–86; notion of, 1, 5, 64
- disability identity, 75, 264
- disability interlace, 73, 74–75, 82, 90, 91, 97, 159, 243
- disability liberation theology, 12, 81, 93, 271n19
- disability masquerade, 20, 21, 147, 150, 151, 155, 166, 208, 292n26
- disability metis, 8, 33, 40, 45, 48, 92, 108, 215, 264
- disability narratives: biographical tendencies in, 138; construction of, 257, 269n1; early modern, 3, 17; as genre, 3, 270n7; lived experience of disability in, 17–18; Renaissance writers on, 1–2, 3; robust, 3; study of, 2, 22
- disability pride. *See* cripp pride
- disability studies, 121, 258–60, 270n11, 276n56, 286n4, 308n1
- disability work, 99, 101, 102, 109, 118, 284n55
- disabled people: in convents, 284n59, 284nn61–62; discrimination against, 309n2; grotesque representation of, 243–44; humility of, 112; importance of good work for, 99–100; Individualized Education Programs for, 309n2; paternalistic view of, 284n57; social discrimination of, 125–26; spiritual and labor capacities of, 106–7; in theater, 291n19
- “Discourse, The” (Collins), 13, 14
- diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) initiatives, 259–60
- divine manual signs, 85–86
- Dobransky, Stephen, 177
- dogs, 157, 256. *See also* guide dogs
- Dokumaci, Arseli, 198, 224, 298n50
- Dolmage, Jay, 8, 45, 102, 150, 162, 175, 250
- Domus Auria, 240
- Don Quijote* (Cervantes): Dürer’s *Melencolia I* and, 290n4; illustration to, 143; madness of protagonist, 142, 288n32, 290n3; prologue to, 126, 128, 264; “real” author of, 264–65; unauthorized sequel, 125
- Doré, Paul Gustave, 142, 143
- Dotti, Ugo, 23
- Drayton, Michael, 159
- drop serene, 179, 296n18
- Drusus, Nero Claudius, 8
- Dubourg, Ninon, 101, 105, 284n59
- Du Laurens, Andre, 154
- Du Moulin, Peter, 297n32; *Regii Sanguinis Clamor* (*The Cry of the Royal Blood*), 187
- Dunn, Kevin, 4, 8, 11, 270n9
- Duran, Angelica, 197, 297n40, 298n41, 299n57
- Dürer, Albrecht, 167, 265; *Melencolia I*, 144, 145, 171, 237, 290n4, 290n6
- Edwards, Robert, 30, 42, 46
- Eiesland, Nancy, 11–12, 140, 271n27
- ekphrasis, 160–61, 162, 251–52, 293n42
- ekphrastic therapy, 164, 170
- Elizabeth I, Queen of England, 271n21
- El licenciado Vidriera* (Cervantes), 131, 132–33, 289n38, 289n42, 306n50
- embodied metaphors, 73, 78, 80, 83, 90, 98, 192, 193, 281n28, 297n40
- enargeia*, 20
- Engel, William, 164
- English Enlightenment, 269n5, 270n6
- Enrique IV, King of Castile, 71
- Epichthonius Cosmopolites, 171
- Epicureanism, 6
- Epistolae morales ad Lucilium* (Seneca), 34, 42, 275n41, 282n34
- Erasmus, Desiderius: *In Praise of Folly*, 148, 170
- error, 25–26, 27, 28, 31, 273n14
- Essays* (Montaigne), 4
- ethics of care, 20, 44, 102, 140, 271n19
- Euripides, 210, 298n48

- euritmia*, 307n57
exordium, 7, 271n15
 “extravagant” embodiment, 272n32
- Falkeid, Unn, 29, 274n24
 Fallon, Stephen, 178, 296n16
 Farr, Jason, 2, 272n31
 Fenichel, Emily A., 308n78
 Fenton, Edward, 306n54
 Festa, Costanzo, 257
 Fiedler, Leslie, 272n32
 fierce creativity, 5
figura serpentinata, 256, 306n55
 Fleming, John, 45
 Fletcher, John, 149
 Floyd-Wilson, Mary, 146
 Folianus, Sigismundus, 230, 304n24
 Fontaine de Vaucluse, France, 29–30, 42, 274n25, 274n27
 Fontana, Annibale, 221, 222, 223, 302n7
 Forcione, Alban, 137, 139
 forensic rhetoric, 9–10
 Foucault, Michel, 276n55, 299n57
 four passions: Stoic concept of, 277n68
