Emerging Varieties of Resilience

Experiences from Germany, Poland and Ukraine

Edited by Maciej Stępka, Agata Mazurkiewicz and Marco Krüger

First published 2026

ISBN: 978-1-032-82161-0 (hbk)
ISBN: 978-1-003-50325-5 (ebk)

6 Resilience and self-organisation of the Polish migration governance system

Experiences from the first months of the "Ukrainian refugee crisis" of 2022

Maciej Stępka

DOI: 10.4324/9781003503255-6

The funder of the Open Access version of this chapter is the Faculty of International and Political Studies under the Strategic Programme Excellence Initiative at Jagiellonian University

Routledge
Taylor & Francis Group
LONDON AND NEW YORK

6 Resilience and self-organisation of the Polish migration governance system

Experiences from the first months of the "Ukrainian refugee crisis" of 2022*

Maciej Stępka

6.1 Introduction

After the Russian invasion in Ukraine on 24 February 2022, Poland became one of the frontline states and a key destination for Ukrainians seeking refuge from war (Mazurkiewicz and Michnik 2023). In the first four months of the invasion, Poland witnessed an unprecedented influx of approximately 3.5 million people (TVN24 2022a), primarily women and children, often crossing the border on foot and requiring immediate assistance (Duszczyk and Kaczmarczyk 2022b:164).[1] The volume of refugees alone put the Polish migration governance system[2] under extreme stress, turning into the biggest migratory crisis in modern Polish history. At the same time, it tested the resilience of the system as well as the state's and society's ability to provide help and shelter to the Ukrainian people.

Resilience has become a new "leitmotif" in security and political studies, influencing, among other things, migration, asylum, and border governance (Paul and Roos 2019). In this chapter, resilience is understood as "the process of patterned adjustments adopted in the face of endogenous or exogenous shocks" (Bourbeau 2015a:1962). It could be construed as the ability of a state, system, or individual to absorb shocks and disturbances; maintain its basic functions under extreme stress; and, if needed, bounce back (Manyena 2006). In the case of Europe, the events of the so-called "migration crisis" of 2015 have already shown the crucial role of resilience of the migration governance system during mass inflows of refugees. As argued by Niemann and Zaun, we do not witness migration crises per se but crises of migration, border, and asylum systems, which collapse under stress, unable to accommodate increased inflows and migrants and refugees (2018).

In 2022, the Polish approach to the management of migration and borders could best be described as securitised and driven by the politics of fear (Jaskułowski 2019; Kabata and Jacobs 2022). The government was controlled by the right-wing Law and Justice party, which became known for being one of the most ardent anti-immigrant voices in the EU (Tomczak-Boczko, Gołębiowska, and Górny

* Open Access of this chapter has been supported by a grant from the Faculty of International and Political Studies under the Strategic Programme Excellence Initiative at Jagiellonian University.

DOI: 10.4324/9781003503255-6

2023; Vaagland and Chmiel 2023). The party was famous for employing exclusionary and securitising rhetoric against immigrants and refugees, using it as a political tool for the legitimisation of discriminatory security practices in regard to migration and border management policies (Kabata and Jacobs 2022; Klaus and Szulecka 2022). Building on the idea of Fortress Europe, Poland, among many other EU member states, designed its migration governance system specifically for deterring and curbing migratory and refugee inflows, rather than accommodating large volumes of people seeking help (Adamczyk 2017). This left the system vulnerable to the type of scenarios that did not include detention, control, and deportation of immigrants (see Niedźwiedzki et al. 2021).

Additionally, the government of the Law and Justice party proved itself an incompetent crisis manager, dismantling important elements of civil defence, mismanaging public resources and strategic reserves, antagonising non-governmental agencies, and erratically changing migration and crisis management laws (Jasiecki 2023). All this resulted in the emergence of the so called "Cardboard State" – a state controlled by façade and ineffectual government and its agencies, entrenched in a position of power and unwilling and/or unable to deal with complex crises (Styczyńska and Zubek 2023). This only contributed to a perception that the Polish migration governance system would collapse during the first months of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, unable and unwilling to accommodate Ukrainian refugees.

Yet, the system did not collapse, and Ukrainian refugees, to varying degrees, found their way to safety, receiving assistance and shelter. The system withstood the migratory shock and continued to function, despite deeply rooted structural deficiencies such as limited space for accommodation of refugees and/or lack of material reserves or proper legal frameworks (Jarosz and Klaus 2023). While the government did try do adapt to new circumstances, during the first days and weeks of the invasion, the key to the system's resilience lay in not the governmental actions but the self-organisation of non-governmental actors, ad hoc groups, and individuals, who strengthened the system using their own resources. Consequently, it is the element of self-organisation that created much-needed space and gave the Polish government time to adjust and adapt the legal and economic frameworks for long-term assistance and support of Ukrainian refugees.

In this chapter, I will trace instances of self-organisation within the Polish migration governance system, explaining how it contributed to the system's resilience during the first months of the so-called "Ukrainian refugee crisis." The analysis focuses on answering the following questions: How did self-organisation manifest within the system? What were the pre-conditions and the nature of self-organisation? How did it influence the adaptability of the system? The chapter builds on qualitative data, driven by content analysis of official reports of governmental and non-governmental agencies involved in the management of Ukrainian refugee inflows as well as publicly available witness accounts and statements of volunteers.[3] The analysis focuses on the initial and most intensive (from the migratory point of view) months after the Russian invasion, namely February to July 2022.

The chapter is structured as follows. After the introduction, it moves to an overview of the concept of resilience and self-organisation. The third part is dedicated to an analysis of the Polish migration governance system and instances of self-organisation during the first months of the Ukrainian refugee crisis. The chapter ends with concluding remarks, retracing the most important examples and patterns of self-organisation and commenting on its consequences and potential application in future migratory crises.

6.2 Resilience, self-organisation, and adaptability

Resilience has become one of the most influential concepts in contemporary security and crisis-response discourse and practice, shifting the focus from reactive forms of policy actions to the culture of preparedness, adaptation, and even far-reaching transformation in the face of extreme stress and turbulence (Ungar 2006). Resilience is not a new concept and has thrived in multiple academic and professional fields before reaching the social sciences (see Southwick et al. 2014). C.S. Holling, in his work on ecological resilience, is often cited as the author who intellectually inspired social scientists to include this new concept in their theoretical toolbox. Holling analysed complex adaptive ecological systems, their cohesion, stability, and persistence of relationships between their constitutive parts (Gunderson 2000; Holling 1973). In his interpretation, resilience is "a measure of the ability of these systems to absorb changes in state variables, driving variables, and parameters and still persist" (Holling 1973:17). As argued by Walker and Cooper, Holling's interpretation opened up discussions on different forms of crisis response that focus not only on mitigating unwanted consequences but also on the sustainability of productivity in affected systems, even under the conditions of extreme stress and instability (Walker and Cooper 2011:146). This includes the ability to adapt and absorb shocks and disturbances.

