

Political Instability in Guinea-Bissau

Edited by
Ricardo Real P. de Sousa, Jens
Herpolsheimer and Jara Cuadrado

First published 2025

ISBN: 978-1-032-74017-1 (hbk)

ISBN: 978-1-032-74018-8 (pbk)

ISBN: 978-1-003-46724-3 (ebk)

Chapter 8

The 2019 National Elections in Guinea-Bissau

A Quantitative Analysis of Religious
and Ethnic Voting

Rui Asano

(CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0)

DOI: 10.4324/9781003467243-8

This chapter is funded by the JSPS KAKENHI.

8 The 2019 National Elections in Guinea-Bissau

A Quantitative Analysis of Religious and Ethnic Voting

Rui Asano

Introduction

The religious and ethnic profiles of politicians or parties wield significant influence within the political landscape of Guinea-Bissau. This influence became particularly apparent during the legislative and presidential elections in 2019, marked by a total of three rounds of voting. Throughout these elections, one or more political parties employed campaign strategies aimed at leveraging particular religious and ethnic identities to secure support from specific demographic groups that shared these identities.

For example, Figure 8.1 shows election posters for the two presidential candidates who proceeded to the runoff round. On the left is Domingos Simões Pereira, representing the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (*Partido Africano para a Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde – PAIGC*), which has been the dominant party for most of the period since the country's independence in 1974. On the right is Umaro Sisoco Embaló, the candidate from the Movement for a Democratic Alternative, Group of 15 (*Movimento para a Alternância Democrática-Grupo dos 15 – MADEM G15*), which was founded in 2018 by members who had split from the PAIGC.

These election posters highlight the contrasting religious beliefs and ethnic identities of the candidates. Pereira practices Christianity and belongs to one of the smallest minority groups in this country, the Kasanga. In contrast, Embaló adopted distinctive Islamic-style attire, wearing white clothing and an Arab-style red-and-white keffiyeh headscarf. Indeed, Embaló is a Muslim and a member of the Fula, which is one of the largest ethnic groups in Guinea-Bissau and in which most of the population has faith in Islam (BBC News Afrique, 2019). The political appeal of MADEM G15 and its candidate, Embaló, to the Muslim community is clearly evident when his style is compared to Pereira's.

Although Embaló refuted claims of political bias towards the Muslim community or any other specific groups and emphasized his marriage to a Christian as evidence of his commitment to national cohesion (e-Global Notícias em Português, 2019), the election campaigns relied heavily on the

DOI: 10.4324/9781003467243-8

This chapter has been made available under a CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license.



Figure 8.1 Election posters for Pereira (round 1) and Embaló (round 2).
Source: Author.

candidates' identities, without providing specific manifestos, and were criticized by the media and civil society (Darame, 2019). It has been suggested that the rapid growth of political support for MADEM G15 and Embaló was attributable to their effective appeal to the Muslim and Fula populations (Nhaga, 2019).

The election results reflected the success of this campaign strategy. As shown in Table 8.1, the MADEM G15 obtained 21.07 percent of total valid votes, positioning itself as the second-largest party following the legislative election. Furthermore, Embaló won the presidency after two rounds of voting. It appears that the political appeal to the Muslim and Fula populations was successful, with voters who identified with these groups casting their votes for MADEM G15 and Embaló. However, despite these facts suggesting that the parties and candidates strategically employed identity politics in the 2019 Guinea-Bissau elections, there has been little systematic study of the outcomes, particularly the voting behavior of individuals based on their religious and ethnic identities.

Therefore, in this chapter, I explore whether voters cast their votes for the parties or candidates who shared similar religious and ethnic identities with them. My

Table 8.1 The results of the 2019 national elections in Guinea-Bissau

	<i>Date</i>	<i>PAIGC/Pereira</i>	<i>MADEM/Embaló</i>
Legislative	March 10	35.22 %	21.07 %
Presidential, round 1	November 24	40.13 %	27.65 %
Presidential, round 2	December 29	46.45 %	53.55 %

Source: The Guinea-Bissau National Election Commission website.

Note: The percentages are the share of valid votes according to the official results.

primary focus is on the 2019 national elections in Guinea-Bissau, specifically the impact of Muslim and Fula voters on the results for MADEM G15 and Embaló.¹ To test the hypotheses, I use detailed data on voter registration and election results. The voter registration data contains the demographic characteristics of registered voters at the individual level, allowing inferences to be made about voters' religious beliefs and ethnicity based on their given names and surnames. The election result data contains the number of votes obtained by each candidate at the polling station level. I aggregate these local geographic data at the electoral-district level and examine correlations between religious and ethnic demographics and voting results.

There are existing studies on coreligious and coethnic patronage networks in political contests (e.g. Bates, 1974; Horowitz, 2000; Posner, 2005). However, there are two key aspects where these studies can be improved, and I address these research gaps. First, the geographical focus has primarily been limited to certain countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, particularly English-speaking countries like Ghana, Kenya, South Africa, and Uganda. In this regard, I shed new light on Guinea-Bissau and confirm whether religious and ethnic voting occurs in a country that has not yet been studied in the literature. Second, the existing studies have often used surveys and field experiments and not actual election data. This approach poses difficulties in interpreting the true impact of religious and ethnic voting in actual election settings. Thus, this study introduces a novel approach by incorporating data derived from official voter registration and election results. As a result, my analysis indicates that religious and ethnic voting was present in the 2019 Guinea-Bissau national elections, especially the presidential election, with Embaló receiving more votes in electoral districts with larger populations of Muslim and/or Fula voters.

The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Initially, I introduce the existing literature and interviews conducted with local experts on identity politics in Guinea-Bissau and propose two hypotheses regarding electoral voting based on religious and ethnic identities. I next explain the research design with the introduction of data on voter registration and election results. I then present findings from the regression analysis. Lastly, I discuss the contribution and limitations of this research.

Identity politics in Guinea-Bissau

In Guinea-Bissau, there are more than 20 ethnic groups with varying religious beliefs, including Islam, Christianity, and traditional animist religions. After the successful struggle for independence from the Portuguese colonial power, Guinea-Bissau has pursued national cohesion among its ethnic groups through a common creole language, interethnic marriage, and population movements (e.g. Kohl, 2018). However, identity politics have been effective in this country, and coreligious and coethnic ties are important for political elites seeking to garner support from the population.

This section draws on the existing literature and my interviews with local experts to reveal how identity politics functions in the country. I discuss the political context in which religion and ethnicity operate in Guinea-Bissau, aiming to answer three questions as follows: i) why voters are motivated to vote based on a candidate's identity profile; ii) why candidates emphasize their identity profiles to mobilize the population; and iii) why identity-based parties have emerged in Guinea-Bissau. Following the explanations, I propose two hypotheses specifically about the 2019 national elections, where the Muslim and Fula people were expected to vote for MADEM G15 and Embaló.