 four perturbations of the mind, 34, 52
 Fox, Richard, 79, 85, 111, 282n32
 Fox, Ruth A., 293n39
 Frank, Arthur W.: *The Wounded Storyteller*, 17
 Frescobaldi, Fiammetta, 284n62
 Friedman, Susan Stanford, 258
 furor, 62, 63, 237, 245, 247, 248
- Garden of Eloquence, The* (Peacham), 10
 Garland-Thomson, Rosemarie, 17, 102, 140, 257, 272n32, 305n44, 308n74
 Garnett, Jane, 134, 138, 289n43
 Gaudenzio Ferrari, 250
 Gaylord, Mary Malcolm, 139–40, 289n44
 gender: disability and, 14, 63, 68, 109, 113, 175
 geohumoralism, 146
 Gill, Carol J., 149, 292n25
- Godin, Leona, 178
 God’s grace, 114–15
 Goldhill, Simon, 293n44
 Goodchild, Karen Hope, 241, 306n49
 Gosellini, Giuliano, 230, 254, 304n23
 Gottlieb, Sidney, 12–13
 Gowland, Angus, 20, 167
 grafting, 73, 76, 78–79, 80, 116, 282n29
 Grant, Elizabeth, 174
 Greene, Thomas, 26
 grotesque: ancient origin of, 242; in art and poetry, 245–46, 306n49, 306n51, 306n52, 307n59, 307n65; criticism of, 240–41; people with disabilities as, 240, 243, 305n44; pleasing effect of, 243; semantic power of, 241–42; theorizations of, 239
 Guarini, Giovanni Battista, 149, 291n23
 Gucci, Archangela, 284n62
 guide dogs, 192, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 266, 283n48, 308nn77–78
 Guidobaldo da Montefeltro, 190
- Hadot, Pierre, 60
 ha-Levi, Rabbi Solomon, 71
 Hannay, Margaret, 13
 Harden, Faith S., 128, 288n26
 Harrison, Sunny, 88–89
 Haskell, Yasmin A., 293n40, 294n53
 Haydock, Richard, 232, 233, 303n14, 303n17, 304n25
 Heffernan, James A., 293n42
 Heraclitus, 53, 160, 291n20
 Herculaneum, 252
 Hermes Trismegistus, 245
 hermetic tradition, 245
 Hippocrates, 166, 167, 292n31
 Hobgood, Allison, 2, 22, 102, 120, 146, 167, 272n31
 Hollander, John, 157, 159
 Homer, 8, 161, 184, 194, 230, 234, 264, 277n63
 Horace, 59, 234, 246, 263, 293n47
 horse training, 88–89

- Hospital del Rey in Burgos, 94
 Howard, Rebecca, 223
 Hsy, Jonathan, 72, 78, 86, 281n28
 humanism, 259
 human monsters, 174
 humility: as authorial alibi, 108–9;
 Benedictine rules on, 111–12; in
 exordium, 271n15; levels of, 111; in
 opening of speeches, 285n66; as
 rhetorical strategy, 107–8, 112; in
 self-authorization, 7, 13–14; spiritual
 benefits of, 108, 110
 humors / humoral theory, 146, 278n88,
 290n9
 Hunter, John, 174, 295n3
 Hunter, William, 295n3
 Hunterian Museum in London, 174
 Huss, Bernhard, 55, 65, 67, 69
 Hutton, Lewis J., 281n14, 281n27
 Huygens, Constantijn, 298n44
- iatreuma*, 7
 Ife, Barry, 122
Iliad (Homer), 194
 image: relation between word and, 162,
 167, 168
 imitation: apian model of, 80, 155, 160,
 231, 282n33, 292n36; simian and crow
 models of, 116–17
 impairment, 269n4
 independent living, 25
 individualism, 25, 59
 inspiration porn, 24
 interdependence, 140, 225
 interlace, 97, 281n21
 interlaced narrative, 73, 74, 75, 90
 intersectionality, 73, 281n19
 Isabella I, Queen of Castile and Leon,
 72
 Italian poetic forms: Spanish adapta-
 tions of, 287n21
- Jacobs, Fredrika, 131
 James I, King of England, 304n25
- Jane, Joseph, 175
 Jerome, Saint, 12
 Jesus Christ: healing powers, 282n36;
 suffering of, 11–12
 Jonson, Ben, 149
 Juan II, King of Castile, 71
 Juárez Almendros, Encarnación, 72,
 286n4
 Jupiter, 290n6
- Kafer, Allison, 73, 288n24
 Kahn, Victoria, 29
 Kang, Andrew Q., 308n1
 Keller, Hellen, 117
 Kemp, Martin, 235, 305n35