The element of adaptability plays a crucial role in resilience discourse and practice. It is a fundamental property of resilient systems that seek stability during crises. In this regard, Philippe Bourbeau proposed a typology of different modes and degrees of patterned adjustments – referred to as MMR (Maintenance, Marginal Adaptation, Renewal) (Bourbeau 2015b:13). While the maintenance approach focuses on preserving the status quo or bouncing back to the pre-disruptive state, marginal adaptation and renewal assume a more adaptive stance, allowing for marginal adjustments or complete transformation or renewal of the system, respectively (Bourbeau 2013:10). In this sense, resilience involves an interplay between adaptation and disturbance.

Resilience is not a fixed feature of any state, society, community, or individual (Walsh-Dilley and Wolford 2015:174). It can occur in relation to one type of disturbance (e.g. floods) but not in another (e.g. terrorist attacks). It depends on how, for instance, a society is able to interpret disturbances and adaptation and navigate through crises, using previous experiences and current resources at its disposal. In this way, Bourbeau points out that crises are essentially interpretative moments and that "they do not objectively exist out there waiting to exercise influence"

(Bourbeau 2013:9). Shocks and disturbances require interpretation by an agent or agents who decide on the type and severity of the crisis, simultaneously defining referent objects and security providers. In other words, "the meaning of an event as a disturbance is often a social construction involving multiple directions and constant interactions between agential powers and the social structure" (Bourbeau 2013:9).

Resilience-centred adaptability often depends on self-organisation. Self-organisation can be seen as an uncoordinated process of adaptations which result in emerging system properties at lower levels of social organisation (Hahn and Nykvist 2017). It is a collective process or effort that necessitates "communication, choice, and mutual behavioural adjustments, resulting in the emergence of ordered structures based on a shared goal among members of a given system" (Bekkers et al. 2014:230). New adaptive structures or practices can be regarded as organically emerging features of the system rather than properties imposed on the system by an external ordering influence (Olsson et al. 2015:4–5). In this context, self-organisation implies that some systems or parts of those systems can develop informal networks within which different actors and resources create closely knit formal and informal structures that can temporarily address extreme vulnerabilities or secure the basic functions of the system (Folke et al. 2005:450).

In resilience literature, self-organisation is depicted as either intentional and guided by internal protocols or creative and spontaneous (Djalante, Holley, and Thomalla 2011; Hahn and Nykvist 2017; Kaufmann 2016). In the case of crisis response, internal protocols govern the implementation of adjustments by, for instance, decentralising the system and/or devolving responsibility for handling a crisis, allowing for a certain degree of agency and autonomy for self-organising subjects (Gruszczak and Frankowski 2018:3; Kaufmann 2013:61). At the same time, the protocols have a constraining and ordering effect, as certain types of actors or resources not included in the protocol can be excluded from the network (Ibidem). This type of self-organisation still does not include external guidance but depends more on internal and inherent pathways that were designed within the system.

However, in cases of unanticipated and perplexing crises, self-organisation often assumes a more creative and spontaneous character. It defies protocols and standardisation; it is not trained or engineered. Spontaneous self-organising individuals, networks, and communities have the capacity to redesign the system under stress, influencing protocols and at least temporarily redefining "who can fit" and "what is allowed" within the system (Kaufmann 2013:60–63). In this sense, they can be described as inclusive, heterogeneous assemblages of self-governance. At the same time, they coexist with formal nodes of governance and crisis management as they are not antithetical but intertwined with other actors (Kaufmann 2013:64). Consequently, adaptive systems often combine both types of self-organisation, reflecting a "dynamic adaptive interplay between sustaining and developing with change" (Folke 2006:259).

One of the assumptions of self-organisation is that it relies on what is known as "resilience found," especially in its more spontaneous form. "Resilience found" is

one of the three broader narratives of resilience, along with "resilience made" and "resilience unfinished" (Simon and Randalls 2016). "Resilience found" assumes that there is an untapped potential for adaptability and patterned adjustment, which is inherent to a given system or subject (Simon and Randalls 2016:8). In this context, self-organising systems appear to activate pre-existing properties and dormant capacities, which could be used to address shortcomings and strengthen the stability of the system. The other two types of resilience refer to the process of "becoming a resilient subject," either through imposition and intentional policies (resilience made) or "imbuing agency and constraints, being subjected to broader discourses or forces from elsewhere, always in the process of remaking and becoming" (resilience unfinished) (Aranda et al. 2012:554–55). Kruger and Albris stipulate that

> resilience as an adjustment process might still embrace all three narratives of resilience, as it draws on pre-existing capacities (resilience found), such as economic and social capital or bodily abilities, can be fostered by practices (resilience made), and affects the unfinished resilient subject.
>
> (2021:354)

This approach not only allows the uncovering of the multiplicity of resilience but also untangles spontaneous (often volunteer-driven) forms of self-organisation.

6.3 The Polish migration governance system: the "Ukrainian refugee crisis" as an interpretative moment and instances of self-organisation

The analysis will be divided into two major parts. The first part will focus on "crisis as an interpretative moment," while the second part will discuss instances of self-organisation and emergence of new patterns of coordination and cooperation within the Polish migration governance system.

It is vital to look first at the way the "Ukrainian refugee crisis" became an interpretative moment, and how its specific interpretation allowed for more or less spontaneous self-organisation and mobilisation of resources and actors that facilitated the adaptation of the system. It should be noted that the pro-refugee interpretation of the Ukrainian crisis was not an obvious choice for the Polish government and Polish society. The government of the Law and Justice party had been in power since 2015 and had become known for the mobilisation of unprecedented levels of securitising discourse in Poland, fuelling resentment towards immigrants, refugees, and later expanding on to the LGBT+ community and women protesting against the radicalisation of anti-abortion laws (Kabata and Jacobs 2022; Yermakova 2021). Further, prior to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Poland had already been involved in a different migration-related emergency on its border with Belarus. The so-called "Polish-Belarusian border crisis" involved an artificial generation of migratory pressure on the Polish border by the Lukashenko regime (Bodnar and Grzelak 2023). The Polish government reacted with an intensive securitisation campaign against refugees and migrants attempting to cross the Polish-Belarusian

border, effectively putting the borderlands in a state of emergency, building barriers, and effectively militarising the management of its eastern border (Stępka and Mazurkiewicz 2024). There was a serious risk that the Polish government would engage in yet another securitising campaign, this time fuelling fear and resentment towards the Ukrainian population fleeing from the war. However, this scenario did not occur.

The influx of Ukrainian refugees showed how different crises can serve as powerful interpretative moments, even diverting public opinion from sedimented discourses and attitudes towards specific issues, in this case refugees. The reason why alternative interceptions could emerge was the initial inaction of the government and its agencies, which were withdrawn and even paralysed by the scale of unfolding events (*Perspektywy* 2022). The fact the government and the ruling party did not attempt to dominate discourse on the refugees created an interpretative vacuum and introduced an opportunity to let more grassroots and civic discourses in. Consequently, the overall trajectory of interpretations that emerged just after the invasion diverted from authoritative securitisation, creating space for alternative heterogenous, even humanitarian and solidarity-driven attitudes and actions.