Voting choice based on identity profiles

First, I focus on the voters themselves, to understand how election campaigns grounded in religious and ethnic connections are received by eligible voters. According to my interview with a researcher, in Guinea-Bissau, voters rarely make informed decisions based on a systematic assessment of parties and candidates. Owing to the high illiteracy rate and low educational attainment, voters may not choose who to vote for based on manifestos, ideology, preparedness, or the concrete actions taken by parties or candidates (e.g. Vaz & Rotzoll, 2005). Instead, they tend to vote for candidates who share their identity profile and belong to their communities, because these candidates provide credible protection from external threats and offer economic and social opportunities.²

In this environment, strong connections have been formed between specific ethnic (or religious) groups and political parties (or candidates). These connections are widespread across the entire country, in both urban and rural areas. Consequently, there is a prevailing belief that individuals within the same ethnic community tend to vote for a particular party because of their shared ethnic ties. For instance, it has been commonly assumed that the Balanta people vote for the Party for Social Renewal (*Partido da Renovação Social – PRS*), which was established by Kumba Yalá from the Balanta ethnic group and which became the third largest party as a result of the 2019 legislative election (see Ferreira, 2004; Temudo, 2009). Similarly, in the context of the 2019 national elections, it was expected that the Fula community would rally behind Embaló, owing to their shared ethnic identity with the candidate.³

Election campaign using coreligious and coethnic ties

Second, I shed light on the political parties and candidates to understand how they effectively utilize identity-based appeals to gain public support. Recognizing that voters attribute considerable importance to the identity profiles of parties and candidates, these political entities must establish strong connections with local populations to secure political support. For example, two campaign tactics have been employed. One is for political parties to dispatch

supporters who are knowledgeable and influential within local communities to each locality, with the aim of persuading residents to vote for their party (e.g. Temudo, 2009). Another is specific to the legislative elections, in which parties strategically select candidates who belong to the predominant ethnic group within each region or electoral unit and put them at the top of the party's list of candidates. Failing to use these tactics could result in difficulties securing votes from the majority of voters who share coethnic ties.⁴

While these campaign tactics have traditionally been employed by the PAIGC, its approach to political appeal based on religious or ethnic characteristics differs markedly from that of MADEM G15 and other parties. The PAIGC's political appeal does not overtly target any specific religion or ethnicity; instead, it is designed to uniformly gain support across the entire country, driven by a strategic vision to foster closer ties with every ethnic or religious group that constitutes the national population (cf. Rudebeck, 1972). In contrast, MADEM G15 and other parties represent particular religious or ethnic groups. Their political appeal is heavily biased toward these particular demographics to attract support only from them. In this context, one researcher commented, "PAIGC is a political party that systematically collects votes through election campaigns, but MADEM G15 is not a political party and collects votes through coethnic ties, without intelligence [meaning that MADEM G15 does not think carefully about its mobilization methods and simply takes advantage of coethnic ties without much thought]".⁵

Historical context for the emergence of identity-based parties

Third and lastly, I examine the historical context in which political parties emerged to practice identity-based political campaigns. The PAIGC's rule immediately after the country's independence was biased in favor of the Cape Verdeans, including Luís Cabral, the first president of Guinea-Bissau, whose parents were originally from Cabo Verde. To pursue their own political interests, members of other ethnic (or religious) groups sometimes organized political parties and struggled to control political power, ousting other groups from power. This subsection elaborates on the historical background behind this power struggle and its relevance to the emergence of the MADEM G15 in the 2019 national elections.

The ethnic cleavage in Guinea-Bissau has its roots in the historical confrontation between the Cape Verdeans and other ethnic groups. During the colonial period, the Cape Verdeans were appointed to most of the positions of local officers. This political domination by Cape Verdeans continued even after independence, and members of other ethnic groups, especially those who fought for the liberation war, complained about their unfair treatment (e.g. Forrest, 1987).

The political rule by Cape Verdeans was terminated in a coup led by João Bernardo Vieira in 1980. Following this successful coup, his ethnic group, the Papel, together with the Balanta, who played a main military role in the

liberation war, assumed leading positions within the administration (De Bruin, 2024; Embaló, 2012; Ostheimer, 2000). Although most Balanta officials were removed from office by 1985, the Balanta reemerged as a primary political force when the PRS won the 1999 national elections (O'Regan & Thompson, 2013). The rise of the Fula and Mandinka, or Muslims, within the political sphere of Guinea-Bissau may have originated from the same historical background, in which certain religious and ethnic groups were eliminated from the rule.⁶

Furthermore, according to my interviews with local experts, the exclusion of the Fula and Mandinka ethnic groups from political rule was linked to the mobilization strategy during the independence war. At that time, the leader Amílcar Cabral, who founded the PAIGC, categorized ethnic groups into two societies in terms of their social structures: the horizontally structured society, including the Balanta, Bijagos, and Felupe, and the vertically structured society, including the Fula, Mandinka, and Manjaco (cf. Temudo, 2008). To fight colonial power, he based his mobilization strategy on the assumption that it was easier to mobilize people from the horizontal societies who harbored thoughts of freedom from the dominant power, than the people from the vertical societies who were highly ordered and shared the colonial ideology. This mobilization strategy suggests that the failure of ethnic groups from vertical societies, such as the Fula and Mandinka, who make up the MADEM G15, to hold significant political power in the PAIGC polity after independence may have been due to ideology that favored ethnic groups from horizontal societies.⁷

Hypotheses on religious and ethnic voting in the 2019 elections

To summarize, political parties in Guinea-Bissau have strategically leveraged the identity profiles of political figures, including their religious beliefs and ethnic backgrounds, to garner support from demographic groups that share these characteristics. This strategy can be particularly effective in winning elections when parties manage to secure votes from the major groups, such as the Muslim and Fula in Guinea-Bissau. As highlighted in the preceding section, MADEM G15 and its presidential candidate, Embaló, seemed to have effectively mobilized support from the Muslim and/or Fula communities to which Embaló himself belongs. Focusing on MADEM G15 and Embaló in the context of the 2019 national elections, I then propose two hypotheses that Muslim and/or Fula voters are more likely to vote for the party/candidate who shares their religious and ethnic identities.

Hypothesis 1 (religious voting): MADEM G15 [Umaro Sissoco Embaló] received a larger share of votes in the 2019 legislative [presidential] election in electoral districts where a larger proportion of registered voters were Muslims.

Hypothesis 2 (ethnic voting): MADEM G15 [Umaro Sissoco Embaló] received a larger share of votes in the 2019 legislative [presidential] election in electoral districts where a larger proportion of registered voters were Fula.