 Kerrigan, William, 300n72
 Kierdorf, Wilhelm, 3, 6
 Kim, Eunjung, 73
 Kim, Yonsoo, 102, 104, 284n58,
 284nn60–61
 King'oo, Clare Costley, 12
 Kinney, Arthur, 26, 273n18
 sge, Georgina, 117, 182, 224
 Klibansky, Raymond, 144
 Kuppers, Petra, 302n12
 Kuuliala, Jenni, 79
 Kuusisto, Steven, 182
- Laes, Christian, 75
 Laguna, Ana María, 144
 Laura of Petrarch's poetry, 26, 38, 48, 63
 Laven, Mary, 131
 Le Blon, Christian, 163, 164
 Leigh, Richard, 295n12
 Leonardo da Vinci, 235, 243, 249,
 307n59
 Leoni, Leone, 253, 253–54, 257
 Lepanto, Battle of, 19, 122, 139
 Lerer, Seth, 26
Letters of Old Age (Petrarch), 30
 “Letter to Damagetos” (pseudo-
 Hippocrates), 166
 “Letter to Philaras” (Milton), 180, 181–
 82, 183, 184–86

- Lewis, Victoria, 5
- liberation theology, 12, 140, 271n19
- Life of Lazarillo de Tormes and of His Fortunes and Adversities, The* (novel), 297n30
- Lightbown, Ronald, 152, 164, 294n48, 294n51
- Ligorio, Pirro, 306n45
- Linton, Simi, 270n8
- lived disability, 281n28
- Livy, 25, 26, 28
- Llull, Ramon, 75
- Loftis, Sonya Freeman, 2
- Lomazzo, Giovanni Paolo: academic career of, 231, 302n5; adaptive reading and writing techniques, 302n4; advice to painters, 229, 230; on Alberti, 303n19; allegorical self-portrait of, 237–38; on artistic inspiration, 21; biographer of, 226; blindness of, 21, 220, 222, 225–26, 233, 246, 303n22; bronze portrait medal of, 221, 222, 223–24; catalog of human monsters, 244, 245; comparison of painting and sculpture, 307–8n68; on *concelto*, 224–25; crip authority of, 230; description of Temple of Painting, 250–51; disclosure of disability, 1, 21, 219, 220–21, 224, 225, 229; on diversity of the human form, 244; ekphrastic style of, 225, 247, 250, 252; English translations of, 232, 233; errors in printed books by, 233–34; on *euritmia*, 307n57; on *figura serpentina*, 306n55; on Fontana's portrait medallion, 265; friends of, 302n7; on grotesque, 225, 239, 241–43, 245–46, 307n59, 307n65; horoscope of, 305n35, 305n40; humility of, 231; *Idea*, 226, 231, 235, 238, 247, 250, 303n14; influence of, 234; linguistic diversity of, 234; Mannerist art theory of, 21, 224, 234, 235, 237, 238, 252; on melancholy, 21, 234, 237, 305n41; on Michelangelo, 238–39; motto of, 224; poems about Cardano and Vicenza, 221, 301n3; reception in England, 232; reference to Augustine's *City of God*, 244; on relationship between painting and poetry, 247–49; on representation of people with physical disabilities, 243–44; reputation of, 230, 233; *Rime*, 220, 227, 303n16; on sister arts, 225; spiritual consolation of, 231; on stereotypes of European nations, 244–45; *Trattato*, 226, 229, 232, 233, 234, 237, 241, 250, 252, 303n17, 303n21; value of diversity, 235–36; view of disability, 227–28, 231, 236, 255; visual memory of, 250; *Vita*, 225–26, 227, 245, 301n2, 305n40, 307n65
- Lope de Vega y Carpio, Félix, 126
- López del Trigo, Pero, 71–72
- López de Mendoza, Íñigo, 281n6
- López Pinciano, Alonso (El Pinciano), 139–40, 289n44
- Loreto, shrine of, 132–34, 136, 137
- love, 62–63, 278n86
- Love, Genevieve, 2
- love-melancholy, 30–31, 38–39, 48–50, 69, 170, 274n29
- Luchs, Alison, 266, 267
- Lucian of Samosata, 246
- Lucretius (Titus Lucretius Carus), 276n57
- Luna, Álvaro de: *The Book of Illustrious Women*, 281n11
- Luna, Pedro de (Antipope Benedict XIII), 281n27
- Lund, Mary Ann, 154