Even though the Polish-Ukrainian relationship and its common history have been complicated, filled with historical resentments, violence, and lingering latent conflicts, the pre-war attitudes towards Ukrainians were moderately positive (Babińska et al. 2022:40; Stępka, Mazurkiewicz, and Zubek 2019). Before the Russian invasion, the numbers of Ukrainian economic immigrants in Poland had been steadily growing, making Ukrainians the largest immigrant minority and an important workforce for the Polish economy (Duszczyk and Kaczmarczyk 2022a).[4] Babińska et al. suggest that the prior presence of Ukrainians in Poland and the consequent familiarisation and intensive interactions contributed to reproachment between the two groups, laying grounds for newfound resilience and the overwhelming support for the Ukrainian refugees (2022:22).

During the first days of Russian invasion, the interpretation of the crisis and Polish attitudes towards the Ukrainians were welcoming, humanitarian, and solidarity-driven (Maciejewska-Mieszkowska 2022). In the first month of the invasion, approximately 94% of Poles supported help for Ukrainian refugees (Centrum Badań Opinii Społecznej 2022). A variety of polls suggested that the declared reasons behind such support revolved around: the need to help neighbours in need, respect and admiration for the Ukrainian people, or Christian and humanitarian values (Babińska et al. 2022:45). Poles also tied the situation in Ukraine to their own national security interests, indicating that the war in Ukraine affected the security of Poland and the whole of Europe, and it was necessary to provide support for Ukrainian people in Poland and in Ukraine (Centrum Badań Opinii Społecznej 2022). The demographic structure of the refugees also played an important role in the development of a more humanitarian interpretation among Poles. Women and children constituted approximately 87% of the entire war refugee population (Narodowy Bank Polski 2023). This contributed to development of a belief among Poles, who often identified themselves as heroic and romantic saviours, driven by compassion towards those in need (Urząd do spraw Cudzoziemców 2023). Lastly,

the external interpretations and expression of solidarity from international organisations (the EU or NATO), global powers (the US or the UK), followed by the initiation of the Temporary Protection Directive and pledges of military help, further facilitated more hospitable attitudes among Poles.[5] It could be argued that the humanitarian and solidarity-driven interpretation of the crisis laid the groundwork for subsequent self-organising initiatives. It created space for and gave momentum to alternative forms of cooperation and management that sustained the functionality of the system, which, during the first weeks of March 2022, was in a state of shock and disequilibrium (Duszczyk and Kaczmarczyk 2022b).

In the first days, the formal components of the Polish migration governance system were under extreme stress. It is estimated that approx. 2.3 million people crossed the Polish-Ukrainian border between late February and the end of March (Atlas of Poland's Political Geography 2022). The highest traffic was recorded at the Medyka and Korczowa border crossings, where between 30,000 and 140,000 people crossed the border every day (Konkret24 2022). The Polish Border Guard managed to maintain the inflow of refugees, opening all Polish-Ukrainian border crossings for pedestrians, thus facilitating the flows (Nowiny24 2022). However, the Polish border and migration services had difficulties controlling border zones and accommodating tens of thousands of refugees, who were often stuck, unable to continue their journey (Oko.press 2023). This is when the system started to self-organise and adapt to new circumstances.

Even though migration governance in Poland is rather centralised, the first responders who started organising assistance for refugees were local governments, private businesses, NGOs, and individual volunteers, who began spontaneously showing up at the border areas, organising help and assisting in travel arrangements, collecting and distributing donations, etc. (see Jasiecki 2023). In this regard, the analysis of self-organisation will be divided into three groups of closely intertwined actors and nodes that emerged in the first days and months after the invasion: local government; non-governmental organisations, volunteers and private companies, and formal and informal Ukrainian networks.

In regard to local authorities, the key services and challenges included securing temporary shelter, providing information and humanitarian assistance, coordination of cooperation with NGOs, and mobilisation of central and local administration to act in a creative and flexible way (Jarosz and Klaus 2023:25).[6] One of the first initiatives taken up at local level was the development of registration, information, and transfer centres for refugees. These were ad hoc information points, often being the first contact between a refugee and organised relief efforts (Rakusa-Suszczewski 2023). The points were located at transport hubs, most often at railway and bus stations, and were supposed to register, inform, and direct refugees to specific services and/or designated reception centres.[7] In many cases, reception centres and shelters for refugees were created by repurposing municipality buildings, social welfare homes and centres, sports halls, hotels, or structures and shelters attached to railway and bus stations (Jarosz and Klaus 2023). This list is not exhaustive, as in many cases, the situation necessitated creative solutions in an attempt to increase the accommodation base. For instance in the border town of Przemyśl, the local

authorities and NGOs were allowed to use a vacant shopping mall for reception centre purposes;[8] a similar case occurred in Kraków, where with the permission of a construction company, the local authorities could repurpose a shopping centre that was earmarked for demolition.[9]

The case of local authorities illustrates how forms of self-organisation began to emerge within the functional coexistence of formal and informal nodes of governance and crisis management, creating a dynamic adaptive system. This system, however, required constant coordination of civic efforts and new modes of cooperation between formal and informal actors. It was during this time that new protocols started to emerge, allowing for the inclusion of new types of actors and the adaptation of existing material (as discussed earlier) and human resources.

The new protocols included more inclusive interactions with spontaneous volunteers, private businesses, and anyone who could contribute to the relief effort. The cooperation was often dependent on the type of relationship local governments had with civil society actors before the war. In several cases, local authorities already had long-standing and/or close ties with NGOs, which facilitated faster and more efficient adjustments to the existing forms of cooperation and the development of new ones.[10] A good example is provided by Podgórska et al. who interviewed representatives of local authorities in Lublin, explaining what made the city more resilient during a mass influx of refugees (2023). As one of their interviewees indicated,

> what is interesting, and what is probably so completely unique about Lublin, is simply that a lot of people associated with this non-governmental environment in the world work in the local authority office; I am also one of these people, but not the only one.
>
> (Podgórska et al. 2023:16)

NGOs were crucial for sustaining services coordinated by local authorities, as they had access to human and material resources which were otherwise not available. Local authorities, on the other hand, already had policies and infrastructure in place to distribute donations and direct lines to other local authorities (including those in Ukraine), as well as access to national and EU funds.[11] While there are many success stories, in numerous cases, the relationship between NGOs and local authorities was strained. Volunteers often reported that local and national politicians did not deliver on their promises, used reception centres as a photo opportunity, and showed up only when the media were involved, leaving NGOs and volunteers to themselves (Weekend.gazeta.pl 2022).