Ideally, these hypotheses should be tested at the individual level, where the actual voting choices of voters who cast valid votes are known. However, in secret ballot elections, it is impossible to conduct analysis at this level because there is no data on who goes to the polls and which specific candidate each voter chooses. Therefore, in this research, I investigate religious and ethnic voting at the level of the electoral district (*Distrito Eleitoral* – DE). I aggregate the individual-level data into the electoral-district level and examine the overall relationship between demographic composition and the vote share won by each candidate at this level. In line with this approach, the two hypotheses are indicated at the electoral-district level.

Research design

I employ regression analysis using quantitative data to test these hypotheses. Key explanatory variables regarding religious and ethnic characteristics of eligible voters and control variables are derived from the individual-level data obtained as a result of voter registration for the 2019 national elections. Dependent variables regarding electoral votes for each political party and presidential candidate are derived from election result data at the level of the polling station (*Mesa de Assembleia de Voto* – MAV).

Unit of analysis

I aggregate these data on voter registration and election results by electoral district, and religious and ethnic voting are analyzed at this level. The electoral district is the smallest unit of analysis I can employ based on these data. For elections, Guinea-Bissau uses three specific units of different sizes: the electoral circle (*Círculo Eleitoral* – CE), the electoral district, and the polling station. Election result data is available for each polling station, which is the smallest unit. However, voter registration data is only available at the electoral-district level, and it is impossible to determine which polling station each registered voter is assigned to when an electoral district contains multiple polling stations.⁸ Therefore, I select the electoral district as the unit of analysis.⁹

Explanatory variables

This subsection introduces the explanatory variables employed in the regression analysis, including both key and control variables. These explanatory variables represent the demographic attributes of registered voters.

Specifically, the key explanatory variables indicate the religious and ethnic characteristics of registered voters, while the control variables capture other demographic features, such as age, profession, and area of residence. The individual information of registered voters is obtained from voter registration lists, and this individual-level data is aggregated to create variables at the electoral-district level for the regression analysis.

The voter registration lists used for the three national elections in 2019 were prepared by the Technical Support Office for the Electoral Process (*Gabinete Técnico de Apoio ao Processo Eleitoral – GTAPE*) through voter registration conducted between September and December 2018. The data on the voter registration lists was provided by the National Election Commission (*Comissão Nacional de Eleições – CNE*) for the purpose of this study, during my field visits to Bissau between 2018 and 2023.

In the electoral system of Guinea-Bissau, national citizens aged 18 or older are subject to voter registration. Upon successful registration, they are issued voter registration cards, which are required for them to vote in elections. The voter registration lists contain the same personal information as the voter registration cards,¹⁰ thus serving as the primary resource used by polling station staff and election observers from political parties to verify voters' identities on election days.¹¹

Using the data on registered voters introduces a potential challenge in examining the impact of actual voters' religious and ethnic attributes, as it may inadvertently capture the influence of individuals who abstained from casting valid votes. Registered voters include both those who participated in the election by casting their votes and those who abstained. Similarly, the voter registration data does not distinguish between those who cast valid votes and those who cast blank or null votes. As a result, the analysis cannot restrict the sample to voters who cast valid votes. It is thus difficult to precisely examine the relationship between religious and ethnic characteristics of actual voters and their vote choices.

However, by aggregating the data on registered voters, it is still possible to explore broader trends in the correlation between the characteristics of the entire population and the level of support for specific parties or candidates at the electoral-district level. While this approach may not provide insights into individual-level voting behavior, it does offer valuable insights into overall electoral dynamics and trends.

Figure 8.2 shows an example from a voter registration list. These lists are compiled for each populated place (*localidade*), which constitutes a geographical unit within the electoral district. Up to 18 registered voters are listed per page, with each rectangular box on the page representing a registered voter and containing a headshot and personal information.¹² As shown in Figure 8.2, this personal information includes the voter's card number (*No Cartão*), date of birth (*Data de Nascimento*), place of birth (*Local de Nascimento*), profession (*Profissão*), father's name (*Pai*), mother's name (*Mãe*), type of document used for registration (*Documento*) and its personal identification number (*Número*), area of residence (*Residência*), type of elections (*Tipo de Eleições*),¹³ and the voter's name (*Nome do Eleitor*). This individual-level data from the voter registration


	No Cartão :	001234567
	Data de Nascimento :	00/00/00
	Local de Nascimento :	
	Profissão :	000000000
	Pai :	0000000000000
	Mãe :	000000000
	Documento :	00000000000000000000
	Número :	000000000
	Residência :	00 - 000000
	Tipo de Eleições :	L P
Nome do Eleitor : 000000 0000		

Figure 8.2 Example of an entry from a voter registration list.
 Source: Voter registration list for the 2019 national elections in Guinea-Bissau.

lists is used to measure the religious beliefs, ethnicity, and other demographic features of registered voters, to be used as variables in this study, as follows.

First, I use the given names of registered voters to identify their religious characteristics. Assuming that those with Arabic-origin names, such as Umaro, the given name of the MADEM G15’s presidential candidate, are more likely to be Muslim, the percentage of registered voters with Arabic-origin names is calculated to determine the Muslim rate in each electoral district. The variable *Muslim rate* captures specific naming patterns and cultural backgrounds within each district, although those who have Arabic-origin names may not necessarily adhere to the Muslim faith, and conversely, those with non-Arabic-origin names may practice Islam.

Table 8.2 presents the most common given names among registered voters in Guinea-Bissau. These names are organized into categories based on their origins (Arabic-origin or non-Arabic-origin) and gender (male or female). Within each category, the ten most popular names are listed in Table 8.2. Generally, Arabic-origin names are more popular than non-Arabic-origin names because a significant portion, 45.1 percent according to the 2009 census (Instituto Nacional de Estatística, 2009), of the Bissau-Guinean population belongs to the Muslim faith. In the analysis, I focus on the top ten given names of Arabic origin, by gender, out of more than 57,000 different names, but these 20 Arabic-origin names still account for 18.57 percent of all registered voters.¹⁴

Second, I use the surnames of registered voters to identify their ethnic characteristics.¹⁵ Certain ethnic groups in Guinea-Bissau, including the Fula, have their own unique surnames. Specifically, I employ the following 19

Table 8.2 Arabic-origin and non-Arabic-origin given names of registered voters, by gender

<i>Arabic-origin names</i>		<i>Non-Arabic-origin names</i>	
Male	Female	Male	Female
Mamadu (2)	Mariama (1)	Domingos (18)	Maria (5)
Braima (4)	Fatumata (3)	Augusto (31)	Quinta (16)
Malam (9)	Aua (6)	Joao (32)	Sabado (17)
Amadu (11)	Cadi (7)	Antonio (36)	Segunda (23)
Mussa (20)	Binta (8)	Mario (37)	Domingas (24)
Bubacar (21)	Aissatu (10)	Jose (40)	Teresa (28)
Ussumane (22)	Maimuna (12)	Julio (41)	Ana (34)
Sadjo (26)	Adama (13)	Fernando (47)	Rosa (46)
Adulai (27)	Djenabu (14)	Quintino (54)	Isabel (51)
Umaro (29)	Fatu (15)	Carlos (59)	Helena (62)

Source: Voter registration list for the 2019 national elections in Guinea-Bissau.