- Lycosthenes, Konrad, 307n58
- Lynch, James, 237, 238, 305n40
- Lyons, Bridget, 156, 157
- Macrobius, 155
- madness, 168, 294n53
- Madrid, Francisco de, 124, 128, 287n18
- Majuelo Apiñániz, Miriam, 284n58

- Malaga, Spain, 134
- malicious ignorance, 101–2, 115, 118
- malicious wonder, 115
- Mannerism (*maniera*): aesthetic of, 236; definition of, 224, 304n33; origin of the word, 234–35; theorization of, 21, 237, 238, 249, 252
- Manrique, Gómez, 72
- Mantegna, Andrea, 250
- Marian iconography, 140
- Marsh, David, 276n59
- Marsili, Luigi, 41
- Martin, Adrienne Laskier, 287n21
- Martínez, Miguel, 121
- Martin of Braga, 277n67
- Marvell, Andrew, 177, 178, 209, 218, 295n12, 295n13; “On Mr. Milton’s *Paradise Lost*,” 177; “Perplexing,” 295n12
- Matthew’s parable of the five talents, 118
- Mazzotta, Giuseppe, 30
- McClure, George, 31, 34, 37, 274n32
- McRuer, Robert, 5
- medical consolation, 15–17, 100
- medicalization, 54, 180, 277n72, 286n5
- melancholy: artistic representation of, 144, 290n4, 290n6; association with literary genius, 20; astrological explanation of, 236–37, 290n6, 305n35, 305nn40–41; causes and symptoms of, 146, 278n88; cure of, 154, 160; definition of, 146; global reach of, 171; humors and, 278n88, 290n9; hypochondriac, 293n40; lived experience of, 147; *vs.* madness, 168, 294n53; perception of time and, 169; perceptions of the natural environment and, 169; positive and negative aspects of, 146–47, 158, 167, 170; sensory perception and, 169; as sin, 37; two faces of, 236; variability of, 168, 172; Vidriera’s type of, 288n33; virulent form of, 290n3
- melancholy assemblage, 170
- memory theater, 21, 225, 247, 250, 251, 308n70
- Mendoza, Juana de, 72, 112
- mental disability: alleviation of, 43–44, 53, 56; ancient tradition of, 33, 34–35, 38–39; characteristics and causes of, 34, 37, 38–39, 56–57; concept of, 18, 275n36, 275n41; consolation of, 15, 56, 62; creativity and, 43, 48, 50–51, 53; dark pleasure of, 38–39, 49; disclosure of, 31–34, 36–37, 43, 69, 171–72, 276n58; effect on imagination, 293n40; literary narratives of, 18, 31–37, 43, 69, 142, 172, 276n58; medicalization of, 34, 54; *vs.* melancholy, 168, 278n88, 290n8, 294n53; in monastic context, 33, 276n46; *vs.* physical disability, 9; social construction of, 306n50; travel as remedy to, 36; of urban life, 36–37, 40, 42
- Metellus, Lucius Caecilius, 195
- “Methought I Saw my Late Espoused Saint” (Sonnet 23) (Milton), 190–91
- metis*. See disability *metis*
- Michelangelo Buonarroti: as a blind pilgrim, depiction of, 254, 255, 256; bronze portrait medal of, 253, 254–56, 266–67; collaboration with Leoni, 257; on *figura serpentinata*, 306n55; melancholy of, 21, 238–39; obscurity of Dante, 249–50
- Milan, Italy, 246, 304n28
- Miller, David Lee, 29, 274n23
- Mills, Mara, 5, 270n10
- Milton, John: adaptive reading techniques of, 299n56; attitude toward cure, 297n31; blindness of, 20, 21, 173, 175–76, 179, 181–82, 187, 295n13, 296nn17–18, 296n22; concept of landscape, 234; critical readings of, 196–98, 298nn49–50, 300n66, 300n68; on death, 295n5; disability narrative of, 1, 20–21, 178–83, 298n49; disinterment of remains of, 173–74, 295n3; fighting

- Milton, John (*continued*)
 skills, 298n43; on friendship, 297n28;
 Marvell and, 177, 295n12; memorial
 in church of St Giles, 175; misogyn-