The last component that played an important role in self-organisation at the local level concerns the adaptation of local administration to crisis mode, which often required more creative and flexible behaviour, especially in regard to formal bureaucratic procedures. While in bigger cities, such as Warszawa or Kraków, more adaptable procedures were allowed, in smaller towns, rigid bureaucracy and lack of willingness to loosen certain procedures obstructed cooperation with national and international NGOs, sometimes leading to wastefulness (Jarosz and

Klaus 2023:79). As pointed out by one of Podgórska et al. interviewee: "We cannot work within a rigid framework; in that case, we wouldn't do anything" (2023:17). As indicated in several studies, inflexible administrative procedures, formality and over-excessive authority over services, and spaces and places designated for refugees later translated to rapid deterioration of relationships between NGOs and local and central authorities (Czerska-Shaw, Krzyworzeka-Jelinowska, and Mucha 2022). Indeed, constructive and creative spontaneity and self-organising efforts may become problematic or even unwanted by bureaucrats. Spontaneous self-organisation often necessitates taking some degree of risk and creativity, sometimes even "bending the obstructive rules" in the interests of resilience. Administrative systems are not designed to adapt quickly and tend to defend the status quo rather than embrace change. NGOs, private businesses, and spontaneous volunteers proved to be a critical self-organising force which strengthened all vital elements of the migration governance system. As already discussed in the previous section, individual NGOs and/or their networks were key partners for local authorities. In several cities and nation-wide, they often organised themselves into new nodes of migration governance, such as committees or forums, which were intended to facilitate the pooling and sharing of resources. For instance in the city of Lublin, The Lublin Social Committee for Assistance to Ukraine was established as a social movement and included the most important migrant-specialised NGOs that were active in the region, while NGO Forum "Razem" (Polish for "together") was created as a platform for cooperation and coordination of efforts between all organisations, including international, interested in providing aid to Ukrainian refugees (NGO Forum Razem 2023). There were also existing networks such as Migration Consortium, which used their know-how and pre-established initiatives and partnerships with private businesses (Jarosz and Klaus 2023:56–57). Emerging and existing NGO networks were crucial for technical support, identification of synergies and partnerships between specialised NGOs, as well as gaps and blind spots in terms of the services provided (Jasiecki 2023). The networks emerged as official coalitions of major and minor actors to represent their interests and promote their goals in relation to national and international donors and actors (Jarosz and Klaus 2023:56–59). However, even with the networks in place, the lack of transparency and deficit of communication between NGOs caused many issues, especially in regard to new national and international organisations that wanted to join the efforts (Czerska-Shaw et al. 2022:81–82).

Next to local and national NGOs, there was a plethora of international actors and specialised governmental and non-governmental organisations that entered the stage in different phases of the crisis. The makeup and scale of activities of these organisations varied. For instance UN agencies and agendas such as UNHCR, UNICEF, WHO, or IOM, which were already present in Poland, had to scale up, which delayed the deployment of their resources and assets (Jarosz and Klaus 2023:78). Many international NGOs were dependent on local organisations in terms of the execution of specific services like UNHCRs' "Blue Dots"[12] Additionally, such international NGOs as Norwegian Refugee Council, Danish Refugee Council, Care, or World's Kitchen became increasingly active in different stages

of the crisis, sometimes supporting ongoing projects or even taking over the coordination of relief activities from local NGOs (Byrska 2022:6–7; Jarosz and Klaus 2023:78–79). Though the overall assessment of the involvement of International Organisation (IOs) and INGOs was very positive, there were tensions between Polish and international NGOs. Some of the criticism towards IOs and INGOs concerned too much focus on the biggest cities, bureaucratisation of relief efforts, or patronising attitudes towards local NGOs. In late 2022, 150 Polish NGOs signed an open letter to international actors, calling for a more inclusive, open, and partnership-driven relationship (Jarosz and Klaus 2023:80).

Private businesses constitute a very wide category of actors, from microbusiness to multinational corporations, which to different degrees supported NGOs and local authorities and/or provided services directly to refugees. The type and degree of assistance varied, from direct financial contributions to distribution of sandwiches in reception centres to logistical and IT support (Jarosz and Klaus 2023:67). Using the city of Kraków as an example, Czerska-Shaw et al. suggest that we can observe the emergence of new patterns and protocols of private-public cooperation. This involves cooperation between private citizens, business people, and companies who utilise their know-how to innovate and create new pathways for delivering aid to refugees (2022:44). An illustrative example was provided by one business owner:

> We eliminated warehouse-to-warehouse interaction, or as it is called in business, B2B (business to business). So, we introduced the warehouse-to-customer option, . . . we [as warehouses] deliver directly to civilian populations, directly to hospitals, directly to orphanages, and directly to soldiers on the front lines.
>
> (Czerska-Shaw et al. 2022:45)

Further, hotels, hostels, and youth shelters were essential in the first weeks after the invasion as they provided a critical accommodation base for the refugees. In later stages of the crisis, hotel owners received a financial incentive to keep refugees for longer periods of time; however, the success of this incentive was limited.[13]

Volunteers and spontaneous bottom-up initiatives represented one of the most important forces and self-organising features of the Polish migration governance system. It is estimated that in the first six months of the crisis, 77% of all adults were involved in some form of relief effort, and private financial contributions amounted to 2.3 billion EUR (Baszczak et al. 2022:4). Volunteering assumed many forms, from direct assistance in reception centres or transporting refugees and donations with private vehicles, to contributing and helping with donations or accepting refugees into their own homes (Pędziwiatr, Brzozowski, and Nahorniuk 2022:30). The volunteers self-organised through their communities, schools, and universities or neighbourhoods, but they also used social media[14] and personal connections to engage family and friends (Byrska 2022:4–5). In many reception centres, they represented the majority of staff, taking on shifts and having a wide array of responsibilities from cleaning to providing first aid to refugees. The volume of volunteers was so high that the system started to overflow and break under the strain of new, eager but

not always prepared people (Czerska-Shaw et al. 2022:53–55). This is when coordination and more organised recruitment of volunteers became essential. Some of the NGOs recruited volunteers directly, but there were also initiatives that allowed volunteers to join through emails or special websites such as "Warsaw Volunteers" or #PomagamUkrainie (Polish for "I help Ukraine"), which allowed for better coordination and management of new volunteers (Ochotnicy Warszawscy 2023).

Finally, the Ukrainian community in Poland proved to be essential in supporting the system and self-organising in its own capacity as well as joining Polish initiatives. Before the Russian invasion, Ukrainian immigrants had created in Poland a growing network of organisations, supporting integration, education, and Ukrainian culture.[15] Just after the invasion, most of these organisations launched their own projects or joined Polish organisations in providing shelter and medical help, organising events for children, and campaigning for refugee aid, among other things (Czerska-Shaw and Jacoby 2023:11). However, as initial help for refugees could be handled by local and national NGOs, the Ukrainian organisations focused on long-term accommodation and more systemic support of refugees such as integration, education, psychological aid, or job placement (Pędziwiatr et al. 2022). Czerska-Shaw and Jacoby provide the example of the Unbreakable Ukraine foundation, which

> has set up Ukrainian schools in Warsaw, Krakow, and Wrocław, catering to 1,500 students with 130 female teachers, supported by UNICEF and Save the Children, among other donors. After one year of existence, they have grown twice in size and continue to provide free education for those displaced by the war.
>
> (2023:11)

As in the case of the Polish population, the Ukrainian community also spontaneously mobilised, joining many initiatives. It is estimated that approx. 30–38% of Ukrainians helped refugees, by organising their travel to Poland, providing them with shelter, assisting in administrative procedures and medical consultations, and seeking employment (Jarosz and Klaus 2023:55). Due to the language barrier between Polish volunteers and the refugees, Ukrainian volunteers were sought after by many NGOs to serve as translators. After stabilising their situation and securing basic needs, many refugees became volunteers themselves (NGO.pl 2022).