Note: Ranks in the list of all names are in parentheses. The given names of the presidential candidates in the runoff round are indicated in boldface.

surnames to identify registered voters who, like the MADEM G15's presidential candidate, belong to the Fula ethnic group: Ba, Balde, Bari, Cande, Culubali, Dja, Djamanca, Djalo, Djau, Embaló, Jalo, Jau, Sabali, Sal, Sane, Seide, Si, Sidibe, and Ture.¹⁶ People with these surnames account for 23.47 percent of all registered voters. Given that the Fula people account for 28.5 percent of the population in Guinea-Bissau, according to the 2009 national census (Instituto Nacional de Estatística, 2009), these surnames cover most of the Fula people. I calculate the percentage of registered voters with these surnames in each electoral district to make the variable *Fula rate*.

Third, I collect five demographic attributes of registered voters at the individual level, using information other than voter names. *Age* indicates the voter's age in years and months in March 2019, when the legislative election was held. The categories used to indicate the professions of registered voters – *No Profession*, *Homemaker*, or *Farmer* – are dichotomous variables.¹⁷ *Registered by ID Card* is also a dichotomous variable indicating whether registered voters used an identification card (*bilhete de identidade*) for the registration process. It is expected that these registered voters are more likely to live in urban areas, where identification cards are administratively easier to obtain and, thus, more common.¹⁸ These attributes are transformed into either average values or percentages to create variables at the electoral-district level. In the regression models, the average voter age per electoral district is included as a control variable. Similarly, I include the percentage of registered voters for each type of profession and the percentage of those who registered by ID card.¹⁹

Table 8.3 presents a summary of voter registration data by region, which is the first-level administrative division of Guinea-Bissau, specifically indicating

Table 8.3 Summary of voter registration data by region

	<i>Tombali</i>	<i>Quinara</i>	<i>Oio</i>	<i>Biombo</i>	<i>B. Bijagós</i>
Electoral districts	145	92	302	120	58
Polling stations	212	158	521	198	77
Populated places	439	309	847	215	241
Registered voters	39,704	31,920	109,179	50,490	17,267
Arabic-origin names (%)	19.13%	17.63%	18.47%	4.41%	8.26%
Non-Arabic-origin names (%)	9.56%	8.78%	11.14%	15.08%	18.53%
Fula names (%)	13.74%	7.46%	13.26%	4.72%	3.23%

	<i>Bafatá</i>	<i>Gabú</i>	<i>Cacheu</i>	<i>Emigração</i>	<i>Bissau</i>	<i>Total</i>
Electoral districts	288	297	283	20	407	2,012
Polling stations	458	426	407	54	645	3,156
Populated places	1,146	847	840	40	419	5,343
Registered voters	100,961	96,811	90,092	16,990	207,659	761,073
Arabic-origin names (%)	30.00%	37.13%	8.76%	13.27%	13.43%	18.57%
Non-Arabic-origin names (%)	3.75%	1.10%	15.63%	11.78%	10.72%	9.56%
Fula names (%)	51.53%	66.49%	5.12%	16.33%	14.27%	23.47%

Source: The numbers of electoral districts and polling stations are based on election results data, while the numbers of populated places and registered voters and the percentages of the registered voters who have specific religious or ethnic names are based on voter registration data.

Note: Owing to data availability, 13 electoral districts are combined with other districts. Bissau = Sector Autónomo de Bissau.

voters' religious and ethnic characteristics. The data extracted from the voter registration lists represents 761,073 registered voters who lived in 5,343 populated places encompassing 3,156 polling stations and 2,012 electoral districts in total.²⁰

As found by the 2009 national census, there are more registered voters with Muslim and/or Fula names in the east regions of Guinea-Bissau, such as Bafatá and Gabú, while there is a smaller number of voters with such names in the Biombo, Bolama Bijagós, and Cacheu regions. The rates of Muslim and Fula registered voters at the electoral-district level have a strong positive correlation because 88 percent of the Fula profess the Islamic faith, according to the 2009 census (Instituto Nacional de Estatística, 2009).

Dependent variables and estimation strategy

This subsection provides details on the dependent variables and estimation models used in the regression analysis. The dependent variables represent the share of the votes received by specific parties and presidential candidates in the 2019 legislative and presidential elections, measured at the electoral-district level. To test the hypotheses, I focus on the vote shares for MADEM G15 and Embaló. Additionally, for comparison, I examine the vote shares of their main opponents, the PAIGC and Pereira.

Note that Guinea-Bissau uses a closed-list system of proportional representation in its legislative elections, in which voters express their preference for a single party rather than an individual candidate. This system allows the vote share for each party in the legislative election to be examined. In its presidential elections, Guinea-Bissau employs a two-round system, in which two candidates advance to the second round if no candidate obtains a majority of votes in the first round. Since there were two rounds in the 2019 presidential election, I use the data from both rounds in the analysis.

I calculate the share of the votes received by each party and candidate, based on the election result data at the polling station level. The data was provided by the CNE. I refer to different data sources for each type of election, as detailed below.

The legislative election data is from the provisional results published by the Regional Election Commission (*Comissão Regional de Eleições – CRE*) of each domestic region.²¹ The non-provisional, official results of the legislative election were only available at the electoral-circle level. When comparing the number of votes obtained by each party at the electoral-circle level, the primary difference between the provisional results and the official results lies in whether protest votes remained as protest votes or were counted as null votes. While there are minor differences in the number of votes for certain parties, these differences were seen in only three of the 27 electoral circles within the country, and moreover, the size of these differences was less than 10 percent of the total votes obtained by the respective party. Thus, using the provisional data does not significantly affect the analysis result.

The presidential election data is from a mirror of the official data (*espelho da acta*), showing the results of the first and second rounds in all the domestic and foreign constituencies. Using these data on the results of legislative and presidential elections, I calculate the vote share of each party and presidential candidate to the number of registered voters at the electoral-district level.²²

To test the hypotheses regarding the relationship between the demographic features and the voting choices of registered voters, I employ ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions with robust standard errors. The estimation models include dummy variables, each of which is coded as one for the sector where an electoral district is located, to take into account potential heterogeneity across sectors.²³ To compare regression results for the three election rounds, I focus on the electoral districts within the domestic constituencies of Guinea-Bissau and exclude foreign constituencies because of their lack of legislative election results.²⁴

Pros and cons of the methodology

Actual election data has rarely been used to explore the presence of religious or ethnic voting. Most existing studies in this field have relied on methods such as exit polls (e.g. Hoffman & Long, 2013; Long & Gibson, 2015), surveys (e.g. Ferree, 2006; Lindberg & Morrison, 2008), and choice experiments (e.g. Adida et al., 2017; Auerbach & Thachil, 2018; Carlson, 2015; Chau-chard, 2016; Ferree et al., 2021).²⁵ These methods afford researchers access to data on individual voting behavior and personal information, including religious and ethnic characteristics, as researchers directly query each subject about these aspects. In contrast, the actual data on election results lacks information on individual voting choices, owing to ballot secrecy, and only provides aggregated results. Similarly, the data on voter registration does not explicitly reveal voters' self-identified religious or ethnic affiliations, requiring estimations based on other available information.