 ist work of, 300n66; monument in
 Westminster Abbey, 295n7; poetry of,
 172; reference to Euripides, 298n48;
 rejection of medicalization, 180–81;
 representation of race, 299–300n64;
 self-representation of, 296n16; sub-
 lime poetry of, 295–96n14; transla-
 tions of Psalms, 298n52
- Milton's works: *asprezza* style in, 188,
 189–90, 191, 203, 211; Biblical allu-
 sions in, 184, 199–200, 201–3, 207; in
 comparative perspective, 179, 184, 196,
 201–3, 208, 218, 219; crip authority in,
 203; *De Doctrina Christiana*, 201–2;
Defensio secunda, 296n17; discussion of
 blindness in, 178–80, 182, 187, 210–19;
Eikonoklastes, 175; “Letter to Philaras,”
 180–86; “Methought I Saw my Late
 Espoused Saint” (Sonnet 23), 190–
 91, 296n19; militaristic consolatory
 strategies, 180, 183, 188, 193, 194–95;
 response to ableism in, 179, 181, 188,
 203; *Samson Agonistes*, 234, 297n31;
sprezzatura style, 188–89; theme of
 patience, 196, 197, 201–3; tragedy in,
 209–10; translations of Psalms, 199–
 200, 298n52; visual images in, 177–78
- Minnis, Alastair, 4
- Mintz, Susannah, 3, 13–14, 22, 90, 270n7,
 271n26–27, 272n29, 301n78
- Mitchell, David, 5, 18, 197, 259, 276n58,
 281n28
- moderate sorrow, 6
- modesty topos. *See* humility
- Monastery of Saint Mary of Guada-
 lupe, 132, 137, 139
- monastic manual signs, 85–86
- monastic rules, 79, 93, 105
- Monstrorum Historia* (Aldrovandi),
 307n58
- Montaigne, Michel de, 4, 134
- Mont Ventoux: Buridan ascent of,
 273n16; natural wonder of, 29–30;
 Petrarch's climbing of, 23, 27, 37, 49,
 51, 53, 69, 260; as poetic inspiration,
 29–31, 41, 44–45; river Sorgue and
 Fontaine de Vaucluse at, 274n25,
 274n27
- More, Alexander, 297n32
- Morrás, María, 280n11, 283n51
- Moshenska, Joe, 218, 301n83
- motists, 304n30
- Moulin, Peter du, 187
- Mount Adams in New Hampshire, 263
- mountaineers, 24, 25–26
- Mount Everest, 24
- Mount Haemus, 25
- Mount Olympus, 48
- Mount Vesuvius, 252
- Mudge, Ken, 282n29
- Murray, Joseph, 86
- narrative prosthesis, 39, 40, 41, 42, 188,
 276n56, 276n58, 301n80
- Nepal Bans on climbing Everest, 25
- Neve, Philip, 173–74, 295n3
- Nicholas V, Pope, 71, 104
- “no barriers” philosophy, 24, 25, 46, 47,
 66
- Nolhac, Pierre de, 275n37
- Novelas ejemplares* (Cervantes), 122, 127,
 131, 132, 140, 166, 287n14
- Núñez de Reinoso, Alonso, 279n1
- Odyssey* (Homer), 187
- Ott, Katherine, 40
- overcoming narratives, 14, 24, 25, 29, 31,
 47, 262–63
- pain, 66, 67–68
- painting: *vs.* poetry, 162, 246–49; *vs.*
 sculpture, 307n68
- Panizza, Letizia A., 43, 62
- Panofsky, Erwin, 144

- Paracelsus, 158, 293n37
- Paradise Lost* (Milton): *asprezza* style in, 191; consolation in, 191–92; criticism of, 176–78; description of blindness in, 182; proems to, 20, 182
- paragone*, 161, 225, 247
- paramythia*, 6, 10
- Pareus, David, 210
- Park, Katherine, 236
- Parker, Samuel, 295n12
- Pasamonte, Jerónimo de, 288n26
- passing, 150, 188–89
- patriarchy, 13, 68, 108
- Paul, the Apostle, Saint, 11–12
- Peacham, Henry, the Elder, 10–11, 217; *The Garden of Eloquence*, 10
- Pegasus, 48
- Pender, Patricia, 13, 108
- Penitential Psalms, 255
- performance studies (performing disability), 149
- performing authority, 148
- performing disability, 149–50
- Perlman, Itzak, 269n1
- personhood, ancient concepts of, 59
- Petracco, Gherardo, 27, 28