6.4 Concluding remarks: newfound resilience and the unsustainability of spontaneous self-organisation

The initial shock and withdrawal of the central government from its securitising discourse and practice towards incoming Ukrainian refugees created space for more humanitarian, creative, and constructive engagement of local authorities, civil society, the private sector, and individual volunteers in the Polish migration governance system. Spontaneous and creative forms of self-organisation carried the system through the first phase of the crisis, sustaining its basic functions. This was possible only because of the massive civil effort of the Polish society and the

Ukrainian minority in Poland. It translated into the emergence of a self-organising assemblage of diverse actors and the development of new protocols and humanitarian practices, which spontaneously boosted the resilience of the Polish migration governance system. There are, however, important challenges and pitfalls related to such newfound self-organising resilience.

Krüger and Albris argue that resilience draws on pre-existing capacities (resilience found) such as economic and social capital or bodily abilities, which may translate into becoming or producing a resilient subject either through imposition or intentional policies (2021). However, the Polish case shows what happens when "resilience made" does not really come into play, leaving newfound capacities and frameworks rather fragile and unsustainable in the long term.

The analysis showed that newfound self-organised resilience, reflected in ad hoc structures, practices, and actors, may collapse under its own weight. The sheer volume of NGOs, volunteers, and resources was barely manageable and required close and careful coordination within and between organisations. Here, the element of spontaneity, though necessary in the first stages of the crisis, contributed to a general feeling of disorder and confusion. It is true that it not only enabled creativity and flexibility but also, to some degree, threatened the stability of the system. However, as one of the volunteers observed, this also translated into "barely controlled chaos" and internal conflicts which were counterproductive and wasteful in terms of time and resources (Weekend.gazeta.pl 2022). At some point, the scale of the efforts and high level of spontaneous civil mobilisation are unsustainable and naturally faded away and burnt out over time. That is why what happens after the peak of such mobilisation is so important.

The analysis of self-organisation of the Polish migration governance system indicates that resilience found requires at least some stable framework or form of institutionalised cooperation that could embrace newfound resilience and make it sustainable. It could be driven by not only governmental programmes and agencies but also bottom-up initiatives capable of giving a structure for action and cooperation between new and old as well as formal and informal actors. In the Polish case, the self-organising initiatives introduced some degree of stability and sustainability of relief efforts, which allowed the central government to introduce new legislation and aid packages for Ukrainian refugees in mid-March 2022 (for instance access to healthcare, selected social benefits, the job market or education).[16] The reception of the legislation was mixed, mostly due to delays caused by extensive bureaucratisation of aid, incompatibility with other existing laws, ambiguous language, or poor execution (Malanchuk 2023; Wentkowska 2022). With the new legislation in place, the government still did not try to support the resilience of the self-organised NGOs, heavily relying on assistance and resources of civic actors and individual volunteers.

The lack of practical support from the government, which was very much needed in the long term, generated discontent and tensions with the NGOs, individual volunteers, and businesses. In the first months, the ruling party and its politicians were arguing that "Poland does not have refugee camps, only thanks to the government of Law and Justice" (Gazeta.pl 2022). This caused an uproar among NGOs and volunteers, who felt used, unappreciated, and deprecated by the

government (Wyborcza.pl 2022). With stabilisation of the situation, the state agencies gradually started taking over the coordination of reception centres and relief infrastructure, thus gradually reclaiming the control they partially relinquished during the first days of the crisis. The governmental involvement was not aimed at embracing newfound resilience but rather its appropriation. Thus, with increased presence of the state power in reception centres and shelters, the volunteers were being increasingly treated as "foreign objects," "unwelcome guests," or "trespassers" who did not fit the traditional protocols of the migration crisis management (TVN24 2022b). This has only contributed to the fatigue of civic involvement and further diminished the numbers of volunteers, donors, and NGOs, who were crucial in building the resilience of the system in the first place (Euractive.pl 2022).

In its current state, the Polish migration governance system can be best described as muddling through. It has lost its momentum and chance to transform and increase its resilience by expanding the pool of human and material resources and establishing more structured and stable cooperation between civic actors and official authorities. It is difficult to omit the cardinal sins of the central and sometimes local authorities, which did not know how to channel and manage the immense civic resource, which self-organised and made itself available during the crisis. In many instances, the government did not so much devolve responsibility for the refugees to the civil society, as we often see in resilience discourse and practice, but rather abandoned and surrendered control over a portion of migration management infrastructure. When it came back, it did not accommodate new actors but rather dominated and eventually discouraged them in pursuit of lost control. This became a wasted opportunity but a lesson learnt that unaccommodated newfound resilience quickly withers and may not be there to boost the state during another crisis.

Notes

1 It should be noted that numbers vary and depend on methodology. The Polish Border Guard provides information about the number of border crossings, which can be confusing as the traffic moves in both directions. One of the statistics that seems to be most accurate is the number of so-called PESELs (Polish personal ID numbers) given to Ukrainian refugees. The official figures indicate that there are 1.5 million PESEL numbers registered to post-war Ukrainian refugees (Jarosz and Klaus 2023:15–16).

2 By migration governance system, the author understands a broader constellation of "formal and informal laws, norms, rules and policies, treaties, agreements and procedures aimed at regulating migrant flows within and between state jurisdictions as well as the associated emigration and immigration processes" (Chand and Markowski 2019:294).

3 In this regard, the chapter predominantly feeds on data from fieldwork reports and analysis conducted by Multiculturalism and Migration Observatory and Migration Consortium (Czerska-Shaw et al. 2022; Jarosz and Klaus 2023; Pędziwiatr et al. 2022).

4 It is estimated that Poland hosted 1.35 million Ukrainian economic immigrants prior to the Russian invasion of Ukraine (Duszczyk and Kaczmarczyk 2022a).

5 The Temporary Protection Directive was essential in unburdening the asylum systems of the EU member states. It allowed for better management of the influx of displaced persons from Ukraine, legalisation of their stay, and the provision of basic services. Nonetheless, in Poland, the implantation of the Directive was problematic due to the incompatibility of Polish and EU migration laws (see more in Łysienia 2023).

