

The European Second Generation Compared

Does the Integration Context Matter?

MAURICE CRUL, JENS SCHNEIDER
& FRANS LELIE (EDS.)



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Does the Integration Context Matter?

edited by Maurice Crul, Jens Schneider and Frans Lelie

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Acknowledgements

The Integration of the European Second Generation project, which we refer to by the acronym of TIES, came to life almost a decade ago. It was in 2003 that Maurice Crul and Hans Vermeulen, both researchers in the University of Amsterdam's Institute for Migration and Ethnic Studies (IMES) served as guest editors for *International Migration Review*. Based on their experience co-editing a special issue on the second generation in Europe, they concluded that a proper cross-comparison could only be conducted by launching a standardised European-wide survey. It was thus in 2003 that they also secured funding to start up TIES. With financial support from the Swiss Foundation for Population, Migration and Environment (BMU), the first meetings of the TIES team could be held, enabling us to develop a common research design and pilot questionnaire.

Hans Vermeulen retired shortly after finishing this pre-study, though he never ceased acting as a valuable advisor to us. He is therefore the first person we thank, above all for his efforts to get this mission off the ground and keep it well on track.

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In 2006, a proposal drawn up within the IMISCOE network graciously awarded us a European Marie Curie Research and Training Network (RTN) grant. Coordinated by Patrick Simon at the National Institute for Demographic Studies in Paris, this sub-project allowed us to hire twelve PhD students and two post-docs to work with the TIES dataset, perform complementary qualitative research and, in general, learn from the execution of such a huge survey. The PhD students – the countless hours spent unravelling the TIES data collection – were indispensable. We appreciate their dedication both as researchers and contributors, several students having become co-authors of chapters in this volume.

Because TIES was a collaborative effort between and across eight countries, the national team leaders were vital. We thank the following coordinators for investing an enormous amount of time and effort into this enterprise. Given in alphabetical order they are: Rosa Aparicio Gómez;¹ Rosita Fibbi;² Liesbeth Heering and Jeannette Schoorl;³ Barbara Herzog-Punzenberger;⁴ Karen Phaet and Marc Swyngedouw;⁵ Patrick Simon and Christelle Hamel;⁶ Charles Westin, Alireza Behtoui and Ali Osman;⁷ Maren Wilmes and the late but well-remembered Michael Bommers.⁸

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General international coordinating was put in the hands of this book's editors, Maurice Crul and Jens Schneider, based at the University of Amsterdam. From the very beginning, Frans Lelie, the third editor of this book, was involved in TIES as a project manager at the University of Amsterdam. She coordinated the project's financial and administrative tasks, acted as the TIES webmaster and edited several TIES publications.

Linked to the TIES project in Western Europe were two associated partners developing similar projects. Raivo Vetik at Tallinn University led a

comparative second-generation study in Estonia, the results of which have been published in the IMISCOE Reports Series.⁹ Even further east, Christine Inglis at the University of Sydney, led a similar project, The Integration of the Australian Second Generation (TIAS), with plans to publish those results in the same series.¹⁰

This book is the result of seven years of intensive collaboration among 35 researchers. Our discussions were often challenging, but the nature of the TIES team was such that even our most heated academic debates allowed room for joking and left us with enough energy to enjoy animated conversations over a late meal after a long working session. This colossal project would have been doomed if the individual people – across disciplines and from different national backgrounds – were unwilling to listen to each other. We take this opportunity to thank everyone for the professionalism, commitment and good nature that they shared.

Further, we are grateful to the three anonymous referees who evaluated this manuscript. Their insightful comments helped us improve and, in some places, rewrite our initial draft. Special thanks goes to Karina Hof, who combined enthusiasm for the project with her excellent editing skills to get our words across to you, our reader, in a lucid and engaging way.

From the very start, our aim was to produce results not only enhancing our general knowledge about the situation of the second generation in Europe, but also to draw policy-relevant conclusions. Moreover, we set out to communicate them to policymakers, migrant organisations and other relevant actors on the local, national and international levels. As such, we thank the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO) for the grant that has enabled anyone interested to read this publication in open access form. We are very grateful that Jan Banning enriched our book with his cover photo, ‘Moroccan girl reading an application form for an “inburgeringscursus” (citizenship course) at a closed window’ from the series ‘National Identities’. The photo in its own right makes a statement, which we support whole-heartedly.

Finally, we thank the nearly ten thousand respondents not only for their collaboration and patience during the one hour and fifteen minutes of their lives that we took up during the interview, but for – in more ways than one – letting us into their lives. We hope that the fruits of the TIES project offer something back to them and their future generations.

Notes

- 1 Institute for Studies on Migrations (IEM), Comillas Pontifical University, Spain.
- 2 Swiss Forum for Migration and Population Studies (SFM), Neuchâtel, Switzerland.
- 3 Netherlands Interdisciplinary Demographic Institute (NIDI), The Hague, Netherlands.

- 4 Austrian Academy of Sciences (ÖAW), Vienna, Austria.
- 5 The Center for Sociological Research and Methodology, University of Leuven, Belgium.
- 6 National Institute for Demographic Studies (INED), Paris, France.
- 7 Centre for Research in International Migration and Ethnic Relations (CEIFO), Stockholm University, Sweden.
- 8 Institute for Migration Research and Intercultural Studies (IMIS), University of Osnabrück, Germany.
- 9 A full-length file of *The Russian Second Generation in Tallinn and Kohtla-Järve: The TIES Study in Estonia* can be read and downloaded at <http://oapen.org/search?identifier=403859>.
- 10 For more readings, see the Publications section of the TIES website (www.TIESproject.eu).

1 Introduction

Maurice Crul, Jens Schneider and Frans Lelie

1.1 Introduction

Immigration and the subsequent integration of newcomers is one of the foremost challenges for European cities. The integration of children born to immigrant parents in countries of migration is critical, for this second generation, as they have come to be known, constitutes a growing share of metropolitan youth today. Research on the second generation is particularly pertinent because it can respond to many universal questions concerning integration.

With an extra push from the late-2000s' financial crisis, the public debate has taken a dramatic shift against immigrants and their children. In Europe, the so-called threat of Islam is being put on the political agenda by one populist party after another. Their popularity in the Netherlands helped produce a minority government that, since 2010's parliamentary support agreement, has had to rely on votes by the downright anti-immigrant Party for Freedom (PVV). The PVV's vetoing power enables this party to hijack the topic of migration and integration, normalising bold anti-immigrant discourse that links unemployment, crime and Islamist extremism with immigrants and their children. In 2011, we saw an extreme – and hopefully rare – expression of the depth of anti-immigrant anxiety in Norway. The right-wing zealot who took the lives of 77 people, mostly teenagers attending a Norwegian Labour Party youth camp, claimed that he wanted to root out the next generation of social democrats and their immigration politics. This xenophobic predilection is even pronounced in the most strongly assimilationist country of Europe. France's anti-immigrant voice is Marine Le Pen, the popular leader of the Front National who has gained prominence in the political arena. Meanwhile, though relatively moderate leaders, Prime Minister Cameron of the United Kingdom and Germany's Chancellor Merkel both recently declared that multiculturalism has failed. Social Democratic Party (SPD) member Thilo Sarrazin, a former board member of the German Federal Bank, amplified Merkel's statement in a controversial book, arguing that Muslim immigrants do not want to integrate and are happy to fall back on criminality and welfare instead. This debate echoes worries about the emergence of a *Parallelgesellschaft*, a

‘parallel society’ in which two million people of Turkish descent are seen as living detached from the wider German society.

What is actually happening to immigrant young adults is therefore of paramount concern to the democratic states of Western Europe. Are the media’s voices correct when they assert that major sections of immigrant communities are failing to integrate and therefore endangering social cohesion? Is the classical assimilation theory wrong about ethnic, cultural and social distinctions becoming less relevant as immigrant ethnic groups become more like the majority – and as the majority, in turn, evolves as it absorbs new groups? Is the fact that not all immigrants and their children ‘assimilate’, or that some even resent the host society, a sign that multiculturalism has failed?

In theory, the second generation should have the same life chances as children of native-born parents. Thus, the relative position of the second generation with regard to important issues such as education and labour force participation is viewed as a robust measure of group integration on the whole. Older children born to Europe’s first labour migrants are now finishing their educational careers and beginning to enter the labour market in considerable numbers. The time is ripe for a first real assessment of second-generation integration. In this book, we investigate how the integration of the second generation is progressing in crucial domains such as education, labour market, social relations, religion and identity formation.

1.2 The survey

In keeping with the framework of the TIES project, the TIES survey compares the second generation across fifteen cities in eight European countries. To be clear: second generation refers here to children of immigrants who were born in the immigration country, have pursued their entire education there and were between eighteen and 35 years old at the time of interview, during 2007 and 2008. The second generation in our sample are the children of immigrants from Turkey, Morocco and the former Yugoslavia.¹ Alongside the second generation, we interviewed a group of respondents whose both parents were born in the survey country.² In this volume, we refer to these respondents as ‘the comparison group’ rather than use a term like ‘native’ or specific demonyms, such as ‘German’ or ‘French’. There are two reasons for this. First of all, according to our definition, second-generation Turks, Moroccans and former Yugoslavians are also ‘native’: they, like their comparison group peers, were born in the survey countries and did not immigrate. Secondly, by far, most of our second-generation respondents possess citizenship of the country where they were born and still live, thus being ‘German’ or ‘French’ themselves.

Immigration being primarily an urban phenomenon, it made sense for the project to be undertaken in metropolitan areas. The fifteen cities we thus surveyed were (given in no particular order): Paris and Strasburg (France); Berlin and Frankfurt (Germany); Madrid and Barcelona (Spain); Vienna and Linz (Austria); Amsterdam and Rotterdam (the Netherlands); Brussels and Antwerp (Belgium); Zurich and Basel (Switzerland); and Stockholm (Sweden). In most cities, our focus fell on two second-generation groups and a comparison group. In the Netherlands and Belgium, the two second-generation groups comprised Turks and Moroccans. In Germany, Austria and Switzerland, they comprised Turks and former Yugoslavians. For various reasons, the French and Swedish teams only focused on second-generation Turks and a comparison group. The Spanish team only focused on second-generation Moroccans and a comparison group. In each country, we aimed to interview 500 persons from each ethnic group and 500 persons from the comparison group in two cities. [Table 1.1](#) gives an overview of the survey respondents.

Part and parcel to our project was a standardised questionnaire that could be used in all eight countries. Each module was designed by specialists from corresponding disciplines. The representation of many kinds of expertises on our research team facilitated sound development of the survey in a cross-disciplinary manner. Understandably, this endeavour required months of debate and negotiating among the team members. But the approach worked. It produced an extensive questionnaire – taking our

Table 1.1 *TIES survey respondents*

		<i>Turkish second generation</i>	<i>Moroccan second generation</i>	<i>Former Yugoslavian second generation</i>	<i>Comparison group</i>	<i>Total</i>
Sweden	Stockholm	251	0	0	250	501
Germany	Berlin	253	0	202	250	1,412
	Frankfurt	250	0	204	253	
Netherlands	Amsterdam	237	242	0	259	1,505
	Rotterdam	263	251	0	253	
Belgium	Brussels	358	311	0	301	1,717
	Antwerp	244	246	0	257	
France	Paris	248	0	0	174	851
	Strasbourg	252	0	0	177	
Spain	Madrid	0	250	0	250	1,000
	Barcelona	0	250	0	250	
Austria	Vienna	252	0	253	250	1,437
	Linz	206	0	242	234	
Switzerland	Zurich	206	0	235	202	1,348
	Basel	248	0	191	266	
Total		3,268	1,550	1,327	3,626	9,771

Source: TIES survey 2007-2008

respondents an average of one hour and fifteen minutes to complete – and that, in turn, gave us a very rich dataset.

The TIES questionnaire consists of twelve modules³ for respondents to complete. They are as follows:

- Module A: Personal details
- Module B: Educational trajectory
- Module C: Labour history
- Module D: Partner(s)
- Module E: Parents and siblings
- Module F: Housing and neighbourhood
- Module G: Social relations
- Module H: Gender roles and child-care
- Module J: Identity, language and transnationalism
- Module K: Religion and religiosity
- Module L: Personal income and partner's income
- Module M: Written question sheet (for more sensitive questions), which respondents complete at the end of the interview.⁴

1.3 Aims

The first ambition of the TIES project was to provide a systematic cross-national comparison of the second generation in Europe. This kind of international, comparative and empirically grounded research into integration processes is still very rare, not least because it is technically very complicated and almost no infrastructure exists for such work.

Most existing comparative European research on integration has focused on immigrants as a whole. The heterogeneous categories 'immigrants' and 'children of immigrants' make it difficult to assure truly international comparability. Studying specific ethnic groups with the same starting position – i.e. members of the second generation whose parents come from the same country of origin – facilitates cross-national comparison. The fact that we can compare the same ethnic group with the same starting position in different countries gives us the opportunity to study the *receiving context* in integration processes. The prime objective of the TIES project is to analyse the relative effects of specific city and national contexts in promoting or hampering the integration of the second generation. As such, our country teams endeavoured to gather information on national and local institutional arrangements in school and the labour market, citizenship policies and anti-discrimination measures. Meanwhile, the TIES survey provided contextual information on the topics of school segregation, selection ages in education, school tracking, discrimination, housing segregation and the warmth of relations between the groups.

1.4 Publications and policy documents

As far as results go, the first step of the research teams was to produce country reports based on the surveys in each of the countries. All reports can be found on the TIES website (<http://www.tiesproject.eu>). The Dutch report⁵ was published in 2008 in the peer-reviewed IMISCOE-Amsterdam University Press Series; the French, German, Swedish, Spanish and Swiss reports are expected to follow suit in the same series.⁶

Our findings have also been synthesised for two internationally comparative publications. The book you now read draws exclusively on the TIES results. Also available is a book comparing the results of similar surveys on the second generation in New York, Los Angeles and Europe. Transatlantic in scope, *The Changing Face of World Cities: Young Adult Children of Immigrants in Europe and the United States*⁷ presents cooperative work by American and European researchers in various thematic chapters on education, labour market, neighbourhoods, citizenship and identity.

From its inception, the TIES project prioritised the production of policy-relevant knowledge and, moreover, to communicate that to policymakers, migrant organisations and other relevant actors at local and national levels across Europe. As such, we published policy briefs and reports⁸ dealing with both levels. In particular, the Open Society Institute commissioned our policy brief on outcomes of the second generation vis-à-vis education and transition to the labour market.⁹ This was presented at the international TIES stakeholders' conference, held in 2009 in Amsterdam, where discussions were held with researchers, policymakers and NGOs from all the cities in which the survey was realised.

1.5 Overview of the chapters in this volume

We designed this volume in the same collaborative spirit guiding the TIES questionnaire and the TIES dataset. Thematic teams coded and recoded the international data, analysing that which was relevant to their particular interests from the national surveys. This analysis is the crux of the thematic chapters: education, labour market, family formation, identity and religion. Each chapter's first-listed author served as team coordinator for the topic at hand.

The chapters strive to give an overview of the main results of the TIES survey for each topic. It should be noted, too, that we requested all thematic teams to focus on second-generation Turks, in particular. This group proved to offer the most generalisability for the sake of cross-country comparison. With a population exceeding four million, people of Turkish descent are the largest migrant group in Europe. We would therefore be remiss to exclude second-generation Turks in any assessment of integration in Europe. The analysis of their position is the backbone of this book.

The volume is divided in two parts. The first section describes the design of the TIES project and our theoretical approach. As argued in [chapter 2](#), the project's international comparative framework demands a new theoretical perspective in which the national and local integration context takes centre-stage. The 'integration context theory' (see also Crul & Schneider 2010) introduced here endeavours to correct the blind spot currently handicapping other theories – especially those in the predominant American assimilationist theory – that problematically disregard the local and national integration contexts. In our view, contextual differences must take into account structural aspects of institutional arrangements, such as the integrative nature of education systems, how the transition to the labour market manifests, how welfare arrangements around paid work and care work are organised, legal frameworks and housing. Our design selection is the direct result of a theoretical focus on the importance of the integration context. In [chapter 3](#), we elaborate on our comparative sampling of the second generation, namely by identifying the same groups across the fifteen cities in eight countries. In [chapter 4](#), we give the reader more details about the characteristics of the sampled second-generation groups and their parents in each city. We focus, in particular, on the Turkish second generation for the aforementioned reason.

The second section of this volume discusses the outcomes for different themes, each chapter following our theoretical emphasis on pathways and trajectories. [Chapter 5](#) details the complete educational careers of our respondents. We show results from preschool onwards, up until the transition to the labour market. [Chapter 6](#) discusses the working careers of our respondents. Following the pathways of the second generation into adulthood leads us to family formation in [chapter 7](#). [Chapter 8](#) on identity probes into respondents' feelings of belonging and what impact they have on their lives. [Chapter 9](#) on religion examines the role played by respondents' faith (or lack thereof). The authors of these last two chapters tap into the previous chapters' findings on education, labour market and family formation, using these outcomes as independent variables to explain trends and variations between second-generation groups across countries.

The final chapter of this volume relates outcomes across thematic fields. Here we have no choice but to underscore the importance of the integration context. For this purpose, we restrict ourselves to second-generation Turks, even more narrowly focusing on children of low-educated parents. Although it is useful to analyse people of the same 'ethno-national' origin who belong to the same generation, looking at children from this group who also grew up in the same socio-economic milieu across countries yields far more insights. As we found, this analysis best indexes the disparities between countries, thereby enhancing the potential for cross-country comparability. Our reward is a clear view – perhaps the clearest one yet – on the crucial differences that sprout from the integration context.

Notes

- 1 For ease of readability, throughout this book we use the term 'second-generation former Yugoslavians' or 'former Yugoslavian second generation' to refer to the children of immigrants from the successor states of Yugoslavia who participated in the TIES survey.
- 2 Because we only know where the parents were born, we acknowledge that the comparison group could possibly also include members of the third generation.
- 3 Questions from modules A through L were read aloud to the respondent by the interviewer, who inputted answers directly into a computer program. Module M – concerning sexuality, conflicts with parents and other more sensitive issues – was handed to the respondent on paper, so he or she could answer these questions in writing rather than orally.
- 4 By 'interview', we refer to the whole session, involving conversation and completion of a questionnaire that took place between the TIES survey interviewer and the respondent.
- 5 A full-length file of *The Position of the Turkish and Moroccan Second Generation in Amsterdam and Rotterdam: The TIES Study in the Netherlands* can be read and downloaded at <http://oopen.org/search?identifier=340071>.
- 6 A full-length file of *The Russian Second Generation in Tallinn and Kohtla-Järve: The TIES Study in Estonia* can be read and downloaded at <http://oopen.org/search?identifier=403859>.
- 7 *The Changing Face of World Cities: Young Adult Children of Immigrants in Europe and the United States*, edited by Maurice Crul and John Mollenkopf (www.russellsage.org/publications/changing-face-world-cities).
- 8 For further reading, see the Publications section of the TIES website (<http://www.tiesproject.eu>).
- 9 TIES Policy Brief 'The Second Generation in Europe: Education and the Transition to the Labour Market' (2009) by Maurice Crul and Jens Schneider; available at above URL.



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2 Comparative integration context theory

Participation and belonging in diverse European cities

Jens Schneider and Maurice Crul

2.1 Introduction

In the last fifteen years a great deal of research about the second generation has appeared in academic journals and books. These publications have stirred a wider theoretical debate about assimilation and integration. Scholars in the United States have been at the forefront of studies producing both research results and theoretical models on the subject of the second generation. Europe's scholars are now catching up, starting to respond to the theoretical notions produced within the North American context, notably where the US-born children of Mexican and Asian immigrants dominate discussion about the second generation. In Europe, these groups are, as a whole, ethnically very varied, the largest populations therein having parents who either come from former European colonies or were recruited as labour migrants. Compared to those in the US, Europe's labour migrants have notably less diverse economic backgrounds. Not all, but most, had come from countryside villages and hardly had any schooling.

2.2 New and segmented assimilation theory

In the US, a number of scholars have argued that the linear model of assimilation is less likely to correspond with today's more complex reality (Portes & Rumbaut 2005) due to fundamental economic changes in society since the formulation of classical assimilation theory, alongside the growing diversity of immigrants in terms of social class and nationality. New theoretical perspectives emerged during the 1990s in the US to reflect this view, beginning with Gans' (1992) concept of 'second-generation decline' and Portes and Zhou's (1993) theory of 'segmented assimilation'. Both ideas expressed a fair degree of pessimism for the future of some US-born immigrant youth, positing that they could face what Portes and Zhou described as 'downward assimilation into the urban underclass', with

permanent poverty being a distinct possibility. Compared to the era in which immigration to the US was mainly by 'white' Europeans, today we see racial and ethnic discrimination against visible minorities and, on top of that, narrowing labour market opportunities for the second generation. Whereas earlier migrants and their descendants could more confidently aspire to upward mobility within working-class jobs, the advent of an hour-glass economy – with fewer middle-ranking posts – has meant fewer opportunities and incentives for less well-educated members of the second generation. Although more historically grounded studies on both sides of the Atlantic caution against painting a rosy picture of seamless integration of pre-World War I immigrants and their descendants (Lucassen 2005; Suárez-Orozco & Suárez-Orozco 2001; Waldinger & Perlman 1998), the persistence of racism and today's polarised labour market are seen as factors potentially leading to a group of disenchanted native-born youth of immigrant descent, especially those who have grown up in socially isolated, deprived neighbourhoods (Portes & Zhou 1993; Zhou 2005).

The central idea of segmented assimilation theory is that there is more than one way to become part of American society (Portes & Rumbaut 1996, 2001). Although this, *per se*, is not questioned by them, authors of 'new assimilation theory' state that the *dominant* stream remains 'straight-line assimilation' – perhaps not pertaining to the second generation in all regards, but indeed applicable to their children, the third generation (Alba & Nee 2003: 271-292). A major study of the second generation in New York City confirms this, and even speaks of a 'second generation *advantage*' (Kasinitz, Mollenkopf, Waters & Holdaway 2008). Yet, beginning as early as 1997, there has been much debate about obvious, substantial stagnation among some second-generation Mexicans, one of the largest and fastest-growing groups of immigrants to the US (Rumbaut 2005).

Advancing and stagnation need not be mutually exclusive. Among the second generation in the US, the dominant current is upward mobility, though there are also sub-groups who lag behind. Both trends are visible and need to be addressed. The idea that people 'assimilate' into more marginalised sections of society is useful to understand that second-generation integration may take different forms. Whereas through education and, to a lesser extent, in the workplace, there is the potential for 'formal acculturation' (Gans 1992), the second generation's more informal experiences outside school or work could in fact prove more significant, especially if such individuals have been left disillusioned by poor schooling or low-paid, low-status employment. This is notably the case when immigrant parents, due to poor language skills and limited knowledge of the host society, are unable to 'direct' and assist the integration of their children – a process that has been described as 'dissonant acculturation' (Portes 1997).

On a more optimistic note, the theory of 'segmented assimilation' also suggests that socio-economic advancement does take place, but with the

second generation upholding the traditions and values of the immigrant community. This is juxtaposed with the classical model of integration into 'white, middle-class America', arguing that immigrant youth do not need to sacrifice the cultural for the economic. Values and beliefs are no longer relegated to a position below the material and financial rewards of socio-economic advancement. Upward mobility through ethnic cohesion, as Portes and Zhou (1993) observed in the Punjabi Sikh community of Northern California, contests classical assimilation theory. Despite the humble social origins of many Punjabi immigrants, and in the face of overt racial discrimination by local white residents, theirs is mostly a story of economic success. The Punjabi second generation respected parental and community values, and did not adopt, as some parents feared, any form of 'oppositional culture' that would have adversely affected their education (Gibson 1989).

Parents resisting the 'Americanisation' of their young children, a stance that segmented assimilation theory has shown to be one possible path for upward mobility among Asian groups, may result in 'classical assimilation' (in the sense of 'becoming successful' in the American society), once the youngsters reach adulthood and access the middle class. Tracing longer life-courses and into adult life, rather than focusing on only a particular part of the trajectory, could help scholars soften some claims of segmented assimilation theory.

Further explanations of differences in outcomes for various ethnic groups are found in the dynamic interplay between structure, culture (of which ethnicity is a significant part) and personal agency. This is particularly apparent at the *local* level. One locality compared to another may well display highly differing patterns of second-generation integration for a variety of reasons: school quality and funding, availability of post-educational opportunities, the incidence of crime, level and nature of familial and community support networks, degree of ethnic cohesion, local politics and the role of local stakeholders. All these variables potentially affect how younger residents in a particular area develop and adapt their personal aspirations and future expectations.

Zhou (2005), for example, illustrates how the interplay of cultural and structural factors at the local level can affect mobility patterns. She distinguishes between ethnic enclaves and underclass ghettos in the US, both of which nonetheless display high levels of segregation by ethnicity, race and social class, and suffer from poverty, poor housing and a scarcity of well-paid jobs. Yet a distinction is found in ethnic enclaves, where the strength of social ties and networks facilitates social organisation and is also conducive to upward mobility; meanwhile, such connections appear to be much weaker in ghettos. Zhou's study of New York's Chinatown portrays a community with a strong sense of its ethnic identity, formed and promoted through the community's various economic, civic and religious

organisations. Some come in response to specific structural needs of the residents (e.g. for employment, information and advice), while others enhance the community's social ties and help establish social norms (e.g. that education is to be highly valued). These ties – Putnam (1995, 2000) called them *linking* ties – may cut across social class and provide access to resources that improve opportunities for socio-economic mobility. In other words, ethnicity interacts with structure to help explain how and why some localities develop strong social ties and networks that make up social capital while other localities do not, despite a common lack of financial and/or human capital. Important is the concept that one form of capital can lead to the creation or enhancement of another, e.g. that social capital gets translated into the personal skills and abilities that make up human capital, especially when a community prioritises the education of future generations (Coleman 1988).

Yet, social capital is by no means uniformly experienced in a positive way. For some, a community's close social ties and networks can pose limitations on personal freedom, pressures to conform and an overbearing sense of control over an individual's future plans and ambitions. Dissent from social norms can entail isolation from family and friends, not to mention stigmatisation by other community members. For those who step outside the confines of a tightly knit community, social capital – or lack thereof – is commensurate to the risk of social exclusion (see Portes 1988; Crul & Vermeulen 2003b).

2.3 The relevance of American assimilation theories for how we study the European second generation

How do theories discussed in the previous section translate into the European context? Research on ethnic groups in Europe has repeatedly drawn upon the theory of 'segmented assimilation' to help describe the integration and mobility patterns of the European second generation (Crul & Vermeulen 2003a; Heckmann, Lederer & Worbs 2001; Penn & Lambert 2009). The focus has particularly been on the theory's two alternative 'modes of incorporation': downward assimilation and upward mobility through ethnic cohesion. In some ways, this reflects the growing disparity between, on the one hand, immigrant youth who are performing well and, on the other, the relatively high numbers of low-educated immigrants in unstable employment conditions. Over-representation in lower levels of education and higher drop-out rates appear to be a characteristic of the Turkish and Moroccan second generations in Europe, although those figures do often conceal that a majority of them is doing well in both school and transition to work. Ethnic minority groups in Europe, in general, disproportionately reside in more deprived areas, where schools are more

likely to have fewer resources, more disciplinary issues and a quicker staff turnover. This echoes some of the notions in the downward mobility variant of segmented assimilation theory. Residential areas in European cities, however, cannot, be compared in scale nor in terms of their social problems with US ghettos, where the potential for downward assimilation is seen as greatest (Portes & Zhou 1993).¹

The American concept of downward assimilation is too striking in its pessimism and too definitive in its claim that this is a permanent feature of certain immigrant communities. Like second-generation Moroccans or Turks, even those who are considered as doing less well than children of other ethnic groups are still upwardly mobile compared to their parents. Furthermore, the data show that it is not simply a case of one ethnic group outperforming another. There are also signs of polarisation within ethnic groups that need to be explained. Indeed, an important critique on the theory of 'segmented assimilation' is that it fails to pay sufficient attention to internal differences within ethnic groups (Crul & Vermeulen 2003b).

The American theoretical debate about the integration of the second generation, moreover, seems to have had a persistent blind spot for the importance of the national context in which the second generation is trying to move forward. Its emphasis has been on comparing different ethnic groups in the same national context (Portes & Rumbaut 1996; for some of the most important studies, see Kasinitz et al. 2008; Portes & Rumbaut 2001). There have been relatively few studies in which the integration of American children of immigrants is compared with the integration of children of immigrants in other countries (exceptions are the studies of Faist 1995; Alba 2005; Mollenkopf 2000). As Reitz (2002) argues for from a Canadian perspective, North American researchers must pay more attention to the national context in which immigrants and their children live and work.

The significance of the national context for integration pathways has received more attention in Europe (Crul & Vermeulen 2003a; Doornik 1998; Eldering & Klopogge 1989; Fase 1994; Heckmann et al. 2001; Mahnig 1998). Research in Europe is easily more cross-national, given the proximity of many countries, which, although economically linked, are nonetheless structured very differently. In the European context, it is therefore more obvious to look at the effects of these differences (which, however, does *not* mean that most research in Europe would be comparative across countries). One of the most important European contributions to the international theoretical debate on integration has been to bring in the national context as a crucial factor for integration.

A transatlantic comparison has triggered questions about the US-centeredness of the American theoretical frameworks (Crul & Holdaway 2009; Crul & Schneider 2010). Are differences in outcomes for the various ethnic groups in the US not partly a reflection of American institutional arrange-

ments in school and labour markets or the specific characteristics of main ethnic groups in the US? If a group lives in a poor neighbourhood in a large American city with low-quality public schools (Portes, Fernandez-Kelly & Haller 2009: 1081; Suárez-Orozco, Suárez-Orozco & Todorova 2008: 88-145), its children will have few chances to enter university, let alone a prestigious school. Extreme differences in the quality of schools are a characteristic feature of American institutional arrangements in education (Crul & Holdaway 2009). To a significant extent, the empirical results in US studies reflect the specific American approach of integrating children into educational institutions. These observations should caution us against transferring American assimilation theory to other national contexts. Even if in other countries we find similar segmented outcomes, the mechanisms and institutional settings behind them will most probably be very different than those described by segmented assimilation theory. The challenge for European researchers is to formulate a theoretical framework that better reflects the Continent's institutional realities, its particular migrant groups and their characteristics. In short, needed is a theory that also takes into consideration the importance of the specific national (and, for that matter, local) integration contexts.

A similar argument about the US-centeredness of American assimilation theories can be made for the influence of national discourses on the formulated ideals of assimilation in both the public and the academic debate. Implicitly (or even explicitly) formulated 'ideals of integration or assimilation' differ greatly across countries. We should be aware that in the US debate, the notion of 'assimilation', i.e. becoming similar to the 'mainstream population', is built on the necessity of a country formed by immigrant groups of many origins to create common denominators and identifiers. In Scandinavia, by contrast, the tradition of a strong welfare state and the ideal of overcoming inequalities motivate the main end goals of integration. In France, the republican model, with its relatively radical egalitarian view of citizenship, poses yet another normative integration goal. A good example of how this works in practice is found in religion. While strong particularistic ethnic and religious institutions are often considered an important stepping stone for assimilation in the US, France presents the most dramatic case for contrast, with religion being largely looked at with great scepticism (Foner & Alba 2008). This also has implications for how assimilation indicators are chosen and how they are judged.

2.4 A theoretical framework for studying the European second generation

The theoretical framework we lay out in this section was primarily developed while working with the TIES data. On the one hand, it looks at the

second generation as active agents of change in cities. On the other hand, it investigates the importance of integration contexts and how they help or obstruct the second generation in claiming their place and position in cities. We formulate our theoretical notions partly in contradistinction to some premises of the aforementioned American assimilation theories.

An established group in the city

American assimilation theories are mostly based on research on the broad category of children of immigrants. In fact, in the US, this category usually includes the native-born children of immigrants as well as those who arrive together with their parents (i.e. the so-called ‘in-between’ or ‘1.5’ generation).² The term ‘second generation’, in the strict demographic sense, only refers to those born in the country of immigration, and we believe that it is important to clearly distinguish these two groups. Second and in-between generations differ radically in at least one central aspect: the second generation is born into the society of immigration and, unlike their parents and children of the in-between generation, they have no migration experience. They do not need to adapt to a society that is new to them. In both the US and Europe, they are also overwhelmingly citizens of their country of residence. As Schinkel (2007) points out, for the second generation there is no such place as ‘outside’ of society.

This is an important point for the theoretical debate. If the second generation does not need to integrate or assimilate into society, the opposition commonly established between ‘the society’ (also referred to as ‘the natives’, the ‘autochthonous’ population and ‘residents’) versus immigrants as ‘newcomers’ does not apply to the second generation. We are not dealing with clearly defined groups of insiders versus outsiders (cf. Glick-Schiller & Wimmer 2002).³ Second-generation youngsters are members of the society from the day they are born. As such, we can look at the second generation as being part of, or participating in, a plurality of social organisations (Luhmann 1989) – for example, their families, neighbourhoods, schools, peer groups, work units or organised free time and leisure activities (sports clubs, etc.). Following the work of Zhou (2005), we propose that the integration of the second generation should be studied in the local context of schools, neighbourhoods and workplaces.

Pursuing this line of inquiry often radically changes our perspective on integration. As our surveys revealed, young people from the second generation are frequently the most established group in the neighbourhoods of Europe’s large cities today. The TIES data predominantly show biographical continuity – many were born, grew up and still live in the same city. In contrast, many of our respondents of native-born parents had moved from other parts of the country to the major cities in order to study or work. As a result, upon analysing attachment at the neighbourhood level, we

generally find a stronger involvement among the second generation than among peers with native-born parents (see [chapter 8](#) in this volume). This raises new questions about participation and belonging from a societal perspective. A student of native-born parents who moves into a cheap and ethnically diverse working-class city neighbourhood will still need some adapting to this new environment – especially if coming from a small town or the countryside, environments usually much less diverse in many ways.

This brings us to our second point. All young people, be they children of immigrants or native-born parents, need to find their place in the social organisations crucial for ‘survival’ in society (see e.g. Bommes 2005; Schinkel 2007: 130ff). In larger European and American cities, this includes the need to cope with an environment that is increasingly multi-ethnic and ‘super-diverse’ (Vertovec 2006). And in some areas (e.g. certain neighbourhoods or school or working environments), this can prove more difficult for children of native-born parents than for the second generation.

The importance of the ethnic group as an analytical category

Segmented assimilation theory is strongly built around differences in social and cultural capital between ethnic groups. Although critiquing the concept of the ‘ethnos’ as a static homogeneous unit, coming from anthropology (Barth 1969; Cohen 1994) is now widespread in the social sciences, much migration research still implicitly assumes that the actions and views of migrants and their children are all motivated by the migration experience and/or their ‘ethnic heritage’.⁴ Again, looking particularly at the second generation, we think that this is debatable. To illustrate our point, here is a profile from the case study of Naima.

Naima is a young unmarried woman of Moroccan descent who studies Spanish and French linguistics in Amsterdam. The young woman speaks Dutch with a slight Amsterdam accent, where she was born and raised. Moroccan Arabic is her mother tongue; with both parents originally from the north of Morocco, the language spoken at home was always Moroccan. Especially when talking on her mobile phone with Moroccan friends and family, she frequently switches to Arabic – not least because it also allows for more privacy in public situations. Naima still lives with her parents in the same neighbourhood where she grew up – partly because it allows her to save money on rent, but also because she feels comfortable in the area. In the FIFA World Cup 2006, her favourite football team was the Netherlands, but if Morocco had qualified, her loyalty would, as she made clear, have been with the Moroccan team. Naima is ‘well integrated’ in a variety of different *social organisations*, for example, her family, the neighbourhood, the university

and a mentor project where she works to help out disadvantaged children in school. Other domains could be added, for example, the secondary school where she is currently doing an internship. She wears a headscarf and is engaged to a first-generation Moroccan man who graduated from university in Morocco.

Naima opposes the idea that she is first and foremost seen as Moroccan simply because she is the child of immigrant parents. Many, if not most, of her attitudes and actions are not based on this fact. In many ways, she resembles a 'typical' Dutch university student. The most important factors driving the majority of her actions are her age, her generation, her gender and a high level of education. In many other aspects, she certainly is also 'Moroccan', though this category becomes problematic when used non-specifically as a sort of explanatory *passerpartout*.

Naima belongs to the growing group of highly educated individuals within the Moroccan community in the Netherlands. Thanks in part to their entrance into professional careers, the second generation is embracing new roles and identities. Naima's aspiration to become a secondary school teacher is a strong identifier.

From the perspective of *culture and identification*, our case study offers a much more ambiguous picture. Naima is a native speaker in Dutch and Arabic, which both serve as important, ever-present means of communication in her daily life. She strongly identifies as Moroccan yet, without apparent contradictions, feels Dutch as well. Now, again we ask: what does this mean for her identification as a young woman living in the Netherlands? Dominant mainstream perceptions and public discourses in most Western countries implicitly or explicitly operate with normative settings here: it is clearly preferred to be well-educated and not unemployed, to wear no headscarf, to have 'native' friends and to not marry someone from Morocco. But to conclude that Naima's attitudes and actions are primarily motivated by her ethnic background is premature. She also strongly identifies as an emancipated woman who, out of her own volition, wears a headscarf for religious reasons. Other meaningful social and cultural categories, such as youth, political and bohemian cultures, can also be important for the second generation. While the first generation's origin is an almost all-encompassing identity (both ascribed and prescribed), this is not true for most of the second generation.

The idea of 'super-diversity', presented by Vertovec (2006), describes the growing diversification within and among city dwellers. We would add that super-diversity is also becoming visible *across* ethnic lines, sometimes challenging existing ethnic hierarchies – for instance, second-generation Turkish doctors in Amsterdam hospitals servicing elderly patients who come from lower- or middle-class non-migrant families.

Migration research chooses survey respondents because they belong *demographically* to a certain 'group', our intention being to compare them to groups reflecting other demographic characteristics. This is also one of the ways we look at the TIES survey data. However, we are aware that any definition of a 'group' merely operates as a departure point for analysis. To *explain* differences with this *a priori* definition is, in a worst case, tautological (see e.g. Latour 1999: 71). Moreover, taking the 'group' hypothesis simultaneously as *explanans* and *explanandum* tends to obscure the fact that the degree of variation *within* a 'group' (as much as other lines of differentiation, for instance, education level and gender) may be more relevant.

'Remaking the mainstream'

Contemporary cities are subject to a gigantic turnover of the population. Statistically, in many of them, almost the entire population is replaced within less than one generation.⁵ While most of Europe's cities have been multi-ethnic for a long time – or even since their foundations as *modern* cities – it is a relatively new phenomenon we see in which the formerly clearly defined ethnic majority group is becoming a minority group, like other ethnic groups. In many European cities, the majority of the population under age twelve is of immigrant origin. The authors of the Immigrant Second Generation in Metropolitan New York (ISGMNY) study point out that non-Hispanic whites still represent a sizable number (although only when taking all European groups together), though this group has actually become just one of the many ethnic minority categories in the city. This new situation challenges standard notions of 'mainstream' and 'majority'.

That they are losing their numeric majority position in the younger cohorts of larger cities does not mean that the 'majority group' will necessarily also lose its status as the most *dominant* in social and economic terms. Nonetheless, Alba (2009) shows how, in the long run, the demographic development of cities does also challenge its 'ethnic hierarchy'. Alba suggests that, in the future, 'the mainstream', simply for demographic reasons, will incorporate non-white groups as well. From our point of view, a new vocabulary is needed to describe this new diverse urban reality.

The highly educated second generation are often found working in city administration, education and social work. These jobs give them, to some extent, the chance to influence city policies and politics (Crul, Pazstor & Lelie 2008). These individuals therefore definitely play an important role in 'remaking the mainstream'. Their group size, however, differs greatly across cities and countries as much in Europe as in the US.

American assimilation theories start with the assumption that the second generation is integrating into certain segments of society or still needs to integrate into the mainstream. The term 'segmented' explicitly refers to

separate sections in society for immigrant groups and their children, meaning either a marginal ethnic underclass position or a self-chosen protective ethnic community life separate from the mainstream. These differing pathways are the result of each ethnic group's unique characteristics and respective reception context.

But the second generation in Europe is living in a neither segmented nor assimilated reality. Their reality is the super-diversity of big and increasingly also smaller cities. They can claim different positions depending on specific contexts and circumstances. The big city reality, for instance, makes it possible to claim a more emancipated and self-determined position for highly educated second-generation women. This comes up against their largely conservative communities whose mores run counter to female self-identities as students and working women. At the same time, the second generation also feels strong enough to claim a religious identity even in the face of a largely secular majority population, thus showing how Islamic life in all its diversity has also become an established part of the big cities. This new approach to integration is rooted in the second generation's status as an established group claiming its own position in the city and in a world where the majority group is losing its numeric dominance and the capacity to impose assimilative pressure on members of other ethnic groups. It is also rooted in the fact that parents' grip on the second generation is especially weak among its successful members; thanks to welfare state arrangements, these young people can move up on the social ladder and through the educational system (including higher education!) almost without financial support of the parents. It is mostly the unsuccessful group that depends on their own family and ethnic community.

2.5 Comparative integration context theory: Theoretical and methodological implications

We have thus far discussed the second generation as active agents of change in cities. But as this volume shows, the second generation does not claim its participation and belonging in all cities in the same way. As such, we find it useful to look at integration *contexts* and their status as either helping or hindering individuals from taking up certain positions. We argue that participation and belonging of the second generation in European cities is highly dependent on the integration context.

Integration contexts are affected by differing institutional arrangements in education, the labour market, housing, religion and legislation. Meanwhile, the social and political contexts are especially important for social and cultural participation and belonging. Part and parcel of the integration context is the diversity of today's European cities, as discussed in the previous section. Young people from all ethnic groups – including those we

formerly considered the ‘majority group’ – need to integrate into a diverse and super-diverse city youth population with various familial and biographical backgrounds and longer or shorter histories of living in the city.

We seek to address the importance of local and national contexts in which young persons – whether immigrants themselves, members of the second generation or of native-born parents – must find a place and position. This is no new topic: the US theories deal extensively with context, for example, with different modes of incorporation (e.g. Portes et al. 2009) and neighbourhoods (e.g. Kasinitz et al. 2008: 150-158). In general, national school systems and access conditions to the labour market are also analysed for their differentiating effects on children across ethnic groups and social classes, though not as part of *the system’s idiosyncrasy* – something that generally comes to the fore only in comparisons across national school or labour market systems.

Taking the institutional arrangements of a country for granted or as a given can seriously affect the way we perceive problems of participation and belonging among the second generation. Comparing different ethnic groups in the same local or national contexts automatically sets the focus on the immigrant groups themselves: why do some underperform as compared to the ‘native’ group, but others do not? The seemingly most logical explanation is culture and class. While we are not saying that these explanations are unimportant – far from it – they tell us only part of the story.

In his book *Warmth of the Welcome*, Reitz (1998) underscores the effect of different institutional settings for immigrants in Canada, Australia and the US. We take the liberty of bringing Reitz’s argument a step further in the European context, where institutional arrangements are much more diverse than in Reitz’s three countries. For the sake of illustration, we concentrate on one key institution: education. As an example, we can trace second-generation Turks’ predominantly disadvantaged educational situation in Germany to their low socio-economic background – to a significant degree though not fully. The remainder is then usually attributed to cultural differences. But if we compare second-generation Turks *across* several European countries, as we do in [chapter 5](#) of this volume, we see that they are doing much better in other countries than they are in Germany. Differences in outcomes across countries also remain when we include the analysis controls for parental education, as shown in the same chapter.

Variation between countries can be well explained by the different educational institutional arrangements. As demonstrated in this volume, influential factors include: school starting age, age of first track selection, the upward permeability within secondary education and the existence of a long or indirect route to higher education through the vocational column. In Germany, compulsory school starts at age six – later than most European countries – and, in most regions, children are selected into the academic or vocational column at age ten, after only four years of joint

learning in primary school. In countries like the Netherlands, this selection occurs after eight years and, even when selected into the lower qualifying tracks, many students still manage to reach higher education through the vocational column (albeit at the cost of three extra years of education). In Germany, a vocational route to higher education also exists, but it is not seen – or, for that matter, used – as an alternative to the same extent. These two aspects of the institutional arrangements in German education thus already determine, to a large degree, the low educational position of second-generation Turks in Germany.

We should be aware that institutional contexts differ greatly from country to country in Europe (or even from city to city in a given country), even though the normative debate is similar. Consider, for example, the comparable ideas found in Germany and France when it comes to learning the majority language as a second language at an early age. Yet, the general institutional arrangements for second language learning are very different, with obvious implications for outcomes in school. This holds true the other way round: there is still a lot of variation between national integration policies and, on another level, government rhetoric across countries, ranging from multiculturalism to right-wing populist and assimilative stances. However, on the city level, we frequently observe rhetoric-independent, pragmatic ways in which state agencies and societal institutions assess the specific necessities of dealing with immigrants and their children, as well as with the cultural diversity of their clientele (Heckmann et al. 2001; Vermeulen 1997; Vermeulen & Stotijn 2009). For this reason, we advocate the assessment of actual practice alongside the study of public discourse and national integration policies.

Understanding participation in key institutions in different European cities requires two principal perspectives. At the societal level, it means looking at the national and local institutional arrangements that facilitate or hamper participation and access, thus reducing or reproducing inequality. ‘Failed participation’ can thus be conceived as an indicator of obstacles to access and participation, for example, the late starting age of compulsory schooling, which has a disproportionately negative effect on children of immigrants. Here, we turn the common academic and policy approach to ‘integration’ on its head. The question is not why individuals fail to participate, but why institutions fail to be inclusive.

A second level looks at the agency of individuals and groups, actively expanding options for themselves and making choices, challenging given opportunities and structural configurations. For example, in the German half-day primary school system, it is expected for parents to actively help their children with homework. In the complex Dutch school system, information about the school system is of crucial importance. Across contexts, we thus see subjective and objective *options* for individuals to gain access and to claim participation, depending on different individual and group

resources (i.e. economic, social and cultural capital). Comparative integration context theory allows us to study both perspectives, scrutinising the actual practices of both institutions and individuals or groups.

The context of social and political discourse

Independent from its impact on policies and institutional practices, government rhetoric also influences *political and social climates*. This directly affects immigrants' and their children's quest for a place and position in the immigration society. On one hand, integration practices are shaped and pre-structured by specific institutional contexts, including legal aspects (e.g. citizenship regimes and policies) and institutional arrangements (e.g. in education and the labour market). On the other hand, integration practices are shaped by rules and 'habits' – in the sense of Bourdieu's *habitus* – by establishing and taking care of social relations and social interaction in a given societal setting (Bourdieu 1977, 1984).

Relevant to this, we distinguish three basic discursive contexts: political discourse; the social discourse of everyday communication and interaction; and media discourse. The political climate and implicit or explicit stereotypes and hierarchies of groups have a constant effect on 'feelings of belonging'. In addition, institutional arrangements can have discursive qualities. Citizenship regimes, for example, are frequently reflected in everyday discourses on the national belonging of groups and individuals (Schneider 2007). The term 'belonging' entails the possibility of simultaneousness, different forms of belonging in different contexts and possible changes over time. 'Belonging' comprises both the individual and institutional level: from an individual perspective, the challenge is to find a widely unquestioned place and position. Belonging in the sense of 'functional identities' (see e.g. Devereux 1978: 137ff) means the ability to develop social relations along 'strong' and 'weak' ties (Granovetter 1973) in many different social contexts. From an institutional perspective, the second generation is likely to experience *boundaries* that are 'brightened or blurred' (Alba 2005) by institutional arrangements, public and social discourses and inclusionary or exclusionary attitudes of groups or individuals. 'Group factors' can be part of the boundary-making process, too, especially when there is a cultural and/or group dynamic promoting or preventing belonging and participation. Group factors are, however, never static or fixed: no group in any context is immune to external influences. The effects of these influences are generally most noticeable in the second generation (see e.g. Alba & Nee 2003: 215).

The discursive context represents a complex field, whereby a constant tension is found between the second generation's personal feelings of belonging and the political, media and social representations of their position in society. The wider dominant discursive context in most European

countries presents a serious challenge here because it overemphasises ethnic background as the main signifier in all societal contexts. Depending on the degree to which belonging of second-generation groups to the local or national community is discursively called into question, ambiguity and hybridity seem adequate responses within the heterogeneity of European cities. Although ‘national identity’ is increasingly embraced and claimed by the second generation, this label is therefore problematic. At the same time, we see how local identity can be a sort of substitute for national identity. Differences between national and local senses of belonging underscore the ‘discursive legitimacy’ of specific labels. In all TIES survey cities, local belonging is more easily self-ascribed than national belonging for the second generation; this is not the case for the comparison group.

In sum, we argue that participation and belonging in diverse European cities greatly depends on differences in integration contexts, including institutional arrangements (in education, the labour market, housing, religion, legislation), and differences in the social and political context.

Comparative integration context theory: Methodology

Our methodological starting point is to see how people deal, *in practice*, with the challenges of finding a place and position in this new diverse urban reality. Here, we borrow from Bourdieu’s ‘theory of practice’, namely, the importance of studying concrete practices in societal fields by individuals, groups and institutions in different contexts and over time. So, instead of trying to fit the empirical complexities into pre-formulated models, we build our insights from the actual, real-life *practices and options* of individuals and groups.

In most research, ‘integration’ is measured only by the present state of things or a final outcome in a specific domain. Examples include the highest education level diploma or a currently held job. This approach makes it difficult to link outcomes with institutional arrangements. After all, present states and final outcomes are the results of underlying processes over time. Rather, an analytical emphasis on process transforms the endpoint’s either/or distinction between ‘success’ and ‘failure’ into a more nuanced sequence of ups and downs. It uncovers in-between pathways, bifurcating at specific points during education or labour market careers. For instance, the educational results of second-generation Turks in the Netherlands are average, as compared to other countries. A ‘classical’ theoretical conclusion would say that the Dutch school system is thus not very selective. However, looking at school *trajectories* reveals that the Netherlands’ educational system is, in fact, one of the most selective systems, streaming pupils into vocational versus academic tracks as early as age twelve and then offering some repair for the early selection with the long route through the vocational column. Judging only end results would obscure the stringent

selection processes in the transition from primary to secondary education. Only by bringing in the *process* it is possible to link outcomes at different school career stages to institutional arrangements, such as early selection and the possibility to rise from lower to middle vocational education and on to higher education. Process is the crucial methodological link to operationalise our theoretical assumptions.

2.6 Final remarks

As prior outlined, the influential segmented assimilation model is largely designed on the differences in educational outcomes of in-between and second-generation youngsters across different ethnic groups. This volume furthers a belief that education is the key to outcomes in the second generation overall. The TIES study enhances this picture by showing how differences in educational outcomes within the same ethnic group across countries are also vast. While ethnic group characteristics form the most pivotal axis in the segmented assimilation model, the ethnic group is not the main driving force in our study. Rather, it is the integration context and its interplay with resources in the ethnic community. For instance, school systems offer different windows of opportunities at various stages for parents to support their children's educational careers. But the opportunities offered in schools for lower-class children with an immigrant background are very different from each other, and the type of involvement that parents are asked for is crucial in determining outcomes.

Institutional arrangements in education, the labour market, housing and the law are all important in shaping the integration pathways. Parents directly affect their children's integration, but the effect is also negotiated in the interplay between what institutions demand of parents and what parents are able to do. Social and political discourse at the national level plays an important role, but so does what is happening at the city level where second-generation youth interact with other ethnic groups. The ethnic community plays a role insofar as what resources it can provide to individuals and how this enables or restricts their behaviour. The model combines what Reitz (2002) has called the 'importance of host societal institutions' and what Zhou (2005) has observed about the local-level interplay between communities, opportunity structure and individual agency.

The chapters in this volume show ample proof for the importance of the integration context through institutional arrangements in all analysed domains. This applies to education, the labour market and the legal statuses of second-generation respondents, but also to conditions for family formation, religiosity and the formation of identity. Institutional arrangements in all fields have a huge impact, often dwarfing differences based on group characteristics – even between the children of immigrants and their peers of

native parentage. For this reason, it is of particular importance to look for relevant lines of differentiation across *and* within groups of respondents.

Notes

- 1 This pessimistic outlook for people residing in 'ghettos' has been the source of some recent criticism. Waldinger, Lim and Cort (2007) find that despite the otherwise gloomy predictions, second-generation Mexicans are now integrating into 'working-class' America – another form of non-downward second-generation integration.
- 2 See, for instance, the Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Study (CILS) and Immigrant Second Generation in Metropolitan New York (ISGMNY) study.
- 3 Another problem with the rather static notion of insiders and outsiders is its presupposition that 'the people', 'the nation' and 'the state' would all fall within the same boundaries. It neglects, as theorists of transnationalism have pointed out, the relationships and constant movements of individuals across nation-state borders (Waters & Levitt 2002).
- 4 Practically all the comparative research on various immigrant groups in one national or local context takes the 'group hypothesis' more or less for granted. Admittedly, this is difficult to avoid because quantitative work, in particular, must create analytical units in order to make comparisons. We should nevertheless be aware that these units, in any case, are analytical artefacts, whose relation to reality must be well considered.
- 5 Accessible through the population registers in many municipalities, annually registered moves to and from a city provide sufficient information in this regard. The phenomenon has a similar magnitude in the US and is constantly changing the 'ethnic landscape' in a similar way.

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3 Research methodology

George Groenewold and Laurence Lessard-Phillips

3.1 Introduction

Mainly under ‘guest worker’ policies, Turkish, Moroccan and former Yugoslavian immigrants in the 1960s began to constitute sizeable diasporic communities in many European cities. They formed families and had children born in the country of immigration. The so-called second generation has now come of age and is well represented among adolescents and young adults in the European Union.

The TIES project’s methodological objective was to obtain statistically representative information on integration-related topics from second-generation Turks, Moroccans and former Yugoslavians in fifteen cities: Amsterdam, Rotterdam (the Netherlands); Antwerp, Brussels (Belgium); Paris, Strasbourg (France); Barcelona, Madrid (Spain); Basel, Zurich (Switzerland); Linz, Vienna (Austria); Berlin, Frankfurt (Germany); and Stockholm (Sweden). Our envisioned strategy was to survey the second generation using probability sampling, as this provides a theoretical basis from which to infer objectively to the entire populations of second-generation Turks, Moroccans and former Yugoslavians in the selected cities. This also meant facing constraints similarly encountered when sampling other minority populations (cf. Groenewold & Bilsborrow 2008). These include:

- Lack of readily available sampling frames from which to sample members of minority groups, including the second generation;
- Tendency of minority groups to concentrate in particular regions and parts of cities;
- Scarcity of members of minority groups in the general population.

This chapter discusses the TIES research methodology. The following sections address the envisioned model sampling strategy, and sampling frame availability and constraints for each participating country and city. We then present summaries of country-specific sampling designs and strategies. Our conclusion entails a discussion about problems encountered in the sampling of the second generation, our adopted solutions and repercussions for the statistical representativity of the collected data.

3.2 Model sampling strategy

The IMES-NIDI project coordination team began by agreeing on a straightforward general sampling strategy to be presented to the collaborators. The individual national institutes would then adapt the model to fit local conditions in terms of available sampling frames (see [section 3.3](#)) and financial constraints. The first step was to formulate eligibility criteria. We decided to set the age range for all study groups at eighteen to 35, while group membership was to be determined by birth in the survey country to at least one parent who was born in the country of ethnic origin (Turkey, Morocco or former Yugoslavia). Also sampled in each city would be a comparison group comprising members in the same age range who were born in the survey country and whose both parents were born in the survey country. For instance, the group of Turkish respondents included children of Kurdish immigrants born in Turkey. Conversely, the comparison group included children whose parents were born in the survey country, but whose grandparents were born abroad, e.g. in a survey country's former colony.

The second step was to formulate a general sampling strategy. In each city, members of one or two second-generation immigrant groups and of a comparison group were to be randomly sampled from a suitable sampling frame and interviewed. The target sample size of each group was set at 250 successful interviews. Within cities, respondents of all groups were to be sampled from the same spatial context (e.g. neighbourhood) to ensure parity across the broad social and economic characteristics of the context. Technically speaking, respondents were to be selected in multiple steps, by first sampling neighbourhoods with probabilities proportional to estimated numbers of second-generation Turks, Moroccans and former Yugoslavian residents and then sampling fixed numbers of respondents within sampled neighbourhoods. This decision was made a priori to ensure that a sufficient number of neighbourhoods be sampled in each city, in turn allowing for a multi-level analysis of neighbourhood effects at a later stage. Depending on whether the aim was for two or three study groups, the objective was thus to successfully interview a total of 500 or 750 persons per city, amounting to 1,000 or 1,500 respondents per country.

Setting equal target sample sizes for each study group implied that each person would be given the same selection probability in the *sample* of respondents. In real life, dealing with the general population, the situation proves quite different: study groups differ in size, so selection probabilities also differ. Because the actual population of potential comparison group members in cities is generally much larger than that of the second generation, the chance of selecting a comparison group member from its reference population is much slimmer than the chance of selecting a member of the second generation. Furthermore, non-response rates between cities, neighbourhoods and study groups are likely to differ, which has an ex post effect

on selection probabilities. To deal with these two factors, so-called compensation weights can be computed and used for all analyses. Such weights ensure that the selection probability of all respondents, irrespective of group membership and spatial location, will be the same. One subsequent effect is that the response of each interviewee is weighted to its proportionate representation in the responding population. Another effect is that outcomes of statistical significance tests are influenced (Cochran 1997; Kish 1965; Lee, Forthofer & Lorimor 1989; Purdon & Pickering 2001). The use of weights is of particular importance for comparative analysis (ESS 2004, 2007) involving respondents from different cities and countries.

To allow for the *ex post* calculation of compensation weights, country teams and cooperating survey bureaus were given specific instructions. They were asked to carefully detail procedures used when sampling study group members in cities and neighbourhoods and to document who had been home-visited, who refused to participate and which replacement respondents were added during field-work. Country teams were asked to adapt this model sampling strategy to reflect differences in local sampling frames and interviewing conditions.

3.3 Sampling frames

Ideally, we expected up-to-date municipal population registers to be available and accessible to researchers in each city. We hoped such a register would offer a database of all documented city residents' personal records consisting of: name, sex, current address, date of birth, birthplace, father's birthplace and mother's birthplace. We found, however, that this optimal situation – one that would permit a sampling of the second generation directly via register details – existed in only a couple survey countries (the Netherlands, Sweden). In others (Belgium, Germany, Switzerland, Austria), population registers were available though did not offer sufficient access. This was either due to rules and regulations concerning privacy (e.g. Belgium) or lacking enough details to unambiguously identify the second generation, notably parents' birth countries (Germany, Switzerland, Austria). In France, it proved almost impossible to access or, for that matter, identify suitable sampling frames. Keeping records of a person's ethnic affiliation is subject to strict rules of privacy and even contradicts the state philosophy that all legal residents are considered first and foremost French. A similar situation exists in Spain, where municipal records do not permit the identification of persons belonging to the second generation.

Similarly, other potential sampling frames, such as telephone directories, electricity company customer files and national labour force surveys (LFS), do not offer sufficient and/or relevant details permitting identification of the second generation (Klevmarken, Swensson & Husselius 2005).

Telephone directories only reflect a select part of the population; certain groups are often underrepresented due to some persons exclusively owning a mobile telephone with an unlisted number, not owning a telephone whatsoever or not consenting to having a listed number. Although large-scale nationally representative panel surveys such as the EC/ESF European Social Survey (ESS) and EC/UNECA's Gender and Generation Project (GGP) permit identification of the second generation, the actual numbers of second-generation respondents is too small for meaningful statistical analysis.

The TIES research teams in Austria, France, Germany and Switzerland decided to join forces, collectively developing a strategy in which existing registers and/or directories (see [section 3.4](#) for details per country) served as the basis for onomastic analysis on persons' forenames and surnames. These lists of names were thus used to determine persons' probable ethnic origin and subsequently derive city- and ethnic group-specific sampling frames. The quality of the frames was then examined by taking name samples from the list and screening the persons through a short interview.

This strategy proved to have highly accurate results for Turkish forenames and surnames, though less so for Yugoslavian-sounding names. Meanwhile, in France it was inappropriate for establishing a sampling frame for the Moroccan second generation because this group could not be singled out from the similarly named Tunisians and Algerians who live in their communities; this study group was therefore excluded. We acknowledge that the onomastic approach has some shortcomings. For instance, it remains uncertain which percentage of the entire second-generation Turks, Moroccans and former Yugoslavians are actually covered in such synthetically derived lists of names and address. Another problem is that Turkish and Moroccan women who marry a person from another ethnic group and take on his surname may go undetected (Humpert & Schneiderheinze 2009).

3.4 Country-specific sample designs and implementation

Between April 2006 and December 2008, the TIES teams developed and implemented country-specific sampling strategies. They led to 6,145 successful interviews with second-generation respondents and 3,626 comparison group respondents – a total of 9,771. The ensuing section describes the principal characteristics of country-specific surveys and sampling strategies. Main survey statistics are presented in [table 3.1](#). Our data presentation is based on the sequence in which the surveys were designed and implemented: first in the Netherlands and somewhat later in Belgium, Sweden, Austria, Switzerland, Germany, France and Spain.

The Netherlands

For the Netherlands, second-generation Turks and Moroccans and members of a native comparison group were sampled in Amsterdam and Rotterdam. Comparison group members were sampled in the same neighbourhoods as the second-generation groups. Minimum total effective sample size was set at 1,500 persons. Independent random samples of equal size were taken in cities (750) and in study groups (250). The municipal population registers served as sampling frames because these personal records comprise information permitting the identification and classification of residents according to age, sex, birthplace and parental birthplaces (BPR 2006).

What follows is a summary of the sampling method. As a first step, in each city, neighbourhoods were sampled with probabilities proportional to the sum of second-generation Turkish and Moroccan neighbourhood residents. To determine how many neighbourhoods were to be sampled, we decided a priori to set cluster size to 30 respondents (3 groups x 10 persons). This number was a compromise between our desire to secure a fair number of respondents from each study group in the neighbourhoods and to secure a sufficient number of neighbourhoods for sampling. Neighbourhood sampling was guided by the systematic selection method (Kish 1965), whereby a neighbourhood could be sampled more than once, depending on the number of second-generation Turkish and Moroccan residents. Effectively, cluster size was increased to a factor four ($4 \times 30 = 120$ respondents) because research into non-response rates in comparable studies suggested that high non-response rates could be expected in the field (e.g. Stoop 2005). Initially, 6,000 addresses ($= 4 \times 1,500$) were thus sampled from the municipal population registers. By the end of the fieldwork, non-response among second-generation respondents appeared higher than expected, so an additional 271 records were sampled from the registers. Of the total 6,271 addresses actually sampled from the registers, 4,999 proved valid. Discrepancy was mostly due to more than one eligible person living at the same address or so much time having elapsed between the sampling and the interview that the eligible person had moved. In the former scenario, we selected the eldest eligible household member (Kish 1965).

Sample design weights were derived and corrected for differential non-response rates across neighbourhoods and study groups. Furthermore, selection bias was examined by comparing age, sex and marital status characteristics of non-respondents with those of respondents. This was possible because the personal records of all sampled persons (non-respondents and respondents both) offer such information. Our finding was that non-response bias seems slight in terms of the compared characteristics (Groenewold 2008).

Ultimately, 738 persons, a total slightly below our target, were successfully interviewed in 23 of Amsterdam's 90 neighbourhoods. In 24 of Rotterdam's 77 neighbourhoods, 767 persons were successfully interviewed, slightly above our target of 750. Overall, the response rates were low: 30.1 per cent in Amsterdam and 29.2 per cent in Rotterdam (see [table 3.1](#) for variation across study groups).

Belgium

In Belgium, second-generation Turks and Moroccans and members of a comparison group were sampled in the same neighbourhoods. Our aimed minimum effective sample size was set at 1,650 – that is, 900 successfully interviewed respondents in Antwerp's ten districts (3 groups x 300 respondents) and 750 respondents in Brussels' nineteen communes (3 groups x 250 respondents). Like the Netherlands, Belgium maintains a national population register. However, in 2005, a modification to privacy regulations made the register effectively inaccessible to researchers.

As such, our objective was to derive a sample of respondents of comparable ages and levels of education from all study groups, whereby the probability of respondent selection would be proportional to the presence of second-generation target groups in a particular neighbourhood. Because the availability of sampling frames differed in Antwerp and Brussels, somewhat variant sampling strategies had to be pursued in the two cities.

In the case of Antwerp, access was obtained from personal records in the population registers of the city's ten districts. Anticipating some non-response, net target numbers of respondents for each target group were scaled-up. The scaled-up target samples of second-generation Turks (667) and Moroccans (668) were sampled with probabilities proportionate to their distribution over the statistical sectors with each district, thus essentially reflecting their actual geographical distribution over the city. Allocation of the scaled-up target sample (701) of comparison group members to districts and statistical sectors called for another tactic. In a first step, the target sample was subdivided over the ten districts according to the prevalence of combined totals of second-generation Turks and Moroccans residing in districts. In a second step, district allocations were allocated to statistical sectors according to the prevalence of second-generation Turks and Moroccans residing in these sectors. A main difference from the designs for Amsterdam and Rotterdam is that the Dutch primary sampling units (PSU) were neighbourhoods, while in Antwerp they were statistical sectors sampled within each of the city's ten districts.

A suitable sampling frame of names and addresses was absent in Brussels, but information on numbers and spatial distribution of members from the three study groups was available. The first step here was to develop a sampling frame of Brussels' street segments. In a second step, street

segments were independently sampled for each second-generation study group, with selection probabilities proportionate to the respective numbers of second-generation members living in them. Sampling and interviewing comparison group members was guided by the same philosophy as our research in Antwerp. Street segments were sampled with selection probabilities in proportion to the combined numbers of second-generation Moroccans and Turks residing there. The research team gained access to a listing of addresses from a commercial database supplier (who uses the information for direct marketing purposes) with information on residents (age, nationality and name, from which we inferred whether the individual might be of Turkish or Moroccan background). On the basis of this information, we could identify the second generation and members of the comparison group as well as their addresses. Based on estimates of expected non-response and misclassifications in addresses, the number of target addresses for interviewing was scaled-up for second-generation Turks (250 to 1,110), Moroccans (250 to 1,114) and comparison group members (250 to 952). The scaled-up number of respondents' addresses was then sampled, the eligibility of persons living there was screened and, if appropriate, they were then interviewed. If more than one eligible person was living at the same address, we selected the eldest eligible household member. Sampling these respondents in the selected street segments was done by the simple random sampling without replacement (SRSWOR) method. Due to the field-work's slow progress – a result of the mediocre quality of our available address list – we decided to switch to a semi-quota sampling approach. Now interviewers were allowed to search for the first eligible potential respondent they could find in the same or adjacent street segment, thus distorting the initial probability sampling strategy.

These distortions occurred in both Antwerp and Brussels, prompting a decision not to derive probability weights (corrected for non-response rate variation), but rather to resort to the computation and application of compensatory weights. The weights were derived by comparing age and sex distribution of the respondents in the three study groups to that of comparable persons in Brussels and Antwerp, as covered by the Belgian censuses in 1991 and 2001 (Swyngedouw, Phalet, Baysu, Vandezande & Fleischmann 2008).

Sweden

Sweden's study groups comprised second-generation Turks and members of a native comparison group. Due to financial constraints, sampling goals were set at successfully interviewing just 250 persons in each group who live Stockholm County. The Swedish TIES team subcontracted sampling issues and field-work to the Swedish Central Bureau of Statistics (Statistiska Centralbyrån, SCB). This cooperation proved advantageous in

that the project gained direct access to one of the best-maintained population registers (Wallgren & Wallgren 2007; Swedish Tax Agency 2007) for sampling purposes and to teams of seasoned sampling experts and interviewers. The Swedish population register comprises the name, address, date of birth, sex, birthplace and parental birthplace of all Swedish citizens. One disadvantage of twinning was that the project proposal had to be screened and approved by various government agencies.

In the first sampling step, a subset of the population register database was created by selecting records only of persons who, as of January 2007, were between eighteen and 35 years old, were currently living in Stockholm County, were born in Sweden and whose both parents were either born in Turkey or in Sweden. In a second step, this subset database was sorted according to parental country of birth in order to create two strata. Stratum 1 thus comprised persons whose both parents were born in Turkey, while stratum 2 comprised persons whose both parents were born in Sweden. From each stratum, a simple random sample of 250 personal records was drawn and the persons were subsequently home-visited and interviewed. Thus, unlike the sampling strategy in other countries (see [section 3.2](#)), this selection method did *not* aim to sample comparison group members coming from the same neighbourhoods as our second-generation Turkish respondents.

During the field-work, refusal and non-response rates were high. As it turned out, second-generation Turkish women refused to be interviewed by male interviewers. In general, second-generation Turkish men were reluctant to participate: they often refused to be interviewed at home or, if an interview was fixed at a neutral location, they would not show up to the appointment. This unexpectedly low overall response rate of 42 per cent made it necessary to draw a second sample from the register. The second sample anticipated high non-response rates by drawing a sufficiently large sample: 2,250 names of second-generation Turks and 750 names of members of the comparison group, whereby the variation in group sample sizes reflected the different expected non-response rates. Once we achieved the targeted 250 interviews, the field-work was terminated.

The sampling approach and a careful documentation of how field-work proceeded permitted a derivation of sample design weights. These were calibrated to account for differences in the characteristics of respondents vis-à-vis non-respondents. Similar to the situation in the Netherlands, basic socio-economic characteristics (i.e. age, sex, educational attainment, income group, marital status, group size within the general population) were available in the population register, thus allowing the two groups to be compared. Differences were analysed, leading to the derivation of a so-called calibration weight for all respondents. This weight was subsequently combined with initial sample design weights, resulting in one single calibrated sample design weight for each respondent. The sum of the

calibrated design weights by group reflects both study groups' relative size within the general population of Stockholm County.

Austria

The study groups for our sampling in Austria were second-generation respondents from the country's two largest immigrant groups, Turks and former Yugoslavians, as well as a comparison group of respondents of native-born parentage. We selected two rather contrasting cities. Vienna, with a recorded 1.7 million inhabitants in 2007, is much larger than Linz, with its population of 190,000. Although a person's migrant status is recorded in Austrian municipal records, parental birthplace is not. The status of migrant also changes once full Austrian citizenship has been acquired so that children of immigrants holding an Austrian passport do not continue to be classified as persons with a migration background. Existing administrative records were therefore unsuitable as a sampling frame for the second generation. Moreover, Austrian privacy protection laws generally prevent social scientists from accessing administrative records.

Fortunately, the Austrian team managed to secure cooperation from both cities. The municipal administrations provided forenames and surnames of *all* inhabitants in the age range of eighteen to 35. These names were then screened by a survey bureau specialised in onomastics, permitting the derivation of an ethnic classification and identification of second-generation study groups. However, different types of 'frame pollution' appeared to be present. For instance, on screening respondents at their doorsteps in Linz, interviewers found that 13 per cent of persons with names identified as 'Yugoslavian' and 8 per cent with names identified as 'Turkish' did not belong to their presumed ethnic groups.

Once an appropriate sampling frame was constructed, the objective was set to the general TIES model sampling strategy of successfully interviewing a total of 1,500 respondents, i.e. 250 per city and per study group. As existing figures on non-response were unavailable for these study groups, a buffer of names and addresses four times the above-mentioned target numbers was created. In the case of Linz, with its much smaller numbers of second-generation residents, this factually boiled down to home-visiting *all* persons with a seemingly Yugoslavian (835) or Turkish (315) name in the database.

While the second generation in both cities was approached by means of a simple random sample (without replacement) straight from the list of names and addresses, the sampling of comparison group members occurred in a different manner. The address of each successfully interviewed second-generation respondent was taken, literally, as the starting point for identifying a comparison group member living nearby. Using the random route method (Kish 1965), the fifth street address following the address of

the interviewed second-generation respondent was screened for the presence of an eligible comparison group member. If present, the person was interviewed. If more than one eligible person was present, eldest household member (Kish 1965) was selected and interviewed. If absent or if the person refused to be interviewed, a new random route was pursued until an eligible comparison group member could be located.

Response rates do not differ much between groups and cities, hovering around 40 per cent, except for Turkish respondents in Linz, where the response rate was about 70 per cent. An onomastic respondent selection strategy does not permit the derivation of conventional sample design weights. To ensure resemblance of the TIES survey population with that of the representative reference population, so-called post-stratification weights were derived. The nationally representative 2008 LFS was used to derive these weights by comparing the distribution of TIES respondents and LFS respondents according to city of residence, ethnic group, age, sex and educational attainment. Thus, the TIES survey population was modelled to resemble the LFS population in terms of the aforementioned characteristics.

Switzerland

Second-generation Turks and former Yugoslavians and a comparison group of native parentage constituted our study groups in the agglomerations of Zurich and Basel, also the main settlement areas for the two immigrant groups. In Switzerland, the number of residents with a migration background is difficult to determine because administrative records do not record parental birthplace or whether Swiss nationality has been gained by birth or naturalisation. Population figures (see appendix 3) were therefore estimated on the basis of the 2000 Swiss census and the times series of recorded numbers of immigrants by origin in the central aliens register.

Similar to their Austrian colleagues' approach, the Swiss team thus built sampling frames for each of the three study groups using available municipal registers. Municipal registers in Basel and Zurich consist of a system of commune-level personal registers interlinked across cities. A survey bureau was subcontracted to develop a sample design in consultation with the Swiss team. This incorporated use of the same computer software that was successfully used in Austria to derive sampling frames (Humpert & Schneiderheinze 2009). The onomastic method was applied to commune-level population registers to identify all persons in the age range eighteen to 35 with forenames or surnames linguistically akin to Turkish and Yugoslavian names.

As a preparatory activity for designing the sampling strategy, we analysed the 2000 census in order to determine the spatial distribution of the three study groups within the boundaries of the two city agglomerations. An important finding was that the two immigrant groups appeared to live

in specific areas within Basel and Zurich. This implied that the TIES model sampling strategy had to be adapted. In other words, though feasible in other countries, the sampling design being developed could not a priori guarantee that members of all three study groups in Switzerland would be sampled in the same area (e.g. communes or neighbourhoods).

In a first step, two strata consequently had to be defined in each city. The Turkish stratum and the Yugoslavian stratum thus each comprised all communes in a city in which at least twenty members of the respective study groups resided. Communes with smaller numbers were excluded. The objective was to sample 250 respondents in each stratum. This was realised by first drawing a sample of communes and then sampling a fixed number of study group members within each sampled commune. If a particular commune was selected in both strata, a fixed number of Turkish and former Yugoslavian respondents was sampled and interviewed in that commune.

In a second step, we determined the numbers of communes and respondents of each study group. The aforementioned analysis of the spread and prevalence of study group members over the city and communes at the time of the 2000 census led to our conclusion that the optimal situation would be five Turkish respondents in each of 50 clusters ($5 \times 50 = 250$) and six former Yugoslavian respondents in each of 42 clusters ($6 \times 42 = 252$). This strategy implied that the target sample of 250 comparison group members was to be redistributed over the two strata according to the ratio of clusters to be sampled from the two strata (i.e. 136 in the Turkish stratum, 114 in the Yugoslavian stratum).

Our third step was to sample communes and respondents. This was achieved by applying the systematic selection method (Kish 1965; Cochran 1977). It provided a convenient way to allocate the 50 and 42 clusters to a cumulative list of communes in each stratum. Application of the method leads to self-weighting samples in each stratum and each city. Communes with high numbers of target group members have higher probabilities of being selected than those with smaller numbers; communes with the highest numbers could be selected more than once through multiple clusters (i.e. multiple batches of five or six respondents). Once subset communes were sampled by this method and the number of persons to be interviewed was known, commune authorities were requested to provide access to their commune registers, allowing researchers to identify and sample names and addresses of potential respondents from each study group.

The success of the Swiss sampling strategy depended heavily on cooperation from commune authorities. As it turned out, not all were cooperative. Some sampled communes thus had to be replaced by ones with a similar proportion of relevant second-generation residents. Furthermore, as non-response turned out to be high (see appendix 3), similar to the situation in other countries, it was necessary to repeatedly sample from the same name register in sampled communes. In some communes, the list of names was

eventually depleted and names had to be selected from other communes, thus distorting the sample design. These sources of errors, among others, complicated the derivation of sample design weights and, to an unknown extent, jeopardised statistical representativity of the data in Basel and Zurich.