Despite these limitations, the use of real election data offers distinct advantages over other types of data. The actual election data employed in this study allows us to capture the real electoral landscape, across the entire country. The primary aim of this research is to provide insights into the influence of religious and ethnic characteristics on voters, based on their actual behavior rather than that observed in survey or experiment settings. The methods used in the literature, such as exit polls, surveys, and experiments, may cause subjects to answer or behave differently from when they actually vote and may not accurately reflect actual election scenarios. Moreover, while it may be claimed that the subjects sampled using these methods are nationally representative, they do not encompass the entire population of voters in the country. In this regard, the data employed in this study provide more comprehensive information about registered voters throughout the territory and their voting choices under real election conditions. Therefore, it is essential to analyze the actual election data provided for this research to gain an understanding of how religious and ethnic voting really operates in the politics of Guinea-Bissau.

Analysis

In this section, I first present the regression results and then address their implications for the situation of political instability in Guinea-Bissau.²⁶ The regression analysis is conducted separately to investigate religious voting and ethnic voting. Tables 8.4 and 8.5 present the respective results.

Religious voting

Table 8.4 presents the results of the OLS regressions regarding religious voting. Models 1–6 differ in terms of dependent variables. The first three models regress on the vote shares for MADEM G15 and Embaló, while the latter three models regress on the vote shares for PAIGC and Pereira.

In Models 1–3, the Muslim rate is positively correlated with the vote shares for MADEM G15 and Embaló in all three national elections, with statistical significance at the 0.01 level. These results correspond to the expectation indicated in the hypothesis that MADEM G15 and Embaló tended to receive a larger share of the vote in electoral districts with a higher proportion of Muslim residents.

In concrete terms, in the legislative election, for example, the vote share for MADEM G15 increased by 4.40 percentage points when the Muslim rate of registered voters increased by 10 percentage points, with all else being equal. The most significant impact of the Muslim rate was observed in the first round of the presidential election, where an increase of 10 percentage points in the Muslim rate resulted in a 7.44 percentage point increase in MADEM G15's vote share. However, this impact diminished between the first and second rounds, because MADEM G15 successfully obtained support even in electoral districts with lower Muslim rates during the second round.

Models 4–6 concerning the vote shares for the PAIGC and Pereira present both similar and different results compared to Models 1–3. In Models 4 and 5, the coefficients for the Muslim rate are positive and statistically significant. In contrast, in Model 6, the coefficient for the Muslim rate is negative and not statistically significant. These findings suggest that the PAIGC and Pereira may also have received positive support from Muslim voters, but this impact was only evident in the legislative election and the first round of the presidential election.

Focusing on the results from Models 4 and 5, these findings seem to indicate that the religious characteristics of supporters were not distinctly aligned with specific political parties, given that MADEM G15 and Embaló received a larger share of the vote in the districts with higher Muslim rates. Nevertheless, an in-depth exploration of the results reveals that the impact of Muslim voters appeared to have had a more substantial impact on the vote shares of MADEM G15 and Embaló than of the PAIGC and Pereira.

A careful comparison of the coefficient sizes reveals that the impact of the Muslim rate was greater for MADEM G15 and Embaló than for the PAIGC

Table 8.4 OLS regression results on religious voting

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5		Model 6	
	MADEM	Embaló	Embaló	Embaló	Embaló	PAIGC	PAIGC	PAIGC	Pereira	Pereira	Pereira	Pereira
		Round 1	Round 1	Round 2	Round 2				Round 1	Round 1	Round 2	Round 2
Muslim rate	0.440*** (0.036)	0.744*** (0.031)	0.273*** (0.037)	0.166*** (0.030)	0.124*** (0.033)				0.006*** (0.002)	0.006*** (0.002)	-0.003 (0.036)	-0.003 (0.036)
Average age	0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.002)	0.003** (0.001)	0.006*** (0.002)				0.006*** (0.002)	0.006*** (0.002)	0.006*** (0.002)	0.006*** (0.002)
No profession rate	-0.041*** (0.015)	0.005 (0.015)	0.041** (0.019)	-0.025 (0.017)	-0.037** (0.018)				-0.037** (0.018)	-0.037** (0.018)	-0.034 [§] (0.019)	-0.034 [§] (0.019)
Homemaker rate	0.032 (0.030)	0.032 (0.026)	0.027 (0.030)	-0.021 (0.026)	-0.009 (0.029)				-0.009 (0.029)	-0.009 (0.029)	-0.006 (0.030)	-0.006 (0.030)
Farmer rate	-0.229*** (0.049)	0.042 (0.044)	0.072 (0.055)	-0.095** (0.044)	-0.157*** (0.052)				-0.157*** (0.052)	-0.157*** (0.052)	-0.065 (0.054)	-0.065 (0.054)
ID card rate for registration	0.012 (0.019)	-0.101*** (0.017)	-0.279*** (0.023)	0.237*** (0.020)	0.182*** (0.021)				0.182*** (0.021)	0.182*** (0.021)	0.153*** (0.023)	0.153*** (0.023)
Constant	0.087* (0.045)	0.037 (0.038)	0.456*** (0.060)	0.041 (0.052)	-0.024 (0.058)				-0.024 (0.058)	-0.024 (0.058)	0.031 (0.063)	0.031 (0.063)
Sector dummy variables	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
N	1,926	1,958	1,959	1,926	1,958	1,926	1,926	1,926	1,958	1,958	1,959	1,959
R ²	0.410	0.763	0.526	0.664	0.595	0.664	0.664	0.664	0.595	0.595	0.538	0.538

Source: Voter registration list and election results data for the 2019 national elections in Guinea-Bissau.
 Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

and Pereira. For example, the coefficient for the Muslim rate is 0.440 in Model 1 for MADEM G15, while the coefficient is 0.166 in Model 4 for the PAIGC. Moreover, the coefficient for the Muslim rate on Pereira's vote share is not only smaller but also negative and statistically insignificant in Model 6. Compared with the results of Models 2 and 5, which suggest that both Embaló and Pereira received more political support from the Muslim community in the first round of the presidential election, the results of Models 3 and 6 imply a shift in the preferences of some Muslim voters toward Embaló rather than Pereira in the second round.