6 The reactions and types of initiatives implemented by local governments varied depending on whether a city was transitory or was a destination for Ukrainian refugees.
7 Even though they were coordinated by local authorities, their functioning was very much dependent on volunteers and donations.
8 Interestingly, the reception centre in Przemyśl, even though the biggest one close to the Ukrainian border, was never officially recognised by the government. This caused several administrative and humanitarian problems later on.
9 It should be noted that the Polish Ombudsman Office reported that in many shelters, which were organised impromptu, sanitary and security conditions were below acceptable standards. Sometimes, these shelters were coordinated by NGOs or local authorities; however, often, there was no clear distinction as to which institution or organisation was responsible for what. This caused chaos and often increased insecurity among the refugees (Rzecznik Praw Obywatelskich 2022).
10 These were called Civic Dialogue Committees.
11 For instance the Małopolska region created a "Małopolska Humanitarian Shield" – a financial initiative that intended to pool financial resources from local and EU funds and redistribute them to Ukrainian refugees in Poland, NGOs, communities, and organisations working and living in Ukraine (Małopolska 2022).
12 Blue Dots served as information centres, providing legal assistance, family reunification, protection of children and people with special needs, and the facilitation of access to public services, to name a few. They were closed in December 2023 (UNHCR 2023).
13 The incentive worked in the first months and provided some help to the tourist industry, which had been severely affected by the COVID-19 crisis. However, close to the re-opening of the tourist season, most hotel owners decided to stop housing refugees (Klaus 70–71).
14 For instance Collective Group Analog located in the city of Poznań. It is a bottom-up initiative that emerged on social media and gathered up to 300 volunteers. They engaged in various activities such as transporting donations, organising activities for children, or managing "freeshops" – distribution points where refugees could collect donations (Facebook 2023).
15 For instance the network of National Ukrainian Houses, which are cultural and community centres in towns and cities with a substantial Ukrainian minority. The Houses operate within the framework of the Association of Ukrainians in Poland, an umbrella organisation which has been coordinating the collection of donations, campaigning for an end to the war in Ukraine, and supporting Ukrainian people (Związek Ukraińców w Polsce 2023).
16 There are many overviews of the changes in Polish legislations, which allowed to create legal and practical conditions for long-term stay of refugees. The introduction of the Temporary Protection Directive on the EU level was crucial, as it quickly created a legal umbrella over the refugees not only in Poland but also in the whole EU (Klaus 2022; Łysienia 2023).

References

Adamczyk, Anita. 2017. "Kryzys Migracyjny w Europie a Polska Polityka Imigracyjna." *Studia Migracyjne – Przegląd Polonijny* 1(163):307–31.

Aranda, Kay, Laetitia Zeeman, Julie Scholes, and Arantxa Santa María Morales. 2012. "The Resilient Subject: Exploring Subjectivity, Identity and the Body in Narratives of Resilience." *Health (United Kingdom)* 16(5):548–63.

Atlas of Poland's Political Geography. 2022. "Uchodźcy z Ukrainy (od początku wojny do końca marca)." Retrieved January 5, 2024. (http://atlas2022.uw.edu.pl/mapa-tygodnia-uchodzcy-z-ukrainy-od-poczatku-wojny-do-konca-marca/)

Babińska, Maria, Michał Bilewicz, Paulina Górska, Sabina Toruńczyk-Ruiz, and Michał Wypych. 2022. "Polacy Wobec Ukraińców: Wyniki Badań Sondażowych Zrealizowanych Po Inwazji Rosyjskiej Na Ukrainę w 2022 Roku." *Nauka* 1(4):37–58.

Baszczak, Łukasz, Aneta Kiełczewska, Paula Kukołowicz, Agnieszka Wincewicz, and Radosław Zyzik. 2022. *Pomoc polskiego społeczeństwa dla uchodźców z Ukrainy*. Warszawa: Polski Instytut Ekonomiczny.

Bekkers, Victor, Jurian Edelenbos, José Nederhand, Bram Steijn, Lars Tummers, and William Voorberg. 2014. "The Social Innovation Perspective in the Public Sector: Co-Creation, Self-Organization and Meta-Governance." Pp. 223–43 in *Innovation in the Public Sector: Linking Capacity and Leadership*, edited by V. Bekkers, J. Edelenbos, and B. Steijn. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan.

Bodnar, Adam, and Agnieszka Grzelak. 2023. "The Polish-Belarusian Border Crisis and the (Lack of) European Union Response." *Bialostockie Studia Prawnicze* 28(1):57–86.

Bourbeau, Philippe. 2013. "Resiliencism: Premises and Promises in Securitisation Research." *Resilience* 1(1):3–17.

Bourbeau, Philippe. 2015a. "Migration, Resilience and Security: Responses to New Inflows of Asylum Seekers and Migrants." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 41(12):1958–77.

Bourbeau, Philippe. 2015b. "Resilience and International Politics: Premises, Debates, Agenda." *International Studies Review* 17(3):374–95.

Byrska, Olga. 2022. "Civil Crisis Management in Poland: The First Weeks of the Relief in Russian War on Ukraine." *Journal of Genocide Research* 0(0):1–8.

Centrum Badań Opinii Społecznej. 2022. "Polacy wobec rosyjskiej inwazji na Ukrainę." *Komunikat z Badań* (38):1–12.

Chand, Satish, and Stefan Markowski. 2019. "ANZ-Pacific Migration Governance System." *International Migration* 57(5):294–308.

Czerska-Shaw, Karolina, and Tamar Jacoby. 2023. *Mapping Ukrainian Civicness Abroad in the War Effort: A Case Study of Poland*. Edinburgh: LSE Conflict and Civicness Research Group.

Czerska-Shaw, Karolina, Aneta Krzyworzeka-Jelinowska, and Janusz Mucha. 2022. *Mobilizacja Pomocy Uchodźczyniom i Uchodźcom Ukraińskim w Krakowie. Wyzwania i Szanse Zarządzania Niepewnością*. Kraków: Obserwatorium Wielokulturowości i Migracji.

Djalante, Riyanti, Cameron Holley, and Frank Thomalla. 2011. "Adaptive Governance and Managing Resilience to Natural Hazards." *International Journal of Disaster Risk Science* 2(4):1–14.

Duszczyk Maciej, and Paweł Kaczmarczyk. 2022a. "Wojna i Migracja: Napływ Uchodźców Wojennych z Ukrainy i Możliwe Scenariusze Na Przyszłość." *CMR Spotlight 4(39)* 4(4):2–15.

Duszczyk, Maciej, and Paweł Kaczmarczyk. 2022b. "The War in Ukraine and Migration to Poland: Outlook and Challenges." *Intereconomics* 57(3):164–70.

Euractive.pl. 2022. "Polacy mniej chętni do pomocy Ukraińcom? 'Martwi regres w motywacji'." Retrieved May 1, 2024. (https://www.euractiv.pl/section/migracje/news/polska-ukraina-wojna-uchodzcy-pomoc-wolontariusze/)

Facebook. 2023. "Kolektyw Grupa Analog." Retrieved May 3, 2024. (https://www.facebook.com/p/Kolektyw-Grupa-Analog-100080821094781).

Folke, Carl. 2006. "Resilience: The Emergence of a Perspective for Social-Ecological Systems Analyses." *Global Environmental Change* 16(3):253–67.

Folke, Carl, Thomas Hahn, Per Olsson, and Jon Norberg. 2005. "Adaptive Governance of Social-Ecological Systems." *Annual Review of Environment and Resources* 30(May 2014):441–73.