Germany

Second-generation Turks and former Yugoslavians as well as members of a comparison group of native parentage were also the subjects of the TIES surveys in Berlin and Frankfurt. Similar to the situation in Austria and Switzerland, no readily available representative sampling frames were feasible via population registers in Germany. Although coverage and quality of German municipal population registers are good, personal records do not offer all information required for identifying the second generation.

In cooperation with the Austrian and Swiss TIES teams, the German team also pursued an onomastic approach (Humpert & Schneiderheinze 2009) to develop appropriate sampling frames for the three study groups. Once the municipalities of both cities had cleared the project and expressed their support, the details of all native-born eighteen to 35 year olds in the population registers could be obtained. These lists comprised 725,040 persons in Berlin and 121,374 persons in Frankfurt. Apart from name, address, sex and age, each personal record included the person's place of birth (though not of the parents) and citizenship status. In the case of Berlin, the onomastic software classified 5 and 1 per cent of the records as being second-generation Turks and former Yugoslavians, respectively. For Frankfurt, this turned out to be 7 and 4 per cent, respectively. Little over 50 per cent of the records in both cities were classified into the stratum of the comparison group of native-born parentage. This constituted the population universe from which statistically representative random samples of names were taken in each city separately. Contrary to the stratified multi-stage sample designs for cities in Austria and Switzerland, simple random samples of 250 names were taken straight from the deduced sampling frames of names of each study group. This deviates from the general TIES strategy of insofar as possible sampling all study groups residing in the same neighbourhood.

Similar to experience in other countries, adolescents and young adults in the three study groups proved difficult to contact and to convince to participate in an interview. For each city, two sampling waves involving the names of 750 and 1,000 persons, respectively, were required to draw a sufficient number of names and addresses to achieve the targeted number of 250 successful interviews in each study group.

France

Identifying second-generation Turks in Paris and Strasbourg was difficult due to lacking access to suitable sampling. France's most recent census and municipal population registers have no record of parents' country of birth. Similar to the approach followed in the German-speaking countries, the French team therefore pursued the onomastic identification procedure to build a sampling frame of names and addresses of the second generation.

The sampling frames in both cities were based on telephone directories. In total, 10,658 names were identified as Turkish: 7,823 in Paris and 2,745 in Strasbourg. Shortcomings of the frame used in France are similar to those experienced in the German-speaking countries, though were compounded by the aforementioned exclusionary tendency of telephone directories.

The sampling frame was established on the basis of postcode areas in each city with probabilities proportional to the number of Turkish names listed as residents in the area. The first stage consisted of a telephone screening among a sample of respondents from the target group. This screening, which consisted of a few basic questions (age, sex, individual and parental country of birth), was intended to quickly determine whether sampled persons did indeed belong to the intended target group and, if so, whether other target group family members were living within or apart from the contacted household. If all criteria were met, the names and addresses were included in a list of potential respondents for the main survey. The sampling frame was updated to include family members as potential respondents, i.e. via the snowball method, frequently used to identify and interview respondents (Kish 1965).

Including a screening stage was advantageous in that it permitted our collecting basic socio-demographic information, including that of persons who would later refuse the main interview or could not be contacted for follow-up. Background characteristics of both respondents and non-respondents were later used to inflate compensation weights for variation in non-response rates between postcode areas and study groups.

A list of names and addresses of members of the comparison group in the age range was compiled during the screening of sampled second-generation Turks in the selected postcode areas. The comparison group was subsequently sampled by postcode area, as was done for second-generation Turks.

The first stage of our field-work yielded response rates (here calculated as the number of successful interviews out of overall eligible individuals) of 25 per cent for second-generation Turks and 37 per cent for the comparison group. In the first stage of the sampling, the number of respondents was too low. A second stage was thus implemented, mainly through re-contacting individuals who had agreed to participate but were unavailable at the time of field-work, re-contacting initial refusals and using snowball sampling.

Spain

In Spain, our groups of interest were second-generation Moroccans in Madrid and Barcelona and a comparison group of native-born parentage in both cities. The lack of recent suitable sampling frames meant having to pursue three separate identification and selection strategies. The first was a sample provided by the Spanish National Statistical Institute (INE), though this one only included a few fitting cases.

The second strategy involved identifying districts within Madrid and Barcelona according to their share of resident Moroccans, regardless of their generational status, and allocating a set number of interviews to each district (proportional to the size of the Moroccan population in the district). Interviewees were then sampled from streets surrounding the centre of a given district. Respondents from the comparison group were selected in the same districts and in the same proportion. A drawback to this method is that during the initial identification stage, it was not possible to distinguish naturalised Moroccans from the comparison group. This might have underestimated districts with a high proportion of naturalised Moroccans (and hence the second generation).

A third method, used in Barcelona towards the end of the field-work period, involved asking Moroccan immigrant organisations for the names of potential interviewees.

In the case of Spain, an appropriate sampling frame could thus not be established. Potential respondents had to be identified in the field by interviewers who went in search of them, i.e. via the snowball method (Kish 1965). Data collected via this method for both study groups in Madrid in Barcelona, however, cannot claim statistical representativity.

Concluding this section, [table 3.1](#) presents some basic statistics of the TIES surveys conducted in the eight participating countries.

3.5 Conclusions

The TIES project used the survey instrument to collect data on various dimensions of integration from second-generation Turks and former Yugoslavians and comparison group members of native parentage in fifteen cities in eight European countries. Our objective was to collect statistically representative data for these target groups, all the while acknowledging that certain constraints had to be overcome. First, we had to identify our target group members; from there, create a sample; next, contact all the persons; and, last but not least, secure their collaboration.

To support the coordinators of the TIES country teams, notably in the initial phase of the project, meetings were held to discuss potential survey sampling approaches and how to overcome technical, logistical and

Table 3.1 *Size estimates of reference populations, numbers of successfully interviewed persons and response rates, by country, city and study group*

	The Netherlands		Belgium		Sweden		Austria	
	Amsterdam	Rotterdam	Brussels	Antwerp	Stockholm	Vienna	Linz	
Population								
Turkish	5,088	6,941	18,575	1,480	5,723	13,125	5,432	
Moroccan	8,649	4,117	61,155	4,506				
Yugoslavian						26,269	3,817	
Comparison	102,491	71,288			275,505	217,623	60,845	
Sample								
Turkish	237	263	244	358	251	252	206	
Moroccan	242	251	246	311				
Yugoslavian						253	242	
Comparison	259	253	257	301	250	250	234	
Response rate (%)								
Turkish	29.9%	30.5%	31.5%	63.5%	32.0%	40.0%	70.0%	
Moroccan	25.9%	24.2%	30.6%	55.9%				
Yugoslavian						38.0%	38.0%	
Comparison	40.1%	34.8%	31.1%	55.8%	54.0%	43.0%	42.0%	
Total	31.1%	29.2%	31.0%	58.4%	42.0%			
	Switzerland		Germany		France		Spain	
	Zurich	Basel	Berlin	Frankfurt	Paris	Strasbourg	Madrid	Barcelona
Population								
Turkish	4,967	4,706	35,363	8,456	n.a.	n.a.		
Moroccan							n.a.	n.a.
Yugoslavian	14,737	4,827	6,477	4,477				
Comparison	709,290	321,104	388,343	61,725	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Sample								
Turkish	206	248	253	250	248	252		
Moroccan							250	250
Yugoslavian	235	191	202	204				
Comparison	202	266	250	253	174	177	250	250
Response rate (%)								
Turkish	38.2%	46.7%	31.2%	24.8%	n.a.	n.a.		
Moroccan							n.a.	n.a.
Yugoslavian	29.7%	45.9%	22.1%	22.9%				
Comparison	41.2%	48.4%	25.7%	24.3%	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Total	36.0%	47.5%	26.4%	24.0%				

Notes: The Netherlands: Population estimates derived from municipal population register (d.d. 1 April 2006). Belgium: Technical report; no information on size of comparison group; response rates in Brussels based on first sampling wave. Sweden: Response rates based on first sampling wave. Austria: Austrian Labour Force Survey weighted estimates; estimates for Linz unavailable and pertain to Voralberg region as a whole.

Source: TIES survey 2007-2008

financial constraints when surveying the second generation. For one, a model sampling strategy was offered to help country teams start developing a strategy that would take their specific local conditions into consideration. This model design assumed the availability of suitable sampling frames.

As it turned out, truly suitable sampling frames were only available for Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Antwerp and Stockholm. These cities offered the luxury of up-to-date population registers containing personal records necessary to define the second generation. Moreover, these databases, albeit with certain restrictions, were accessible to the research community. A notable advantage here was being able to know the size of the actual second generation reference population for which the TIES survey results aim to be representative. That all study groups could be directly sampled from the registers was also beneficial.

Circumstances were less favourable in other cities, where even an estimated size of the second-generation reference population could not be derived (see [table 3.1](#)). The implication was that the a priori probability of selection of a respondent could not be determined, which is a necessary condition for probability samples (Cochran 1977). Therefore, creative and innovative, albeit partial, solutions to this problem had to be developed. In the case of Brussels, for example, area sampling was implemented by sampling street segments from the main residential areas, followed by the screening of street addresses, and subsequently sampling and interviewing eligible respondents. In Austria, Switzerland, Germany and France, the national TIES teams made concerted efforts to develop the required sampling frames. Their innovative approach allowed the names and addresses of eighteen to 35 year olds in each city to be collected and compiled. From there, onomastic software was used to analyse the lists and, in so doing, derive sampling frames for each TIES study group. From these frames, probability samples of group members were taken, leading to survey data that were statistically representative for the reference population in the name lists. In the absence of a readily available and/or up-to-date population register, sampling frames derived in this way are probably the next best option. The approach's main – and inevitable – drawback is that the study populations are likely to deviate from the actual reference populations, especially if the deviation is caused by the systematic omission of persons with certain characteristics. Consequently, survey results can only claim statistical representativeness for persons included in such type of sampling frames.

Response rates were generally low in all countries, ranging from 22 per cent among second-generation former Yugoslavians in Berlin to 70 per cent among second-generation Turks in Linz. The majority of the TIES survey target audience proved difficult to contact in the first place and difficult to pin down for an interview. Low response rates raise doubts about

whether responding persons can represent non-respondents in terms of personal characteristics and measured attitudes and opinions. For Amsterdam, Rotterdam and Stockholm, this could be examined more closely because basic information on non-respondents was available in population registers. This information revealed that age, sex and marital status differences between responding and non-responding persons proved to be slight, lending support to claim statistical representativity of the collected data in these cities.

In the French cities, basic personal characteristics were collected during a large-scale eligibility screening of persons included in the constructed sampling frames. After the survey, non-respondents and respondents were compared with respect to age, sex and educational attainment. The conclusion was that in both study groups – second-generation Turks and comparison group members – non-respondents were more likely to be men and had a lower level of educational attainment than respondents. To preserve statistical representativity, compensation weights were thus derived for dealing with this bias, giving higher weight to lower-educated and male respondents.

For the German, Swiss and Austrian cities, this kind of sampling frame information was unavailable, but the survey contained a question for the interviewers to answer after each successful interview concerning how difficult it was to get in contact with the respondent. The continuum of resistance model (Lin & Schaeffer 1995; Stoop 2005) asserts that late respondents can be considered as proxies for unobserved non-respondents. Comparison of age, sex and educational attainment of easy-to-reach with difficult-to-reach respondents in these cities revealed that: 1) in German cities, difficult-to-reach respondents of Turkish origin have slightly lower levels of education; 2) in Austrian cities, difficult-to-reach respondents of both study groups are more often males and have a lower level of education; 3) in Swiss cities, the two types of respondents did not appear to differ in terms of age, sex or educational attainment. This analysis was also applied to the responses of study groups in the Dutch and French cities. Results confirmed earlier conclusions that non-respondents and respondents do not seem to differ much according to age, sex or educational attainment profile. In the case of Sweden, the survey did not collect information required for this analysis.

From these reflections, we conclude that appropriate procedures were followed insofar as was possible and feasible. We found indications that, despite fairly high non-response rates, non-response bias in most cities may not be too problematic. In light of constraints encountered in the field, the data collected and compiled by the TIES project probably reflects the best one might expect to retrieve from second-generation study groups.

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4 The TIES respondents and their parents

*Background socio-demographic characteristics*¹

Laurence Lessard-Phillips and Christopher Ross

4.1 Introduction

As the TIES project has affirmed, socio-demographic characteristics of migrants and their descendants across Europe vary greatly. We see this both in terms of individuals as well as their families. Our survey has also revealed such differences among respondents who share common ethno-national origins. The aim of this chapter is to give a first descriptive overview of all TIES respondents – including the comparison groups – detailing their age, citizenship status, household composition alongside pertinent socio-demographic information about their parents.² We describe here to what extent parental characteristics of second-generation respondents may diverge from their respective cities' comparison groups. A particular comparative focus on second-generation Turks across countries is reflected in this chapter, as it is elsewhere in this volume, because this group is numerically and visibly present in seven of the eight participating survey countries and thus forms a substantial part of our overall sample. For this reason, a separate paragraph under each theme is dedicated to information specifically about them and their parents.

The first section examines select demographic characteristics of our respondents themselves. The second section focuses on their parents.


4.2 Respondents' socio-demographic characteristics

Age distribution

Immigration patterns vary across receiving countries and immigrant groups. Naturally, this has resulted in varied waves of migration and different immigration peak periods. This also affects age distribution patterns among second-generation respondents from diverse origins. We contend that age is an important factor when studying the timing – and for that matter, mere presence – of crucial life course transitions, such as entry into the


labour market and union formation. Figures 4.1a through 4.1o show the mean age and confidence intervals of the TIES respondents at the city level, separated by gender.³

Figure 4.1a Age distribution, by group and gender in Vienna




Source: TIES 2007-2008

Figure 4.1b Age distribution, by group and gender in Linz




Source: TIES 2007-2008

Figure 4.1c *Age distribution, by group and gender in Brussels*




Source: TIES 2007-2008

Figure 4.1d *Age distribution, by group and gender in Antwerp*




Source: TIES 2007-2008

Figure 4.1e Age distribution, by group and gender in Zurich




Source: TIES 2007-2008

Figure 4.1f Age distribution, by group and gender in Basel




Source: TIES 2007-2008

Figure 4.1g *Age distribution, by group and gender in Berlin*




Source: TIES 2007-2008


Figure 4.1h *Age distribution, by group and gender in Frankfurt*



Source: TIES 2007-2008


Figure 4.1i *Age distribution, by group and gender in Madrid*

Source: TIES 2007-2008

Figure 4.1j *Age distribution, by group and gender in Barcelona*


Source: TIES 2007-2008

Figure 4.1k Age distribution, by group and gender in Paris




Source: TIES 2007-2008


Figure 4.1l Age distribution, by group and gender in Strasbourg




Source: TIES 2007-2008

Figure 4.1m *Age distribution, by group and gender in Amsterdam*

Source: TIES 2007/2008

Figure 4.1n *Age distribution, by group and gender in Rotterdam*

Source: TIES 2007-2008


Figure 4.10 *Age distribution, by group and gender in Stockholm*

Source: TIES 2007-2008


The figures show that age gaps exist between comparison and second-generation groups in almost all cities, with the latter being, on average, younger than the former. We can attribute this to the relatively recent arrival of the second generation's parents in most countries and the fact that, according to our definition anyway, the second generation is necessarily born in the survey country. To illustrate with an example, if a Turkish or a Moroccan mother arrived in the survey country in 1980, her first locally born child could have been, at most, 28 years old during the survey.⁴

But as the figures also show, considerable differences exist between second-generation groups. Respondents of Turkish descent are somewhat younger than those of former Yugoslavian descent in Frankfurt and Vienna, but of comparable age across other cities. Respondents of Moroccan descent are substantially younger than those of Turkish descent in the Dutch cities. In the Belgian cities, there is no consistent pattern, and variation exists across cities and gender.

Figures 4.2a and 4.2b offer a closer look, showing the mean age of second-generation Turkish groups across the TIES cities. Substantial discrepancies in age distributions appear. Turkish second-generation men are oldest in both Belgian and German cities and in Stockholm. This could be due to the fact that, on average, parents arrived here earlier – and in some cities much earlier – than elsewhere. At the other extreme, their counterparts are particularly young in Paris, which can at least partially be linked

Figure 4.2a *Age distribution of Turkish second-generation men*

Source: TIES 2007-2008

Figure 4.2b *Age distribution of Turkish second-generation women*

Source: TIES 2007-2008

to the later migratory flows to France. This fits within the existing body of literature on the French second generation (see e.g. Simon 2003).

But we also find – perhaps for similar reasons – some substantial differences between cities *within* countries. This holds particularly for the mean age of second-generation Turkish men in Paris as compared to Strasbourg; in Austria, the difference between Vienna and Linz is also relevant.

City-specific age differences among second-generation Turkish women (figure 4.2b) are not as pronounced. One striking result is that our respondents from this group in the Belgian cities were not significantly older than most of their peers in all other cities except Vienna (Brussels), Basel (Brussels) and Paris (Brussels and Antwerp). Their counterparts in the two German cities have significantly higher mean ages than those in Vienna, both Swiss cities and Paris. For men, a similar picture appears in Stockholm. And again, Turkish second-generation women in Paris are the youngest of all cities.

Citizenship

Another important aspect differentiating the second-generation experience is the citizenship status of its members. These outcomes across cities are heavily influenced by past and current citizenship legislations at the national level. Considering the openness of citizenship regimes and access to nationality, we ranked the TIES countries according to existing typologies. We found that Sweden and Belgium are among the most open regimes, with high levels of access to nationality. Germany and Austria have the considerably most restricted access. The other countries fall somewhere in-between (Castles, Schierup & Hansen 2006; MIPEX 2007; Michalowski 2009; Goodman 2010). Examined elsewhere in this volume is the extent to which citizenship impacts other outcomes, such as unemployment figures (chapter 6) and feelings of national belonging (chapter 8).

Table 4.1 shows the citizenship status reported by our second-generation respondents. Many have dual citizenship, being the dominant status for groups in Belgium, the Netherlands, Sweden and Switzerland. In Germany, France, Spain and Austria, the majority of the second generation only holds citizenship of the survey country. The distribution of these two trends across the countries, however, is not uniform, but rather the result of disparate citizenship policies.

In *Austria*, the majority of the Turkish and the former Yugoslavian second generations held only Austrian citizenship. Dual citizenship is rare, being something not typically allowed (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1985). A still relatively high percentage of respondents indicated that they only hold the citizenship of their parents' country of origin, a status more common among the former Yugoslavian group.

Table 4.1 *Respondents' citizenship (in %), by ethnic group and sex*

		Second generation					
		Turks		Moroccans		former Yugoslavians	
		Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women
<u>Austria</u>	Survey country only	82.9	86.9	-	-	76.2	79.9
<u>Vienna/</u>	Dual citizenship	3.3	2.9	-	-	3.5	0.4
<u>Linz</u>	Country of parents only	12.9	9.4	-	-	18.9	18.2
	Neither	1.0	0.8	-	-	1.3	1.5
	N	210	245	-	-	227	264
<u>Belgium</u>	Survey country only	22.5	23.0	39.7	47.0	-	-
<u>Brussels/</u>	Dual citizenship	73.6	74.0	53.3	48.3	-	-
<u>Antwerp</u>	Country of parents only	3.9	3.0	6.2	3.5	-	-
	Neither	-	-	0.8	1.3	-	-
	N	333	269	242	315	-	-
<u>Switzerland</u>	Survey country only	8.1	11.8	-	-	16.7	25.8
<u>Zurich/</u>	Dual citizenship	58.5	67.7	-	-	52.2	55.3
<u>Basel</u>	Country of parents only	32.5	20.5	-	-	30.1	18.4
	Neither	0.9	-	-	-	1.0	0.5
	N	234	220	-	-	209	217
<u>Germany</u>	Survey country only	50.8	55.2	-	-	68.9	68.1
<u>Berlin/</u>	Dual citizenship	31.0	31.0	-	-	17.9	23.3
<u>Frankfurt</u>	Country of parents only	18.2	13.8	-	-	13.3	8.6
	N	242	261	-	-	196	210
<u>Spain</u>	Survey country only	-	-	52.0	53.7	-	-
<u>Madrid/</u>	Dual citizenship	-	-	44.5	40.2	-	-
<u>Barcelona</u>	Country of parents only	-	-	3.5	5.7	-	-
	Neither	-	-	-	0.4	-	-
	N	-	-	254	246	-	-
<u>France</u>	Survey country only	61.5	69.1	-	-	-	-
<u>Paris/</u>	Dual citizenship	35.8	26.6	-	-	-	-
<u>Strasbourg</u>	Country of parents only	1.8	3.9	-	-	-	-
	Neither	0.9	0.4	-	-	-	-
	N	218	282	-	-	-	-
<u>Netherlands</u>	Survey country only	31.4	43.0	56.5	51.0	-	-
<u>Amsterdam/</u>	Dual citizenship	62.4	51.9	36.2	40.9	-	-
<u>Rotterdam</u>	Country of parents only	6.2	4.7	7.3	6.9	-	-
	Neither	-	0.4	-	1.2	-	-
	N	242	258	246	247	-	-
<u>Sweden</u>	Survey country only	33.1	53.5	-	-	-	-
<u>Stockholm</u>	Dual citizenship	65.3	45.7	-	-	-	-
	Country of parents only	1.6	0.8	-	-	-	-
	N	124	127	-	-	-	-

Note: Columns total 100% within countries.

Source: TIES 2007-2008

In *Switzerland*, two statuses prevailed. First was dual citizenship, which was only introduced in 1992 (Fibbi, Lerch & Wanner 2007). Second was citizenship of the parents' country of origin. This is true for both the Turkish and the former Yugoslavian second generations. The proportion

holding only survey country citizenship was markedly lower than that for any other country. It was, however, substantially higher among the former Yugoslavian respondents than for those of Turkish descent.⁵ The low proportion of survey country citizenship among the second generation is directly linked to the legal challenges associated with naturalisation in Switzerland (Fibbi et al. 2007).

As in Austria and Switzerland, a good proportion of second-generation respondents in *Germany* only holds the citizenship of their parents' country of origin. The rates are on par with those of Austria, but are much lower than in Switzerland. Unlike their Austrian peers, respondents of Turkish descent are more likely than those of former Yugoslavian descent to only hold citizenship of their parents' country of origin.

Just a tiny minority of second-generation respondents in *France, Belgium, the Netherlands* and *Sweden* only holds the citizenship of their parents' country of origin. Our respondents in Belgium, the Netherlands and Sweden are more likely to hold dual citizenship than only survey country citizenship. In France, we see the converse: French citizenship abounds. Notably, second-generation Turks in Belgium and the Netherlands more often hold dual citizenship than do second-generation Moroccans.

The variation in citizenship status among our respondents seems to abide by past and current citizenship legislation. It is only the disparity between the German and Austrian rates of dual citizenship that is somewhat surprising, given the similarities in their citizenship regulations. The source of this incongruity is unclear: it could be an artefact of a sampling bias – although we have no reason to believe in the occurrence of a systematic bias of such magnitude (see [chapter 3](#)) – or it could be related to Germany's less strict prevention of de facto dual citizenship. (Some people report attaining dual citizenship by formally renouncing their Turkish nationality in order to obtain German nationality. Once they have received a German passport, they then reacquire their Turkish nationality, which in the eyes of the Turkish state can indeed be combined with another.)

Household composition

Another important characteristic to examine is the composition of the household in which the respondents lived at the time of the survey. [Table 4.2](#) shows that second-generation respondents were more likely than the comparison group to not have formed their own household and still live with their family (i.e. their parents or other relatives). We assume that this difference is mainly due to age distribution disparity, with second-generation respondents being typically younger than those from the comparison groups.

Table 4.2 *Household composition (in %), by country, ethnic group and gender*

		Second-generation Turks		Second-generation Moroccans		Second-generation former Yugoslavians		Comparison group	
		Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women
<u>Austria</u>									
Vienna/	Own household, living alone	9.5	4.1	-	-	26.6	18.1	42.7	28.9
Linz	Own household, living with others	39.8	50.0	-	-	41.5	51.7	29.5	42.6
	Living with family	50.7	45.9	-	-	31.9	30.2	27.8	28.5
	N	211	246	-	-	229	265	227	256
<u>Belgium</u>									
Brussels/	Own household, living alone	6.3	4.1	9.1	3.2	-	-	26.3	19.7
Antwerp	Own household, living with others	38.6	54.5	26.9	53.3	-	-	36.9	53.2
	Living with family	55.1	41.4	64.0	43.5	-	-	36.9	27.1
	N	332	268	242	315	-	-	274	284
<u>Switzerland</u>									
Zürich/	Own household, living alone	10.7	8.2	-	-	12.0	15.7	19.6	17.1
Basel	Own household, living with others	29.9	35.9	-	-	25.8	41.5	47.1	52.6
	Living with family	59.4	55.9	-	-	62.2	42.9	33.3	30.3
	N	234	220	-	-	209	217	240	228
<u>Germany</u>									
Berlin/	Own household, living alone	32.6	21.1	-	-	40.3	33.3	43.8	38.4
Frankfurt	Own household, living with others	38.4	48.7	-	-	36.2	45.2	38.3	48.7
	Living with family	28.9	30.3	-	-	23.5	21.4	17.9	12.9
	N	242	261	-	-	196	210	240	263
<u>Spain</u>									
Madrid/	Own household, living alone	-	-	8.7	4.9	-	-	18.3	10.3
Barcelona	Own household, living with others	-	-	24.0	26.8	-	-	21.8	29.2
	Living with family	-	-	67.3	68.3	-	-	59.8	60.5
	N	-	-	254	246	-	-	229	271
<u>France</u>									
Paris/	Own household, living alone	4.6	1.8	-	-	-	-	31.5	28.2
Strasbourg	Own household, living with others	20.3	39.1	-	-	-	-	42.0	47.9
	Living with family	75.1	59.1	-	-	-	-	26.5	23.9
	N	217	281	-	-	-	-	162	188

Table 4.2 (continued)

	Second-generation Turks		Second-generation Moroccans		Second-generation former Yugoslavians		Comparison group	
	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women
The Netherlands Amsterdam/ Rotterdam								
Sweden Stockholm								


Notes: Columns total 100% within countries. Results are unweighted.

Source: TIES 2007-2008

At the same time, second-generation respondents were also more likely to have left the parental home to move into their own household in order to live with someone else (described in the questionnaire as ‘Own household, living with others’). The other individual was usually a partner or spouse, and the intention was to form their own family. This tendency holds true across cities and ethnic groups, most notably when it comes to female respondents. By contrast, many more respondents in the comparison groups left the parental household to live on their own.

Figure 4.3 highlights the household compositions of the Turkish second generation across countries. Except for in Germany and the Netherlands, about half of them still live with their parents. The two most extreme cases are France and Germany, with only 29 per cent of Turkish second-generation men still living with their parents in the two German cities and 75 per cent of them in the two French cities. Second-generation Turks in Germany – men, especially – also most often live on their own without a partner and without anyone else. The fact that respondents in the French cities more often still live with their parents is unsurprising, given their relative youth (especially in Paris). What is remarkable, however, is that many more female respondents than males no longer live with their parents, irrespective of age. This might have something to do with family formation patterns.

Figure 4.3 *Household compositions of second-generation Turks (in %), by country and gender*



Source: TIES 2007-2008


Siblings

An individual's number of siblings is often cited as an important factor impacting socio-economic outcomes for children (see e.g. Chiswick's (1988) child quality investment hypothesis). Figure 4.4 shows the mean number of siblings for the various groups at the country level.⁶

We observe that Moroccan respondents have the most siblings, with mean rates being similar in Belgium and the Netherlands, though substantially lower in Spain. Turkish respondents have more siblings than the respective comparison groups, yet the differences are not as great as for Moroccans. In some countries, such as Switzerland and France, the difference in sibling numbers between the Turkish second generation and the comparison group is not very high. Sibling numbers among former Yugoslavians respondents is similar to that of the comparison group respondents.

The families in which the Turkish second generation grew up had, on average, three to four children. In fact, we see that sibling numbers are often similar across the cities. This is notably the case in Austria, Switzerland, Germany and France. On the other hand, their counterparts in Belgium, the Netherlands and Sweden have a slightly higher mean number of siblings.

Figure 4.4 Respondents' mean number of siblings, by group and aggregate



Source: TIES 2007-2008

The descriptive statistics in this section have shown us compositional differences between the second-generation groups with regard to age, household composition and sibling numbers. Along with citizenship status, these

critical factors help us gain a clearer sense of the types of respondents behind the TIES data.

4.3 Parents' socio-demographic characteristics

We now turn to the socio-demographic characteristics of the TIES respondents' parents, who are no doubt major actors in their children's socialisation process. Our focus is double-lensed, so to speak. First, we look at circumstances particular to the parents as immigrants, such as the timing of their arrival in the survey country and their citizenship status. Second, we examine parental characteristics also analysable in the comparison groups, such as highest level of education and occupational status. These observations help lay bare the differences in the groups' respective socio-economic origins.

Timing of arrival


Timing of the immigrant parents' arrival is an important factor, as it indexes the economic, political and social circumstances under which they migrated. Whether having arrived as a labour migrant (the case for most migrants prior to the 1980s), as a refugee or as part of family reunification (mainly the case for women), an individual's migration history can provide useful background information.

The overwhelming majority of the second generation has two immigrant parents from the same country of origin (see [table 4.10](#) in appendix). These figures are well over 80 per cent in all countries, except for former Yugoslavians in Germany, who seem to have a slightly greater proportion of mixed immigrant parentage. It is thus crucial to examine a respondent's father's and mother's timing of arrival separately. [Figures 4.5a](#) and [4.5b](#) show the period in which fathers and mothers immigrated, divided into three categories: prior to the 1970s; during the 1970s; and from the 1980s onwards.

The migratory flows of fathers and mothers show that most immigrant parents arrived in the survey country prior to 1980. This corroborates the general finding of labour migrants' arrival to the TIES countries. Further affirming this trend is the fact that mothers arrived later than fathers, which is consistent with marriage migration and family reunification patterns, even if some women were recruited for labour in labour migration programmes, albeit in a smaller proportion (Stalker 2002; Kofman 1999).


In some countries, migratory flows appear to be more recent. In fact, respondents' parents in the Swiss, Spanish and Austrian cities arrived later than those residing in the other cities. German and, albeit to a lesser extent, Dutch figures indicate early migration flows (notably of immigrant father and some mothers in the 1960s). Immigrant parents in the French and Swedish cities overwhelmingly arrived in the 1970s. The effect of varied

Figure 4.5a Parents' year of immigration, by city and group



Source: TIES 2007-2008

Figure 4.5b Parents' year of immigration, by city and group



Source: TIES 2007-2008

arrival timing can be seen in the age range differentials of the respondents in these cities (see [section 4.3](#)).

Looking distinctly at Turkish parents' migration ([table 4.3](#)), we find some variation across countries, most of which is in keeping with the existing literature about Turkish migratory flows to Europe. Earlier migratory patterns (mostly of fathers) are observed in countries that had labour market agreements with Turkey in the 1960s: Germany (1961); Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands (1964); France (1965); and Sweden (1967) (Akgündüz 1995; Aybar, Özgöker & Akman 2008). The resulting pattern is consistent with family reunification patterns: 1) the majority of Turkish migrants were men and 2) women largely came through family reunification. Yet, female guest workers were also quite numerous in Germany and Austria prior to the 1970s (Mattes 2005; Herzog-Punzenberger 2003), which can also help explain some of the high proportions of immigrant mothers arriving prior to 1970.

Citizenship status

The citizenship status of the respondents' parents is presented by country as well as separately for mothers and fathers in [table 4.4](#). As the table shows, we find considerable cross-national variation in parental citizenship, a status that is highly influenced by national legislation.⁷ Discrepancies between mothers and fathers in terms of citizenship are, however, not very big.

We see that in *Austria's* two survey cities, Turkish parents either hold the survey country's citizenship or that of the country of origin. Dual citizenship is common only among one fourth of the immigrant parents. Country of origin citizenship is most common among former Yugoslavian fathers.

In *Belgium*, the majority of immigrant parents holds dual citizenship, while a good share of both fathers and mothers only holds citizenship of their country of origin. This proportion is slightly higher for Turkish parents than Moroccan parents, and is higher among mothers.

A very small proportion of immigrant parents in *Switzerland* only holds Swiss citizenship, which is in accordance with past and current legislation. A somewhat greater share of parents from former Yugoslavia only holds Swiss citizenship.

In *Germany*, most Turkish parents only hold Turkish citizenship. A plurality of Yugoslavian parents holds dual citizenship. About a quarter of the parents from both groups only holds German citizenship.

By contrast, in both cities in *France* and in *Stockholm*, the overwhelming majority of Turkish parents only holds the citizenship of their country of origin.⁸

Table 4.3 *Turkish parents' year of immigration (in %), by city*

		Father	Mother			Father	Mother
<u>Austria</u>				<u>France</u>			
Vienna	<=1969	15.4	11.1	Paris	<=1969	20.3	10.7
	1970-1979	49.7	43.2		1970-1979	64.1	58.9
	>=1980	34.9	45.7		>=1980	15.6	30.4
	Median	1977	1979		Median	1973	1976
	Standard deviation	6.9	7.2		Standard deviation	7.2	6.4
Linz	N	195	199	Strasbourg	N	64	56
	<=1969	19.8	10.9		<=1969	19.5	7.6
	1970-1979	54.5	51.3		1970-1979	69.5	76.2
	>=1980	25.7	37.8		>=1980	10.9	16.2
	Median	1974	1977		Median	1972	1975
	Standard deviation	7.2	6.9		Standard deviation	5.6	5.0
	N	167	156		N	128	105
<u>Switzerland</u>				<u>The Netherlands</u>			
Zurich	<=1969	21.2	9.8	Amsterdam	<=1969	22.2	6.7
	1970-1979	53.0	47.6		1970-1979	62.2	67.6
	>=1980	25.8	42.7		>=1980	15.6	25.7
	Median	1975	1978		Median	1974	1976
	Standard deviation	7.6	7.0		Standard deviation	6.2	4.7
Basel	N	151	143	Rotterdam	N	180	179
	<=1969	15.9	7.0		<=1969	28.3	11.4
	1970-1979	42.1	43.5		1970-1979	55.7	60.0
	>=1980	42.1	49.5		>=1980	16.0	28.6
	Median	1978	1979		Median	1973	1977
	Standard deviation	7.4	6.5		Standard deviation	6.4	5.6
	N	195	186		N	212	210
<u>Germany</u>				<u>Sweden</u>			
Berlin	<=1969	49.8	28.1	Stockholm	<=1969	24.4	9.3
	1970-1979	32.4	54.2		1970-1979	55.8	70.5
	>=1980	17.8	17.7		>=1980	19.8	20.3
	Median	1970	1973		Median	1975	1976
	Standard deviation	6.4	6.0		Standard deviation	6.2	5.2
Frankfurt	N	213	192		N	217	227
	<=1969	47.4	21.8				
	1970-1979	38.7	55.7				
	>=1980	13.9	22.4				
	Median	1970	1974				
	Standard deviation	6.6	6.3				
	N	194	174				

Note: Results are unweighted.

Source: TIES 2007-2008

Table 4.4 *Parents' citizenship (in %), by group*

		Second-generation					
		Turks		Moroccans		former Yugoslavians	
		Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother
<u>Austria</u>	Dual citizenship	19.6	22.7	.	.	22.9	27.2
<u>Vienna/</u>	Survey country only	46.7	42.4	.	.	26.9	38.8
<u>Linz</u>	Country of origin only	32.9	34.0	.	.	48.8	32.2
	Neither	0.8	1.0	.	.	1.4	1.8
	N	392	406	.	.	432	441
<u>Belgium</u>	Dual citizenship	58.0	55.7	60.0	56.4	.	.
<u>Brussels/</u>	Survey country only	4.1	4.1	10.4	12.7	.	.
<u>Antwerp</u>	Country of origin only	37.8	40.2	28.5	30.3	.	.
	Neither	0.2	-	1.1	0.6	.	.
	N	588	560	527	495	.	.
<u>Switzerland</u>	Dual citizenship	34.0	38.7	-	-	37.2	42.9
<u>Zurich/</u>	Survey country only	1.3	2.4	-	-	8.7	12.7
<u>Basel</u>	Country of origin only	63.1	58.7	-	-	46.6	36.2
	Neither	1.6	0.2	-	-	7.5	8.2
	N	447	450	-	-	414	417
<u>Germany</u>	Dual citizenship	23.6	28.0	-	-	39.4	43.0
<u>Berlin/</u>	Survey country only	22.0	18.5	-	-	25.5	26.4
<u>Frankfurt</u>	Country of origin only	51.9	51.0	-	-	34.4	29.8
	Neither	2.5	2.5	-	-	0.8	0.8
	N	478	482	-	-	381	379
<u>Spain</u>	Dual citizenship	-	-	45.3	48.6	-	-
<u>Madrid/</u>	Survey country only	-	-	4.3	4.5	-	-
<u>Barcelona</u>	Country of origin only	-	-	49.9	46.1	-	-
	Neither	-	-	0.5	0.8	-	-
	N	-	-	373	399	-	-
<u>France</u>	Dual citizenship	25.1	21.6	-	-	-	-
<u>Paris/</u>	Survey country only	2.9	4.2	-	-	-	-
<u>Strasbourg</u>	Country of origin only	72.0	73.6	-	-	-	-
	Neither	-	0.6	-	-	-	-
	N	490	473	-	-	-	-
<u>Netherlands</u>	Dual citizenship	62.3	63.7	61.9	61.5	-	-
<u>Amsterdam/</u>	Survey country only	5.5	4.6	4.8	4.9	-	-
<u>Rotterdam</u>	Country of origin only	32.0	31.0	32.4	32.5	-	-
	Neither	0.2	0.6	0.9	1.1	-	-
	N	472	474	457	449	-	-
<u>Sweden</u>	Survey/other country*	16.0	18.3	-	-	-	-
<u>Stockholm</u>	Country of origin only	84.0	81.7	-	-	-	-
	N	237	241	-	-	-	-

Notes: Columns total 100% within countries. Results are unweighted.

*For Sweden, only information about holding citizenship of the parental country of birth was collected. Survey country citizenship is thereby derived from this information.

Source: TIES 2007-2008

The majority of both the Turkish and Moroccan parents in the *Netherlands* holds dual citizenship.

In *Spain*'s two survey cities, the citizenship status of immigrant parents is polarised between dual citizenship and citizenship of the country of origin.

Focusing solely on the parents of the Turkish second generation unveils interesting patterns in citizenship statuses. With the exception of Sweden, the countries with more open systems have much higher rates of dual citizenship among parents than the restricted ones, which show greater rates of country of origin citizenship. This is consistent with the patterns outlined in this chapter's 'Citizenship' section.

Educational level

Parents' level of human capital – the skills and resources that an individual possesses, often measured via education (Coleman 1988: S109) – is an important explanatory factor for the outcomes of all children. Research on the second generation has emphasised the significance of large disparities in parental human capital between immigrants and non-immigrants. This is especially relevant in the European context, as most of the labour migrants come from low socio-economic backgrounds, thus putting them at an extra disadvantaged starting position in their receiving society (Crul & Vermeulen 2003).

Figures 4.6a and 4.6b show the distribution of the highest education achieved by the parents. Based on a nationally comparable classification of educational credentials,⁹ the levels are separated into three categories: 1) attended no school at all, a religious school only or primary school only; 2) attended some secondary school; 3) attended post-secondary school and/or achieved a higher level of education. The figures show the educational attainment of fathers and mothers separately.¹⁰

The most obvious feature in figures 4.6a and b is that the parents of the comparison group have much higher levels of education than those of any second-generation group. This is true for both fathers and mothers. This is hardly surprising when we consider the general schooling levels offered in the sending countries, the immigrant parents' mainly rural background and the state of rural development in Turkey, Morocco and the former Yugoslavia from the 1960s through to the 1980s.¹¹ Such a discrepancy may be instrumental in explaining many of the disparities between the second generation and the comparison group, and will be explored in more detail in subsequent chapters of this volume.

Within the second-generation groups, parental education levels are most comparable among Turks and Moroccans. The former Yugoslavian parents tend to be, on average, better educated, though they have not reached educational parity with the comparison group's parents.

Figure 4.6a *Fathers' education levels (in %), by city and group*





Figure 4.6b *Mothers' education levels (in %), by city and group*



Source figures 4.6a and 4.6b: TIES 2007-2008

In *Austria*'s two survey cities, approximately 30 per cent of fathers from the Turkish and former Yugoslavian group have low levels of educational attainment. The proportion with low educational attainment is even higher for Turkish mothers. The fathers and mothers of the comparison group are hardly represented at the lowest level, and quite a high percentage has attained post-secondary education – more than double that of the second-generation groups' parents. Yet, we still see a gender discrepancy in parental education within the comparison group, where mothers have lower attainment, especially at the tertiary level.

Low levels of parental education are quite pronounced in the two cities in *Belgium*. Almost half of the parents of the second-generation respondents fall in the lowest category, with an even lower attainment among the mothers.

In *Switzerland*, educational attainment among Turkish parents is much lower than that of comparison group parents and former Yugoslavian parents. Even in instances when Yugoslavians have, on the whole, reached higher levels than the comparison group, the Yugoslavian fathers fall short. Interestingly, Yugoslavian mothers' educational attainment is relatively similar to that of comparison group mothers.

The contrast between the Turkish parents, the Yugoslavian parents and the comparison group parents is even more striking in *Germany*. More than 70 per cent of our respondents report having fathers and mothers who had, at most, only finished primary school. Just a very small group (the slimmest percentage in all categories) had post-secondary education. This finding appears to be linked to origin and cohort effects, i.e. Turkish migrants in Germany come from more remote regions of origin and have relatively earlier arrival timing. Yugoslavian parents' educational credentials prove similar to that of the comparison group.

In *France*, the educational differences between the parents of the Turkish second generation and the comparison group are sizeable, with a high proportion of Turkish mothers and fathers having only attained lower levels. Though substantial, these differences are not as remarkable as in Germany.

In the *Netherlands*, parents of the Moroccan second generation have the lowest education levels. Generally speaking, the proportion of immigrant parents with post-secondary education is higher here among fathers than mothers, though not as high as in some other countries.

The difference in the distribution of educational credentials between the parents of the second generation and the comparison group in *Sweden* is quite noteworthy. The latter's parents have much higher levels than the immigrant parents.

Table 4.5 highlights the variation in educational levels among Turkish parents. Even if the differences in educational attainments across cities are not very pronounced, we can see how most parents have low levels of education. This is especially notable in Brussels, Berlin, Frankfurt, Paris

Table 4.5 *Turkish parents' highest level of education (in %), by city*

		Father	Mother		Father	Mother
<u>Austria</u>	Vienna	No school or religious school	0.4	Germany	No school or religious school	26.8
		Primary school	29.0		Primary school	49.1
		Secondary school	58.5		Secondary school	29.8
		Post-secondary and tertiary	12.0		Post-secondary and tertiary	21.1
	Linz	N	241		N	0.9
		No school or religious school	1.5		N	213
		Primary school	30.3	Frankfurt	No school or religious school	228
		Secondary school	45.6		Primary school	54.0
		Post-secondary and tertiary	22.6		Secondary school	16.4
		N	195		Post-secondary and tertiary	28.6
<u>Belgium</u>	Brussels	No school or religious school	9.4	France	No school or religious school	3.0
		Primary school	45.9		N	0.9
		Secondary school	36.8	Paris	No school or religious school	199
		Post-secondary and tertiary	7.9		Primary school	213
		N	329		Secondary school	8.1
					Post-secondary and tertiary	41.1
	Antwerp	No school or religious school	8.2		Primary school	42.8
		Primary school	28.2		Secondary school	39.4
		Secondary school	55.0	Strasbourg	Post-secondary and tertiary	14.8
		Post-secondary and tertiary	8.6		N	9.7
		N	220			236
					No school or religious school	236
					Primary school	18.7
					Secondary school	2.9
					Post-secondary and tertiary	51.7
					N	48.4
					No school or religious school	30.5
					Primary school	4.5
					Secondary school	2.4
					Post-secondary and tertiary	242
					N	246

Table 4.5 (continued)

		Father	Mother		Father	Mother		
<u>Switzerland</u>	Zurich	No school or religious school	1.6	<u>Netherlands</u>	Amsterdam	No school or religious school	6.8	15.1
		Primary school	29.9			Primary school	47.3	53.3
		Secondary school	56.0			Secondary school	40.6	28.8
		Post-secondary and tertiary	12.5			Post-secondary and tertiary	5.3	2.8
		N	184			N	207	212
	Basel	No school or religious school	3.1		Rotterdam	No school or religious school	9.1	18.1
		Primary school	37.4			Primary school	42.6	51.3
		Secondary school	49.3			Secondary school	39.6	25.4
		Post-secondary and tertiary	10.1			Post-secondary and tertiary	8.7	5.2
		N	227			N	230	232
			208	<u>Sweden</u>	Stockholm	Primary school	38.5	35.0
						Secondary school	44.6	56.3
						Post-secondary and tertiary	16.9	8.8
						N	231	240

Notes: Columns total 100% within countries. Results are unweighted.

Source: TIES 2007-2008

(mothers only), Strasbourg, Amsterdam and Rotterdam – where well over 50 per cent of the parents in these cities have a low level of education. In Linz, the proportion of parents with tertiary education is quite high, as is the case specifically for fathers in Vienna, Zurich, Basel, Paris and Stockholm. Also salient is the variation across cities at the lowest level: while in Vienna, Zurich, Basel and Stockholm, this category for Turkish parents is practically, if not simply, non-existent, more than a quarter of the fathers in Berlin reached no level of education higher than this. The same goes for almost a third of the fathers in Frankfurt and around half the mothers in these cities.

Occupational status at respondents' age fifteen

The occupational status of the second generation's parents by and large reflects their low levels of education.¹² An overview of both fathers' and mothers' work situations at the time our respondents were fifteen years old provides insight into the resources present in the family when respondents were growing up. Figure 4.7a shows the fathers' mean scores (as well as their confidence intervals) according to the International Socio-Economic Index of Occupational Status (ISEI) (see Ganzeboom & Treiman 2003).

Immigrant fathers have much lower mean ISEI levels than those of non-immigrant fathers in all cities. The gaps between the second generation's fathers and the comparison group's fathers are small in Madrid, Vienna (for former Yugoslavians) and Frankfurt, but quite big in the Belgian, Swiss, French, Dutch and Swedish cities. In addition, the immigrant fathers' ISEI level varies within a smaller range across the cities than it does for comparison group fathers. In general, Moroccan and Turkish fathers have the lowest mean ISEI scores. In Vienna, discrepancies between former Yugoslavian and Turkish fathers are the greatest.

Before examining their occupational status, we first need to know how many of the mothers were actually economically active. Table 4.6 shows that in all cities a substantial number of immigrant women was in fact economically inactive. This is notably the case for Turkish mothers in the German and Dutch cities.

Mothers of the comparison group more often worked when their children were fifteen years old than did mothers of the second-generation groups. At the height of family unification, the labour force participation rate of women in all host countries was higher, if not much higher, than that of women in Turkey (Jaumotte 2003). This statistic partly explains the overall higher labour market participation of comparison group mothers.

Worth noting, however, is the high level of working immigrant mothers in the Swiss cities, where their number equals that of the comparison group. The proportion of working mothers is, on average, much higher among

Table 4.6 *Mothers' level of economic activity at respondents' age 15 (in %), by city and group*

		Second-generation Turks	Second-generation Moroccans	Second-generation former Yugoslavians	Comparison group
<u>Austria</u>	Vienna	44.6	-	89.2	66.9
	N	240	-	241	248
	Linz	71.6	-	80.7	67.6
	N	197	-	223	225
<u>Belgium</u>	Brussels	48.7	24.7	-	76.3
	N	238	231	-	245
	Antwerp	28.7	10.1	-	66.0
	N	352	306	-	294
<u>Switzerland</u>	Zurich	61.9	-	69.4	58.0
	N	194	-	232	193
	Basel	67.0	-	80.9	62.3
	N	233	-	188	257
<u>Germany</u>	Berlin	22.3	-	52.8	48.4
	N	251	-	197	246
	Frankfurt	31.7	-	47.8	59.4
	N	230	-	203	249
<u>Spain</u>	Madrid	-	43.1	-	26.1
	N	-	225	-	249
	Barcelona	-	32.9	-	58.3
	N	-	222	-	228
<u>France</u>	Paris	45.9	-	-	67.6
	N	242	-	-	173
	Strasbourg	36.7	-	-	74.9
	N	245	-	-	175

Table 4.6 (continued)

			Second-generation Turks	Second-generation Moroccans	Second-generation former Yugoslavians	Comparison group
<u>The Netherlands</u>	Amsterdam	Economically active	29.7	20.9	-	63.2
		N	212	220	-	247
	Rotterdam	Economically active	28.3	21.9	-	58.9
<u>Sweden</u>		N	244	237	-	246
	Stockholm	Economically active	68.0	-	-	90.8
		N	244	-	-	240

Notes: Columns total 100% within countries. Results are unweighted.

Source: TIES 2007-2008

former Yugoslavians. Moreover, in all cities (except Stockholm), a higher level of economic activity corresponds with a higher mean ISEI score.¹³

It is worth noting that some of the Turkish mothers were labour migrants themselves and had already worked in Turkey. A case in point here is Linz: over 40 per cent (see [table 4.7](#)) of these mothers had worked prior to migration. This is consistent with the fact that Austria had a high demand for female labour (Herzog-Punzenberger 2003). As [table 4.7](#) shows, few immigrant mothers, however, held a job prior to migrating to the survey countries. In Berlin, for example, this applies to only 2.6 per cent of Turkish mothers.¹⁴

We now turn to the occupational status of women who did work when their children were fifteen years old. Discrepancies between women are not as big as between men. While mothers' average ISEI levels are lower, the


Table 4.7 *Mothers' work status before migration (in %), by city and group*

			<i>Second generation</i>		
			<i>Turks</i>	<i>Moroccans</i>	<i>former Yugoslavians</i>
<u>Austria</u>	Vienna	Worked	7.0	-	37.9
		N	199	-	169
	Linz	Worked	40.5	-	19.4
		N	148	-	144
<u>Switzerland</u>	Zurich	Worked	17.2	-	31.1
		N	134	-	151
	Basel	Worked	15.0	-	32.3
		N	180	-	130
<u>Germany</u>	Berlin	Worked	2.6	-	29.0
		N	151	-	124
	Frankfurt	Worked	13.1	-	21.1
		N	145	-	114
<u>Spain</u>	Madrid	Worked	-	25.0	-
		N	-	12	-
	Barcelona	Worked	-	12.4	-
		N	-	89	-
<u>France</u>	Paris	Worked	27.3	-	-
		N	55	-	-
	Strasbourg	Worked	11.4	-	-
		N	105	-	-
<u>The Netherlands</u>	Amsterdam	Worked	19.9	10.1	-
		N	201	208	-
	Rotterdam	Worked	9.0	6.8	-
		N	234	219	-
<u>Sweden</u>	Stockholm	Worked	16.9	-	-
		N	231	-	-

Notes: Columns total 100% within countries. Results are unweighted.


Source: TIES 2007-2008

Figure 4.7a *Fathers' occupational status at respondents' age 15 (in %), by city and group*



Source: TIES 2007-2008

Figure 4.7b Mothers' occupational status at respondents' age 15 (in %), by city and group



Source: TIES 2007-2008

disparity between the second generation and the comparison group is smaller (and sometimes not significant). Though notable differences still remain in the French and Swedish cities, none is significant in the mean ISEI between these two groups in the Swiss cities or in Frankfurt. The differences are also quite small in Vienna (for former Yugoslavians), Linz, Berlin and Madrid. Lesser variation between women can partly be explained by the fact that comparison group mothers' ISEI mean levels are sometimes low, too. Another important explanation is that ISEI figures only take into account individuals who were employed (thus necessarily excluding individuals either unemployed or inactive).

Regional origins

Finally, we look at Turkish parents' distribution in the provinces of origin, specifically where they themselves lived at age fifteen (for an overview of Moroccan parents' regions of origin, see [table 4.9](#) in appendix).¹⁵ In most countries, the origins are spread over various provinces, with no single place or area dominating the emigration scheme per country or city. Exceptions to this, however, are Belgium and Sweden: almost 30 per cent of the Belgian respondents' parents came from the province of Afyon; almost 40 per cent of the Swedish respondents' fathers in Stockholm come from the city of Konya.

In Austria, Switzerland, Germany and France, the main city of origin is Istanbul. Ankara is a common region of origin in Austria and Germany. Most of the respondents' parents in Austria, Belgium and the Netherlands (and, to some extent, France) come from Central Anatolia. Aside from those coming from more urban regions, the mixture in Germany is more diverse, with parents originating from the Aegean, Mediterranean and Southeastern Anatolia provinces. In France, Turkish parents mostly come from Central Anatolia and the Aegean provinces. In Switzerland, the Aegean and Mediterranean, Eastern Anatolia and Marmara provinces are most represented.

As we can see, there is also considerable overlap between the survey countries in terms of provinces of origin. In this respect, however, Sweden is an exception, as parents here come from other provinces (mostly Southeastern Anatolia and the Black Sea region). Implicit here is the fact that Turkish immigrants to Sweden are more diverse in their ethnic as well as religious origins, with an increased presence of Christian Turks and Kurds. Given that we are dealing with a different immigrant population, this could potentially have a major impact on our Swedish results, not to mention the conclusions we might draw from them.

4.4 Conclusion

This chapter endeavoured to flesh out our understanding of the TIES respondents. Acquiring knowledge about the actual composition of our sample was an important first step in analysing our data and in order to subsequently understand our results. Our respondents' socio-demographic characteristics displayed rather high rates of variation, reflecting conventional wisdom concerning differences between the second generation and the comparison group. As we make clear in other chapters in this book, such incongruity can potentially impact outcomes for all groups and disparities between them.

Considerable variation between second-generation Turks and their parents across cities was apparent. Among other observations, we found differences in the respondents' age distribution (Paris' Turkish second generation is especially relatively young). This, in turn, influenced outcomes of respondents' household composition across countries. We also found that second-generation Turkish women more often than men live outside the parental household in their own newly formed households.

The parents of the Turkish second generation tend to be overwhelmingly low educated, with the exception of those in Paris, Linz and Stockholm. Some variation in the mean ISEI level between second-generation Turks' parents is also visible across countries. In some cases, the difference between Turkish mothers across cities is substantial, being related to incongruities in their level of economic activity.

As observed through the TIES survey, the second generation – and especially Turks and Moroccans among them – tend to be, on average, younger than their comparison group peers. They tend to come from more modest educational and socio-economic backgrounds, points of particular concern that compelled the TIES team to select comparison group individuals from similar backgrounds (mainly via neighbourhood selection). Yet, the socio-demographic characteristics outlined here show that a discrepancy remains between the groups. This disparity could affect – if not explain – differences in various life course outcomes. One of the challenges this book thus sets out to examine is the extent to which their disadvantaged starting position is something the second generation will be able to transcend.

Notes

- 1 Production of this chapter would not have been possible without the useful guidance and help of Liesbeth Heering and Nienke Hornstra at NIDI.
- 2 All information about the TIES second generation in this chapter is used to describe the main characteristics of the TIES respondents. Weights were not used because our goal is mainly descriptive. Hence, the results outlined in this chapter should not

- be assumed to be representative of the targeted second-generation groups at the city level (for more details about methodology, see [chapter 3](#)).
- 3 The appendix also includes a breakdown of gender, by group and city; see [table 4.8](#).
 - 4 Sampling variation might provide another explanation for the observed differences in age, though previous studies have found that the second generation tends to be relatively young (see Heath, Rethon & Kilpi 2008).
 - 5 This could also be due to the higher proportion of former Yugoslavian second-generation respondents with only one immigrant parent (see [table 4.11](#) in appendix).
 - 6 By 'country level' we refer to the composite outcomes of a country's two survey cities.
 - 7 Answers are based on reported rather than actual citizenship for the respondents.
 - 8 Up until 2001, Sweden did not officially allow individuals going through the naturalisation process to hold dual citizenship (Government Offices of Sweden 2010). The estimates here are based solely on responses to the question of whether or not respondents held citizenship of the country in which they were born. Because it is assumed that those without birth country citizenship by default hold Swedish citizenship, these numbers might overestimate the prevalence of Swedish citizenship.
 - 9 For details on educational levels and degrees, see EDU codes in [chapter 5's appendix](#).
 - 10 Credentials of the parents of the second generation and those of the comparison group were not always perfectly comparable. Figures 4.6a and b do not assume equivalence of credentials though do give an indication of discrepancies in their distribution. This is important to bear in mind and will be addressed in greater detail in [chapter 5](#).
 - 11 For the main regions of origins of Turkish and Moroccan parents, see [tables 4.9 and 4.10](#) in [appendix](#).
 - 12 It is assumed here that the non-transferability of skills, something typically experienced by immigrants when settling in the host society, might affect low-educated migrants less than more highly educated ones.
 - 13 In Stockholm, many Turkish mothers worked, though not necessarily in jobs corresponding to their level of education.
 - 14 Differences may be due to our only few observations, which came as a result of large numbers of missing answers to this question.
 - 15 We must bear in mind that parents might have migrated internally (or even externally) before arriving to the survey countries. Insofar as this information is relevant for our purposes, it should be interpreted with the knowledge that where a parent lived at age fifteen is not necessarily the only place he or she has known prior to emigrating.

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Appendix

Table 4.8 Respondents' sex distribution (in %), by group and city

		Second-generation Turks		Second-generation Moroccans		Second-generation former Yugoslavians		Comparison group	
<u>Austria</u>	Vienna	Male	43.3		-	48.6	53.2		
		Female	56.7		-	51.4	46.8		
	Linz	N	252		-	253	250		
		Male	49.5		-	43.8	40.2		
		Female	50.5		-	56.2	59.8		
		N	206		-	242	234		
<u>Belgium</u>	Brussels	Male	63.5		50.4	-	45.1		
		Female	36.5		49.6	-	54.9		
		N	244		246	-	257		
		Male	49.7		37.9	-	52.5		
	Antwerp	Female	50.3		62.1	-	47.5		
		N	358		311	-	301		
<u>Switzerland</u>	Zürich	Male	49.5		-	53.6	46.0		
		Female	50.5		-	46.4	54.0		
		N	202		-	239	202		
		Male	52.2		-	44.8	55.3		
	Basel	Female	47.8		-	55.2	44.7		
		N	247		-	192	266		
<u>Germany</u>	Berlin	Male	55.7		-	48.5	54.8		
		Female	44.3		-	51.5	45.2		
		N	253		-	202	250		
		Male	40.4		-	48.0	40.7		
	Frankfurt	Female	59.6		-	52.0	59.3		
		N	250		-	204	253		

Table 4.8 (continued)

		Second-generation Turks	Second-generation Moroccans	Second-generation former Yugoslavians	Comparison group
<u>Spain</u>	Madrid	-	50.8	-	40.0
		Female	49.2	-	60.0
		N	250	-	250
	Barcelona	-	50.8	-	51.6
		Female	49.2	-	48.4
		N	250	-	250
<u>France</u>	Paris	48.8	-	-	47.1
		Female	-	-	52.9
		N	248	-	174
	Strasbourg	38.5	-	-	45.8
		Female	61.5	-	54.2
		N	252	-	177
<u>The Netherlands</u>	Amsterdam	46.0	49.2	-	47.5
		Female	54.0	-	52.5
		N	237	-	259
	Rotterdam	50.6	50.6	-	50.2
		Female	49.4	-	49.8
		N	263	-	253
<u>Sweden</u>	Stockholm	49.4	-	-	49.2
		Female	50.6	-	50.8
		N	251	-	250

Notes: Columns total 100% within countries. Results are unweighted.

Source: TIES 2007-2008

Table 4.9 Turkish parents' province of usual residence until age 15 (in %)

Mothers												
Austria		Belgium		Switzerland		Germany		France		The Netherlands		Sweden
1	Istanbul	9.0	Afyon	28.6	Istanbul	16.3	Istanbul	6.8	Istanbul	7.8	Kayseri	10.7
2	Yozgat	8.7	Konya	7.6	Erzincan	10.1	Adana	5.9	Kayseri	7.8	Ankara	8.5
3	Ankara	8.2	Kirsehir	4.8	Kahramanmaraş	7.8	Ankara	5.1	Tunceli	6.3	Karaman	8.2
4	Konya	6.3	Ankara	4.6	Denizli	6.5	Izmir	4.1	Izmir	6.0	Sivas	7.7
5	Aksaray	5.3	Corum	4.4	Bursa	4.9	Antalya	3.4	Aydin	5.6	Kirsehir	5.0
6	Sakarya	4.8	Istanbul	4.2	Sakarya	3.4	Diyarbakir	3.2	Konya	5.2	Yozgat	5.0
7	Antalya	4.5	Yozgat	4.0	Sivas	3.4	Bingöl	2.9	Denizli	4.5	Konya	4.5
8	Sivas	3.4	Kayseri	3.6	Tunceli	3.4	Batman	2.9	Afyon	3.9	Aksaray	4.2
9	Denizli	3.2	Sivas	3.2	Izmir	2.8	Sivas	2.9	Sivas	3.9	Adana	4.0
10	Adana	2.6	Eskisehir	2.9	Usak	2.8	Konya	2.9	Ankara	3.0	Istanbul	4.0
		55.9		67.8		61.4		40.2		53.9		61.7
												35.6
Fathers												
Austria		Belgium		Switzerland		Germany		France		The Netherlands		Sweden
1	Istanbul	12.4	Afyon	26.9	Istanbul	19.7	Istanbul	7.8	Istanbul	9.2	Kayseri	10.7
2	Ankara	8.3	Konya	6.7	Erzincan	8.9	Ankara	6.4	Kayseri	7.6	Ankara	9.2
3	Yozgat	8.0	Ankara	6.1	Denizli	7.4	Adana	6.4	Izmir	6.3	Karaman	8.2
4	Konya	6.6	Istanbul	4.6	Kahramanmaraş	6.7	Antalya	4.3	Konya	5.7	Sivas	8.0
5	Aksaray	4.4	Kirsehir	4.6	Izmir	4.4	Izmir	4.1	Tunceli	5.5	Istanbul	5.0
6	Antalya	4.4	Yozgat	4.1	Tunceli	3.7	Sivas	3.7	Denizli	5.1	Kirsehir	5.0
7	Sakarya	4.4	Eskisehir	4.1	Sivas	3.4	Bingöl	3.0	Sivas	4.1	Konya	5.0
8	Izmir	3.6	Kayseri	3.9	Bursa	3.2	Konya	3.0	Aydin	3.9	Yozgat	4.2
9	Adana	3.2	Sivas	3.9	Konya	2.7	Diyarbakir	3.0	Afyon	3.7	Aksaray	4.0
10	Samsun	3.2	Corum	3.3	Ankara	2.7	Batman	2.7	Yozgat	3.3	Trabson	4.0
		58.3		68.3		62.8		44.3		54.4		63.2
												88.8

Table 4.10 Moroccan parents' province of usual residence until age 15 (in %)

<i>Mothers</i>						
<i>Belgium</i>			<i>Spain</i>		<i>The Netherlands</i>	
1	Nador	33.9	Tangier	22.3	Nador	25.9
2	Tangier	16.1	Tetouan	20.9	Al Hoceima	17.1
3	Al Hoceima	14.2	Casablanca	13.3	Tetouan	7.0
4	Oujda	10.9	Marrakesh	9.0	Oujda	6.5
5	Tetouan	4.1	Nador	6.9	Tangier	5.5
6	Meknes	3.2	Larache	5.1	Casablanca	5.3
7	Casablanca	3.2	Al Hoceima	3.7	Chefchaouen	4.5
8	Agadir	2.6	Fes	3.4	Ouarzazate	4.0
9	Fes	1.7	Rabat-Sale	2.8	Meknes	3.8
10	Marrakesh	1.5	Taounate	2.3	Taza	2.8
		91.4		89.7		82.4

<i>Fathers</i>						
<i>Belgium</i>			<i>Spain</i>		<i>The Netherlands</i>	
1	Nador	34.7	Tangier	23.3	Nador	28.5
2	Tangier	15.7	Tetouan	18.6	Al Hoceima	19.4
3	Al Hoceima	14.1	Casablanca	12.6	Oujda	7.7
4	Oujda	11.0	Marrakesh	9.1	Tetouan	6.7
5	Tetouan	4.4	Nador	7.8	Ouarzazate	4.8
6	Casablanca	3.2	Larache	6.4	Chefchaouen	4.6
7	Agadir	2.6	Al Hoceima	4.0	Tangier	3.8
8	Meknes	1.8	Rabat-Sale	3.5	Casablanca	3.8
9	Marrakesh	1.6	Fes	2.4	Taza	3.1
10	Fes	1.4	Taounate	2.0	Meknes	2.6
		90.6		89.8		84.9

Source: TIES 2007-2008

Table 4.11 *Parents' country of origin (in %). by ethnic group*

		Second generation		
		Turks	Moroccans	former Yugoslavians
<u>Austria</u> Vienna/ Linz	Both Turkey/Morocco/former Yugoslavia	88.5	-	87.1
	One survey country; one above-mentioned country	10.4	-	11.6
	Other	1.1	-	1.2
	N	444	-	482
<u>Belgium</u> Brussels/ Antwerp	Both Turkey/Morocco/former Yugoslavia	86.2	83.8	-
	One survey country; one above-mentioned country	13.0	12.9	-
	Other	0.9	3.4	-
	N	585	536	-
<u>Switzerland</u> Zurich/ Basel	Both Turkey/Morocco/former Yugoslavia	89.2	-	90.2
	One survey country; one above-mentioned country	9.7	-	7.9
	Other	1.1	-	1.9
	N	443	-	418
<u>Germany</u> Berlin/ Frankfurt	Both Turkey/Morocco/former Yugoslavia	87.2	-	78.3
	One survey country; one above-mentioned country	12.8	-	21.7
	Other	0.0	-	-
	N	462	-	383
<u>Spain</u> Madrid/ Barcelona	Both Turkey/Morocco/former Yugoslavia	-	86.7	-
	One survey country; one above-mentioned country	-	13.3	-
	Other	-	-	-
	N	-	474	-
<u>France</u> Paris/ Strasbourg	Both Turkey/Morocco/former Yugoslavia	91.3	-	-
	One survey country; one above-mentioned country	7.1	-	-
	Other	1.6	-	-
	N	495	-	-

Table 4.11 (continued)

		Second generation		
		Turks	Moroccans	former Yugoslavians
<u>The Netherlands</u> <u>Amsterdam/</u> Rotterdam	Both Turkey/Morocco/former Yugoslavia	90.6	90.7	-
	One survey country; one above-mentioned country	9.0	6.8	-
	Other	0.4	2.5	-
	N	491	484	-
<u>Sweden</u> <u>Stockholm</u>	Both Turkey/Morocco/former Yugoslavia	89.9	-	-
	One survey country; one above-mentioned country	7.3	-	-
	Other	2.8	-	-
	N	248	-	-

Note: Columns total 100% within countries.
Source: TIES 2007-2008

5 School careers of second-generation youth in Europe

Which education systems provide the best chances for success?

Maurice Crul, Philipp Schnell, Barbara Herzog-Punzenberger, Maren Wilmes, Marieke Slootman and Rosa Aparicio Gómez

5.1 Introduction

We begin this chapter with some profiles of respondents to the TIES survey, namely, three young women of Turkish descent living in Paris, Frankfurt and Amsterdam. The women's parents all came from small villages in the countryside of Yozgat, a province in central Turkey, which is a major sending area for Turkish emigrants. The mothers had all gone only to primary school, while the fathers each had attended an additional few years of secondary school. These stories exemplify differences in school careers for young second-generation Turkish women in the different European cities we studied.

First there is Kaya, an unmarried Turkish-French woman who was 22 years old at the time of the TIES survey in France. Living in Paris, at age three, she went to *école maternelle*,¹ followed by the local primary school where, according to her estimation, half the children came from immigrant families.² She never had to repeat a year and, at age eleven, continued on to a *collège*, a lower secondary school, in her neighbourhood. In this school, three quarters of the children were of immigrant descent. Again, she did not have to repeat years and obtained her BEPC diploma, after which she continued in the first year of a *lycée technologique*, an upper secondary school. At age seventeen, she received her baccalaureate degree and then moved on to a higher vocational education institution where, at age 21, she got her Bachelor's degree. At that point, Kaya stopped her studies because, as she put it, she was satisfied with her results. Upon leaving school, she was first unemployed, though after eight months she found a professional job as a social worker. Kaya represents a large group of female respondents of Turkish descent in our Paris survey.

Turning to Frankfurt, we meet Aysa, a Turkish-German twenty year old at the time of the TIES survey in Germany. Aysa did not go to *Kindergarten* and so only began school at age six. She went to a neighbourhood primary school in which about three quarters of the children were from immigrant families. She repeated a year once and thus finished primary school at age eleven. She received no recommendation for a specific track and went to *Hauptschule* for lower vocational education, which she completed, getting her diploma at age sixteen. At that point, she did get a recommendation for *Fachoberschule*, an upper secondary vocational track. Instead, she chose to leave school altogether. Marriage was the reason Aysa gave for not continuing her studies. An actual marriage, to her cousin, took place two years after she left school. Before starting her own family, she did household work at her parents' home. At the time of the survey, she had no job and was taking care of her first child. Aysa represents a considerable group of Turkish second-generation women in the Frankfurt sample.

Fatma, a Turkish-Dutch young woman from Amsterdam, was also twenty at the time of the TIES survey in the Netherlands. She did not go to preschool and began school at age four. Fatma went to her neighbourhood primary school in which half of the children were of immigrant descent. She did not repeat any years and left primary school at age twelve. Her school's recommendation was to attend *MAVO*, the middle-level track of lower secondary school. She followed this advice, obtaining her *MAVO* diploma at age sixteen without any delay. Fatma then got a recommendation to continue on to *MBO*, middle vocational education, during which she completed a three-year course and, by age nineteen, graduated. Although she was advised to continue on to *HBO*, higher vocational education, she instead left school. Like Aysa, Fatma's reason for not continuing was marriage. Fatma found a job immediately after leaving school and subsequently got married. At the time of the survey she was working part-time.

Education is one of the most crucial indicators for assessing the overall position of the second generation. This chapter thus presents an overview of the survey's main educational findings for the Turkish, Moroccan and former Yugoslavian second generation and for the children of native parentage (the comparison group) in each of the fifteen cities we researched. We compare school results for each ethnic group across countries and cities and investigate educational gaps with the comparison group. We find large variation *across* the different second-generation groups, *within* the second-generation groups in different cities and between the second generation and the youth of native parentage. The differences among the Turkish groups across countries and cities are especially interesting and surprisingly large.

The second part of the chapter focuses on comparing second-generation Turkish respondents across thirteen European cities whose parents have similar low educational backgrounds (having completed, at most, lower secondary school). We use the theoretical framework and methodology of the internationally comparative *integration context theory* introduced in [chapter 2](#) in order to explain differences in school level outcomes in and among countries and cities (see also Crul & Schneider 2010). Our point of departure, based on distinctions made by Kerckhoff (2001; see also Crul & Vermeulen 2006; Werfhorst & Mijs 2010), was to assume that more open educational systems in countries like Sweden and France (Alba & Silverman 2011; Alba & Fournier 2007; Bayram 2009; Brinbaum & Ceballoboada 2007; Kirszbaum 2009; Meurs 2008; Penn & Lambert 2009; Simon 2003; Westin 2003) are better suited to include the children of Turkish immigrants in higher education than the more stratified school systems of Germany and Austria (Bacher 2003, 2005; Faist 1995; Heckmann, Penn & Schnapper 2001; Herzog-Punzenberger 2003, 2005, 2007; Unterwurzacher 2007; Weiss 2007; Worbs 2003). Belgium and the Netherlands, with their more mixed systems, would fall somewhere in between (Crul & Doornik 2003; Crul & Vermeulen 2006; Crul & Schneider 2009; Dagevos et al. 2007; Phaet & Heath 2010; Neels 2000; Timmerman, Vanderwaeren & Crul 2003). We also assumed that more vocationally oriented systems would probably do a better job retaining this more vulnerable group in the educational system (Crul & Vermeulen 2003; Kerckhoff 2001). Our empirical data do indeed show a strong effect of the integration context. The outcomes, however, show a much more complex reality than we predicted based on these general school system characteristics.

The main differences in school level outcomes between countries and cities are found at both ends of the educational ladder. For this reason, we made a typology based on the percentages of early school leavers and the percentages of higher education students. We roughly distinguish four types of outcomes: *fast upward mobility* (second-generation Turks in Stockholm and Paris); *polarisation* (second-generation Turks in the two Dutch cities, Brussels and Strasbourg, comprising a large group that experiences fast upward mobility yet simultaneously quits education too soon to qualify for a professional diploma); *slow mobility* (second-generation Turks in the two Swiss cities, where the main trend is to pursue apprenticeships without a strong upward trend towards mobility); and *low mobility* (second-generation Turks in the two German cities, the two Austrian cities and Antwerp, where three quarters of students are either in the apprenticeship system or leave school early). We show that the four different outcomes are the result of interaction between varying school system characteristics and attributes typical of Turkish parents with low levels of education. On the negative side, this includes the challenge of providing children practical help with their homework; positively, we see how some parents

have a strong drive to push their children ahead through education (see also Suárez-Orozco, Suárez-Orozco & Todorova 2008; Kasinitz, Mollenkopf, Waters & Holdaway 2008). To unravel the complex puzzle of different school outcomes at the two extremes – early school leaving and higher education attendance – we analyse what opportunities schools offer to second-generation Turkish students as well as what they demand in terms of parental involvement in school. We evaluate this at the three most important selection and transition points in education: the transition from primary to secondary education and, more specifically, selection between academic and vocational tracks in secondary school; the transition to apprenticeships; and the transition to tertiary education. How the transition to apprenticeships is organised is important when studying outcomes of the early school leaving indicator. Across the countries, we also find that differences in tertiary education attendance are brought to light by opportunities and problems that students encounter when entering tertiary education, be it via an academic or a vocational track.

5.2 Educational systems

National educational systems are, apart from educating, thought to serve two purposes in modern nation-states. One is cultural and political homogenisation; the other is social stratification. In the first instance, differences in the population stemming from a person's family background and individual personality should be diminished in order to create a national culture, a common understanding of citizenship and civil society (see Schiffauer, Baumann, Kastoryano & Vertovec 2004). In the second instance, educational institutions serve as a 'sorting machine' to stratify a society's population (see Kerckhoff 2001). Western European societies, such as those covered in our research, have highly comparable distributions of occupations. The entrance ticket into the labour market is usually an individual's educational credentials. Interestingly enough, educational credentials are often more difficult to compare across countries than occupations. Differences in the type of credentials are expressive of institutional structures' national variation, something which shapes the educational process.³

This section concentrates on three elements that all the analysed school systems share and on three that quite differ. Starting with the commonalities, we discuss: 1) compulsory education, 2) the three sequential steps of primary, secondary and tertiary education and 3) a differentiation between vocational and academic tracks.⁴

Every school system has a compulsory phase aimed at securing the basic skills individuals need to survive in society and, quoting from the World Declaration on Education for All, to supposedly '... develop their full capacities, to live and work in dignity, to participate fully in development, to

improve the quality of their lives, to make informed decisions, and to continue learning' (Eurydice 2002a: 13). While all countries have compulsory schooling,⁵ their starting age ranges from five to seven, and the number of requisite years ranges from nine to twelve. To illustrate, this means that compulsory education ends at age fifteen in Austria, at age fifteen or sixteen in Switzerland and Germany, at age sixteen in Spain, France and Sweden and at age eighteen in the Netherlands and Belgium (Eurydice 2010a).

Another structural characteristic all national educational systems share is the division into primary, secondary and tertiary education. While primary education is compulsory in all systems, secondary education is obligatory only up to a certain age. Primary education consists of four to eight years of schooling. Consequently, secondary education starts and also ends at different ages. In most countries, secondary school is divided into a lower and an upper secondary part. Whereas lower secondary education is often referred to as the second stage of basic education,⁶ the degree of specialisation in upper secondary education increases. The last of the three main divisions is tertiary or higher education, usually starting at age eighteen or nineteen.