Ethnic voting

Table 8.5 presents the results of the OLS regressions regarding ethnic voting. As with Table 8.4, Models 7–12 differ in terms of dependent variables. With regard to the legislative election, Model 7 shows that, in contrast to the hypotheses, the Fula rate is negatively correlated with the MADEM G15's vote share. In contrast, Model 10 reveals that the Fula rate is positively correlated with the PAIGC's vote share. It indicates that the Fula people provided more political support to the PAIGC than to MADEM G15 in the legislative election. This result may be due to the ethnicity of MADEM G15's national coordinator, Braima Camará. He belongs to the Mandinka ethnic group unlike Embaló, and MADEM G15 might be perceived as representing the Mandinka, not the Fula.²⁷

Regarding the presidential election, however, the Fula rate shows a positive correlation with Embaló's vote share but a negative correlation or no correlation with Pereira's vote share. This result suggests that, as hypothesized, the Fula were more likely to support Embaló, than Pereira, in the presidential election. Furthermore, the Fula people became more decisive in supporting Embaló in the second round. In Models 8 and 11, for the first round, the impact of the Fula rate is significant for Embaló but not significant for Pereira. In Models 9 and 12, for the second round, both the coefficients of the Fula rate are statistically significant; but the Fula rate has a positive impact on Embaló's vote share and negative one on Pereira's.

Results regarding control variables

Beyond the religious and ethnic characteristics of registered voters, Tables 8.4 and 8.5 reveal other dimensions of the political environment in Guinea-Bissau. For example, vote shares for the PAIGC and Pereira were higher in electoral districts where elderly voters were more likely to reside. Moreover, and especially in the second round of the presidential election, Embaló received more political support in electoral districts where a greater proportion of voters had no profession, whereas Pereira received a smaller vote share in these districts. Similarly, Embaló received more political support in rural areas, whereas the PAIGC and Pereira received more political support

Table 8.5 OLS regression results on ethnic voting

	Model 7		Model 8		Model 9		Model 10		Model 11		Model 12	
	MADEM		Embaló		Embaló		PAIGC		Pereira		Pereira	
			Round 1	Round 2	Round 1	Round 2	Round 1	Round 2	Round 1	Round 2	Round 1	Round 2
Fula rate	-0.065*** (0.019)		0.195*** (0.019)	0.102*** (0.017)			0.042*** (0.014)			-0.005 (0.016)		-0.059*** (0.017)
Average age	-0.002 (0.001)		-0.002** (0.001)	-0.000 (0.002)			0.002* (0.001)			0.005*** (0.002)		0.005*** (0.002)
No profession rate	-0.048*** (0.016)		-0.017 (0.016)	0.032* (0.019)			-0.030* (0.017)			-0.039** (0.018)		-0.033 [⊗] (0.019)
Homemaker rate	0.063** (0.030)		0.068** (0.030)	0.039 (0.031)			-0.012 (0.026)			-0.002 (0.029)		-0.004 (0.030)
Farmer rate	-0.326*** (0.054)		-0.140*** (0.052)	0.002 (0.056)			-0.137*** (0.043)			-0.184*** (0.052)		-0.059 (0.053)
ID card rate for registration	0.012 (0.020)		-0.085*** (0.019)	-0.272*** (0.023)			0.241*** (0.020)			0.183*** (0.022)		0.151*** (0.023)
Constant	0.270*** (0.049)		0.185*** (0.042)	0.495*** (0.059)			0.074 (0.051)			0.018 (0.058)		0.059 (0.062)
Sector dummy variables	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
N	1,926		1,958	1,959			1,926			1,958		1,959
R ²	0.344		0.697	0.521			0.660			0.592		0.541

Source: Voter registration list and election results data for the 2019 national elections in Guinea-Bissau.
 Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

in urban areas, where people used identification cards to register to vote. Lastly, MADEM G15 [Embaló] and the PAIGC [Pereira] received less political support from farmers, who might be more likely to vote for other parties, such as the PRS, the third largest party.

Implications for political instability

As expected, this analysis reveals that voters tended to respond to political appeals made by parties and candidates based on religious and ethnic characteristics. These campaign strategies and voting behaviors strongly influence political instability in Guinea-Bissau.

First, as no single religious or ethnic group constitutes a majority of the population, parties cannot independently secure a parliamentary majority through the support of any single group in the country. As a consequence, parties seek to form coalitions to achieve a parliamentary majority after elections. However, these attempts to form coalitions often prove unsuccessful, and internal conflicts can arise within coalitions, even after agreements have been made. Owing to these problems, the composition of the majority may switch between coalitions, or the government may be repeatedly reorganized, ultimately undermining the effective functioning of the parliament and the government.²⁸ This unstable governance is attributable, in part, to the parties' reliance on specific religious and ethnic groups and the responses of voters to such political appeals.

Second, identity-based politics can lead to confrontations between different demographic groups. The parties relying on specific religious and ethnic groups aim to secure votes by catering to their respective target groups. If successful in elections, these parties may implement policies in favor of specific groups to continue to bolster support from them. Such policies can lead to dissatisfaction and grievances from those not benefiting. Consequently, identity-based politics threatens national cohesion and may escalate into political violence between different demographic groups; for example, Guinea-Bissau experienced several coups d'état in its history. The current research, which indicates the existence of religious and ethnic voting, suggests the possibility of further political instability in Guinea-Bissau.

Conclusion

This study provides systematic evidence of religious and ethnic voting in Guinea-Bissau and makes a valuable scholarly contribution to understanding the dynamics of identity-based voting in the country. Regression analysis has been undertaken using data on voter registration and election results, and clearly indicates that there was voting based on religious and ethnic characteristics in the 2019 national elections in Guinea-Bissau. The findings demonstrate significant correlations between registered voters' religious and ethnic characteristics and voting results, particularly the impact of Muslim

and Fula voters on the vote shares for MADEM G15 and Embaló, at the electoral-district level. To my knowledge, this research offers the first examination of religious and ethnic voting in Guinea-Bissau using quantitative data.

This research opens avenues for further study in two main areas. First, it would be valuable to examine the correlations between religious and ethnic characteristics and vote choices at the individual level. The major limitations of this analysis are the data aggregation at the electoral-district level, and the simplistic estimation of personal religious beliefs and ethnicity based on voters' names. Future research could benefit from other methods, such as field surveys or experiments, to collect information regarding individual demographics and voting behavior.