Gazeta.pl. 2022. "Kowalczyk chwali PiS. 'To, że w Polsce nie ma obozów dla uchodźców, to zasługa rządu'." Retrieved May 10, 2024. (https://wiadomosci.gazeta.pl/wiadomosci/7,114884,28200569,kowalczyk-chwali-pis-to-ze-w-polsce-nie-ma-obozow-dla-uchodzcow.html).

Gruszczak, Artur, and Paweł Frankowski. 2018. "Introduction: Protocols of Modern War." Pp. 1–9 in *Technology, Ethics and the Protocols of Modern War*, edited by A. Gruszczak and P. Frankowski. London and New York: Routledge.
Gunderson, Lance H. 2000. "Ecological Resilience – In Theory and Application." *Annual Review of Ecology and Systematics* 31(1):425–39.
Hahn, Thomas, and Björn Nykvist. 2017. "Are Adaptations Self-Organized, Autonomous, and Harmonious? Assessing the Social-Ecological Resilience Literature." *Ecology and Society* 22(1):art12.
Holling, C. S. 1973. "Resilience and Stability of Ecological Systems." *Annual Review of Ecology and Systematics* 4(1):1–23.
Jarosz, Sarian, and Witold Klaus, eds. 2023. *Polska Szkoła Pomagania. Przyjęcie Osób Uchodźczych z Ukrainy w Polsce w 2022 Roku*. Warsaw: Migration Consortium.
Jasiecki, Krzysztof. 2023. "Pomoc Humanitarna Dla Uchodźców z Ukrainy Jako Katalizator Nowej Aktywności Społecznej w Polsce." *Studia Politologiczne* 68(2/2023(68)):138–57.
Jaskułowski, Krzysztof. 2019. *The Everyday Politics of Migration Crisis in Poland*. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan.
Kabata, Monika, and An Jacobs. 2022. "The 'Migrant Other' as a Security Threat: The 'Migration Crisis' and the Securitising Move of the Polish Ruling Party in Response to the EU Relocation Scheme." *Journal of Contemporary European Studies* 00(00):1–17.
Kaufmann, Mareile. 2013. "Emergent Self-Organisation in Emergencies: Resilience Rationales in Interconnected Societies." *Resilience* 1(1):53–68.
Kaufmann, Mareile. 2016. "Exercising Emergencies: Resilience, Affect and Acting out Security." *Security Dialogue* 47(2):99–116.
Klaus, Witold, ed. 2022. *Ustawa o Pomocy Obywatelom Ukrainy w Związku z Konfliktem Zbrojnym Na Terytorium Tego Państwa. Komentarz*. Warszawa: Wolters Kluwer.
Klaus, Witold, and Monika Szulecka. 2022. "Departing or Being Deported? Poland's Approach towards Humanitarian Migrants." *Journal of Refugee Studies* 00(0).
Konkret24. 2022. "Ilu uchodźców z Ukrainy wjeżdżało dziennie do Polski? Dane od początku wojny." Retrieved May 1, 2024. (https://konkret24.tvn24.pl/polska/ilu-uchodzcow-z-ukrainy-wjezdzalo-dziennie-do-polski-dane-od-poczatku-wojny-ra1100170-ls5791210).
Krüger, Marco, and Kristoffer Albris. 2021. "Resilience Unwanted: Between Control and Cooperation in Disaster Response." *Security Dialogue* 52(4):343–60.
Łysienia, Maja. 2023. "Following the EU Response to the Russian Invasion of Ukraine? The Implementation of the Temporary Protection Directive in Poland." *Central and Eastern European Migration Review* 12(1):183–200.
Maciejewska-Mieszkowska, Katarzyna. 2022. "Stosunek Polaków Do Uchodźców w Kontekście Wojny w Ukrainie." *Środkowoeuropejskie Studia Polityczne* (4):137–53.
Malanchuk, Illia. 2023. "Legal Framework for the Protection of Ukrainian Refugees: A Comparative Study." *Problems of Legality* (160):230–48.
Małopolska. 2022. "Małopolska Tarcza Humanitarna." Retrieved January 3, 2024. (https://www.malopolska.pl/pomocukrainie/malopolska-tarcza-humanitarna).
Manyena, Siambabala Bernard. 2006. "The Concept of Resilience Revisited." *Disasters* 30(4):434–50.
Mazurkiewicz, Agata, and Wojciech Michnik. 2023. *Towards the "Frontline States" Concept? Understanding the Responses to Russia's War against Ukraine*. Edinburgh: LSE Conflict and Civicness Research Group.
Narodowy Bank Polski. 2023. *Sytuacja życiowa i ekonomiczna migrantów z Ukrainy w Polsce – wpływ pandemii i wojny na charakter migracji w Polsce Raport z badania ankietowego*. Warszawa: Departament Statystyki.
NGO Forum Razem. 2023. "Pomagamy się łączyć i łączymy, aby pomagać. Pracujmy razem!" Retrieved May 1, 2024. (https://forumrazem.org.pl/pl).
NGO.pl. 2022. "Wolontariat obywateli Ukrainy." Retrieved May 9, 2024. (https://publicystyka.ngo.pl/wolontariat-obywateli-ukrainy).

Niedźwiedzki, Dariusz, Jacek Schmidt, Maciej Stępka, and Przemysław Tacik. 2021. *Strzeżone Ośrodki Dla Cudzoziemców w Polsce Jako Kultura Organizacyjna. Analiza Prawna, Politologiczna, Socjologiczna i Antropologiczna*. Kraków, Poznań: Komitet Badań nad Migracjami Polskiej Akademii Nauk.

Niemann, Arne, and Natascha Zaun. 2018. "EU Refugee Policies and Politics in Times of Crisis: Theoretical and Empirical Perspectives." *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 56(1):3–22.

Nowiny24. 2022. "Na wszystkich przejściach granicznych z Ukrainą wprowadzono odprawę pieszych." Retrieved May 3, 2024. (https://nowiny24.pl/na-wszystkich-przejsciach-granicznych-z-ukraina-wprowadzono-odprawe-pieszych/ar/c1-16069455).

Ochotnicy Warszawscy. 2023. "Znajdź wolontariat dla siebie – wybór pierwszego wolontariatu w pytaniach i odpowiedziach." Retrieved May 1, 2024. (https://ochotnicy.waw.pl/aktualnosci/953-znajdz-wolontariat-dla-siebie-wybor-pierwszego-wolontariatu-w-pytaniach-i-odpowiedziach).

Oko.press. 2023. "Bez świeżego powietrza i nadziei – ukraińscy uchodźcy wegetują w ośrodkach. Apel wolontariuszy." Retrieved January 3, 2024. (https://oko.press/bez-swiezego-powietrza-i-nadziei-ukrainscy-uchodzcy-wegetuja-w-osrodkach-apel-wolontariuszy).