A third dimension found in all national educational systems is a division into programmes or tracks that are either more practically or more theoretically oriented. As we will see later, how the vocational track is incorporated into the school system logic differs a lot across countries. To cite the two extremes: on one end, there is no differentiation in the upper secondary education degree, as is the case in Sweden where everyone gets a *gymnasie* diploma, no matter which courses he or she has taken. On the other end, there are the German-speaking countries, which differentiate students at age ten according to tracks, thus resulting in highly differing final degrees. Such a system is mostly geared to effectively place students into the labour market. A student's credentials in this system closely predict his or her future position in the labour market.

We now turn to *differences between educational systems*. Though we acknowledge their importance, we do not discuss at length the number of contact hours in school (preschool and half-day versus whole-day schooling); the degree of curriculum standardisation, if there are obligatory financial contributions for the parents; or the topic of private versus public schools. The following paragraphs do, however, discuss three topics that emerged as being most important in our comparison: 1) the age at which children first become involved in educational institutions, 2) the pathways through the system and 3) the nature and effects of the tracking systems.

Starting age of compulsory schooling and preschool attendance

The age at which compulsory school begins varies by country, as does the extent of most children's previous experience with public education. Most countries in the TIES survey begin primary school at age six, with the exceptions of the Netherlands, being at age five, and Sweden, at age seven. The decisive difference, however, lies in early childhood education and care. While Sweden *requires* schooling only at age seven, in 2006, 78 per cent of all Swedish children aged 1-3 were in fact in some sort of preschool institution (Eurydice 2010b: 3). In France, the compulsory schooling starting age is six, but in 2007-2008, all children aged 3-6 (and 23 per cent of children aged two) attended nursery school (Eurydice France 2009a: 2). Even in the Netherlands where the compulsory starting age is five, in 2008, 99 per cent of all four year olds attended primary school (Eurydice Netherlands 2009b: 2). In Germany and Austria, the percentage of children aged 3-6 in institutions of education and preschool was reported to be 91 per cent for 2009 and 94 per cent for 2010 (Eurydice 2011: 76; Statistik Austria 2011: 23). Interestingly, in 2005-2006, only 66 per cent of all three year olds in Austria were in a care facility (Statistik Austria 2011: 23), thus being much less than the share of even younger children in Sweden. While there is now increasing convergence in the TIES countries towards more – and earlier – inclusion of young children in institutions of education and care, we see much greater diversity in the past, including those years in which our respondents were at the corresponding ages. As a reminder, our data is collected from young adults between eighteen and 35 years old who would have attended early childhood education and care facilities from 1970 to 1990.

Preschool facilities across countries have different purposes and missions, which are reflected in the very terms used to name them. In Austria and Germany, they are *Kindergärten*. Spain refers to them as 'children's education'. France calls them 'maternal schools'. The Netherlands sends young children to 'basic education'. In Sweden, they are known as 'preschools'. In countries like France, their *educational* role is explicit and enforced. In others, including Austria and Germany, day care was not understood as falling within the educational realm until recently, and it is not the Ministry of Education that oversees this. These differences also reflect national cultures and perceptions regarding the better environment for young children – either the family or an institutional education – and this view is also reflected in whether or not parents tend to place their children in a public institution before compulsory schooling. Based on the TIES data, we see that immigrant families completely adjust to the institutional structure and behaviour prevalent in their immigration country.

The way through the system

It is clear from the countries presented in this chapter that the transition from one year to another, or from one level to another, also varies considerably. In the German-speaking countries, the transition from one year to another is not automatic, but actually tied to subject-specific grades. If proficiency in one or more subjects is deemed insufficient at the end of the year, the student can be held back from advancing to the next year. The student then has little choice but to repeat the year (or leave that school for another, where the student may try to advance to the next year or enter into another, usually lower, level of education). If he or she has already completed the requisite years of schooling, the student can exit the educational system altogether. In some countries, the likelihood of repeating a year for students with a migration background is significantly higher than for students without one.⁷ Some will consequently fulfil the obligatory number of years of attending compulsory schooling before having even reached the final year in lower secondary school. On leaving, they have no valid school certificate beyond that of primary school. While in Belgium repeating a year is a regular phenomenon, in the Netherlands it is less so, especially in primary school. In France, a student's performance evaluation only takes place at the end of a completed stage (for instance, lower secondary school), and the teacher's decision for a student to repeat a year can be appealed by parents (Eurydice 2009a: 4). In Sweden, on the other hand, repeating a year of compulsory schooling does not exist.

Another difference in the way through the system is the transfer from one phase to the next: primary to lower secondary; lower secondary to upper secondary or vocational training; and upper secondary to vocational training, the labour market or tertiary education. There are four main models for these transfers (see Eurydice 2002a: 13). The first can be described as 'no requirements', i.e. transfer is more or less automatic, such as in Sweden where primary and lower secondary educations together form one structure called the *grundskola*. In the second model, a phase must be completed before the student can advance to the next, as is the case with the transfer from primary to lower secondary in France and Spain. The third model holds that a phase must be completed and educational recommendation must be issued by a teacher or another school official who designates the specific kind of school the student should attend next, as is the case in the Netherlands, Austria, Germany and Switzerland. The fourth model requires a specific certificate for students to proceed, as is the case in Belgium's transition from primary to lower secondary school. We will return to the element of selectivity connected to this transfer in some systems, i.e. the so-called tracking method.

The way the transfer from lower secondary to upper secondary or vocational training is organised also differs a lot across countries. In Sweden,

the transition from lower to upper secondary schooling happens more or less automatically. In other countries, one needs information and personal contacts to navigate the transition successfully. Placement in academic upper secondary schools is sometimes competitive and, for placement in the vocational education and training sector (VET), an apprenticeship is sometimes necessary. Each year sees many more applications for apprenticeships than actual places are available. This puts children of immigrants, especially, in a disadvantaged position.

Tracking

As described in the beginning of this section, educational systems have two main functions in the modern nation-state: homogenisation and stratification. While primary school mostly performs the task of cultural homogenisation, the secondary and tertiary phases essentially act as sorting machines for the labour market. One of the most important mechanisms in this is tracking. Though we emphasise the role of formal tracking throughout the chapter, we are aware of the fact that there is also informal tracking in educational systems, be it in the way courses are combined, or simply by virtue of the prestige of an individual school.⁸

Tracking formally or informally groups children into separate classes or schools through its various emphases on academic or more vocationally oriented knowledge. The allocation process is based on test results or the recommendations of teachers. Tracks usually determine opportunities to access subsequent educational or training institutions and to specific segments of the labour market. The idea behind tracks is twofold: first, for optimal teaching results the learning abilities of children in a single class should be as equal as possible; second, separate tracks are believed to appropriately prepare students for more or less determined sections of the labour market. In the German-speaking countries, the vocational specificity of the opportunities afforded by the school system is most pronounced. At the other end of the spectrum, Sweden has no tracking until the end of compulsory schooling. In between is a continuum, with the Netherlands closer to the German-speaking countries and Belgium closer to France and Sweden.

In half the survey countries, the first selection happens at the lower secondary level. Especially in the German-speaking countries, the allocation to different routes happens very early, at age ten. The exception is in Berlin, where the first selection happens at age twelve, as is the case in the Netherlands. The detrimental effect of early selection on the full development of students' potentials and subsequent prospects has been repeatedly proven (e.g. OECD 2005: 50-62), though it must be noted that there is also variation across countries with early selection. Among the countries in our survey with differentiated lower secondary education in different schools,

the least differentiation is found in Austria, having only two tracks using the same curriculum. All the others have had three or even more. The number and designation of tracks have an impact on the pathways later on. In Austria, the permeability between the two tracks in lower secondary is not particularly large; after completion of the non-academic track, however, many students choose to continue in education streams that do give access to university. In countries where the least demanding track is one out of three or four possibilities, streaming into tertiary education is usually low.

In the German-speaking countries there are four separate paths of vocational education and training (VET), with varying contents and credentials. In Austria, 80 per cent of young people in tenth grade attend a vocational education or training path, which proves how attractive it is to students (Tritscher-Archan 2009: 26). In 2005, 61 per cent of young people in Germany were reported as enrolled in VET (OECD 2005). One of the VET paths is the apprenticeship system,⁹ which comprises 40 per cent of sixteen- to eighteen-year-old Austrians (Tritscher-Archan 2009: 30) and two thirds of the youngsters at the post-compulsory level in Switzerland (Moret & Fibbi 2006: 11). The high proportion of young adults here conveys how central these tracks are for the German-speaking countries. In the non-German-speaking countries it is mainly children with learning and/or behavioural problems who are recommended for these tracks. In bigger cities, these tracks are highly segregated, often catering to a majority of immigrant students. These tracks usually carry little prestige and students sometimes only stay in them to comply with compulsory schooling regulations (Moldenhawer, Miera, Kallstenius, Messing & Schiff 2009: 8). It is a challenge to compare the various kinds of vocational training across European countries, since their schooling experiences differ highly and lead to different positions in the labour market.

5.3 Educational positions of the TIES respondents

Overview of school level outcomes

We first describe the last or – should the respondent still have been in school at the time of the survey – current educational status of the TIES respondents.¹⁰ Because our survey group is between eighteen and 35 years old, a substantial number of the young adults is still in some sort of education. In many countries this is particularly the case for our second-generation respondents. The number of students still in school, however, varies not only among groups, but also for the same ethnic groups across cities. To give an example: while more than half the Turkish respondents in Paris were still enrolled in education, this only applied to 10 per cent of their counterparts in Berlin. This disparity can be attributed in part to the varying age distribution across the countries and in part to the differing average

Table 5.1 *TIES respondents still in school (in %, N), by city and group*

Country	City	Turkish second generation	N	Moroccan second generation	N	Former Yugoslavian second generation	N	Comparison group	N
Austria	Vienna	19.0	54			13.8	36	25.1	74
	Linz	29.6	70			17.0	71	27.4	73
Belgium	Brussels	23.2	59	34.8	81			39.0	104
	Antwerp	20.7	74	16.1	49			16.7	40
Switzerland	Zurich	37.2	79			29.7	77	44.9	82
	Basel	45.0	104			42.6	84	38.0	102
Germany	Berlin	10.6	26			11.6	34	14.7	36
	Frankfurt	14.7	41			11.7	29	9.5	27
Spain	Madrid			33.2	83			42.4	106
	Barcelona			26.8	67			31.6	79
France	Paris	60.0	139					28.0	54
	Strasbourg	31.1	77					40.0	67
Netherlands	Amsterdam	47.1	98	54.8	120			34.8	93
	Rotterdam	39.5	98	53.3	135			31.0	79
Sweden	Stockholm	22.7	50					20.9	47

Source: TIES survey 2007-2008

length of educational careers across cities. In France, more second-generation Turks continue into post-secondary education; in Germany, many stop after completing lower vocational education (*Hauptschule* or *Realschule*). This, of course, has an effect on the percentages of students who are still in school. As we see in [table 5.1](#), this effect is also notable in the comparison group, i.e. the children of native parentage.

With about a third of respondents still in school, it is not easy to assess the educational position of the second generation. If we simply exclude those still in school, we arrive at a serious underestimation of school outcomes because many are still enrolled, particularly those pursuing higher education. It is those students who had already left school at the time of the survey who more often have short educational careers. For instance, if we consider only the results of those who had already left school in France, we find that almost a quarter has achieved a diploma from *collège* (lower secondary school) or less. But if we look at those respondents still in education, we find that only one person was still in *collège*. At 68 per cent, the overwhelming majority was in post-secondary or tertiary education. To do justice to both trends, we include the highest-level diploma for those who had already left school and the present educational level for those who were still in school.¹¹

As such, the results presented in [tables 5.2 a](#) through [c](#) differ to certain degrees from national survey results that are solely based on acquired school diplomas (e.g. Brinbaum & Cebolla-Boada 2007; Alba et al. 2007).

Table 5.2a Educational level (in %) of second-generation Turks, by city

	Educational level	Austria		Belgium		Switzerland		Germany		France		The Netherlands		Sweden	
		Vienna	Linz	Brussels	Antwerp	Zurich	Basel	Berlin	Frankfurt	Paris	Strasbourg	Amsterdam	Rotterdam	Stockholm	Stockholm
Primary and similar	Primary school	4.8	2.9	6.6	6.6	1.0	1.0	3.3	1.1	3.7	6.7	2.7	10.8	n.a.	n.a.
	Special secondary education	0.0	0.5	7.4	7.7	0.0	0.0	1.4	0.4	0.0	0.0	1.6	1.2	n.a.	n.a.
Lower secondary	Vocational track	19.9	14.6	11.6	14.6	11.5	17.3	22.7	17.5	n.a.	n.a.	11.2	8.4	n.a.	n.a.
	Integrated track	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	0.0	2.0	0.4	0.3	6.1	12.2	1.4	2.0	9.8	9.8
	Middle track	0.0	0.0	n.a.	n.a.	0.0	0.0	6.3	8.9	n.a.	n.a.	10.0	8.6	n.a.	n.a.
	Highest level track	4.8	2.4	13.8	7.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	n.a.	n.a.	0.0	0.0	n.a.	n.a.
Post-lower secondary and upper secondary	Short middle vocational education or apprenticeship	36.3	36.2	11.8	14.9	9.6	11.2	50.2	59.5	23.1	31.1	8.0	13.3	n.a.	n.a.
	Upper secondary vocational track or apprenticeship (3 or 4 years)			8.5	12.3	51.1	47.8			10.8	17.2	33.6	27.1	27.7	27.7
	Upper secondary academic track	19.9	19.0	11.6	5.2	11.0	9.9	9.0	5.5	4.7	3.9	1.5	1.0	29.1	29.1
Post-upper secondary and tertiary	Higher vocational education or academia	4.4	7.3	17.2	24.4	6.6	4.3	n.a.	n.a.	18.5	17.4	19.2	20.8	17.8	17.8
	University	10.0	16.1	11.5	6.9	9.2	6.6	6.7	6.7	33.0	11.7	10.8	6.8	15.6	15.6
	N	252	206	236	349	206	248	253	250	248	252	237	263	251	251

Source: TIES survey 2007-2008

Table 5.2b Educational level (in %) of second-generation Moroccans, by city

	Educational level	Belgium		Spain		The Netherlands	
		Brussels	Antwerp	Madrid	Barcelona	Amsterdam	Rotterdam
Primary and similar	Primary school	6.9	5.2	7.2	18.2	6.0	8.6
	Special secondary education	1.4	2.3			1.3	0.4
Lower secondary	Vocational track	6.1	10.3			8.6	7.6
	Integrated track	n.a.	n.a.	37.4	29.0	0.0	1.2
	Middle track	n.a.	n.a.			8.1	7.6
	Highest level track	9.6	5.5			0.0	0.0
Post-lower secondary and upper secondary	Short middle vocational education or apprenticeship	11.8	26.5	14.0	15.6	12.3	9.5
	Upper secondary vocational track or apprenticeship (3 or 4 years)	9.7	19.2	10.6	11.2	28.7	37.0
	Upper secondary academic track	15.2	4.7	24.4	13.0	1.5	0.8
	Higher vocational education or academia	30.2	20.3	2.6	5.2	24.6	19.8
Post-upper secondary and tertiary	University	9.0	6.1	3.8	7.8	7.3	7.4
	N	309	240	235	231	242	251

Source: TIES survey 2007-2008

Table 5.2c Educational level (in %) of second-generation former Yugoslavians, by city

	Educational level	Austria		Switzerland		Germany	
		Vienna	Linz	Zurich	Basel	Berlin	Frankfurt
Primary and similar	Primary school	3.6	2.0	0.4	0.9	2.9	0.9
	Special secondary education	0.8	0.4	0.0	0.0	0.8	0.0
Lower secondary	Vocational track	12.6	3.6	6.9	7.2	10.8	8.1
	Integrated track	n.a.	n.a.	0.0	0.9	0.0	0.4
	Middle track	0.0	0.4	0.0	0.4	3.2	4.7
	Highest level track	1.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Post-lower secondary and upper secondary	Short middle vocational education or apprenticeship	39.5	61.1	8.9	5.0	65.5	66.9
	Upper secondary vocational track or apprenticeship (3 or 4 years)			62.7	57.6		
	Upper secondary academic track	16.6	16.7	10.2	10.6	8.6	6.7
Post-upper secondary and tertiary	Higher vocational education or academia	14.2	4.8	2.4	5.0	0.0	0.0
	University	11.1	11.1	8.5	12.3	8.3	12.4
	N	253	242	234	190	202	204

Source: TIES survey 2007-2008

Table 5.2d Educational level (in %) of comparison group, by city

	Austria		Belgium		Switzerland		Germany		Spain		France		The Netherlands		Sweden	
	Vienna	Linz	Brussels	Antwerp	Zurich	Basel	Berlin	Frankfurt	Madrid	Barcelona	Paris	Strasbourg	Amsterdam	Rotterdam	Stockholm	
Primary and similar	0.8	1.7	0.9	1.8	0.0	0.0	2.0	2.1	4.0	9.0	1.2	0.2	1.5	1.5	0.0	
Special secondary education	0.0	0.4	0.6	1.8	0.0	0.0					0.0	0.0	0.7	0.0		
Lower secondary	7.2	4.7	6.5	5.2	4.3	4.8	6.7	5.7			n.a.	n.a.	1.9	8.4	n.a.	
Vocational track	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	0.0	0.4	0.0	0.5	16.6	22.7	3.4	1.0	0.4	0.4	3.9	
Integrated track	0.4	2.1	n.a.	n.a.	0.0	0.7	7.6	1.7			n.a.	n.a.	2	4.3	n.a.	
Middle track	5.2	0.9	7.1	4.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0			n.a.	n.a.	0	0.0	n.a.	
Highest level track																
Post-lower secondary and upper secondary	28.3	26	1.5	6.4	3.7	2.6	42	67.5	7.7	11.6	15.7	13.1	5.7	5.5	n.a.	
Short middle vocational education																
or apprenticeship																
Upper secondary vocational track			7.9	13.9	37.2	34.0			13.0	9.4	8.2	11.1	14.7	20.6	21.2	
or apprenticeship (3 or 4 years)																
Upper secondary academic track	23.5	31.6	16.3	6.5	20.7	17.3	9.7	4.9	38.9	23.6	6.0	4.7	5.0	2.3	15.5	
Post-upper secondary and tertiary	8.0	9.0	28.5	44.6	8.1	6.1	0.5	0.5	2.8	5.2	11.3	11.0	27.5	28.7	15.3	
Higher vocational education or academia																
University	26.7	23.5	30.9	15.1	26.0	34.1	21.4	17.0	17.0	18.5	54.2	58.9	40.6	28.1	44.1	
N	250	234	252	301	202	262	250	253	247	233	174	177	259	253	250	

Source: TIES survey 2007-2008

To continue with our French example, more than half of Paris' second-generation Turks, as shown in [table 5.2 a](#), are in the post-secondary education category (because we include those who were at the time still studying in post-secondary education), though less than a quarter already possessed a post-secondary diploma. Using the highest diploma as the only indicator results would thus overlook an important aspect of this age cohort's reality.

The four tables detail the educational levels our respondents have attained. To enable a comparison across the fifteen cities, we devised a coding system specifically for this dataset.¹² The codes are constructed to do justice to both the variation across school systems and the comparability across the countries in this study. The results shown are weighted according to group characteristics (age and gender) at the city level. For Germany and Austria – though not for Switzerland – we had to combine students from both short and longer apprenticeship tracks because they could not be separated out.

The tables uncover some of the differences in school systems across European cities as described in the first part of the chapter. In the lowest part of the tables, the figures show that many students go into special education, thus suggesting that this is particularly well developed in Belgium. The concentration of integrated tracks in France and Sweden is the result of postponing selection into different tracks until after lower secondary school. After compulsory schooling (usually by the end of lower secondary school), students either secure an apprenticeship or continue into upper secondary school. In Germany, Austria and Switzerland, the apprenticeship system receives the bulk of second-generation youth. At the highest level, we distinguished between higher vocational education and university. Most of the second-generation youth is found in the first category, which is more practically oriented and probably offers better job opportunities, though also has less prestige.

[Tables 5.3 a](#) through [d](#) show the five school level categories we created. Reducing the international variation to five levels enables us to better compare outcomes across the European cities and allows us to test school level outcomes for significant differences across cities and by gender.

A first general observation from the school level tables is that only a small proportion of the second generation in our survey occupies a rung at the very bottom of the educational ladder. Respondents who did not finish lower secondary education and therefore hold only a primary school diploma are few. The exception is Belgium, due to the relatively large share of pupils in special education. The group that attained a lower secondary diploma but stopped at that is larger and varies in size from city to city and group to group. But most second-generation youngsters in our survey actually continued studying beyond the end of compulsory schooling, which is usually upon completion of lower secondary school. They either continue into an apprenticeship track, a short middle vocational track or a

Table 5.3a Educational level (in %) of second-generation Turks in five levels, by city

Educational level	Austria		Belgium		Switzerland		Germany		France		The Netherlands		Sweden	
	Vienna	Linz	Brussels	Antwerp	Zurich	Basel	Berlin	Frankfurt	Paris	Strasbourg	Amsterdam	Rotterdam	Stockholm	Stockholm
Primary school and special education	4.8	3.4	14.0	14.3	1.0	1.0	4.7	1.5	3.7	6.7	4.3	12.0	n.a.	n.a.
Lower secondary	24.7	17.0	25.4	22.1	11.5	19.2	29.4	26.7	6.1	12.2	22.6	19.0	9.8	9.8
Apprenticeship or vocational track	36.3	36.2	20.3	27.2	60.7	59.0	50.2	59.5	33.9	48.3	41.6	40.4	27.7	27.7
(upper secondary or post-lower secondary)														
Upper secondary academic track	19.9	19.0	11.6	5.2	11.0	9.9	9.0	5.5	4.7	3.9	1.5	1.0	29.1	29.1
Post-upper secondary and tertiary	14.3	23.4	28.7	31.2	15.8	10.9	6.7	6.7	51.5	29.0	30.0	27.6	33.4	33.4
N	252	206	236	349	206	248	253	250	248	252	237	263	251	251
Significance	0.061		n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	0	0.004	0.004	0.004	n.a.	n.a.

Source: TIES survey 2007-2008

Table 5.3b *Educational level (in %) of second-generation Moroccans in five levels, by city*

<i>Educational level</i>	<i>Belgium</i>		<i>Spain</i>		<i>The Netherlands</i>	
	<i>Brussels</i>	<i>Antwerp</i>	<i>Madrid</i>	<i>Barcelona</i>	<i>Amsterdam</i>	<i>Rotterdam</i>
Primary school and special education	8.3	7.5	7.2	18.2	7.2	9.1
Lower secondary	15.7	15.8	37.4	29.0	16.7	16.4
Apprenticeship or vocational track (upper secondary or post-lower secondary)	21.5	45.7	24.6	26.8	41.0	46.5
Upper secondary academic track	15.2	4.7	24.4	13.0	1.5	0.8
Post-upper secondary or tertiary	39.3	26.4	6.4	13.0	31.9	27.1
N	239	309	235	231	242	251
Significance	0.000		0.001		n.s.	

Source: TIES survey 2007-2008

Table 5.3c *Educational level (in %) of second-generation former Yugoslavians in five levels, by city*

<i>Educational level</i>	<i>Austria</i>		<i>Switzerland</i>		<i>Germany</i>	
	<i>Vienna</i>	<i>Linz</i>	<i>Zurich</i>	<i>Basel</i>	<i>Berlin</i>	<i>Frankfurt</i>
Primary school and special education	4.4	2.4	0.4	0.9	3.7	0.9
Lower secondary	14.2	4.0	6.9	8.6	14.0	13.2
Apprenticeship or vocational track (upper secondary or post-lower secondary)	39.5	61.1	71.6	62.6	65.4	66.9
Upper secondary academic track	16.6	16.7	10.2	10.6	8.6	6.7
Post-upper secondary or tertiary	25.3	15.9	10.8	17.3	8.3	12.4
N	253	242	234	190	202	204
Significance	0.000		0.002		n.s.	

Source: TIES survey 2007-2008

Table 5.3d Educational level (in %) of comparison group in five levels, by city

Educational level	Austria		Belgium		Switzerland		Germany		Spain		France		The Netherlands		Sweden	
	Vienna	Linz	Brussels	Antwerp	Zurich	Basel	Berlin	Frankfurt	Madrid	Barcelona	Paris	Strasbourg	Amsterdam	Rotterdam	Stockholm	
Primary school and special education	0.8	2.1	1.5	3.7	n.a.	n.a.	2.0	2.1	4.0	9.0	1.2	0.2	2.3	1.5	n.a.	
Lower secondary	12.8	7.7	13.5	9.8	4.3	5.9	14.3	7.9	16.6	22.7	3.4	1.0	4.2	13.1	3.9	
Apprenticeship or vocational track	28.3	26.0	9.4	20.3	40.9	36.6	52.0	67.5	20.7	21.0	23.9	24.2	20.4	26.1	21.2	
(upper secondary or post-lower secondary)																
Upper secondary academic track	23.5	31.6	16.3	6.5	20.7	17.3	9.7	4.9	38.9	23.6	6.0	4.7	5.0	2.3	15.5	
Post-upper secondary or tertiary	34.7	32.5	59.3	59.7	34.1	40.2	21.9	17.5	19.8	23.6	65.4	69.8	68.1	56.9	59.4	
N	250	234	250	294	202	262	250	253	247	233	174	177	259	253	250	
Significance	0.077		0.013		n.s.		0.001		0.000		n.s.		0.004		n.a.	

Source: TIES survey 2007-2008

vocational upper secondary school. The most successful students enter the academic track in upper secondary school, which we find in all survey countries' school systems.

There are big differences between countries and cities at the highest level. In the countries with the best results, between one quarter and one third of the second generation can be found in post-secondary or tertiary education. On average, about one in five of all second-generation respondents in the eight TIES survey countries is in higher education or had already obtained a post-secondary or higher education diploma. This in itself is an interesting finding because many of these second-generation youngsters have parents with little schooling. They have thus taken a huge step in terms of intergenerational mobility.¹³

We also analysed the role of country-versus-city effects, i.e. whether school level outcomes significantly differ between two cities within one country. Significant variation between cities alerts us to possible differences between each city's groups or the school context. For second-generation Turks, we found significant differences between cities in three countries: France, the Netherlands and Austria. These are mostly the result of Turkish parents being somewhat better educated in Paris, Amsterdam and Linz. In France, however, there are also different school policies regarding selection and tracking. For second-generation Moroccans, we found a significant difference in school level outcomes in Brussels and Antwerp. This, again, is partly the result of parental characteristics and partly the result of differences in school policies regarding selection and tracking. In the case of the former Yugoslavian second generation, significant differences between the two cities are found in Austria and Switzerland, but not in Germany.

Over the last decade, the trend in many countries has been for girls to demonstrate better school outcomes than boys. Does this trend also apply to the second generation? We looked at differences between males and females for all three second-generation groups in all cities. We found no significant difference in school outcome levels between second-generation Turkish males and females in any of the thirteen cities. Nor did we find any gender differences for the second-generation former Yugoslavians in the six cities where they were interviewed. Only in Antwerp did we see that second-generation Moroccan females are doing significantly better than men ($p < 0.01$), the former being especially better represented in post-secondary education. Looking back to the situation in the 1980s, females of the in-between generation were more likely to lag behind their male peers (Crul 2009; Crul & Schneider 2009). Today, females have reached equal educational positions.


The tables on educational outcomes indicate that differences between the comparison group and second-generation groups are considerable and can be found in all thirteen cities.¹⁴ Since the parents of the second generation mostly attended school at the lowest level while parents of the comparison

group generally attended school at much higher levels, it is difficult to compare the two groups' parental educational background in a meaningful way. To get some indication of the possible differences, figure 5.1 compares children of parents who attended school at the middle level. In all groups, this group sufficiently represents to make a proper comparison.

Figures 5.1 a through c show school level differences for respondents with parents who only had secondary schooling. In the following three figures, we compare second-generation Turks, Moroccans and former Yugoslavians with the comparison group. A bar above the line indicates an overrepresentation of the second generation and a bar under the line indicates underrepresentation.


With only one exception, we do not see any significant overrepresentation of second-generation youth at the very lowest level of the educational range (primary school). The largest significant overrepresentation is at the middle level (apprenticeship and upper secondary and vocational oriented). This is especially true for second-generation Turks. The most widespread underrepresentation for all three groups is at the level of higher education, where we find many more students of the comparison group in post-

Figure 5.1a *School level differences between second-generation Turks and comparison group with parents who attended secondary school only (only significant outcomes presented)*




Source: TIES survey 2007-2008

Figure 5.1b *School level differences between second-generation Moroccans and comparison group with parents who attended secondary school only (only significant outcomes presented)*



Source: TIES survey 2007-2008

Figure 5.1c *School level differences between second-generation former Yugoslavians and comparison group with parents who attended secondary school only (only significant outcomes presented)*



Source: TIES survey 2007-2008

secondary or tertiary education than the children of immigrants. Gaps in post-secondary and higher education are very similar across cities. Second-generation youth are performing at lower levels than children of native parentage, even when their parents have similar educational background characteristics. Their parents' immigrant background puts them at an extra disadvantage in almost all school systems.


The effect of parental educational levels on school outcomes

Parental educational level can usually explain a large part of school outcomes. In the case of Turkish and Moroccan parents, educational level is overall very low. About half the parents went no further than primary school. The second-largest group (about 40 per cent) went to lower secondary education for a few extra years. We grouped parents' educational level into three categories: 1) primary school only, 2) some lower secondary education and 3) some upper secondary education or more beyond that. We also analysed parental education effects separately for fathers and mothers. Looking across all countries, we see that both cities in Germany and both in Austria displayed the strongest educational level effects of Turkish fathers' education (Berlin $p < 0.01$; Frankfurt $p < 0.01$; Vienna $p < 0.01$; Linz $p < 0.01$) and Turkish mothers' education (Berlin $p < 0.01$; Frankfurt $p < 0.01$; Vienna $p < 0.05$; Linz $p < 0.01$). We found similar effects for the second-generation former Yugoslavians in these four cities. This supports general knowledge derived from other studies that German and Austrian school systems are more stratified and have a strong class- and origin-based selection of students (e.g. OECD 2006).

Figures 5.2 a through c present the effect of the fathers' education on the attained educational levels of Turkish second-generation respondents in Austria and Germany. Children of fathers with, at most, primary school are represented by the blue line; children of fathers with lower secondary school, the red line; and children of fathers with upper secondary or tertiary education, the green line. The five educational outcome levels for the second-generation Turks are represented in the horizontal bar: primary and special education; lower secondary education; apprenticeship or something similar; academic upper secondary; post-secondary and tertiary. The graph clearly demonstrates that children of parents with very low levels of education also have the worst school outcomes. This group is particularly large in Germany.¹⁵


In most of the fifteen cities, we found no significant differences in outcomes between children of parents who have had, at most, primary school and children of parents with lower secondary schooling, be it just some or completion of the level. This is an important finding because a large majority of the second-generation respondents come from families in these two categories. Thus, differences are often not significant when analysing the

Figure 5.2a *School level of second-generation Turks in Vienna (according to five possible school level categories) and their fathers' educational level*




Source: TIES survey 2007-2008


Figure 5.2b *School level of second-generation Turks in Linz (according to five possible school level categories) and their fathers' educational level*



Source: TIES survey 2007-2008

Figure 5.2c *School level of second-generation Turks in Berlin (according to five possible school level categories) and their fathers' educational level*

Source: TIES survey 2007-2008

Figure 5.2d *School level of second-generation Turks in Frankfurt (according to five possible school level categories) and their fathers' educational level*

Source: TIES survey 2007-2008

effect of parental educational level. At the same time, this finding obscures the fact that in many cases children of more highly educated parents do much better than the rest. However, the group with more highly educated parents is very small in the Turkish samples of the TIES survey.

Parents' low educational levels prove a serious obstacle for the educational career of their second-generation children especially in post-secondary and tertiary education. The second-generation children of more highly educated parents follow a very distinct pattern, their school outcomes in fact being more similar to the comparison group.

5.4 School level outcomes and integration school contexts: A typology

This second part of the chapter concentrates on comparing second-generation Turks across seven countries. In the previous section, we saw that the children of more highly educated Turkish parents have a very distinct school outcome pattern, resembling that of the comparison group. To make the Turkish groups more comparable across the cities, we excluded respondents with more highly educated parents from the following analyses. The cut-off point for parental education is upper secondary school or higher. However, this is overall quite a small group. We thus only compared Turkish respondents whose parents went to secondary school for a few years at most (i.e. lower secondary school). Between half and two thirds of our Turkish second-generation respondents do come from families with low or very low educational credentials.¹⁶

Since differences between second-generation Turks across European cities mostly occur at the extreme ends, we constructed a typology to primarily capture a sense of the proportions of early school leavers and of higher education students.

According to an EU definition, early school leavers are students who exit school with only a lower secondary school diploma or even less (OECD 2005: 25-36). As a percentage of the total sample, [table 5.4](#) shows how many of our respondents fit this category.¹⁷

The percentages of early school leavers among second-generation Turks in the Dutch, Belgian, German and Austrian cities are high to very high.¹⁸ We find the lowest percentages in Stockholm, Paris, Zurich and Basel. The comparison group follows a similar ranking pattern across the cities. In Stockholm, only very few second-generation Turks leave school early; this is also true for the comparison group, though even fewer Swedes of native parentage leave school early. In the two Dutch cities, early school leaving is a huge problem not only among second-generation youth, but also for the comparison group. This seems to be a general rule, also applicable to other school indicators: if the comparison group experiences difficulties in certain

Table 5.4 *Early school leavers among second-generation Turks with low-educated parents (in %, N), by city*

Countries	Cities	%	N	Sign
Austria	Vienna	36.9	58	
	Linz	25.5	27	n.s.
Belgium	Brussels	34.9	38	n.s.
	Antwerp	29.9	63	
Switzerland	Zurich	11.5	10	n.s.
	Basel	14.3	17	
Germany	Berlin	35.7	61	n.s.
	Frankfurt	30.3	46	
France	Paris	10.3	14	0.012
	Strasbourg	20.9	37	
The Netherlands	Amsterdam	23.2	36	n.s.
	Rotterdam	28.6	46	
Sweden	Stockholm	9.0	8	n.a.

Source: TIES survey 2007-2008

educational phases, we see a sort of *multiplier effect* for the second generation, who experience the same difficulties albeit at exponentially higher rates.

Figures given at the beginning of the chapter, in figures 5.2 a through d, conflated respondents in post-secondary education with those in tertiary education. For this typology, we restrict ourselves to those in tertiary education.¹⁹

Table 5.5 *Second-generation Turks in higher education who have low-educated parents (in %, N), by city*

Countries	Cities	%	N	Sign
Austria	Vienna	13.4	21	
	Linz	17.9	19	n.s.
Belgium	Brussels	24.8	27	0.014
	Antwerp	13.7	29	
Switzerland	Zurich	19.5	17	n.s.
	Basel	11.7	14	
Germany	Berlin	5.3	9	n.s.
	Frankfurt	4.6	7	
France	Paris	52.2	71	0.000
	Strasbourg	28.8	51	
The Netherlands	Amsterdam	27.7	43	n.s.
	Rotterdam	26.1	42	
Sweden	Stockholm	32.0	29	n.a.

Source: TIES survey 2007-2008

Analysing the relationship between early school leavers and tertiary education indicators, we can roughly distinguish four typical integration pathways in the field of education.

Table 5.6a *Four possible outcomes based on percentages of early school leavers and higher education students*

	<i>High % early school leavers</i>	<i>Low % early school leavers</i>
High % higher education	Polarised mobility	Fast upward mobility
Low % higher education	Low mobility	Slow mobility

Source: TIES survey 2007-2008

1 *Low mobility*

Second-generation Turks in the two German and Austrian cities and Antwerp: the largest part (over three quarters) is in the vocational track or in the apprenticeship system and a very large group leaves school early.

2 *Slow mobility*

Second-generation Turks in the two Swiss cities: the majority of the Turkish second generation successfully enters the apprenticeship system. There are relatively few early school leavers.

3 *Polarisation*

Second-generation Turks in the two Dutch cities and Brussels and Strasbourg: the trend is a significant share of respondents experiencing strong upward mobility and an almost equally big share leaving school early.

4 *Fast upward mobility*

Second-generation Turks in Stockholm and Paris: since access to higher education is less dependent on parental or other background characteristics and few students leave school early, the second generation experiences a generalised strong upward social mobility in relation to their parents' generation.

Table 5.6b *A school outcome typology for second-generation Turks with low-educated parents*

<i>Countries and cities</i>		<i>Early school leavers</i>	<i>Apprenticeship and non-tertiary</i>	<i>Higher education students</i>	<i>Typology</i>
Germany		33.1	61.9	5.0	Low mobility
Austria		32.3	52.5	15.2	Low mobility
Belgium	Antwerp	29.9	56.4	13.7	Low mobility
Switzerland		13.0	72.0	15.0	Slow mobility
Belgium	Brussels	34.9	40.3	24.8	Polarisation
Netherlands		25.9	47.2	26.9	Polarisation
France	Strasbourg	20.5	50.7	28.8	Polarisation
Sweden		9.0	59.0	32.0	Fast upward
France	Paris	10.3	37.5	52.2	mobility

Source: TIES survey 2007-2008

5.5 Explaining differences across Europe: How school system characteristics interact with family resources and support

This section analyses the school careers of early school leavers and tertiary education students in more detail. We endeavour here to identify relevant factors influencing the sizeable differences across countries and cities. The TIES survey identified not only final educational outcomes, but also all the steps in between, starting with preschool. We use this uniquely gathered information to show in greater detail where the school careers of second-generation Turkish youth start to differ across countries and groups. In particular, we look at three crucial selection points in the educational systems.

Only by viewing the entire school career are we able to link educational results directly with differences in school institutional arrangements. For instance, the final educational results for second-generation Turks in the two Austrian cities and Antwerp are almost the same. However, we see that how school careers developed in the two national contexts could not be any more different. In the Austrian case, the relatively low performance of the Turkish second generation is the result of their low participation in preschool and early selection after primary school. In Antwerp, it is the result of high dropout rates and being downstreamed in upper secondary school. Yet this crucial systemic difference only becomes visible when we reconstruct the entire school careers in detail.

The same is true for the importance of family resources. School systems differ in terms of both the intensity and the type of role parents are expected to play during the various school phases. In some systems, parents are expected to play a large role in primary school, whereas in others, their role is more important in the second part of the school career. Explanatory models testing the effect of parental characteristics as the dependent variable on their children's final educational level do show a culminating effect of parental support over a period of fifteen to twenty years. This can potentially include positive and negative effects during different time periods. Statistically, they may have the effect of levelling each other out. In the Netherlands, for instance, we see that some second-generation Turkish children are able to reach higher education because their parents provide them practical support, namely, help with their homework during primary school. Others reach higher education even though their parents could not help them at this level; they become successful on a longer alternative route because they have persisted at school. The influence of parents' practical support on their children's final educational outcome will look less strong as a result because both children with and without support have ultimately reached higher education. Looking at their school careers not only as a whole, but at each individual phase, enables us to identify the importance of family resources at the respective school phases. This brings to


the fore how differences in school systems affect school careers and how the systems interact with family resources.

Parental involvement in school

The TIES survey addressed a number of questions about both parental and sibling involvement in school. We asked about parents helping with their homework and controlling the time spent on it, talking about school and meeting with their teachers. We also asked two questions about help from elder siblings. Since the educational levels of parents in the reduced sample are very similar (because we excluded more highly educated parents), we expect differences in parental and sibling involvement in school to explain some of the remaining differences in school outcome levels.

We introduce the most important school involvement indicators briefly by presenting outcomes across countries. We only present the two extreme ends. Figure 5.3a shows that about two thirds of the parents rarely or never helped their children with homework; this is a very large group. In general, it is not so much that parents are not interested in school – because most do talk about it with their children – but that parents are not *able* to help due to either a language barrier or not understanding the homework's content.


Figure 5.3a *How often low-educated parents of second-generation Turks helped with homework*



Source: TIES survey 2007-2008

Alternatively, parents may control the time children spend on homework. For this, they do not necessarily need to understand its content. They can, for instance, prevent children from watching television before finishing their homework. About a quarter of the parents often controlled the time spent on homework. Later in this chapter, we will see that these two different types of parental involvement have different effects on school outcomes.


Figure 5.3b *How often low-educated parents of second-generation Turks controlled time spent on homework*



Source: TIES survey 2007-2008

A third possible level of parental involvement is talking about school. For this, parents need even less knowledge of schoolwork content. As a result, the number of parents who talk with their children about school is much larger; fewer parents rarely or never talk about school. The only exceptions here are parents in Germany, which was particularly the case when a mother had little knowledge of the German language.

Figure 5.3c *How often low-educated parents of second-generation Turks talked to them about school*



Source: TIES survey 2007-2008

Tracking within secondary school: Institutional arrangements in preschool and primary school and how their role interacts with family resources

In all countries, the most important selection point arose when it was time for tracking into academic tracks that are distinct from middle and vocational tracks in secondary education. As described in [section 5.1](#), in most countries the timing of the selection is at the beginning of secondary education. Exceptions are France and Belgium, which select only after lower secondary school. In Sweden, selection takes place at the end of *grundskola* (primary school), which includes the lower part of secondary school.

We first look at the group of respondents best positioned and prepared to continue into higher education: those following academic tracks. There are large differences between the countries and cities with regard to the share of second-generation Turkish pupils found here. Half of second-generation Turkish children in Paris were entering an academic track, compared to only a bit more than one in ten in Frankfurt or Berlin. In Switzerland, we could not make a meaningful distinction in our data because in most cases the respondents went on to follow a combined middle and academic track.

Table 5.7 *Second-generation Turks (with low-educated parents) in academic tracks in secondary school (in %, N), by city*

<i>Countries</i>	<i>Cities</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>Sign</i>
Austria	Vienna	19.7	31	
	Linz	15.1	16	n.s.
Belgium	Brussels	50.5	99	0.018
	Antwerp	65.3	62	0.018
Switzerland	Zurich	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
	Basel	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Germany	Berlin	10.5	18	n.s.
	Frankfurt	12.5	19	n.s.
France	Paris	62.9	83	0.000
	Strasbourg	39.4	65	0.000
The Netherlands	Amsterdam	23.2	36	n.s.
	Rotterdam	23.6	38	n.s.
Sweden	Stockholm	52.9	45	n.a.

Source: TIES survey 2007-2008

Access to the academic tracks is significantly different between cities in two countries, France and Belgium. In Strasbourg, significantly more pupils get a recommendation to follow a vocational track than in Paris. About 90 per cent in both cities follow this advice. We checked the background of these *collège* students to see if such characteristics could account for the difference. But even when taking only those students who did obtain a *collège* diploma and never repeated a year in primary school, we still saw

significantly more students in Strasbourg than Paris being advised to follow a vocational track.

We also analysed whether teachers in Strasbourg were targeting Turkish students, in particular. This hunch was supported by the fact that we saw no similar trend for the comparison group. It appears that teachers in Strasbourg did more often have a vocational route in mind when advising students who are of Turkish descent and a lower-class background. The Turkish communities in Paris and Strasbourg differ in terms of their relative size within the two cities. In Paris, Turks represent a rather small group among many other immigrant groups, but in Strasbourg they are the largest immigrant group. In the Alsace region, of which Strasbourg is both capital and principal city, the Turkish community is the most visible minority, known for its presence in construction and manual labour. This recognised working-class image of the Turkish community may well have affected teachers' views on the Turkish second generation. It seems, however, that this is slowly changing. Among our respondents, the younger cohorts (eighteen to 25 year olds) were less often advised to follow a vocational track than the older cohorts (25 year olds and up). As a result, the gap between Paris and Strasbourg is gradually closing.

The varied outcomes in Brussels and Antwerp are also due to different advising policies. In Antwerp, significantly more children were recommended for lower vocational education (*BSO*). But also within the academic track, significantly more Turkish pupils in Brussels (48.8 per cent) than Antwerp (18.9 per cent) were recommended to continue into the general academic track (*ASO*) and not the technical academic track (*TSO*). As is generally the case, *TSO* pupils more often do not continue into higher education after upper secondary school. In the long term, the different advising policy leads to significantly fewer students of Turkish descent being in higher education in Antwerp. In contrast to France, this difference in advising policy between the two cities is also visible in the comparison group. But, as in Strasbourg, the younger cohorts in Antwerp were less often advised to follow vocational tracks than the older cohorts. As such, the gap between Antwerp and Brussels is slowly closing.

Vocational tracks can be identified in each country, but some distinguish between levels. The following tables present outcomes for only the lowest vocational tracks in secondary school. For this reason, we exclude France and Sweden, where such lower vocational secondary tracks do not exist.

More than three quarters of second-generation Turks in Austria are tracked into *Hauptschule* (while the other 18 per cent in Vienna and 24 per cent in Linz follow the academic track). This is partly because there are only two tracks available in Austria, whereas in most countries there is an additional middle track between the lower vocational track and the academic track. In the two Swiss cities as well, more than half of second-

generation Turks are found in lower vocational tracks. In Antwerp, significantly more children are sent on to the vocational *BSO* track than in Brussels.

Table 5.8 *Second-generation Turks (with low-educated parents) in lowest vocational tracks in secondary school (in %, N), by city*

<i>Countries</i>	<i>Cities</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>Sign</i>
Austria	Vienna	75.8	119	n.s.
	Linz	82.1	87	0.008
Belgium	Brussels	29.4	32	0.008
	Antwerp	44.5	94	n.s.
Switzerland	Zurich	55.2	48	n.s.
	Basel	54.2	65	n.s.
Germany	Berlin	40.8	69	n.s.
	Frankfurt	35.5	54	n.s.
The Netherlands	Amsterdam	23.9	37	n.s.
	Rotterdam	32.3	52	n.s.

Source: TIES survey 2007-2008

A number of general school system differences described in the beginning of the chapter explain the large differences in tracking outcomes across Europe. We highlight the two most important for our respondents: age on entrance into early education and care facilities and age at which first selection takes place.

As shown above, the age at which children are expected to enter education and care facilities is very different across Europe. The systems in the German-speaking countries are characterised by a relatively late entrance into educational institutions, while our Turkish second-generation respondents in the two French cities were the youngest to enter education: almost 90 per cent went to *école maternelle* at age two or three. In Belgium and France almost all children of all groups go to preschool. In the German-speaking countries sample the average starting age is much later, while in the Dutch sample the average is four years old. The mean age for entering school among second-generation Turks in Stockholm is three. However, Sweden is the country with the widest range: some children began *barne*, a combination of preschool followed by kindergarten, at a very early age, while others stayed home until the beginning of compulsory schooling at age seven.²⁰

Looking at the comparison group, we see the same trend across countries and cities (see appendix 5). The starting age in each country is mostly dependent on national policies based on beliefs and norms about what is considered a 'good age' to enter preschool. However, we find that second-generation Turkish respondents in all countries except Sweden tend to start preschool later than the comparison group, and they are also more likely not to attend preschool whatsoever. The differences with the comparison group are most pronounced in the Austrian cities. There is also a

remarkable difference between the two Austrian cities themselves: second-generation Turks in Linz went to *Kindergarten* 1.5 times more often than their peers in Vienna.

Table 5.9 *Age of entrance into an educational institution among second-generation Turks with low-educated parents*

City	<3	3	4	5	6	7	8	Unknown
Vienna	1.9	1.3	21.0	12.1	47.1	15.9	0.6	0.0
Linz	3.8	14.2	24.5	20.8	31.1	2.8	0.0	2.8
Brussels	18.4	63.1	3.9	5.8	8.7	0.0	0.0	n.a.
Antwerp	23.1	69.7	5.3	1.0	0.0	1.0	0.0	n.a.
Zurich	0.0	0.0	4.6	67.8	18.4	8.0	1.1	n.a.
Basel	0.0	0.0	14.7	62.9	16.4	4.3	1.7	n.a.
Paris	4.4	78.7	11.0	4.4	1.5	0.0	0.0	n.a.
Strasbourg	2.8	90.4	5.1	1.1	0.6	0.0	0.0	n.a.
Berlin	0.0	33.3	29.8	12.9	9.4	12.9	0.0	1.8
Frankfurt	0.0	43.4	28.3	7.9	6.6	12.5	0.0	1.3
Amsterdam	1.9	11.0	73.4	9.7	3.9	0.0	0.0	n.a.
Rotterdam	1.9	5.0	83.2	7.5	1.9	0.6	0.0	n.a.
Stockholm	37.5	12.5	12.5	15.0	10.0	0.0	0.0	12.6

Source: TIES survey 2007-2008

In Belgium and France, preschool attendance is common among all groups. In the other countries, preschool attendance varies between and within groups. In Germany and Austria, this results in many second-generation youngsters not going to preschool. These variations in starting age mean that the second-generation Turkish respondents began their educational careers in very different ways. In France, they began to learn French in an educational environment at the age of two or three, during the phase in development that is most open to learning a new language. In Switzerland and Austria, they entered education, on average, two years later and accordingly had more difficulty learning German as a second language.

In countries where there is considerable variation in preschool attendance (Germany, Austria, the Netherlands and Sweden), we can analyse the effect this has on streaming into academic tracks. In both Germany and Austria, we find a significantly positive effect ($p < 0.05$) of preschool attendance on academic track selection in secondary school.

Another relevant aspect of the first selection is how many years have passed between entering educational facilities and the streaming into different school tracks. This is significant not only for the sake of exposure to the majority language, but also for increased opportunities to acquire skills necessary for higher academic levels. If we take the mean age our respondents entered school and the formal selection age in each country, the situation proves most favourable in France, Sweden and Belgium, with eleven

to twelve years of common education under a student's belt before any selection is made.

At the other extreme, the situation is least favourable in Austria, Germany and Switzerland, with a period of only five to seven years of common education prior to selection. This is not only rather short but, combined with the fact that the majority of schools in the German-speaking countries were only half-day, it thus further limits the amount of contact hours between teachers and children. Kindergarten and preschool attendance were not particularly encouraged when our respondents were young, one reason being that considerable costs were involved. Compulsory schooling in these countries begins only at age six. This means that considerable shares of respondents were in an educational institution, learning the German language and other academic skills, for only four years before, at age ten, the most important decision on their future school careers was made.

Table 5.10 *Years between start of education and tracking among second-generation Turks with low-educated parents*

	Mean age at entering (early childhood) education institution	Age at track selection	Years of education before selection
Austria	4.9	10	5.1
Belgium	3.0	14	11.0
France	3.1	15	11.9
Germany	4.2	10 to 12	5.8/7.8
The Netherlands	4.0	12	8.0
Sweden	3.1	15	11.9
Switzerland	5.2	12	6.8

Source: TIES survey 2007-2008

A combination of late start and early selection diminishes the opportunity second-generation Turkish children in Germany have to enter *Gymnasium*. At the other end of the spectrum, in countries with an early start *and* a late selection (France, Sweden and Belgium), about half the second-generation Turkish respondents followed the academic track. Their counterparts in the Netherlands, located precisely in the middle range of years in education before selection, also rank in the middle with regard to the percentage having pursued the academic track.

The school system mechanisms behind tracking differ greatly across Europe. As a result, we also expect family characteristics to have different effects. Because many children in Germany and Austria did not go to pre-school, they did not learn the second language in an institutional environment before starting primary school, as is the practice for many children in Belgium and France. As such, the parents have more responsibility for helping their children learn German as a second language. Many second-

generation Turkish children thus came into primary school with low proficiency in German. The short time span between starting and selection ages, forced them to try to overcome the language gap quickly. In addition, Turkish parents in Germany and Austria are expected to play a very active role during the primary school years. Children only attend school for half-days and are thus mostly expected to do homework in the afternoon under the guidance of their parents. Independently from each other, we tested six different aspects of parent and sibling school involvement to see how they influenced academic track access as the dependent variable. We tested whether outcomes were significant based on a three-answer scale: 1) very often/often, 2) sometimes or 3) rarely/never.

As shown in [figure 5.4](#), only a very small group of parents was actually able to help with homework in a practical way, and what parents were able to do in terms of homework support was not very effective in most cases. Therefore, only in Austria do we see practical homework help's small significant positive effect ($p < 0.1$) on tracking; in all other countries, the effect is not significant. Because of their own low level of education and second language difficulties, most parents were unable to give support that really made a difference. The result of this is, however, quite different across the countries. In Germany, only one in ten of the pupils whose parents were unable to help with homework nevertheless went to *Gymnasium*. In countries like Belgium and France, still more than half of those similarly lacking parental support made it into an academic track.


Controlling the time children spent on homework – something parents could do even without much content comprehension – seems to have been a more effective strategy. This is a highly significant factor in Austria ($p < 0.01$), Germany ($p < 0.01$) and France ($p < 0.01$). In Germany, chances for second-generation Turkish children to enter an academic track dropped to almost zero (only 6 per cent) when parents did not control time spent on homework. By contrast, about a quarter of the children of parents who did exercise control made it into *Gymnasium*. In Austria, the same applies to almost a third, even though this percentage is still much lower than in most other countries. As expected, the respondents in Germany and Austria were most dependent on practical help and control by parents. We see a similar pattern when it came to talking about school and meeting with teachers. Again, we find significant effects only in Austria (talking about school $p < 0.01$; meeting the teacher $p < 0.01$) and Germany (talking about school $p < 0.1$; meeting the teacher $p < 0.05$). Pupils whose parents were less active concerning school matters experienced seriously reduced opportunities in these two countries. The same applies to the effect of an elder sibling talking with respondents about school or helping with homework, being again only significant in Austria (talking about school $p < 0.05$) and Germany (helping with homework $p < 0.05$; talking about school $p < 0.01$). In Austria, slightly more than a quarter of children with a sibling who often

talked with them about school entered an academic track. The number is less than 10 per cent for those children whose siblings rarely or never talked about school with them.

Sweden is an interesting case for contrast because here parental involvement items negatively correlate with performance in school. It seems that Turkish parents more often controlled homework ($p < 0.05$) and talked about school ($p < 0.05$) – or felt the need to do so – when children did *not* perform well. The average or above-average student apparently did not need the exercise of such control to be prompted to follow an academic track.

In Stockholm, the tracking process is much more determined by actual learning abilities. This allows not only pupils with the most supportive and best-educated families to pursue an academic track, but also bright and average-level children from disadvantaged families. In other words, parental involvement manifests very differently across the seven countries. To show this graphically, we singled out children whose parents did not help with nor control homework. In Sweden, Belgium and France, this did not have an effect on the share of those going into academic tracks. In Germany, on the other hand, without this kind of family support it was almost impossible to enter an academic track. The Austrian and Dutch cases fall somewhere in between.

Figure 5.4 *Second-generation Turks in an academic track with low-educated parents who rarely or never controlled time spent on, or helped with, homework*



Source: TIES survey 2007-2008

To a considerable extent, the tracking mechanisms across countries determine the school level outcomes in our typology. The place occupied by German and Austrian Turks at its low end is largely determined by the late start in school and the early selection – a situation that requires a lot of practical support from parents, though which many are not able to give. In contrast, the fast upward educational mobility typical for most Turks in Paris and Stockholm is, in large measure, determined by the much more open school systems that do not rely on practical support from parents.

Early school leavers: Institutional arrangements in the transition to the apprenticeship system and family resources

The tracking that takes place in secondary school has a huge effect on future school career. We see this most clearly when looking at early school leavers. The chance of becoming an early school leaver is much greater when a pupil is tracked into a lower vocational track compared to a middle track or an academic track. The most extreme case is Germany, where lower vocational pupils are *25 times more likely* to become early school leavers than pupils following an academic track.

The relationship between lower vocational education and leaving school early is different across countries, but is significant in all cases. Table 5.11 shows only lower vocational pupils and the percentage among them who became early school leavers. The fourth column gives the percentage for the comparison group. These two groups, which in theory are both selected according to the same learning abilities (lower vocational track), have very different chances of becoming early school leavers. The chances for second-generation Turks to become early school leavers are,

Table 5.11 *Early school leavers who attended lower vocational education in secondary school among second-generation Turks with low-educated parents and comparison group (in %, N), by city*

<i>Countries</i>	<i>Cities</i>	<i>Turkish second generation</i>	<i>Comparison group</i>
Austria	Vienna	41.2	17.0
	Linz	28.7	11.2
Belgium	Brussels	43.8	50.0
	Antwerp	36.2	29.4
Switzerland	Zurich	7.5	3.1
	Basel	14.0	7.1
Germany	Berlin	52.9	28.6
	Frankfurt	50.0	35.4
The Netherlands	Amsterdam	36.2	31.3
	Rotterdam	40.0	33.3

Source: TIES survey 2007-2008

in almost all cases, much greater. In Austria, Switzerland and Germany, countries that rely most on the apprenticeship system, twice as many second-generation Turks become early school leavers than the comparison group. In the Netherlands and Belgium, the likelihood for pupils in lower vocational education to become early school leavers is high in both groups.

In most cases, early school leavers stop after compulsory school. However, a smaller group even drops out during lower secondary school.²¹ Dropout in lower secondary school is most prominent in the Netherlands, Belgium and France.²² An important effect of early tracking in the Netherlands and Belgium is the marginalisation of the lowest vocational track as compared to other lower secondary school tracks. This is underlined by the similarly high percentage of early school leavers in the comparison group following this track. Children with learning and behavioural problems tend to be concentrated here. Children in lower vocational education are usually placed in separate schools or school buildings. In these schools in the big cities, children of immigrants are highly overrepresented, thus yielding the label 'ghetto schools'. Half the second-generation Turkish respondents following these tracks in the two Dutch cities and about a third in the two Belgian cities went to schools with 75 per cent or more pupils of immigrant origin. Dropout rates in these schools are very high. Parents of native descent try to avoid sending their children to these schools. Children of native parentage who do end up in these schools are often from very disadvantaged backgrounds. Three quarters of parents in the Dutch and Belgian groups went to, at most, lower secondary school – a very low level of education compared to other native-born parents in our survey.

Students who do finish a lower vocational track are usually streamed into another middle or upper vocational track, with or without hands-on experience via an apprenticeship in a company. The transition from lower secondary school to an apprenticeship track marks the end of compulsory school. For this reason, the step taken after compulsory school is crucial. Some students do not continue into further education for various reasons; others are unable to get an apprenticeship or drop out of middle vocational education. In all three cases the result is early school leaving.

The numbers of early school leavers differs immensely between countries and cities. The following paragraphs briefly discuss the most relevant differences in the school systems. Sweden, being the country with the lowest percentage of early school leavers, merges primary and lower secondary educations into one school, *grundskola*. This eliminates the so frequently problematic transition from primary to lower secondary school. Every extra transition to be made, as we will see in other countries, results in more pupils leaving school early. This seems to be a first explanation for lower percentages of early school leavers in the Swedish sample. Moreover, in the

lower part of Swedish secondary school, pupils with different learning abilities are grouped together in the same classes. After *grundskola*, all children are expected to continue onto *gymnasie* (from age fifteen to eighteen), where children of all levels still remain together. Pupils may be tracked along different programmes within *gymnasie*, but they study at the same school in the same building. This means there are no separate (or, as is often the case, marginal) lower vocational schools, as there are in the Netherlands or Belgium.


Switzerland is the other country with quite low percentages of early school leavers. Here, early school leaving is not nearly as high as in Germany or Austria, despite a similar school system and similarly high shares of pupils in lower vocational education. Analysing school careers here shows how in Switzerland the transition into an apprenticeship is eased by the so-called *Brückenangebot*, which coaches them for entrance into such a position.

We see that the transition from *Hauptschule* to an apprenticeship is highly problematic for second-generation Turks in Germany and Austria. One out of three students does not make it into such a position directly after school. These are vulnerable students who left lower secondary education, supposedly lacking the capacities and skills to enter an apprenticeship – a big problem when there is tight competition for securing such a position. This is handled differently in Switzerland. Here, students do not completely drop out of the system at this point, but are placed in the *Brückenangebot*, where they receive coaching to prepare them for an apprenticeship. In three quarters of the cases this works well, especially considering that it concerns the most vulnerable group. The *Brückenangebot* works almost equally well for second-generation Turks as for the comparison group, notably also because it enjoys a good reputation among the employing companies. Prospects look different in Germany, where supposedly comparable programmes serve as little more than a ‘parking spot’ for youngsters who are still of compulsory schooling age.

Interestingly, those countries with the best-developed vocational trajectories produce the highest percentages of early school leavers. This is somewhat paradoxical. Early tracking (beginning as young as age ten) is designed to put children, as soon as possible, into tracks that match their skills and abilities. For second-generation Turks, this does not seem to work accordingly.


In Germany, the transition from *Hauptschule* to an apprenticeship track seems to be the most problematic. Here, only a bit more than one third of second-generation Turks makes it directly into an apprenticeship, while at the same time an even larger share does not continue with any formal education after *Hauptschule*.

Figure 5.5 *Brückenangebot to apprenticeship tracks among second-generation Turks and comparison group (%)*



Source: TIES survey 2007-2008

Figure 5.6 *Hauptschule to apprenticeship tracks among second-generation Turks and comparison group (%)*



Source: TIES survey 2007-2008

With almost 40 per cent of second-generation Turks going through *Hauptschule* in Germany, there is a large group of early school leavers. Also, the continuation rates for second-generation Turks are much lower than for the comparison group, wherein about a quarter does not continue after *Hauptschule*. This is also a sizable group, but still only half as many as among the second-generation Turks.

The picture totally changes if the pupils spent their lower secondary education in a *Realschule* (Germany's middle level in secondary school). As many as three quarters of the second-generation Turks in this track went directly into an apprenticeship. Here, the group that is unsuccessful in making this transition is much smaller (10.5 per cent), and the disparity with peers in the comparison group almost vanishes. Among other things, this demonstrates the very difficult position *Hauptschule* students face compared to *Realschule* students in competing for apprenticeships. Having a much larger share in *Hauptschule* than their comparison group peers, second-generation Turks are thus at a greater disadvantage.

Early school leaving is either the result of dropping out or *not* continuing with one's studies beyond the lower secondary education diploma. We expect the parents to play an important role in the decision of whether or not to continue further studies at this young age. Again, we tested the seven parental and sibling involvement strategies for children who started in the lower vocational track (*Hauptschule*, *VMBO* in the Netherlands or a comparable level in other countries) and continued studying. We then compared them to those who became early school leavers in Germany, Austria, the Netherlands and Belgium – the four countries most plagued by early school leaving. We included the mothers' ability to speak the majority language because it, too, appeared to be an important factor.

Yet, only Germany and Austria showed strong significant effects. Parental help with homework is – highly – significant only in Germany ($p < 0.01$). Parental control over the time spent on homework is significant in both Germany ($p < 0.01$) and Austria ($p < 0.05$). Parents talking about school with their children is significant in both Germany ($p < 0.01$) and Austria ($p < 0.05$). Regularly meeting with teachers is not significant in Germany, though it is in Austria ($p < 0.05$) and the Netherlands ($p < 0.05$). An elder sibling talking about school with a younger sibling is highly significant in Germany ($p < 0.01$) and only weakly significant in the Netherlands ($p < 0.1$). In Germany, only 12 per cent of *Hauptschule* students whose parents often controlled time spent on homework became early school leavers; when parents never exercised such control, it climbed up to 62 per cent. We see similar large discrepancies for help with homework and talking about school. Having or lacking parental support is thus extremely important for explaining early school leaving among pupils who went through *Hauptschule* in Germany and Austria. Since many parents actually did not give this kind of support to their children, the effect on

early school leaving is considerable compared to other countries. The mother's ability to speak the majority language also makes a significant difference in Germany ($p < 0.01$) and Austria ($p < 0.1$). Children whose mothers speak German well are five times more likely to continue studying after *Hauptschule* than children whose mothers do not.

It is remarkable that parental involvement has no significant effect on early school leaving in Belgium or the Netherlands. We thus see how the effects of parental support are very different across countries.

For all countries but Belgium, the TIES survey also inquired into *reasons* for respondents not to continue their studies. Table 5.12 shows that both pull factors (wanting to earn money and to get married) and push factors (not wanting to go to school anymore) affect early school leavers. The pull factors are most prominent in the Netherlands and the push factors, in Germany.²³ An aversion to school is expressed quite strongly in the early school leaving group, especially in Germany and Austria. A substantial group of second-generation Turkish girls also gave marriage as their reason to stop studying. The percentages, however, differ between countries. The fact that Austrian compulsory school stops by age fifteen explains why in both cities early school leavers are still very young (four out of the five left school at age sixteen). This probably also explains why Austria has a lower percentage of females who cite marriage as the main reason to stop school than does the Netherlands.

Table 5.12 *Second-generation Turks' reasons for early school leaving after acquiring a lower secondary school diploma (in %), by country*

	Austria*	Germany	The Netherlands
Satisfied	13.5	11.3	17.2
Don't want to go to school anymore	42.3	56.3	20.3
Work	19.2	28.8	26.6
Work (males only)	14.3	45.0	37.0
Marriage (females only)	4.2	17.5	29.7

*A number of early school leavers go to the *Polytechnikum* after *Hauptschule* to finish compulsory education.

Source: TIES survey 2007-2008

We also have information on what early school leavers did directly after leaving school. The patterns are strongly gendered. In Germany, 60 per cent of the females lived at home doing housekeeping for their own or their parents' households. Males were much more geared towards the labour market, though only 3 per cent immediately found a job. In Austria, half the females did household work directly after leaving school; only 12 per cent immediately found a job, and another 18 per cent were actively looking for a job at the time of the survey. Among the males, 40 per cent immediately found a job and another third was actively looking for a job.

In the Netherlands, the pattern also proved gendered, though much less so than in Germany and Austria. Only a quarter of the women did household work immediately after they stopped school. More than a third started working immediately; another 20 per cent was looking for work. Of the males, two thirds started working immediately after leaving school, and another quarter was actively looking for a job. In Belgium, half of the females and three quarters of the males started to work immediately after leaving school. Less than 10 per cent of the females did household work right after school.

If we combine reasons for leaving school early with information on what these respondents did after leaving school, we begin to get a fuller picture. In Germany and Austria, many young women helped out in their own family household and then got married afterwards, setting up their own households. The fact that their parents were not talking much about school with them probably had to do with the lack of expectation for daughters to continue studying and to earn an income. In Germany, of the 33 married females who left school early, 24 married someone to whom they were introduced by their parents or through their parents' network. Seven females married a relative. In Austria, nineteen of the 34 married females who left school early were first introduced to their spouses through their parent's network. Thirteen females married a relative. It seems that in Austria and Germany many females who left school early are pretty much following the traditional gendered pathways of their mothers.

In the Netherlands and Belgium, females are, on average, older when leaving school, as compulsory school ends, respectively, at the ages of seventeen and eighteen. This seems to give females more room to escape traditional gender role expectations, as we find that many more enter the labour market. The fact that in Germany and Austria pupils can stop school so early also has an effect on their decision *not* to enter the labour market.


For males, the picture is far more difficult to read. In the Netherlands and Belgium, they enter the labour market in big numbers. Starting to work is also given as the main reason for not continuing studying. To a lesser extent, this is also true for Austria. But in Germany, only a few immediately enter the labour market. Perhaps this is unsurprising, considering their young age, but it raises a serious question: why, without any real alternative, did the young men not continue their education? One possible answer is that they were unable to find an apprenticeship. This is probable, as about two thirds of second-generation Turkish males in the two German cities expressed having experienced discrimination while looking for a job, as did three quarters in the two Austrian cities.

In Germany and Austria, second-generation Turks must choose to either continue their schooling or to actively seek an apprenticeship – largely on their own – at the young age of fifteen or sixteen (the end of compulsory

school). At this point, in the middle of puberty, a large part is no longer motivated to go to school. In families where there is no clearly expressed positive attitude towards education, the risk of early school leaving dramatically increases. The Swiss system of *Brückenangebot* shows how this risk can be compensated for by a proactive approach on the part of schools and labour market institutions.

In France and Sweden, most pupils do not need to make any decision about school continuation before the end of upper secondary school, at age eighteen or above. Not having to make the choice earlier means that there is also less risk of early school leaving. Across the countries, children from families with similar background characteristics encounter very different risks of becoming early school leavers. In Germany and Austria, about half the children whose parents rarely or never talk about school or meet with their teachers become early school leavers. In France this is the case for only one out of five children. In Switzerland it is only one out of eight.

Figure 5.7 *Early school leavers among second-generation Turks with low-educated parents who rarely or never talk about school or meet with their teachers (in %), by country*



Source: TIES survey 2007-2008

Early school leaving is one of the two indicators in our typology. As a result of the high level of early school leaving in the two German and two Austrian cities and Antwerp, we have placed second-generation Turks in these cities together in the low-mobility typology. This outcome is a

combination of two factors: first, a result of many children being tracked into *Hauptschule* or *BSO*; second, a result of the problematic transition to an apprenticeship or upper secondary school at a very young age. The high degree of institutional risk factors in Germany and Austria makes for an unfortunate match with family risk factors in the Turkish communities.

Institutional arrangements in the transition to tertiary education and family and individual resources

Differences in percentages of students on academic tracks in secondary education between the countries and cities are significant. As already discussed, this can mostly be explained by differences in terms of *access* to academic tracks. In most cases in the German-speaking countries, chances for higher education are already considerably reduced by the early selection that occurs at age ten or twelve. The school systems in Sweden, Belgium and France offer considerably more opportunities for children of very low-educated parents to access an academic track. Despite the fact that academic tracks generally aim to lead pupils directly into tertiary education, two relevant phenomena are to be observed here: on the one side, pursuing an academic track is no guarantee for actually entering tertiary education afterwards. Conversely, we find quite a lot of students in tertiary education who did not come from an academic track. This is particularly true for our second-generation Turkish respondents, but it also differs quite strongly across countries and cities.

Table 5.13 shows how many of the students who were streamed into an academic track in secondary education actually ended up in tertiary education.²⁴ The percentage of students entering into higher education from an academic track differs a lot across countries and cities.

Table 5.13 *Second-generation Turks (with low-educated parents) who reached tertiary education via an academic track in secondary school (in %)*

<i>Countries</i>	<i>Respondents</i>
Austria	44.2
Belgium	40.4
Germany	52.2
France	77.6
The Netherlands	74.2
Sweden	56.7

Source: TIES survey 2007-2008

The reasons students do not make it into tertiary education differ from country to country. In some cases, downstreaming in secondary school is considerable; in other countries, it is because students do not continue into tertiary education after finishing academic upper secondary school. Below

we concentrate on Belgium and Sweden, two countries with relatively large groups of second-generation Turks in academic tracks in secondary school and much smaller numbers in tertiary education.

Downstreaming from an academic track to a vocational track occurs most often in Belgium. After the initial selection between *ASO*, *TSO* and *BSO*, a further selection takes place in transitioning from the second to the third cycle in secondary school. Some of the *ASO* and *TSO* pupils end up in *BSO*, and others drop out of school altogether. We compared *ASO* and *TSO* pupils who reached higher education with those who did not. Repeating a year in secondary school turns out to be the strongest predictor for not continuing into tertiary education. Children who repeated a year were three times more likely to not continue into tertiary education. When pupils must repeat in Belgium they are simultaneously advised to drop to a lower school track. This so-called 'waterfall' system is largely responsible for the downward trend. Parental support is very important for children's survival along the academic track. Children whose parents talk about school and meet with their teachers are twice as likely to continue into tertiary education. We saw in the previous section how, for the first selection, family characteristics made little difference in Belgium. In the second half of secondary school, however, these family resources begin to play a much more prominent role, similarly to other countries.

The way the transition from upper secondary school to tertiary education is organised also has an important impact on how many students reach tertiary education. In France and the Netherlands, almost all students who receive an academic diploma from secondary school continue into tertiary education. Belgium and Sweden are outliers because of the large groups of students with an academic secondary school diploma who do not automatically transfer into tertiary education. While in France and the Netherlands, the transition does not really involve a deliberate choice, in Belgium and Sweden, it seems to. In Stockholm, more than a quarter of second-generation Turks do not continue into tertiary education after *gymnasie*. Another 20 per cent continue into a sort of non-tertiary adult education. This is true for pupils in all *gymnasie* programmes, though especially for those in vocational ones, and it applies much more to males than females. Also, about half the students with a *TSO* diploma (the vocational track in upper secondary school) in Belgium do not continue into tertiary education. Many more second-generation Turkish youth than children of native parents in Sweden and Belgium stop after upper secondary school. The fact that in these two systems a continuation to tertiary education involves a real choice works out negatively for the children of Turkish immigrants. In middle- and upper class-families, there are expectations for children to attend university from the very beginning. This differs in immigrant families in which a *gymnasie* or *TSO* diploma is already a major step forward, compared to what their parents' have achieved. In these families, pursuing

tertiary education competes with the opportunity to work and earn one’s own income. It seems that the decision of whether or not to continue school is largely made by the eighteen year olds themselves.

In the Netherlands and Austria, the percentage of second-generation Turks in tertiary education is actually higher than for academic tracks in secondary school. This means that a considerable group enters tertiary education through upstreaming and continuing their studies after middle vocational education. Table 5.14 presents the percentage of tertiary students who started out in a vocational track in secondary school.

Table 5.14 *Second-generation Turks (with low-educated parents) in higher education who followed a non-academic track in secondary school (in %), by country*

<i>Non-academic track in secondary or lower secondary school</i>	<i>Austria</i>	<i>Belgium</i>	<i>The Netherlands</i>	<i>France</i>	<i>Germany</i>	<i>Sweden</i>
Respondents	52.5	30.7	45.9	10.5	25.0	19.2

Source: TIES survey 2007-2008

The Dutch system is very selective at the beginning of secondary school, creating a division of pupils into different tracks as early as at age twelve. But this early selection is somewhat mitigated by the many opportunities to stream up into pre-academic tracks and tertiary education. Almost half the second-generation Turks have taken this alternative route to tertiary education. In the group of native parentage, this applies to only half as many students (20 per cent). Once on the alternative route, mechanisms for second-generation Turks and the comparison group are no longer that different. For both groups, about three quarters take a route through middle vocational education (*MBO*), which is three years longer than the direct route; about one quarter enters through upstreaming during upper secondary school (*HAVO*), which takes only one year longer than the direct route.

Compared to children on the direct route, these students generally have parents with very low levels of education (often only primary school or no education at all). They also live in more cramped houses and have less space to do their homework. They also less often reported having elder siblings already in tertiary education who could help them out with school. The indirect route seems to be an alternative for students from families with very low cultural capital.

The Austrian case is interesting to contrast with the Dutch one because pupils who move up from the non-academic track in Austria do not experience a similar delay in getting a degree that gives them access to university. In Austria, at the end of lower secondary education, the students coming from *Hauptschule* can switch directly to *AHS Oberstufe*, the upper

secondary academic track lasting four years (comparable to *HAVO/VWO* in the Netherlands), or they continue on to *BHS*, the upper secondary vocational track lasting five years. Both provide a diploma to enter university.

The pathways of successful students are very different. In Sweden and France, the group that makes it into tertiary education is much larger and much more diverse. An early exposure to institutional learning and late selection make it possible for many 'above-average students' from disadvantaged backgrounds to reach higher education on a direct route without major delays. In the Netherlands, above-average students who are persistent enough also get a chance to enter higher education through a longer or alternative route. But in the two German cities, we find that even the brightest children can barely achieve entry into the higher education system if their parents are poorly educated. The German school system is so selective at all important transition points that virtually all children of lower-educated Turkish parents are driven away from the academic track.

5.7 Concluding remarks

The position of the second generation at school highly differs from country to country. In all cases, however, the second generation still lags behind their peers of native-born parents. The main differences with the comparison group occur at extreme ends of the educational spectrum. More second-generation youngsters are early school leavers and fewer are able to access higher education. The vocational track receives the majority of the second-generation youth in our survey, between half to three quarters being found there. Some only get as far as the first step and become early school leavers, while others climb the ladder higher and finish an apprenticeship that gives access to middle-level positions in the labour market. There is, however, also a considerable group of second-generation youth found in post-secondary or tertiary education. About one in five of our second-generation respondents was still studying in tertiary education or had already obtained a higher education diploma. Second-generation females in most cases closed the gender gap up to the highest level. Access to tertiary education is one of the areas where country and city variation is largest. This means that in some cities the second generation is already quite visible in higher education institutions, while in others this group is still very small. A substantial part of second-generation students in tertiary education has taken an indirect route through the vocational track into higher education. The indirect route provides a 'second chance' especially for those school systems that select children early. We see that the second generation is using these indirect routes much more often than the comparison group.