- Petrarch, Francesco: admiration of Roman portrait coins, 223; *Africa*, 44, 50, 275n35; on aging, 41–42; antimedical attitudes, 54, 277n72; ascent of Mont Ventoux, 23–24, 27, 29–31, 37, 49, 69, 260, 273n15; Cicero's influence on, 34, 275n33; consolatory works of, 24, 70, 77, 124, 156, 272n4, 274n32; contemplation of death, 277n61; on deafness, 85, 86; description of river Sorgue and Fontaine de Vaucluse, 30, 42; *De viris illustribus*, 50; disability narrative in works of, 1, 18–19, 31–34, 44–45, 218, 262; on errors, 26, 27–28, 31, 44, 53, 69, 273n14; on friendship, 68; home in Vaucluse, 30; influence on premodern authors, 18–19, 20; interest in hydrology, 274n27; *Letters of Old Age*, 30; literary fame, 30; love to Laura, 26, 63; mental disability of, 27–28, 56, 276n46; misrepresentation of physique of, 261; notations in books, 40; personality of, 260–61, 273n5; praise of Sappho, 68; psalmic allusions, 92; *Psalmi penitentiales*, 60–61, 278n81; *Rime Sparse*, 26, 30, 38, 63; scholarly edition of Livy's *Ab urbe condita libri*, 25–26, 273n9; Seneca's influence on, 35; sortilege practice of, 28–29, 44, 261, 273n18, 274n24; Stoicism of, 62; use of the noun “frenum,” 92; value of lived experience, 54; views on disability, 55, 68; on vulnerability of human beings, 69; walks in Vaucluse, 261
- Philaras, Leonard, 179, 180, 181, 183, 184, 185, 187
- Philip V, King of Macedon, 25, 26, 27
- Philostratus the Elder, 246
- Philostratus the younger, 246
- physical disability, 1, 9, 17, 52, 54, 64–65, 68–69, 111
- physiological types, 290n9
- Piero della Francesca, 226–27
- Piero di Cosimo, 240, 241
- Pigman, G. W., 282n33
- Pinacoteca Brera Museum, 237
- Pineda, Victoria, 234
- pity, 8, 17, 42, 64, 102, 107, 156, 210, 284n57
- Pizan, Christine de, 72
- planets: effects on psychological types, 305n35; melancholy and, 144, 147, 237, 290n6, 305nn40–41
- plastic arts, 293n42
- Plato, 230, 263
- Platter, Felix, 160
- Pliny, the Elder (Gaius Plinius Secundus), 60, 309n13
- Plutarch, 210, 246, 309n13
- Poems, etc. upon several occasions* (Milton), 196

- Polidoro, 249
 Ponce de León, Pedro, 289n41
 portrait medals, 223, 224
 Price, Margaret, 150
 pride, 117
Prodigiorum ac ostentorum chronicon
 (Lycosthenes), 307n58
prooemion, 6–7
prosopographia, 122, 123
Psalmi penitentiales (Petrarch), 60–61,
 278n81
 psalms, 12, 86–87, 89, 90, 95–97, 110,
 271n22
 psychotherapy, 54
 Puteanus, Erycius: *Caecitatis consolatio*,
 298n44
- queer people, 208, 270n11, 302n12
 Quillen, Carol Everhart, 46, 69, 276n60
 Quintilian (Marcus Fabius Quintilianus), 7–8
- race, 60, 73, 117, 175, 260, 281n19, 290n10,
 299n64
 Radzinowicz, Mary Ann, 198, 200, 211,
 300n74
 Ramírez de Carrión, Manuel, 289n41
 Randolph, Adrian W. B., 302n12
 Raphael, 250
 reading: adaptive techniques for people
 with low vision, 299n56, 301n4; con-
 solatory, 40–42, 44, 48, 50–51, 52, 55, 77
 reconstructive narratives, 257
 Reiss, Timothy, 59, 80, 273n5, 288n33
 Remensnyder, Amy, 139
 Renaissance individualism, 59
 Rendall, Steven, 122
 resignification, 5, 44, 141, 203
 rhetoric, 6–7, 80
Rhetorica ad Herennium (attrib. Cicero),
 7, 285n68
 Richard III, King of England, 120, 121
 Rigolot, François, 26–27
Rime (Lomazzo), 21, 303n16, 306n52
Rime Sparse (Petrarch), 26, 30, 38, 63
 Rivera Carretas, Maria-Milagros,
 280n5
 Rivera Cordero, Victoria, 72, 78, 281n28
 Robbins, Jill, 273n14