Second, it would also be enlightening to further investigate the motivations behind voting for parties such as MADEM G15 and candidates like Embaló (or others). While the present analysis demonstrates significant correlations between demographic characteristics and voting results, it does not delve into the underlying motivations that drive voters to choose candidates who share their religious and ethnic identities. Future research needs to explore, for instance, whether election campaigns play a significant role in influencing voters' preferences, or whether voters choose candidates based on familiarity with religious and ethnic characteristics, regardless of election campaign efforts. This exploration could shed light on the mechanisms through which identity-based politics shape electoral outcomes in Guinea-Bissau.

On June 4, 2023, Guinea-Bissau held its first legislative election since the 2019 elections, which were the primary focus of this chapter. Like the 2019 elections, the 2023 legislative election was characterized by the identity politics employed by political parties. Notably, the emergence of the Guinean Laborers' Party (*Partido dos Trabalhadores Guineenses* – PTG), which was established in 2021, highlighted that identity-based campaign strategies have taken root in this country's political landscape. Since this new party was led by Botche Candé from the Fula ethnic group, it was expected to share the Muslim vote with MADEM G15, including those from the Fula and Mandinka populations. Given the differences in ethnic representation between these two parties, it was believed that the PTG would attract the Fula votes, while MADEM G15 would represent the Mandinka ethnic group, owing to the leadership of Camará.

The results of the 2023 legislative election revealed the political strength of parties like MADEM G15 and PTG, which appear to have received substantial support from specific ethnic groups. A majority of seats was won by a coalition of parties led by the PAIGC, the Inclusive Alliance Platform Coalition – Terra Ranka (*Coligação Plataforma Aliança Inclusiva – Terra Ranka – PAI Terra Lanka*). However, the PTG won six seats in its first election, and MADEM G15 secured 29 seats, out of 102 seats in the National People's Assembly (*Assembleia Nacional Popular*: ANP). These results suggest that religious and ethnic voting observed in the 2019 elections will continue and will have an enduring impact on the political landscape of Guinea-Bissau. Therefore, it is important to further examine these religious and ethnic influences and any shifts in voting behaviors among the population in the elections of 2023 and in the future.

Notes

- 1 The assumption that MADEM G15 and Embaló similarly represented the Muslim and Fula groups may be simplistic. MADEM G15 was generally perceived as a party closely tied to the Mandinka ethnic group, unlike its presidential candidate Embaló, because its national coordinator, Braima Camará, belongs to the Mandinka ethnic group.
- 2 Interview with a researcher via social networking service on March 19, 2023.
- 3 Interview with a researcher in Lisbon, Portugal, on March 31, 2023.
- 4 Interview with an official, at the CNE office in Bissau, Guinea-Bissau, on March 28, 2023.
- 5 Interview with a researcher, at the National Institute of Studies and Research (*Instituto Nacional de Estudos e Pesquisa*: INEP) in Bissau, Guinea-Bissau, on March 20, 2023.
- 6 Embaló's political practice is corroborative of this explanation. According to an interview with a researcher in Bissau, Guinea-Bissau, on March 20, 2023, Embaló has attempted to eliminate all the national symbols and destroy the national cohesion created under the PAIGC administration; for example, everyone in Guinea-Bissau used to address one another using the traditional honorific *Camarada*, but it now has the political connotation of being a supporter of the PAIGC. In contrast, Yalá's administration of the PRS sought to avoid marginalizing Muslims, especially the Fula, from the political sphere (Ostheimer, 2001).
- 7 Interviews with a researcher at the INEP in Bissau, Guinea-Bissau, on March 27 and 29, 2023, and a researcher at the Universidade Colinas de Boé in Bissau, Guinea-Bissau, on March 30, 2023.
- 8 As detailed below, voter registration lists are compiled for each populated place, which is a geographical component unit of Guinea-Bissau and constitutes an electoral district. However, election result data is not available at the populated place level, and thus, I did not opt for the populated place as the unit of analysis.
- 9 The online Appendix shows the distribution of the number of registered voters within electoral districts.
- 10 Some information, such as a voter's gender and marital status, was only written on the voter registration cards, but not on the lists.
- 11 The CNE shares the results of voter registration upon requests from candidates, political parties, and alliances of the parties, according to Article 30 of the Voter Registration Law.
- 12 Populated places include city areas (*bairros*) and villages (*tabancas*). The number displayed at the top of each headshot corresponds to an identification number assigned within a specific list for a populated place. Registered voters within each list are organized in alphabetical order, and they are sequentially numbered according to this order.
- 13 "L P" stands for legislative (*legislativa*) and presidential (*presidenciais*) elections and appears for all registered voters on the voter registration lists. As it indicates, registered voters used the same cards in the 2019 legislative and presidential elections.
- 14 I define a given name as the name that appears before the first white space in the full name. Note that the 25th most popular given name within the list of all names, Mama, is not used for this analysis because it is sometimes part of given names such as Mama Saliu, Mama Samba, and Mama Saidu.
- 15 Bowles et al. (2020) used surnames of registered voters to measure polling station homogeneity in Liberia.
- 16 This information is based on an interview with a CNE official who belongs to the Fula ethnic group. I ignore diacritical marks for the given names and surnames to code the variables. A surname is defined as the name that appears after the last white space in the full name, typically the father's surname.

- 17 At the individual-level dataset, these three variables are each coded as one if the registered voter was without a profession (*sem profissão*), homemaker (*doméstica*), or farmer (*lavrador*), respectively. Spelling errors in all three of these profession types are reflected in the coding, as far as I am aware.
- 18 According to Article 22 of the Voter Registration Law, registration must be carried out by presenting an identification card, but other documents, such as a passport (*passaporte*), personal certificate (*cedula pessoal*), or testimonial proof (*testemunha*), are also allowed.
- 19 The online Appendix presents the regional distribution of registered voters by age, profession, and type of registration document used.
- 20 The number of registered voters in the study's dataset differs from the official number, 761,676.
- 21 I could not obtain the same data for foreign constituencies.
- 22 Out of the 3,102 polling stations within domestic constituencies, 19 have no election results for at least one round of the 2019 elections. Consequently, the 17 electoral districts containing these polling stations are excluded from the analysis. Additionally, ten electoral districts in Pitche, Gabú, are not included in the analysis, owing to discrepancies in the number of registered voters between the voter registration data and the election result data.
- 23 The sector is the second-level administrative division of Guinea-Bissau, following the region. An electoral district must all be within a single sector. In the analysis, Bissau is divided into six sectors based on the electoral circles within it.
- 24 The online Appendix provides the descriptive statistics of the variables I use for the regression analysis and a few plots to visually check the correlations between the Muslim and Fula rates and the vote shares for MADEM G15 and Embaló.
- 25 One exception is Ichino and Nathan (2013), who used census and polling station data on voters' demographic characteristics and election results, but their analysis focused on only one region of Ghana and not the entire country.
- 26 The online Appendix provides a further discussion about the interpretation of the analysis results.
- 27 The analysis result shows that the MADEM G15's vote share in the legislative election does not have a positive correlation with the Fula rate of registered voters; rather, the result shows that the MADEM G15's vote share is negatively correlated with the Fula rate. This result may be attributed to the historical reluctance of the Fula population to vote for the Mandinka party, which is discussed in the online Appendix.
- 28 For example, Shaw and Gomes (2020) and Toupane et al. (2019) provided details about the political crisis before and after the 2019 elections in Guinea-Bissau.