Based on *comparative integration context theory*, we predicted that second-generation groups of the same ethnic origin would perform very

differently across countries and cities. The detailed information on school outcomes and school careers does indeed show that the challenges faced by second-generation Turks are very different across countries and sometimes even between cities within the same country. Educational institutional arrangements are a main driving force behind school level differences. An obvious example is the starting age for school and preschool. In France, learning the second language is a much smaller challenge than in Austria, where the average age on entering an educational institution is three to four years later. Most second-generation children in France begin learning French by age three, when their peers of native-born parents are also still in the beginnings of language learning. In Austria, only entering an educational institution at age six or seven means that children of Turkish immigrants already lag considerably behind in their German language skills, compared to the children of native parentage.

Our results also show large differences across countries concerning the importance of the vocational track and how transitions to an apprenticeship and from upper secondary school to post-secondary education are organised. All these variations combined lead to substantial difference in attained educational levels across countries and cities. Comparing the school level outcomes for second-generation Turks across the seven countries in the TIES survey, we distinguished four typical outcomes: fast upward mobility, polarisation, slow mobility and low mobility. Based on our analysis of the three primary selection and transition points in the school careers of second-generation Turks in the seven countries, we can summarise the most significant institutional arrangements to determine the four outcomes, as seen in [figure 5.8](#).

Influential institutional factors can roughly be brought together under the heading of ‘preparing practices’. In early childhood education and care facilities, second-generation youth have the opportunity to learn the language of instruction (assuming that it is not spoken at home), to the extent that they will be comfortable and capable enough to learn using that language in primary school. Late selection gives second-generation youth extra time to prepare for high-stakes testing. Upstreaming in upper secondary school affords an extra opportunity to move up the educational ladder after the first selection point. All these institutional arrangements influence tracking in secondary school.

For early school leaving, the main focus is on students who fall in the vocational column. The original idea behind tracking in secondary school (and the main objection to a more comprehensive approach in school otherwise) is that different tracks would create a learning environment best adapted to students’ varying abilities and skill levels from an early age. However, this is not the case. Early tracking often leads to marginalised, highly segregated school streams, with many social problems concentrated in one school type. As a result, children on vocational tracks have a much

Figure 5.8 *Important institutional arrangements in school according to the school outcome typology for second-generation Turks in seven European countries*

Countries and cities		School outcome typology	Institutional arrangements explaining tracking in secondary school	Institutional arrangements explaining % of early school leavers	Institutional arrangements explaining % of higher education students	Resulting school integration context
Germany		Low mobility	Vocationally oriented	Difficult transition to apprenticeship	Further selection	Highly unfavourable
Austria			Preschool optional		Upstreaming downstreaming	
Belgium	Antwerp			Marginal vocational track	Downstreaming	
Switzerland		Slow mobility	Early selection	Smooth transition to apprenticeship	Upstreaming and downstreaming	Neutral
The Netherlands		Polarisation	Comprehensive Preschool almost compulsory	Marginal vocational track	Upstreaming and long route	Mixed
Belgium	Brussels				Somedownstreaming	
France	Strasbourg				Some stop after upper secondary	
Sweden	Stockholm	Fast upward	Late selection	Automatic transition to upper	Secondary	Highly favourable
France	Paris			school	Most enter higher education directly	

Source: TIES survey 2007-2008

higher chance of leaving school early than pupils in other tracks. While the transition within the academic tracks from lower to upper secondary school is almost automatic, many second-generation pupils in the vocational tracks do not make the transition to an apprenticeship, in which case most become early school leavers. Only the *Brückenangebot* in Switzerland provides a positive example of how to ease this transition.

School systems are also organised differently in the transition to tertiary education. In most countries, students are expected to continue to higher education after *Gymnasium* or *lyceum*, but in some countries this is not automatic. Another main difference is the availability of an alternative route through the vocational column. Upstreaming through the non-academic column provides, at least in some countries like in the Netherlands, a second chance to pass high-stakes testing at a later stage, when the students are better prepared to succeed.

In general, we see that specific characteristics of the school systems are magnified for the second generation by contrast to the comparison group. If school systems produce a lot of early school leavers, children of immigrants are among the groups most affected. Or, if downstreaming is an important feature of the school system, this proves to be an even stronger mechanism for the second generation. The same is true for school system features like upstreaming or the long route. They work equally well, if not even better, for the second generation as for the comparison group. We coin this the *multiplier effect*.

Different school systems demand different levels of parental involvement. Some types of support are easier than others for parents with low levels of education. In primary school in Germany and Austria, parents are expected to provide practical support and to control the time children spend on homework. Should they not attend preschool, the parents are also responsible for their children's German language proficiency. This results in an unhappy marriage of lacking family resources and demands of the school system. Yet, more 'egalitarian' systems exist that require the parents to intervene only when children show more severe learning and behavioural problems. The Swedish system, especially, shows how the average pupil can succeed without much parental involvement.

Based on our findings, we can create a *school integration context typology* for children of low-educated immigrants that can be used for international comparative research. We identified four types of school integration contexts that range from very favourable to very unfavourable. The most favourable school integration context is an *inclusive* context in which immigrant children's learning abilities are the primary factor in placement into academic tracks and where immigrant parents' lower educational level is not a hindrance, per se. At the opposite end of the spectrum in the most unfavourable *exclusionary* integration school context, whereby the lower-class background of the immigrant parents prevents most children from entering tertiary education, but also makes the transition to an apprenticeship problematic for lower-class immigrant children. Among children whose parents offer little or no school support, many become early school leavers. An *inclusive vocational* school integration context, in contrast, provides a smooth transition to apprenticeships. The route to higher education, however, is still blocked for most children of lower-educated immigrant parents. Finally, in the *permeable* integration school context, there exist many opportunities to stream up, but also to be streamed down. This leads to highly polarised outcomes. Parents' support or lack thereof can thus be crucial; so is persistence among the students themselves.

Boudon (1974) introduced a useful distinction when determining differences in children's school career courses that stem from different class background. Primary effects describe differences in academic performance;

secondary effects describe different choices in educational career when performance levels are the same. If we compare the four types, the primary effects (driven by the parents' own education) are largest in an exclusionary integration school context. Here, Turkish parents with very low levels of education are usually unable to offer the help needed in this school system. Secondary effects loom large in integration school contexts that involve crucial choices. The points at which decisions must be made prove important here, too. Decisions at an early age are much more influenced by parents, while later in life decisions are much more frequently made by the student. In an exclusionary integration context, choices must be made early, for instance, with regard to preschool attendance and continuation after compulsory school at age fifteen or sixteen. In an inclusive and permeable school integration context, these decisions need only be made by age eighteen or older. In this last case, the students' own motivations and goals gain more currency.

The national school systems offer various windows of opportunity at different stages for parents and elder siblings to support children in school. Immigrant parents are better equipped for some challenges than others. As a result of both the integration context and the agency of parents, we see the second generation performing more successfully in education in some countries than in others.

Notes

- 1 An explanation of the different schools and levels per country is given in [table 5.15](#) in the appendix.
- 2 The respondents were asked to estimate the share of immigrant children in the schools they attended.
- 3 The great variation in national educational structures across the European Union could well diminish during the next decades.
- 4 The educational systems in many countries have undergone structural changes, either since our respondents attended school or during their school careers. Older respondents may have thus experienced somewhat different institutional settings than the younger ones.
- 5 The option to home-school children is regulated differently across the countries. The share and nature of private and public schools also differ greatly in the countries covered.
- 6 As explained in the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED) 1997 (UNESCO 1997: 9).
- 7 In Austria, the share of students of a Turkish migration background at the end of compulsory schooling (aged fifteen) who have repeated one or more years is 30 per cent, while the share among students of a former Yugoslavian background is 18 per cent. This figure drops to 13 per cent among students with no migration background (see Breit 2009: 142-144).
- 8 As Kerckhoff (2001: 14) has pointed out, a student's individual choice is not only affected by formal structures, but also the normative influences of functional

communities. Together the three elements – structures, functional communities, individual choices – affect the trajectories through the educational system and on the labour market in all societies, even though ‘... nature, extent, and timing of their effects vary’.

- 9 Over the course of three years, apprentices have two places of learning: four days a week at the enterprise itself and one day at school. Successfully attaining an apprenticeship certificate at the end of this period means the student possesses a full professional qualification, which, depending on the profession, can translate into higher earnings than credentials gained on an academic track in upper secondary schooling would yield. However, the academic track is still seen as more prestigious, leading to university access and more promising careers in the long run.
- 10 Results presented in the tables are weighted against characteristics of the different ethnic groups in the city population (for a detailed explanation of the weights, see [chapter 3](#)).
- 11 By effect, this leads to a certain degree of overestimation of educational attainments because some of these students would have dropped out of their present level. On the other hand, some of those who were still in education would have continued on to an even higher level. In the French survey, for instance, about a third of these respondents were still in secondary education and many were bound to move up to some form of post-secondary education. We suppose that, on average, conflation of the highest diploma with current level of schooling produces the most realistic representation of our respondents’ educational attainment.
- 12 The details of this coding system are described in appendix 5.1.
- 13 Looking at results, we need to be cautious because early school leavers are usually slightly underrepresented in surveys. Our survey in France was able to identify the educational level of respondents who refused to participate; here we did see that early school leavers were somewhat underrepresented and higher education students were a bit overrepresented.
- 14 The comparison group in our survey is purposely sampled in neighbourhoods where the second generation is settled. While for the second generation, we aimed to interview a representative sample at the city level, this was not the aim for the comparison group. In some cities, neighbourhoods where the second generation lives have high percentages of students, whereas in others, the predominant non-immigrant population is working-class. As a result, the socio-economic background characteristics of the comparison group differ considerably across cities.
- 15 Outcomes for the other two second-generation groups show similarly large impacts of parental educational level in Germany and Austria.
- 16 Mostly recruited for unskilled labour in the 1960s and 1970s, the parents frequently entered the host countries as guest workers coming from rural areas. Overwhelmingly, the parents were educated in their home countries, namely, in villages with limited schooling opportunities.
- 17 It is difficult to fit the Belgian case into the international comparison because, unlike in any other country, secondary education is divided in three parts, rather than two. We can either base our Belgian figures on the first cycle (years 1 and 2) as this is the official threshold for early school leaving, or we could include the second cycle (years 3 and 4), which comes closer to the duration of lower secondary education in most other countries. Using the latter basis, the percentage of early school leavers is much larger and matches that of the Dutch case. We selected this broader definition of early school leaving, including the second cycle, even though it means having to overestimate early school leaving in Belgium vis-à-vis other countries.

- 18 We see similarly high outcomes for second-generation Moroccans in the Dutch and Belgian cities. The outcomes for the second-generation former Yugoslavians in Germany and Austria look a bit more promising than those of their Turkish peers.
- 19 This excludes, in particular, a group of post-secondary (non-tertiary) respondents in Belgium, who were doing an extra sixth year after upper secondary school.
- 20 The reader should take into account that the starting school age of our sample of eighteen to 35 year olds reflects the situation in kindergarten and primary school in the 1970s and 1980s.
- 21 In the Dutch case, a quarter of the second-generation Turkish students who dropped out of lower secondary school had interrupted their school attendance in the Netherlands during primary school to go to Turkey for a period lasting more than three months. This decision, one made by their parents, has had a huge negative effect on their school careers in the Netherlands.
- 22 This is less clear-cut in France, where those who have no lower secondary diploma usually did finish *collège*, albeit without a diploma. It is questionable if they should actually be categorised as drop-outs.
- 23 Unfortunately, for the German-speaking countries we did not include the answer category 'Not able to find an apprenticeship'. In hindsight, we realise this was probably a major reason for many students not to continue.
- 24 Excluded from the analysis are respondents who are still in school and previously followed an academic track in secondary school but are not yet in tertiary education.

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Appendix

For the purposes of sound cross-country comparison, we designed a coding system. Though based on the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED) system, we included more detailed categories of the TIES survey countries' education systems. We refer to this toolkit as the EDU codes. Especially challenging was the fact that some countries have separate vocational tracks after lower secondary school, while others keep the vocational track within upper secondary education. Our criteria for coding students within an internationally comparable scheme are similar to that of the ISCED: we thus look to the next potential step in education to which a current track provides access. The steps in the coding table follow the logic of a hierarchy from lower to higher. Distances between the steps, however, are not equal.



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Table 5.15 Explanation of international coding system: EDU codes

	The Netherlands	Germany	Austria	Belgium	France	Sweden	Zurich (canton)	Switzerland Basel (city)	Basel
1	Preschool	Kindergarten	Kindergarten		École maternelle			Kindergarten	
11	Primary school	Grundschule	Volksschule	Basisschool	École primaire			Primarschule	
12	Special secondary education	Sonderschule	Sonderschulen	Bijzonder onderwijs					
21	Vocational track	Hauptschule	Hauptschule	Orientatie B			Oberschule, Realschule, AVO (Stammklasse Abteilung C)	Gesamtklasse	Realschule inklusive Berufswahl-klasse (now Sekundar- schule Niveau A)
		Berufs vorbereitungs-jahr (BVJ);	Polytechnikum				(now 3-teilige Sekundarschule Abteilung B, C, Stammklasse G)	A-Zug	
		Berufs qualifizierender Lehrgang (BQL)					Brückenangebot (Berufswahljahr, Werkjahr, 10. Schuljahr, Vorlehre, Vorkurs, Vorbereitungsschule)		

22	Integrated track	VMBO-gemengd (new)	Gesamtschule				College	Grundskole Utbildning	Weiterbildungs-schule (Gesamt- klassen)	Gesamtklasse		
23	Middle track	MAVO (old); VMBO-T (new)	Realschule	Mittelschule					Sekundarschule (now Dreiteilige Sekundarschule Abteilung A) AVO Stammklasse E (now Dreiteilige Sekundarschule Stamm-klasse E)	E-Zug	Sekundarschule allgemeine Abteilung (now Sekundarschule niveau E)	
24	Highest level track	HAVO (year 1-3) VWO (year 1-3)	Gymnasium	AHS Unterstufe	Orientatie A				Langgymnasium	Progymnasium	Sekundarschule progymnasiale Abteilung (now Sekundarschule niveau P)	

31	Short middle vocational education or apprenticeship	KMBO (old)	Berufsgrundschuljahr (BGJ)	Lehre, einjähriger, zweijähriger und mehrjähriger Lehrgang Berufsbildende mittlere Schule (BMS);	BSO	CAP/MC/BEP - Certificat d'aptitude professionnelle - CAP or BEP - Brevet d'études professionnelles; Brevet professionnel ou de technicien	Gymnasie Unterricht (Vocational programme)	Berufslehre (Anlehre) 1-2 Jahre mit Berufsattest
		MBO-1 (new) MBO-2 (new)	Lehre mit Berufsschule (duale Ausbildung)					
33	Upper secondary vocational track or apprenticeship (3 or 4 years)	MBO or MBO-4 or HAVO	Berufsober- schule; Fachoberschule (FOS)		TSO	Baccalauréat professionnel; Baccalauréat technologique		Berufslehre 2-4 years with Fähigkeitsausweis, Weiterführende Schule, Diplommittelschule

34	Upper secondary academic track	VWO or gymnasium	Gymnasium (allgemeinbildend, beruflich u.ä.)	AHS Oberstufe; Aufbaulehrgang mit Matura-Abschluss; Berufsbildende höhere Schule (BHS)	ASO	Baccalauréat général or Brevet supérieur or DAEU	Gymnasie	Berufslehre with Berufsmaturität; LehrerInnenseminar; Gymnasium (gymnasiale Maturität); Berufsmaturitätsschule after Lehre	
41	Higher vocational education or academia	HBO	Verwaltungs-fachschule Fachhochschule	Akademien, Kolleg Schule mit Diploma, Medizin Spezial-lehrgang	Specialisation after the sixth year Lower tertiary education (non-university)	Diplôme des professions sociales et de la santé de niveau Bac+2 BTS DUT	Höhere Fachschule		

42	University	Universiteit	Fachhochschule Kunst- oder Musik	Fachhochschule	Higher tertiary education (university; new system)	Diplôme de 1 ^{er} cycle universitaire	University	Fachhochschule
			Pädagogische Hochschule	Universität	Higher tertiary education (university; old system)	Diplôme de 2 ^{ième} cycle universitaire	4 years	Universität, ETH
			Universität		Complemen- tary lower tertiary education (non- university)	Diplômes d'ingénieur, d'une grande école		
					Complemen- tary higher tertiary education (university)			
50		Doctor (PhD)	Post-graduale Ausbildung	Doktorads- studium	Doctorate	Diplôme de 3 ^{ième} cycle universitaire	PhD	PhD
			Promotions-studium			Doctorat et médecine, pharmacie		

Source: TIES survey 2007-2008

6 Assessing the labour market position and its determinants for the second generation

Laurence Lessard-Phillips, Rosita Fibbi and Philippe Wanner

6.1 Introduction¹

There is ample research evidence about the economic hardship that immigrants and their families face (see e.g. Kogan 2006; OECD 2007, 2008). The most predominant reasons for such hardship include the low starting position of unskilled and low-skilled migrants and, especially for more highly educated migrants, a lack of skills transferability upon migration. An evaluation of the second generation's position in the labour market gives insights into the extent to which labour market disadvantages found in the first generation are reproduced in the subsequent one. The labour market integration of the second generation, along with education, helps to determine the quality of structural integration processes. Our research seems to suggest that disadvantages are still present in the second generation, though this is mostly due to lower levels of human capital and lower-status social origins. Yet, there are also disadvantages unaccounted for by these factors that vary according to their specific context of integration.

A major goal of this chapter is to assess the level of labour market integration. We focus on second-generation Turkish respondents because, as a group, they offer the most generalisability for a cross-country comparison. Specifically, we focus on the extent to which they have reached parity with the comparison group vis-à-vis labour market features such as labour force participation, unemployment, occupational status and mobility. A comparison benchmark like this is important for examining in how far the second generation, as a whole, reaches various positions within the labour market and may move at a different pace from the comparison group. This allows us to measure, to a certain point, their level of labour market integration. Examining these differentials, we hone in on, as Heath and Cheung (2007) refers to them, possible *ethnic premiums* and *ethnic penalties* that remain once individual and human capital factors are taken into account. We look primarily at city-level differences since they comprise the aggregate level of our data. Beyond the comparison with respondents of native descent, we investigate the impact of individual, structural and institutional factors

on the labour market outcomes for second-generation Turks across cities. We explore the effect of differences in institutional arrangements between cities, taking into account the impact of individual characteristics of the respondents.

This chapter allows for an examining of multiple labour market outcomes in a simultaneous, comparative perspective and thus contributes to an empirical literature still in its infancy. In the following sections, we outline areas in which second-generation Turks demonstrate success, or lack thereof, in the labour market, and where further research is still needed.

6.2 An overview of studies on labour market integration among immigrants and their descendants

Theoretical approaches dealing with the integration of the second generation can be separated into two strands: those attempting to describe the overall extent of labour market integration; and those focusing more specifically on important determinants, either at the micro- or macro-level. Both will be briefly discussed here.

Studies that focus on the second generation are deeply rooted in classical assimilation theory (Park & Burgess 1921; Warner & Srole 1945; Gordon 1964), which starts from the notion of moving-up in three generations: ‘from peddler to plumber to professional’ (Suro 1998). Central to this approach is the idea of an individual path that gradually leaves behind ethnic and ascriptive identities and allows for advancement on the labour market. A similar optimistic strand, the immigrant advantage theory (Kasinitz, Mollenkopf, Waters & Holdaway 2008), stresses motivational factors in explaining the powerful resilience of second-generation children and thus their capacity to avoid the pitfalls of social reproduction. Yet, some argue that even if empirical evidence appears to show some intergenerational progress, second-generation outcomes are not as positive as the above theories foresee, or they differ in progress according to immigrant origin. The unfulfilled promises of various assimilation theories for certain immigrant groups undermine its presuppositions. This is when other frameworks are useful that emphasise fewer – or slower – successes in second-generation outcomes.

Structural approaches focus on the labour market segmentation for first-generation immigrants, often pointing at open or covert discrimination that nails the second generation down to similar structural positions as their parents (Barth & Noel 1972; Parkin 1979; Castles & Kosack 1985). The theory of segmented assimilation is a good example of a theoretical framework attempting to expand on classical assimilation theory (see e.g. Portes & Zhou 1993; Zhou 1997; Portes & Rumbaut 2001). It emphasises the way in which individual, family and contextual factors affect the extent

and magnitude of assimilation processes. The new economic sociology, with its focus on the social construction of economic processes, provides other insightful theoretical advancements. The embeddedness of economic processes (Tilly & Tilly 1994) calls attention to the importance of social ties and cultural belonging in which economic behaviour is rooted. This can differ according to the immigration status influencing the economic behaviour of immigrants and their children.

Most theoretical approaches see the labour market as an important entry point into the host society. Yet, there is disagreement over the extent to which the second generation, upon entering the labour market, is encountering *structural* barriers within society. That is, above and beyond individual barriers already accumulated from having lower educational qualifications or lower-status social background. Beyond these very broad theoretical frameworks, important contributions to unravel the types of determinants that help, or hinder, integration into the labour market can be found in comparative analyses of transitions from school to work as well as of labour market outcomes. As much for the overall population as for immigrant groups, these analyses have demonstrated the importance of individual factors such as human capital – including education and labour market experience – (Becker 1964; Chiswick 1978; Chiswick & Miller 2002), sociocultural differences (Kalter & Granato 2007), social networks (Granovetter 1983; Lin 1999; Waldinger 2003), social class (Duncan 1969; Heath, Mills & Roberts 1992; Heath & McMahon 2005), religious affiliation (Lindley 2002) and citizenship status (Heath, Rothon & Kilpi 2008). The impact of these factors is often reproduced in the second generation, though not necessarily to the same extent across all groups (Heath & Cheung 2007).

This chapter focuses on the presence, or absence, of labour market disadvantages or advantages once human capital and individual-level demographic characteristics are taken into account. Using the terminology of Heath and Cheung (2007), we speak of ‘ethnic penalties’ if ethnic disadvantage is still present and of ‘ethnic premiums’ if ethnic advantage is present. Remaining disadvantages in the second generation could indicate the presence of discrimination in the labour market (see Simon 2003). But there are also other *individual* factors, such as the lack of effective social networks or any of the elements mentioned in the prior paragraph, which could explain some remaining differentials. We focus on citizenship and religion as two factors that could account for some remaining differences and could indicate the presence of specific types of discriminatory practices.

There are also a number of *structural and institutional factors* that might affect second-generation integration. These factors probably have a different impact across contexts. A comparison of immigrants from the same country of origin, who share similar structural positions in the social

stratification of their countries of settlement, allows us to highlight the role of various ‘exogenous’ contextual factors in shaping labour market outcomes. According to Müller and Gangl (2003), the transition into the labour market is influenced by the interaction between individual-level and human capital characteristics, the structure of the labour market and the structure of the education and training systems – i.e. the opportunities for entering the labour market (see [chapter 5](#) in this volume; Crul & Vermeulen 2003; Aybek 2008).

The special added value and simultaneous challenge of international comparisons is that societal or institutional arrangements may substantially vary from one country to another. In this case, alongside individual and group factors we need to capture key elements of policies and macro-level characteristics that might influence the labour market outcomes. In our study of institutional arrangements – namely, the labour market opportunities of young people and, in particular, of second-generation Turks – we therefore include contextual features whose impact on unemployment is well documented (Smyth, Gangl, Raffe, Hannan & McCoy 2001; Breen 2005; Wolbers 2007). They include anti-discrimination policies to ensure equal chances on the labour market and more or less extensive systems of vocational education and training (VET). In relation to labour market competition, we also look at the share of young people in the total population. The indicators used are given in [table 6.1](#) and subsequently explained.

Table 6.1 *Indicators of contextual factors*

	MIPEX-D ¹	VET ²	DEM 15-24/25-54 ³
Austria	42	3	0.27
Belgium	75	1	0.29
Switzerland	33	3	0.27
Germany	50	3	0.28
France	81	1	0.30
The Netherlands	81	2	0.28
Sweden	94	2	0.33

Sources:

¹ Migrant Integration Policy Index: Niessen et al. (2007)

² Vocational and Educational Training: Müller and Gangl (2003)

³ Relative share of young persons: Gomez and Leiner (2008)

We rely on the Migrant Integration Policy Index II (MIPEX II) to outline the impact of immigrant-related policies. MIPEX is a comparative index, benchmarking policies aiming at the integration of migrants in 25 EU member states as well as in three non-EU countries in 2007 (Niessen 2007). A first key area covered by MIPEX is the labour market. Various facets of labour market policy are considered, such as access to labour market for first-generation immigrants and their rights as workers. Yet, this

may not be most relevant for the second generation. Rather, the dimension taken into account here is the normative framework of anti-discrimination measures on the labour market, MIPEX-D, as this particular index is known, expresses levels of anti-discrimination measures on a scale of 1 to 100 (from very low to very high), thereby capturing how legislation helps guarantee equal opportunities in economic, social and public life for all members of the society. It is assumed that high anti-discrimination protection reduces the unemployment rate. As shown in the first column of [table 6.1](#), the MIPEX-D score is high for Sweden, fairly high for France and the Netherlands, but very low for Switzerland, Austria and, to a lesser extent, Germany (Niessen 2007). These countries thus offer considerably fewer guarantees for equal opportunities, presumably pushing more vulnerable groups, including the second generation, into a more precarious labour market position.

The development level of a vocational and educational training (VET) system is also examined here. Research has clearly linked educational system features to labour market entry (Konietzka 2008; Andersen & Van de Werfhorst 2010). Classification of the importance of the VET system is shown in the second column of [table 6.1](#). We expect a VET structure to have various impacts on labour market outcomes. In countries that operate with extensive vocational training systems at the upper secondary level (Austria, Germany and Switzerland), the total proportion of young people not progressing beyond compulsory education is relatively low (some 15 per cent), and it is believed that individuals going through vocational training will have a smoother school-to-work transition, albeit still within the realm of lower-level occupations. On the other hand, countries that operate with general, rather than vocational, qualifications at the upper secondary level (such as France and Belgium) have a higher proportion of young people progressing beyond compulsory education. And yet, they enter the labour market with more general, less specialised vocational qualifications – something that could negatively affect their opportunities for accessing the labour market (Müller & Gangl 2003).

Demographic factors may also affect unemployment. Gomez-Salvador and Leiner-Killinger (2008) find a positive correlation between the share of young people in the total population and the youth unemployment rate: the smaller the share of young people in the population, the lower the risk of their being unemployed. This is assumed to affect the second generation in the same manner as the whole population. The share of young people in the population is given in the third column of [table 6.1](#), presenting the ratio of the 15-24 age group on each active individual between 25 and 54 years old.²

Current empirical evidence

Research into the overall comparability of the second generation's outcomes, gleaned primarily from a review of existing studies, shows that second generations from non-European backgrounds – including Turks – have higher risks of unemployment. Furthermore, we see ethnic penalties in many countries, such as Austria, Belgium, France, Germany and the Netherlands (Heath et al. 2008). Nation-specific research allows us to see the extent to which the second generation, on the whole, is disadvantaged at the national level. This also helps us take a comparative perspective on factors that can explain the labour market position of second-generation Turks, in particular.

- In the Austrian context, second-generation Turks are found mainly at the low end of the occupational hierarchy. They have difficulties entering highly skilled jobs, but they also have quite low levels of unemployment (Herzog-Punzenberger 2003; Kogan 2007). Ethnic penalties are present for them in terms of unemployment and lower returns to education (Kogan 2007; Liebig 2009).
- In Switzerland, access to employment for second-generation Turks seems subjected to discriminatory practices, with naturalisation not necessarily being beneficial for employment outcomes (Fibbi, Lerch & Wanner 2006, 2007).
- In Germany, there seems to be quite important intergenerational progress in economic activity for Turkish second-generation women, even if their levels of activity are lower than that of the native population. On the whole, however, this generation experiences disadvantages in terms of employment, and they tend to earn less (Worbs 2003; Kalter & Granato 2007; Schurer 2008; Liebig 2009). Moreover, second-generation Turks have, albeit with some exceptions, lower returns from education with regard to occupational attainment (Kalter & Granato 2007).
- In Belgium, second-generation Turks have the lowest levels of economic activity (albeit with the strong intergenerational progress for women) and high levels of unemployment. They are underrepresented in higher occupational classes (Timmerman, Vanderwaeren & Crul 2003; Phalet 2007; Liebig 2009), but show good returns to education, albeit generally of a low level. Their access to highly skilled jobs is especially challenged in Brussels, yet at the same time their unemployment is lower here than elsewhere in Belgium (Phalet 2007; Phalet & Heath 2010).
- In France, the second generation tends to have higher rates of unemployment (Simon 2003; Meurs, Pailhé & Simon 2006), with Turks, especially women, being most vulnerable (Silberman, Alba & Fournier 2007). Access to citizenship does not appear to have any significant effect on employment. Second-generation Turks are quite segregated in

specific occupational sectors; men, especially, do not hold high-status occupations (Meurs et al. 2006; Silberman & Fournier 2007).

- In the Netherlands, the transition into the labour market is especially difficult for second-generation Turks, who show the worst labour market outcomes (and quite high levels of unemployment) compared to other ethnic groups (Crul & Doornik 2003; Van Ours & Veenman 2004; Tesser & Dronkers 2007). Moreover, both men and women appear to have quite low labour force participation rates compared to their peers (Crul & Doornik 2003; Van Ours & Veenman 2004; Tesser & Dronkers 2007).
- Research in Sweden has shown that second-generation Turks have lower probabilities of employment and lower levels of earnings (Rooth 2003; Westin 2003; Behtoui 2004; Behrenz, Hammarstedt & Månsson 2007).

Recent empirical evidence thus clearly shows that second-generation Turks lag behind their peers of native parentage in labour market outcomes. Still, a good proportion of the literature misses in-depth statistical analyses of such outcomes, either due to the lack of available data or small sample issues. Sometimes, studies also fail to disambiguate one ethnic group from others in the second generation. This chapter hopes to remedy this gap by providing an even-handed outlook on the labour market integration of second-generation Turks.

The national and local context at the time of survey

To determine the conditions under which the TIES respondents entered the labour market, the market situation should be assessed at the time of the TIES survey and, more generally, within a historical perspective. Figures 6.13 to 6.16 in the appendix present statistics from the online database Key Indicators of the Labour Market (KILM) of the International Labour Organization (ILO 2010). They show the level of ‘labour force participation’³ from 1990 until 2008 for men and women, for all working-age individuals (15-64 years old) and, in particular, for young people (15-24 years old). The figures show that labour force participation has remained more or less constant for young people, which is lower than for working-age men and women. Among working-age individuals, Switzerland and Sweden have the highest participation rates for both men and women, whereas Switzerland and the Netherlands have the highest rates among young people. Belgium and France appear to have the lowest participation rates, both in the total working-age and young populations. Unsurprisingly, labour force participation for women is lower than for men in both groups, though it differs less amongst young people.

Turning to the level of unemployment (as shown in figures 6.17 and 6.18 in the appendix), we see that there was more disparity in unemployment during the mid-1990s. The unemployment rates in 2007 are lower and ranged between 3 and 9 per cent, after a small peak between 2003 and 2006. The countries with the highest levels of male unemployment in 2007 were Germany, France, Belgium and Sweden. Unemployment rates in Austria, the Netherlands and Switzerland were amongst the lowest. Across the TIES countries, the unemployment rate for women has been higher than for men, although there appears to be convergence towards the men's rates in recent years. As of 2007, women's level of unemployment, along with its range, was similar to that of men. Some gaps in unemployment appear to be more marked for women in Belgium and France. Only in a few instances is unemployment lower for young people than adults. In general, however, youth unemployment has tended to be higher than adult unemployment, and tended to be much higher for young men than young women.

Table 6.2 *Activity and unemployment indicators at the city level (in %)*

	<i>Economic activity</i>		<i>Youth economic activity</i>		<i>Unemployment rate</i>		<i>Proportion of unemployed youth</i>	
	<i>Male</i>	<i>Female</i>	<i>Male</i>	<i>Female</i>	<i>Male</i>	<i>Female</i>	<i>Male</i>	<i>Female</i>
Vienna	76.5	63.5	52.6	46.6	9.3	8.4	17.9	15.4
Linz*	80.0	68.0	64.8	58.0	7.4	6.5	11.0	11.1
Brussels	67.2	52.6	35.6	32.2	17.5	16.6	27.8	31.0
Antwerp	73.1	56.1	43.7	40.7	10.0	10.7	18.6	21.9
Zurich†	88.5	78.6	67.1	67.4	n.a.	n.a.	5.8	5.2
Basel	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Berlin	76.7	67.7	50.3	45.8	21.1	16.7	23.5	18.3
Frankfurt	77.2	64.0	45.3	43.0	10.2	7.6	14.2	7.1
Paris	80.3	73.2	37.1	35.2	11.1	11.6	15.9	12.6
Strasbourg*	72.2	61.0	29.5	24.6	9.4	9.8	20.0	19.4
Amsterdam	79.3	69.4	59.0	64.1	7.9	6.5	12.5	6.9
Rotterdam	74.8	61.3	58.8	57.7	9.7	8.9	20.8	16.7
Stockholm*	76.4	74.8	44.0	45.0	3.6	2.9	3.6	3.0

Notes: Urban indicators for 2003-2006 period unless otherwise indicated

* Values for 1999-2002 period

† Values for economic activity for 1999-2002 period

Source: Eurostat Urban Indicators (Eurostat 2010)

Information about the levels of economic activity and unemployment at the city level is presented in table 6.2. The results are based on the Urban Audit Database of Statistical Office of the European Communities (Eurostat 2010) for the period 2003-2006.⁴ The information at the local level shows that economic activity was either lower or similar to the national averages, with lower rates usually found in the main cities. This was

also coupled with higher levels of unemployment (a common characteristic for large urban centres), again mostly found in the capital cities. The general patterns, especially with regard to the labour market characteristics of young people, follow the national trends, though they also indicate that more economic hardship is to be expected in bigger urban centres. The local labour market contexts in which many TIES respondents entered the labour market was thus rather unfavourable.

6.3 Main results: The labour market positions of second-generation Turks

Methodology

We now examine the labour market position of second-generation Turks, namely their labour force participation, unemployment rates, occupational status and mobility. Attention is also briefly given to their transition into the labour market after leaving full-time education and to perceived levels of discrimination in finding employment. Most of our analyses compare outcomes of second-generation Turks to those of the comparison group as a way to measure how far the second generation has advanced on the labour market compared to their peers with native-born parents. Some further analyses focus only on second-generation Turks in order to analyse differences across the TIES cities.

In each of the sections, the analyses are performed on a sub-sample of respondents who have already left the school system: that is, respondents who have completed their schooling or whose combination of current study and work status indicate that they are fully participating in the labour market. In our analyses of unemployment and occupation status, further sample selections were made: only economically active individuals in the labour force at the time of survey were analysed for unemployment, whereas only individuals currently in paid employment were used in the analyses of occupational status and mobility.

The analyses are based on a series of (non-weighted) logistic regressions at the ‘country’ level (i.e. aggregating the participating cities within their respective countries).⁵ Standardised⁶ and unstandardised regression coefficients are presented to allow comparison across models within our city samples (Winship & Mare 1984; Mood 2010). For the comparative analyses of second-generation Turks, predicted probabilities⁷ are calculated for each city, separately for men and women.⁸ As we saw in [chapter 4](#), the second-generation respondents have varying age distributions across cities and, in some of them, the proportion of individuals still in school is quite large. Some of the results could in fact be driven by these circumstances, rather than indicating actual differences in labour market outcomes. Appropriate controls are introduced to deal with this issue in the best way

possible. For statistical purposes, the analyses separate the groups by city as follows: the comparison group in the main city; Turks in the main city; the comparison group in the secondary city (the reference category); and Turks in the secondary city. The motivation for using these categories is mainly to ensure within-aggregate comparisons while also accounting for composition effects. Individuals from the comparison group in secondary cities were chosen as the reference category (except in Sweden) mainly because secondary cities – being smaller urban centres – tend to show higher rates of labour force participation as well as lower unemployment levels (with some exceptions, as previously mentioned). In all analyses, multiple comparisons of the city-group coefficients are given to provide the reader with an idea of differences for various outcomes considered within-city (comparing the second generation with the comparison group) and within-group (comparing the second generation across cities).

The first model (gross effects model) controls for basic compositional effects: age and gender. For the analyses of unemployment and occupational status and mobility, we introduce partnership status as an extra control variable in the gross effect model because it is deemed an important factor in shaping respondents' outcomes, especially women. The second model (net effects model – human capital) includes controls for respondents' education and, with regard to the occupation-related analyses, age at first labour market entry (capped at eighteen years old) to assess the presence, or absence, of ethnic penalties and premiums. In all analyses, the effect of the respondents' religious affiliation was also tested for second-generation respondents. The impact of citizenship status is only analysed for Austria, Switzerland and Germany because these countries show relevant differences in citizenship status distribution. In the analyses of unemployment, we also test the impact of institutional arrangements. In this case, the samples were pooled together and analysed for the second generation and the comparison group separately.⁹

The main independent variables in the analyses and their distribution across the basic sub-sample are shown in [table 6.14](#) in the appendix. Despite some local variation, of those who had left school, second-generation Turkish respondents in our sub-sample generally tend to be younger and to have lower levels of education than their comparison group peers. They are predominantly religious (i.e. Muslim), and the large majority holds citizenship of the survey country (albeit in lower proportion in the Austrian, Swiss and German cities), if not dual citizenship. Given the age structure of the TIES sample and the fact that our analyses specifically target respondents no longer in school, our sub-sample tends to have lower levels of education; those with higher levels are most likely to still be in some sort of higher educational institution and are hence excluded from our analyses.

Entry in the labour market and current labour force participation

We first present some figures on the transition of our main groups into the labour market upon completion of their studies. These numbers indicate potential difficulties encountered on entering the labour market. [Table 6.3](#) summarises the time period in months between leaving full-time school and entering the labour market for the second generation and the comparison group.

Table 6.3 *Transition to first job (in months), by city and group*

		Second- generation Turks	Comparison group			Second- generation Turks	Comparison group
Vienna	Mean	3.88	4.11	Frankfurt	Mean	6.15	4.00
	Std dev	4.63	6.00		Std dev	7.38	6.31
	N	138	138		N	160	202
Linz	Mean	4.88	3.53	Paris	Mean	4.25	4.38
	Std dev	5.47	4.04		Std dev	6.04	6.09
	N	122	142		N	101	111
Brussels	Mean	4.43	2.36	Strasbourg	Mean	3.56	3.38
	Std dev	7.52	5.14		Std dev	5.81	5.92
	N	147	121		N	152	102
Antwerp	Mean	2.77	1.82	Amsterdam	Mean	2.10	1.70
	Std dev	6.17	4.87		Std dev	4.06	3.94
	N	251	250		N	119	177
Zurich	Mean	1.70	1.71	Rotterdam	Mean	1.79	1.48
	Std dev	3.43	4.33		Std dev	3.68	4.15
	N	135	135		N	145	175
Basel	Mean	2.96	2.50	Stockholm	Mean	5.06	4.31
	Std dev	5.65	4.59		Std dev	6.15	4.41
	N	149	168		N	66	68
Berlin	Mean	5.99	5.79				
	Std dev	7.50	7.64				
	N	155	161				

Notes: Includes all out-of-school respondents who gave a valid answer to this question (i.e. who found a job after finishing their studies), capped at 36 months

Weighted results

Unweighted N

Bold indicates significant difference (at 0.05 level) in means between second generation and comparison group.

Source: TIES 2007-2008

On average, most cities' results do not appear to indicate that second-generation Turks have experienced a more difficult transition from school to work. Exceptions are Linz, Brussels and Frankfurt.¹⁰ Linear regression analyses of time it takes to secure a first job (not shown) do not yield many significant gross differentials or net differentials for the second generation,

but rather show that Brussels' second generation has had more difficulties in its transition to the labour force regardless of actual human capital. In all other cases, the level of education plays an important role in explaining differences in the transition, with lower levels making the transition more difficult and upper secondary or apprenticeship programmes and tertiary education usually reducing the time it takes to find a first job.

The next indicator examined is labour force participation (i.e. economic activity). We examined whether the second generation participates in the current labour force in similar numbers as the comparison group. This is actually the case for second-generation Turkish men. That their rates of economic activity are not very different from the comparison groups is unsurprising because they are likely to leave school earlier than their peers of native-born parentage. In the youngest age group (< 25 years old), the proportion of economically active second-generation men is higher than for comparison group men, which reflects their early school-leaving tendencies.

By contrast, differences in economic activity among women are more pronounced. As [table 6.4](#) shows, in Vienna, Brussels, Antwerp, Frankfurt, Paris, Strasbourg, Amsterdam and Rotterdam, Turkish second-generation women have significantly lower levels of economic activity than their comparison group peers. Breaking the results down by age groups allows us to see that the level of economic activity is lower in the Turkish second generation at all ages, though the differences are most pronounced among prime working-age women (25-35 years old).

Given the gender differences in economic activity, we also briefly examined the reasons behind men's and women's levels of economic inactivity, which differ from each other. For women, the main reason was childbearing and child-rearing; for men, it was being without paid employment and not looking for work. The impact of partnership and presence of children on women's levels of economic activity is presented after an overview of the situation for all respondents.

We now turn to the analyses of economic activity for the whole sample. [Table 6.5](#) shows the gross and net standardised coefficients (controlling for respondents' level of education) of economic activity of all respondents for the city groups.¹¹ The results refer to the likelihood that a group is economically active: negative coefficients indicate a lower likelihood, whereas positive coefficients indicate a greater likelihood. Statistically significant differences with the reference group have been highlighted, as well as within city and between-group differences.

The likelihood of being economically active is negative for second-generation Turks in almost all cities. The gross effects are significant for Turks in all cities except Linz, Basel, Zurich and Stockholm. There are also differences between the two Austrian cities, with Vienna's second generation being less likely economically active than Linz's.

Table 6.4 *Women's rate of economic activity (%), by city and group*

		<i>Second- generation Turks</i>	<i>Com- parison group</i>			<i>Second- generation Turks</i>	<i>Com- parison group</i>
Vienna	Economi- cally active	48.6	80.8	Frankfurt	Economi- cally active	67.0	84.7
	N	106	78		N	128	139
Linz	Economi- cally active	83.6	89.5	Paris	Economi- cally active	80.5	>90 (SC)
	N	67	90		N	58	60
Brussels	Economi- cally active	74.9	91.9	Strasbourg	Economi- cally active	80.1	>90 (SC)
	N	66	92		N	101	60
Antwerp	Economi- cally active	70.7	96.2	Amsterdam	Economi- cally active	70.6	89.4
	N	140	125		N	80	90
Zurich	Economi- cally active	90.7	89.1	Rotterdam	Economi- cally active	67.6	92.4
	N	66	73		N	85	92
Basel	Economi- cally active	90.4	92.4	Stockholm	Economi- cally active	85.2	93.4
	N	71	79		N	95	104
Berlin	Economi- cally active	62.8	85.5				
	N	102	98				

Notes: Includes all out-of-school respondents who gave a valid answer to this question

Weighted results

Unweighted N

SC = residual unweighted cell value < 5; result not reported

Bold indicates significant difference (at 0.05 level) in proportions between second generation and comparison group.

Source: TIES 2007-2008

With regard to net effects, differentials for the second generation are reduced, but significant negative differences still remain in some cases. The difference between the second generation and the comparison group disappear in Frankfurt, Strasbourg and Paris. Here, human capital thus accounts for the difference. But this is not necessarily the case in all cities.

Figure 6.1 shows the predicted probabilities of economic activity for Turkish second-generation men and women with the same level of education (secondary school) in the various TIES cities. The cities appear in descending order according to the predicted probabilities of economic activity for men. We see that second-generation Turkish men have the highest predicted probabilities of economic activity in the Swiss and Dutch cities; the lowest are in Strasbourg, Paris and Vienna. Yet overall, these differences are not very large. Looking at the predicted probabilities for women, we see much greater levels of variation. The picture is the same at the top and

Table 6.5 *Differences in levels of female economic activity between the second generation and the comparison group: Gross and net effects*

	Gross coefficient	Differences		Net coefficient	Differences	
		within	between		within	between
Vienna comparison group	-0.37			-0.35		
Linz Turkish	-0.11		✓	-0.09		✓
Vienna Turkish	-0.70	✓	✓	-0.63	✓	✓
Brussels comparison group	-0.16			-0.16		
Antwerp Turkish	-0.81	✓		-0.62	✓	
Brussels Turkish	-0.69	✓		-0.53	✓	
Zurich comparison group	0.13			0.07		
Basel Turkish	-0.22			0.27		
Zurich Turkish	0.07			0.38		
Berlin comparison group	0.01			0.10		
Frankfurt Turkish	-0.42	✓		-0.22		
Berlin Turkish	-0.53	✓		-0.62	✓	
Paris comparison group	0.02			0.02		
Strasbourg Turkish	-0.71	✓		-0.50		
Paris Turkish	-0.63	✓		-0.50		
Amsterdam comparison group	-0.05			-0.30		
Rotterdam Turkish	-0.71	✓		-0.45	✓	
Amsterdam Turkish	-0.68	✓		0.47	✓	
Stockholm Turkish	-0.02			-0.01		

Source: TIES 2007-2008

Notes: Y-standardised regression coefficients


Differences within: Statistical difference between groups within survey city

Differences between: Statistical difference between Turkish groups across cities within same country

the bottom: second-generation Turkish women in the Swiss cities have the highest predicted probabilities of economic activity; those in Vienna have the lowest. But this is where similarities end, as the variations in economic activity do not follow the same pattern as for men. The smallest gender gaps are found in the Swiss and Swedish cities and the biggest in Vienna and both German and Dutch cities.

The impact of religious affiliation and citizenship status for the second generation is, on the whole, small. But as [table 6.6](#) shows, second-generation Turks who identify as Muslim in Austria and Germany do have significantly lower log odds of labour force participation. In Germany, moreover, not holding the survey country citizenship also appears to be a significant

Figure 6.1 *Predicted probabilities of economic activity for second-generation Turks, by city and sex*



Source: TIES 2007-2008

disadvantage when entering the labour market; this is not the case in Austria or Switzerland (even if the coefficient is also negative here).

As expected, our Turkish female respondents tend to be more frequently economically inactive than their male peers. But due to childbearing and persistent gender roles, this is also a common feature in the respective comparison groups. The question is whether partnership status and having

Table 6.6 *The impact of religion and citizenship status on economic activity for second-generation Turks*

	Religion	Citizenship
Austria	-0.86	0.12
Belgium	-0.01	
Switzerland	0.25	-0.23
Germany	-0.46	-0.50
France	0.06	
The Netherlands	0.03	
Sweden	-0.27	

Notes: Y-standardised regression coefficients


Bold indicates significant coefficient (at 0.05 level).

Source: TIES 2007-2008

a child have a similar impact on second-generation and comparison group women. Looking solely at the gross effects (see [table 6.16](#) in the appendix), second-generation Turkish women in Vienna, Antwerp, Brussels, Frankfurt, Berlin, Paris, Strasbourg, Amsterdam and Rotterdam are more often economically inactive than women in the comparison group. But in most of the cities (exceptions being Antwerp and Rotterdam), the differences are reduced to a non-significant level once family formation is taking into account; this is the effect of second-generation Turkish women getting married and their becoming mothers at younger ages and more frequently. Of the two family formation indicators, having a child has significant negative impact on economic activity. Only in Germany does partnership, alone, have a negative impact on female economic activity.¹² Our findings indicate that childbearing is the most important explaining factor to understand the low labour force participation of second-generation Turkish women. Another factor to consider is women's choice – whether their own or a forced one – to not enter the labour market.

Figure 6.2 shows the predicted probabilities of economic activity for second-generation Turkish *mothers* who are either partnered or single. The cities are given in a decreasing order of predicted probabilities for single women. Women with a partner generally have lower predicted probabilities of participating in the labour market, with the exception of the two French cities and Stockholm. It has been argued (Soehl, Fibbi & Vera Larrucea

Figure 6.2 *Predicted probabilities of second-generation Turkish mother's economic activity, by city and family situation*



Source: TIES 2007-2008

2012) that differences in the gaps can be explained by the respective countries' varying welfare state arrangements. The French and the Swedish welfare states promote a dual-breadwinner model for families, favouring the labour market participation of women by supplying full-day child-care. On the contrary, the gap between single and partnered women is widest in Germany and Austria, where the welfare system is more conservative in relation to gender roles.

Analyses of economic activity shown thus far indicate that some differences between the second generation in some places and the respective comparison groups remain once human capital characteristics are taken into account. The family formation situation explains some of these remaining gaps in the economic activity of female respondents. However, some cities' remaining differences are most likely contingent on differences in the wider integration context – e.g. welfare state regimes and the availability of child-care facilities, including for younger children.

Unemployment

We now expand our analysis to unemployment levels in the economically active population. The unemployment rate is calculated according to the ILO criteria: respondents without a job but looking for one as a percentage of all economically active respondents (ILO 2005). The analyses focus on the gross and net second-generation differentials, the impact of citizenship status and the way in which institutional arrangements are likely to affect both the second generation and the comparison group.

We first look at the unemployment rate of the second generation and the comparison group, broken down by the main independent variables (tables 6.7 and 6.8).¹³ The overall unemployment rate for second-generation Turks is 17 per cent; more than twice as high as the unemployment rate observed among the comparison group (almost 7 per cent). The variability of the unemployment rate by country, however, is pronounced: Belgium and Switzerland represent the two extremes with the unemployment rates being lowest in Switzerland and highest in Belgium for both the Turkish and the comparison groups. This is consistent with other results presented above. In all countries except Germany and Sweden, the unemployment rates for second-generation Turks are significantly higher than for the comparison group, applying to men and women alike. In the two German cities, there are no differences in the unemployment rate of the second generation and comparison group. The female unemployment rate is higher for second-generation women in the Belgian and Dutch cities and in Stockholm. Age groups show some significant differences between the descent groups, but the proportions mainly confirm that unemployment is more common in the younger cohorts and that the gap tends to be more pronounced in the older cohorts.

Table 6.7a *Unemployment rates, by country, group and select characteristics*

	Austria			Belgium			Switzerland			Germany		
	Total	Turkish second generation	Compar- ison group	Total	Turkish second generation	Compar- ison group	Total	Turkish second generation	Compar- ison group	Total	Turkish second generation	Compar- ison group
Gender												
Total	11.3	16.9	6.5	19.5	24.6	14.2	5.0	8.6	SC	13.7	16.0	11.8
Men	11.9	17.3	6.6	16.5	20.2	12.1	5.4	8.5	SC	15.2	17.2	13.3
Women	10.5	16.2	6.4	23.1	30.9	16.5	4.5	8.8	0.7	11.8	14.2	9.9
Age												
<20	30.3	40.1	6.6	41.5	42.4	38.8	16.8	24.4	4.6	32.4	38.2	15.3
20-24	15.0	17.9	11.1	27.2	32.9	21.2	3.4	4.8	0.0	22.7	24.4	20.8
25-29	7.9	14.0	1.9	18.4	19.7	17.0	5.2	9.1	2.2	8.3	6.2	9.8
30+	8.2	9.2	7.7	13.6	22.0	6.2	2.3	5.5	0.8	10.4	12.9	8.7
Education												
Lower secondary	28.4	27.1	32.1	30.1	31.5	27.0	23.2	23.7	20.1	36.3	34.6	39.3
Middle vocational	8.2	12.0	3.7	25.6	28.1	20.0	14.7	17.3	0.0	9.3	9.1	9.5
Upper vocational track	4.0	7.7	3.1	15.9	17.2	14.3	2.8	3.6	2.0	13.2	16.7	10.8
and academic secondary												
Tertiary education	3.2	4.7	3.0	14.1	20.2	11.4	2.0	7.6	0.0	0.7	0.0	0.8
Religion												
Muslim		18.7			25.6			9.5			16.3	
Non-religious		8.2			19.3			8.0			16.0	
Citizenship												
Survey country		13.6		24.6			4.5				14.6	
Parental country only		29.0			24.7			21.6			24.4	
N	557	263	294	794	401	393	560	274	286	748	344	404

Notes: Includes all out-of-school economically active respondents

'Lower secondary' refers to students with at most this level of education. 'Middle vocational secondary' refers to students completing a short middle vocational education or apprenticeship. 'Upper vocational and academic secondary' refers to students completing a three or four year upper level secondary vocational or academic track or apprenticeship. Survey country citizenship also includes dual citizenship.

Weighted results; Unweighted N; Bold indicates significant difference (at 0.05 level) in means/proportions between second generation and comparison group (except for citizenship where the difference is calculated within the second generation group).

Source: TIES 2007-2008

Table 6.7b *Unemployment rates, by country, group and select characteristics*

	France			The Netherlands			Sweden		
	Total	Turkish second generation	Comparison group	Total	Turkish second generation	Comparison group	Total	Turkish second generation	Comparison group
Gender									
Total	12.0	16.0	7.7	3.2	16.6	2.6	4.4	11.1	4.2
Men	12.4	15.6	8.9	3.4	11.4	SC	1.2	1.0	7.3
Women	11.5	16.6	6.4	3.0	23.6	2.2	7.5	16.4	7.4
Age									
<20	44.5	45.4	32.1	1.4	12.9	0.0	9.7	14.5	9.6
20-24	14.5	15.2	11.8	5.6	17.5	3.9	4.9	19.4	4.2
25-29	9.3	13.2	6.2	4.0	19.9	3.3	5.7	5.3	5.7
30+	6.1	3.2	7.4	2.1	9.7	1.9	2.8	5.5	2.8
Education									
Lower secondary	20.4	21.8	6.3	10.3	17.8	9.1	1.6	24.4	0.0
Middle vocational secondary	14.4	14.6	14.2	14.3	26.2	13.0	3.6		3.5
Upper vocational and academic secondary	15.7	19.5	10.2	3.0	11.6	2.5			
Tertiary education	5.6	7.0	5.2	0.8	15.3	0.6	5.0	13.0	5.0
Religion									
Muslim		18.8			17.3			9.4	
Non-religious		0.0			25.0			17.1	
Citizenship									
Survey country		15.7			16.5			11.3	
Parental country only		37.4			10.9				
N	458	239	219	590	249	341	375	185	190

Notes: Includes all out-of-school economically active respondents

'Lower secondary' refers to students with at most this level of education. 'Middle vocational secondary' refers to students completing a short middle vocational education or apprenticeship. 'Upper vocational and academic secondary' refers to students completing a three or four year upper level secondary vocational or academic track or apprenticeship. Survey country citizenship also includes dual citizenship.

Weighted results; Unweighted N; Bold indicates significant difference (at 0.05 level) in means/proportions between second generation and comparison group (except for citizenship where the difference is calculated within the second generation group).

Source: TIES 2007-2008

As expected, unemployment rates go down with higher educational levels. In all cities except Stockholm, low school achievements go hand in hand with high risks of unemployment, regardless of ethnic origin. In contrast, significant differences according to origin exist for youth with an upper secondary education degree in the Austrian and French cities. There are no differences between the second generation and the comparison group in unemployment rates for those educated at the VET level. Finally, second-generation Turkish holders of tertiary credentials run significantly higher risks of being unemployed than the comparison group members with tertiary credentials in Belgium, Switzerland the Netherlands and Sweden. This could be due to many factors, including greater competition with the majority population in these countries for more highly skilled jobs.

We also examined unemployment rates according to religious affiliation and citizenship status. In France we found a significant difference in unemployment rate vis-à-vis religious affiliation. The citizenship status of second-generation Turks appears to matter for unemployment in Austria and Switzerland, the two countries where there is a noticeable percentage of non-naturalised second-generation respondents (see [chapter 4](#)). Respondents not holding survey country citizenship have higher rates of unemployment than those who hold the citizenship of their residence country.


[Figure 6.3](#) shows the great variation of unemployment rates across cities. The gap between the two origin groups is widest in Amsterdam and Zurich; intermediate in Linz, Paris, Rotterdam and Stockholm; and very limited in Berlin and Basel. With the exception of France and the Netherlands, the unemployment rate tends to be lower in the smaller cities than the main cities. In Basel, Berlin, Frankfurt and Stockholm, the gap between origin groups is statistically not significant.

Again, we focus on the gross effects and the net effects of human capital to measure possible ethnic penalties. The regression analyses reveal many gross effects (see [table 6.16](#) in the appendix) for second-generation Turks. In particular, we see a higher likelihood of unemployment than among the comparison group in the reference cities: Linz, Vienna, Antwerp, Brussels, Zurich, Rotterdam and Amsterdam. But in all these cities, much of these differentials also remain statistically significant once we look at net effects, indicating that belonging to the Turkish group entails an ethnic penalty. One of the possible factors for this could be discrimination on the labour market.

The impact of the different control variables is also worthy of examination. The net effects model shows that women have a higher risk for unemployment in Belgium, the Netherlands and Sweden. Being older significantly diminishes risks of unemployment in Germany, France and Sweden. Controlling for the respondents' education shows the importance of pursuing training beyond the compulsory level. In all countries, unemployment

risks are statistically significantly higher for those respondents who were early school leavers – meaning the compulsory level was the highest completed (see [chapter 5](#)). In Belgium, Switzerland and the Netherlands, vocational training at the post-compulsory level was also not enough to protect respondents from higher risk of unemployment. By contrast, respondents' educational achievement in France does not seem to affect unemployment risks.

Figure 6.3 *Unemployment rate, by group and city*




Source: TIES 2007-2008

On the basis of these controls we can calculate predicted probabilities of unemployment for second-generation Turkish men and women at the city level in relation to the reference category of the comparison group in the secondary city. [Figure 6.4](#) shows the probability of unemployment in a model that controls for gender, age, partnership status and education of respondent.

Within the same country, differences between cities for the second-generation Turks – even if large between cities in France, Switzerland and Germany – are not statistically significant. There are, however, certain groups whose predicted probabilities are significantly different from their peer groups across cities. While naming all significant differences would yield a long list of group differences, there are some of noteworthy interest: the lower predicted probabilities of unemployment for men in

Stockholm as well as for men and women in Basel; and, at the opposite end, the higher probabilities of unemployment for men and women in Brussels. Despite the apparent unbalances, gender differences in fitted probabilities of unemployment are also not statistically significant within cities. Hence, the contexts of local labour markets seem to play an important role with regard to unemployment probabilities.¹⁴

Figure 6.4 *Predicted probabilities of unemployment for second-generation Turks, by city and sex*



Source: TIES 2007-2008

We further developed our analyses by testing the impact of religion and citizenship status. In none of the seven TIES survey countries where second-generation Turks were surveyed did religious affiliation result in higher risks of unemployment. The effect of citizenship, however, is visible. As [table 6.9](#) shows, not holding the survey country citizenship significantly increases the likelihood of unemployment for second-generation Turks in Switzerland and Germany. These results confirm previous analyses on the socio-economic outcomes of the second generation in Switzerland (Fibbi et al. 2007) and Germany (Salentin & Wilkening 2003). The analysis focuses on the three German-speaking countries because, as mentioned earlier, only here do we find relevant numbers of Turkish respondents who do not hold their birth country nationality.

We now turn to a last set of unemployment-related analyses in which we test the impact of the wider societal context. Do similar institutional arrangements and demographic factors in several countries lead to similar

Table 6.8 *The impact of citizenship status on unemployment*

	Austria				Switzerland				Germany**			
	Gross		Net		Gross		Net		Gross		Net	
	b/se	Std coeff	b/se	Std coeff	b/se	Std coeff	b/se	Std coeff	b/se	Std coeff	b/se	Std coeff
City-group	0.40	0.20	0.43	0.21	1.38**	0.64	1.33*	0.60	0.83*	0.38	0.87*	0.39
Turkish second generation, main city	(0.37)		(0.38)		(0.52)		(0.53)		(0.34)		(0.35)	
Woman	0.18	0.09	0.18	0.09	0.21	0.10	0.49	0.22	0.01	0.01	0.11	0.05
	(0.36)		(0.36)		(0.49)		(0.52)		(0.35)		(0.35)	
Age	-0.05	-0.03	-0.05	-0.02	-0.06	-0.03	-0.06	-0.03	-0.03	-0.02	-0.04	-0.02
	(0.05)		(0.05)		(0.06)		(0.06)		(0.04)		(0.04)	
Partnership status												
With partner	-0.83	-0.41	-0.77	-0.38	-0.45	-0.21	-0.33	-0.15	-1.67**	-0.75	-1.65**	-0.74
	(0.44)		(0.45)		(0.59)		(0.60)		(0.52)		(0.52)	
Education												
Lower secondary	1.06*	0.53	0.89	0.44	2.37***	1.10	1.85**	0.83	1.02	0.46	1.14	0.51
	(0.52)		(0.53)		(0.65)		(0.69)		(0.63)		(0.64)	
Middle vocational secondary	-0.06	-0.03	-0.14	-0.06	1.67**	0.78	1.39*	0.63	-0.54	-0.25	-0.46	-0.20
	(0.53)		(0.54)		(0.64)		(0.67)		(0.63)		(0.64)	
Tertiary education	-0.53	-0.26	-0.57	-0.28		0.96	0.44	1.03	0.47			
	(1.16)		(1.16)		(0.76)		(0.77)					
Citizenship												
Parental country (or neither)			0.70	0.35			1.45**	0.65			0.93*	0.42
			(0.42)				(0.53)				(0.47)	
Constant	-0.73		-0.90		-2.59		-3.20*		-0.95		-1.05	
	(1.16)		(1.18)		(1.48)		(1.56)		(1.12)		(1.14)	
N	261		261		269		269		330		330	
Pseudo-R2	0.11		0.12		0.17		0.22		0.19		0.20	

Source: TIES 2007-2008

* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001

Note: Results for Germany exclude respondents with high level of education (perfect prediction of employment).

The reference categories are as follows: 'Turkish second generation in the secondary city' for city-group; 'No partner' for partnership status; 'Upper secondary vocational track or apprenticeship (3 or 4 years) and Upper secondary academic track' for education, and 'At least survey country' for citizens. 'Lower secondary refers to students with at most this level of education. 'Middle vocational secondary' refers to students completing a short middle vocational education or apprenticeship.

Table 6.9 *The impact of context on unemployment*

	<i>Turkish second generation</i>		<i>Comparison group</i>	
	<i>b/se</i>	<i>Std coeff</i>	<i>b/se</i>	<i>Std coeff</i>
Woman	0.43** (0.13)	0.22	0.03 (0.17)	0.02
Age	-0.05** (0.02)	-0.02	-0.04 (0.02)	-0.02
Partnership status with partner	-0.70*** (0.16)	-0.36	-0.79*** (0.20)	-0.39
Education				
Lower secondary	1.23*** (0.20)	0.63	1.60*** (0.27)	0.80
Middle vocational secondary	0.64*** (0.19)	0.33	0.70** (0.26)	0.35
Tertiary education	0.14 (0.23)	0.07	-0.35 (0.26)	-0.18
Country context:				
MIPEX antidiscrimination legislation	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01	0.03 (0.02)	0.02
Extended VET system	-1.07* (0.52)	-0.55	0.45 (0.69)	0.23
Demography: Youth ratio	0.01 (0.01)	0.01	0.04* (0.02)	0.02
Constant	0.09 (1.30)		-4.59* (1.84)	
N	1,942		2,122	2,122
Pseudo-R2	0.08		0.10	0.10

Source: TIES 2007-2008

* $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$

Note: The reference categories are as follows: 'No partner' for partnership status, 'Upper secondary vocational track or apprenticeship (3 or 4 years) and Upper secondary academic track' for education. 'Lower secondary' refers to students with at most this level of education. 'Middle vocational secondary' refers to students completing a short middle vocational education or apprenticeship.

labour market outcomes in the second generation and the respective comparison groups? Table 6.10 presents two models, confirming the prior observed influence of respondents' age and educational achievement. But it also shows that once context is accounted for, the impact of gender on unemployment risks varies by origin group: second-generation Turkish women have significantly higher risks of unemployment than their male counterparts, but this is not the case in the comparison group.

An educational system with an extended vocational training system significantly reduces unemployment risks for the second generation. Yet, it has no significant effect on the likelihood of unemployment of the comparison group. This result confirms the findings of Müller and Gangl (2003),

Table 6.10 *Self-reported experiences of discrimination while job-seeking for second-generation Turks (in %)*

Vienna	None	52.3	Frankfurt	None	32.1
	Incidental	37.5		Incidental	55.5
	Systematic	10.2		Systematic	12.4
	N	107		N	137
Linz	None	18.2	Paris	None	62.4
	Incidental	64.7		Incidental	29.1
	Systematic	17.2		Systematic	8.5
	N	105		N	85
Brussels	None	47.8	Strasbourg	None	37.3
	Incidental	42.3		Incidental	39.3
	Systematic	10.0		Systematic	23.4
	N	114		N	114
Antwerp	None	55.3	Amsterdam	None	66.9
	Incidental	33.0		Incidental	24.9
	Systematic	11.7		Systematic	8.2
	N	188		N	89
Zurich	None	61.7	Rotterdam	None	53.5
	Incidental	33.0		Incidental	32.1
	Systematic	5.3		Systematic	14.4
	N	115		N	113
Basel	None	62.0	Stockholm	None	61.9
	Incidental	31.2		Incidental	25.4
	Systematic	6.8		Systematic	12.7
	N	129		N	155
Berlin	None	39.6			
	Incidental	54.8			
	Systematic	5.6			
	N	144			

Source: TIES 2007-2008

Notes: Includes all currently employed out-of-school respondents

Weighted results

Unweighted N

who analysed general youth unemployment and argued that the VET system is specifically beneficial for the second generation.

Concerning the youth ratio, the coefficient signs confirm the hypothesis that the younger the age cohorts, the higher the unemployment risks, but this effect is only found within the comparison group. However, there could be an issue of limited statistical significance due to the fact that the indicator adequately represents the country average, but it is less satisfactory at the city level and specifically for the second generation.

Anti-discrimination legislation does not appear to have an impact on second-generation unemployment risks. To explain why the second generation does not seem to profit from such legislation, we may consider the methodological weakness of the MIPEX index since it only measures legislative actions and not their actual implementation. An alternative approach to the

role of discrimination would be to look at the perceived experiences of discrimination from our respondents. Table 6.11 endeavours to capture the extent to which the second generation felt unfairly treated or discriminated against on the basis of their ethnic background when job-seeking.¹⁵ The survey question producing these results elicits subjective information, which is influenced by all sorts of individual and contextual factors, including personal and public awareness of the issue of discrimination. In other words, reported discrimination depends on personal experiences though is also framed by the public debate.

Unfavourable treatment experienced while job-seeking is widely self-reported by second-generation Turks. In all cities, at least one respondent in three who was confronted with such an experience attributed it to his or her ethnic background. In Frankfurt, Strasbourg and Berlin, this was the case for more than half the respondents. Amsterdam, Stockholm, Basel and Zurich had the highest numbers of respondents – almost two thirds – reporting never having had a negative experience in this regard. At least in Switzerland, this was certainly also connected to the fact that unemployment figures are so low that virtually everyone finds a job.

On the other hand, it is the second-generation respondents in the secondary cities who seem to report more origin-based discrimination. This is especially the case in Strasbourg, Rotterdam, Linz and Frankfurt. The result contrasts with the lower unemployment rate we found in almost all the secondary cities. We thus observe interesting city differences within the same country despite the same regulatory and discursive national frame on discrimination issues. When looking at gender differences, men report more experiences of discrimination than women.

Occupational status

This section examines occupational attainment focusing firstly on the extent to which the second generation is able to achieve high levels of occupational attainment in relation to the comparison group. Secondly, we look at intergenerational social mobility – between the respondents and their parents – examining the extent to which social reproduction over generations is similar or different in the second generation, as compared to respondents of native parentage.

All analyses are based on the occupational positions of respondents who are not in full-time education and employed at the time of the survey. The occupational status is measured on the basis of the Erikson-Golthorpe-Portocarero (EGP) classification scheme.¹⁶ Due to small sample sizes, the EGP classes were recoded into three categories: executives and professionals (classes I and II); intermediate (classes IIIa, IIIb and IV); and blue collar (classes V and above). Mobility, here defined as whether a respondent's current class is higher than that in which the highest parental occupation

falls, was calculated using the five-category class scheme, in order to allow for more variation. The categorisation of the parents was derived from information about parental occupation when the respondent was fifteen years old.¹⁷

Table 6.11 *Difference in occupational status between the comparison group and second-generation Turks (in %), by city and sex*

		Men	Women			Men	Women	
Vienna	Executives, professionals	7.3	28.4	Berlin	Executives, professionals	34.5	17.2	
	Intermediate	22.1	-20.6		Intermediate	8.8	-3.6	
	Blue-collar	-29.4	-7.7		Blue-collar	-43.3	-13.6	
	N	134	94		N	177	121	
Linz	Executives, professionals	16.8	8.8	Frankfurt	Executives, professionals	24.5	17.6	
	Intermediate	12.8	6.6		Intermediate	3.0	-6.5	
	Blue-collar	-29.5	-15.4		Blue-collar	-27.5	-11.1	
	N	113	120		N	139	177	
Brussels	Executives, professionals	3.4	24.6	Paris	Executives, professionals	36.5	15.7	
	Intermediate	16.8	-1.6		Intermediate	5.8	-15.4	
	Blue-collar	-20.2	-23.1		Blue-collar	-42.4	-0.3	
	N	129	93		N	96	96	
Antwerp	Executives, professionals	13.8	18.2	Strasbourg	Executives, professionals	29.8	41.5	
	Intermediate	2.3	-16.6		Intermediate	-12.1	-0.5	
	Blue-collar	-16.1	-1.6		Blue-collar	-17.7	-41.1	
	N	234	180		N	97	112	
Zurich	Executives, professionals	8.7	8.1	Amsterdam	Executives, professionals	22.8	37.5	
	Intermediate	-8.0	-16.3		Intermediate	-11.9	-43.5	
	Blue-collar	-0.7	8.2		Blue-collar	-10.9	6.0	
	N	122	115		N	122	111	
Basel	Executives, professionals	16.8	23.1	Rotterdam	Executives, professionals	43.8	23.2	
	Intermediate	-2.9	-8.5		Intermediate	-10.6	-18.1	
	Blue-collar	-13.9	-14.6		Blue-collar	-33.2	-5.2	
	N	149	130		N	140	114	
				Stockholm	Executives, professionals	24.1	21.5	
					Intermediate	-6.2	-3.8	
					Blue-collar	-17.9	-17.7	
					N	132	126	

Source: TIES 2007-2008

Notes: Includes all employed out-of-school respondents with a valid occupational coding
Coefficient in bold indicates significant difference in proportion between the second generation and the comparison group

Weighted results

Unweighted N

The distribution of the respondents across occupational statuses is shown in [table 6.11](#). The table shows the difference in proportion in occupational status between second-generation Turks and comparison group by sex for each city. Positive percentages indicate a higher proportion of comparison group members in a category; negative percentages show higher numbers of Turkish respondents there. Numbers in bold show that differences are statistically significant (< 0.05).

In almost all cities, second-generation Turks have a significantly lower proportion of members in the highest occupational category. This applies roughly for men and women alike, albeit with some exceptions (Turkish men are better represented in this category in Vienna, Brussels, Strasbourg and Amsterdam; women are better represented as such in Linz, Berlin, Rotterdam and Paris). The table also shows the extent to which Turkish men are particularly overrepresented in the lowest occupational category.

We now turn to examining occupational attainment more closely with separate logistic regressions of low (i.e. blue collar) and high (i.e. executive and professional) occupations performed by country. The net effects models have an additional control for the age at which each respondent held his or her first job as our proxy for labour market experience.¹⁸ The following figures show the effect size based on the odds ratios of the standardised coefficients on a logarithmic scale. Effects to the right of the axis imply greater odds of being in a particular occupation (low/high), whereas effects to the left of the axis indicate lower odds (reference: the comparison group in the respective second city).


As expected, with regard to the *gross* effects ([figure 6.5](#)), second-generation respondents tend to be more likely to hold low-level occupations than the comparison group.

[Figure 6.6](#), however, shows that the higher likelihood of low-level occupations is considerably reduced when controlling for the human capital of the respondents. Significant results remain for second-generation Turks in Frankfurt, Berlin, Zurich and Amsterdam. In the last two cities, the likelihood of low-level occupations is even lower for the second generation than the comparison group. However, due to sample size issues these results should be taken on board with some caution.

Among the different control variables, level of education is the most important, as expected. Higher levels of education – together with labour market experience – significantly reduce the likelihood of a low-level occupational status. We also tested the impact of religious affiliation and citizenship in the models, but did not find any significant results. These two factors therefore do not seem to play a role in further reducing or increasing ethnic differentials with regard to low-level occupational attainment in our analyses.


[Figure 6.7](#) again looks at differences between second-generation Turkish men and women across cities by showing the predicted probabilities of low-level occupational attainment for the net effects model. For men, the

Figure 6.5 Odds ratios of second-generation Turks being in low-level occupations (gross effects on a logistic scale)



^ = within-city difference
* = within-second generation difference
Source: TIES 2007-2008


Figure 6.6 Odds ratios of second-generation Turks being in low-level occupations (net effects (human capital) on a logarithmic scale)



^ = within-city difference
* = within-second generation difference
Source: TIES 2007-2008

cities with the highest predicted probabilities of low-level occupational attainment are Brussels, Antwerp, Berlin and Frankfurt. The lowest predicted probabilities are in Linz, Zurich, Vienna and Amsterdam. Women in Brussels and Antwerp have the highest predicted probabilities of low-level occupational attainment among their group, followed by their peers in Berlin and Stockholm.

Figure 6.7 *Predicted probabilities of low-level occupational attainment among second-generation Turks, by sex*




Source: TIES 2007-2008

Second-generation Turks in the Belgian and German cities tend to have higher predicted probabilities of low-level occupational attainment after controlling for individual characteristics. A concentration of the second generation in these sectors of employment could well be due to labour market segmentation. This is consistent with earlier research showing that the German labour market is highly segmented and offers very few opportunities for mobility, especially for immigrants, regardless of their origin (Constant & Massey 2005; Kogan 2004).


Turning to second-generation differentials in high-level occupations reveals a largely inverted picture (see [figure 6.8](#)). But again, these differentials are dramatically reduced once human capital characteristics are taken into account (see [figure 6.9](#)). Educational background is mainly behind the second-generation respondents' more difficult access to high-level occupations, as expected.

Figure 6.8 Odds ratios of second-generation Turks being in high-level occupations (gross effects on a logarithmic scale)



A = within-city difference
* = within-second generation difference
Source: TIES 2007-2008

Figure 6.9 Odds ratios of second-generation Turks being in high-level occupations (net effects (human capital) on a logarithmic scale)




A = within-city difference
* = within-second generation difference
Source: TIES 2007-2008

Once more, the levels of human capital do not impact as profoundly in the German cities. The only significant difference is present between second-generation Turks and the comparison group in Berlin. Although the significance levels are not strong, one can see that even with the controls, the magnitude of the effects remains negative for the second generation.

Figure 6.10 compares and contrasts the predicted probabilities of second-generation Turkish men and women attaining a high-level occupation in their city. The cities are classified according to the decreasing order of men's predicted probabilities.

Figure 6.10 *Predicted probabilities of high-level occupational attainment among second-generation Turks, by sex*



Source: TIES 2007-2008

The most interesting result here is that – when compared to figure 6.7 – higher probabilities of high-level attainment do not always go hand in hand with lower probabilities of low-level attainment, and vice versa. Second-generation Turkish men and women in Switzerland have the highest predicted probabilities of holding high-level occupations. This might appear surprising given the educational attainment of second-generation Turks in those cities, which is low. Closer examination of those currently employed (those in our target sample for these analyses) shows that they tend to be highly educated, whereas individuals with lower levels of education tend more often to be unemployed or inactive. This is an interesting dual outcome that shows more promising prospects – for those who make it onto

the labour market. At the low end of the distribution are men in Berlin, Stockholm, Antwerp and Rotterdam, who show quite low predicted probabilities of high-level occupations. The picture for women is similar, but the gap between the cities with the highest predicted probabilities levels (Basel and Zurich) and the lowest (Strasbourg and Stockholm) is greater in the case of women than men.