 Roberts, John G., Jr., 260–61, 262,
 309n2
 Rodaja, Tomás (character), 132–34,
 135–37, 138
 Rodas, Julia Miele, 212
 Rojas, Fernando de, 279n1
 Roman portrait coins, 223
 Rose, Sarah, 104
 Rosser, Gervace, 134, 138, 289n43
 Row-Heyveld, Lindsey, 2–3
 Ruffino, Alessandra, 239
- Salamanca University, 109, 132–33, 152
 same-sex love, 63
 Sampson, Alden, 196
 Samson (biblical hero), 297n31
Samson Agonistes (Milton): *asprezza*
 style in, 211; autobiographical nature
 of, 21, 209–10, 300n68; biblical
 allusions in, 211; consolation theme
 in, 180, 204, 213–14, 216–18; Dalila
 character in, 214; disability gain,
 21, 215–16; discussion of blindness,
 180, 183, 204, 210–13, 214–18, 300n74;
 narrative prosthesis, 301n80; Samson
 character in, 208, 211–12; as tragedy,
 208–11, 217, 300n67
 Sanchez, Rebecca, 5, 270n10
 Sánchez de Arévalo, Rodrigo, 76, 81–82,
 86, 94
 Sandahl, Carrie, 149
 Santa María, Álvaro García de, 71, 76
 Santa María, Gonzalo García de, 71
 Santa María, Pablo de, 71
 Santo Tomás, Enrique García, 126
 Sappho, 63, 68
 Sarabia, Doña María de, 71
 Saturn (planet): melancholy and,
 290n6, 305n35, 305nn40–41

- Saturn and Melancholy* (Panofsky and Saxl), 144
- Saturnia arte, 237
- Saxl, Fritz, 144
- Scarborough, Connie, 72, 107
- Schalk, Sami, 3, 270n11
- Schlosser, Julius von, 234
- scorn (ableist), 8, 100, 108, 110–12, 113, 126, 151, 215–16
- scrutiny (ableist), 177–78, 179
- Scully, Jackie Leach, 257
- “Second Meditation” (Collins), 13
- secretum*: meaning of, 52
- Secretum* (Petrarch), 77; allusions to Cicero, 48; consolation narrative of, 31–34, 39–45, 47–48, 50–52, 275n43; contemplation of death, 47, 275n38; crip authority in, 18, 44, 46–47, 52, 276n58; disability gain in, 49–50; disclosure of mental disability in, 31–34, 36–37, 43, 69, 276n58; lived experience of *aegritudo* and *acedia* in, 34–35, 37–39, 43; love-melancholy in, 38–39, 48–50; on mental stress of urban life, 36–37; proem of, 31–32; references to St. Augustine, 32, 33, 41, 44, 45–46, 52; sources of, 276n59, 277n60; writing and revision of, 31, 52
- Seidenspinner-Núñez, Dayle, 102, 104, 279n4, 284n58, 284nn60–61
- self, theory of, 276n55
- self-authorization, 4, 5, 6–8, 11, 12–13, 270n9
- self-blinding, 229–30
- self-esteem, 111
- self-pity, 17
- self-representation, 252
- Seneca, Lucius Annaeus: on *aegritudo*, 34–35, 38–39, 57; on bees, 282n33; consolatory works of, 18; *De tranquillitate animi*, 34, 35, 37, 49; *Epistolae morales ad Lucilium*, 34, 42, 275n41, 282n34; on mental disability, 35; Spanish translations of, 71; on writer’s activity, 80
- sensory disability, 65, 70, 72, 83–84, 85, 86, 87, 91, 92
- Serenus, Annaeus, 35
- Serrano y Sanz, Manuel, 281n14
- Sette, Guido, 30
- sexuality, 22, 63, 73, 175, 208, 260, 309n1
- Shakespeare, William: *Richard III*, 120; *As You Like It*, 148
- Shearman, John, 235
- Shirilan, Stephanie, 161, 162, 170
- Siebers, Tobin, 20, 21, 150, 239, 243, 264, 291n19, 292n26
- sighted guides, 186, 192, 297n30, 298n41
- Simonides of Ceos, 248–49
- Singer, Julie, 54
- sister arts, 161, 224, 225, 246–47
- Sistine Chapel, 255, 257
- sitpoint, 254, 308n74
- Skinner, Cyriack, 179, 188
- Smith, David, 266
- Snyder, Sharon, 5, 18, 197, 259, 276n58, 281n28
- Socrates, 238
- soldierly republic of letters, 121
- Solomon ha-Levi, 71
- Sophocles*, 210
- Sorgue River, 30, 31, 42, 62, 274n27