Olsson, Lennart, Anne Jerneck, Henrik Thoren, Johannes Persson, and David O'Byrne. 2015. "Why Resilience Is Unappealing to Social Science: Theoretical and Empirical Investigations of the Scientific Use of Resilience." *Science Advances* 1(4):1–12.

Paul, Regine, and Christof Roos. 2019. "Towards a New Ontology of Crisis? Resilience in EU Migration Governance." *European Security* 28(4):393–412.

Perspektywy. 2022. "Czy Polska jest gotowa przyjąć milion uchodźców z Ukrainy?" Retrieved March 22, 2024. (https://perspektywy.pl/portal/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=6927:czy-polska-jest-gotowa-przyjac-milion-uchodzcow-z-ukrainy&catid=257&Itemid=476).

Pędziwiatr, Konrad, Jan Brzozowski, and Olena Nahorniuk. 2022. *Refugees from Ukraine in Kraków*. Kraków: Obserwatorium Wielokulturowości i Migracji.

Podgórska, Karolina, Andrzej Jekaterynczuk, Oksana Yarosh, Olga Kuzmuk, and Valentyna Liubchuk. 2023. "Support for Ukrainian Refugees after Russia's Invasion of Ukraine: Aid Structure and Resilience Factors. Case Studies of Lublin and Lutsk." *European Societies* (May):1–25.

Rakusa-Suszczewski, Mikołaj. 2023. "Instytucjonalny i Społeczny Wymiar Działania Centralnych Punktów Recepcyjnych Na Granicy Polsko-Ukraińskiej." *Studia Politologiczne* 68(2/2023(68)):158–74.

Rzecznik Praw Obywatelskich. 2022. "Co z centrum recepcyjnym dla uchodźców z Ukrainy w Przemyślu? Odpowiedź przemyskiego magistratu." Retrieved May 3, 2024. (https://bip.brpo.gov.pl/pl/content/rpo-centrum-recepcyjne-uchodzcy-ukraina-przemysl-zamkniecie-odpowiedz).

Simon, Stephanie, and Samuel Randalls. 2016. "Geography, Ontological Politics and the Resilient Future." *Dialogues in Human Geography* 6(1):3–18.

Southwick, Steven M., George A. Bonanno, Ann S. Masten, Catherine Panter-Brick, and Rachel Yehuda. 2014. "Resilience Definitions, Theory, and Challenges: Interdisciplinary Perspectives." *European Journal of Psychotraumatology* 5(1):1–14.

Stępka, Maciej, and Agata Mazurkiewicz. 2024. "Unravelling the Spectacle of Militarised Border Management: The Use of Polish Territorial Defence Forces (TDF) in the Polish-Belarussian Border Crisis." In *Geopolitical and Humanitarian Aspects of the Belarus-EU Border Conflict*, edited by E. Kużelewska, A. Kasińska-Metryka, K. Pałka-Suchojad, and A. Piekutowska. London: Routledge.

Stępka, Maciej, Agata Mazurkiewicz, and Marcin Zubek. 2019. "Local Spoilers and Pathways to Reconciliation: The Polish Perspective on the Polish-Ukrainian Relations in the Borderlands." *Politické Vedy* 22(4):8–32.

Styczyńska, Natasza, and Marcin Zubek. 2023. "Poland: The 'Cardboard State' Versus the Virus." Pp. 111–21 in *Governments' Responses to the Covid-19 Pandemic in Europe: Navigating the Perfect Storm*, edited by K. Lynggaard, M. D. Jensen, and M. Kluth. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan.

Tomczak-Boczko, Justyna, Klaudia Gołębiowska, and Maciej Górny. 2023. "Who Is a 'True Refugee'? Polish Political Discourse in 2021–2022." *Discourse Studies* 25(6):799–822. https://doi.org/10.1177/14614456231187488

TVN24. 2022a. "Od początku rosyjskiej inwazji 3,5 miliona osób wjechało do Polski z Ukrainy." Retrieved March 22, 2024. (https://tvn24.pl/polska/od-poczatku-rosyjskiej-inwazji-35-miliona-osob-wjechalo-do-polski-z-ukrainy-dane-strazy-granicznej-st5719996).

TVN24. 2022b. "Dworzec Centralny: wolontariusze jak 'niechciani goście', brak wrzątku czy prądu." Retrieved May 10, 2024. (https://tvn24.pl/tvnwarszawa/najnowsze/warszawa-rosja-zaatakowala-ukraine-uchodzcy-na-dworcu-centralnym-chaos-w-punkcie-st5625710).

Ungar, Michael. 2006. "Resilience across Cultures." *British Journal of Social Work* 38(2):218–35.

UNHCR. 2023. "Zamknięcie punktów Blue Dot UNICEF i UNHCR w Polsce." Retrieved February 14, 2024. (https://www.unhcr.org/pl/14893-blue-dot-unicef-unhcr.html).

Urząd do spraw Cudzoziemców. 2023. "Obywatele Ukrainy w Polsce – aktualne dane migracyjne." Retrieved May 10, 2024. (https://www.gov.pl/web/udsc/obywatele-ukrainy-w-polsce – aktualne-dane-migracyjne).

Vaagland, Karin, and Oskar Chmiel. 2023. "Parochialism and Non-Co-Operation: The Case of Poland's Opposition to EU Migration Policy." *Journal of Common Market Studies* 1–19.

Walker, Jeremy, and Melinda Cooper. 2011. "Genealogies of Resilience: From Systems Ecology to the Political Economy of Crisis Adaptation." *Security Dialogue* 42(2):143–60.

Walsh-Dilley, Marygold, and Wendy Wolford. 2015. "(Un)Defining Resilience: Subjective Understandings of 'Resilience' from the Field." *Resilience* 3(3):173–82.

Weekend.gazeta.pl. 2022. "Chaos kontrolowany. Dziś w byłym Tesco śpi "tylko" 500 osób." Retrieved May 3, 2024. (https://weekend.gazeta.pl/weekend/7,183331,28276871,chaos-kontrolowany-dzis-w-bylym-tesco-spi-tylko-500-osob.html).

Wentkowska, Aleksandra. 2022. "In Defense of the Rights of Ukrainian Citizens. Actions of the Commissioner Human Rights in the First Month of Russia'S Attack on Ukraine, 24.02–24.03.2022." *Roczniki Administracji i Prawa* 1(XXII):113–25.

Wyborcza.pl. 2022. "Pomagają wolontariusze, rząd podczepia się pod ich pracę. 'Nawet leki na raka kupujemy za własne pieniądze'." Retrieved May 10, 2024. (https://wyborcza.pl/7,162657,28203705,pomagaja-wolontariusze-rzad-podczepia-sie-pod-ich-prace-nawet.html).

Yermakova, Olena. 2021. "PiS vs LGBT: The 'Othering' of the LGBT Movement as an Element of Populist Radical Right Party Discourse in Poland." *Sprawy Narodowościowe. Seria Nowa* (53):1–28.

Związek Ukraińców w Polsce. 2023. "Pomoc dla Ukrainy." Retrieved February 14, 2024. (https://ukraincy.org.pl/pomoc-dla-ukrainy/).