A last aspect we examine is intergenerational mobility. We analyse to what extent the second generation is able to avoid reproducing the low social starting position of their immigrant parents (see [chapter 4](#)). [Table 6.12](#) shows the proportion of respondents who are upwardly mobile, i.e. those

Table 6.12 *Intergenerational occupational mobility (in %), by city, group and sex*

		<i>Turkish second generation</i>		<i>Comparison group</i>	
		<i>Men</i>	<i>Women</i>	<i>Men</i>	<i>Women</i>
Vienna	Upwardly mobile	49.1	66.6	28.3	31.3
	N	55	44	72	46
Linz	Upwardly mobile	31.1	42.0	33.2	18.0
	N	54	45	51	71
Brussels	Upwardly mobile	50.3	54.0	10.6	25.6
	N	73	22	38	56
Antwerp	Upwardly mobile	47.0	73.6	32.1	36.5
	N	100	53	112	107
Zurich	Upwardly mobile	39.9	46.0	17.8	24.5
	N	61	53	60	61
Basel	Upwardly mobile	35.7	52.8	26.3	28.3
	N	71	57	78	72
Berlin	Upwardly mobile	34.7	57.3	34.3	21.1
	N	72	45	80	67
Frankfurt	Upwardly mobile	34.9	45.9	25.3	34.5
	N	42	61	75	100
Paris	Upwardly mobile	64.4	67.2	26.3	21.2
	N	41	40	50	52
Strasbourg	Upwardly mobile	51.7	50.8	27.6	24.8
	N	52	59	37	50
Amsterdam	Upwardly mobile	50.6	66.7	35.9	29.6
	N	24	24	64	58
Rotterdam	Upwardly mobile	31.6	70.1	38.5	43.0
	N	40	20	57	68
Stockholm	Upwardly mobile	41.9	37.8	18.5	25.9
	N	63	46	53	62

Notes: Includes all employed out-of-school respondents with a valid occupational coding
Weighted results. Unweighted N.

Bold indicates significant difference (at 0.05 level) in proportions between second generation and comparison group.


Italics indicates a significant difference in proportion between the second generation across cities.

Source: TIES 2007-2008

whose current occupational status is higher than their parents' (measured here as the highest parental occupation). Given the generally very low level of education and occupational attainment among the Turkish immigrant parents (see [chapter 2](#)), it is unsurprising that the rates for upward occupational mobility are higher in the second generation than the comparison group – in many cases, significantly higher. But the table also shows that second-generation women tend to have higher rates of upward mobility than their male peers (except in Strasbourg and Stockholm). If we compared them to their mothers, the jump in occupational status would be much greater. On the other hand, it should be taken into consideration that we are only looking at women who are active on the labour market here. The table does not reflect the much higher proportions of economically inactive women over men.

[Figure 6.11](#) shows that the gender gap in mobility plays out quite differently in the different cities. It is smallest in Strasbourg and highest in Antwerp and Rotterdam. Overall, we see great variation in the rates of upwardly mobile women, with the difference in proportion being almost 40 percentage points between the city with the highest proportion of upwardly mobile women (Rotterdam) and 22 percentage points in the city with the lowest proportion of upwardly mobile men (Berlin).

Figure 6.11 *Percentage of upwardly mobile second-generation Turks, by sex*




Source: TIES 2007-2008

In most cases (except Rotterdam), the coefficients of upward mobility are quite high – and significant – for most second-generation respondents, though the gross effects are smaller than the net effects (see [table 6.13a](#) and [13b](#)). This either indicates that at similar levels of human capital and labour market experience, the second generation is more successful at moving upwards than its peers with native-born parents, or that other unmeasured aspects could explain the differences. Even if they are not directly comparable, the coefficients are smallest in the German cities, despite their showing a propensity for more upward mobility for the second generation. Many low-educated individuals have smaller levels of upward mobility, but the negative impact of low levels of education is not consistent across countries. Nor, for that matter, is the impact from having achieved upper levels of education. Second-generation Turkish women in some countries have higher levels of upward mobility than men.¹⁹

As [figure 6.12](#) shows, the highest predicted probability levels of upward mobility for second-generation Turks are found in Paris, Vienna, Strasbourg and Amsterdam, while Brussels and Stockholm show the lowest levels for men and Stockholm and Linz for women.

Figure 6.12 *Predicted probabilities of upward occupational mobility for second-generation Turks, by city and sex*



Source: TIES 2007-2008

Even if not all the groups appear to experience upward mobility to the same extent, which could be partly explained by differences in their parents' socio-economic levels, the overall picture is such that most second-generation groups show considerable upward occupational mobility. This can be seen as a very positive outcome given the fact that, at their young

Table 6.13a (continued)

Education																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																				</

Table 6.13b Analyses of intergenerational occupational mobility for second-generation Turks

	France				The Netherlands				Sweden			
	Gross		Net		Gross		Net		Gross		Net	
	b/se	Std coeff	b/se	Std coeff	b/se	Std coeff	b/se	Std coeff	b/se	Std coeff	b/se	Std coeff
City-group												
Comparison group, main city	-0.44 (0.34)	-0.22	-0.41 (0.34)	-0.20	-0.34 (0.27)	-0.18	-0.43 (0.27)	-0.23				
Turkish second generation, secondary city	1.00 ^{***} (0.31)	0.51	1.48 ^{***} (0.35)	0.73	0.27 (0.33)	0.15	0.37 (0.34)	0.20				
Turkish second generation, main city	1.55 ^{***} (0.35)	0.79	1.83 ^{***} (0.37)	0.90	0.86 ^{***} (0.35)	0.46	0.96 ^{***} (0.37)	0.51	1.12 ^{***} (0.31)	0.60	1.38 ^{***} (0.34)	0.71
Woman	0.10 (0.22)	0.05	0.06 (0.23)	0.03	0.29 (0.22)	0.16	0.25 (0.23)	0.13	0.07 (0.30)	0.04	0.07 (0.31)	0.04
Age	0.00 (0.03)	0.00	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.01	0.02 (0.03)	0.01	0.01 (0.03)	0.01	0.04 (0.04)	0.02	0.01 (0.04)	0.01
Partnership status With partner	-0.03 (0.26)	-0.01	0.08 (0.26)	0.04	-0.07 (0.23)	-0.04	-0.04 (0.23)	-0.02	0.16 (0.32)	0.09	0.13 (0.33)	0.07
Education												
Lower secondary			-1.18 ^{**} (0.44)	-0.58			-0.40 (0.35)	-0.21			0.06 (0.61)	0.03
Middle vocational secondary			-0.87 [*] (0.38)	-0.43			0.25 (0.48)	0.13				
Tertiary education			0.04 (0.36)	0.02			0.24 (0.29)	0.13			0.78 ^{**} (0.38)	0.40

Table 6.13b (continued)

Age first job	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.05	0.02
Constant	-0.95 (0.84)	-0.76 (1.25)	-1.11 (0.79)	(0.04) -1.09 (0.97)	(0.05) -3.20* (1.37)	
N	381	381	355	355	224	
Pseudo-R2	0.10	0.13	0.03	0.04	0.05	0.08

* p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001. Notes: Y-standardised variables. Shaded cell indicates significant difference between groups within the same city. The reference categories are as follows: 'Secondary city' for city-group; 'No partner' for partnership status; 'Upper secondary vocational track or apprenticeship (3 or 4 years)' and 'Upper secondary academic track' for education. 'Lower secondary' refers to students with at most this level of education. 'Middle vocational secondary' refers to students completing a short middle vocational education or apprenticeship.

Source: TIES 2007-2008

age, they have not even reached their 'occupational peak'. Yet, we must think about the extent to which this level of mobility could also be driven by other factors, such as changes in the occupational structure, which could simply indicate some type of cohort effect being at play. This would require more in-depth analyses in line with classic mobility studies, given that our approach here was a very basic one.

6.4 Conclusion

We framed our analysis of second-generation Turks on the labour market within the ethnic penalty approach. Identifying the importance of remaining differentials, once individual level characteristics are controlled for, directs the focus at the impact of factors outside 'typical' determinants for differentials, among which is discrimination. The discussion of the results concerning second-generation Turks, in particular, maps areas where educational credentials are *not* sufficient for closing the gap between the second generation and the comparison group. As a matter of fact, despite a seemingly smooth transition into the labour market itself, some ethnic penalties remain when the labour market outcomes of the second generation are more closely analysed. Most differentials between second-generation Turks and the comparison group, however, seem to be a result of the second generation's lower levels of human capital. Hence, education has a major albeit not all-encompassing influence on these differentials.

We began by analysing the labour force participation of our respondents. Net labour market participation differentials appeared for second-generation Turkish women in the Belgian cities and in Rotterdam, despite controls for partnership status and the presence of children. Also, religious affiliation and citizenship appeared to affect the overall economic activity of the second generation in Austria, Germany and, though to a lesser extent, also Switzerland.

Concentrating on respondents in the labour force, we accounted for three crucial labour market outcomes: unemployment, occupational attainment and intergenerational mobility.

Unemployment differentials proved quite frequent. They especially concerned second-generation Turks with lower education credentials, but occasionally even extended to those who had completed apprenticeships. Controlling for educational background, we found that ethnic penalties persist for the second generation in the Austrian, Belgian and Dutch cities as well as in Zurich. Lack of local citizenship was identified as a major factor negatively influencing employment chances in Switzerland and Germany – this is in line with previous findings.

Beyond individual factors, we analysed how contextual factors, such as institutional arrangements and demographic circumstances, impact the rate

of unemployment. In contexts where educational systems have extensive vocational tracks, risks of unemployment were reduced for the second generation. Yet, we also saw how educational attainment at that level did not lead to high levels of occupational status. We did not find any effects of whether anti-discrimination measures do or do not exist at the national level. There may be a beneficial impact on the labour market outcomes for immigrant workers, but not necessarily for the second generation.

Employed second-generation youth experience difficulties in obtaining adequate returns on their educational investment. Net differentials in low-level occupational status appear mainly for second-generation men in the two German cities as well as in Amsterdam, a finding consistent with Kogan's research (2004). Even if successful at finding employment, their frequent channelling into the low-skilled labour positions can be regarded as a key indicator of the labour market segmentation. On the other hand, as expected, differentials in high-level occupational status are well accounted for by educational achievement.

The second generation seems able to avoid intergenerational social reproduction vis-à-vis occupational status. Second-generation Turks experience strong intergenerational occupational mobility, and at considerably higher levels than their comparison group peers. Considering their own parents' already low-level education, youth of immigrant descent can hardly experience downward mobility. The gender gap among second-generation Turks, however, shows that the strong upward occupational mobility is not yet automatic for all. For as long as they enter the labour market, women have higher probabilities for upward occupational mobility and evasion of low-level occupations. This is probably the result of pre-existing gender biases in the labour market whereby women are better positioned to exploit society's shifts from an industrial to a service economy.

What can our results contribute to the debate between the two main strands on second-generation integration? Do they rather subscribe to the assimilation strand or do they point to stagnation? The answer to these questions has major scientific consequences and policy implications. The main differentiator between the two theoretical strands is the explanatory role of educational achievement for a variety of labour market outcomes. If educational achievement is an exhaustive explanans for observed differences, then supply-side variables reliably account for them: in this case, the analysis should concentrate on factors impacting the second generation's educational achievement. Should this not be the case, then demand-side variables should account for the observed differences. Further analyses are needed to elucidate explaining factors on the demand side of the labour market.

Qualifying the situation of second-generation Turks is difficult, the picture being extremely complex. The presence of ethnic penalties indicates that various factors are at play in determining labour market outcomes

beyond educational achievement and individual agency. Ethnic penalties for second-generation Turks appear in the labour market participation of women in Belgium and the Netherlands; in risks of unemployment in Austrian, Belgian and Dutch cities; and in low-level occupational status in the German cities. Persisting disadvantageous outcomes of second-generation Turks are notably observed in occupational attainment in Frankfurt and Berlin. They point to the existence of a considerably segmented labour market.

Although we only analysed a particular sub-section of the second generation – those in urban centres across different countries – our results proved consistent with the sparse existing research. In sum, it is not their entry to the labour market that appears problematic for second-generation Turks, but their acquiring a favourable position in it. This finding was almost consistent across all TIES countries.

The heterogeneous patterns we found require further investigation pertaining to respondents' cultural background as well as to the importance of institutional factors. For the time being, they raise pertinent questions about modes of incorporation and the demand-side of the labour market.

Notes

- 1 With gratitude, we acknowledge the useful feedback and help provided by many colleagues: Nienke Hornstra, Tineke Fokkema and Liesbeth Heering at NIDI; Marco Pecoraro at SFM; the editors of this volume, as well as the members of the various national TIES teams.
- 2 Figures for EU countries are taken from Gomez-Salvador and Leiner-Killinger (2008); figures for Switzerland and Sweden are the authors' own calculations based on data from Statistics Sweden (2010) and the Swiss Federal Statistical Office (2010).
- 3 Labour force participation is defined as 'a measure of the proportion of a country's working-age population that engages actively in the labour market, either by working or looking for work' (ILO 2005).
- 4 The Urban Audit Database only provides data for three-year periods rather than annual statistics. This is why the period covered by the Eurostat data is shorter than that of the ILO. In instances when data were unavailable for the most recent period, we used latest available information.
- 5 Detailed regression tables for the analyses are not presented here, but their digital versions are available at [http://imiscoe.org/index.php?option=com_content &view=category&layout=blog&id=30&Itemid=35](http://imiscoe.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=category&layout=blog&id=30&Itemid=35).
- 6 Y-standardised coefficients are used, which implies that the coefficient is divided by the 'estimated standard deviation of the latent variable' (Mood 2010: 73).
- 7 Although average marginal effects could have been used in this instance (see Mood 2010), predicted probabilities were calculated for ease of understanding.
- 8 In producing the predicted probabilities, unless otherwise indicated, continuous control variables (such as age) are held at the mean, while dummy and categorical variables are held at the reference category.

- 9 The analyses were not performed for the other outcomes because we did not see sufficiently strong theoretical bases for them.
- 10 Some differences could be due to second-generation Turks who hold Turkish citizenship probably having been delayed entry into the labour market by compulsory military service.
- 11 Detailed regression tables for the analyses are presented in digital versions of tables 6.17 through 6.37 available at http://imiscoe.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=category&layout=blog&id=30&Itemid=35.
- 12 Interaction terms between the city groups and the family formation variables were examined, but very few were significant and thus led by small sample size.
- 13 Note that some figures given in the tables are based on small values of unemployed individuals. Results should thus be interpreted with caution.
- 14 This applies to individuals in terms of age (mean), partnership status (no partner) and education (general upper secondary education).
- 15 Given that this question was only asked of employed respondents, the data cannot be forcibly applied in analyses using the full sub-sample.
- 16 The EGP class scheme was derived from the International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO-88) (Ganzeboom & Treiman 1996, 2002).
- 17 There are a few caveats to this approach, for example, a certain lack of detail with regard to the respondents' occupations and being confined to post-migration parental occupation at only one point in time. Yet, this is the most detailed analyses of occupational attainment and mobility the TIES data make feasible.
- 18 We excluded all 'employment' before age eighteen, i.e. summer jobs, apprenticeships and internships. Given the small numbers, we were unable to run separate analyses by gender, though interaction effects were examined and did not yield significant results.
- 19 Interaction effects were examined but did not yield any significant results.

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
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
Appendix

Figure 6.13 *Economic activity at the national level, men aged 15-64, 1990-2008*




Source: ILO

Figure 6.14 *Economic activity at the national level, women aged 15-64, 1990-2008*




Source: ILO

Figure 6.15 *Labour force participation at the national level, men aged 15-24, 1990-2008*




Source: ILO

Figure 6.16 *Economic activity at the national level, women aged 15-24, 1990-2008*




Source: ILO

Figure 6.17 *Unemployment rate at the national level, men, 1990-2008*



Source: ILO

Figure 6.18 *Unemployment rate at the national level, women, 1990-2008*



Source: ILO

Table 6.14 Descriptive statistics of the independent variables

		Age		Gender		% Lower secondary at the most	Education			Religion			Citizenship		N
		Mean		% Women			% Upper secondary apprenticeship	% Upper secondary	% Tertiary	% Muslim	% No religion	% At least survey country			
Vienna	Comparison group	28.0		48.2		13.9	36.7	25.6	23.8		65.3				179
	Second-generation Turks	25.0		47.9		43.7	44.8	8.8	2.7	88.0	10.7	87.4			200
Linz	Comparison group	28.7		49.2		12.5	39.4	32.0	16.1		53.1				153
	Second-generation Turks	26.8		48.6		38.7	51.6	5.6	4.1	70.1	28.2	79.9			135
Brussels	Comparison group	28.5		50.7		6.3	18.8	20.1	52.9		72.9				153
	Second-generation Turks	27.2		46.4		9.9	34.4	31.6	19.9	77.6	17.1	96.4			185
Antwerp	Comparison group	27.6		49.0		3.2	20.0	24.6	52.2		71.1				261
	Second-generation Turks	27.2		49.3		9.9	45.1	21.8	22.5	90.5	8.1	96.8			284
Zurich	Comparison group	27.9		55.2		SC	SC	61.2*	38.9		65.8				136
	Second-generation Turks	25.6		46.8		11.2	12.6	62.2	14.0	53.6	44.0	74.7			139
Basel	Comparison group	28.1		46.4		4.6	3.9	54.0	35.8		63.7				173
	Second-generation Turks	24.5		46.7		19.8	15.5	50.6	14.2	49.9	49.5	73.4			154
Berlin	Comparison group	27.8		47.1		18.2	50.6	11.2	20.0		77.4				221
	Second-generation Turks	26.6		49.8		36.6	52.9	7.1	3.4	63.7	34.8	89.7			228
Frankfurt	Comparison group	28.2		49.9		10.9	67.5	5.6	16.1		78.2				231
	Second-generation Turks	27.0		49.8		31.1	59.6	5.9	3.4	78.1	21.5	77.8			212
Paris	Comparison group	29.1		47.6		SC	22.9*	15.3	61.8		68.3				120
	Second-generation Turks	24.2		45.6		24.6	27.6	21.3	26.5	79.2	17.4	98.8			109
Strasbourg	Comparison group	28.8		52.0		SC	20.4*	16.4	63.2		46.9				110
	Second-generation Turks	25.6		52.6		27.1	35.4	21.3	16.2	89.2	6.1	98.2			175

Table 6.14 (continued)

Amsterdam	Comparison group	29.2	49.0	8.6	7.0	20.5	63.9	79.6		181
	Second-generation Turks	25.6	53.5	42.9	7.1	32.4	17.5	17.2	96.1	141
Rotterdam	Comparison group	29.0	49.5	19.3	6.1	24.9	49.7	68.5		181
	Second-generation Turks	25.8	49.0	45.2	15.9	26.4	12.5	8.3	93.8	172
Stockholm	Comparison group	28.6	50.4	5.0	n.a.	35.8	59.3	85.2		203
	Second-generation Turks	25.6	45.1	12.7	n.a.	59.0	28.3	25.3	98.2	201

Notes: Includes all out-of-school respondents

Weighted results

Unweighted N

Bold number indicates significant difference in means/proportions with the comparison group (not done for religion and citizenship)

SC = small cell count (< 5)

* indicates merging of categories as one of the statistics was based on a small cell value

Missing categories excluded

Table 6.15 (continued)

Education (ref: Upper secondary vocational track or apprenticeship (3 or 4 years) and Upper secondary academic track)					
Lower secondary					
at the most	-0.38	-0.15	-1.95***	-0.86	-2.66***
	(0.41)		(0.57)		(0.73)
Short middle vocational education or apprenticeship	1.21**	0.48	-0.50	-0.22	-0.06
					-0.02
Tertiary education					
Constant	1.52	-1.30	4.59***	3.45**	7.87***
	(0.83)	(1.01)	(1.12)	(1.21)	(1.59)
N	341	341	414	414	287
Pseudo-R2	0.09	0.25	0.11	0.17	0.09
					0.33
					0.42

* p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001

Notes: Bold coefficients indicate significant difference between the groups within a specific city.
Italics indicate difference within the second generation across cities within the same participating country.

Table 6.15 (continued)

	Germany						France					
	Gross			Gross - family			Gross			Gross - family		
	b/se	Std coeff		b/se	Std coeff	Net	b/se	Std coeff		b/se	Std coeff	Net
City-group (ref: Comparison group, secondary city)												
Comparison group, main city	0.12 (0.36)	0.06 (0.42)		-0.10 (0.42)	-0.04 (0.73)	0.03 (0.77)	-0.06 (0.73)	-0.03 (0.77)		-0.19 (0.77)	-0.08 (0.77)	-0.16 (0.77)
Turkish second generation, secondary city	-1.01*** (0.30)	-0.53 (0.36)		-0.54 (0.36)	-0.23 (0.38)	-0.09 (0.38)	-1.55*** (0.59)	-0.80 (0.61)		-0.78 (0.61)	-0.34 (0.65)	-0.61 (0.65)
Turkish second generation, main city	-1.22*** (0.31)	-0.64 (0.37)		-0.76* (0.37)	-0.32 (0.39)	-0.15 (0.39)	-1.64*** (0.63)	-0.84 (0.66)		-1.34* (0.66)	-0.57 (0.68)	-1.21 (0.68)
Age	-0.06** (0.02)	-0.03 (0.03)		0.12*** (0.03)	0.05 (0.04)	0.03 (0.04)	-0.06 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.04)		0.13* (0.06)	0.05 (0.06)	0.12 (0.06)
Partnership status (ref: No partner)												
With partner				-0.84* (0.36)	-0.36 (0.37)	-0.90* (0.37)				0.32 (0.63)	0.14 (0.65)	0.34 (0.65)
Child				-2.84*** (0.36)	-1.2 (0.37)	-2.76*** (0.37)				-3.03*** (0.72)	-1.3 (0.76)	-3.02*** (0.76)
Education (ref: Upper secondary vocational track or apprenticeship (3 or 4 years) and Upper secondary academic track)												
Lower secondary at the most						-1.03* (0.50)						-0.68 (0.57)
Short middle vocational education or apprenticeship						0.81 (0.31)						0.20 (0.08)
Tertiary education												
Constant	3.43*** (0.72)	-0.11 (0.90)				0.50 (1.08)						0.80 (1.73)
N	467	467		467	467	467				279	279	279
Pseudo-R2	0.06	0.30		0.30	0.37	0.37				0.20	0.21	0.21

* p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01; ****p < 0.001

Notes: Bold indicates significant difference between the groups within the same city.

Italics indicates difference within the second generation across cities within the same participating country.

Table 6.15 (continued)

	The Netherlands				Sweden			
	Gross		Gross - family		Gross		Gross - family	
	b/se	Std coeff	b/se	Std coeff	b/se	Std coeff	b/se	Std coeff
City-group (ref: Comparison group, secondary city)								
Comparison group, main city	-0.41 (0.52)	-0.21 (0.54)	-0.70 (0.54)	-0.31 (0.63)	-1.41* (0.63)	-0.55		
Turkish second generation, secondary city	-1.83*** (0.47)	-0.93 (0.49)	-1.35** (0.49)	-0.60 (0.52)	-1.22* (0.52)	-0.48	-0.27 (0.55)	-0.34
Turkish second generation, main city	-1.75*** (0.47)	-0.89 (0.49)	-1.33** (0.49)	-0.60 (0.53)	-1.38* (0.53)	-0.54		
Age	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.04)	0.08 (0.04)	0.03 (0.04)	0.00 (0.04)	0.00	0.04 (0.06)	0.05
Partnership status (ref: No partner)								
With partner			-0.07 (0.47)	-0.03 (0.49)	-0.22 (0.49)	-0.09	0.25 (0.62)	0.30
Child			-2.09*** (0.44)	-0.93 (0.47)	-1.67*** (0.47)	-0.65	-0.71 (0.69)	-0.84
Education (ref: Upper secondary vocational track or apprenticeship (3 or 4 years) and Upper secondary academic track)								
Lower secondary at the most					-1.52*** (0.39)	-0.59		0.10
Short middle vocational education or apprenticeship					-1.00* (0.51)	-0.39		0.19 (1.14)
Tertiary education					1.36* (0.66)	0.53		-0.28
Constant	2.94** (1.06)	1.53 (1.13)			3.94*** (1.33)		2.10 (1.57)	0.58 (1.77)
N	347	347	347	347	347	199	199	199
Pseudo-R2	0.09	0.20	0.20	0.30	0.30	0.06	0.06	0.07

* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001
Notes: Bold indicates significant difference between the groups within the same city.
Italics indicates difference within the second generation across cities within the same participating country.

Table 6.16 Analyses of unemployment: Gross and net effects

	Austria				Belgium				Switzerland				Germany			
	Gross		Net		Gross		Net		Gross		Net		Gross		Net	
	b/se	Std coeff	b/se	Std coeff	b/se	Std coeff	b/se	Std coeff	b/se	Std coeff	b/se	Std coeff	b/se	Std coeff	b/se	Std coeff
City-group (ref: Comparison group, secondary city)																
Comparison group, main city	1.34*	0.66	1.24*	0.57	0.91**	0.47	0.94**	0.47	-0.82	-0.38	-0.63	-0.29	0.65*	0.33	0.50	0.22
	(0.58)		(0.59)		(0.30)		(0.31)		(1.17)		(1.18)		(0.32)		(0.34)	
Turkish second generation, secondary city	1.66**	0.81	1.34*	0.63	0.92**	0.47	0.67*	0.34	0.70	0.32	0.18	0.08	-0.01	-0.01	-0.44	-0.20
	(0.59)		(0.61)		(0.29)		(0.30)		(0.71)		(0.75)		(0.36)		(0.38)	
Turkish second generation, main city	2.13***	1.05	1.83**	0.86	1.38***	0.71	1.23***	0.62	1.69**	0.78	1.52*	0.69*	0.74*	0.37	0.31	0.14
	(0.57)		(0.59)		(0.29)		(0.30)		(0.65)		(0.67)		(0.33)		(0.34)	
Woman	0.10	0.05	0.19	0.09	0.44*	0.23	0.54**	0.27	-0.23	-0.11	0.01	0.01	-0.26	-0.13	-0.09	-0.04
	(0.28)		(0.29)		(0.20)		(0.21)		(0.41)		(0.44)		(0.23)		(0.24)	
Age	-0.03	-0.01	-0.01	-0.00	-0.05*	-0.02	-0.03	-0.02	-0.10*	-0.05	-0.05	-0.02	-0.09***	-0.04	-0.05*	-0.02
	(0.03)		(0.03)		(0.02)		(0.02)		(0.05)		(0.05)		(0.02)		(0.03)	
Partnership status (ref: No partner)																
With partner	-0.83*	-0.41	-0.92*	-0.43	-0.69**	-0.35	-0.73***	-0.37	-0.47	-0.22	-0.55	-0.25	-0.96***	-0.48	-1.05***	-0.47
	(0.35)		(0.36)		(0.21)		(0.22)		(0.51)		(0.53)		(0.29)		(0.30)	

Table 6.16 (continued)

Education (ref: Upper secondary vocational track or apprenticeship (3 or 4 years) and Upper secondary academic track)									
Lower secondary at the most									
	1.57***	0.74	0.84**	0.42					
	(0.42)		(0.38)						
Short middle vocational education or apprenticeship									
	0.14	0.06	0.72***	0.36					
	(0.44)		(0.26)						
Tertiary education									
	-0.09	-0.04	-0.17	-0.09					
	(0.64)		(0.28)						
Constant									
	-2.60**		-0.91						
	(0.98)		(0.65)						
N	557		784						
Pseudo-R2	0.09		0.07						
			0.09						
			0.21						
			0.52						
			(0.68)						
			748						
			0.09						
			0.19						

* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001
Notes: Bold indicates significant difference between the groups within the same city.
Italics indicates difference within the second generation across cities within the same participating country.

Table 6.16 (continued)

	France				The Netherlands				Sweden			
	Gross		Net		Gross		Net		Gross		Net	
	b/se	Std coeff	b/se	Std coeff	b/se	Std coeff	b/se	Std coeff	b/se	Std coeff	b/se	Std coeff
City-group (ref: Comparison group, secondary city)												
Comparison group, main city	-0.97 (0.53)	-0.48	-1.02 (0.53)	-0.49	-1.41 (0.80)	-0.64	-1.34 (0.81)	-0.59				
Turkish second generation, secondary city	0.06 (0.39)	0.03	-0.30 (0.42)	-0.15	1.45** (0.45)	0.66	1.18* (0.46)	0.52				
Turkish second generation, main city	-1.16* (0.52)	-0.57	-1.40* (0.55)	-0.68	1.45** (0.46)	0.66	1.33** (0.47)	0.59	0.76 (0.46)	0.37 (0.48)	0.84 (0.48)	0.39
Woman	0.18 (0.31)	0.09	0.26 (0.32)	0.13	0.48 (0.31)	0.22	0.66* (0.32)	0.29	1.31** (0.47)	0.63 (0.50)	1.54** (0.50)	0.71
Age	-0.12** (0.04)	-0.06	-0.09* (0.04)	-0.05	-0.01 (0.04)	-0.00	0.02 (0.04)	0.01	-0.11* (0.05)	-0.06 (0.06)	-0.13* (0.06)	-0.06
Partnership status (ref: No partner)												
With partner	-0.61 (0.38)	-0.30	-0.72 (0.39)	-0.35	-0.63 (0.33)	-0.29	-0.66 (0.34)	-0.29	-0.23 (0.48)	-0.11 (0.49)	-0.38 (0.49)	-0.18
Education (ref: Upper secondary vocational track or apprenticeship (3 or 4 years) and Upper secondary academic track)												
Lower secondary at the most			0.27 (0.48)	0.13			0.90* (0.42)	0.40			1.63* (0.65)	0.75
Short middle vocational education or apprenticeship			0.27 (0.43)	0.13			1.46** (0.51)	0.65				
Tertiary education			-0.76 (0.46)	-0.37			-0.06 (0.50)	-0.02			0.97 (0.51)	0.45
	1.65 (1.09)		1.28 (1.12)		-2.71* (1.14)		-3.92** (1.22)		-0.68 (1.38)		-0.99 (1.51)	
N	458		458		590		590		375		375	
Pseudo-R2	0.11		0.12		0.13		0.17		0.11		0.15	

*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001

Notes: Bold indicates significant difference between the groups within the same city.

Italics indicates difference within the second generation across cities within the same participating country.

7 Union formation and partner choice

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7.1 Introduction

Partner choice and union formation are important events in the lives of young adults. The specific choices involved in these events are determined by a range of factors. For example, research indicates that social homogeneity plays an important role in partner choice. The timing of union formation is, moreover, strongly correlated with people's educational level and other social background characteristics. At the same time, common social patterns in partner selection and union formation do change over time and in the succession of generations. Two of the most significant changes to occur across Europe in recent decades are a considerable postponement of entry into union and parenthood and the marked decline of formal marriage. On one hand, these changes are linked to rising numbers of people in pursuit of higher education, thus leading to an older average age for completion of the educational career. On the other hand, there has been a widely acknowledged transformation of norms and values vis-à-vis sexuality and marriage. Though such trends vary by country (Sobotka & Toulemon 2008), they are quite well documented for Europe. The transformation first gained visibility in Sweden during the late 1960s, having gradually spread to Western Europe, Southern Europe (Prioux 2006) and, more recently, Eastern Europe (Atkinson & Marlier 2010). Prior research reveals gender differences in union formation behaviour, pointing out how women start unions earlier than men and choose partners who are, on the whole, slightly older than themselves (Kalmijn 2007; Liefbroer & Goldscheider 2006).

Unlike our knowledge about general trends in the European population, data concerning partner choice and union formation patterns among young adults of immigrant origin in Europe is limited. And that is despite – if not a very impetus for – widespread ‘folk’ ideas about immigrants, for example, their large, overly-populating families, their ‘conservative’ family values and their rules for partner choice, specifically for young women. The children of immigrants – a generation born and raised in Europe – find

themselves in a clearly different set of circumstances than their parents. These mothers and fathers comprising the first generation came as married couples or by large majority chose a partner from their country of origin upon founding a family. By contrast, the second generation's link with their parents' country of origin is not mediated by the personal experience of migration. Yet at the same time, these young adults find themselves in a position distinct from their peers with native-born parents. That is, the second generation's 'marriage market' also includes their parents' country of origin. Links created through regular visitations (for example, on holidays or for family gatherings), create opportunities for them to find potential partners there. Having two country contexts in which to find a partner also ushers in different sets – two at least – of norms, values and practices.

In many societies, union formation choices and related attitudes towards family are among the core values (Lesthaeghe 2000) transferred from parent to child (De Valk & Liefbroer 2007). Marriage among children raised in the country of immigration thus often becomes a particularly crucial issue in immigrant families, with the second generation being required to negotiate differences between their parents' cultural preferences and their own. Union formation patterns in Turkey and Morocco are markedly different from those in Europe in several respects. Marriage is practically universal in Turkey and Morocco. While marrying age remains low in Turkey (HUIPS 2004: 91), Morocco's has risen sharply in recent decades (Ouahad-Bedidi & Vallin 2000). The situation in former Yugoslavian countries differs less from that in North-Western Europe. Communism's collapse and the fall of the Iron Curtain in the late 1980s and early 1990s dramatically affected family life in Central and Eastern Europe. For one, it led to the lowest fertility rates in Europe. The economic crisis following the political developments, together with the end of family support policies and changes in family values, resulted in a dramatic decline in marriage and childbearing within marriage as well as a substantial increase in unmarried cohabitation and extramarital childbearing (Philipov & Dorbritz 2003). An interesting question for us to consider now thus concerns the union and family formation behaviour of the second generations of immigrant origin in Western Europe. How and to what degree are they reflections of their parents' countries of origin versus their own countries of birth? How do they represent the two respective cultures? And how do they mirror or deviate from actual circumstances in the 'motherland'?

Most available studies on children of immigrants do not allow us to distinguish between first and second generations, nor do they have a comparative focus across immigration countries or origin groups. The present chapter aims, therefore, to fill part of this gap by analysing the Turkish, Moroccan and former Yugoslavian second generations in comparison to their peers with native-born parents. We specifically focus on the transition to first union: its timing, the prevalence of different types of union

(marriage or cohabitation), the partners' origins and socio-demographic characteristics and the share of transnational or mixed unions. We endeavour to unravel how socio-economic and migration background characteristics interact with decisions by the second generation regarding union formation. How and to what extent are their union formation choices affected by structural constraints, by the local or national context in which they live and/or by individual preferences? Observed variation between countries and between cities is discussed in relation to the history of Turkish, Moroccan and former Yugoslavian migration, as well as the size of the marriage market in each country. We assess to what extent young adults of immigrant parentage follow common paths of union formation in their parents' country of origin or take other routes. We also look at the commonalities and differences between young adults of Turkish, Moroccan and former Yugoslavian descent and their peers of non-immigrant parentage in selected European cities.

7.2 Transition to first union

Union formation in Morocco, Turkey and former Yugoslavia

Entry into partnership is one of the key markers for the transition to adulthood. The Turkish and Moroccan and, albeit to a lesser extent, former Yugoslavian parents of respondents to the TIES survey come from places where, unlike Western countries, marriage is virtually universal and unmarried cohabitation remains rare (Locoh & Ouadah-Bedidi 2010). In Morocco, sexual activity outside marriage is considered prostitution; unmarried cohabitation is hence illegal. Unmarried people who engage in sexual intercourse can be jailed under article 490 of the Moroccan penal code, even though the law is rarely invoked today. Despite major improvements in women's rights, recent reforms to Moroccan legislation – notably in 2004 to the personal status code, the *Mudawana* (see Zoglin 2009) – have basically left this situation unchanged.

In Turkey, the 2001 reform of the civil code and the 2004 reform of the penal code eliminated references to patriarchal concepts such as morality, chastity and honour, as well as abolished previous practices of discrimination towards unmarried women with children. It also recognised women's autonomy over their own bodies and sexuality, though the practice of 'virginity testing' – commonly used in the 1990s by government physicians on prostitutes or women accused of extramarital sex (Parla 2001) – has not been explicitly banned in all circumstances (Anil 2005; Ilkcaracan 2007). In both countries, though especially in Morocco, practices and opinions surrounding sexuality and gender roles have changed among the younger generation; that being said, regulations regarding sexual activity remain particularly strict.

Turkey and Morocco differ markedly when it comes to the timing of union formation. This is the case despite the countries' common heritage of a 'culture of honour and shame' (Peristiany 1965) that makes women's premarital virginity a matter of the family's reputation (Parla 2001; Ozyegin 2009) and despite the fact that marriage is practically universal. According to the 2003 Turkish Demographic and Health Survey, the median age of first-time marriage among women aged 25-29 was 21, while for women aged 45-49 it was nineteen; this indicates a two-year increase occurred over twenty years. Only 3 per cent of the women aged 40-44 never married (HUIPS 2004). The relatively young age at the first union formation correlates with low levels of educational attainment. In Morocco, by contrast, the changes began earlier and are more pronounced: first-time marriage age has risen drastically in the last decades, with an age increase of almost eight years since the 1960s (Ouadah-Bedidi & Vallin 2000). The median age at first marriage among women aged 25-29 in 2004 was 24 (Loudghiri 2003), which is comparable to that in some European countries (Sobotka & Toulemon 2008). Many young men and women today also remain single longer. Demographers see this as a sign that for younger generations the universality of marriage – and hence the norm of premarital virginity – are under challenge (Locoh & Ouadah-Bedidi 2010). Because of the Moroccan law, the young generation cannot openly contest norms on marriage and virginity, but ethnographic research, especially on abortion and single motherhood, has shown that their actual hold is weakening. Still, single mothers suffer from stigmatisation and social isolation (Naamane-Guessous 1985).

Data on union formation in former Yugoslavia give an incomplete picture, as no fertility or family surveys have recently been conducted in those countries. In addition, unmarried cohabitation is not recorded in the census (Thornton & Philipov 2009). We can only present the mean first-time marriage age in 1980 and 2000, having risen from 22.5 to 25 in Serbia and Montenegro; from 22 to 25 in Croatia; and from 22 to 23 in Bosnia and Herzegovina (between 1980 and 1990, data unavailable for 2000) (Billari 2005).

Partnership experiences of the TIES respondents

Across the board, TIES respondents are young adults who, at the time of the survey, may or may not have already entered into a partnership. In the section that follows, we define 'union' as simply the formation of a co-residential partnership, without differentiating between marriages and cohabitations. [Tables 7.1a](#) and [7.1b](#) provide a first descriptive overview of young adults who entered a first union.

Given that men and women from the same origin group and living in the same city are roughly the same age, our comparison by sex is relevant.

Table 7.1a Respondents who have ever lived in a union (in %), by city, origin and sex in Austria, Switzerland, Germany and Sweden

		Turkish second generation			Former Yugoslavian second generation			Comparison group		
		Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total
Austria	Ever lived in union	45.8	48.3	47.1	44.4	43.6	43.9	33.6	35.5	34.4
	N	210	244	454	229	264	493	223	250	473
Vienna	Ever lived in union	40.6	60.2	50.4	43.0	47.9	45.4	34.6	35.4	35.0
	N	109	141	250	123	129	252	130	113	243
Linz	Ever lived in union	50.9	36.3	43.7	45.7	39.2	42.4	32.5	34.9	33.7
	N	101	103	204	106	135	241	93	137	230
Switzerland	Ever lived in union	29.5	31.6	30.5	33.9	40.8	37.4	37.4	40.3	38.9
	N	242	261	503	196	210	406	240	228	468
Zurich	Ever lived in union	26.7	29.7	28.2	36.0	43.4	39.5	36.5	41.1	39.0
	N	103	103	206	125	110	235	93	109	202
Basel	Ever lived in union	32.2	33.4	32.8	31.7	38.2	35.3	38.2	39.5	38.8
	N	131	117	248	84	107	191	147	119	266
Germany	Ever lived in union	35.4	46.2	40.8	39.1	45.2	42.3	39.1	41.2	40.1
	N	242	261	503	196	210	406	240	263	503
Berlin	Ever lived in union	40.7	46.7	43.7	44.7	58.0	51.7	34.2	35.2	34.7
	N	141	112	253	98	104	202	137	113	250
Frankfurt	Ever lived in union	30.1	45.6	37.8	33.4	32.4	32.9	43.9	47.1	45.5
	N	101	149	250	98	106	204	103	150	253
Sweden/ Stockholm	Ever lived in union	38.0	38.3	38.1	-	-	-	45.8	61.5	53.6
	N	124	127	251	-	-	-	123	127	250

Source: TIES survey 2007-2008

Table 7.1b Respondents who have ever lived in a union (in %), by city, origin and sex in Belgium, France and the Netherlands

		Turkish second generation			Moroccan second generation			Comparison group		
		Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total
Belgium	Ever lived in union	48.8	54.4	51.6	34.6	46.2	40.3	28.4	37.3	32.8
	N	333	269	602	242	315	557	274	284	558
Brussels	Ever lived in union	55.1	59.4	57.3	41.4	56.4	48.9	33.6	42.2	37.9
	N	178	180	358	118	193	311	158	143	301
Antwerp	Ever lived in union	42.5	49.3	45.8	27.7	35.9	31.7	23.2	32.3	27.6
	N	155	89	244	124	122	246	116	141	257
France	Ever lived in union	18.7	32.8	26.0	-	-	-	43.6	49.6	46.6
	N	217	280	497	-	-	-	162	185	347
Paris	Ever lived in union	12.3	22.4	16.5	-	-	-	45.5	52.5	49.1
	N	121	126	247	-	-	-	81	92	173
Strasbourg	Ever lived in union	25.0	43.2	35.4	-	-	-	41.7	46.7	44.1
	N	96	154	250	-	-	-	81	93	174
The Netherlands	Ever lived in union	33.9	45.7	39.5	15.2	28.9	22.2	42.6	45.1	43.7
	N	241	258	499	243	244	487	248	261	509
Amsterdam	Ever lived in union	30.6	46.0	37.9	14.7	29.2	21.9	46.4	41.6	43.9
	N	109	128	237	118	120	238	122	135	257
Rotterdam	Ever lived in union	37.2	45.3	41.1	15.6	28.5	22.4	38.7	48.5	43.4
	N	132	130	262	125	124	249	126	126	252
Spain	Ever lived in union	-	-	-	14.1	19.9	17.0	16.6	20.3	18.6
	N	-	-	-	36	49	85	38	55	93
Madrid	Ever lived in union	-	-	-	14.1	17.9	16.0	14.0	18.0	16.4
	N	-	-	-	18	22	40	14	27	41
Barcelona	Ever lived in union	-	-	-	14.1	22.0	18.0	18.6	23.1	20.8
	N	-	-	-	18	27	45	24	28	52

Source: TIES survey 2007-2008

In line with previous studies, we mostly found that more women than men had already formed a first union (tables 7.1a and 7.1b). With a few exceptions, this holds true for women of all origins in our study, indicating that, regardless of people's background, there are similar gender-related mechanisms at work.

The direct comparison across groups and cities is not meaningful. This is because there are too many potential explanations for variation between cities with regard to the proportion of those who ever formed a union within each group, as well as across groups in the same city. Possible influential factors include respective social norms about 'ideal' ages and stages in a person's life for forming a union, the variation in the respondents' mean age and differences in respondents' level of education (see chapter 5). The following subsections endeavour to more specifically assess these influential factors at different levels. It is worth mentioning that the very young age structure of the Spanish sample is reflected in very low shares of persons who have ever lived in a union. For this reason, the Spanish case is excluded from the following analyses; case numbers are simply too small.

Age at first union formation

Although the descriptive findings yield some initial insights, they are limited in that they lack background information on *when* the young adults entered a first union. We consequently analyse the role of age in the transition to a first union by using event-history techniques and presenting the Kaplan-Meier survival estimates, which yields the estimated share of persons who enter a union and when they do so. This section analyses the role of age in the transition to a first union for men and women, respectively. A crucial indicator here is the median age at which 50 per cent of the respondents have ever had formed a union. Tables 7.2a and 7.2b give detailed information on the median ages.

Overall, we find that second-generation Turks are youngest when starting a union and the comparison group is oldest. Those of Moroccan and former Yugoslavian origin fall somewhere in between. This general pattern by origin group holds for all countries. As expected, women are generally younger upon entering their first union than men. The gender difference is, on average, 1.7 years in the comparison groups and two and three years, respectively, for second-generation Turks and Moroccans. At less than one year, the gender gap is smallest for second-generation former Yugoslavians.

To facilitate the cross-country comparison, we also analysed the findings for second-generation Turks separately by sex. Figures 7.1a and 7.1b provide an overview by country (with two cities collapsed) of the share of men and women aged 15-30 who had *not* entered a first union at a given age.

Table 7.2a Median age at first union, by country, city, sex and origin

Country/city	Turkish second generation			Former Yugoslavian second generation				Comparison group				
	Women	Men	Together	Gender gap	Women	Men	Together	Gender gap	Women	Men	Together	Gender gap
Austria	21.8	23.3	23.0	1.5	23.0	24.9	24.0	1.9	25.0	28.2	25.8	3.2
Vienna	21.2	24.8	23.2	3.6	22.1	23.4	22.9	1.3	24.1	29.8	26.0	5.7
Linz	22.2	23.3	23.0	1.1	24.0	26.5	25.2	2.5	25.5	25.5	25.5	0.0
Switzerland	25.0	26.1	25.8	1.1	-	-	-	-	26.0	28.7	27.2	2.7
Zurich	25.8	28.9	28.0	3.1	-	-	-	-	26.2	28.7	27.3	2.5
Basel	23.3	24.3	23.9	1.0	-	-	-	-	26.0	28.8	27.3	2.8
Germany	25.1	26.0	25.5	0.9	26.4	26.4	26.4	0.0	27.4	28.0	27.8	0.6
Berlin	24.9	25.2	25.1	0.3	25.6	26.4	26.0	0.8	30.1	28.8	30.4	-1.3
Frankfurt	25.2	27.0	26.0	1.8	28.0	27.0	27.7	-1.0	26.3	27.2	26.8	0.9
Sweden	23.2	25.7	24.7	2.5	-	-	-	-	23.5	25.5	24.7	2.0
Stockholm	23.2	25.7	24.7	2.5	-	-	-	-	23.5	25.5	24.7	2.0

Source: TIES survey 2007-2008


(Kaplan-Meier survival estimates)

Table 7.2b *Median age at first union, by country, city, sex and origin*

Country/city	Turkish second generation				Moroccan second generation				Comparison group			
	Men		Women		Men		Women		Men		Women	
	Together	Gender gap	Together	Gender gap	Together	Gender gap	Together	Gender gap	Together	Gender gap	Together	Gender gap
Belgium	22.3	25.0	23.8	2.7	23.2	25.2	25.2	2.0	26.2	28.2	26.8	2.0
Brussels	22.4	24.8	24.2	2.4	24.0	27.8	26.7	3.8	27.5	28.8	27.5	1.3
Antwerp	22.3	25.3	23.6	3.0	23.0	28.4	24.7	5.4	25.8	28.2	26.7	2.4
France	23.7	26.1	25.0	2.4	-	-	-	-	24.9	26.9	25.8	2.0
Paris	25.3	26.1	25.9	0.8	-	-	-	-	24.9	28.2	26.2	3.3
Strasbourg	22.8	26.1	23.6	3.3	-	-	-	-	24.1	25.1	25.1	1.0
The Netherlands	22.8	24.7	24.1	24.1	25.6	27.7	26.8	2.1	26.1	27.3	26.8	1.2
Amsterdam	22.8	25.6	23.6	23.6	24.3	27.8	27.0	3.5	27.7	26.8	27.2	-0.9
Rotterdam	22.8	24.3	24.1	24.1	26.6	27.3	26.8	0.7	24.7	28.1	26.4	3.4


Source: TIES survey 2007-2008
(Kaplan-Meier survival estimates)

Figure 7.1a *Transition to a first union of second-generation Turkish women across countries*



Source: TIES survey 2007-2008

Figure 7.1b *Transition to a first union of second-generation Turkish men across countries*



Source: TIES survey 2007-2008

In the two Austrian cities, the formation of the first union among second-generation Turks is earliest (median age 23). The oldest union formation ages are found in Germany (25.5) and the two Swiss cities (25.8), thus revealing a difference of 2.8 years between Austria and Switzerland. If we focus solely on women, only in Austria is the age at first union comparable to that of Turkey (around 21). In all other countries, young second-generation Turkish women form a union later than the average age in Turkey.


Interestingly, as [figures 7.2a](#) and [7.2b](#) show, the results for the comparison groups are more heterogeneous across countries.

The cross-country comparison shows a different ranking of cities for the comparison groups. We find the lowest median age for entering a first union in Stockholm (24.7 years). As with second-generation Turks, the Swiss and German cities' comparison groups show the highest median age for the first stable union (27.2 and 27.8, respectively).


In sum, the suggestion is that national and local contexts sway union formation patterns in the Turkish second generation. This influence, however, is neither straightforward nor all-encompassing. The overall variation in timing across countries is not reflected identically among the second generations, though they do seem to follow the respective dominant pattern to a degree. In Germany and Switzerland the correlation is closer, while in Austria and Sweden, far less.

To better understand the influence of the national and city contexts on second-generation Turks, [figure 7.3a](#) compares this group with the comparison group in each country by sex. (For figures on second-generation Moroccans, see [figures 7.4](#) in appendix; for second-generation former Yugoslavians, see [figure 7.5](#) in appendix.)


Stockholm is a particularly interesting case for analysis here. In Sweden, as in other Scandinavian countries, young people leave the parental home earlier than in the rest of Europe (Van de Velde 2008b). This reflects the social importance attached to an individual's autonomy and independence, though is undoubtedly also facilitated by generous levels of public financial support (Van de Velde 2008a). Such subsidies allow individuals to leave the parental home even if they have not completed their education or lack permanent employment. Combined with the fact that there are few moral restrictions for unmarried couples, young adults in Sweden can move in together more easily than in countries where access to independent housing may be more complicated. It is remarkable that in Stockholm we see no difference in the median age for the transition to first union between second-generation Turks and the comparison group. We identify at least three possible explanations for this. First, the Swedish welfare state system reduces the role that different social backgrounds may have in accessing housing, thus offering opportunities that are exploited as much by second-generation Turks as the comparison group. In this sense, the Swedish welfare system produces a levelling-out effect by reducing

Figure 7.2a *Transition to a first union of comparison group women*

Source: TIES survey 2007-2008

Figure 7.2b *Transition to a first union of comparison group men*

Source: TIES survey 2007-2008

Figure 7.3a *Transition to a first union in Sweden*


Source: TIES survey 2007-2008

differences between poor and wealthy families across ethnic groups. A second possible explanation is that young adults of Turkish parentage follow the traditional Turkish pattern of early marriage, which is indeed facilitated by – though not contingent on – the welfare system (Bernhardt, Goldscheider, Goldscheider & Bjerer 2007). In this respect, we therefore see that second-generation Turks in Sweden do not differ from this group as studied in other European countries. Meanwhile, such a parallel is not seen in Sweden's comparison group, who form first unions at a slightly younger age than comparison groups in other European countries, thereby increasing their union formation semblance with their Turkish peers. Yet a third possible explanation for the correspondence in median age at transition into first union between Sweden's Turkish second generation and comparison group is that at least part of this second-generation does not follow the aforementioned early marriage pattern; like comparison group couples, Turkish couples do form their own households quite young, but these are unmarried cohabitational arrangements. We expect to draw some

conclusions concerning these explanations in [section 7.3](#). There we examine preferred types of union (marriage or cohabitation) and opinions on female premarital sexual activity, which gives insight into whether early union formation may be associated with, or disconnected from, early marriage and notions of chastity.

Following Stockholm, the French cities have the next-youngest age for first union formation in the comparison groups (see [figure 7.3b](#)). As in Sweden, access to housing in France is available for students in higher education (Corijn 2001). This provides opportunities for young people to cohabitate.¹ At the same time, France is also characterised by high levels of unemployment among young adults, which can potentially generate a postponement of first union formation. Second-generation Turkish men in the French cities show almost the same first union entrance pattern as the comparison group, though their female counterparts deviate from the main

Figure 7.3b *Transition to a first union in France*




Source: TIES survey 2007-2008

trend, thus enlarging the gender gap among our Turkish respondents. The following paragraphs examine this further.

In the two Austrian cities, both male and female second-generation Turks enter a first union much earlier than males and females in the comparison group (see [figure 7.3c](#)). Previous research on the majority group's transition to adulthood in Austria (Pfeiffer & Vera Nowak 2001) has revealed the influence of the educational path chosen. As referred to in German, the 'dual system of vocational education', which consists of half-time education at school and half-time on-the-job training at a company, offers good access opportunities to a first job right after finishing one's education and at a relatively early age. Leaving the parental home and first union formation are thus timed in quite close succession. The earlier first union formation among second-generation Turks might at least partly reflect these respondents' much higher numbers in vocational education and the consequent earlier completion of education (which also means *not* entering into the dual system; for more details on educational choices, see [chapter 5](#)).

Figure 7.3c *Transition to a first union in Austria*




Source: TIES survey 2007-2008


Germany has one of the latest patterns of entry into union. Leaving the parental home and first union formation occur, as in Austria, in close succession and after access to paid employment (Hullen 2001). Second-generation Turkish women enter earlier into their first union than the comparison group, but the gender difference is quite small compared to some other countries.²

The Swiss case is similar to the German, albeit with a few differences (see figure 7.3e). Like Germany, Switzerland has a dual school system. Unlike in other European countries, however, first union timing for the comparison group is not accounted for by entrance into the labour market. Rather, it seems to be something chosen by the young adults themselves (Thomsin, Le Goff & Sauvain-Dugerdil 2004). A relatively large share of the comparison group remains outside a union until age 30. Young second-generation Turkish women and men form their first union much earlier than the comparison group. Whereas in Sweden we found mainly gender differences and a relatively limited variation by origin, second-generation

Figure 7.3d *Transition to a first union in Germany*



Source: TIES survey 2007-2008

Figure 7.3e *Transition to a first union in Switzerland*

Source: TIES survey 2007-2008

Turks in Switzerland have almost identical patterns of first union formation. The relatively small gender differences among the second-generation Turks in Germany and Switzerland was not found in the other surveyed countries.

Belgium and the Netherlands show much commonality across all groups (see figures 7.6a and 7.6b in appendix). In both countries, second-generation Turkish women are the youngest to enter a first union; falling between them and the comparison group males are second-generation Turkish males and comparison group females. In the Netherlands, the union formation pattern of second-generation Moroccan women is close to that of comparison group women. By age 30, around a third of these women (like their male Moroccan and male comparison group peers) have still not formed a first union.

Factors influencing the transition to a first union

The second stage in the event-history analyses focuses on mechanisms driving the start of a first union. We estimated piecewise-constant intensity regression models. All analyses were performed separately for men and women by origin group. Since we found largely similar patterns for men and women, we present here only the findings for women of different origins (for findings for men, see [table 7.12a](#) in appendix).

[Table 7.3a](#) shows clear differences in entry to a first union for women across the different countries.³ As presented above, comparison group women in all countries enter the first union later than women in Sweden (model 1). The transition to the first union occurs particularly late in Germany.

Model 2 adds a number of control variables such as birth cohort, education, religion, number of siblings, father's education and age. Previous studies have found that educational enrolment is associated with delaying the first union. However, the effects of the educational level seem to be of little importance in the comparison groups. Education only significantly postpones first union formation when respondents are still enrolled in some educational institution. Also, no effects were found for religious upbringing, the presence of siblings or father's education.

This picture looks different when we focus on second-generation Turks in various European countries. The first model includes only the respondents' age and country of residence. Among second-generation Turkish women, we found a postponed union formation tendency in France and, in particular, Germany and Switzerland (model 1). As this pattern highly resembles findings in the comparison groups, we see a potential correlation with factors of context to which both the majority groups as well as the second generations are exposed.

The second model introduces additional individual and family characteristics, thus neutralising the potential effects of differences between cities in the social composition of groups. For respondents of the same age, coming from the same level of education, social background and situation regarding educational enrolment, the likelihood of entering a first union remains lower in Germany and Switzerland than in the other surveyed countries. This indicates that in these countries national patterns of transition to adulthood are more influential. In all the countries, the likelihood of first union formation is lower for the second generation's younger birth cohort (i.e. those born between 1981 and 1990) than the older cohort (i.e. those born between 1970 and 1980). Being enrolled as a student is a significant factor in postponing union formation for second-generation Turkish women. The model shows no effect from the father's educational level; a reason may well be the very low educational level of the great majority of the fathers.

Table 7.3a *Relative risks in transition to a first union for comparison group and second-generation Turkish women*

Variable	Turkish second generation		Comparison group	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2
Sweden (ref.)	1	1	1	1
France	0.88	0.82	0.65 **	0.65 **
The Netherlands	1.17	0.98	0.57 ***	0.58 ***
Germany	0.72 *	0.47 ***	0.44 ***	0.35 ***
Austria	1.17	0.95	0.67 ***	0.62 **
Switzerland	0.68 *	0.58 **	0.60 ***	0.57 ***
Belgium	1.12	0.89	0.55 ***	0.55 ***
Birth cohort				
1971-1980		1		1
1981-1990		0.8 **		1.05 **
Education				
Primary/special education		0.88		1.29
Lower secondary		1		1
Apprenticeship		0.65 ***		1.11
Upper secondary/ apprenticeship		0.55 ***		0.83
Tertiary		0.31 ***		0.76
Enrolment in education		0.19 ***		0.52 ***
Religion during childhood				
Muslim (ref.)		1		n.a.
None, Jewish or other		1.04		1
Christian		0.72		1.01
Number of siblings				
0 (ref.)		1		1
1 or 2		1.89 *		1.17
3+		2.37 **		1.18
Father's education				
Primary or less		1		1
Secondary		1.04		1.06
Tertiary		1.02		0.95
Age in years				
18-20	0.004 ***	0.005 ***	0.003 ***	0.004 ***
20-25	0.012 ***	0.016 ***	0.013 ***	0.014 ***
25-30	0.011 ***	0.013 ***	0.017 ***	0.020 ***
30-35	0.013 ***	0.015 ***	0.013 ***	0.014 ***
Log likelihood	-1390.7	-1151.7	-1332.8	-1227.0

* = 5%; ** = 1%; *** = 0.1%

Note: Education variables each contain a small number of missing values without significant impact

Source: TIES survey 2007-2008

The effect of an Islamic upbringing seems no different from that of being brought up with another religion or in a non-religious context. Family size, however, as indicated by the number of siblings, is clearly related to union formation. Second-generation Turkish women with many siblings are considerably more likely to have entered a union than those with few or no siblings. This could indicate that families with more children hold more traditional views on gender roles and the timing of union formation. An alternative explanation could be that in large families domestic overcrowding gives daughters an incentive to move out, thus living with a partner sooner than those who have no siblings at home.

Our findings on second-generation Moroccans, as studied in the Netherlands and Belgium, are summarised in the appendix (for women, see [table 7.12b](#); for men, see [table 7.12c](#)). Among the women in this group, education was found to be an important factor: namely, higher levels of educational attainment led to union formation postponement. Chances of entering a union were again lower for the younger cohort of second-generation Moroccan women. Other family characteristics did not seem to be significant determinants.

Our findings on second-generation former Yugoslavian women, as studied in Germany and Austria, are also summarised in the appendix (for women, see [table 7.12b](#); for men, see [table 7.12c](#)). Again, we find clear educational differences that are fully consistent with what was found for the second generation of other origins: enrolment in education and higher educational attainment are both associated with lower transition rates into a union. Once again, we see that having more siblings significantly increases the likelihood of entering a union. At the same time, the father's educational level and religion do not have the expected effect and seem unrelated to the first union formation of female second-generation former Yugoslavians.

In sum, educational attainment and sibling numbers are the most important factors for the timing of first unions in all three second-generation groups, but not for the comparison groups. The weaker role of education for the comparison groups may have to do with the fact that postponing union formation is a sort of generalised pattern in the majority population, whereas the educated second generation may be forerunners at adopting new union formation behaviour. The same applies to sibling numbers: since having many siblings is quite an exception in the majority population, this cannot play a role comparable to the one it does for second-generation women. For second-generation men, educational attainment seems to have less impact on union formation behaviour.

7.3 Type of first union: Marriage and unmarried cohabitation

Many young Europeans nowadays start a union by living together in an unmarried partnership. Scholars have noted that young adults delay commitments and are more individualised than in the past (Lesthaeghe & Van de Kaa 1986), trends which have been linked to the emergence of less standardised life courses and new types of partner relationships (Elzinga & Liefbroer 2007). Directly entering into marriage has become much less common and, in many European countries, unmarried cohabitation has established itself as a recognised form of partnership alongside marriage. Also, a substantial proportion of young adults continues to marry after having cohabited with a partner for some time (Billari & Wilson 2001). The extent of unmarried cohabitation, however, varies widely across Europe. It is most common in Sweden, France and Germany (Billari & Wilson 2001).

By contrast, most immigrants originate from countries where the first union is almost without exception a marital union. Few studies, however, have focused on the type of union chosen specifically by the second generation in different contexts. De Valk (2007) has shown that premarital cohabitation is the preferred option for a growing proportion of young adults of Turkish and Moroccan origin in the Netherlands, whereas Milewski and Hamel (2010) have shown that young men and women of Turkish origin in France do prefer marriage over consensual union. Are the young adults interviewed for the TIES survey opting for unmarried cohabitation – as are the majority populations where they live – or for marital union? [Tables 7.4a](#) and [7.4b](#) provide a descriptive overview of the findings.

The vast majority of second-generation Turkish women's first unions are marital. Proportions of marital unions are highest in Belgium (95 per cent) and France (90 per cent); this reveals the strong influence of Turkish norms on the second generation's affective life – notably in France, given that unmarried cohabitation is quite universal here. The lowest rate of marriage is found in Switzerland, even though it remains high at 73 per cent. For second-generation Turkish men, percentages are on the whole lower than for women. The lowest shares are again found in Switzerland, where only 60 per cent live with a spouse, while the rate of consensual unions in the comparison group is not higher in this country than any others. Following Switzerland, Sweden has the second-lowest country rate of marriage among second-generation Turks. In other words, in these two countries, young second-generation Turkish adults follow the 'Turkish pattern' of marriage to a lesser extent than others.

For second-generation Moroccans – although marriage again accounts for the majority of first unions – percentages of those cohabiting are substantial, particularly for men, and more so in the Netherlands than in Belgium. The difference between the countries of residence is remarkable,

Table 7.4a *Type of first union (in %), by group, sex and country*

		Turkish second generation			Former Yugoslavian second generation			Comparison group		
		Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total
Austria (Vienna & Linz)	Married	73.6	86.8	81.2	59.4	67.6	64.0	25.5	37.4	32.0
	Not married N	26.4	13.2	18.8	40.6	32.4	36.0	74.5	62.6	68.0
		89	121	210	111	143	254	86	105	191
Switzerland (Zurich & Basel)	Married	60.3	72.8	66.8	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	34.4	40.4	37.5
	Not married N	39.7	27.2	33.2	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	65.6	59.6	62.5
		82	89	171	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	109	120	229
Germany (Berlin & Frankfurt)	Married	74.2	88.0	82.0	58.5	65.6	62.3	38.8	45.1	42.4
	Not married N	25.8	12.0	18.0	41.5	34.4	37.7	61.2	54.9	57.6
		98	127	225	88	103	191	95	124	219
Sweden (Stockholm)	Married	70.1	78.4	74.5	-	-	-	19.3	23.5	21.6
	Not married N	29.9	21.6	25.5	-	-	-	80.8	76.5	78.4
		64	71	135	-	-	-	78	99	177

Note: Data for former Yugoslavian second generation in Switzerland unavailable because questions on first union were not asked here.

Source: TIES survey 2007-2008

Table 7.4b *Type of first union (in %), by group, sex and country*

		Turkish second generation			Moroccan second generation			Comparison group		
		Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total
Belgium (Antwerp & Brussels)	Married	93.8	95.3	94.5	80.4	94.8	90.4	27.6	42.0	35.9
	Not married N	6.2 167	4.7 153	5.5 320	19.6 79	5.3 182	9.6 261	72.4 101	58.0 136	64.1 237
France (Paris & Strasbourg)	Married	84.6	90.0	88.3	-	-	-	1.6	1.2	1.4
	Not married N	15.4 52	10.0 115	11.3 167	-	-	-	98.4 68	98.9 96	98.7 164
The Netherlands (Amsterdam & Rotterdam)	Married	81.2	84.9	83.4	65.4	75.6	71.9	23.9	25.7	24.9
	Not married N	18.8 101	15.1 141	16.6 242	34.6 49	24.4 87	28.1 136	76.1 131	74.3 148	75.1 279

Source: TIES survey 2007-2008

with second-generation Moroccan men and women in the Netherlands much more frequently cohabiting than their counterparts in Belgium.

Of the three origin groups, the least likely to form marital unions is the second-generation former Yugoslavians (see table 4a). Although cohabitation is much more common in this group than in the other two second generations, the shares of cohabitants are still below those in the respective countries' majority populations. Between one third and half of former Yugoslavian second-generation men formed an unmarried cohabiting union. For women, too, unmarried cohabitation is far from exceptional. The proportion of cohabiting unions is slightly higher for both male and female respondents in Germany than in Austria.

Factors shaping the choice for marriage versus unmarried cohabitation

The choice for marriage versus unmarried cohabitation has been linked in the literature to both individual preferences and parental socialisation. But as Kalmijn (1998) has pointed out, opportunity structures also impact union formation. It is relevant that state rules for acquiring a residency status and citizenship may influence the second generation's choice of type of union if their partner is an immigrant. In the majority of European countries, marriage still confers more extensive rights than cohabitation; a legal permit to stay is hard to obtain through other means. These legal issues can be expected to be more significant for second-generation Moroccans and Turks than for those of former Yugoslavian origin. At the same time, cultural aspects may play a role in people's preference for marriage, especially when it comes to the importance attached to female chastity. These possible explanatory factors should be kept in mind when interpreting the following findings on the preferences for marriage or cohabitation.

Our analyses of the second generation's choice of union focuses mainly on individual and family characteristics, as regularly applied in the literature. Table 7.5a shows findings of the logistic regression analyses. The first model looks at the effect of respondents' social characteristics (sex, place of residence, cohort and educational level) on the likelihood of marriage over cohabitation. The second model adds the respondents' family characteristics (religion practised during childhood, number of siblings and father's level of education). The two models are presented separately for the comparison group and second-generation Turks.

The first model's findings for the comparison groups show that women are more likely than men to have formed a marital union, though the significance of this observation is weak. We also find cross-national differences in likelihood of being married when differences in education level and age of the studied populations across cities are neutralised. At the same age and with the same education level, respondents from the comparison group are more than twice as likely to be in a married union in Germany,

Table 7.5a *Factors influencing marriage versus unmarried cohabitation for Turkish second-generation and comparison group, by group (odds ratios)*

Variable	Turkish second generation		Comparison group	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2
Men	1	1	1	1
Women	1.83 ***	1.8 ***	1.36 *	1.43 [0.007]
Sweden	1	1	1	1
France	1.52	1.22	0.08 ***	0.06 ***
The Netherlands	1.49	1.11	1.16	1.17
Germany	0.96	0.73	2.60 ***	2.44 **
Austria	0.99	0.93	1.63	1.49
Switzerland	0.62 *	0.56 [0.059]	2.16 **	2.40 **
Belgium	4.30 ***	4.03 ***	2.04 *	2.06 *
Birth cohort				
1971-1980	1	1	1	1
1981-1990	0.52 ***	0.52 ***	0.19 ***	0.18 ***
Education				
Primary/special education	1.32	1.33	0.35	0.33
Lower secondary	1	1	1	1
Apprenticeship	1.49	1.52 [0.098]	1.33	1.37
Upper secondary/ apprenticeship	0.93 [0.086]	1.22	1.10	1.08
Tertiary	0.53 ***	0.70	0.93	1.03
Religion during childhood				
Muslim		2.06 ***		21.4 **
None or other		1		1
Number of siblings				
0		1		1
1 or 2		2.41 *		0.73 [0.095]
3+		3.50 **		0.97
Father's education				
Primary or less		1		1
Secondary		0.92		0.95
Tertiary		0.32 ***		0.65
Log likelihood	-609.5	-527.5	-787.9	-733.4

*=5%; **=1%; ***=0.1%.

Notes: Education variables each contain a small number of missing values without significant impact (not displayed here).

Source: TIES survey 2007-2008

Switzerland and Belgium than comparison group respondents in Sweden or France. Differences between the other countries are not significant. We also find that the younger cohort is less often married than the older cohort, indicating that marriage is still losing its importance, though no overall differences by education level are found. Introducing parental background and socialisation characteristics in model 2 does not change these findings. In the comparison group choice of type of first union appears unrelated to either parental education or sibling numbers.

The factors influencing the likelihood of marriage are not exactly the same for second-generation Turks. Women are more likely to have gotten married than men in this group, but this gender gap is much more pronounced than in the comparison group and appears to be highly significant. Moreover, the fact remains after controlling for family background characteristics in model 2. In sum, at the same age, with the same education level, same social background, same number of siblings and same religion during childhood, second-generation Turks are far more likely to be married in Belgium than in any other country (with Sweden as the reference category). The higher proportion of marriages in Belgium is thus not due to a higher proportion of lower-educated people there. Important factors here could be the level of group cohesion, endogamy and, partially related to this, likelihood of choosing a partner from Turkey. (We will come back to this in the next paragraph.) Switzerland also appears to be a country where the likelihood of marriage for young second-generation Turkish men and women is lower than in Sweden. This reveals how the national norm of unmarried cohabitation here influences the second generations' practices, which does not seem to be the case in the other countries, where observed variations of marriage rates are mainly due to variations in respondents' education levels across cities.

Our analyses, furthermore, point to the younger cohort of second-generation Turks as being less likely to be married, with the same holding true for those with tertiary education. Thus, marriage is slightly tending to lose its importance among second-generation Turks, though this process is less pronounced here than in the comparison groups. As far as the variables in model 2, both religion and number of siblings are factors that encourage marriage; a Muslim upbringing increases the likelihood of marriage, as does having three or more siblings. Both factors could be indicators for the degree to which parents endorse more traditional values concerning union formation. Including the father's educational level in the analysis makes the individual level variables less important. Those with a highly educated father more often formed unmarried cohabiting unions.

The analyses were replicated for second-generation Moroccans and former Yugoslavians (see [table 7.13](#) in appendix). Again, second-generation Moroccans in Belgium have much higher chances of forming a married union than their counterparts in the Netherlands (model 1). This finding

remains robust after controlling for other factors in model 2. This suggests that the Belgian context is an important additional explaining factor alongside the characteristics of the diasporic community mentioned in the above paragraph (Timmerman, Lodewijckx & Wets 2009). For second-generation former Yugoslavians, we do not find country differences after controlling for other factors.

Again, women in both Moroccan and former Yugoslavian second generations whom we surveyed were more likely to have been married than men. Religion is a major explanatory factor for a person's type of union; being raised in a Muslim tradition significantly increases the likelihood of having married. The same is true for having three or more siblings.

Our analyses show interesting gender differences that persist for all groups and in all cities. At the same time, clear differences exist between places of residence. With the available data it is hard to isolate the factors at work here. Of potential relevance are an individual's migration history, the partner's origin and the union formation behaviour of the majority population. Our data also suggest that individual orientation towards marriage (as indicated by educational level and socialisation characteristics) remains important for all groups and in all settings. A lower propensity to marry found among the younger cohort may indicate a process of change that is underway within each of the origin groups. As Lesthaeghe (2000) pointed out, attitudes concerning family and union formation involve core values that are inevitably slow to change. The substantial proportions in the second generation who are already opting for cohabitation – with an even larger proportions in the younger cohort – may well be an indication for how union formation will evolve in the future among second-generation young adults in Europe.

Leaving the parental home

To better understand how the first union is connected to other major events in the transition to adulthood, we present reasons for leaving the parental home. One of the key considerations for leaving the parental home among young adults of the majority group in Europe was 'living independently'.

Our findings on the type of partnerships are also reflected in the reasons young adults gave for leaving the parental home.

Tables 7.6a and 7.6b indicate the percentage of young adults who stated that they left home to form a union, either marriage or cohabitation, to be independent, to study or work (as there were several answers possible, the total sums up to more than 100 per cent). We provide information by origin, sex and country of residence. The majority of the comparison group members chose 'living independently', 'to study' or 'to work' as their main reasons for leaving the parental home (around 70 per cent). Differences between men and women are small.

Table 7.6a *Reasons for leaving parental home (in %), by country and group*

	Reasons for leaving parental home	Turkish second generation			Former Yugoslavian second generation			Comparison group		
		Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total
Switzerland (Zurich & Basel)	Marriage	37.7	49.5	43.8	-	-	-	0.9	7.7	4.5
	Cohabitation	12.0	10.6	11.3	-	-	-	15.8	25.6	20.9
	Independent living	28.3	24.2	26.3	-	-	-	43.2	44.3	43.8
	Study	5.7	7.8	6.7	-	-	-	23.3	17.1	20.0
	Work	4.6	3.2	3.9	-	-	-	8.0	8.8	8.5
	N	82	89	171	-	-	-	109	120	229
Germany (Berlin & Frankfurt)	Marriage	47.7	68.4	59.4	22.4	20.6	21.2	8.3	8.5	8.4
	Cohabitation	33.9	47.8	41.7	28.0	51.0	52.5	29.2	37.5	33.9
	Independent living	40.8	12.1	25.4	62.5	45.8	53.8	51.7	48.9	50.8
	Study	1.2	0.8	1.0	2.0	1.8	1.8	7.3	5.4	6.2
	Work	12.7	6.5	9.4	9.4	7.7	8.5	9.9	17.1	13.4
	N	98	127	225	88	103	191	95	124	219
Sweden (Stockholm)	Marriage	33.8	62.9	49.1	-	-	-	0.0	0.0	0.0
	Cohabitation	10.8	7.4	9.0	-	-	-	14.7	15.5	15.1
	Independent living	20.5	7.8	14.0	-	-	-	40.2	25.2	31.8
	Study	13.3	12.9	13.1	-	-	-	28.8	40.7	35.5
	Work	4.4	2.1	3.3	-	-	-	5.0	8.7	7.1
	N	64	71	135	-	-	-	78	99	77

Notes: Data for Austria unavailable due to a mistake in the questionnaire.

Shares do not add up to 100% because multiple answers were possible.

Source: TIES survey 2007-2008

Table 7.6b *Reasons for leaving parental home (in %), by country and group*

	<i>Reasons for leaving parental home</i>	<i>Turkish second generation</i>			<i>Moroccan second generation</i>			<i>Comparison group</i>		
		<i>Men</i>	<i>Women</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>Men</i>	<i>Women</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>Men</i>	<i>Women</i>	<i>Total</i>
France (Paris & Strasbourg)	Marriage	26.1	76.4	60.7	-	-	-	0.0	6.1	3.6
	Cohabitation	15.9	5.2	8.5	-	-	-	13.8	35.8	26.7
	Independent living	6.8	8.7	8.0	-	-	-	17.6	8.1	12.4
	Study	7.6	5.9	6.4	-	-	-	49.7	38.1	43.3
	Work	7.4	4.5	5.4	-	-	-	22.1	14.3	17.8
	N	52	115	167	-	-	-	68	96	174
The Netherlands (Amsterdam & Rotterdam)	Marriage	29.5	63.3	49.2	33.9	52.9	46.0	1.3	3.2	2.3
	Cohabitation	10.5	16.1	13.8	15.7	13.8	12.0	18.9	25.1	22.2
	Independent living	25.4	3.4	14.9	30.3	13.8	19.7	19.9	21.8	20.9
	Study	7.3	3.1	5.0	4.1	4.8	4.6	49.9	43.0	43.2
	Work	1.0	1.3	1.2	7.7	0.8	3.3	3.7	3.7	3.7
	N	101	141	242	49	87	136	131	148	179

Notes: Data for Belgium unavailable because question was not posed here.
 Shares do not add up to 100% because multiple answers were possible.

Source: TIES survey 2007-2008

The scenario is radically different for second-generation Turks. Only 20 to 30 per cent left the parental home for these same reasons, the main being union formation; this was particularly pronounced for women and for entering marriage rather than cohabitation. However, second-generation Turks in Sweden and Switzerland seem to be the forerunners of a new pattern. 'Living independently' was the highest-scoring reason for second-generation Turkish women in Switzerland (24 per cent); 'to study' was highest-scoring for their counterparts in Sweden (13 per cent).

Young former Yugoslavian adults occupy an intermediate position between those described above. Cohabitation is the major reason for leaving the parental home, but getting married is more common among them than it is for the comparison group. Moroccans in the Netherlands (no data available in Belgium on this issue) largely follow the Turkish patterns.