- sortilege, 28–29, 44, 46, 273n18, 274nn21–24
- Soussloff, Catherine M., 301n2, 309n3
- speech: limitations of, 283n42
- spiritual honor, 128
- spiritual overcoming, 29
- sprezzatura*, 188–89, 190, 192
- stemmatics, 26, 273n10
- Stoic tradition, 6, 273n17
- strife: concept of, 53, 291n20
- Studley, Marian, 198, 199, 200, 299n55
- suffering, 11–12, 16, 66–67, 68, 100, 271n27
- suffering body of Christ, 11–12, 14, 81, 271n19

- supercrip, 24, 67, 178, 180, 204, 208, 215, 218
 Surphlet, Richard, 155
 Surtz, Ronald, 92, 94
- Tablet of Cebes*, 171
 Tarkington, Booth, 296n24
 Tasso, Torquato, 189
 Taylor, Anne, 295n10
 Tertullian, 12
 theatrum mundi, 20, 147, 148, 172, 291n17
 Thévinin, François, 180
 Thomas Aquinas, 285n63
 Tillyard, E. M. W., 196
 Timoleon of Corinth, 195
 Tiresias (mythological prophet), 8
 Titian, 250
 "To Mr. Cyriack Skinner Upon His Blindness" (Sonnet 22) (Milton): *asprezza* style of, 188, 189; consolation theme in, 186–87, 188; discussion of blindness in, 179, 188, 190, 198, 199, 201, 203; friendship theme in, 192–93, 196; *sprezzatura* style of, 188–89
 Toombs, S. Kay, 281n28
 Torre, Andrea, 41, 276n55
 Toscano, Pasquale S., 214, 215, 297n40, 301n80
 "To the Reader" (Cardano), 15
 "To the Reader" (Collins), 13
 tragedy: as literary genre, 209–10
 tragicomedy, 291n23
 Traister, Barbara, 148
 Tramelli, Barbara, 230
 translation of the senses, 87
 transumption, 158
Tratado de consolación (Villena), 285n68
Trattato dell'arte della pittura (Lomazzo), 21, 303n14, 303n17, 307n58, 307n61
 travel: narratives, 289n36; as remedy for mental distress, 36, 275n43
 Trigo, López de, 73
 Trinkaus, Charles, 59
Tusculan Disputations (Cicero), 34, 214
 Twain, Mark, 117
 Twyne, Thomas, 202
- Valla, Lorenzo, 273n9
 Valladolid, Spain, 135, 289n40
 Vasari, Giorgio, 226–27, 240–41, 265, 301n2, 306n49
 Vaucluse region of Provence, France, 23, 30, 31, 42, 62
 Vázquez, Mateo, 122
 Vega, Garcilaso de la, 134
 Vicenza, Girolamo, 221
 Villena, Enrique de, 285n68; *Tratado de consolación*, 285n68
 Vinaver, Eugene, 74
 Virgil (Publius Vergilius Maro): *Aeneid*, 11, 43
 Virgilian *cursus*, 128
 Virgin of Guadalupe: monastery of, 137, 138, 139
 Visconti Borromeo, Pirro, 246
 visual descriptions at art galleries, 252
 Vitruvius, 240, 245
 voluntarism, 276n60
 voluntary humility, 110, 111, 112
 votive offerings, 131–32, 137–38, 139, 288n30, 288n31
- Ware, Linda, 259
 Warton, Thomas, 172
 Webb, Ruth, 293n42
 Weihenmayer, Erik, 24, 25
 Weinryb, Ittai, 132
 Wenzel, Siegfried, 38
 Westminster Abbey: "poets' corner" in, 295n7
 "When I Consider How My Light Is Spent" (Sonnet 19) (Milton): biblical allusions in, 199–200; consolation in, 201, 202, 203; crip authority in, 201; critical readings of, 196–98; discussion of blindness, 179, 196, 213;

- mobility metaphor, 201; theme of
patience in, 197, 203
- Wilkins, Ernest Hatch, 25
- Williams, Katherine Schaap, 3, 291n19
- Wittreich, Joseph Anthony, Jr., 295n12
- Wojciehowski, Hannah Chapelle, 30
- Wolfe, Jessica, 194
- women's spirituality, 282n31
- wonder: beneficial (good), 114; two
types of, 114–16
- Wood, Anthony: *Athenae Oxonienses*,
155
- Wood, David Houston, 2, 22, 146
- Wounded Storyteller, The* (Frank), 17
- writing: consolatory, 40, 43–44, 48,
50–51, 77
- Young, Stella, 24–25
- Zak, Gur, 43, 274n32
- Zim, Rivka, 4
- Zizka, Jan, 195