Acknowledgments

The author wishes to thank the editors, Susumu Annaka, Carlos Cardoso, Idríça Djaló, Bucar Indjai, Zeca Jandi, João José Huco Monteiro, Rui Jorge Semedo, and the participants of the International Seminar on the (In)stability in Guinea-Bissau (October 14, 2022, Lisbon) and the Waseda University Workshop on Experimental Political Science (February 28, 2023, Tokyo) for granting interviews and for their helpful comments. I am also grateful to those who supported my field research in Guinea-Bissau, especially Takashi Nagatsuji. This research was funded by the Sub-Saharan Africa Scholarship Fund from the Africa Society of Japan.

References

- Adida, C., Gottlieb, J., Kramon, E. & McClendon, G. (2017). Reducing or reinforcing in-group preferences? An experiment on information and ethnic voting. *Quarterly Journal of Political Science*, 12(4), 437–477.
- Auerbach, A. M. & Thachil, T. (2018). How clients select brokers: Competition and choice in India's slums. *American Political Science Review*, 112(4), 775–791.
- Bates, R. H. (1974). Ethnic competition and modernization in contemporary Africa. *Comparative Political Studies*, 6(4), 457–484.
- BBC News Afrique (2019). Second tour de l'élection présidentielle en Guinée-Bissau. www.bbc.com/afrique/monde-50939394 (Accessed November 24, 2023).
- Bowles, J., Larreguy, H. & Liu, S. (2020). How weakly institutionalized parties monitor brokers in developing democracies: Evidence from postconflict Liberia. *American Journal of Political Science*, 64(4), 952–967.
- Carlson, E. (2015). Ethnic voting and accountability in Africa: A choice experiment in Uganda. *World Politics*, 67(2), 335–385.
- Chauchard, S. (2016). Unpacking ethnic preferences: Theory and micro-level evidence from North India. *Comparative Political Studies*, 49(2), 253–284.
- Darame, B. (2019). Guiné-Bissau: “Maioria dos candidatos sem manifestos”. <https://p.dw.com/p/3TG2F> (Accessed November 24, 2023).
- De Bruin, E. (2024). Power sharing and coups d'état in postconflict settings: Evidence from Burundi and Guinea-Bissau. *Armed Forces & Society*, 50(1), 274–293
- e-Global Notícias em Português (2019). Guiné-Bissau: “Se eu for candidato à presidência, o DSP votará em mim”, diz Umaro Sissoko. <https://eglobal.pt/noticias/lusofonia/guine-bissau/guine-bissau-se-eu-forcandidato-a-presidencia-o-dsp-votara-em-mim-diz-umaro-sissoko> (Accessed November 24, 2023).
- Embaló, B. (2012). Civil-military relations and political order in Guinea-Bissau. *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 50(2), 253–281.
- Ferree, K. E. (2006). Explaining South Africa's racial census. *Journal of Politics*, 68(4), 803–815.
- Ferree, K. E., Gibson, C.C. & Long, J. D. (2021). Mixed records, complexity, and ethnic voting in African elections. *World Development*, 141, 105418.
- Ferreira, P. M. (2004). Guinea-Bissau: Between conflict and democracy. *African Security Studies*, 13(4), 44–56.
- Forrest, J. B. (1987). Guinea-Bissau since independence: A decade of domestic power struggles. *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 25(1), 95–116.
- Hoffman, B. D. & Long, J. D. (2013). Parties, ethnicity, and voting in African elections. *Comparative Politics*, 45(2), 127–146.
- Horowitz, D. L. (2000). *Ethnic Groups in Conflict: Updated Edition with a New Preface*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Ichino, N. & Nathan, N. L. (2013). Crossing the line: Local ethnic geography and voting in Ghana. *American Political Science Review*, 107(2), 344–361.
- Instituto Nacional de Estatística (2009). *Terceiro recenseamento geral da população e habitação – 2009: Características socioculturais*. www.stat-guineebissau.com/Menu_principal/IV_RGPH/RGPH.html (Accessed November 24, 2023).
- Kohl, C. (2018). *A Creole Nation: National Integration in Guinea-Bissau*. New York: Berghahn Books.
- Lindberg, S. I. & Morrison, M. K. C. (2008). Are African voters really ethnic or clientelistic? Survey evidence from Ghana. *Political Science Quarterly*, 123(1), 95–122.

- Long, J. D. & Gibson, C. C. (2015). Evaluating the roles of ethnicity and performance in African elections: Evidence from an exit poll in Kenya. *Political Research Quarterly*, 68(4), 830–842.
- Nhaga, A. (2019). *Voto étnico e religioso vai definir novo presidente na Guiné-Bissau*. www.dn.pt/edicao-do-dia/29-dez-2019/votosetnico-e-religioso-vai-defnir-novo-presidente-na-guine-bissau11655504.html (Accessed November 24, 2023).
- O'Regan, D. & Thompson, P. (2013). Advancing stability and reconciliation in Guinea-Bissau: Lessons from Africa's first narco-state. *ACSS Special Report: A Publication of the Africa Center for Strategic Studies* (2).
- Ostheimer, A. E. (2000). Guinea-Bissau's rocky path to peace and democracy. *South African Journal of International Affairs*, 7(1), 107–121.
- Ostheimer, A. E. (2001). The structural crisis in Guinea-Bissau's political system. *African Security Review*, 10(4), 45–58.
- Posner, D. N. (2005). *Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Rudebeck, L. (1972). Political mobilisation for development in Guinea-Bissau. *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 10(1), 1–18.
- Shaw, M. & Gomes, A. (2020). *Breaking the vicious cycle: Cocaine politics in Guinea-Bissau*. Global Initiative Against Transitional Organized Crime.
- Temudo, M. P. (2008). From “people's struggle” to “this war of today”: Entanglements of peace and conflict in Guinea-Bissau. *Africa*, 78(2), 245–263.
- Temudo, M. P. (2009). From the margins of the state to the presidential palace: The Balanta case in Guinea-Bissau. *African Studies Review*, 52(2), 47–67.
- Toupane, P. M., Kanté, A. & Faye, A. K. (2019). Guinea-Bissau: Priorities for long-term stability. West Africa Report 22. Institute for Security Studies.
- Vaz, N. & Rotzoll, I. C. (2005). Presidential elections in Guinea Bissau 2005: A stabilizing factor in a fragile democracy or only a spot test of the state of affairs? *Africa Spectrum*, 40(3), 535–546.