7.4 Partner choice: Different social factors at play

Surveys on immigrants or their descendants that explore partner choice generally focus on intermarriage. This tradition can be traced back to works on immigrant assimilation by sociologists in the Chicago School. In the first half of the twentieth century, North American researchers considered frequency of intermarriage the most reliable indicator of assimilation (Safi 2008), though it was not until 1964 that Gordon developed the first theoretical exposition of the relationship between intermarriage and assimilation. The implicit idea is that children of mixed couples have a weaker attachment to their immigrant parents' group of origin. It is also argued that intermarriage is a consequence of dissolving boundaries between immigrant groups and the majority population, since members of the other group are regarded as acceptable partners (Perlman & Waters 2004). As Kalmijn (1998) has observed, however, it takes two to form a mixed couple. If one group is open to intermarriage though the other not, endogamy continues to prevail in both groups. Contrasting with the Chicago School research on intermarriage, more recent studies show that high rates of endogamy may coincide with successful integration (which is, for instance, the case of Jews and Asians in the United States). On the other hand, economically vulnerable groups may have high rates of exogamy (as is the case for the population of West Indian origin in the United Kingdom; see Muttarak 2003). Though we know about relations between immigrants and their partners from the majority population, there is still hardly any theorising on intermarriage between different immigrant groups. In sum, the debate is still inconclusive about the interpretation of intermarriage and its consequences (Song 2009).

The following section examines different factors in the choice of one's partner. They include educational and religious homogeneity (Uunk 1996),

where people meet future partners and what their ethnic or migrational background is, indicating rates of intermarriage.

Educational homogamy

Sociologists and demographers have shown how choosing a partner is not solely a personal matter (Girard 1964; Bozon & Héran 1989; Kalmijn 1991). The idea of partner selection based on a romantic model of mutual love is, at best, incomplete and, at worst, an illusion: in many cases partner choice is governed by broader contextual and social characteristics, such as the individuals' occupations and those of their parents. Girard (1964) showed for France in the early 1960s how individuals generally preferred a partner with similar personal background characteristics and with parents whose occupations were close to his or her own parents' place in the social hierarchy of occupations. In general, high levels of socio-economic homogamy are frequently observed (Kalmijn 1998).

Analysts of social stratification argue that the personal characteristics of couples are good indicators of how open or closed groups in society are. The existence of exogamous couples (with respect to origin) and heterogamous couples (with respect to occupation or education) is evidence that groups see each other as equals. One of the main factors of stratification in Western societies today is education. Recent studies on socio-economic homogamy are based on the partners' educational level rather than their family backgrounds (traditionally accounted for by the father's occupation). Indeed, the role social background plays in partner choice has decreased in most industrialised countries (Ultee & Luijkx 1990). Our analyses are thus also based on the educational levels of second-generation couples. Educational experience has become an important proxy for cultural capital and taste as well as socio-economic success – both of which impact partner choice (see Kalmijn 1994).

Our analysis distinguishes three levels of education. Level 1 corresponds to having left school after lower secondary level. Level 2 corresponds to having had higher secondary education or an apprenticeship. Level 3 corresponds to tertiary education. [Tables 7.7a](#) and [7.7b](#) show the correlation of the interviewees' education (I) with their partners' educational level (P). Results are presented by sex and origin group for each country.

In all the countries' comparison groups, educational homogamy exceeds 59 per cent. It is highest in Belgium and France, where, respectively, 77 per cent and 70 per cent of the couples have the same level of education. Living in these two countries' big cities appears to increase individuals' likelihood of forming a couple within their own social milieu; it also indicates relatively rigid social stratification. As shown in previous studies, men tend to be more highly educated than their female partners. We observe this especially for the comparison group in the German and Swiss

Table 7.7a *Educational homogamy of the current union (in %), by country and group*

		Turkish second generation			Former Yugoslavian second generation			Comparison group		
		Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total
Austria (Vienna & Linz)	I=P	53.3	54.5	53.9	70.8	72.8	71.8	52.6	65.5	59.1
	I>P	27.5	13.3	20.1	12.9	6.5	9.7	23.7	18.5	21.1
	I<P	19.3	32.2	26.0	16.3	20.7	18.5	23.7	16.0	19.8
	N	77	101	178	85	94	179	57	68	125
Switzerland (Zurich & Basel)	I=P	40.2	45.7	42.9	70.9	63.6	66.9	55.6	62.3	59.1
	I>P	32.2	20.8	26.5	13.9	13.4	13.6	25.0	14.0	19.3
	I<P	27.6	33.6	30.6	15.2	23.0	19.5	19.4	23.7	21.7
	N	63	68	131	55	77	132	88	90	178
Germany (Berlin & Frankfurt)	I=P	50.3	57.0	54.5	73.2	55.6	63.7	64.6	56.1	60.4
	I>P	42.2	13.4	25.8	24.7	23.2	23.8	30.5	26.1	28.1
	I<P	7.5	29.6	19.8	2.1	21.2	12.6	5.0	17.8	11.4
	N	84	119	203	69	88	157	86	114	200
Sweden (Stockholm)	I=P	58.9	49.2	54.2	-	-	-	63.2	63.8	63.5
	I>P	26.9	36.3	31.5	-	-	-	21.7	32.3	27.7
	I<P	14.2	14.5	14.3	-	-	-	15.2	3.9	8.8
	N	55	57	112	-	-	-	61	80	141

Table 7.7b *Educational homogamy of the current union (in %), by country and group*

		Turkish second generation			Moroccan second generation			Comparison group		
		Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total
Belgium (Brussels & Antwerp)	I=P	41.6	45.4	43.6	43.5	50.9	47.7	76.7	64.6	70.0
	I>P	46.0	33.6	39.7	32.7	29.3	30.7	11.9	30.2	22.0
	I<P	12.3	20.9	16.7	23.9	19.9	21.6	11.4	5.2	8.0
	N	157	137	294	68	146	214	78	117	195
France (Paris & Strasbourg)	I=P	57.2	38.4	44.9	-	-	-	84.2	71.5	77.4
	I>P	29.2	31.3	30.5	-	-	-	5.0	23.0	14.7
	I<P	13.6	30.4	24.6	-	-	-	10.8	5.5	8.0
	N	48	100	148	-	-	-	57	77	134
Netherlands (Amsterdam & Rotterdam)	I=P	48.0	56.5	52.7	47.6	38.8	42.0	63.1	56.2	59.6
	I>P	31.6	18.9	24.5	22.3	25.3	24.0	19.4	32.5	26.1
	I<P	20.4	24.6	22.8	30.1	36.0	34.0	17.5	11.3	14.3
	N	91	126	217	37	70	107	103	114	217

Notes for 7.7a and 7.7b: I = interviewee's level of education; P = partner's level of education

I=P educational homogamy

I>P interviewee has higher level

I<P partner has higher level

Source: TIES survey 2007-2008

cities. In Switzerland, for example, 25 per cent of the men versus only 14 per cent of the women are more highly educated than their partners. In France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Sweden, the situation is reversed: more couples feature women as the more highly educated of the two. This is particularly pronounced in Belgium and France, where the proportion of hypergamous (marrying a partner of lower social status) women is, respectively, three and five times higher than that of hypergamous men.⁴

In all countries, homogamous couples are much less common among second-generation Turks. The differences are most marked in the French and Belgian cities. While 84 per cent of the men and 71 per cent of the women in the French comparison group live as homogamous couples, this is only the case for 57 per cent of the men and 38 per cent among second-generation Turks. Their counterparts in the Belgian cities are 41 per cent for men and 45 per cent for women versus the comparison group's 76 per cent for men and 64 per cent for women. The same observation applies to second-generation Moroccans living in the Dutch and Belgian cities. Second-generation former Yugoslavians, however, stand out, having much higher levels of homogamy than the comparison groups in Austria, Germany and Switzerland. Yet, some caution is needed when interpreting these differences. Research on social homogamy has shown that more highly educated groups tend to be more homogamous than lower educated groups. The differences we observe by origin may thus be the result of structural effects arising from educational level variation across the groups in each city (see [chapter 5](#)). These results on educational homogamy argue for a more in-depth examination of how the second generation meets partners.

Meeting place and family influences

The Choice of a Spouse survey conducted in 1959 by Girard at the French National Institute for Demographic Studies (INED) provided a quantitative picture of the strength of social homogamy among French couples at that time. Thirty years later, two other demographers from INED conducted the Formation of Couples survey (Bozon & Héran 1989), which gave special attention to partners' friendship networks and where people met their partners. This approach was also applied in other quantitative surveys on partner choice (e.g. Lampard 2007; Kalmijn & Flap 2001). It revealed a strong correlation between the places where people meet and the social background of the people who frequent them, as well as associations with specific values, norms or tastes.

Partner choice is also the result of interactions between young adults and their parents. Most parents express expectations concerning the characteristics of their child's future partner, stressing, for example, the need to find someone with a stable job. The origin of the partner may also be a

topic for discussion within families. People usually know whether their parents would accept or refuse someone from a different origin group or religion. But parents in present-day Europe have lost much power to influence, if not control, their children's choice. Nevertheless, most individuals orient partner choice according to anticipated acceptability by their parents. Social homogamy today is the result of new practices based on individuals with the same social background and characteristics who likely belong to the same networks and partake in the same activities, such as leisure pursuits. Since most choose partners from within their own network, they often share social characteristics.

Bozon and Hérán (1989) constructed a classification scheme of places people meet their future partners, based on the type of meeting places most frequently associated with homogamy. They showed that members of the highest social classes tend to meet their partners in self-selective places, such as at school or university, in clubs and political parties, at the workplace, sports centres and holiday resorts. The workplace is an especially significant way for civil servants to meet future partners. The working class more often meet their partners in public places in the neighbourhood, at shopping centres, parks, movie theatres and bars. A third category in the scheme encompasses social networks of friends and family members.

Given the particular situation of second-generation Turks and Moroccans, the TIES survey distinguished between the individual's own network (identified by the response 'through friends') from the family network ('through my parents', 'at a family gathering' or 'on holiday in my parents' home country') when asking where respondents met their partners. The family network responses would indicate a relatively strong, if indirect, influence by the family on partner choice. The family network fosters an environment that is proximate to the first generation's own social milieu, where parental control can still be effective. The survey also included the response 'through an introduction by my parents', an answer that hints at parents' direct influence. [Tables 7.8a](#) and [7.8b](#) present the results for the different meeting place categories.

In all the countries, 20 to 40 per cent of the comparison group members met partners-to-be through mutual friends. Another third met their partners at school or university, at work or in an association of some sort. In other words, around two thirds found their partners in places qualified as either private or self-selective, which corresponds to practices among the educated that result in high rates of social homogamy. Only around one fifth of the introductions took place in public places such as cinemas and bars, on the street and in the neighbourhood. Moreover, family influence appears very limited: introduction to one's future spouse by parents is almost non-existent (less than 1 per cent), while the indirect family influence amounts to 10 per cent. No significant gender differences are observed in the

Table 7.8a *Place of meeting current partner (in %), by country, group and sex*

	Turkish second generation			Former Yugoslavian second generation			Comparison group		
	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total
Austria (Vienna & Linz)									
	14.0	20.8	17.6	17.8	19.5	18.7	32.7	34.2	33.5
	22.6	20.6	21.5	38.4	38.3	38.4	36.1	30.9	33.5
	3.1	2.6	2.8	19.2	16.1	17.7	26.7	22.3	24.5
	37.7	39.4	38.6	22.5	20.3	21.4	3.8	10.4	7.1
	17.5	12.2	14.8	0.0	2.7	1.3	0.7	0.0	0.3
Switzerland (Zurich & Basel)	5.1	4.4	4.8	2.1	3.2	2.6	0.0	2.1	1.1
	77	101	178	85	94	179	57	67	124
Germany (Berlin & Frankfurt)									
	13.3	11.7	12.5	18.1	16.8	17.4	38.5	39.8	39.2
	13.0	18.7	15.9	13.0	25.6	20.1	23.3	17.2	20.2
	17.6	7.0	12.1	22.4	30.1	26.7	21.5	21.4	21.5
	46.2	45.8	46.0	38.4	19.3	27.7	4.6	12.2	8.5
	2.8	2.4	2.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.1	0.9	1.0
Other	7.1	14.4	10.9	8.1	8.3	8.2	11.0	8.5	9.8
	63	73	136	57	83	140	95	93	188
Other									
	15.1	6.4	10.2	21.0	15.5	18.0	30.0	26.3	28.1
	28.9	29.7	29.3	43.3	48.0	45.9	37.9	42.9	40.4
	8.6	8.6	8.6	10.9	12.9	12.0	17.7	20.5	19.1
	41.3	38.7	39.9	24.8	22.1	23.4	13.0	7.5	10.2
	5.1	15.8	11.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.1	1.1
N	1.0	0.7	0.9	0.0	1.5	0.8	1.4	0.8	1.1
	85	120	205	69	89	158	86	115	201

Source: TIES Survey 2007-2008

Table 7.8.b *Place of meeting current partner (in %), by country, group and sex*

	Turkish second generation			Moroccan second generation			Comparison group		
	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total
France									
(Paris &									
Strasbourg)									
Select places	33.7	15.1	21.5	-	-	-	29.9	32.3	31.2
Private network	21.2	11.4	14.7	-	-	-	39.2	38.5	38.9
Public places	0.0	5.1	3.3	-	-	-	7.9	6.2	7.0
Indirect family influence	38.6	53.6	48.5	-	-	-	14.8	16.1	15.5
Direct family influence	4.2	2.0	2.7	-	-	-	2.0	0.0	0.9
Other	2.4	12.9	9.3	-	-	-	6.2	6.9	6.6
N	48	100	148	-	-	-	57	78	135
The Netherlands									
(Amsterdam									
& Rotterdam)									
Select places	21.6	20.3	20.9	22.7	15.8	18.1	46.7	29.4	37.8
Private network	12.7	14.2	13.5	15.1	21.7	19.5	16.2	21.8	19.1
Public places	9.2	5.3	7.0	12.5	9.4	10.5	21.8	27.7	24.8
Indirect family influence	43.1	44.8	44.0	34.0	44.1	40.8	5.7	9.7	7.8
Direct family influence	8.4	7.8	8.1	5.1	1.0	2.4	0.0	0.0	0.0
Other	5.1	7.6	6.5	10.5	8.0	8.9	9.6	11.5	10.6
N	93	128	221	38	76	114	105	115	220

Notes for tables 7.8a and 7.8b: Data for Belgium and Sweden unavailable because question was not posed here.

Select places comprises the categories: At school or university or at a school party / At workplace / Through an association, sports club or political party

Private places comprises the category: Through friends

Public places comprises the categories: At a night club / For second generation: On holiday not in parental home country / For comparison group: On holiday in survey country

Indirect family influence comprises the categories: / During a family celebration / On holiday in parental home country / Through someone in parents' network of friends / In my neighbourhood or street / In a public place (commercial center, park, street)

Direct family influence comprises the category: Introduced by parents

Source: TIES survey 2007-2008

comparison group, except in Austria and Germany, where an indirect family influence plays a more significant role for women.

For second-generation Turks, friends are either the second- or third-most common way of meeting a partner. The most is at family gatherings, through family networks and while on holiday in Turkey – these three situations reflect an indirect family influence. The percentages for self-selective places (i.e. school, university and workplace) vary between 10 and 20 per cent, thus being two to three times less frequent than for the comparison groups. Direct parental influence is also visible in all countries. It is especially high in Austria for both sexes (17 per cent for men and 12 per cent for women); only for women in Germany (16 per cent versus 5 per cent for men); and slightly less important in the Netherlands (8 per cent for both sexes). In France, direct family influence is more frequent for men, but overall only of marginal importance (4 per cent for men and 2 per cent for women); the same applies to Switzerland (less than 3 per cent for both sexes).

In this regard, second-generation Moroccans prove quite similar to their Turkish peers. Partners are met primarily through the family network (44 per cent), although direct family intervention is less important (5 per cent for men and 1 per cent for women). Self-selective meeting places are reported far less often by second-generation Moroccans (18 per cent versus Turks' 38 per cent). By contrast, second-generation former Yugoslavians in Austrian, German and Swiss cities have very similar practices to those of the comparison group; this observation is particularly stable across countries.

In conclusion, we can account for the lower homogamy of Turkish and Moroccan second-generation couples observed earlier. This is partly the result of, by contrast, higher educational levels in the comparison groups and partly due to differences in the social network through which partners are found. If they are immigrants from Turkey or Morocco, the likelihood that they will have a different level of education than their second-generation partners increases notably, since school systems differ.

The partner's migration background

As noted earlier, the social and geographical space in which the offspring of immigrants meet their future partners is effectively transnational. Segregation, xenophobia and racism in the country of residence may restrict their pool of available partners from the majority population. The proportion of mixed couples in the parents' generation may also play an important role.

This section distinguishes three types of union: transnational unions formed with an immigrant born in the parents' country of origin (i.e. Turkey, Morocco or former Yugoslavia); mixed unions formed with someone born in the surveyed country whose parents were also born in the

surveyed country; and unions formed with a person who is not only also of immigrant parentage but of the same origin. We will also examine to what extent the size of the community of origin influences the types of unions.

Regardless of country of residence, second-generation Turks have rarely formed couples with members of the majority population. Those doing so represent only 13 per cent in German cities, which is the highest rate of any country. The Swiss, Dutch and Belgian cities have the lowest proportion of mixed couples (3-6 per cent). Explanations for this considerably high level of endogamy are varied: examples include the strong influence exerted by parents; limits on the marriage market imposed by stigmatisation from the majority population (hence difficulty in finding a partner of non-immigrant background); religious boundaries that discourage unions with persons of another religious affiliation or none at all. Stringent boundaries do exist in European societies between groups of different religious affiliation, especially between Muslims and Christians (Alba & Golden 1986; Kalmijn & Van Tubergen 2007). At the same time, this is not surprising for the second generation; similar levels of endogamy can be found, for example, among descendants of Mexican and Chinese immigrants in Los Angeles (see Schneider, Chávez, Waters & DeSipio forthcoming).

Most Turkish partners of our respondents are Turkish-born. This is the case for over 50 per cent in Sweden and Switzerland and even more than the 60-70 per cent found in the Austrian, French, Dutch and Belgian cities. Only the German outcomes constitute a remarkable exception to this pattern, since transnational couples in the two cities only represent 12 per cent of the couples. By contrast, 70 per cent chose a second-generation Turkish partner as opposed to 20-30 per cent in the other countries. Germany has the longest Turkish migration history and by far the largest Turkish community (Worbs 2003). For 2003, Worbs estimated a population of 1,322,500 adults of Turkish descent below age 35 in Germany. This makes the case unique: young adults of Turkish descent in Germany can choose potential partners from a much larger pool of second-generation peers with the same immigrant background than in the other countries. In this respect, marriage markets may function differently in the diverse countries (see also Huscsek, De Valk & Liefbroer 2010).

In relation to transnational marriages, a pronounced gender gap was observed in the Belgian, Austrian and French cities. Here second-generation Turkish women were more frequently in couples with a Turkish immigrant than were men (in Belgium, 80 per cent of women versus 66 per cent of men; in Austria, 68 per cent versus 55 per cent; in France, 70 per cent versus 36 per cent). This particularly large gender gap was not found in Sweden, Germany or Switzerland.

Second-generation Moroccans are seemingly subjected to the same processes as those of their Turkish counterparts. Their chosen partners were

Table 7.9a *Partner's migration background (in %), by country, group and sex*

		Turkish second generation			Former Yugoslavian second generation			Comparison group		
		Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total
Austria (Vienna & Linz)	Immigrant (same origin)	55.1	68.2	61.9	38.4	37.1	37.7	-	-	-
	Descendant of immigrant (same origin)	27.0	20.6	23.6	48.4	40.4	44.4	-	-	-
	Descendant of survey country	11.5	9.8	10.6	8.4	12.4	10.4	74.1	85.0	79.6
	Immigrant (other origin)	1.0	0.0	0.5	4.4	4.7	4.6	-	-	-
	Descendant of immigrant (other origin)	5.5	1.5	3.4	0.4	5.4	2.9	-	-	-
	Immigrant (any origin)	-	-	-	-	-	-	16.1	10.1	13.1
Switzerland (Zurich & Basel)	Descendant of immigrant (any origin)	-	-	-	-	-	-	9.8	4.9	7.3
	N	77	101	178	85	94	179	57	68	125
	Immigrant (same origin)	51.2	55.6	53.4	41.9	67.8	56.2	-	-	-
	Descendant of immigrant (same origin)	16.0	24.1	20.1	19.8	9.9	14.3	-	-	-
	Descendant of survey country	3.8	1.3	2.5	17.3	14.5	15.8	57.0	64.0	60.6
	Immigrant (other origin)	23.4	17.7	20.6	15.4	6.7	10.6	-	-	-
Germany (Berlin & Frankfurt)	Descendant of immigrant (other origin)	5.6	1.3	3.4	5.7	1.1	3.1	-	-	-
	Immigrant (any origin)	-	-	-	-	-	-	27.9	20.2	24.0
	Descendant of immigrant (any origin)	-	-	-	-	-	-	15.1	15.8	15.4
	N	70	76	146	60	84	144	96	93	189
	Immigrant (same origin)	11.7	13.7	12.8	6.7	12.4	9.9	-	-	-
	Descendant of immigrant (same origin)	69.8	73.1	71.7	36.3	20.9	27.8	-	-	-
	Descendant of survey country	15.5	11.3	13.1	53.6	57.2	55.6	81.6	83.0	82.3
	Immigrant (other origin)	1.0	0.0	0.5	3.3	4.8	4.2	-	-	-
	Descendant of immigrant (other origin)	2.1	1.9	2.0	0.0	4.6	2.6	-	-	-
	Immigrant (any origin)	-	-	-	-	-	-	12.5	7.5	2.0
	Descendant of immigrant (any origin)	-	-	-	-	-	-	5.9	9.4	7.7
	N	85	120	205	69	89	158	86	115	201

Table 7.9a (continued)

	Turkish second generation			Former Yugoslavian second generation			Comparison group		
	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total
Sweden									
Immigrant (same origin)	51.6	44.6	48.1	-	-	-	-	-	-
Descendant of immigrant (same origin)	24.7	27.2	25.9	-	-	-	-	-	-
Descendant of survey country	10.2	12.5	11.3	-	-	-	76.7	77.9	77.4
Immigrant (other origin)	5.1	6.0	5.5	-	-	-	-	-	-
Descendant of immigrant (other origin)	8.5	9.8	9.1	-	-	-	-	-	-
Immigrant (any origin)	-	-	-	-	-	-	8.1	11.0	9.8
Descendant of immigrant (any origin)	-	-	-	-	-	-	15.2	11.0	12.8
N	56	58	114	-	-	-	61	81	142

Source: TIES survey 2007-2008

Table 7.9b Partner's migration background (in %), by country, group and sex

	Turkish second generation			Moroccan second generation			Comparison group		
	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total
Belgium									
Immigrant (same origin)	66.2	80.7	73.8	58.4	59.5	59.1	-	-	-
Descendant of immigrant (same origin)	21.2	15.6	18.3	22.3	29.1	26.2	-	-	-
Descendant of survey country	11.1	1.2	5.9	8.2	4.6	6.1	89.4	75.3	81.6
Immigrant (other origin)	0.6	0.6	0.6	3.6	5.0	4.4	-	-	-
Descendant of immigrant (other origin)	0.9	1.9	1.4	7.4	1.9	4.3	-	-	-
Immigrant (any origin)	-	-	-	-	-	-	2.3	12.1	7.7
Descendant of immigrant (any origin)	-	-	-	-	-	-	8.3	12.6	10.7
N	162	151	313	75	157	232	81	122	203

Table 7.9b (continued)

		Turkish second generation			Moroccan second generation			Comparison group		
		Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total
France (Paris & Strasbourg)	Immigrant (same origin)	36.7	70.4	58.7	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Descendant of immigrant (same origin)	39.6	18.3	25.7	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Descendant of survey country	16.8	9.1	11.8	-	-	-	80.3	80.2	80.2
	Immigrant (other origin)	0.0	0.0	0.0	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Descendant of immigrant (other origin)	6.9	2.2	3.8	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Immigrant (any origin)	-	-	-	-	-	-	5.0	7.9	6.6
	Descendant of immigrant (any origin)	-	-	-	-	-	-	14.8	11.9	13.2
	N	48	100	148	-	-	-	57	78	135
The Netherlands (Amsterdam & Rotterdam)	Immigrant (same origin)	56.0	66.7	61.9	38.2	59.7	52.6	-	-	-
	Descendant of immigrant (same origin)	33.1	26.9	29.6	48.1	26.3	33.5	-	-	-
	Descendant of survey country	4.1	2.2	3.0	5.4	4.2	4.6	77.1	76.6	76.9
	Immigrant (other origin)	0.0	2.3	1.3	2.9	5.4	4.5	-	-	-
	Descendant of immigrant (other origin)	6.9	2.0	4.2	5.5	4.5	4.8	-	-	-
	Immigrant (any origin)	-	-	-	-	-	-	13.4	13.8	13.6
	Descendant of immigrant (any origin)	-	-	-	-	-	-	9.6	9.6	9.6
	N	94	129	223	38	76	114	105	115	220

Source: TIES survey 2007-2008

mainly Moroccan immigrants, a pattern again more marked for women than men. Second-generation former Yugoslavians present a more variegated picture, depending on their city of residence. In the Swiss and Austrian cities, half chose a partner born in former Yugoslavia (respectively, 56 per cent and 44 per cent), but in German cities the principal trend was to choose partners of native parentage (56 per cent).

Transnational unions and educational homogamy

This section examines whether the heterogamy of the couples can be linked to the partner's origin. Namely, do the immigrant partners have a higher or a lower educational level than the respondents? [Tables 7.10a](#) and [7.10b](#) present the educational level of the TIES respondents (I) compared with that of their partners (P), according to their partners' origin.

When second-generation Turks partner with the majority population, they predominantly form educationally homogamous couples (50-60 per cent of the mixed couples). Between 12 and 20 per cent are more highly educated than their partners. Second-generation Turks rarely form a couple with someone from the majority population who is more highly educated. When the respondent is in a couple with a Turkish-born immigrant, the proportion of educationally homogamous couples becomes slightly lower (ranging from 36 per cent in Belgium to 56 per cent in the Netherlands). This means that more respondents live in heterogamous couples. In most cases, the respondent is *less* educated than the partner born in Turkey. This may signify that only the most highly educated people in Turkey are eligible candidates in the eyes of the second generation living in Europe, though it also can point to the fact that educational levels in Turkey are rising. Since all these couples live in Europe, it may also indicate that the European background of the respondent and the higher educational level of the Turkish partner create a sense of 'homogamy' for the couple. Second-generation Moroccans and former Yugoslavians seem to be subject to the same phenomenon.

Transnational unions and opinions on sexuality

Earlier in this chapter we hypothesised that certain union formation patterns, such as type of union and partner choice, are also connected to cultural values. The following section explores to what extent the norm of a woman's virginity at marriage is correlated with choice of a partner either from the survey country or from the parents' country of origin. As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, this norm remains of importance in Turkey and Morocco.

Between a quarter and almost two thirds of second-generation Turkish respondents who live in couples consider women's engagement in

Table 7.10a *Educational homogeneity of the current union (in %), by country, group and type of union*

	Level of education	Turkish second generation			Former Yugoslavian second generation			Comparison group		
		Partner born in survey country	Immigrant partner	Total	Partner born in survey country	Immigrant partner	Total	Partner born in survey country	Immigrant partner	Total
Austria	I=P	60.6	49.9	53.9	70.0	74.3	71.8	60.9	47.1	59.1
Vienna	I<P	14.5	23.4	20.1	13.5	4.6	9.7	20.2	26.8	21.1
Linz	I>P	24.9	26.7	26.0	16.6	21.1	18.5	18.9	26.1	19.8
	N	67	111	178	107	72	179	107	18	125
Switzerland	I=P	46.4	41.5	42.9	80.3	59.4	66.9	59.1	58.9	59.1
Zurich	I<P	18.6	29.7	26.5	6.9	17.4	13.6	20.3	15.2	19.3
Basel	I>P	35.0	28.8	30.6	12.8	23.2	19.5	20.6	25.9	21.7
	N	38	93	131	46	86	132	142	36	178
Germany	I=P	56.2	43.1	54.5	67.2	41.9	63.7	62.8	39.2	60.4
Berlin	I<P	23.0	43.8	25.8	21.5	37.5	23.8	25.3	53.7	28.2
Frankfurt	I>P	20.8	13.1	19.8	11.3	20.6	12.6	11.9	7.1	11.4
	N	177	26	203	137	20	157	181	19	200
Sweden	I=P	64.7	45.0	54.2	-	-	64.9	51.0	63.5	-
Stockholm	I<P	23.1	38.9	31.5	-	-	-	25.4	49.0	27.7
	I>P	12.3	16.2	14.3	-	-	-	9.8	0.0	8.8
	N	53	59	112	-	-	-	127	14	141

Notes: I = interviewee's level of education; P = partner's level of education

I=P educational homogeneity

I>P interviewee has higher level

I<P partner has higher level

Source: TIES survey 2007-2008

Table 7.10b Educational homogeneity of the current union (in %), by country, group and type of union

	Level of education	Turkish second generation			Moroccan second generation			Comparison group		
		Partner born in survey country	Immigrant partner	Total	Partner born in survey country	Immigrant partner	Total	Partner born in survey country	Immigrant partner	Total
Belgium	I=P	62.8	36.3	43.6	50.1	46.1	47.7	72.4	37.9	70.0
Antwerp	I < P	23.1	46.0	39.7	22.8	35.8	30.7	20.4	43.0	22.0
Brussels	I > P	14.1	17.7	16.7	27.1	18.1	21.6	7.2	19.1	8.0
	N	83	211	294	83	131	214	180	15	195
France	I=P	53.3	39.0	44.9	-	-	-	77.5	75.8	77.4
Paris	I < P	25.6	34.0	30.5	-	-	-	14.0	24.3	14.7
Strasbourg	I > P	21.0	27.1	24.6	-	-	-	8.5	0.0	8.0
	N	51	97	148	-	-	-	122	12	134
The Netherlands	I=P	50.2	54.3	52.7	46.3	38.4	41.8	61.6	46.6	59.6
Amsterdam	I < P	22.6	25.7	24.5	17.9	29.1	24.3	23.4	43.2	26.1
Rotterdam	I > P	27.3	20.1	22.8	35.8	32.6	34.0	15.0	10.2	14.3
	N	78	139	217	44	63	107	187	30	217

Notes: I = interviewee's level of education; P = partner's level of education

I=P educational homogeneity

I > P interviewee has higher level

I < P partner has higher level

Source: TIES survey 2007-2008

Table 7.11a *Opinion on women's premarital sexual activity (in %), by country, group and type of union*

	Opinion on women's premarital sexual activity	Turkish second generation			Former Yugoslavian second generation			Comparison group		
		Partner born in survey country	Immigrant partner	Total	Partner born in survey country	Immigrant partner	Total	Partner born in survey country	Immigrant partner	Total
Austria (Vienna & Linz)	Always acceptable	39.2	5.7	18.3	81.8	54.1	70.1	94.9	87.5	93.9
	Acceptable in some cases	15.5	19.7	18.1	12.3	36.8	22.7	5.2	0.0	4.5
	Never acceptable	45.4	74.6	63.6	5.9	9.1	7.2	0.0	12.5	1.7
	N	67	109	176	107	72	179	102	18	120
Switzerland (Zurich & Basel)	Always acceptable	39.9	32.4	34.1	82.2	70.7	74.7	88.0	94.4	89.5
	Acceptable in some cases	48.4	41.0	42.7	13.0	19.4	17.2	7.3	5.6	6.9
	Never acceptable	11.8	26.6	23.2	4.8	9.9	8.1	4.7	0.0	3.6
	N	26	83	109	40	80	120	129	39	168
Germany (Berlin & Frankfurt)	Always acceptable	22.9	3.6	20.3	57.9	39.2	55.3	88.9	78.1	87.8
	Acceptable in some cases	32.3	35.6	32.7	39.0	54.1	41.1	10.3	18.0	11.1
	Never acceptable	44.9	60.8	47.0	3.1	6.8	3.6	0.8	3.9	1.1
	N	177	28	205	138	20	158	181	20	201
Sweden (Stockholm)	Always acceptable	54.2	25.2	35.4	-	-	-	92.8	100.0	93.5
	Acceptable in some cases	41.7	37.8	39.2	-	-	-	4.1	0.0	3.7
	Never acceptable	4.2	37.0	25.4	-	-	-	3.1	0.0	2.8
	N	22	39	61	-	-	-	96	10	106

Source: TIES survey 2007-2008

Table 7.11b *Opinion on women's premarital sexual activity (in %), by country, group and type of union*

	Opinion on women's premarital sexual activity	Turkish second generation			Moroccan second generation			Comparison group		
		Partner born in survey country		Immigrant partner	Partner born in survey country		Immigrant partner	Partner born in survey country		Total
France (Paris & Strasbourg)	Always acceptable	28.6	14.7	20.4	-	-	-	93.7	81.3	92.9
	Acceptable in some cases	21.7	31.1	27.3	-	-	-	3.2	18.7	4.2
	Never acceptable	49.7	54.2	52.3	-	-	-	3.2	0.0	3.0
	N	51	97	148	-	-	-	123	12	135
The Netherlands (Amsterdam Rotterdam)	Always acceptable	27.9	12.8	18.2	21.5	16.6	18.8	89.1	86.4	88.7
	Acceptable in some cases	46.5	31.6	36.9	47.9	39.3	43.1	9.2	3.5	8.4
	Never acceptable	25.7	55.6	44.9	30.6	44.1	38.1	1.7	10.1	2.8
	N	68	130	198	45	59	104	180	29	209

Note: Data for Belgium unavailable because question was not posed here.

Source: TIES survey 2007-2008

premarital sex as being 'never acceptable'. For those living in Switzerland or in Sweden, women's chastity is becoming a minority norm, though it is widely dominant in Austria and, albeit to a lesser extent, Germany. Young second-generation Moroccan men and women have similar opinions, while this position is endorsed by less than 4 per cent in the comparison groups. In keeping with previous indicators, young second-generation former Yugoslavian men and women come very close to the comparison groups.

In all cities, the share of those who attach a lot of importance to women's chastity is higher if the partner comes from Turkey. The causal relation between both items cannot be established here: it may as well be that the 'brightness' of boundaries between groups leads second-generation Turks to choose a partner in Turkey, also making them more likely to adhere to values and norms dominant in their partners' country of origin. At the same time, second-generation Turkish respondents may have chosen a partner from Turkey *because* they themselves adhere to these more traditional values, which they believe will have a stronger prevalence among possible partners there.

The German case is quite interesting in this regard since the rate of transnational unions is so much lower than in other countries. We would therefore expect the importance attached to female virginity to be lower, though it remains surprisingly high (45 per cent of second-generation Turks claim that women's engagement in premarital sexual activity is never acceptable). It is, however, much lower than in transnational couples (60 per cent). These findings indicate that views on sexuality are still highly influenced by the values of the immigrant parents or the wider Turkish diaspora, even when marrying a second-generation Turkish partner. Even though these findings reflect opinions and not practices – so there could well be a difference between what is expressed in public and what is experienced in private – we have reasons to believe any such disparity is small.⁵

The data on sexual norms are particularly important to understand the meaning of both the timing and type of first union formation. Whereas the share of marriages does not significantly vary between cities, the opinions on female premarital sexual activity show remarkable variations. This may give some clues on how to interpret earlier-than-average union formation ages in Sweden and in Austria. In Sweden, this likely has to do with a correspondence to the belief in young adults' rights to autonomy and equal rights for women – also including among second-generation Turks. By contrast, Austria's seemingly similar outcome is probably best explained by just the opposite: a higher frequency of arranged marriages and widespread traditional ideas about gender roles in the Turkish community.

7.5 Conclusion

The findings of this chapter can be summarised under three main headings. First, a strong common trend is observed among second-generation Turks living in Europe. Offspring of Turkish immigrants do not follow the dominant patterns of union formation in Turkey nor of the countries where they live. Overall, we may conclude that the transition to first union shows substantial variation between European countries, both for comparison groups and the second generation. Timing patterns between the different origin groups vary much more in some countries than in others. Sweden is the most extreme example, with a much sharper gender gap than origin variation concerning age at first union formation. Men and women behave differently, and these differences look exactly the same for second-generation Turks as the comparison group. For all the other countries except Germany, we may conclude that differences between men and women from the same origin group are generally more pronounced than those between origin groups.

Second-generation Turks form their first union later than people do in Turkey, though earlier than the comparison groups in their countries of residence. We also found that marriage is no longer universal, but remains much more common than cohabitation. Women's virginity before marriage remains widespread, but it is no longer a necessarily dominant norm. The second-generation – women especially – often chooses a partner born in Turkey (except in Germany, where they more often choose a fellow second-generation partner) and, when they do so, it is likely for the partner to be more highly educated than they are. Demographically, this is not really surprising. However, it contradicts a commonplace image in political discourse and the media of Turks 'importing' low-educated brides and grooms from the Turkish countryside.

Choosing a spouse born in Turkey is a key issue, especially for women. This holds for all countries except Germany, where it is more common to choose a partner from among local second-generation Turks. Yet interestingly, our analyses on partner characteristics revealed that young second-generation Turkish adults who find partners in Turkey are particularly wont to find partners who are more highly educated than themselves. Although this is not really surprising given that women generally marry men who are slightly older and more highly educated, it also contradicts the aforementioned stereotype of 'importing' a low-educated spouse.

It is important to recognise that the national contexts specific to the survey countries also show their effects. In each country, a minority within the Turkish second generation follows the national patterns. This minority is larger in some countries than others, primarily dependent on institutional arrangements, economic situation and a social climate that favour female autonomy and equal participation. This minority is particularly sizeable in Sweden and Switzerland, but smaller in Austria, Belgium and Germany.

Let it be noted that at the time of the survey the second generation was still relatively young and many respondents had yet to enter partnerships for the first time. In the years to come, this group who had postponed union formation may in fact be making partner choices more similar to that of their comparison groups peers. How these young adults negotiate their life course choices in private and in the public spheres of education and the labour market will be crucial to their own personal development and that of European societies at large.

Notes

- 1 Unlike other countries, France showed a difference between cities (Milewski & Hamel 2010). For second-generation Turks and their comparison group peers, first union formation occurred later in Paris than in Strasbourg. This reflects a difference in the composition of the surveyed population: Paris attracts more highly educated persons, both immigrants and nationals, who tend to form couples later on. In addition, access to housing is especially difficult in the capital city, where rents are particularly high.
- 2 As in France, a difference is observed between the two cities, with first union formation occurring later in Berlin than in Frankfurt. The more difficult-to-access labour market in the European capitals, as compared to the secondary cities, may account for this (see [chapter 6](#)).
- 3 Our additional analyses (not shown) revealed that city differences play only a minor role in female union formation behaviour.
- 4 In several European countries, women now have higher levels of educational attainment than men, though they do not systematically get better jobs. Discrimination when it comes to accessing employment and notably in their actual professional careers keeps them in less well-paid, less prestigious work for which they are overqualified to begin with. Since men are generally more highly positioned than women on the labour market and vis-à-vis social stratification, they tend to form couples with women in lower positions. As a result, a man may form a couple with a woman who holds the same socio-economic status as himself though is nonetheless better qualified on the job market. Information about the jobs partners held when they first met is not included in the TIES survey, so we cannot detail this phenomenon further.
- 5 The TIES survey asked respondents to specify their age upon first engaging in sexual intercourse. The results indicate a strong correlation between respondents' opinions on sexual issues and their reported practices (Milewski & Hamel 2010).

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
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
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Appendix

Figure 7.4 *Transition to a first union of second-generation Moroccans*




Source: TIES survey 2007-2008


Figure 7.5 *Transition to a first union of second-generation former-Yugoslavs*

Source: TIES survey 2007-2008

Figure 7.6a *Transition to first union in Belgium*



Source: TIES survey 2007-2008

Figure 7.6b *Transition to first union in the Netherlands*

Source: TIES survey 2007-2008

Table 7.12a *Relative risks in transition to a first union for Moroccan and former Yugoslavian second-generation men*

Variable	Turkish second generation		Comparison groups	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2
Sweden	1	1	1	1
France	0.66 *	0.67	0.70 *	0.81
The Netherlands	1.00	0.92	0.69 **	0.79
Germany	0.76	0.52 **	0.53 ***	0.58 **
Austria	1.37 *	1.13	0.67 *	0.73
Switzerland	0.79	0.81	0.58 ***	0.65 *
Belgium	1.12	0.91	0.56 ***	0.58 ***
Birth cohort				
1971-1980		1		1
1981-1990		0.8 **		0.80 **
Education				
Primary/special education		0.78		0.78
Lower secondary		1		1
Apprenticeship		1.07		1.07
Upper secondary/apprenticeship		0.80		0.80
Tertiary		0.65 **		0.65 **
Enrolment in education		0.32 ***		0.32 ***
Religion during childhood				
Muslim		1		n.a.
None, Jewish or other		0.90		1
Christian		0.83		0.96
Number of siblings				
0		1		1
1 or 2		1.22		1.22
3+		1.50		1.50
Father's education				
Primary or less		1		1
Secondary		0.86		0.86
Tertiary		0.83		0.83
Missing		1.44		1.44
Age in years				
<20	0.002 ***	0.002 ***	0.002 ***	0.003 ***
20-25	0.009 ***	0.011 ***	0.008 ***	0.018 ***
25-30	0.014 ***	0.017 ***	0.014 ***	0.032 ***
30+	0.007 ***	0.009 ***	0.011 ***	0.023 ***
Log likelihood	-1018.1	-916.5	-1087.5	-1008.9

*=5%; **=1%; ***=0.1%.

Notes: Education variables each contain a small number of missing values without significant impact (not displayed here).

Education of respondent is a time-varying covariate.

Source: TIES survey 2007-2008

Table 7.12b *Relative risks in transition to a first union for comparison group and Turkish second-generation women*

Variable	Second-generation Moroccan women		Variable	Second-generation former Yugoslavian women	
	Model 1	Model 2		Model 1	Model 2
The Netherlands	1	1	Germany	1	1
Belgium	1.63 ***	1.76 ***	Austria	1.86 ***	1.81 ***
Birth cohort					
1971-1980		1			1
1981-1990		0.8 **			1.0
Education					
Primary school/ special education		1.15			0.45
Lower secondary		1			1
Apprenticeship		0.46 **			0.65 *
Upper secondary/ apprenticeship		0.44 **			0.47 **
Tertiary		0.11 ***			0.46 **
Enrolment in education		0.11 ***			0.16 ***
Religion during childhood					
Muslim		0.95			1
None or other		1			1.15
Christian					1.68 *
Number of siblings					
0		1			1
1 or 2		0.79			2.12 **
3+		1.18			2.87 ***
Father's education					
Primary or less		1			1
Secondary		1.17			0.78
Tertiary		1.07			0.92
Age in years			Age in years		
18-20	0.002 ***	0.005 ***	18-20	0.001 ***	0.001 ***
20-25	0.008 ***	0.018 ***	20-25	0.008 ***	0.006 ***
25-30	0.010 ***	0.020 ***	25-30	0.009 ***	0.009 ***
30-35	0.006 ***	0.018 ***	30-35	0.005 ***	0.004 ***
Log likelihood	-431.9	-332.9		-364.9	-301.6

*=5%; **=1%; ***=0.1%

Note: Education variables each contain a small number of missing values without significant impact (not displayed here).

Source: TIES survey 2007-2008

Table 7.12c *Relative risks in transition to a first union for men*

Variable	Moroccan second generation		Variable	Former Yugoslavian second generation	
	Model 1	Model 2		Model 1	Model 2
The Netherlands	1	1	Germany	1	1
Belgium	1.00	0.84	Austria	1.69 ***	1.69 **
Birth cohort					
1971-80		1			1
1981-90		0.7			0.9
Education					
Primary/special education		1.51			0.50
Lower secondary		1			1
Apprenticeship		1.46			0.67
Upper secondary/apprenticeship		1.18			0.55
Tertiary		1.22			0.66
Enrolment in education		1.31			0.28 **
Religion during childhood					
Muslim		1.31			1
None or other		1			1.12
Christian		n.a.			1.18
Number of siblings					
0		1			1
1 or 2		0.76			1.83 **
3+		1.17			2.36 ***
Father's education					
Primary or less		1			1
Secondary		0.92			0.93
Tertiary		1.46			1.22
Missing		0.83			
Age in years					
< 20	0.000 ***	0.000 ***		0.001 ***	0.001 ***
20-25	0.004 ***	0.004 ***		0.007 ***	0.005 ***
25-30	0.009 ***	0.007 ***		0.013 ***	0.010 ***
30+	0.006 ***	0.004 ***		0.005 ***	0.003 ***
Log likelihood	-212.8	-185.2		-275.5	-219.5

*=5%; **=1%; ***=0.1%.

Notes: Education variables each contain a small number of missing values without significant impact (not displayed here).

Education of respondent is a time-varying covariate.

Source: TIES survey 2007-2008

Table 7.13 *Factors influencing marriage versus unmarried cohabitation, by group (odds ratios)*

Variable	Moroccan second generation		Variable	Former Yugoslavian second generation	
	Model 1	Model 2		Model 1	Model 2
Men	1	1		1	1
Women	2.9 ***	3.22 ***		1.53 *	1.52 [0.054]
The Netherlands	1	1	Germany	1	1
Belgium	2.89 **	2.34 *	Austria	0.93	0.74
Birth cohort					
1971-1980	1	1		1	1
1981-1990	0.57 [0.067]	0.60 [0.069]		0.29 ***	0.27 ***
Education					
Primary/special education	0.66	0.8		0.39	0.5
Lower secondary	1	1		1	1
Apprenticeship	1.21	1.34		1.51	1.67
Upper secondary/apprenticeship	1.26	1.55		1.51	1.8
Tertiary	1.21	1.25		0.32 **	0.33 **
Religion during childhood					
Muslim		2.55 *			4.89 **
Christian		—			0.87
None or other		1			1
Number of siblings					
0		1			1
1 or 2		4.02			1.81 [0.077]
3+		8.03			2.01 [0.065]
Father's education					
Primary or less		1			1
Secondary		0.36 *			0.63
Tertiary		1.33			1.29
Log likelihood	-157.0	-131.0	-271.8		-260.5

*=5%; **=1%; ***=0.1%.

Notes: Education variables each contain a small number of missing values without significant impact (not displayed here).

Source: TIES survey 2007-2008

8 Identities

Urban belonging and intercultural relations

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8.1 Introduction: Theories, definitions and concepts

Identities are difficult to grasp – in more ways than one. Conceptually, ‘identity’ is probably one of the most fuzzy concepts constantly used in the social and cultural sciences. For several disciplines it is a key term, notably psychology, anthropology and cultural studies, but standard and encyclopaedic definitions are highly diverse, even within one discipline. We know that every person has ‘an identity’, but we also know that people have *multiple* identities. The term’s root is the Latin word for ‘the same’ (*idem*), which highlights a contradiction found in each definition of ‘identity’. The notion of the *uniqueness* of each individual self seems to work against the sameness acknowledged in our sharing central attributes (e.g. gender, age, ethnicity) with other individuals and the fact that individuals forming groups is an essential part of ‘being human’.

Terms such as ‘ethnic identity’ and ‘national identity’, even when invoked as attributes of an individual, only take on meaning when they are shared with other individuals. As formulated by the French anthropologist and psychologist George Devereux, each individual belongs to a diverse range of meaningful categories (or ‘classes of attributes’) in which he or she is just one among many others. However, the unique combination of these categories is so specific that each individual is unequivocally identifiable and distinct from all others (Devereux 1978: 138). The broader the range of categories, the better an individual can respond – and find a place and position – in most diverse situations and contexts. It is this ability that makes an identity ‘functional’ (Devereux 1978: 170ff).

Identity, belonging and citizenship

Identities are difficult to grasp because of the boundedness of their ‘enactment’ to specific contexts and the different levels of enactment therein.

Identities can be defined as ‘labels’ for belonging to certain categories, though these labels can be quite disconnected from actual cultural and social practices (Devereux 1978: 145; Brubaker 2004). The process of ‘labeling’ involves three different perspectives: the self-ascription of the individual, the habitus of the category (or the group itself) and the ‘outside world’ (non-group members). It can be presumed that the *legitimacy* of a label’s use in specific contexts is dependent on, not least, the degree of consensus across the three perspectives (Schneider 2002: 13). There are many empirical examples in which the consensus is *not* there. One of the most telling has been the example of anti-Semitism in Europe and its almost complete disconnection from ‘empirical evidence’. Anti-Semitism could not (nor did it bother to try to) rely on ‘objective’ cultural differences between Jews and the majority population (see e.g. Balibar 1990; Gilman 1992; Borneman & Peck 1995; Rapaport 1997). With regard to the subject of this book, we frequently observe relevant differences in the self-perception of the second generation in Europe and how they are perceived by large sectors of the majority society.¹

Nonetheless, divergences in the criteria used to label identity formations and politics in one way or another are seen as the norm, especially in complex social settings such as cities. On the other hand, even when the label itself is not controversial, in most cases its precise contents and implications are. Identity constructions for an important part constitute a *discursive* field in which social and societal actors constantly negotiate their place and position. Therefore, identities have also been described as ‘fluid’ and ‘liquid’ (e.g. Wright 2010), as being largely independent from fixed attributes, such as observable behaviours or physical characteristics in the widest sense.

At the same time, identities *are* connected to, or closely intertwined with, distinct cultural and social practices. These practices generally have at least three different dimensions relevant to the enactment of belonging and identification. The symbolic dimension refers as much to concrete symbols (e.g. flags, uniforms, anthems) as to ‘symbolic performances’ of group belonging (e.g. national holidays, ceremonious rites of passage). The interactional dimension refers to the fact that, by definition, the individual perception of ‘self’ requires the presence of ‘others’ (see e.g. Erdheim 1992: 21). The different categories of belonging (or ‘class memberships’) thus receive their meaning from the particular social contexts in which they are relevant (Devereux 1978: 138). But, as a consequence, this dimension also describes the versatility and situational relevance of the multiple belongings of each individual: being a woman or a man, a father or a son, an employer or an employee and so forth. Finally, the discursive dimension refers to the definitional criteria for labels of belonging that are not specific to individuals, but rather are based on social narratives established, reproduced and disseminated through ‘discursive formations’ in a given social

setting (cf. Foucault 1972). This means that there are not only discursive aspects in particular identity enactments, but that discourses also play a central role in prefiguring the 'field' in which individuals and groups of individuals negotiate their place and position (see e.g. Bourdieu 1994: 50ff). Discourses also reflect the structural characteristics of groups, societies and cultures in all their aspects: power, hierarchies, zeitgeist, 'the public opinion', 'collective awareness', etc. (Trudgill 1983; Fairclough 1992: 211).

As described in [chapter 1](#), the TIES project compares the same second-generation groups across different countries. Our main interest is identifying the role that institutional arrangements play on specific outcomes in different domains of structural participation in and as part of 'the society'. The most basic aspect of nation-state intervention with regard to individual belonging, or lack thereof, is citizenship. This, in its traditional sense – for the moment thus leaving aside notions such as cultural and social citizenship – is intimately linked to the nation. The nation-state configures a whole set of subjective aspects of what constitutes a 'citizen' and makes him or her part of the national community. Some research indicates a close connection between legal definitions of citizenship (and their repercussions in other legal fields, such as alien law and family law) and the respective 'master narratives' on belonging and identity (see e.g. Borneman 1992; Schneider 2007). The relation between citizenship and belonging has also been indirectly acknowledged by scholars who talk about 'collectively shared identity' (Benhabib 2007: 19), a 'shared sense of political identity among citizens' (Bauböck 2006: 114) and 'citizens' loyalty' (Sassen 2002). It is through citizenship that 'belonging' becomes 'membership', with the formal and subjective characteristics being intimately related.

At the same time, citizenship theory today must account for new dynamics experienced by groups comprising people who are considered citizens without necessarily being 'nationals'. This is what makes the study of the second generations particularly interesting. These citizens do not necessarily share the same cultural grounds as their peers of native parentage, thus making the connection between citizenship and ethno-national belonging no longer self-evident. Still, a need for more openness when it comes to conceiving 'membership' or 'citizenship' has been reflected in the rise of new terminologies, such as 'cultural citizenship' (e.g. Rosaldo 2003; Benmayor, Torruellas & Juarbe 1992), 'hybridity' (e.g. Burke 2009; Werbner & Modood 1997) and 'hyphenation' (e.g. Çağlar 1997).

Social integration and acculturation

Belonging is in itself an important indicator in that it is simultaneously a precondition and an indication for a person's emotional relatedness to his or her 'life world'. This relatedness to a place or community is based on socialisation and enculturation processes that make an individual capable

of adequately maintaining social relations and feeling ‘culturally intimate’ (Herzfeld 1997). These processes are part of the tribulations of adolescence, in general, but the way they unfold for immigrants and their children has frequently been seen as a particular challenge (see e.g. King & Koller 2006). From the receiving societies’ point of view – which, revealingly, is also the dominant perspective in migration and integration studies – the ‘problem of integration’ experienced by children of immigrants has therefore always also been seen as a problem of adaptation and acculturation.

In the book *Suicide: A study in sociology*, first published in 1897, Durkheim laid down the foundations of social integration theory (Durkheim 1951; see Zhou & Bankston 1994). Writing in France during the rapid industrialisation of Continental Europe, with large rural-to-urban migration flows fanning fears of a new ‘dangerous underclass’ (Lucassen 2007), Durkheim argued that the better integration of individuals within a given society increases its possibilities for controlling them. Although not talking about international migration, Durkheim considered heterogeneity a basic problem. He distinguished mechanical solidarity – based on common values, behaviours, attitudes and beliefs – from organic solidarity, acknowledging the complementary difference inherent in the modern division of labour and thus discarding a demand for cultural uniformity. This idea was taken up by Park in 1914 (609): ‘Solidarity of modern states depends less on the homogeneity of the population than, as James Bryce has suggested, upon the through-going mixture of heterogeneous elements’ (see also Taylor 1988).

For Gordon (1964: 81), this acceptance of heterogeneity was ‘the keystone of the arch of assimilation’. Unless a new group of immigrants is allowed to enter social relationships with the rather closed circles of the host population, even high levels of acculturation will fail to translate into full participation in society. For Gordon and others, acculturation was therefore seen mainly as a *function* of the social structure rather than a goal or aim on its own.² An interesting question concerns to which degree the *referent* of immigrant acculturation – i.e. the unit to which immigrants are supposed to become ‘similar’ – can actually be operationalised for scientific analysis. Terms such as ‘the mainstream’, ‘core’, ‘majority’ and ‘host society’ (or simply ‘society’) serve to juxtapose immigrants (along with their culture or country of origin, ethnic identity, group traits, etc.) with the non-immigrant society (and ‘*their*’ culture). But if we wish to replace ‘a concept that understands society as a big collective/collectivity by a concept of modern world society, i.e. a society that is functionally differentiated in different realms (...) and modern organizations’ (Luhmann 1997; cf. Bommes 2005; Glick-Schiller, Basch & Blanc-Szanton 1995; Glick-Schiller & Wimmer 2002; Vertovec 1999), we also must adopt the position that ‘by taking roles inside organisations and fulfilling the bundles of social expectations connected to these roles, *all individuals* assimilate in order to enable their

participation in society and their survival' (ibid.). Going back to the origins of Durkheim's work on social integration, the theoretical challenge is to conceive of society as a multifaceted dynamic structure within which the contours of people's lives are negotiated among diverse groups of people with unequal access to sources of power and persuasion (Tsing 2004). Part of this inequality has generally been described as *structural*, having been dealt with in this volume's contributions on demography (chapter 4), education (chapter 5) and work (chapter 6). The present chapter adds identity-related issues to the mix.

Addressing identity issues in a survey such as TIES proves difficult because the aforementioned dimensions – symbolical, interactional and discursive – cannot really be concretised. Surveys do not address *individual* strategies for self-positioning nor, even less so, do they account for the individuals' personal politics of identity. The statistical distribution of 'feelings of belonging' in different domains and their degree of correlation with background variables and interrelation with other relevant domains (e.g. social relations, language, religion, social participation) are indicators of the *structural* dimension within the identificational incorporation of children of immigrants into urban societies in Europe. However, discursive aspects play a role, if only because surveys rely on language.³ In the face of these complexities, the TIES survey concentrated on issues of belonging: self-ascriptions to common categories of membership, such as ethnic group, country and city of residence and religion. These items could relate to common background variables (e.g. age, gender, education, parents' socio-economic status) and self-reported cultural and social practices (e.g. religious practice, language use and skills, participation in organisations).

As such, we do not test any particular 'grand theory' or hypothesis. Today's second generation is complex. That complexity has hardly been done justice in most quantitative work, reducing its reality to three or four 'modes of acculturation'. This chapter therefore opts for a more 'explorative' approach to a reality that is extremely divergent across countries and groups, offering interpretations and 'thick descriptions' (cf. Geertz 1973) of data analyses rather than prefixed categorisations.

The TIES survey looks more closely at the category of city rather than country, with the second generation being appreciated as an integral part of city populations and in relation to urban society. European cities have become highly diverse, and the array of cultural influences – being in one way or another part of an immigration narrative – is steadily increasing, especially in the younger age cohorts. All our second-generation respondents have, at least, a dual set of ethno-national references: to the city and country where they were born and raised into and their parents' country of origin. A major danger in quantitative research lies in the relation between the methodologically necessary a priori definition of a unit of analysis and its a posteriori use as the main explanatory axis. The so-called 'group

hypothesis' (see e.g. Crul & Schneider 2010: 1255), mostly referring to minority, ethnic or immigrant groups, does not question whether or to what extent boundaries between 'groups' do actually correspond to the most significant differences found in the total sample of respondents. The danger is not only epistemological – in the sense of confounding *explanans* and *explanandum* – but also analytical and interpretational: with 'the group' as a fixed frame of interpretation, the analysis moves away from the focus on structural conditions and the role of context. In a chapter addressing self-identification it is thus a constant challenge to avoid the very automatisms intrinsic to the application of the 'group hypothesis'. We acknowledge this even though our use of denominations, such as 'Moroccans' or 'the Turkish second generation', is at the same time suggestive and unavoidable. It should therefore be kept in mind throughout the following analyses that groups of respondents – who are classified according to the mere demographic criterion of their parents' birth country (see [chapter 3](#)) – cannot be equalled to *ethnic* groups.

8.2 Multiple belongings

Contrary to widespread folk and political ideas about identities, belonging is never confined to just one category. It is also not necessarily put in either-or terms.⁴ Moreover, as described above, the relevance of a feeling of belonging is strongly contextual. It depends on the social environment and on the specific place and time in which identity is 'enacted' (for example, through a statement like 'I am ...'). But whatever 'label' happens to be chosen in a specific situation or set of circumstances, it always represents a combination of diverse possible meanings, firmly rooted in social discourse. These socially established meanings are sometimes internally contradictory, but in any case offer different degrees of 'legitimacy' or acceptability for an individual to adhere to. As such, the TIES survey questions about belonging not only allowed respondents' simultaneous adherence to different labels, but also to differentiate the degree of importance or relevance for each. The ensuing section presents the results of our comparative analysis of respondents' expressed feelings of belonging within the main categories addressed in the TIES survey.

National identity: Ethnic dimensions, discourse and citizenship

For much of the second generation in Europe, a sense of feeling of belonging is complicated by the general discursive context of the survey country. This not only refers to experiences of 'othering'⁵ that range from simple remarks to overtly xenophobic treatment and are quite frequent for persons considered to 'come from somewhere else'.⁶ The difficulty lies also in the

‘habitual’ definitional criteria for belonging to the nation or the nation-state. ‘Being German’ (or Dutch, French, etc.) can be defined according to any one or all of the following criteria: nationality, ethnic origin and descent (e.g. whether one is born to parents of ‘native’ ancestry), place of birth, and the cultural context for socialisation and ‘enculturation’.

Social discourse rarely applies these criteria in a coherent way, nor are they equally acceptable in all contexts. Nationality is important for political discourse and as a precondition for political participation, but discourses of ‘othering’ and xenophobic behaviours do not ask to see their target’s passport. Place of birth is also usually underemphasised in Europe, though it is important, if not central, in ‘classic’ immigration countries such as the United States, Australia and Brazil (see e.g. Schneider 2007). Of much greater importance in everyday situations are the ‘ethnic descent’ and the cultural context of socialisation – which, in turn, also influence the acquaintance of an individual with regard to, for example, local dialects or accents in language use. The respective roles of the various criteria for definition can obviously differ majorly across countries. Germany and France have been widely used as illustrations par excellence for different official stances towards (and roles assigned to) the ‘ethnic origins’ of individuals (Brubaker 1994; Dumont 1991; Schnapper 1996; Soysal 2004; White 1997).

Applied to the second generation, these criteria have different degrees of legitimacy. The ethnic criterion is the most pivotal because it forms the basis of many folk apprehensions about what it’s supposed to mean ‘to be’ French, German, etc. At the same time, it is the least discursively legitimised criterion for the native-born children of immigrants, hardly conducive to being used by them unambiguously. [Tables 8.1a](#) and [8.1b](#) show the strength of feelings respondents claimed towards the country (or nation-state) in which the survey was conducted, also being the country to which at least one of their parents had migrated to.⁷

Unsurprisingly, all cities’ respective comparison groups show much stronger feelings of national belonging than the second-generation respondents. At the same time, in all cities there are more – and in some cities, many more – second-generation respondents expressing ‘strong’ or ‘very strong’ rather than ‘weak’, ‘very weak’ or ‘no’ feelings of belonging. Looking at the Turkish respondents in particular, the numbers for those expressing ‘weak or no’ such feelings range from around 14 per cent in the two Swiss cities to 25 per cent in Strasbourg. This means that talking about a feeling of belonging to the country or nation one was born into is mainly an issue falling somewhere between the evocation of ‘strong’ feelings and an ‘ambiguous or neutral’ position.⁸

The range between these two answer categories is indeed very wide – across countries and even between cities within one country. In the Turkish second generation, ambiguous or neutral feelings are particularly high in

Table 8.1a *Feelings of belonging to the survey country, per city and ethnic group*

			Second generation		Comparison group	
			Turkish	Former Yugoslavian		
Austria	Vienna	Strong feelings of belonging	32.9	58.2	74.0	
		Ambiguous/neutral	45.0	23.9	20.0	
		Weak or no feelings	22.1	17.9	6.0	
		N	249	251	250	
	Linz	Strong feelings of belonging	44.4	63.1	78.2	
		Ambiguous/neutral	38.0	29.9	18.8	
		Weak or no feelings	17.6	7.1	3.0	
		N	205	241	234	
	Switzerland	Zurich	Strong feelings of belonging	55.0	53.2	62.4
			Ambiguous/neutral	30.0	35.5	35.6
Weak or no feelings			15.0	11.3	2.0	
N			200	231	202	
Basel		Strong feelings of belonging	43.2	58.3	61.5	
		Ambiguous/neutral	43.2	37.2	34.7	
		Weak or no feelings	13.7	4.4	3.8	
		N	241	180	265	
Germany	Berlin	Strong feelings of belonging	45.5	74.3	79.6	
		Ambiguous/neutral	36.8	17.8	18.4	
		Weak or no feelings	17.8	7.9	2.0	
		N	253	202	250	
	Frankfurt	Strong feelings of belonging	54.4	65.7	81.0	
		Ambiguous/neutral	28.4	26.0	15.4	
		Weak or no feelings	17.2	8.3	3.6	
		N	250	204	253	
Sweden	Stockholm	Strong feelings of belonging	42.6		86.7	
		Ambiguous/neutral	36.7		12.4	
		Weak or no feelings	20.7		0.8	
		N	251		249	

Columns total 100% within cities.

Source: TIES survey 2007-2008

both Austrian cities, in Vienna, Basel and Strasbourg (around 45 per cent); they are lowest in Zurich and Frankfurt (around 30 per cent). These numbers should be viewed in light of differing discursive contexts and the common attitudes fostered by respective societies concerning the question of national belonging. Such is reflected in the responses of the comparison groups. Their adherence to the label of 'national belonging' is particularly low in the two Swiss cities, in Antwerp and Paris, with only around 62 per cent expressing 'strong' feelings. In the other cities, the numbers are considerably higher: 75 per cent or more (with Madrid even close to 100 per cent).

Similar answers by second-generation respondents may therefore represent different degrees of correlation with the typical trend identifiable in a

Table 8.1b *Feelings of belonging to the survey country, per city and ethnic group*

			Second generation		Comparison group
			Turkish	Moroccan	
Belgium	Antwerp	Strong feelings of belonging	42.2	50.0	61.8
		Ambiguous/neutral	19.0	19.4	24.6
		Weak or no feelings	38.8	30.6	13.6
		N	358	311	301
	Brussels	Strong feelings of belonging	53.1	46.8	70.2
		Ambiguous/neutral	18.8	23.0	20.2
		Weak or no feelings	28.2	30.2	9.7
		N	243	246	256
Netherlands	Amsterdam	Strong feelings of belonging	38.6	46.7	78.8
		Ambiguous/neutral	38.6	33.7	16.2
		Weak or no feelings	22.8	19.6	5.0
		N	194	191	250
	Rotterdam	Strong feelings of belonging	39.3	42.0	81.7
		Ambiguous/neutral	36.9	38.0	14.5
		Weak or no feelings	23.8	20.0	3.8
		N	217	220	232
Spain	Barcelona	Strong feelings of belonging		68.8	72.4
		Ambiguous/neutral		23.2	15.4
		Weak or no feelings		8.0	12.2
		N		237	246
	Madrid	Strong feelings of belonging		88.8	99.2
		Ambiguous/neutral		9.6	0.8
		Weak or no feelings		1.6	0.0
		N		250	250
France	Paris	Strong feelings of belonging	44.2		64.6
		Ambiguous/neutral	38.8		28.1
		Weak or no feelings	16.9		7.3
		N	247		174
	Strasbourg	Strong feelings of belonging	31.7		71.7
		Ambiguous/neutral	43.3		25.2
		Weak or no feelings	25.0		3.1
		N	251		177

Columns total 100% within cities.

Source: TIES survey 2007-2008

country or city. In Spain, for example, the Moroccan second generation has the highest percentage of 'strong' feelings among all second-generation groups in the survey. They come close to the very uniformly high responses of the comparison group. At the other end of the spectrum, the comparison group in Switzerland is the most sceptical about its own national belonging (62 per cent expressing 'strong' or 'very strong' and 35 per cent 'neither strong nor weak' feelings). Yet, the highest score of all cities for 'strong' feelings of national belonging among Turks is found in Zurich. Here the gap between the Turkish group and the comparison group is particularly small, at 7.4 per cent. The largest gaps are found in Vienna, Stockholm, Strasbourg and the two Dutch cities, all showing a difference of more than 40 per cent.

Switzerland is also the country where in both cities the respondents of former Yugoslavian descent were the most ambiguous about their feelings of belonging to the country (around 36 per cent). This was much higher than their peers interviewed in Austria and Germany. The result points in two possible directions. On the one hand, descendants of immigrants from the former Yugoslavia seem to have generally closer outcomes to the respective comparison groups than to the Turkish respondents, and this is in fact the case in Switzerland. On the other hand, particularly in Switzerland, they find themselves much more at the centre of debate on migration and integration than in Austria or Germany, countries where such discussion is much more focussed on Turks.

From this overview, teasing apart certain basic background variables emerge to reveal several relevant factors. Especially meaningful here are citizenship, the educational level of respondents, their degree of religiosity and whether or not they report having experienced discrimination. Citizenship is significant in most countries and cities, and it follows the same basic pattern: those with only the survey country citizenship tend to have higher numbers for 'strong' feelings and lower numbers for 'ambiguous or neutral' and 'weak or no' feelings, followed by those with dual citizenship. Those only possessing the nationality of their parents' country of origin show the lowest feelings of belonging. Because citizenship regulations differ a lot from country to country, this category – notably for those with only Turkish or Moroccan or former Yugoslavian nationality – is virtually absent in Belgium, France, the Netherlands and Sweden. The category of those with dual citizenship is also sometimes rather small, for example, in France and Austria, albeit for very different reasons. On the flipside, over 80 per cent of the Turkish respondents in both Dutch cities and in Antwerp hold dual citizenship (for details, see [chapter 4](#)).

Although not quite an accurate historical observation, mass immigration is commonly considered a new phenomenon in Europe. The growing presence of a native-born second generation thus challenges established notions of who is 'native' and who is an 'immigrant'. Citizenship legislations in

Europe have differed in their approaches to defining nationality and responding to the challenges posed by mass immigration since the early 1960s. For example, France is often presented as the prime example for *ius soli*, the right to citizenship by birth; up until a decade ago in Germany parents' nationality was the main identifier, *ius sanguinis*. This has diametric effects: France automatically grants the second generation French citizenship upon reaching adulthood; in Germany, this access was only until recently restricted and subject to a specific application procedure. To a certain degree, such discrepancies are also reflected in society's expressed perceptions: in France, the second generation is expected to be part of general civil society and, if even, to comprise an ethnic *minority* within it; in Germany, they are considered to be part of 'the immigrant community', not being 'Germans' *sui generis*. To illustrate, for second-generation Turks in France it is a sort of 'must' to declare oneself French; the corresponding statement for second-generation Turks in Germany is essentially a discursive impossibility. Table 8.2 shows the results of a multivariate analysis testing a number of possible determinants for this group's strength of feelings of belonging to the survey country.

Citizenship is only tied to national belonging, *per se*, for the small minority of our respondents who possess only a Turkish passport. However, it does systematically correspond to other related factors: the intensity of relations to the parents' home country (measured by degree of transnationalism) and the intensity of religious practice. As our analyses indicate, a small minority of more strongly religious second-generation Turks displays very low levels of identification with the urban society they live in. Significantly conducive to feelings of national belonging are the following: language skills and use (specifically, the positive self-evaluation of one's writing skills in the survey country language and using it with siblings), having or having had friends of non-Turkish origin during secondary school and at present, a positive assessment of the overall development of relations between the diasporic community and the majority society. Resulting positive equations to feelings of national belonging are, however, mainly jeopardised by respondents' experiences of discrimination based on parental origins. Interestingly, the effect is vastly independent from the actual magnitude of the problem: to mention the two extremes, it is as significant for the 77 per cent of second-generation Turks in Linz who reported having experienced discrimination as for the corresponding 25 per cent of second-generation Moroccans in Madrid.

Among the individual background factors, gender is the only that has a significant effect in all countries: women show stronger feelings of belonging to the country they were born into than do men. Other factors do not appear to have a significant effect in table 8.2, as the outcomes in our cross-country outlook do not point in the same direction. This is mainly true for education and for participation in the labour market. In Austria,

Table 8.2 *Determinants of the degree of national belonging among second-generation Turks in six countries (N=2,079)*

Male	-0.15***
Educational attainment (ref. below intermediate level)	
Intermediate level	0.08*
Highly educated	-0.03
Activity status (ref. working)	
Unemployed	-0.07
Studying	0.00
Domestic/family	-0.06
Feelings of belonging to Turkey	-0.04
Intensity of religious practice ¹ (ref. no Muslim feelings at all)	
Strict	-0.40***
Selective	-0.38***
Private	-0.19**
Identificational	-0.22
Citizenship (ref. country of residence only)	
Dual	-0.06
Parental home country only	-0.38***
Writing skills language survey country (poor – excellent)	0.13***
Language used with siblings (mostly Turkish – mostly survey country language)	0.04*
Best friends during secondary school (of survey country origin only)	0.08**
Current best friends (of survey country origin only)	0.12***
Experiences of discrimination	-0.14***
Degree of transnationalism ²	-0.13***
Ethnic composition of neighbourhood of residence	-0.06*
Perceived development of relations between majority population and Turks/Moroccans/Former Yugoslavians in recent years	0.11***
(less friendly – more friendly)	
Countries [†]	
Austria	0.10
Switzerland	-0.03
Germany	0.30***
France	-0.11
The Netherlands	0.07
Sweden	-0.33***
Adjusted R ²	0.22

Notes: ***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05; † deviations from the grand mean

¹For details on these categories, see [chapter 9](#); in this analysis a simplified version was used.

²For details on the construction of this category, see [table 8.9](#).

Source: TIES survey 2007-2008

France and Germany, for example, the low educated express significantly weaker feelings of national belonging than the better educated, but in the Netherlands and, in particular, Switzerland, the correlation is inverse. Working or studying also has a positive effect in some countries, when

compared to the unemployed and those primarily occupied with domestic activities and/or family life. This may serve as an indication that actively participating in society can have a positive effect on one's feeling of belonging to it.

'Ethnic' identity: Socio-cultural dimensions and ethnic minorities

By definition, our second-generation respondents possess a second 'ethno-national' reference through having parents – at least one of them anyway – who has had the migration experience and comes from a non-survey country of origin. Like belonging to the survey country, 'being Turkish' (or Moroccan or former Yugoslavian) can mean different things for members of the second generation:

- a citizen of the parental country of origin, i.e. holding that nationality as one's sole nationality or alongside the survey country's nationality;
- a reference to one's descent and name, i.e. the 'ethnic criterion';
- a reference to one's early childhood cultural influences (e.g. mother language, religious feasts, meals) being perceived as different from the survey country's dominant 'ethno-culture';
- a member of a group identified as such, even though this membership may contradict self-perceptions (thus resulting in 'reactive identification');
- for national minorities (e.g. Kurds), having parents who originate from a country even though they themselves do not feel part of the dominant 'ethno-nation'.

These criteria can play a role in individual self-definitions, but they are also relevant in interaction and discourses. Social discourses generally correspond with institutionalised forms of a definition, e.g. citizenship regulations. They thus form a sort of 'definitional habitus', with implications for the way different layers of identity work. In some survey countries, it implies the discursive difficulty of simultaneously belonging to more than one 'ethno-national' category. In other countries, belonging to an 'ethnic minority' is an established discursive option and does not contradict a person's national belonging. Moreover, countries apply different rules for persons being born in their territory or area of jurisdiction, which is also frequently reflected in the identifiers used in social and political discourse (cf. Schneider 2007).

Answers to our 'ethnic' belonging question could thus be interpreted as much as an 'ethno-national' reference to the parents' country of origin as a reference to being part of an ethnic minority *within* the national setting of the survey country. Table 8.3a and 8.3b presents the degree to which our respondents felt 'Turkish' or 'Moroccan'. The notable complexity of this

Table 8.3a *Feeling 'Turkish', per city and ethnic group*

			Turkish	Comparison group ¹
Austria	Vienna	Strong feelings of belonging	76.0	74.0
		Ambiguous/neutral	20.4	20.0
		Weak or no feelings	3.6	6.0
		N	249	250
	Linz	Strong feelings of belonging	67.8	78.2
		Ambiguous/neutral	20.5	18.8
		Weak or no feelings	11.7	3.0
		N	204	234
Switzerland	Zurich	Strong feelings of belonging	64.4	62.4
		Ambiguous/neutral	24.2	35.6
		Weak or no feelings	11.3	2.0
		N	194	202
	Basel	Strong feelings of belonging	58.3	61.5
		Ambiguous/neutral	28.9	34.7
		Weak or no feelings	12.8	3.8
		N	242	265
Germany	Berlin	Strong feelings of belonging	59.7	79.6
		Ambiguous/neutral	20.6	18.4
		Weak or no feelings	19.8	2.0
		N	253	250
	Frankfurt	Strong feelings of belonging	72.8	81.0
		Ambiguous/neutral	14.0	15.4
		Weak or no feelings	13.2	3.6
		N	250	253
Sweden	Stockholm	Strong feelings of belonging	51.3	86.7
		Ambiguous/neutral	20.1	12.4
		Weak or no feelings	28.6	0.8
		N	234	249

Columns total 100% within cities.

¹ Comparison group numbers refer to 'national belonging'.

Source: TIES survey 2007-2008

question for our Yugoslavian respondents merits a separate paragraph in which we discuss their 'ethnic' self-definitions.

In all cities a large majority of the second-generation respondents expresses strong feelings of being Turkish or Moroccan, the numbers ranging from 51 per cent in Stockholm to 88 per cent in Strasbourg. Also, in most cities, these numbers are close to those of the respective comparison groups with regard to their own feelings of 'national' belonging, thus indicating similar degrees of identification with the country's respective main 'ethno-national' reference.

There are, however, some exceptions. In Stockholm, Zurich, Linz and Berlin, the reference to Turkishness is particularly low (51-68 per cent). One possibly relevant factor here is that in these cities the share of Kurds

Table 8.3b *Feeling 'Turkish' and 'Moroccan', per city and ethnic group*

			<i>Second generation</i>		<i>Comparison group¹</i>
			<i>Turkish</i>	<i>Moroccan</i>	
Belgium	Antwerp	Strong feelings of belonging	86.3	80.6	61.8
		Ambiguous/neutral	6.7	9.0	24.6
		Weak or no feelings	7.0	10.3	13.6
		N	358	311	301
	Brussels	Strong feelings of belonging	75.2	74.5	70.2
		Ambiguous/neutral	11.0	14.2	20.2
		Weak or no feelings	13.8	11.3	9.7
		N	244	246	256
Netherlands	Amsterdam	Strong feelings of belonging	75.9	80.0	78.8
		Ambiguous/neutral	17.2	15.6	16.2
		Weak or no feelings	6.9	4.4	5.0
		N	201	183	250
	Rotterdam	Strong feelings of belonging	80.5	76.0	81.7
		Ambiguous/neutral	14.6	16.0	14.5
		Weak or no feelings	4.9	8.0	3.8
		N	219	216	232
Spain	Barcelona	Strong feelings of belonging		72.9	72.4
		Ambiguous/neutral		17.4	15.4
		Weak or no feelings		9.7	12.2
		N		236	246
	Madrid	Strong feelings of belonging		78.7	99.2
		Ambiguous/neutral		16.1	0.8
		Weak or no feelings		5.2	0.0
		N		249	250
France	Paris	Strong feelings of belonging	82.9		64.6
		Ambiguous/neutral	13.8		28.1
		Weak or no feelings	3.5		7.3
		N	247		174
	Strasbourg	Strong feelings of belonging	88.3		71.7
		Ambiguous/neutral	7.1		25.2
		Weak or no feelings	4.6		3.1
		N	252		177

Columns total 100% within cities.

¹ Comparison group numbers refer to 'national belonging'.

Source: TIES survey 2007-2008

and other ethnic minorities among the 'Turkish' respondents is relatively high (around 15-20 per cent; see paragraph on ethnic minorities below).

The respondents' citizenship status shows a corresponding opposite effect to national belonging. In all countries, those holding only survey country nationality do identify less with being Turkish or Moroccan than those with dual citizenship, and even more so than those holding only Turkish or Moroccan nationality. As mentioned, Austria shows very low numbers for respondents with dual citizenship and the overall effect is therefore rather small; in Sweden and Switzerland, the effect is strong and significant. In short, the effect is stronger when the total numbers of respondents with only the survey country's citizenship (in a country or a second-generation group) are smaller.

In most survey countries, feelings of being Turkish or Moroccan are not related to most standard control variables. Women's feelings of ethnic belonging are lower; this is significant in Sweden, Switzerland, Belgium, Austria and France. The educational level of the respondents plays a significant role in Sweden, Germany, Austria and Switzerland: the better educated, the weaker the importance attached to being a Turk, a Moroccan or someone from former Yugoslavia. In the four aforementioned countries, respondents' main professional activity also plays a role: feeling part of an 'ethno-national' group is particularly strong among the unemployed and, to a lesser extent, those staying at home for the sake of domestic activities and/or family life, while students are those with the weakest feelings of 'ethnic' belonging. Working people's responses come closer to those of students than the unemployed. As was the case with national belonging, it seems that being involved in activities that imply leaving the house and mixing with different kinds of people has a weakening effect on the importance attached to feeling Turkish or Serbian/Croatian/Albanian – at least in the four aforementioned countries. It is, however, interesting to note that both educational level and main occupation type seem to play no more than an ephemeral role in France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Spain.

A cross-cutting category: Religion

The TIES survey reveals the second generation's general tendency to strongly identify with the categories of 'Turkish' or 'Moroccan' and 'Muslim'. In all countries, those who are self-reportedly more religious do identify significantly more strongly with being Turkish or Moroccan than their non-religious 'co-ethnic' peers. However, there is also considerable variation among the respondents (confirmed by high standard deviation numbers), though the variations are more significant for feeling Muslim than for Turkish or Moroccan identity.

Yet, even the role of religious belief differs strongly across cities and countries. The overall share of Turkish and Moroccan respondents who

report having religious belief ranges between 57 per cent among Turks in Switzerland and 89 per cent among Moroccans in the Netherlands. The lowest number is for the Moroccan second generation, at 67 per cent in Spain; the highest is for the Turkish group, at 88 per cent in the Netherlands. Descendents of immigrants from former Yugoslavia range between 39 per cent in Germany and 66 per cent in Austria.⁹

It should be noted that ‘having a religion’ is not the same as identifying with a specific religion. The issues overlap in the comparison groups, but in their case there is hardly any connection to questions of ‘ethnic’ or ‘national’ belonging. The disconnect is quite different especially for the two predominantly Muslim second-generation groups. Unsurprisingly, second-generation Turks and Moroccans who state that they currently practise a religion feel most strongly attached to Muslim identity; this applies in all countries and cities and more to Sunni Muslims than practitioners of other forms of Islam. However, it is interesting to note that, with the exception of Paris and Basel, between 26 per cent and 41 per cent of respondents in all survey cities who report not having religious belief still strongly identify as Muslims. This means that being Muslim – as an identity category – is not necessarily linked to feelings of religiousness or certain degrees of religious practice, but rather is an integral part of people’s self-definition as Turkish or Moroccan (for details on religion, see [chapter 9](#)).

Again, educational attainment shows some influence in this regard. Strong Muslim identities are less common among higher-educated respondents. The very diverging levels of educational attainment across cities and countries (see [chapter 5](#)) also affect identity feeling outcomes.


Interrelations of Turkish second-generation identity feelings in France, Germany and the Netherlands

We now explore the intersections and relative positions of categories of belonging in multiple identifications in the Turkish second generation in three countries. We make use of multiple correspondence analysis (MCA), a method that visualises relationships between different variables by mapping their attributes into a bi-dimensional matrix. The spatial position of each object reflects the relative similarity to, or preference for, other objects with regard to the dimensions represented by the axes (for more details, see Hair, Black, Babin, Anderson & Tatham 2006). The advantage of MCA is that it allows: a) identifying those variables that really differentiate the individuals for each issue while simultaneously controlling for relevant correlations; and b) viewing the relative positions of more than two variables at the same time. The method is therefore particularly suited to capture the complexity of identity constructions along the dimensions of simultaneousness and mutual exclusion.

MCA is applied here to the following identity variables: Turkish, Muslim, country, city, and European feelings of belonging among descendants of Turkish immigrants in Germany, the Netherlands and France. It was our purpose here to look for trends *within* each country. The six-point answer scale for our belonging questions was formed around a centre position of ambiguous or neutral feeling of belonging. Figures 8.1, 8.2 and 8.3 show the position of each variable in the bi-dimensional space, allowing us to interpret the relations between variables. On both axes, the distance from the central crossing point (0.0) indicates the degree of differentiation between the individuals. The modalities more towards the centre of the graph are those that are combined with all the other categories around.¹⁰


The respondents' distribution is not the same across the three national samples, nor is the relationship between the variables. In the German and French samples, Turkish and Muslim feelings of belonging are found near the centre position V. They thus do not contribute to differentiating the respondents in the bi-dimensional space created, although they do in the Dutch sample. Here they show a different combination for the identity variables with the other identity categories. In the German and French samples, 'weak' and 'indifferent' feelings of belonging are clearly differentiating the individuals in all identity variables, and they also seem to combine different types of identity feelings with similar intensities of belonging. By

Figure 8.1 *Identity combinations for the Turkish second generation in Germany*




Source: TIES survey 2007-2008

Figure 8.2 Identity combinations for the Turkish second generation in France



Source: TIES survey 2007-2008


Figure 8.3 Identity combinations for the Turkish second generation in the Netherlands¹



Source: TIES survey 2007-2008


Note: In this graph, the European feeling of belonging category is supplementary and therefore does not show a borderline.

Figure 8.4 *Distribution of the Turkish second generation across identity combinations in Germany*




Source: TIES survey 2007-2008

Figure 8.5 *Distribution of the Turkish second generation across identity combinations in France*



Source: TIES survey 2007-2008

Figure 8.6 *Distribution of the Turkish second generation across identity combinations in the Netherlands*



Source: TIES survey 2007-2008

contrast, for the Dutch sample, ‘weak’ and ‘indifferent’ identity feelings seem to be closer to each other and less distinct, although when combining different types of identity they show more contrast. Therefore, axis 1 for the Dutch sample is mainly determined by Turkish and Muslim identity feelings (‘ethnic identity’), while in the other two samples it is the lack of differentiation between the three categories – national, local and European – that combine to generate generalised feelings of exclusion versus inclusion on axis 1. In the German and French graphs, quadrant IV represents strong feelings of belonging in the national, local and European categories and low feelings of ‘ethnic’ belonging (quadrant III in the Dutch graph). Quadrant III represents the counterposition of strong feelings of ‘ethnic’ belonging together with weak feelings towards, or detachment from, the other categories (quadrant II in the Dutch graph). Quadrant II indicates a generalised stance of indifference towards all categories of belonging (in the Dutch graph this is closer to quadrant I). Another significant position is indicated by the V on the German and French graphs (quadrant IV in the Dutch graph), which corresponds to strong identity feelings towards the ‘ethnic’ categories as much as the contextual identity categories.

Assessing the relative importance of these positions in the three national samples, figures 8.4, 8.5 and 8.6 show the distribution of the individuals across the quadrants per country. The graphs indicate the numerical

prevalence of the different identity combinations in the respective Turkish respondent groups.

Position V on the German and French graphs and quadrant IV in the Dutch graph are the main areas where individual respondents are found. These quadrants stand for combinations of rather strong identity feelings, in general. This is particularly clear in the case of France, where we also find significant numbers of respondents combining 'ethnic' identity with 'indifference' towards national, local and European identity categories.

In the Netherlands, the combination of strong ethnic and national, local and European identification is prevalent (quadrant IV). It is followed by a significant number of cases of respondents who combine strong 'ethnic' identification with 'detachment' from other categories of belonging (quadrant II). For the Turkish respondents in Amsterdam and Rotterdam, local belonging can serve as an alternative to national and European belonging – much more than it does in the French and German cities anyway.

In all three national samples, very few respondents are detached from their Turkishness, but show up strong in other categories. The category of persons not holding strong feelings of belonging to *any* of the identity category is also marginal (quadrant II in the German and French graphs, quadrant I in the Dutch graph).

Kurds and Moroccan minorities

One particular aspect of the divergent situation in the different cities is the presence of minority groups with origins in Turkey and Morocco. For the Turkish case, these include Kurdish, Suryoye, Armenian and Aramaic language groups; in the Moroccan case, we refer to Riffi, Tachelhiyt and Tamazight. The TIES sample, however, only allows for approximations.¹¹ One aspect is language and, here in particular, language socialisation. The group of individuals being raised in Kurdish is largest in Berlin (19 per cent) and Basel (15 per cent), while much fewer respondents are found in Stockholm, Paris and Zurich (not more than 5 per cent). The Suryoye Syrian language group is only found in the TIES sample for Stockholm, with about 12 per cent of the respondents.

Another question inquires into the strength of feeling Kurdish. Among those respondents with at least fair knowledge of some Kurdish language, only about half 'strongly' or 'very strongly' feel Kurdish, while a quarter feels 'ambiguous or neutral' about it.¹² We can combine both aspects so that the definition comprises 'Kurdishness' as much by family origin and language ability as by identification. 'Being Kurdish' in the following analyses thus means having: a) at least an ambiguous feeling of Kurdish belonging among those who understand the Kurdish language 'well or fairly well' or were raised in it and b) a strong feeling of Kurdish belonging among those who were neither raised in the language nor understand it

well. Defined in such manner, the share of Kurdish respondents in Berlin increases to 22 per cent of the total Turkish sample (in Frankfurt 10 per cent) and in Basel to even half of all Turkish respondents (in Zurich 14 per cent).

A significant portion of Kurdish respondents does not consider themselves Turkish. About a quarter of Kurds in Basel stated they have 'weak or no' feelings of being Turkish; in Berlin, this applies to a third of Kurds. In both cities, Kurdish identity is to a certain degree opposed to Turkish identity – the two 'labels' being significantly negatively correlated – although much more strongly so in Berlin than Basel.¹³ This also applies to other ethnic minorities originally from Turkey, e.g. Assyrians in Stockholm. On the whole, they seem to endorse more strongly their relation to the culture and social sphere of their parents' Kurdish origins. They are more likely to have travelled to Turkey and also show lower feelings of national, local and European belonging (all weakly significant). Contrary to what might be expected, Kurdish respondents do not more often participate in a political organisation or party. However, Kurds do see themselves considerably more at the left or far left of the political spectrum: almost 60 per cent of Kurds in Berlin (50 per cent in Basel) versus one third of non-Kurdish Turkish respondents in both cities.

Berbers in Morocco represent a much larger share of the total population, numbering 60 to 70 per cent, than do Kurds in Turkey, numbering around 20 per cent. As a consequence, among Moroccan emigrants to Western Europe and in the second generation, origins from Berber regions are quite common; the most frequently spoken languages in the Netherlands, Belgium and Spain are Tashelhit, Tamazight and, most widespread of all, Tarifit. Among the TIES respondents, we therefore also find many who identify as Berbers and/or were raised in one of the three Berber languages that our questionnaire offered as answer categories.

Considering the large share of Berbers within the total Moroccan population and the fact that European guest workers were frequently recruited from rural areas in Morocco, the number of respondents identifying with being Berber is relatively low. Only in Rotterdam does it reach slightly more than 60 per cent, while staying around 50 per cent in Amsterdam, Antwerp and Barcelona and comprising only one third of respondents in Brussels and Madrid.

In Spain and the Netherlands, an identification with feeling Berber is much stronger than a familiarity with any of its languages. In Amsterdam, only one quarter grew up in a Berber home language environment, while in Rotterdam the number reached one third of the respondents. In Spain, this number drops down to 9 per cent for Barcelona and 3 per cent for Madrid. Those who state they understand Berber at least fairly well number a bit higher in these four cities, likely indicating that its vernacular use within the Moroccan diaspora goes beyond the mere family. This seems

less the case in Amsterdam, where more than half of the TIES Moroccan second-generation respondents grew up with Berber – notably Tarifit – being spoken in their families.

Unlike the Kurdish-Turkish issue, being at once Berber and Moroccan seems hardly a contradiction. The two categories are rather positively related. This, despite the fact that official recognition of Berber as a language in Morocco was only granted in 2010 and there have been repeated attempts to ‘Arabise’ Berbers, being seen as the ‘indigenous’ people of the region.

Assessing sense of belonging post-Yugoslavia

Ethnic membership in what is now the former Yugoslavia is a good example of a very fluid and recent ethno-genesis. What’s more, it occurred under conditions of cross-cutting regional, linguistic and religious boundaries that made clear – not to mention parsimonious – definitions of in-group and out-group membership tremendously challenging. When the parents of the former Yugoslavian second generation migrated to Western Europe they arrived as ‘Yugoslavian guest workers’, with little attention paid to the fact that they came with multiple languages, religious beliefs and senses of ethnic belonging. Meanwhile, in Yugoslavia, ethnic and religious categories also failed to show clearly marked boundaries, at least in many areas.

To learn about ‘ethno-national’ feelings of belonging among children of immigrants from today’s Yugoslavian successor states, the TIES survey divided the supranational category of ‘Yugoslav’ into ethnic components. We then examined which ethnic groups were contained within the sample and how they could be meaningfully identified. As Barth observed in his classic introduction to *Ethnic groups and boundaries* (1969), ethnic groups are defined by the boundaries between them rather than by observable cultural differences. The Yugoslavian case illustrates how dependent ethnic definitions are on power relations and historical contingencies in a given society.

In our own attempt at categorising the TIES survey respondents according to their ethnic groups we looked for the relative importance of various boundary-markers. Since most scholars agree that they are the two most crucial markers for ethnic differentiation in former Yugoslavia, we decided to use religion and language to define each respondent’s ‘ethnic heritage’. However, in the Slovenian, Albanian and Macedonian cases, language is a more important marker of ethnicity than religion; in the Croatian, Slavic Muslim and Serb-Montenegrin cases, language is not a clear indicator, so religion was taken as the primary boundary-marker. This method corresponds to Gurr’s (1993: 3ff) assertion that ‘religion is salient to ethnicity if it is a defining trait that sets a group apart in its own eyes and/or in the eyes of others’.

Table 8.4 *Distribution of former Yugoslavian ethnic groups, by country and city*

	<i>Germany</i>		<i>Switzerland</i>		<i>Austria</i>	
	<i>Berlin</i>	<i>Frankfurt</i>	<i>Zurich</i>	<i>Basel</i>	<i>Vienna</i>	<i>Linz</i>
Serbs	41.1	40.2	28.0	40.0	44.3	33.5
Croats	22.3	19.6	24.3	24.2	18.2	36.0
Slavic Muslims	5.4	7.4	9.2	6.3	11.5	10.3
Albanians	1.0	2.5	23.8	10.5	0.8	1.2
Macedonians	2.0	3.4	1.3	2.1	2.0	0.0
Slovenes	1.0	2.5	1.3	1.6	4.0	4.0
Montenegrins	0.5	1.5	0.8	0.0	0.8	0.4
Undefined cases	26.7	23.0	11.3	15.3	18.6	16.1
N	202	204	239	190	253	242

Source: TIES survey 2007-2008

Our classification, as shown in [table 8.4](#), comprises seven main ethnic groups: Albanian, Croatian, Montenegrin, Macedonian, Serbian, Slavic Muslim and Slovenian. For the most part, these categories correspond to those used in censuses during the region's existence as the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. We also had to create a category of 'undefined cases', which became quite numerous. This comprises non-religious respondents whose parents spoke Serbo-Croatian or Bosnian, two languages that cannot be exclusively associated with one particular ethnic group. The category also includes those whose religion deviates from that which is conventionally associated with their ethnic group (e.g. Catholic Serbs or Orthodox Christian Croats), cases of mixed marriage and those respondents who could not be defined for other reasons.

In the three countries where we surveyed 'Yugoslavs', respondents of Serbian and Croatian descent form the two largest ethnic groups, also being the two largest in the Yugoslavian successor states. In Germany and Austria, Slavic Muslims form the third largest, but in Switzerland – despite similar numbers for the latter – those of Albanian descent (mostly from Kosovo and Macedonia) come in third. The difference between the three countries is quite striking. Respondents of Albanian descent only comprise about 1 per cent of the former Yugoslavian second-generation respondents in Austria and Germany, but almost 18 per cent in Switzerland. Because official statistics are mostly based on nationality, the number of Albanian-speaking people from Yugoslavian successor states is hard to estimate. Using language as their definitional criterion, some Swiss researchers have suggested that Albanian speakers account for 45 per cent of all immigrants originating from the areas of Serbia, Kosovo and Montenegro (Haug, Schuler & Wanner 2002). In terms of city differences, we see that 74 per cent of respondents of Albanian descent in Switzerland live in Zurich.

There is a similar concentration for children of Croatian descent in Austria, with more than two thirds living in Linz.

In terms of education, former Yugoslavian respondents are, on the whole, performing better than our Turkish respondents, though less well than the comparison group. In Germany and Austria, Croatian peers show levels of education comparable to the comparison group. Differences *across* the three countries are quite substantial. The respondents of Serbian descent in Switzerland report better education levels than their ‘co-ethnics’ in Germany. This is also the case with Croatian respondents in Austria, as compared to their peers in Germany; both effects correspond with overall lower educational levels in Germany, as compared to Austria and Switzerland.

Former Yugoslavia’s three main religions are Catholicism, Islam and Orthodox Christianity. While respondents of Serbian and Croatian descent are associated mainly with being Orthodox and Catholic, respectively, respondents of Albanian descent are predominantly Muslim, though there are also Albanian Catholics and Orthodox Christians (see [table 8.11](#) in the appendix for further details on the religiosity of our respondents).

Such demographic characteristics point out differences along various lines, though it seems clear that local and national contexts play a decisive role in explaining them. The question is to what extent ‘ethnic’ or group differences can also be seen as relevant for explaining variation within our sample of former Yugoslavians respondents. Broadly speaking, we find the largest dissimilarities in Austria, where the Croatian and Serbian second generations, forming the two main groups, differ across several key characteristics. In Germany, however, they only differ according to the degree of their religious affiliation. In Switzerland, the two groups diverge in terms of social relations, religious affiliation, perceived and experienced discrimination and citizenship. Respondents of Albanian descent in Switzerland differ from the Croatian group in terms of knowledge of the language they grew up with, educational level, social relations, religion and citizenship.

The following section analyses the role of various feelings of belonging in the groups under consideration. Rather surprisingly, it can be said that descendants of the different ‘Yugoslavian’ ethnic groups identify almost as strongly with their respective birth country as the comparison group respondents. [Table 8.5](#) examines the correlations between ethnic belonging and national and local belonging. It is worth noting that, in general, local and national belonging are significantly positively correlated.

We see that ethnic and national belonging are significantly *negatively* correlated for Serbian and Croatian respondents in two cities, Vienna and Zurich. In Basel and Linz, the relationship is negative, but not significant while, among respondents of Serbian descent in Berlin, we see the only significantly positive correlation. [Table 8.6](#) indicates that ethnic and local belonging are less often juxtaposed in public and everyday discourses.

Table 8.5 *Correlation coefficients (Spearman-Rho) between 'ethnic' versus national belonging and 'ethnic' versus local belonging, by former Yugoslavian group and city*

		National versus ethnic belonging	Local versus ethnic belonging	N
Vienna	Croatian	-0.380 **	-0.251	46
	Serbian	-0.494 ***	-0.422 ***	108
Linz	Croatian	-0.020	0.205	84
	Serbian	-0.154	0.051	81
Zurich	Croatian	-0.327 *	-0.113	58
	Serbian	-0.369 **	-0.185	65
Basel	Albanian	-0.213	-0.003	55
	Croatian	-0.221	-0.201	46
	Serbian	-0.178	-0.175	75
Berlin	Albanian	-0.240	-0.096	19
	Croatian	-0.001	-0.085	45
	Serbian	0.360 **	0.003	83
Frankfurt	Croatian	-0.103	-0.273	40
	Serbian	0.023	-0.006	82

***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05

Source: TIES survey 2007-2008

Moreover, feelings of belonging to the city are sometimes even stronger in all three second-generation groups than in the respective comparison groups.

As was shown for the Turkish second generation, feelings of national belonging depend on contextual factors such as citizenship and social relationships outside the diasporic community. In terms of citizenship, there is significant variation across countries, which in great part has to do with different citizenship regimes (see [chapter 4](#)). We also seem to see different effects on former Yugoslavia's respective ethnic groups. Differences are strongest in Switzerland with, on one end, 45 per cent of respondents of Croatian descent and 60 per cent of those of Serbian descent having dual citizenship. On the other end, large shares of respondents only possess the citizenship of their parents' country of origin, being the case for 17 per cent of Albanian respondents and 38 per cent of Croatian respondents. Germany has the largest percentage who are naturalised, being about 94 per cent of respondents of Serbian descent.

In sum, these analyses present neither a homogeneous nor uniform image. Results for the three ethnic subgroups in the former Yugoslavian sample are sufficiently divergent at city or national levels to argue in favour of regarding these three 'ethnicities' as distinct diasporic ethno-national groups rather than subsuming them under the increasingly obsolete label of 'former Yugoslavia'. At the same time, their situation seems highly reliant on specific local and national context factors. It is particularly interesting

how the Serbian and Croatian second generations show such divergent outcomes in almost all domains of the TIES survey. Given the fact that Serbian and Croatian second generations in Germany do not play a major role in the public discourse or fuel debate on integration issues, it is not unexpected to find both groups in a seemingly more 'comfortable' position than the Turkish second generation there. Concretely speaking, former Yugoslavians report fewer experiences of discrimination, higher shares of German citizenship and more friendships with peers of non-immigrant parentage. This is different in Austria and Switzerland, though again to varying degrees and in different manners. The comparatively strong demographic and discursive presence of an Albanian second generation in Switzerland constitutes an additional major difference from Austria and Germany.

8.3 Relations with and in the city

Since the 1960s, large-scale immigration in Europe has been mainly an urban phenomenon, although by no means restricted to the bigger cities. Yet, it is the big cities that today draw the most attention in debates on issues of integration and the rapid diversification of the population – city youth, in particular. Since all our second-generation respondents, by definition, were born in the survey countries, we observe an interesting effect in comparison to the group of respondents whose parents were born in the survey country. Albeit to differing degrees, in all survey cities, second-generation groups are more 'native' to their city of residence than their peers of non-migrant parentage. By this, we mean that, by far, the majority was born and raised in the city, while many comparison group members only came to the city to study or work. The proportion of this 'native'-vs.-newcomer inversion varies from city to city. It ranges from around a ten-point difference in Berlin to over 40 points in the two Dutch cities.¹⁴


Local belonging

Many large cities today promote an inclusive discourse when it comes to the increasing cultural diversity of their populations. However, this is rarely accompanied by effective policies of recognising diversity. At the same time, discourses of diversity tend to emphasise the *difference* between immigrant and 'native' cultures. On top of this, measures of effective discursive and symbolic inclusion of the second generation are widely absent in Europe.

These discourses stressing non-belonging or the 'otherness' of children of immigrants mostly draw on *national* representations of belonging. As such, *local* belonging, even though not independent of these national

discourses, has the potential to function as an alternative for expressing a sense of being part of the society one was raised into. It is therefore unsurprising that second-generation respondents in most cities express stronger feelings of local rather than national belonging, while this difference is less accentuated, if not reversed, in the comparison groups. Figure 8.7 shows this for the case of the Moroccan second generation in six cities.

Figure 8.7 Moroccan second generation and the comparison group: Strong feelings of local and national belonging (in %)



Source: TIES survey 2007-2008

In all cities, the Moroccan second generation identifies stronger with the city than with the nation, but the magnitude of the difference varies greatly. It is smallest in Madrid and largest in the two Dutch cities. In the two Spanish cities and in Antwerp, the underlying pattern is the same for the Moroccans and the comparison groups; in Brussels and the Dutch cities, the national level is more important for the comparison groups than the local level. In Amsterdam and Rotterdam, this translates into even stronger feelings of city belonging in the Moroccan second generation than in the comparison groups.¹⁵


Local belonging is discursively less contested when moving down to the neighbourhood. At this level, second-generation respondents express their high degrees of 'nativeness' through autobiographies of 'sedimented' childhood experiences and memories. Also due to the age range present in the survey, the second generation not only resides in the same city where they grew up, but very frequently in the same neighbourhoods as, and in proximity to, parents, siblings and other relatives.

A number of items in the TIES survey ask for respondents' relation to, and perception of, the neighbourhood where he or she currently lives. Some measure perceptions of disorder (such as crime rates and sanitation problems); others aim to establish the respondents' degree of involvement with the neighbourhood and the people living there. In figure 8.8, four items were combined to form an index of *neighbourhood involvement*: 'I feel attached to this neighbourhood'; 'I feel comfortable in this neighbourhood'; 'I feel responsible for this neighbourhood's quality of life'; 'I have good relations with the neighbours'. The figure shows the results for the Austrian and German cities in which all four items were asked.¹⁶

In all four cities, neighbourhood involvement is higher in both second-generation groups than among the respective comparison groups at overall similar levels. Close to two thirds of the Turkish and former Yugoslavian second generation are highly involved in their neighbourhood of residence. The 'hunkering down' effect as a reaction to increasing cultural or ethnic diversity in one's local community, as Putnam (2007: 158) observed for diversifying communities in the US, might be seen in the non-immigrant native population in certain areas, but it certainly does not apply to the children born of immigrants in these areas.

The four cities have concentrations of immigrant populations and second-generation groups in certain areas. It is thus possible that the high level of neighbourhood attachment is somehow related to the visible presence of one's ethno-national diaspora. Table 8.6 analyses the correlation between neighbourhood attachment and the perceived share of persons of one's own ethnic background there.

In all six cities displayed, the correlation is significantly positive only in the comparison groups. These respondents indeed feel more attached to their neighbourhood, when 'ethnic Germans' (or Austrians or Swiss) are

Figure 8.8 Degree of involvement with one's neighbourhood (four-item index)

Source: TIES survey 2007-2008

Note: 'Turkish G2' is 'Turkish second generation'. 'SSYU G2' is 'Former Yugoslavian second generation'.

clearly perceived as being dominant in the neighbourhood. For the former Yugoslavian group in Vienna and for both second-generation groups in Linz, the two items are even significantly *negatively* correlated, i.e. these respondents are more likely to feel attached to the neighbourhood, when

Table 8.6 *Correlation between attachment to neighbourhood and perceived share of persons of one's own ethnic background therein (Spearman-Rho)*

Berlin	Turkish	0.012	(N=232)
	Former Yugoslavian	0.066	(N=174)
	Comparison group	0.322**	(N=221)
Frankfurt	Turkish	0.073	(N=233)
	Former Yugoslavian	0.031	(N=181)
	Comparison group	0.480**	(N=237)
Vienna	Turkish	-0.015	(N=241)
	Former Yugoslavian	-0.328**	(N=242)
	Comparison group	0.197*	(N=238)
Linz	Turkish	-0.233**	(N=200)
	Former Yugoslavian	-0.260**	(N=233)
	Comparison group	0.262**	(N=220)
Zurich	Turkish	0.054	(N=198)
	Former Yugoslavian	-0.103	(N=231)
	Comparison group	0.268**	(N=196)
Basel	Turkish	0.024	(N=247)
	Former Yugoslavian	-0.070	(N=186)
	Comparison group	0.171*	(N=258)

***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05

Source: TIES survey 2007-2008

there are fewer people of Turkish or former Yugoslavian background living there. Also, the visibility of the group does not seem to play a role. A good case in point here is Berlin with a strong Turkish presence in some neighbourhoods, but hardly any visibility of the former Yugoslavian community. Still, we see no sizable difference between the two second-generation groups with regard to this question.

Intercultural relations and multiculturalism

It is in neighbourhoods and local social institutions or organisations where people are most strongly confronted with the diversification of their life worlds. The socially shared environment also provides an important part of their social networks. This section analyses diversity encountered in two basic areas: a) perceptions of diversity in one's life world and reported intercultural practices and b) opinions and attitudes towards a number of issues related to the increasing diversification and pluri-culturality of cities and neighbourhoods.

Table 8.7a and 8.7b reproduce a number of outcomes across cities and countries in these two areas for the Turkish second generation and the respective comparison groups. One important aspect in this field is spatial segregation – reflected in social and media discourse with terms like

‘ethnic ghettos’ or ‘parallel societies’. It is quite common for shares of certain ethnic groups to be overrated, especially when a neighbourhood is ‘ethnically coded’ – such as Berlin’s Kreuzberg district, also known as ‘Little Istanbul’ (cf. Lang 1995). Although high percentages of the Turkish population do not factually exist in any neighbourhood in any of the TIES cities, between 6 per cent (Zurich, Paris, Amsterdam) and 15 per cent (most other cities) of this population estimate the share of Turks in their neighbourhood as three quarters or more.¹⁷

The fact that ‘Turkish neighbourhoods’ are rather likely to be *diverse* neighbourhoods is reflected in the numbers on the ethnic background of respondents’ circle of closest friends. For a large majority of Turkish respondents in both Belgian cities, both Swiss cities, in Paris and Stockholm, at least two of three closest friends are not Turkish. In the other cities, the numbers are much lower – between a quarter in Vienna and around 40 per cent in Strasbourg, Linz and Frankfurt – though they are still around three times higher than for the comparison groups in almost all cities. In fact, it is the respective comparison groups who especially show the highest levels of ‘segregation’ in these terms, i.e. living in non-diverse neighbourhoods, having been to school with very few immigrant children and having the least friendships with ethnic backgrounds other than their own. Another interesting practice concerns going-out to venues frequented by many immigrant youth. The variation across cities is large, ranging from only around 10 per cent of the comparison groups in Stockholm and Vienna who regularly frequent such places to almost half in Berlin and two thirds in Paris.

Education and how to deal with school diversity are sensitive issues in many cities. One question in [tables 8.7a](#) and [8.7b](#) therefore asks whether respondents would send their children to a school with more than 50 per cent immigrant children. The percentages of those willing to do so is surprisingly large: between half and three quarters of the Turkish respondents, but also around half (in most cities) and up to two thirds (in both French cities) of the respective comparison groups (exceptions here are the two Austrian cities with only about 20 per cent).

Both the Turkish second generation and the respective comparison groups seem positive and optimistic about the multicultural realities of their cities. By far, a large majority of all respondents (three quarters and more) thinks that living alongside or together with other cultures is not threatening, but rather enriching, or at least that it makes no difference. Overall, the respondents of Turkish descent are more explicitly positive than the respective comparison groups. Concerning development of intercultural relations between Turks and the ‘ethnic majority’ population over the past years, the Turkish respondents are more optimistic.

We also tested the correlation between whether, on the one hand, relations between Turks and the majority population became more or less friendly, and on the other hand, feelings of belonging to the nation and perceived

Table 8.7a *Intercultural practices and opinions/attitudes of second-generation Turks and the comparison groups*

		Austria				Switzerland				Germany				Sweden	
		Vienna		Linz		Zurich		Basel		Berlin		Frankfurt		Stockholm	
		Turks com- parison	Turks com- parison	Turks com- parison	Turks com- parison	Turks com- parison	Turks com- parison	Turks com- parison	Turks com- parison	Turks com- parison	Turks com- parison	Turks com- parison	Turks com- parison	Turks com- parison	
Practices/realities															
Share of people of own ethnic origin in the neighbourhood	>= 75%	10.8*	10.8	7.4	4.6	5.4	37.0	14.5	28.5	14.5	31.0	9.3	53.6	7.6x	n.a.
		35.1	10.4	32.7	4.7	52.9	16.9	43.5	15.8	53.4	46.1	56.2	30.8	63.0	16.8
		28.6	n.a.	40.9	n.a.	72.8x	n.a.	59.3x	n.a.	34.3	14.8	46.2	15.8	60.5x	n.a.
Number of best friends of ethnic origin other than own	2 or more														
Ever go out to places with many Turkish youth?	Yes	66.1	12.4	74.9	9.0	54.8	31.4	72.1	43.9	71.1	44.0	81.0	33.6	55.0	12.6
Opinions															
School system offers equal chances for immigrants	Agree/totally agree	36.9	42.8	33.1	43.6	47.6	41.6	47.2	31.2	36.4	50.6	34.6	45.1	71.3	67.6
		64.3	20.8	42.2	19.1	58.9*	49.2	56.0#	57.3	65.6	50.8	66.0	46.6	56.6#	63.2
		33.3	62.2	67.0	70.1	69.3#	68.1	60.0#	72.0	69.3	58.8	64.7	54.1	71.4*	85.2
Schools should teach principles of tolerance and civic morality	Agree/totally agree														
Schools should teach immigrant children their parents' language and culture	Agree/totally agree	51.0	22.8	58.2	13.7	36.9*	20.5	45.8*	32.2	59.7	37.9	64.5	35.6	63.4*	56.1
Is diversity in city rather threatening or enriching?	Rather enriching	40.9	25.2	29.7	14.5	64.0#	56.9	54.4#	48.2	50.4	40.8	49.0	23.4	68.9*	78.7

Table 8.7a (continued)

How would you describe the development of relations between majority population and people of Turkish/Yugoslavian origin in the last years?	<i>Makes no difference</i> <i>More friendly</i> <i>Less friendly</i> <i>25% or less</i>	48.0	51.2	51.2	58.8	29.1	30.7	36.3	38.0	36.3	40.8	41.7	38.7	24.7	13.3
		20.4	10.8	10.2	9.5	35.9x	23.3	33.8x	30.4	28.0#	26.8	25.1*	27.3	34.7	26.5
Preferred share of people of other ethnic origin in neighbourhood	<i>Don't care</i> <i>Agree/totally agree</i>	11.6	24.0	47.6	39.3	20.4	17.3	23.4	26.7	26.4	21.6	23.5	30.5	18.3	11.6
		6.0	55.6	6.8	61.3	4.3	31.7	6.8	33.8	15.1	36.8	11.3	58.3	1.2x	n.a.
Immigrants also have the right to live according to their own customs and norms outside their homes	<i>Don't care</i> <i>Agree/totally agree</i>	41.8	34.8	45.6	29.4	52.4	41.6	45.2	41.4	42.8	33.6	40.9	27.6	42.2x	n.a.
		38.1	32.0	66.0	32.6	48.0*	33.7	53.2	* 42.5	59.2	36.0	63.0	34.4	56.6	53.4

If not marked otherwise the differences between groups in one city are significant at $p < .001$.
* Difference between groups in city is significant at $p < .05$.
Difference between groups in city is not significant.
x Pearson's chi-square could not be calculated for this variable.
1 This question was posed differently in Belgium; percentages indicate the number of persons with 'quite some' or 'many' friends of ethnicities other than their own.
2 This question was posed differently in Belgium; percentages indicate 'Disagree/totally disagree' in response to 'Do you agree that all minorities in Belgium should renounce their own culture and adopt Belgian culture?'
Source: TIES survey 2007-2008

Table 8.7b Intercultural practices and opinions/attitudes of second-generation Turks and the comparison groups

	Belgium		The Netherlands				France		Spain							
	Antwerp	Brussels	Amsterdam	Rotterdam	Paris	Strasbourg	Barcelona	Madrid								
	Turks Com- parison	Turks Com- parison	Turks Com- parison	Turks Com- parison	Turks Com- parison	Turks Com- parison	Turks Com- parison	Turks Com- parison								
Practices/realities																
Share of people of own ethnic origin in the neighbourhood	14.4	42.3 30.4	35.4	6.3	24.4	11.8	17.5	6.0	44.2	13.9	61.6	27.2	44.4	16.8	65.6	
Share of immigrants in own secondary school	49.5	23.7 65.6	39.9 76.4	18.5 69.1	22.5 69.1	22.5 69.7	39.6 55.1	20.3 14.3	10.8 38.0	23.8						
Number of best friends of ethnic origin other than own	75.7 ¹ x 20.9	76.3 ¹ x 33.2	37.5	10.6	32.3	12.2	59.0	17.0	39.8	7.0	99.1	4.2	98.4	2.4		
Ever go out to places with many Turkish (Moroccan) youth?	Yes	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	73.3	37.6	68.1	31.2	81.9	67.8	92.5	61.6	61.1	29.8	69.9	7.6
Opinions																
School system offers equal chances for immigrants	Agree/ totally agree	64.7 [#]	61.8 49.8 [#]	35.3 57.4 [*]	59.5 65.0 [#]	64.0 42.7 [*]	30.2 34.5 [*]	22.5 58.8 [#]	52.0 80.4 [#]	81.6						
I would send my children to a school with over 50% immigrants	Yes	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	53.1	38.0	58.1	37.9	72.6 [#]	77.0 63.5 [#]	70.1 85.7	51.0 96.4	78.7			
Schools should teach principles of tolerance and civic morality	Agree/totally agree	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	59.1	85.6	69.2	88.4 90.3 [#]	92.0 88.9 [#]	93.8 88.0 [#]	81.9 88.0	85.6				
Schools should teach immigrant children their parents' language and culture	Agree/totally agree	44.5	23.6 30.5	13.6 46.4	12.4 48.0	15.6 10.9 [#]	6.9 21.4	2.9 86.0	52.7 86.4	69.2						

Table 8.7b (continued)

Is diversity in city rather threatening or enriching?	<i>Rather enriching</i>	49.0*	57.7	56.8	61.9	32.1	60.8	33.6	42.2	89.9	80.4	88.1	84.2	61.6	33.8	80.0	65.6
How would you describe the development of relations between majority population and people of Turkish origin in the last years?	<i>Makes no difference</i>	32.1	23.7	31.3	26.8	44.7	26.2	44.1	31.9	6.9	17.8	9.1	12.4	32.4	38.2	19.6	36.8
	<i>More friendly</i>	13.3x	26.5	23.6	x	30.1	33.8	17.4	28.9	25.7	32.7	*	29.8	42.5	20.5	47.6	* 38.9
Preferred share of people of other ethnic origin in neighbourhood:	<i>Less friendly</i>	39.3	32.3	24.9	30.1	27.1	59.7	32.0	33.1	10.8	15.5	17.1	24.3	25.6	24.9	14.0	17.6
	<i>25% or less</i>	3.6	45.0	8.2	33.2	4.4	42.8	5.7	53.3	7.2	17.8	3.6	15.2	19.6	62.0	6.0	40.4
Immigrants also have the right to live according to their own customs and norms outside their homes	<i>Don't care</i>	24.0	21.8	14.8	12.9	19.0	13.6	17.0	18.5	60.1	64.9	55.6	74.0	40.4	19.6	56.0	40.0
	<i>Agree/ totally agree</i>	70.5 ²	66.4	65.8	²	71.4	51.3	19.6	28.3	14.2	54.5	33.3	25.9	76.0	40.6	76.0	58.4
Immigrant should do more to integrate	<i>Agree/ totally agree</i>	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	72.6	48.3	72.7	45.2	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Native-born children of immigrants should get dual nationality	<i>Agree/ totally agree</i>	56.3	28.8	60.4	28.9	77.2	30.0	79.9	21.2	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	90.0	65.8	88.4	68.8

If not marked otherwise the differences between groups in one city are significant at $p < .001$.

* Difference between groups in city is significant at $p < .05$.

Difference between groups in city is not significant.

x Pearson's chi-square could not be calculated for this variable.

¹ This question was posed differently in Belgium; percentages indicate the number of persons with 'quite some' or 'many' friends of ethnicities other than their own.

² This question was posed differently in Belgium; percentages indicate 'Disagree/totally disagree' in response to 'Do you agree that all minorities in Belgium should renounce their own culture and adopt Belgian culture?'

Source: TIES survey 2007-2008

levels of discrimination against Turks and Muslims (not shown). All three correlations are negatively significant in Germany, Austria, France and Spain.

8.4 Between 'home' and the 'country of origin'

The second generation is not torn between two cultures, nor caught between two worlds. For children of immigrants, 'home' is where they were born and raised. Yet, differing from the experience of children of native-born parentage, the second generation has another 'ethno-national' reference frame: their parents' country (and culture) of origin. This second frame manifests in their childhood memories not only thanks to frequent summer travels, but also practices, for instance, eating favourite ethnic dishes and celebrating cultural and religious holidays with family. Language is also an important issue here. The parental home and its social relations are mostly connected to the parental language of origin, while another language reigns in life outside (e.g. social relations at school and activities of leisure).

A dual set of reference frames for feelings of belonging does not present a problem, *per se*. We mean this both at the individual level, psychologically speaking, but also socially, in the sense that 'hyphenation' or 'hybridity' could weaken the sense of community and feelings of belonging among its members. As the introduction to this chapter indicated, a *functional* individual identity requires multiple belongings, and there is no reason why having access to two 'ethno-national' reference frames should be an exception here. However, discursively and in the public perception, ethno-national references are frequently connected to notions of exclusiveness and absoluteness. This is why dual nationality is not accepted in some nation-states, while others forbid citizens from abandoning their nationality. These notions evince the tension created by having a dual set of cultural and identificational influences, something that the second generation grows up having to deal with.

The role of language

'Immigrants should learn the language of the immigration country.' This is probably the most universally iterated demand directed as much towards integration policies as to the immigrants and their offspring themselves. Now a key issue in debates on integration in Europe, language is not only about the practicality of being able to communicate and thus work in the local setting. Language also mediates enculturation and socialisation processes into specific sets of norms and values. In itself, it is one of the strongest symbols of a person's attachment and belonging to a group, a culture,

an *ethnos* or a nation. Last but not least, language is the main carrier for *discourse* – understood via Foucault (1972) as a ‘formational system’ pre-figuring individual narratives and ways of expression – which provides the main field for individuals and groups to find and/or negotiate a place and position (see [section 8.1](#)).

As all our respondents were born and raised in the survey countries, we expected them to have been exposed to both family and survey country languages from early childhood onwards. It is therefore unsurprising that a large majority of respondents states having been raised in the survey country language *together* with their parents’ native language. Only a small minority of the respondents was raised exclusively in the survey country language (not more than 9 per cent). Those stating to have been raised *only* in the parental home language are also a small number in most countries. In Sweden and Switzerland, this applies to only 8 per cent of the Turkish respondents; in Germany, no respondent chose this answer option. Exceptions, however, are France and Belgium, where almost half the respondents state having been raised exclusively in their parents’ native language (the proportion proves even higher in Strasbourg than Paris). Considering that 80 to 90 per cent of the respondents’ parents were exclusively raised in a language other than that dominant in the survey country, the large share of respondents being raised in *both* languages underscores the second generation’s dynamic linguistic adaptation. This is remarkable for a group that the literature has repeatedly portrayed as particularly ‘resistant to linguistic assimilation’ (see e.g. Condon & Régnaud 2010; Ersanilli 2009; Esser 2006).

We found that differences in language socialisation are not connected to gender and age, though education proved to be a major differentiator. France, Germany and the Netherlands present interesting cases for contrast in this regard. Paris showed many more cases of higher-educated Turkish respondents being raised exclusively in their parents’ native language than those with lower educational outcomes (51 per cent and 15 per cent, respectively). The inverse held for both German cities: respondents with higher education (15 per cent) outnumbered their lower-educated peers (2 per cent) as far as being raised exclusively in German.

Our respondents’ *current* skills in both the survey country’s and their parents’ language are, on the whole, very positively self-evaluated. Only a small percentage of mostly low-educated respondents rate their survey country language skills lower than ‘good’ (on a six-point scale from ‘bad’ to ‘excellent’). Although use of the survey country language within the family and during the respondents’ childhood was more predominant in Germany, this second generation’s self-evaluation is rather modest: less than half showed enough self-confidence to deem their writing skills in German ‘very good’ or ‘excellent’. By contrast, respondents in France were notably positive about their survey country language skills – more

than three quarters evaluated them as 'very good' or 'excellent' – even though French played no major role in their intra-familial communication. The respondents in the Netherlands follow closely, at above 70 per cent.

Unsurprisingly, in all cities, the respondents' evaluations of their own survey country language skills depend on their level of educational attainment, with higher-educated respondents rating their skills better than the lower educated did. The influence of education proved more significant in Germany than the other countries. In Berlin and Frankfurt, respondents with lower educational outcomes evaluate their writing skills in German as 'very good or excellent' four times less frequently than higher-educated respondents (18 per cent versus 69 per cent). In the other cities, this difference is significant though much smaller: for instance, 62 per cent versus 84 per cent in Amsterdam and 57 per cent versus 81 per cent in Rotterdam.

This general pattern is also reflected in respondents' answers to questions about the main language they currently use to communicate with their parents. The Turkish second generation in France most uses Turkish to communicate with their parents, followed by their peers in the Netherlands (both countries around 80 per cent) and then Germany (at least 71 per cent). When it comes to language used with their siblings – i.e. interlocutors likely to speak both languages as well as the respondents do – France's language assimilation issue comes to the fore: only 14 per cent speak mainly or only Turkish with their siblings. This applies to 43 per cent of the respondents in the Netherlands and 31 per cent in Germany.

Transnational connections

A couple of crucial factors are at stake for the second generation to engender feelings of belonging to their parents' ethno-national reference frame and to interweave them with the simultaneous feeling that their country of birth is 'home'. One realm is the city and/or the neighbourhood where the respondent was born and raised. Another, albeit interrelated, realm is the set of social and cultural practices of 'enacting' these feelings of belonging and their possible consequences for individual life trajectories. For most members of the second generation, the parental country of origin is not a foreign place: they have visited it repeatedly throughout their childhood, relatives are there and they speak the language of the country and/or the village well enough to communicate at ease there. Many respondents also hold the nationality of their parents' country of origin, which opens up possibilities, both concretely and theoretically speaking.

To illustrate: take two young men of Turkish descent born in the same city, Gelsenkirchen, Germany. Both became professional football players in the German premier league and, after some successful years of play, were both offered the opportunity to play in the national selection – of

Germany or of Turkey. Hamit Altıntop chose the Turkish team. Mesut Özil went for the German team. Altıntop, who actually never lived in Turkey, played in the German premier league for several years. Özil became a German national idol following the 2010 FIFA World Cup in South Africa. Both footballers now play for Spain's Real Madrid (though speculating on their careers further would, alas, go beyond the scope of this book). It is difficult to imagine that these footballers' decisions to play for one or another team were compelled primarily by feelings of national belonging. At the same time, we would like to emphasise that people's practices, opportunities they are presented with and decisions they make cannot always be so finely sifted from identity.

As [tables 8.8a](#) and [8.8b](#) show, remittances and investments do not play a major role in any of the three second-generation groups. On average, around a quarter of all respondents have sent money to Turkey, Morocco or Yugoslavian successor states in the past five years (ranging from 6 per cent of the Moroccans in Madrid to 42 per cent of the Turks in Strasbourg). Moreover, the amounts have mostly been small: on average, less than € 500 (not in the table). Consequently, investments are infrequent, though this could be due to our respondents' relative youth and subsequent smaller cash flow. Turkish second-generation respondents are slightly more likely to have invested money than members of the other two groups, with the highest share again found in Strasbourg.

The majority of respondents had visited their parents' country of origin once or twice in the past five years. Exceptions are both the Turkish and the former Yugoslavian respondents in Switzerland, who made more frequent trips, mostly for holidays and/or family visits.

Respondents were also asked about the option of moving to their parent's country of origin to live there for an extended period of time. Again, the share of those stating to plan to 'certainly' or 'likely' do so was highest, by far, in Strasbourg, at 38 per cent. In the other cities, it was never higher than 26 per cent, which was in Linz; in Frankfurt, it went down to 5 per cent for both answer categories combined. On the whole, the Turkish second generation is slightly more likely to imagine 'returning' to the country of their ancestors than our Moroccan or Yugoslavian successor state respondents.

Several of these transnational items were combined into a three-point index to indicate whether or not a respondent could be considered a transmigrant – i.e. measuring the degree of orientation towards, and relationship with, the parents' country of origin. The numerical distribution of this category is shown in [tables 8.8a](#) and [8.8b](#). [Table 8.9](#) shows the results of a logistic regression analysis for a couple of factors.

The analysis shows that there is a significant relationship between respondents' being transnationally oriented and their feelings of belonging. A stronger orientation towards the parental country of origin correlates

Table 8.8a Markers of transnationalism

	Austria			Switzerland			Germany			Sweden			
	Vienna		Linz	Zurich		Basel	Berlin		Frankfurt	Stockholm			
	Turks	Former Yugoslavian	Turks	Former Yugoslavian	Turks	Former Yugoslavian	Turks	Former Yugoslavian	Turks	Former Yugoslavian	Turks		
Remittances	11.0	18.1	23.0	13.8	18.0	22.6	17.3	20.3	11.1	9.9	12.8	9.3	20.0
Investment													
Investing in home country of parents	4.1	14.5	17.6	6.7	5.3	5.9	3.6	7.3	4.3	1.0	5.6	2.5	0.0
Frequency of visits	17.3	25.7	14.9	14.6	9.7	6.8	6.5	6.8	32.9	50.0	30.1	51.0	16.7
(last 5 years)													
1-2 times	47.7	15.7	24.3	5.0	16.0	20.9	32.3	21.9	29.8	34.2	30.5	20.1	33.3
3-4 times	23.0	20.1	32.2	9.2	21.8	14.0	22.6	19.3	20.6	10.4	22.5	14.2	25.0
5 times per year	11.1	17.3	17.3	38.9	40.8	33.6	34.3	34.4	16.3	5.4	14.5	13.2	16.7
Several times per year	0.8	21.3	11.4	32.2	11.7	24.7	4.4	17.7	0.4	0.0	2.4	1.5	8.3
Holidays	75.4	44.4	68.1	67.8	83.0	83.0	86.7	79.1	45.8	33.2	51.2	41.2	63.6
Family visits	52.9	65.5	62.6	77.4	69.4	82.1	70.9	78.6	52.6	41.6	57.2	36.3	45.5
Business	0.8	4.0	3.0	1.7	1.9	3.0	0.8	0.5	0.8	1.5	0.0	0.0	0.0
Studies	0.8	0.0	1.0	0.0	1.0	1.7	0.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Other	4.9	3.6	3.4	2.5	1.0	1.7	2.4	1.6	2.4	1.0	1.6	1.0	0.0
Only survey country channels	39.7	65.7	37.9	76.3	54.9	82.6	58.7	82.3	58.9	91.6	60.4	76.0	50.0
As much survey country as Turkish/Former Yugoslavian channels	30.4	23.9	31.8	18.3	31.1	15.3	32.8	13.5	28.5	7.9	26.0	20.1	40.0
Mostly Turkish/Former Yugoslavian channels	27.8	9.2	23.2	5.4	14.1	2.1	8.1	4.2	11.5	0.5	12.4	3.9	10.0
Only Turkish/Former Yugoslavian channels	2.1	1.2	7.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.4	0.0	1.2	0.0	1.2	0.0	0.0

Table 8.8a (continued)

Use of internet	For information about parental home country	14.2	16.7	17.6	7.9	13.6	16.5	12.1	9.4	12.3	8.4	14.4	10.8	18.2
'Return' intention	Certainly not	29.9	55.5	33.7	57.5	52.7	63.4	63.1	74.0	57.1	77.7	60.4	77.3	60.0
	Possibly	43.9	22.3	33.2	33.3	29.5	17.0	22.5	11.5	25.6	16.8	28.4	13.8	30.0
	Likely	5.7	13.0	21.5	3.8	7.7	8.1	3.6	5.7	4.7	2.5	5.2	1.0	10.0
	Certainly	2.0	2.0	4.9	0.4	3.4	3.4	4.8	2.1	2.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Overall transnational behaviour	Do not know	18.4	7.3	6.8	5.0	6.8	8.1	6.0	6.8	10.2	3.0	6.0	7.9	0.0
	Transmigrant**	1.6	4.0	10.6	0.0	1.9	1.3	0.8	2.1	1.6	0.0	2.0	0.5	0.0
	In-between	91.0	77.6	83.0	90.4	91.3	92.7	96.0	91.6	75.5	55.4	78.8	56.4	90.9
	Non-transmigrant***	7.4	18.4	6.4	9.6	6.8	6.0	3.2	6.3	22.9	44.6	19.2	43.1	9.1
	Mean score (0-4)	1.2	1.3	1.7	1.2	1.5	1.2	1.3	1.2	1.0	0.4	1.0	0.6	1.3

* Because question asked for 'main reasons' multiple responses were possible.

** Transmigrant = sending remittances; 3+ visits to parental home country in past 5 years; watching parental home country TV channels; likely/certainly intending to 'return'

*** Non-transmigrant = not sending remittances; no visits to parental home country in past 5 years; watching only survey country TV channels; possibly/certainly not intending to 'return'.

Source: TIES survey 2007-2008

Table 8.8b (continued)

Use of internet	For information about parental home country	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	46.7	37.8	47.6	41.7	12.4	6.4	36.2	50.0
'Return' intention	Certainly not	44.5	55.5	55.6	74.8	43.3	48.9	43.9	60.0	56.6	54.4	31.5	28.3
	Possibly	31.0	20.8	22.9	14.2	20.0	24.4	22.0	24.0	11.2	6.0	32.7	20.0
	Likely	13.5	14.3	11.7	8.1	6.7	4.0	7.3	4.0	8.4	2.8	10.4	20.8
	Certainly	6.9	4.5	8.1	1.3	13.3	4.0	14.6	4.0	2.8	1.2	14.6	17.1
	Do not know	4.1	4.9	1.7	1.6	16.7	8.0	12.2	8.0	20.9	35.6	10.8	13.8
Overall	Transmigrant**	3.6	2.6	5.7	1.6	3.3	0.0	4.8	0.0	1.2	2.0	2.3	7.5
transnational behaviour	In-between	94.2	90.9	88.6	92.1	89.8	92.7	92.8	90.5	75.6	86.0	95	90.8
	Non-transmigrant***	2.2	6.5	5.7	6.3	6.9	7.3	2.4	9.5	23.2	12.0	2.7	1.7
	Mean score (0-4)	1.7	1.0	1.7	1.4	1.7	1.1	1.7	0.9	0.8	1.3	1.8	2.2

*Because question asked for 'main reasons' multiple responses were possible.

**Transmigrant = sending remittances; 3+ visits to parental home country in past 5 years; watching parental home country TV channels; likely/certainly intending to 'return'

***Non-transmigrant = not sending remittances; no visits to parental home country in past 5 years; watching only survey country TV channels; possibly/certainly not intending to 'return'

Source: TIES survey 2007-2008

Table 8.9 *Logistic regression: Whether or not second-generation respondents could be considered transmigrants*

Age	1.07**
Male	1.25
Having a partner	2.03**
Employed	1.12
Occupational status	1.00
Perceived financial problems (ref. no)	
Sometimes	1.36
Regularly	1.21
Often	0.87
Feelings of national belonging	0.74***
Feelings of belonging to 'ethnic group'	1.25*
Speaking skills in the language of parental home country	1.51***
Use of parental language within the family (index)	1.48
None/very few persons of non-immigrant background as friends	1.66**
Intensity of religious practice (index)	2.98**
Second-generation group (ref. Turks)	
Moroccans	0.26***
Former Yugoslavians	0.74
Country of residence [†]	
Austria	1.17
Switzerland	0.65
Germany	0.37**
France	1.34
Sweden	0.91
Belgium	1.29
The Netherlands	0.83
Spain	2.71*

***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05; [†] Deviations from the grand mean

Source: TIES survey 2007-2008

with greater feelings of belonging to the 'ethno-national' country and lower feelings of belonging to their own country of birth and residence. This, however, is not a statement about the direction of causality. The same applies to the role of parental language. Those having more intensive contact with their parents' home country show a more extensive use of, and higher skills in, parental language (not significant). Again, this can be a *reflection* of respondents having spent more time in Turkey, Morocco or the former Yugoslavia and/or a *motivation* to go there more often in order to further their linguistic skills. A very strong and significant factor is religiosity, which – due to religion's little relevance among the former Yugoslavian respondents – mainly applies to respondents of Islamic belief. Being a transmigrant is more likely among active practitioners of Islam. This is consistent with our other findings, indicating that more religious respondents – especially those who practise Islam¹⁸ – have significantly lower degrees of feelings of belonging to the birth country, higher shares of discriminatory

experiences and fewer social relationships outside the diasporic community.

High levels of transnational activities more often occur among our oldest cohort of second-generation respondents and those living with a partner (who are often from the same ethnic group, but may have been born in the survey country or the parental home country; for details, see [chapter 7](#)). There are no big differences between males and females. Moreover, it is surprising that the respondents' socio-economic status – measured by labour force participation, occupational status and financial standing – has no effect. In other words, economic integration does not seem to lead to either fewer transnational ties, as conventional assimilation theories would foresee, or to more engagement in transnational practices, as Itzigsohn and Saucedo (2002) suggest.

Membership in transnational organisations

In debates about integration, the most frequently referenced indicator for describing membership is political participation. The question is to which extent the second generation follows their parents' engagement in diasporic community organisations or rather prefers the membership and political activity of mainstream organisations, political parties, etc. Engaging in ethnic organisations can be motivated by more than an individual's socio-political commitment. Participation in this kind of association may, for example, be related to friendship and peer relations or the desire to develop useful networks.

In general, the civic engagement and participation of the second generation is somewhat lower than in the respective comparison groups. Around half of second-generation respondents and two thirds of the comparison groups stated they were active in some sort of association, club or organisation. As expected, the most frequently mentioned membership was in a sports club. Between a fifth and half of the respondents in all four groups cited one, depending mostly on the city and/or country context. Some of these sports clubs have pronounced ethnic affiliations, such as the European football clubs that began being founded in the 1970s mainly for Turkish players and fans.¹⁹ Notably, in bigger cities with larger migrant communities, 'ethnic' sports clubs and associations do play a certain role. For example, in both Dutch cities and in Berlin, around a quarter of second-generation Turks who were members stated that their sports club was Turkish in orientation.

With regard to membership in 'ethnically oriented' associations, Islamic organisations play the most prominent role. Again, overall membership rates in ethnic associations are low, ranging from less than 2 per cent in Paris to almost 20 per cent in Berlin (on the issue of the institutionalisation of Islam in Europe, see also [chapter 9](#)).

Finally, associations for art, music and other kinds of cultural activities are relatively common in the second-generation groups (between 5 and 20 per cent). A minority of them is also related to their parental country of origin or the respective ethnic community in the city. Although diasporic organisations are frequently cultural associations, *per se*, they do also include political activities and maybe even ‘ethnically coded’ professional or parental associations.

8.5 Conclusions

According to the findings of the TIES survey, the second generation *belongs*. The descendents of immigrants from Turkey, Morocco and former Yugoslavia are even often more autochthonous to our cities and neighbourhoods than their peers of non-migrant background. They are also more likely to have family living close by, and they therefore also *feel* that they belong. This, despite a number of discursive restrictions imposed on them by the media, politics and everyday discourses (cf. Schneider 2001). For most of our respondents, feeling Turkish *and* Dutch or Moroccan *and* Belgian or Serbian *and* Swiss is not a contradiction. Yet, in the wider societal discourse it is. But even when their feelings of *national* belonging are mostly ambiguous, the second generation clearly identifies with the *local* place where they grew up and live – be it their city or neighbourhood. Some factors are conducive to their sense of belonging to the society. Others hinder it. The most relevant factors seem to be sense of discrimination, citizenship, religiosity and – though to different degrees and intertwined with other variables – education and labour market participation.

The second generation does not live in anything close to what is sometimes labelled a ‘parallel society’. By a large majority, second-generation respondents have mixed circles of friends, they participate in the majority society’s political parties and civic associations, they mostly do not live in ethnically homogeneous neighbourhoods and they also do not wish to live in ethnic enclaves.

The second generation is also culturally ‘adapted’. Its members share normative views on the relationship between state and religion. They have a good command of the survey country’s dominant language, using it more than their parents’ native language even in a family context. At least when measured along similar lines of social and educational background, most share similar viewpoints on social issues such as gender roles, premarital sexual activity and the multiculturalism of society. But they also maintain a strong relationship with their parents’ culture of origin by preserving and using its language, being allegiant to the faith of their parents and maintaining ties with their parental home country and family there.

The issue of identity among the diverse second-generation groups in our survey cities reflects the complex social reality in which they grew up and must find their place and position. This equally refers to aspects of a country's specific institutional arrangements (e.g. citizenship regulations and corresponding administrative practices) or a city's (e.g. housing policies) and to the discursive setting. Even though national integration models cannot explain 'integration outcomes' as such, it is probably in the area of identity where they can have the most visible influence. The German and Austrian model of non-distinction between national *demos* and *ethnos* and its subsequent non-admission of native-born children of immigrants into the 'national community' is reflected in comparatively high degrees of ambiguity in the contextual categories of belonging *here* (nation and, to a lesser extent, city) and their discursive juxtaposition to categories of belonging *there* ('ethnicity' and religion). By contrast, inasmuch as the supposedly multiculturalist Swedish and Dutch models, along with the assimilationist French model (even if in quite different discursive settings) provide more space for simultaneous modes of feeling of belonging, they are not necessarily conceptualised in terms of here and there (cf. Schneider et al. 2012).

Against many odds, the second-generation groups in the TIES survey are part of the societies they were born into. They identify with these societies. However, as with education and work careers, there are also 'non-identifiers', i.e. respondents who are particularly ambiguous or even negative about their feelings of belonging to the wider society. The actual size of this group is difficult to determine because there proved to be no clear measurement for them. For example, we can take the Turkish respondents with 'weak or no' feelings of belonging to the city or country. The size of this group ranges from 4 per cent in Paris and in the two Dutch cities to 15 per cent in Vienna and Antwerp. (It is no coincidence that we find the highest percentages of individuals expressing doubt about their belonging in the two countries – and, for that matter, cities – with the strongest presence of right-wing anti-Islamic populist discourse in politics. The numbers for the other cities are 13 per cent for Linz and Brussels, 10 per cent for Berlin and Strasbourg, 8 per cent for Basel, 7 per cent for Zurich, 6 per cent for Stockholm and 5 per cent for Frankfurt.)

However, this does not mean that these respondents would fulfil the criteria for individuals living in a 'parallel society' and being mostly or solely connected to Turkey and the Turkish diaspora in their respective cities. To name just a few examples: in all cities, the large majority of these 'non-identifiers' still feels attached to their neighbourhoods; they also practically rule out moving to Turkey as an alternative to their current living environment; and they do not necessarily identify strongly as Turks. As already indicated, in many cases, weak feelings of belonging extend to all identity categories. In some countries, the likelihood of being part of the 'non-

identifiers' group rises when coming from a family with low-educated and religious parents, being low educated and/or working in a low-skilled profession, though also being raised in certain neighbourhoods and having been to a widely segregated school. But again, this relationship varies greatly across cities and countries according to background variables. It is a differentiator notably in Strasbourg and in both Austrian cities, but plays practically no role in Paris or the two Dutch cities.

Finally, we do not wish to say that 'non-identifiers' are problematic, *per se*. The issue would be better considered the other way round. The variation in outcomes across countries and cities that this group experiences may suggest that they are the *product* of a society and discursive setting in which equal opportunities and room for being 'different' (in whatever aspect) are not self-evident.

Notes

- 1 This has fuelled a considerable body of commentary and publications by authors who are themselves from the second and 1.5 generations (1.5 referring to people who immigrate to a new country before or during their early teens). For the second generation in Germany, see e.g. Acevit and Bingöl (2005), Ateş (2006), Kermani (2009), Şenocak (2011) and Tuschik (2000) among many more.
- 2 This is also the focus of current scholarly work on 'assimilation'. For example, segmented assimilation theory broadens the scope by observing how insertion into the labour market and accompanying acculturation can occur along different lines of incorporation into different, largely separated segments of the population (e.g. Portes & Zhou 1993; cf. Schneider & Crul 2010).
- 3 For the TIES survey, translation issues also had to be addressed, since our questionnaire had to be made available in the eight participating countries' five dominant languages.
- 4 Devereux (1978: 146) states that ethnic identity in its 'purest form' represents an 'all-or-nothing-proposition', in the sense that one cannot be just a little bit 'French', 'Turkish', etc. – the label is either there or not. But he also observes how, empirically, ethnic identity is nearly always 'contaminated' by folk ideas about what makes a person 'French', 'Turkish', etc. (ibid.: 140ff). From this empirical point of view, the TIES approach to inquiring about 'belonging' comes close to the 'folk' way of declaring oneself 'French' or 'Turkish'.
- 5 The term 'othering' refers to the mechanism of marking a difference or boundary between a supposed collective 'self' and 'others'. This is primordially a question of narratives and of symbolical inclusion/exclusion (cf. Fabian 1983; Schneider 2001, 2002; Sökefeld 2001).
- 6 Many testimonies and books on everyday racism cite 'Where are you from?' – a question uttered in all kinds of situations – as one of the most disturbing and subtle forms of othering people with a 'different' name or physical appearance (Kalpaka & Räthzel 1990; Essed 1991; Schneider 2001; Kilomba 2008; Sow 2008; Ergün 2010 and many more).
- 7 Questions about belonging offered six answer categories: 'no feelings at all', 'very weak feelings', 'weak feelings', 'neither strong, nor weak feelings', 'strong feelings' and 'very strong feelings'. These categories were collapsed into three for the tables

in this chapter: 'no or weak' (answer categories 1-3), 'ambiguous or neutral' (answer category 4) and 'strong' (answer categories 5-6).

- 8 All descriptive tables in this chapter reproduce weighted results (for details on our methodology, see [chapter 3](#)). In Belgium this question was preceded by a screening question about whether the category at stake was even applicable. In tables 8.1a+b, those who considered a category inapplicable were added to those opting for 'very weak' or 'weak' feelings of belonging. The statistical effect produces a stronger polarisation away from the 'ambiguous or neutral' category.
- 9 The question about religious belonging was only posed to the comparison groups in Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland. With the exception of Germany, in most countries, its non-response rate was quite high, or respondents somehow missed the question because of routing problems in the questionnaire. For this reason, we abstain from making direct comparisons concerning this topic between the second-generation and comparison group respondents.
- 10 See [table 8.10](#) in the appendix for a tabular description of this distribution. The small table below each graph indicates the variance explained by the dimensions included – the *inertia*. The choice of which dimensions would be included in the analysis was based on whether the inertia value was greater than 0.2. Another indicator included is Cronbach's alpha to assess the reliability of the analysis.
- 11 The same applies for trying to establish a reference population from other data sources. The Berliner Gesellschaft für Kurdologie (2003) estimates the number of Kurds in the city as 20,000 to 50,000. Not only is this a wide-ranging estimation, but it also includes Kurds from Iraq, Iran and Syria (although likely to be small numbers). Since statistics are based on citizenship, most of the Kurds get subsumed into the categories of Turks and naturalised persons. The Kurdish community in Basel, the largest in Switzerland, is estimated to be around 10,000 (*NZZ Folio* 11/93: 'Über den Rhein nach Klein-Pazarcik: Die Basler Kurdenkolonie'; for information on the Kurdish diaspora in diverse European countries, see also <http://www.institut-kurde.org>).
- 12 Parents' geographical origin does not serve as an additional indicator. Even among respondents with parents from provinces with higher proportions of Kurdish populations, those being raised in Kurdish-speaking households do not represent more than 35 per cent.
- 13 Berlin: Spearman-Rho of -.378, significant at $p < 0.01$; Basel: Spearman-Rho of -.163, significant at $p < .05$.
- 14 The absolute numbers are difficult to compare. Note, for example, that Amsterdam is part of a large urban conglomeration of cities and suburbs (known as the Randstad), where many people live and from where they commute to work in Amsterdam's city centre. However, this conglomeration is not counted as part of the city itself. By contrast, Berlin is surrounded by a vast, very low-populated countryside with no major neighbouring city within a 100-kilometre radius.
- 15 A similar observation can be made for the Turkish second generation in both Dutch cities and in Zurich as well as for the former Yugoslavian second generation in Zurich, Basel and Linz.
- 16 In the other TIES cities, only two of these items were asked, though the results nonetheless conform to this finding. Respondents could agree or disagree with the statements on a five-point scale from 'strongly agree' to 'strongly disagree'. In the combined index, high, medium and low levels of involvement represent combined agreement mean scores on these items in the upper, middle and lower third, respectively.
- 17 In Brussels, this applies to almost one third of the Turkish respondents. Almost 30 per cent of our Moroccan respondents in Barcelona estimate the share of Moroccans

- in their neighbourhoods as being above three quarters of the local population. In Madrid, that figure is only 17 per cent.
- 18 'Practicing Islam' entails customs such as praying five times a day, making weekly visits to the mosque, eating halal food and fasting during Ramadan.
 - 19 The best known of these clubs is probably Türkyemspor Berlin, founded in 1978 and still located in the 'Turkish' district of Kreuzberg (see <http://www.tuerkiyemspor.info>).

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Appendix

Table 8.10 *Distribution of the strength of feelings of belonging in five categories among second-generation Turks in France, Germany and the Netherlands*

		Extent to which you feel...		sense of belonging to survey country	sense of belonging to city of residence	Feeling European
		Turkish	Muslim			
Paris	Strong feelings of belonging	82.9	69.5	44.2	59.6	58.5
	Ambiguous/neutral	13.6	15.9	16.9	23.5	26.5
	Weak or no feelings	3.5	14.6	38.8	16.9	15.0
	N	258	246	260	260	260
Strasbourg	Strong feelings of belonging	88.3	87.3	31.7	30.4	51.5
	Ambiguous/neutral	7.1	5.1	25.0	15.8	31.5
	Weak or no feelings	4.6	7.6	43.3	30.4	17.0
	Not concerned				23.3	
	N	239	236	240	240	241
Berlin	Strong feelings of belonging	59.7	60.9	45.5	47.8	26.9
	Ambiguous/neutral	20.6	19.4	36.8	36.0	41.1
	Weak or no feelings	19.8	19.8	17.8	16.2	32.0
	N	253	253	253	253	253
Frankfurt	Strong feelings of belonging	72.8	72.0	54.4	47.6	38.0
	Ambiguous/neutral	14.0	15.6	28.4	37.6	37.6
	Weak or no feelings	13.2	12.4	17.2	14.8	24.4
	N	250	250	250	250	250
Amsterdam	Strong feelings of belonging	74.6	78.0	41.0	63.2	31.0
	Ambiguous/neutral	17.9	12.0	35.9	25.8	29.8
	Weak or no feelings	7.5	9.9	23.1	11.1	23.1
	No answer					15.9
	N	201	191	195	190	208
Rotterdam	Strong feelings of belonging	81.3	80.3	36.8	67.1	31.6
	Ambiguous/neutral	15.1	11.0	38.2	22.4	28.1
	Weak or no feelings	3.7	8.7	25.0	10.5	27.7
	No answer					12.6
	N	219	218	220	219	231

Source: TIES 2007-2008

Table 8.11 *Being raised with a religion and currently practising a religion, by ethnic group and cities*

		<i>Were you raised in a religion? % answer: yes</i>	<i>Do you currently have a religion? % answer: yes</i>	<i>Less or more religious: -/+</i>	<i>N</i>
Vienna	Croatian	91.3	50.0	-41.3	46
	Serbian	71.4	61.6	-9.8	112
	Comparison group	59.1	28.9	-30.2	247
Linz	Croatian	74.7	54.0	-20.7	87
	Serbian	91.3	87.7	-3.6	80
	Comparison group	82.9	45.9	-37.0	234
Zurich	Croatian	86.2	79.3	-6.9	58
	Serbian	74.6	62.7	-11.9	67
	Albanian	85.5	52.6	-32.9	57
	Comparison group	70.8	33.7	-37.1	202
Basel	Croatian	82.6	76.1	-6.5	46
	Serbian	50.0	60.5	10.5	76
	Albanian	75.0	60.0	-15.0	20
	Comparison group	61.3	32.3	-29.0	266
Berlin	Croatian	64.4	42.2	-22.2	45
	Serbian	68.7	22.9	-45.8	83
	Comparison group	47.2	22.4	-24.8	250
Frankfurt	Croatian	70.0	55.0	-15.0	40
	Serbian	80.5	41.5	-39.0	82
	Comparison group	61.7	22.5	-39.2	253

Source: TIES 2007-2008

9 Ways of 'being Muslim'

Religious identities of second-generation Turks

Karen Phalet, Fenella Fleischmann and Snežana Stojčić

9.1 Introduction

Large-scale immigration from Muslim-majority countries to highly secularised North-Western European societies has raised questions about how the European-born children of Muslim immigrants relate to and practise religion. On the one hand, second-generation Muslims are socialised into Islam within their immigrant families and communities. On the other hand, they grow up in societies where the majority is historically Christian, highly secularised and, in a post-9/11 era, increasingly anti-Islamic (Bruce 2011). By secularisation, we refer to a robust downward trend in the importance and impact of religion among Christian-majority populations (Gorski & Altinordu 2008). In European societies, secularism is a normative ideology that represents religiosity as a foreign, backward and/or dangerous force. Islam and its practitioners are particular targets of hostile public attitudes towards religion (Allen & Nielsen 2002). From a majority perspective, the religiosity of second-generation Muslims therefore appears to be a bright boundary, one setting them apart from the so-called mainstream and standing in the way of their successful integration (Fleischmann & Phalet 2012).

By contrast, from the minority perspective of immigrants and their children, religious traditions and ties are highly valued parts of cultural heritage and crucial sources of personal self-esteem, social support and cultural continuity in their socio-cultural environment (Bankston & Zhou 1995; Ebaugh & Chafetz 2000; Warner & Wittner 1998). Accordingly, Muslim immigrant parents purposefully and effectively transmit Islamic religious practices and beliefs to the next generation (Güngör, Fleischmann & Phalet 2011). The second generation is often highly committed to their Muslim identity, which is experienced as central to their sense of self-understanding (Duderija 2007; Fleischmann & Phalet 2012; Şirin, Bikmen, Mir, Fine, Zaal & Katsiaficas 2008; Verkuyten & Yıldız 2009).

In view of the contrasting orientations of Muslim immigrant communities and European receiving societies, this chapter asks how second-generation Turks in Europe negotiate their religious identities. We distinguish between attachment – i.e. the subjective importance of religion – and practice, such as praying or fasting. In addition, we examine how these identities relate to religious socialisation in immigrant families and communities as well as experiences of religious discrimination in receiving societies. Drawing on the TIES survey data, we investigate contextual variation in ways of ‘being Muslim’, namely, the different patterns of religious attachment and practices. We make a comparison of second-generation religion in four countries, namely across Berlin, Frankfurt, Brussels, Antwerp, Amsterdam, Rotterdam and Stockholm. These seven cities represent distinct national patterns of the institutional incorporation of Islam and different local dynamics of religious inter-group boundaries.

9.2 Religion in the second generation

Integration and secularisation

Are second-generation Turkish Muslims less religious than their immigrant parents, or do they maintain and reaffirm their religious heritage? A secularisation paradigm in the sociology of religion posits that the importance and impact of religion will decline in modern societies, as evidenced from the progressive separation of church and state as well as decreasing religious service attendance (Dobbelaere 1981). Despite continuing scholarly debate about the exact nature, the universality and the irreversibility of secularisation, empirical trends in church attendance among Europe’s majority populations show a marked decrease in people’s religious involvement (Gorski & Altinordu 2008). Moreover, secularism has become the norm in Europe as compared to the United States insofar as ‘Americans think that they are supposed to be religious, while Europeans think that they are supposed to be irreligious’ (Casanova 2003: 19). In stark contrast with visions of immigrant religion in the US, in European societies, immigrant religious traditions are commonly seen as a burden to be left behind in the process of intergenerational integration (Foner & Alba 2008). In the European context, the classic assimilation hypothesis predicting that immigrant lifestyles and life chances will converge with those of natives over time and over generations amounts to a secularisation hypothesis. From the perspective of secularisation and assimilation, second-generation Muslims – especially the more highly educated among them – are thus expected to become less religious as they become exposed to a predominantly secular environment.

Research on Muslim minorities using large-scale surveys in the Netherlands (Van Tubergen 2007; Phalet, Gijsberts & Hagendoorn 2008) and in Belgium (Lesthaeghe & Neels 2000) mostly confirms the secular-

isation hypothesis: the second generation and the more highly educated Turkish Muslims among them tend to be less religious. Yet, significant generational decline is selective. This means that some religious practices and preferences are largely retained (e.g. stable preference for a Muslim spouse). Moreover, it is contingent on life chances so that persistent educational disadvantage implies that religiosity is maintained at a rather high level (Phalet et al. 2008). Recent analyses of religious trends among Turkish Muslims in the Netherlands and Germany suggest intergenerational stability thanks to the renewed religious involvement of some part of the second generation as well as those with higher education (Diehl & König 2009; Maliepaard, Lubbers & Gijsberts 2010). In view of the mixed evidence of secularisation, this study compares the Turkish second generation across different receiving contexts. The secularisation hypothesis predicts a significant loss of religion so that the second generation would count fewer self-identified Muslims than its parents and more highly educated Muslims would be less religious than their peers who lack higher qualifications.

Religious vitality among immigrants

Competing with secularisation is a hypothesis that emphasises religious vitality in immigrant families and communities. Turkish immigrants come from a Muslim-majority society where levels of religiosity are much higher than those in Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands and Sweden (Norris & Inglehart 2004). We thus wonder to what extent Turkish immigrants are willing and able to pass on their Islamic traditions and practices to the next generation, who grow up in historically Christian, highly secularised European societies. Comparable to the notion of ethno-linguistic vitality in socio-linguistic studies of minority languages (Harwood, Giles & Bourhis 1994; Giles, Bourhis & Taylor 1977), we define religious vitality as the continuity of a minority religion through the family- and community-based socialisation of the next generation. In this vein, religious studies have correlated strong family or co-ethnic ties among fellow believers with enhanced religious continuity across generations (Ellison & Sherkat 1990; Ellison 1995; Sherkat 2001). Turkish immigrants have typically built local ethnic communities with high levels of ethnic retention. We see them in, for instance, their ethnic language usage and media consumption as well as the strong co-ethnic ties that appear in local residential concentrations and dense ethnic associations. Within Turkish immigrant families, strict parental control and pressure to conform ensure the effective intergenerational transmission of traditional cultural values, such as conservative gender roles and filial obligations (De Valk & Liefbroer 2007). More generally, religious studies have documented the impact of family socialisation that encourages the children of more religious parents to be more religious themselves later in life (Kelley & De Graaf 1997; Myers 1996). Along those

lines, Güngör, Fleischmann and Phalet (2011) showed the parallel effects of parental religious practice and Koran lessons during childhood have on sustained religiosity among second-generation Turks in Belgium. Interestingly, they found more effective religious transmission among Turks than Moroccans. This observation is consistent with relatively high overall levels of ethnic retention and social closure in Turkish immigrant communities. Focusing on Turkish Muslims and extending our comparison to other European cities, the religious vitality hypothesis expects the second generation to mostly maintain its religious identity and practice; notably, those who, as children, were exposed to religious practice and instruction within their family and community will be most religious later on in life.

Symbolic and reactive forms of religious identity

Looking beyond the binary of more-versus-less religiosity, contrasting religious orientations in immigrant communities and in the wider society evoke questions concerning how second-generation Muslims experience and express their religious identities. Some qualitative findings suggest a generational shift away from one 'Islam of the fathers' towards new – more reflective and differentiated – meanings and forms of religion in the second generation. For example, qualitative case studies have documented the search for religious roots, the emergence of novel practices and the multiple meanings of religious belonging (Dassetto & Nonneman 1996; Vertovec & Rogers 1998). In this spirit, we discern varying ways of being Muslim as distinct identity options under the umbrella of a broadly shared, strongly held Islamic identity.

One line of argument extends the present-day notion of 'belonging without believing' to immigrant religion. Gans (1994) coined the term 'symbolic religiosity' to denote second-generation religious identities that are loosely connected to beliefs and practices – such as the observance of rules and rites or acquaintance with religious creeds – in conjunction with a similar notion of symbolic ethnicity. If symbolic religiosity applies to second-generation Islam, European-born Muslims may embrace a common Muslim identity. They would value it as a meaningful part of their cultural attachments and self-understandings without necessarily observing religious rules (e.g. dietary restrictions) or practices (e.g. daily prayers). Symbolic religiosity hence implies a decoupling of the subjective identification of second-generation Muslims from Islamic practices.

An alternative 'reactive religiosity' argument posits the increased centrality of religious ties and traditions in the second generation. We see this notion extended among the most deprived second-generation groups in the US (Portes & Rumbaut 2001) to the religious domain. Reactivity implies that the children of immigrants distance themselves from the mainstream

culture and society, reaffirming a distinctive ethno-religious tradition in reaction to social exclusion and experiences of discrimination. In a similar vein, some believe in the 'ethnicisation' of second-generation religion: ethnic communities are seen as exerting pressure to uphold challenged religious values and practices as part of an ethnic reaffirmation of their minority cultures and identities. Accordingly, Maliepaard et al. (2010) found that religious and ethnic identities and practices are more closely associated to one another in second-generation Dutch Muslims as compared to the first generation. Moreover, there is some evidence of increased religious identification in the face of perceived religious discrimination among Turkish Muslims in the Netherlands (Fleischmann, Phalet & Klein 2011; Verkuyten & Yıldız 2007). This is consistent with experimental findings in social psychology which show that the experience of discrimination strengthens identification with the disadvantaged group and thus protects collective self-worth and personal well-being (Jetten, Branscombe, Schmitt & Spears 2001). Since religion provides explicit guidelines for living 'a good life', religious group identities may be a particularly attractive source for positive social identity, especially in the face of discrimination (Ysseldyk, Matheson & Anisman 2010). In short, reactive religiosity implies that those who experience more discrimination will identify more – or even more – strongly as Muslims. In contrast with symbolic religiosity, the reactivity argument suggests that Muslims may turn to stricter religious observance as a way to consolidate their threatened religious identity (Klein, Spears & Reicher 2007; Phalet, Baysu & Verkuyten 2010).

9.3 Comparative TIES data

The relative scarcity of empirical evidence from large-scale surveys on the religiosity of second-generation Muslims in European societies is mainly due to data limitations. Previous studies have focused on mainly, if not only, the first generation. Furthermore, they use restrictive measures of religious affiliation and worship (e.g. going to the mosque) and/or are usually single-country studies (Phalet et al. 2008; Smits, Ruiter & Van Tubergen 2010). Comparative approaches in this area remain an exception (but see Connor 2010). The TIES data make it possible to investigate religious identities and practices among the Turkish second generation from a comparative perspective, making use specifically of surveys conducted in Germany (IMIS 2008), Belgium (CeSo-CSCP 2008), the Netherlands (IMES-NIDI 2007-2008) and Sweden (CEIFO 2008). These four countries were selected because they represent different institutional arrangements of church-state relations, which create differential opportunity structures for the practice of Islam by Muslim minorities (Fetzer & Soper 2005; Fleischmann & Phalet 2012; Statham, Koopmans, Giugni & Passy 2005).

Moreover, the seven cities differ in local boundary dynamics as a function of ethnic segregation and social disadvantage along religious lines: such boundaries are most rigidly defined in the German cities and rather less so in the Belgian and Dutch cities and in Stockholm.

Most Turkish second-generation participants in Amsterdam and Brussels were self-identified Muslims, as were large majorities of our samples in Germany and Sweden (excluding Turkish Christians from the latter; see [figure 9.1](#)). Because religion questions were only asked of participants who self-identified as Muslims, the analyses do not include secular Turkish participants. This resulted in comparison samples of Turkish Muslims in Berlin (N=156), Frankfurt (N=185), Antwerp (N=330), Brussels (N=194), Rotterdam (N=205), Amsterdam (N=166) and Stockholm (N=118).

It should be acknowledged that our study has a number of limitations, including the differential selection of Muslims from ethnically defined Turkish samples, the cross-sectional nature of the data and the comparability of samples and measures across the different cities. Furthermore, the design did not allow us to completely separate out the role of community forces from that of religious opportunities and discrimination on the side of receiving societies. This last point will prove a challenging but very necessary task for future research

9.4 Religious boundary dynamics

Religious boundaries

For the purposes of the present investigation, we asked if it mattered which country or city one inhabits as a second-generation Turkish Muslim. In other words, do the religious identities and practices of the second generation differ across Europe? As a heuristic framework, we focused on the interplay between religious and social boundaries as this is shaped by different institutional arrangements and societal structures. The comparative cases in this study range from cities with more rigidly defined – i.e. less permeable and more closely overlapping – religious and social boundaries to those with more permeable, greater intersecting ones. Religious boundaries can be seen as one instance of symbolic boundaries, alongside ethnic, linguistic or cultural boundaries, that exclude immigrants and their offspring from mainstream societies (Lamont 2000). Lamont and Molnar (2002) define symbolic boundaries as evaluative distinctions that separate people into groups and that generate feelings of affinity, superiority or inferiority. Religion as a symbolic boundary-marker can be more salient and rigidly defined or, alternatively, more flexible and negotiable, depending on the public accommodation of religious diversity. Foner and Alba (2008) argue that religion constitutes a bright boundary in most European societies, where Christian identities (albeit secularised) are a central part of

national self-understandings and histories of nation formation, much like race in the US. Also within Europe, countries differ in the institutional pathways of church-state relations as well as ensuing forms and degrees of incorporation of religious diversity – of Islam, in particular (Soper & Fetzer 2007). Lamont and Molnar (2002) define social boundaries as being distinct from symbolic boundaries, specifically as objectified social differences that are manifested in unequal access to resources and opportunities. Symbolic and social boundaries are mutually constitutive; the former organise and justify social differences according to shared social networks, values and lifestyles. Religious and social boundaries, however, can be more overlapping or intersecting, depending on the degree to which societies are structured according to a religious divide between Muslims and non-Muslims. What is more, religious boundaries are seen to be more permeable, fluid and/or blurred in societies or in local inter-group settings where there is more upward social mobility and more social mixing across ethno-religious boundaries. This is made evident, for instance, by Muslims' access to higher education and their integration into mixed neighbourhoods and schools.

Our comparative study asks how religious boundary dynamics affect religious identity options or ways of being Muslim. In particular, we expect more reactive religiosity and stricter ways of being Muslim in settings where religious boundaries are more rigidly defined and where there is more overlap with social boundaries. Conversely, we argue that loose,

Table 9.1 *Religious and social boundaries: City profiles of second-generation Turks*

	<i>Berlin</i>	<i>Frankfurt</i>	<i>Antwerp</i>	<i>Brussels</i>	<i>Rotterdam</i>	<i>Amsterdam</i>	<i>Stockholm</i>
Selectivity:							
Secular father	Few	Few	Few	Some	Few	Some	Many
Qualified father	Few	Few	Few	Many	Some	Some	Few
Accommodation:							
Public recognition	Low	Low	Mod- erate	Mod- erate	High	High	Mod erate
Social mobility:							
% Tertiary educated	Low	Low	Mod- erate	Mod- erate	Mod- erate	Mod- erate	High
Social mixing:							
% Other in neighbourhood	Very low	Low	Low	Very low	Low	Mod- erate	Mod- erate

Notes: Selectivity of the first generation refers to the presence of immigrant parents with a secular background and/or secondary or higher qualifications in each city. Accommodation refers to the degree of institutional incorporation of Islam in pre-existing state-church relations in the four countries. Social mobility is indicated by the rates of participants with higher qualifications in each city. Social mixing refers to the self-reported presence of native inhabitants or pupils in participants' neighbourhoods and schools.

Source: TIES 2007-2008

eclectic or ultimately 'symbolic' forms of religion are most likely to appear in settings where religious boundaries are more flexible and negotiable and where they intersect with social boundaries. In addition, the comparison of Turkish Muslims across national and local receiving contexts allows us to test the boundary conditions of competing secularisation and religious vitality hypotheses. Is secularisation – the intergenerational decline of religion among the higher educated – restricted to societal contexts that disregard, if not reject, religious diversity, such as when Muslim minorities are denied public recognition or are socially excluded? Similarly, does religious vitality – the effective socialisation of religion in immigrant families and communities – require some degree of public acceptance and social inclusion in the wider society?

Selective immigration

Before turning to the different religious boundary dynamics across the comparison cities, we briefly address the issue of differential selectivity among first-generation Turks across cities. Differential selection of the first generation will affect its children through the intergenerational transmission of, *inter alia*, parental human capital and religious traditions (Nauck 2000). Across the seven cities, most parents of Turkish Muslims comprised unskilled or low-skilled immigrant workers and their spouses. The large majority typically migrated for work or family reunification (this applied to 80 per cent of the fathers in Berlin; 84 per cent in Frankfurt; 86 per cent in Stockholm; and over 90 per cent in the other cities). Accordingly, most fathers arrived with little or no formal qualifications (around 60 per cent with primary education or less in Berlin, Frankfurt, Antwerp and Stockholm; over 50 per cent in Rotterdam and Amsterdam; over 40 per cent in Brussels).

Turkish parents generally came from the most religious strata of Turkish society. We attribute this to the selective recruitment of guest workers from the least developed rural areas in central and eastern Turkey, combined with regional patterns of family reunion and family formation. Nevertheless, the presence of secular parents differed considerably across the seven cities, being largest in Stockholm, followed by Brussels and Amsterdam, and being very small in Berlin, Frankfurt, Antwerp and Rotterdam. Among these parents, refugee migration – and the related presence of Alevites and Orthodox Christians – was most significant in Stockholm, less so in Berlin and Frankfurt, and marginal in the other cities.

To sum up, second-generation Turkish Muslims proved comparable across cities to the extent that the large majority of their parents came as immigrant workers or spouses thereof from less developed regions in Turkey. Nevertheless, the parental characteristics of participants across

cities, suggest that some, such as Stockholm and Brussels, may have attracted significant numbers of less religious and/or more qualified immigrants. Consequently, parents in those cities are less homogeneous in terms of their religious orientation and social disadvantage. Those in Berlin, Frankfurt and especially Stockholm are more often Alevite Muslims than in the other cities; they are more often secular in Brussels, Amsterdam and especially Stockholm. Finally, Brussels counts more Turkish Muslims with parents holding secondary or higher education qualifications than other cities.

Institutional accommodation of Islam

As mentioned in our introduction, the four comparison countries represent different national histories of church-state relations. More recently, these modes have been extended to new forms of religious diversity (Soper & Fetzer 2007). As such, the position of Islam within the wider religious landscape differs between European societies with significant Muslim populations as a function of national institutional pathways (König 2007). We hold that, from an institutional perspective, the accommodation of Islam has been least thorough in Germany, more thorough in Belgium and Sweden, and most thorough in the Netherlands (Fleischmann & Phalet 2012).

A privileged judicial status of Germany's Christian churches as corporations of public law means that they can profit from church taxes collected by the state and subsequently distributed among them. To grant the same status to Islamic organisations, German authorities require the establishment of a centralised hierarchical organisational structure representing Islam that is modelled on the Catholic and Protestant Churches' organisation. In the absence of such structure, Islamic organisations are denied the status of public law corporation and hence access to financial resources from the state (Fetzer & Soper 2005). Although a number of Islamic organisations have set up national federations that strongly resemble the authority-advocated model, so far they have been denied recognition based on the argument that they are not representative of Germany's entire Muslim population. The state-imposed establishment in 2007 of a Coordinating Council of Muslims to represent the Islamic faith community vis-à-vis German authorities remains contested by Muslim communities and lacks legitimacy. In the absence of formal recognition, Islamic organisations in Germany therefore remain marginalised relative to established churches.

In Belgium, the institutional status of Islam is formally equal to that of the historically dominant Catholic Church and other recognised religions. Yet, equality was only recently fully implemented. Although Islam was the first religion, after Catholicism, to be officially recognised – a nominal acknowledgement occurred in 1974 – Belgian Muslims had to wait until the

turn of the millennium to see its practical application (Foblets & Overbeeke 2002). To receive the state funding to which they were legally entitled, Muslim minorities were required to set up a national Islamic council that was to represent all Belgian Muslims vis-à-vis the Belgian state and that would be held responsible for the actions of imams, whose services were thereby financed. Only in the late 1990s was such a council effectively established. This was carried out on Belgian authorities' initiative, being a first step towards implementing the formal status of Islam as a national religion (Manco 2000). The very recent application of Islam's equal status implies that Islamic organisational structures are less fully developed on the ground than they are in the Netherlands, to which we now turn.

In the early twentieth century, Dutch society, a historically multi-faith one, was characterised by so-called pillarisation. This tried and tested system of religious pluralism enabled the peaceful coexistence of separate sovereign communities under one national roof. Specifically, Protestant, Catholic, liberal and socialist 'pillars' operated independently from each other, yet still enjoyed equal representation in national affairs. Each pillar maintained its own institutions, such as schools, trade unions and broadcasting companies, which were all funded by the state on an equitable basis. With increasing secularisation, the social barriers between pillarised faith communities within the majority population have since largely broken down. At the same time, the history of independent yet equal religious communities has created the opportunity for Muslim minorities to develop their own institutions, which operate on a par with Christian and other religious organisations (Doomernik 1995). Thus, Dutch Muslims have not only established numerous local mosque associations, but also set up state-funded Islamic broadcasting networks and schools. From an institutional perspective, then, Muslims have been granted formal equality with Christian and other religious groups in the Netherlands and they have made the most of opportunities offered by the Dutch system.

The situation in Sweden is formally comparable to that in the Netherlands since Islam enjoys legal status on a par with other religions. Moreover, Islamic institutions are entitled to state funding. Unlike the Dutch case, however, Sweden has historically established a state church presided over by the Swedish king. The centuries-old notion of nation and church unity is still reflected today in the fact that, despite high levels of secularisation, more than 80 per cent of the majority population are registered as members of the Swedish Lutheran Church (Alwall 2000). Freedom of religion was granted in the constitution only in the second half of the twentieth century. The state church's privileged position has also been dismantled since. Equalising their status with that of the Swedish Lutheran Church, the state has officially recognised other religious groups: first the Swedish Free Churches, later on Judaism and still later Islam (Alwall 2002). This implies that Islamic and other religious organisations

and their institutions are funded by the state commensurate to their membership size (Alwall 2002). What is more, Muslims have created state-funded Islamic schools. As in the Netherlands, Islam in Sweden has been granted formal equality with established churches. Because of the legacy of the state-church system and the dominant status of the Swedish Lutheran Church, however, Islam is still dominated by a quasi-monopoly of the Swedish Lutheran Church.

Summing up, from an institutional perspective on religious diversity, Islamic organisations in the Netherlands operate on a par with other religious organisations. In Sweden, formal equality and state support for Islamic institutions are qualified by the continued dominance of the Swedish Lutheran Church. In Belgium, formal equality with established churches has only recently been implemented. In Germany, the position of Islamic organisations is least established, notably in the absence of public recognition (see [table 9.1](#)). Therefore, we expect to find, on the one hand, the strictest forms of religious identity in the German cities. This is in keeping with reactive religiosity, coming up against more differentiated and possibly purely symbolic forms of religious identity in Belgian, Swedish and Dutch cities. On the other hand, secularisation is also most likely in the German cities, where Islam is formally excluded. Meanwhile religious vitality is most likely in the Netherlands' multi-faith society where inclusive institutional arrangements have fostered religious practices and community-building.

Social inclusion and exclusion

Beyond their formal recognition, social structures also differ between national and local contexts across Europe, so that the second generation is less included and more excluded in some countries and cities than in others. This is made evident by varying levels of ethnic segregation, educational and occupational attainment (Heath, Rethon & Kilpi 2008). At high levels of social segregation and disadvantage, the maximal overlap of religious with social boundaries constitutes the most bright or impermeable inter-group boundaries separating second-generation Turkish Muslims from the mainstream. The cities represent different degrees of social mixing and upward mobility across ethnic group boundaries, ranging from very high to more moderate levels of ethnic segregation and persistent social disadvantage (see [table 9.1](#)). The TIES surveys asked participants to estimate percentages of Turkish inhabitants in the neighbourhood where they lived before leaving the parental home. Whereas self-reported residential segregation was generally high, the highest levels were reported in Berlin and Brussels, with over 50 per cent of the participants living in majority-Turkish city blocks. Perceived segregation levels were high in Frankfurt (42 per cent), Antwerp and Rotterdam (35 per cent). They were moderate

in Amsterdam and Stockholm (30 per cent). In addition, the TIES surveys inquired extensively into the educational careers of the second generation (see [chapter 5](#)). This revealed more persistent educational disadvantage in some cities and countries – despite the generally low education levels of Turkish immigrant parents across cities. Specifically, Turkish Muslim participants with higher (i.e. tertiary education) qualifications were almost absent in Berlin and Frankfurt, while they represented almost one third of our sample in Stockholm and intermediate rates in the other cities (ranging from 15 to 18 per cent).


All in all, the given profiles allow a tentative global ranking of the comparison cities from most overlapping to most intersecting religious and social boundaries. Turkish Muslim participants in Berlin and Frankfurt represent the most exclusionary end, with higher levels of segregation and persistent disadvantage. Those in Stockholm clearly represent the opposite, more inclusive end, with moderate levels of social mixing and upward mobility. From the perspective of social exclusion, we therefore again expect the strictest forms of religion in the German cities, as well as secularisation among the very few higher educated. We expect religious vitality, along with more differentiated forms of religious identity, in the other cities, especially Stockholm.

9.5 Secularisation or religious vitality?

[Figure 9.1](#) shows the percentages of how Turks in each city responded to being asked whether they had been raised with a religion, whether they currently had a religion and, if so, which one. In line with previous observations of religious stability, the vast majority of participants in all cities who were raised Muslim identified Islam as their current religion. We conclude that religious stability is clearly the main comparative finding. This should be qualified, however: some Turks in Berlin and Frankfurt who were raised as Muslims were no longer religious, whereas some Turkish Muslims in Stockholm were not raised as Muslims.

A closer look at the religious affiliations of Turkish Muslims shows that most participants were Sunnites, with around 20 per cent self-identifying as Shiite or Alevi in Berlin and Frankfurt, and less than 5 per cent in the other cities.¹ One should keep in mind that religious Muslims are differentially selected from the total samples of second-generation Turks in each city. While there were very few non-Muslim participants in Antwerp and Rotterdam (around 10 per cent), they were more numerous in Frankfurt, Brussels and Amsterdam (around 20 to 25 per cent) and most numerous in Berlin and Stockholm (around 40 to 50 per cent). The reasons for non-overlapping ethnic and religious group boundaries vary: factors include the reception of Christian Turkish refugees in Stockholm, the self-selection of

Figure 9.1 *Religious socialisation and current religion among second-generation Turkish Muslims (in %)*



Source: TIES 2007-2008

secular Turkish immigrants in Brussels and Amsterdam and a more significant loss of religion over generations in Berlin and Frankfurt. It should be noted that the wording of the religion question in German refers more narrowly to 'being religious' rather than 'having a religion' as in Dutch or Swedish.

9.6 Ways of 'being Muslim'

Religious dimensions

Looking beyond religious stability across generations, we explore distinct ways of 'being Muslim' among second-generation Turks. In a first step, we could reliably distinguish between affective and behavioural dimensions of religious identity in repeated principal component analyses in each city. As a first dimension, 'religious attachment' consists of four statements that express participants' personal commitment to their Muslim identity: 'Being Muslim is an important part of myself'; 'I often think about my being Muslim'; 'I see myself as a true Muslim'; 'When someone says bad things about Muslims I feel personally hurt'. Participants were asked to rank these statements from (1) for totally disagree to (5) for totally agree. The TIES surveys additionally inquired about the frequency of four religious habits: saying daily prayers, going to the mosque, fasting during Ramadan and eating halal food. Rate of religious practice was rated from


(1) for never through (3) for occasional to (5) for regular observance. Together, the habits form a second dimension: that of 'religious practice', which refers to participants' behavioural involvement in religious ritual and dietary practices.² Finally, bivariate correlations of religious attachment with religious practice support our finding of clearly distinct attachment and practice dimensions despite substantial overlap across cities (i.e. Spearman's ρ ranges from .42 to .64).

Private, selective and strict Muslims

In a next step, we inductively derived distinct ways of being Muslim from the patterning of second-generation religious attachment and practices in each city. Cluster analysis is well suited for this exploratory endeavour. To allow for selective religious practice, we entered the four indicators of religious practice separately into K-means cluster analyses, along with a reliable composite index of religious attachment. In each of the cities, similar clusters emerged, indicating three distinct patterns of Muslim identities that we labelled 'private', 'selective' and 'strict' (see figures 9.2 though 9.4). Across cities, a first cluster of private Muslims is characterised by moderate to high levels of attachment; for instance, they fully agree that 'Being a Muslim is an important part of myself'. Strong attachment, however, typically goes together with low levels of any religious practice. Private Muslims come closest to the decoupling of affective and behavioural dimensions, in line with symbolic religiosity. By contrast, so-called strict Muslims combine strong religious attachment with high levels of adherence to all four measured habits. For the strict, Muslim identity seems to imply devout conformity to religious obligations and behavioural guidelines. Finally, selective Muslims differ from the strict in that they combine high levels of attachment with more selective ways of practising their religion. Specifically, in this cluster we find high levels of fasting during Ramadan and the observance of eating halal food, along with low levels of praying and going to the mosque. Whereas the latter habits have a distinct ritualistic character, the former's primary meaning is that of communal sharing and social belonging to the Muslim community rather than Islamic praxis in the narrow sense.


Although very similar clusters for private, selective and strict types of Muslim identities were replicated in all seven cities, local boundary dynamics also came into play so that boundaries between distinct types may slightly shift between cities. For instance, private Muslims in Brussels, Antwerp and Amsterdam (though not in other cities) reported eating halal food most of the time. Interestingly, eating halal takes on different meanings, from a 'light' variant of halal for private Muslims (e.g. avoiding pork meat) to the most exigent variants for strict Muslims (e.g. requisite ritual slaughtering of meat and taboos on many ingredients). Another example of

Figure 9.2 *Mean profiles of religious attachment and practices among private Muslim second-generation Turks*




Source: TIES 2007-2008

Figure 9.3 *Mean profiles of religious attachment and practices among selective Muslim second-generation Turks*



Source: TIES 2007-2008

Figure 9.4 *Mean profiles of religious attachment and practices among strict Muslim second-generation Turks*



Source: TIES 2007-2008

local variation in behavioural norms concerns the boundary between selective and strict forms of practice. Thus, selective Muslims in Berlin and Frankfurt typically report *some* prayer and mosque visits in addition to eating halal food and fasting during Ramadan. Meanwhile, in Stockholm, behavioural norms seem much less demanding so that even strict Muslims do not report regular daily prayers.


To conclude, the emergence of a distinct private type of Muslim identity in all seven cities supports the validity of a conceptual distinction between affective and behavioural dimensions of religious identity. At the same time, typically moderate levels of religious attachment among private Muslims call into question an alleged decoupling of identity and practice, as proposed by symbolic religiosity. By contrast – and in support of identity consolidation through behavioural involvement – *some* active involvement in shared practices with other Muslims certainly strengthens the religious attachment of the second generation.

Religious boundaries

Our main research question is concerned with contextual variation in ways of being Muslim. More precisely, we compared cities as inter-group settings with more or less permeable religious boundaries. In support of a contextual approach from local religious boundary dynamics, the distribution of second-generation Turks over the three clusters varies considerably

between cities (see figure 9.5). Thus, strict Muslims constitute the largest group, relative to selective and private Muslims in Berlin, Antwerp and Rotterdam; in Frankfurt, strict and selective Muslims are roughly equally represented (40 to 50 per cent strict Muslims in the four cities); Brussels and Amsterdam count relatively more selective Muslims (around 50 per cent) than strict ones; Stockholm is the only city where private Muslims dominate numerically (over 50 per cent), and the share of this cluster in Stockholm is substantially larger than in all other cities. Focusing on the comparison of relative differences between the three Muslim types,³ preliminary comparative findings are consistent with differential boundary dynamics between cities. Specifically, strict religious observance predominates in cities with bright religious boundaries, in particular Berlin and Frankfurt, as well as the cities of Antwerp and Rotterdam, which share the presence of a widely supported and very vocal far-right party. Conversely, selective religious practice seems to be the rule in cities with more permeable boundaries, notably Stockholm, and, to a lesser extent, also Brussels and Amsterdam. Apparently, more demanding behavioural implications of Muslim identity are reinforced by – and, in turn, are reinforcing – bright religious boundaries in highly exclusionary local inter-group settings. Here, the emphasis is on the strict observance of religious rules and rites, thus drawing a marked distinction between insiders and outsiders of the moral community of 'good' Muslims. In local inter-group contexts that are less severely exclusionary, however, the behavioural implications of second-

Figure 9.5 *Relative proportions of strict, selective and private types of being Muslim among second-generation Turks*



Source: TIES 2007-2008

generation Muslim identities are less demanding, with an emphasis on social belonging and communal sharing. In these inter-group contexts then, selective religious practices are enabled by – and simultaneously are enabling – religious boundary-blurring.

9.7 Religious socialisation or reactive identity?

In light of generally high levels of religious attachment and involvement among second-generation Turkish Muslims across cities, we must ask which group processes could be driving generational continuity in the religious domain. To assess the role of religious socialisation within immigrant communities, on the one hand, and experiences of discrimination by non-Muslims, on the other, we examined correlations with religious attachment and practices among our respective samples.

Religious socialisation


How effectively was the minority religion of the first generation transmitted to the next generation in local Muslim families and communities? As seen in [figure 9.1](#), a large majority of Turkish Muslim participants across cities was raised with Islam. Accordingly, frequencies of parental mosque visits during childhood appeared comparably high across cities, reflecting rather similar levels of religiosity among the first generation of Turkish Muslims. Specifically, more than 60 per cent of the parents in Berlin, Frankfurt and Antwerp were reported to make weekly mosque visits when participants were children; this is followed by 45 per cent and Rotterdam, 41 per cent in Amsterdam, 38 per cent in Stockholm and 36 per cent in Brussels. At the same time, Muslim participants across cities differed considerably in terms of religious education. Thus, attending Koran lessons was the rule for Turkish Muslim children in Antwerp, Amsterdam and Rotterdam (with 75 per cent attendance or more), but less common in Berlin and Frankfurt (with attendance rates > 50 per cent) and even less common in Stockholm and Brussels (< 50 per cent).

Were second-generation Muslims whose parents more regularly practised and/or who attended Koran lessons as a child more strongly attached to – and actively involved in – Islam? To test net correlations of second-generation religious attachment and practice with religious socialisation, we conducted multiple regressions with parental religious practice and teaching during childhood as predictors in each city. When controlling for gender, age and education, we found significant net effects of religious socialisation on both religious identification and practice dimensions in all seven cities (see [tables 9.7](#) and [9.8](#) in the appendix). Turkish Muslim participants whose parents regularly went to the mosque and who were sent to Koran

lessons as a child were not only more strongly attached to their Muslim identity as young adults, but they were also more actively involved in the religious life of their community. We had to conclude that religious socialisation within Turkish migrant families is a robust predictor of second-generation religious identities across cities. This is a general finding despite contextual variation in parental religious practice and religious teaching among Muslim participants in the seven cities. Furthermore, the strength of correlation with current religious identities also varied between cities.⁴


Relatedly, did religious socialisation make a difference between private, selective and strict ways of being Muslim? Figures 9.6 and 9.7 show the bivariate associations of religious socialisation with distinct ways of being Muslim. Across cities, our observations attest to the importance of religious upbringing for the ways in which the Turkish second generation experience and express their Muslim identity in young adulthood. There is an obvious trend towards the increasing importance of religion during socialisation for private, selective and strict Muslims.⁵ Thus, the strict more often grew up in a family where the parents went to the mosque weekly; a majority attended Koran lessons as a child. In contrast, early exposure to religious education and having parents as religious role models during childhood were much less frequent among private Muslims. While selective Muslim most closely resembled private Muslims in terms of their fathers' mosque attendance, they were most similar to strict Muslims in terms of Koran lesson attendance. This suggests that community-based religious

Figure 9.6 *Childhood religious socialisation of private, selective and strict Muslim second-generation Turks: Mean levels of mosque visits by father*



Source: TIES 2007-2008

Figure 9.7 *Childhood religious socialisation of private, selective and strict Muslim second-generation Turks who attended Koran lessons as a child (in %)*



Source: TIES 2007-2008

teaching effectively supports the continued religious involvement of second-generation Muslims. Participants who attended Koran lessons as a child were much less likely to be private Muslims as young adults. As Koran classes are most often organised by local mosque associations, this finding attests to the key role of local (and transnational) communities of co-religionists in the transmission of Islam to the next generation of European-born Muslims. In addition, parental religious practice directly indexes Turkish immigrant families' religious socialisation. Our observations suggest that parental ritual practice is decisive for sustained ritual practice in the second generation.

To conclude, despite differences between cities in the prevalence of family- and community-based religious socialisation, and despite differential effects of both types of religious socialisation on practice in young adulthood, the overall trend is clear. The more important the role religion played in a participant's childhood, the more likely he or she is to be a practising Muslim today. This observation is repeated for all seven cities. It highlights the key function religious ties and resources within Turkish migrant families and communities have in explaining the continued religious involvement of the second generation. Our observations suggest that a common emphasis on public recognition or state-sponsored religion in the European comparative literature seems one-sided. In addition, more programmatic cross-national research is needed into the role of religion in local and transnational community-building among European-born Muslims.


Reactive identity

From our comparative overview of diversity patterns and policies across cities, it became apparent that religion in European societies constitutes a bright inter-group boundary. Indeed, religious inter-group boundaries have remained firmly in place despite formal civic inclusion of the second generation. Against a background of social disadvantage and public hostility in inter-group relations with non-Muslims, we asked to what extent the experience of discrimination is part of the social realities of Muslim participants in the seven cities. Overall, we found high levels of consensus and little variation across cities with regard to the public perception of group discrimination against Muslims. Thus, over 90 per cent of the second-generation Turkish respondents in each city agree that Muslims as a group are, as our survey put it, subject to 'hostile or unfair treatment because of their origin or background', with responses ranging from 'some' to 'most of the time' on a five-point Likert scale. Furthermore, varying percentages of Muslim participants across cities reported *some* personal experience of discrimination. Personal discrimination was similarly defined as 'hostile or unfair treatment because of one's origin or background', with responses ranging from 'never' to 'most of the time' on a five-point Likert scale. No time period was specified, so that participants could also report experiences of discrimination during childhood or adolescence. In reply to our question, a clear majority of Muslim participants reported at least one experience of personal discrimination in Berlin (76 per cent), Frankfurt (82 per cent), Brussels and Antwerp (both 60 per cent); this was the case for roughly half of the participants in Amsterdam (49 per cent), Rotterdam (43 per cent) and Stockholm (53 per cent). Lastly, all participants who reported one or more personal experiences of discrimination also answered a follow-up question about the perceived grounds of discrimination. Fixed response categories included religion, ethnicity, race, language, gender and social class. Participants could tick more than one corresponding box. In keeping with variation from less to more permeable religious boundaries, the cities dramatically differed in terms of the salience of religion in personal experiences of discrimination. Thus, religion was most frequently perceived as ground for discrimination by Muslim participants in Berlin (37 per cent) and Frankfurt (42 per cent), and least frequently in Stockholm (only 6 per cent), with the other cities falling somewhere in between (around 20 per cent). It should be added that participants across cities perceived their Turkish origin as the most obvious ground for discrimination. As both ethnic and religious parts of minority identity are closely entwined, the religion question indicates the relative salience of one's Muslim identity – as distinct from one's Turkish identity – in the context of negative experiences of inter-group encounters.

Are second-generation Muslims who experience more discrimination, personally or against Muslims in general, more strongly attached to and more actively involved in their religion? While the social realities of participants across cities are marked by the experience of discrimination, the evidence of an alternative explanation of second-generation religion as 'reactive identity' is mixed (see [table 9.8](#) and [9.9](#) in the appendix). The correlations of religious identities with religious attachment and practice were tested in linear multiple regressions with self-reported frequencies of group discrimination against Muslims, personal discrimination experiences and religious or other grounds of discrimination as predictors. Specifically, the effects of experienced discrimination were estimated net of gender, age and levels of education, in addition to religious socialisation. Only in Berlin, Frankfurt, Antwerp and Stockholm (and not in the other cities) were experiences of discrimination significantly related to religious attachment. Only in Antwerp were Muslim participants who reported more personal experiences of religious discrimination not only more strongly attached to their Muslim identity, but also more actively involved in religious practice. To conclude, there is some support for reactive identity in response to experienced unfairness and hostility in inter-group relations for the affective attachment dimension. Yet, there is little evidence of a similar linear effect of experienced discrimination on religious practice among the second generation.

In a last step, we examined differences between types of Muslims in terms of average levels of discrimination. Does experienced discrimination make a difference between private, selective and strict ways of being Muslim? In the absence of a linear increase of religious practice with more frequent experiences of discrimination in most cities, it is very well possible that certain ways of being Muslim are distinctly more 'reactive' than others. Thus, perceived unfairness or hostility in inter-group relations might be related to a shift away from private religiosity and towards more communal definitions of Muslim identity as a shared faith and a common fate. Furthermore, 'reactive identity' might be most applicable to strict definitions of religious identity and its behavioural implications, which enforce the most bright inter-group boundaries between religious insiders and outsiders. Since discrimination on religious grounds is most consistently associated with religious identity, we focus here on differences in personal religious discrimination between private, selective and strict Muslims. Despite considerable variation in their frequencies, we found similar correlations of experienced religious discrimination with distinct ways of being Muslim across cities (see [figure 9.8](#)). With the exception of Amsterdam and Stockholm, we see a general trend: levels of experienced discrimination increase from private to selective Muslims and, further, from selective to strict Muslims.⁶ However, in view of the cross-sectional nature of the data and the endogeneity of experiences of discrimination – which depend

Figure 9.8 *Reports of religious discrimination experiences among private, selective and strict Muslim second-generation Turks (in %)*



Source: TIES 2007-2008

as much on awareness of injustice as on actual exposure to injustice – caution is warranted in interpreting the causal direction of mutual associations between experiences of discrimination and ways of being Muslim. Thus, prior experiences of discrimination may drive people to increased identification as Muslim and more consequence in religious practices. Yet, it is equally plausible that more religious Muslims are more aware of religious discrimination. Moreover, visibly devout Muslims are also more likely to encounter discriminatory treatment to the extent that they adopt behavioural codes (e.g. avoiding eye contact or shaking hands with the opposite sex) and/or dress codes (e.g. wearing headscarves or beards) that signal a salient, distinctively Muslim identity in inter-group encounters with non-Muslims.

To conclude, our findings are suggestive of the potentially reactive nature of second-generation Muslim identities in some, if not most, of the cities. At the same time, correlations with religious discrimination are generally weaker and less consistently replicated across cities than the correlations with religious socialisation. We therefore conclude that religious socialisation within immigrant families and communities has a decisive impact, while religious discrimination may further reinforce the religious identities of the second generation.

9.8 Discussion

This chapter develops a comparative approach to the religious identities of the second generation of Turkish Muslims (excluding secular and Christian Turkish participants in TIES) in seven European cities. All seven cities attracted large numbers of Turkish immigrant workers in the late 1960s and early 1970s, who have in common predominantly rural, low-educated pre-migration backgrounds. Across cities, Turkish immigrants have developed vibrant Muslim communities that support the continued religious involvement of the next generation.

At the same time the cities differ in their degrees of facilitating social mobility and social mixing, with the most social mobility and mixing in Stockholm; the least in Berlin and Frankfurt; and the Belgian and Dutch cities falling somewhere in between. The four countries in our study are highly secularised societies with historically established Christian churches. Yet, they represent different institutional pathways of religious accommodation: Sweden's state church, Germany's cooperative separation of church and state and Belgium's and the Netherlands' historical religious pluralism. Extending a contextual approach of second-generation religion from inter-group boundary dynamics, we conceive of the cities as different inter-group settings with more or less permeable religious boundaries.⁷ Our central question was how the second generation of European-born Muslims negotiates their religious identities in the context of inter-group tension or hostility in majority-non-Muslim societies. Contrary to the secularisation hypothesis, comparative evidence of remarkably effective religious transmission from Muslim parents to children supports earlier findings of religious continuity in Turkish migrant families, albeit with some qualifications for those in Berlin and Frankfurt. Looking beyond generational continuity versus loss of religion, our main research question here was concerned with qualitatively distinct ways of being Muslim under the umbrella of a common Muslim identity for all. In support of internal diversity in terms of qualitatively distinct ways of being Muslim, cluster analyses of second-generation religious identities in the seven cities revealed three similar types of Muslim identity across cities. While private Muslims are attached to their Muslim identity without engaging in religious practice, strict Muslims connect strong religious attachments with devout observance of dietary and ritual practices, such as praying and going to the mosque.

Finally, selective Muslims observe dietary practices, such as fasting during Ramadan and eating halal food, in the absence of regular ritual practices, such as praying and going to the mosque. Importantly, selective Muslims are strongly attached to religion in a way that is similar to strict Muslims. It should be added that the typology leaves some room for local boundary dynamics, with slightly different patterns of selective practice in different cities. Most importantly, the findings attest to the availability of

multiple identity options for second-generation Muslims in Europe under the common heading of a 'Muslim identity' in all seven cities. What is more, our own discoveries speak to an alleged decoupling of religious identity and practice, as suggested by notions of 'symbolic religiosity' and 'belonging without believing'.

One direction in which we looked for explanations of second-generation religious identities was the internal dynamics of immigrant families and communities. In particular, we looked into processes of religious socialisation within Muslim communities. The importance of generational transmission as an explanation of continued religious attachment and involvement in the second generation received very strong support in all seven cities. Thus, most participants who indicated Islam as their current religion were raised with Islam as children. Moreover, both parental role models and community-based religious education contributed to the effective intergenerational transmission of religious traditions. It is noteworthy that both parental religious practice and the religious education of children depend on a 'religious supply side', which is mainly ensured by Turkish mosque associations with transnational links to Turkey and their European headquarters in Germany. To complement more extensive comparative research on national differences in the public accommodation of religion, more research is needed into the impact of local and transnational religious communities and organisations on second-generation Muslim identities.

An alternative explanatory ground for the generally stable and strong religious identities among the second generation refers to the quality of inter-group relations between Muslim minorities and majority-secular or Christian groups in European societies. Extending research on reactive ethnicity, we looked for evidence of reactive religiosity – correlating religious attachment and practice with experiences of discrimination. To summarise, our findings are mixed: experiences of ethnic and religious discrimination are undoubtedly part of the daily lives of Turkish Muslim participants in all cities. However, linear correlations of second-generation religion with these experiences appear to be partial at best – i.e. they mostly affect religious attachment rather than practice – and they are significant only in some cities. Finally, with respect to distinct ways of being Muslim, across cities, the strict were most likely to report personal experiences of discrimination on religious grounds. Importantly, it seems plausible that the correlation goes two ways: strict Muslims might be simultaneously more aware of, as well as more often exposed to, unfair or hostile treatment in inter-group encounters with non-Muslims. To conclude, the reactive religion hypothesis receives more consistent support in cities with bright religious boundaries, such as Berlin and Antwerp. Here quasi-consensual public perceptions of unfairness and hostility in inter-group relations are routinely reinforced by personal experiences of religious discrimination. Across all cities, however, the religious vitality hypothesis does most of the

explanatory work, as second-generation religion is supported by strong primary ties within immigrant families and communities.

To contextualise religious identities, we contrasted cities with the most bright religious boundaries such as Berlin and Frankfurt as well as, to a lesser extent, Antwerp and Rotterdam, with cities such as Stockholm as well as, to a lesser extent, Brussels and Amsterdam. We inquired into how predominant ways of being Muslim vary according to city contexts as local inter-group settings. According to our expectation that more permeable inter-group boundaries lead to more selective religious practices or even to religious attachment without practice, we find that a private Muslim identity is most frequent in Stockholm, where inter-group boundaries are mitigated by significant degrees of social mixing and upward mobility. Conversely, in Berlin and Frankfurt and, to a lesser extent, in Antwerp and Rotterdam, Turkish immigrant groups are more explicitly set apart by bright religious boundaries. Accordingly, in these cities, roughly half or more participants opted for a strict Muslim identity. Finally, selective practice was the predominant pattern among Muslims in Brussels and Amsterdam, where inter-group relations are less marked by religious tension than in their respective twin cities of Antwerp and Rotterdam. Interestingly, varying patterns of religiosity among second-generation Muslims appear to be organised at the local rather than the national level. For instance, we found striking commonalities in second-generation religious identities between Antwerp and Rotterdam, two industrial economic centres with strong anti-immigrant constituencies on the far-right of the political spectrum.

To conclude, our comparisons highlight how religious identities – in the plural indeed – emerge from contextual variation in religious socialisation within immigrant communities as well as varying experiences of inter-group tension or conflict along religious lines in different city contexts. They complement a common top-down approach of religious diversity from national differences in European state institutions and policies.

Notes

- 1 Selectivity of the first generation refers to the presence of immigrant parents with an urban background and/or secondary or higher education qualifications in each city. Accommodation refers to the degree of institutional incorporation of Islam in pre-existing state-church relations in the four countries. Social mobility is indicated by the rates of participants with higher qualifications in each city. Social mixing refers to the self-reported presence of native inhabitants or pupils in participants' neighbourhoods and schools.
- 2 Interestingly, the residual category 'Muslim Other' was the modal self-identification in Amsterdam and Rotterdam (over 50 per cent); it was less often used in Brussels and Antwerp (around 25 per cent); and it was marginal in other cities. It is unclear

whether this category mainly reflects indifference, ignorance about religious traditions or, alternatively, whether it signals resistance towards particular labels or reluctance to subdivide what is seen as a common Muslim identity.

- 3 Religious attachment and practice form reliable and clearly distinct dimensions across cities: internal consistencies α range from .65 to .86 for attachment and from .64 to .87 for practice; bivariate correlations range from .42 to .63 between religious attachment and practice.
- 4 Relative differences in predominant ways of being Muslim between cities are not explained by socio-demographic differences between Muslim samples, as religious identities are not consistently associated with gender, age or education. Specifically, strict Muslims are significantly more often male in Brussels, Antwerp, Amsterdam and Stockholm; strict Muslims tend to be less educated in Frankfurt and Amsterdam. In Brussels, younger participants are more often private Muslims; in Antwerp, younger Muslims are more often strict Muslims.
- 5 It is likely that the proportion of 'private Muslims' is especially underestimated in Berlin and Frankfurt relative to the other five cities. Due to the different wording (see note 3) of the filter question in German, respondents well may have declared themselves as 'not religious'.
- 6 For religious attachment, explained variances by the regression models (see adjusted R in tables A7 and A8) varied from around 10 per cent in Antwerp, Brussels, Amsterdam and Rotterdam to 25 per cent or more in Berlin, Frankfurt and Stockholm; for religious practices, explained variances were somewhat larger, ranging from 25 per cent to 45 per cent across cities (except for a mere 5 per cent in Brussels).
- 7 Differences in parental religious practice between strict and both selective and private Muslims were significant in all cities on the basis of one-way analyses of variance (F-tests) and pairwise comparisons of means (t-tests). Differences in religious education between private and both selective and strict Muslims were significant in all cities on the basis of bivariate comparisons of proportions who attended Koran lessons (χ^2 tests).
- 8 Differences in personal religious discrimination between strict and both selective and private Muslims are significant in five cities (Frankfurt, Brussels, Antwerp, Amsterdam and Rotterdam) on the basis of pairwise comparisons of proportions who mention religion as a ground for discrimination (χ^2 tests).
- 9 The fact that Sweden seems to provide the most open context for the accommodation of non-Christian beliefs, while, at the same time, not having the most pluralistic form of institutionalisation, can be taken as an indication that other contextual factors also intervene – for example, educational opportunities and the presence of welfare state provisions.

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Appendix

Table 9.2 *Migration motives: Percentages of Turkish Muslim parents who migrated for family and work reasons*

	Berlin	Frankfurt	Brussels	Antwerp	Amsterdam	Rotterdam	Stockholm
Work father	62.4	69.0	64.7	67.0	67.3	62.6	41.0
Family father	17.2	15.2	29.5	25.5	24.7	26.5	45.3
Work mother	2.5	4.9	7.3	6.3	3.1	2.5	7.8
Family mother	77.9	79.9	85.9	86.7	91.5	91.3	82.6

Source: TIES 2007-2008

Table 9.3 *Economic development in sending areas: Percentages of Turkish Muslim parents originating from rural Turkey (only including parents who lived in Turkey until at least age 15)*

	Berlin	Frankfurt	Brussels	Antwerp	Amsterdam	Rotterdam	Stockholm
Village father	36.7	45.2	55.0	47.6	56.6	53.7	45.3
Village mother	42.4	46.0	62.3	50.0	53.0	52.2	47.9

Source: TIES 2007-2008

Table 9.4 *Formal qualifications in Turkey: Percentages of Turkish Muslim parents with primary education or less*

	Berlin*	Frankfurt*	Brussels	Antwerp	Amsterdam*	Rotterdam*	Stockholm
Primary or less father	66.0	61.1	42.4	59.7	55.0	51.4	64.1
Primary or less mother	71.8	64.9	57.9	72.3	72.4	72.0	67.4

*German and Dutch percentages do not distinguish qualifications imported from Turkey from those obtained after migration.

Source: TIES 2007-2008

Table 9.5 *Self-reported school segregation: Percentages of Muslim second-generation Turks with 50% or more pupils of immigrant origin in primary and secondary schools*

	Berlin	Frankfurt	Brussels	Antwerp	Amsterdam	Rotterdam	Stockholm
>50% immigrants primary	58.9	51.4	76	50.3	64.6	69.5	72.4
>50% immigrants secondary	58.3	55.7	66.7	49.3	76.7	73.0	68.2

Source: TIES 2007-2008

Table 9.6 *Self-reported ethnic segregation: Percentages of Muslim second-generation Turks currently living in neighbourhoods with 50% or more Turkish residents*

	Berlin	Frankfurt	Brussels	Antwerp	Amsterdam	Rotterdam	Stockholm
>50% Turks	62.1	42.7	61.1	35.5	29.2	35.0	30.4

Source: TIES 2007-2008

Table 9.7 *Upward mobility: Percentage of Muslim second-generation Turks who are attending or have completed tertiary education*

	Berlin	Frankfurt	Brussels	Antwerp	Amsterdam	Rotterdam	Stockholm
Tertiary education	2.6	4.9	18.3	17.5	19.8	15.2	30.8

Source: TIES 2007-2008

Table 9.8 Multiple regressions of religious attachment on religious socialisation, discrimination and background variables: Parameter estimates
beta (standard errors)

	Berlin	Frankfurt	Brussels	Antwerp	Amsterdam	Rotterdam	Stockholm
Constant	3.14 (.22)***	3.48 (.23)***	3.52 (.38)***	3.17 (.28)***	3.84 (.42)***	2.99 (.35)***	3.18 (.45)***
Woman	.11 (.08)	-.07 (.09)	-.05 (.13)	.19 (.09)*	-.12 (.12)	.25 (.13)	.19 (.16)
Age 26-35	.06 (.08)	.18 (.08)*	.05 (.13)	-.15 (.09)	-.08 (.13)	.04 (.13)	-.18 (.16)
Education low							
Education medium	-.27 (.08)***	-.29 (.09)**	.22 (.18)	-.03 (.12)	-.13 (.30)	-.12 (.20)	.51 (.23)*
Education high	-.56 (.24)*	-.43 (.21)*	.09 (.21)	-.20 (.13)	-.46 (.33)	-.29 (.25)	-.25 (.25)
Socialisation Koran lessons	.43 (.08)***	.32 (.09)***	.28 (.13)*	.39 (.13)***	.16 (.18)	-.17 (.17)	.25 (.17)
Socialisation parent practice	.14 (.05)**	.16 (.05)**	.12 (.05)**	.06 (.03)	.10 (.05)*	.19 (.05)***	.12 (.06)*
Discrimination group	.11 (.04)**	.05 (.04)	.01 (.06)	.02 (.04)	-.10 (.05)	-.00 (.05)	-.15 (.08)
Discrimination personal	-.05 (.06)	-.16 (.06)**	-.11 (.07)	.07 (.05)	.02 (.06)	.10 (.07)	.17 (.07)*
Discrimination religious reason	-.01 (.09)	.36 (.10)***	.10 (.20)	.23 (.14)*	.30 (.16)	-.03 (.17)	.53 (.29)
Adjusted R2	.35	.31	.08	.10	.15	.07	.31

*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001

Source: TIES 2007-2008

Table 9.9 Multiple regressions of religious practice on religious socialisation, discrimination and background variables: Parameter estimates beta (standard errors)

	Berlin	Frankfurt	Brussels	Antwerp	Amsterdam	Rotterdam	Stockholm
Constant	1.17 (.32)**	1.10 (.29)***	3.32 (.35)***	3.50 (.32)***	2.40 (.50)***	1.79 (.41)***	1.91 (.60)***
Woman	.18 (.12)	.08 (.11)	-.28 (.15)*	-.38 (.11)***	-.39 (.15)**	.10 (.15)	-.21 (.22)
Age 26-35	.03 (.12)	.09 (.10)	-.10 (.15)	-.37 (.11)***	.07 (.15)	.20 (.15)	-.29 (.21)
Education low							
Education medium	-.27 (.12)*	-.11 (.12)	.23 (.19)	-.11 (.14)	.34 (.36)	.05 (.23)	-.07 (.31)
Education high	-.87 (.37)*	-.08 (.27)	.04 (.23)	-.11 (.15)	.38 (.40)	.01 (.28)	-.81 (.33)
Socialisation Koran lessons	.64 (.13)***	.33 (.11)**	.25 (.14)	.66 (.15)***	.58 (.21)**	-.01 (.20)	.56 (.22)*
Socialisation parent practice	.61 (.07)***	.50 (.06)***	.10 (.05)*	.17 (.04)***	.26 (.06)***	.37 (.06)***	.22 (.07)***
Discrimination group	-.01 (.06)	-.01 (.01)	.02 (.07)	.01 (.05)	-.14 (.06)*	-.02 (.05)	-.03 (.11)
Discrimination personal	-.10 (.08)	-.08 (.07)	.04 (.08)	-.03 (.06)	.05 (.07)	.13 (.08)	.08 (.10)
Discrimination religious reason	.15 (.14)	.16 (.21)	.05 (.22)	.51 (.16)***	.16 (.19)	.09 (.18)	.11 (.38)
Adjusted R2	.46	.46	.05	.25	.34	.25	.29

*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001
Source: TIES 2007-2008



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10 Conclusions and implications

The integration context matters

Maurice Crul and Jens Schneider

10.1 Introduction

Throughout this book, we pursued several lines of comparison across countries, between and across cities and for multiple origin groups. We found major differences between groups as well as remarkable variation within the same origin group across cities and countries. In our conclusion, we make use of the preceding chapters' various outcomes to look at one origin group in more detail. For this purpose we selected second-generation Turks, as they are significantly present in seven of the eight countries that the TIES survey covered. This group's ubiquity enabled robust comparison and, at the same time, contemplation on the integration context and its specific bearing on the second generation as a whole.

Deviating from our approach in others chapters, here we focus on absolute differences between Turks across countries rather than relative differences between this group and respondents of native-born parentage. Our aim is to assess what kind of context best affords opportunities for the Turkish second generation's upward mobility. We seek to pinpoint what helps them succeed and what hinders them across countries.

The sometimes major variation in outcomes provides evidence that integration contexts across countries and cities offer radically differing opportunities. This realisation ushers in new explanatory factors and takes some weight off individual or group factors. As the previous chapters showed, the contextual conditions created by institutions (e.g. arrangements in school and on the labour market, citizenship and welfare policies) are of paramount importance.

However, we do not mean to totally dismiss the impact of individual and family characteristics. Several chapters in this volume underscore, for example, the relevance of parental background characteristics. Yet, the impact of individual and family-related factors often only becomes apparent in the interplay of specific conditions of the local and national integration

contexts. This chapter therefore casts the spotlight on the integration context and its interplay with available resources in the family.

10.2 A comparison of second-generation Turks with low-educated parents across seven countries

Much of the variation we see between countries is rooted in general macro-level institutional differences in the structure of the labour market or how educational systems are organised. The aforementioned interplay of contextual conditions only comes to the fore when meso- and micro-levels are also considered. For instance, we probed into what kind of help and support respondents received from parents, siblings and other significant people in the community and at school. We asked: how do individuals and families operate and navigate within a certain school system? How do their social networks help them find work? Analysing the micro and the meso, we see both the restraints of the integration context and the windows of opportunities available to individuals and families. Integration context theory forms the basis of our approach, as [chapter 2](#) discussed in detail (see also Crul & Schneider 2010).

Another striking observation in this volume is that ‘integration outcomes’ sometimes highly differ across thematic fields. Second-generation Turks in Sweden, for instance, show very favourable results in education, as compared to those in other countries. Meanwhile, in terms of national identity, a large group of them only weakly identifies as much with being Swedish as with having a sense of belonging to their home city, Stockholm. This puts into question models that predict *overall* negative or positive integration outcomes. The lived reality of the second generation is not a straightforward result of national integration models, but the result of more complex processes. Thus, on the one hand and following Bourdieu (1984), we prefer to conceive of the fields of education, the labour market and social life as relatively autonomous, each with its own structure and set of power relations. As we found, the opportunities in these fields are very different across cities and countries. On the other hand, the fields are not totally insular. For example, educational results obviously affect labour market access and working careers, though how they do so differs from one country to the other. We therefore ask: how does identity formation relate to education? How do social relationships impact people’s position on the labour market? How are such relationships affected by a country’s or a city’s climate of acceptance of cultural diversity and immigration?

The TIES project offered us the unique possibility to compare the children of Turkish immigrants born across thirteen cities in seven European countries. That said, the internal heterogeneity of these communities presented a challenge as we strived to make accurate assessments. For starters,

the parents of our second-generation respondents do not share the same background. They have different ethnic, regional, religious and socio-economic characteristics. Some parents came from large cities in Turkey, but others from the remotest rural parts. By far, most parents were labour migrants, but some also came as political refugees.

For proper comparison, we had to account for such incongruities in the Turkish survey sample.¹ As [chapter 5](#) on education showed, in almost all countries, parental educational background was a differentiator, with the most important cut-off point being a parent's completion of at least a few years of lower secondary school. The school careers of children with better-educated parents usually resembled those of the comparison group's children more closely than those of lower-educated Turks. As such, our analysis in this concluding chapter has a focus exclusively on those *respondents with low-educated parents* (i.e. with a few years of lower secondary school at most). This rules out, in particular, many children of immigrants from large Turkish cities and those who came to Europe as refugees, thus encompassing significant groups of children of professionals in Paris and Christian Turks in Sweden. By contrast, most Alevites and Kurds are included in the sub-sample because their parents have low education levels. Our narrow scope considerably reduces the diversity in parental background characteristics across the countries. It means that those counted as second-generation Turks in this sub-sample actually had very similar socio-economic starting positions in the seven countries, thus allowing us to concentrate specifically on contextual factors to explain differences in outcomes.

Unlike elsewhere in this book, the findings in this chapter therefore do not give a representative picture of the second-generation Turks in the thirteen European cities. Many results would look far more positive if they were based on the entire Turkish origin sample. Nevertheless, the results do give an accurate overview of the situation of low-educated Turkish labour migrants' children in those cities. Moreover, looking at this group with the most adverse starting position is advantageous in that it tests the 'integration capacity' of national and local institutional settings to a maximum. The approach clearly indexes the structural opportunities and obstacles presented by the different integration contexts.

10.3 Educational position

An enormous amount of studies has been published around the theme of education and the children of immigrants (for an overview, see Holdaway, Crul & Roberts 2009). Their emphasis has mostly been on comparing such children with a group of children of native-born parentage or with other ethnic minority groups. Gaps between ethnic groups are mostly

attributed to differences in class and culture. Looking at social class goes back to a longer established tradition of research on children from working-class families. Cultural differences in relation to education are often operationalised in the value parents attach to education and the role parents assign to teachers and schools. In this chapter, class plays but a minor part because, as mentioned, we look solely at second-generation Turks with low-educated parents. Comparing children in similar socio-economic positions across countries directed us to the relevance of other explanatory factors.

Of all the thematic fields, school outcomes showed the most extreme differences. In [chapter 5](#), we distinguished four typical outcomes based on percentages of early school leavers (those who have a lower secondary school degree at most), higher education students and the group in the middle (those who reached apprenticeships or upper secondary school). The Turkish second generations in France and Sweden show the most promising educational results, with low percentages of early school leavers and a considerable group of high achievers. These systems are successful not only in producing high shares of well-educated young people, but also in preventing dropout in lower and upper secondary education, which results in insufficient credentials. Second-generation Turks in Germany and, to a lesser extent, Belgium and Austria, have the least promising educational outcomes. These systems produce a considerable group of early school leavers, and the number of those who make it to higher education is worryingly low. A third stream is represented by second-generation Turks in Switzerland, where there are neither many early school leavers nor a lot of high achievers. Finally, second-generation Turks in Netherlands can be characterised as the most polarised group, with a disconcertingly large group of early school leavers and an equally large group of high achievers.

Table 10.1 *Educational level among second-generation Turks with low-educated parents, based on highest degree obtained or current level of schooling (in %)*

	Early school leavers	Apprenticeship or upper secondary education	Higher education
Austria	32.3	52.5	15.2
Belgium	34.1	48.4	17.5
Switzerland	13.0	72.0	15.0
Germany	33.1	61.9	5.0
France	16.1	47.5	36.4
The Netherlands	25.9	47.2	26.9
Sweden	9.0	61.8	29.2

Source: TIES survey 2007-2008

In Germany, Austria and Belgium, one third of second-generation Turks with low-educated parents can be classified as early school leavers. In the Netherlands, this contingency comprises one fourth. This is an important negative indicator, as having nothing more than a lower secondary school degree precludes securing any job but one of the lowest ranking. These countries' percentages of very high early school leavers must be interpreted as failure to be successfully integrated into the national educational system. Compared to their parents, this group shows hardly any educational progress.

However, in France, Sweden and the Netherlands, we find a group of between a quarter and a third of respondents who has reached or already completed higher education. This group has very successfully managed its way through the educational system. From an intergenerational perspective, they have taken an enormous, impressive step forward. Most parents of these successful students have attended primary school at most.

The largest group represented in all countries falls in the middle category. This contingency is still a lot better educated than its parents, although they will probably not fill top-ranking positions in society. Depending on whether they get skilled or white-collar jobs, they would, however, have taken a considerable step forward in relation to their parents and thus successfully fulfilled the ambitions of the first generation's emigration project.

Reconstructing our respondents' educational careers, as we did in [chapter 5](#), revealed three pivotal points: the selection after primary school into either a vocational track or an academic lower secondary track; the selection of an apprenticeship versus upper secondary school education; and the transition into higher education. These turning points, to a large degree, determine ultimate school outcomes. We also identified three types of determining characteristics: institutional; individual; and family. Among the most relevant institutional factors, we identified were: the organisation of preschool; early versus late tracking; upstreaming and downstreaming options in secondary school; existence of a long alternative route to higher education through the vocational column; organisation of the transition into an apprenticeship; and organisation of the transition from upper secondary school into higher education.

Outcomes nevertheless also depended on what school systems asked for from both pupils and parents. Parents were expected to play an active role in some, while, in others, this was much less crucial. The Swedish and the German cases are opposites here. In both countries, we found a considerable group of Turkish parents who rarely or never talked about school with their children. In the literature, this is generally presented as a facet of cultural heritage from rural Turkey, where parental involvement in school was not something to be expected. But, as [table 10.2](#) shows, depending on the context, parental attitudes can have varying influences on their children's school careers.

Table 10.2 *Educational attainment of second-generation Turks with low-educated parents who rarely or never talked about school (in %)*

	Early school leavers	Apprenticeship or upper secondary education	Higher education
Austria	47.4	43.6	9.0
Belgium	34.7	40.0	25.3
Switzerland	15.2	72.7	12.1
Germany	48.0	49.7	2.3
France	16.7	54.8	28.6
The Netherlands	39.7	39.7	20.7
Sweden	0.0	69.2	30.8

Source: TIES survey 2007-2008

To put it simply, more than in any other country, second-generation Turks in Germany are penalised because their parents do not – or are unable to – support their school careers. In the German system, this reduces chances to almost zero for even the brightest children of lower-educated Turks to enter tertiary education. By contrast, in other systems like France's and Sweden's, children of average learning ability and from similar family situations do make it into the tertiary education.

At the lower end of the educational hierarchy we thus see very large percentages of early school leavers in Germany and Austria. In these two countries, almost half of second-generation Turks were placed in *Hauptschule*, the lowest-qualifying, least prestigious lower secondary school track. The risk of not finishing the track proved very high. The likelihood of dropout loomed as they tried to make the transition into an apprenticeship, something especially difficult for students who had to find one on their own. Lack of coaching and/or parental guidance here resulted in high numbers of early school leavers. But we wondered, did children of native parentage who also followed *Hauptschule* suffer from the same problems? Their numbers of early school leavers are, however, much lower. The most extreme disparities are seen in Germany, Austria and Switzerland, where twice as many second-generation Turks become early school leavers than children of native parentage.

At the other end of the spectrum a comparable picture emerges. Again, in all countries, second-generation Turks are less likely than respondents of native-born parentage to enter higher education, even when they have completed an academic track. In this case, Belgium and Sweden show almost twice as many respondents of native-born parentage entering higher education than second-generation Turks from the same academic secondary school track. Most problems occur in the transition from upper secondary to post-secondary education.

At the same time, more than students of native-born parentage do, they make use of an alternative, often longer, route through the vocational track into higher education. This trend is particularly visible – and shows effective results – in Austria, the Netherlands and France.

Second-generation Turks cannot fall back on the same level of parental support and networks as their peers with native-born parents. We see this effect when parents cannot prevent their children from being streamed into a lower vocational track and or help them seek an apprenticeship (something compounded by the fact that second-generation respondents do not receive equal treatment from employers). Even for second-generation Turks on the academic track, a lack of family resources and support more often results in downstreaming, dropout and not continuing into higher education. Only among a select number of averagely performing yet persistent students does a family's avid encouragement of higher education (even if it means taking a longer route) seem to affect their careers positively. National and local educational opportunity structures are thus crucial for children of immigrants and their real-life chances, not least because they also determine in how far family background characteristics foresee ultimate educational outcomes.

10.4 Labour market positions

Entering the labour market is generally the step meant to follow education. The relevant questions here concern how educational credentials are transferable into labour market access, and to which degree the large differences found in educational outcomes also translated into different work careers. On the urban labour market, second-generation Turks must compete with peers from other ethnic backgrounds. In a system that produces many young people with degrees in higher education, the value of a diploma may be different from one obtained in a country where only a minority of the population enters a higher education institution.

The tables in this section compare the job status level of our respondents who finished school and found employment. [Table 10.3](#) presents Turkish respondents with, at most, a lower secondary education diploma. Sweden and Switzerland are excluded because their total number of early school leavers already on the labour market was too small for comparison. As expected, early school leavers are mainly active in unskilled and skilled jobs. In the countries with the highest shares of early school leavers, Germany, Austria and the Netherlands, more than half were working in unskilled jobs. At the same time, almost half of them were hired for skilled or professional jobs; in Belgium and France, this group even amounts to two thirds.

Table 10.3 *Second-generation Turks (with low-educated parents) who completed, at most, lower secondary education and their job status (in %)*

	<i>Unskilled</i>	<i>Skilled</i>	<i>Professional</i>
Austria	55.8	30.2	14.0
Belgium	32.1	56.6	11.3
Switzerland	X	X	X
Germany	57.1	34.3	8.6
France	30.3	54.5	15.2
The Netherlands	55.0	39.0	6.0
Sweden	X	X	X

Source: TIES survey 2007-2008

Table 10.4 *Second-generation Turks (with low-educated parents) who completed an apprenticeship or upper secondary education and their job status (in %)*

	<i>Unskilled</i>	<i>Skilled</i>	<i>Professional</i>
Austria	8.1	75.7	16.2
Belgium	31.6	54.5	13.9
Switzerland	6.1	45.1	48.8
Germany	25.2	58.5	16.3
France	45.8	41.0	13.3
The Netherlands	22.5	57.7	19.8
Sweden	56.7	26.7	16.7

Source: TIES survey 2007-2008

Table 10.4 shows the job status level of respondents with middle educational levels. In Germany, Austria and the Netherlands, the position of those respondents who completed apprenticeships is especially better than that of their lower-educated peers. This group is mostly found in skilled jobs.

Most remarkable is that about half the group holding a diploma in upper secondary education in France and Sweden is found in unskilled jobs. Zooming in on the situation, we find that both cases concern specific students. In France, three quarters of them had actually followed the vocational track leading to a *BEP* or *CAP* diploma.² In Sweden, four out of five students in this group had followed a vocational programme in gymnasium. In both countries, these tracks form the lowest category in the educational system and therefore carry little prestige. The systems do sometimes foresee a practical component, but a very minor one at that, which leaves their students ill-prepared for the realities of the labour market. Students with a *BEP* or *CAP* in France and a (vocational) gymnasium diploma in Sweden enter an unskilled position as often as early school leavers in the Netherlands and Germany. In retrospect, we realise that these degrees in France and Sweden could be categorised similarly to lower vocational degrees in Germany, the Netherlands and Austria.

Table 10.5 *Second-generation Turks (with low-educated parents) who completed post-secondary or tertiary education and their job status (in %)*

	<i>Unskilled</i>	<i>Skilled</i>	<i>Professional</i>
Austria	0	62.5	37.5
Belgium	18.4	40.8	40.8
Switzerland	7.7	23.1	69.2
Germany	X	X	X
France	6.7	36.7	56.7
The Netherlands	12.1	25.3	62.2
Sweden	16.7	8.3	75.0

Note: Germany is not included in this table because the number of higher-educated respondents with low-educated parents is too small for comparison.

Source: TIES survey 2007-2008

As expected, second-generation Turks with a post-secondary or a tertiary education degree show the best returns on the labour market, even though, particularly in Belgium and Sweden, there is still a considerable number of respondents working far below their educational level in unskilled jobs (see [table 10.5](#)). Moreover, comparing them with respondents of native-born parentage who have the same educational credentials, we see that, on average, the latter are more likely to be found in jobs of a higher status. As [chapter 6](#) on the labour market shows, this is mostly the result of their being older and thus possessing more work experience. In all cases except Germany, differences are no longer significant when findings are controlled for age and experience. However, their *direction* remains the same: on average, Turkish respondents with the same educational attainment tend to work in jobs with a lower prestige.

Alongside job status, levels of unemployment and labour market inactivity are important indicators of successful integration into the workforce. Overall, labour market participation among second-generation Turks with low-educated parents is high, somewhere between 75 and 90 per cent. It is lowest in Germany, followed by the Netherlands and Austria. But in Germany and Austria, labour market participation is also comparatively low among the respondents of native-born parentage. As [table 10.6](#) shows, women are particularly affected by non-participation in the workforce,

Table 10.6 *Second-generation Turkish women (with low-educated parents) who are no longer in school and are non-active on the labour market (in %)*

	<i>Austria</i>	<i>Belgium</i>	<i>Switzerland</i>	<i>Germany</i>	<i>France</i>	<i>Netherlands</i>	<i>Sweden</i>
Women non-active on the labour market	32.3	27.7	14.3	38.2	22.5	33.6	20.0

Source: TIES survey 2007-2008

being especially much more likely to spend time in domestic activities and/or family life.

Second-generation Turkish women are part of a larger trend here. In Germany and Austria, a considerable group of women of native-born parentage also does not enter the labour market. This is mainly attributed to having children: regardless of ethnic background, women with young children in these two countries either never enter the labour market or leave it upon becoming mothers. Financial and practical arrangements around day care and preschool facilities and the predominantly half-day school system in primary education make it difficult to combine work with raising young children in Germany and Austria. The main difference here is that second-generation Turkish women more often do not enter the labour market at all, while women of native-born parentage often have worked before having children. As observed in [chapter 7](#) on union formation, this concerns, not least, respondents' mean age at marriage. Many second-generation Turkish female respondents in Germany and Austria left school early (some at age fifteen) to help out in their parental households, then get married and start their own households, all while still relatively young themselves. Women of native-born parentage more often postponed marriage and children, thereby having had a much better chance to work before having children.

In the Netherlands and Belgium, second-generation Turkish women leave school, on average, later than their peers in Germany and Austria, and they more often enter the labour market for a period of time before getting married. The Netherlands is known for its large part-time sector, although, as seen in [table 10.6](#), this does not lead to greater labour market participation among this demographic. In the Netherlands, after-school and day care facilities are expensive, proving sensible only if women earn a salary high enough to at least cover the costs. This keeps a considerable group of female early school leavers off the Dutch labour market – more than half of them.

Switzerland's outcomes demand some special attention from us, as its percentage of women who are non-active on the labour market is low and there is only a very small difference with women of native-born parentage. When controlling for individual characteristics in [chapter 6](#), we saw how second-generation Turkish women in Switzerland are even slightly *more* active on the labour market than women of native parentage. Further analysis of this group reveals two factors that set their situation distinctly apart from that of the Netherlands and Germany: many women work part-time, usually in skilled or white-collar jobs (a by-product of Switzerland's low percentages of early school leavers). Since these jobs are generally well-paying, it is attractive for them to work part-time in combination with caring for their family. In addition, as [chapter 7](#) shows, these women also tend to marry later than those in other countries, thus being able to enter the

labour market before marriage, similar to women from the comparison group.

Particularly high labour market participation from second-generation Turkish women is also found in Sweden. It is no coincidence that the country is known for its extensive welfare arrangements. The Swedish after-school child care service system was intentionally designed to allow both women and men to work fulltime. Although second-generation Turkish women make slightly less use of these provisions than women of native-born parentage, compared to other countries, their full-time labour market participation is very high.

Women's labour market participation thus depends on the opportunity structure in a given country with respect to practical solutions for combining work and child-rearing. Unsurprisingly, these structural conditions sometimes go hand in hand with how people regard these issues. The TIES survey asked all respondents whether they agreed or disagreed with the statement 'Women should not work while their children are still young'. In Germany, three quarters of respondents supported this statement, compared to only about a third in Switzerland and a third in Sweden. Germany's results could imply a conservative stance – that mothers of young children should not work – or simply a realistic appreciation of the great difficulties parents of young children face when both partners work. What can certainly be said is that the welfare arrangements in Germany (and, as it were, in Austria) do not promote change in persisting negative attitudes about working women. Meanwhile in Sweden and Switzerland, Turkish second-generation mothers avail of the opportunities offered to combine a paid job with family care.

Unemployment is also an important indicator for labour market participation, as it highlights the difficulties of integrating into the workforce. Unemployment levels among second-generation Turks are high in almost all cities, especially when compared to their respective comparison group. In the worst cases, one in five respondents no longer in education is unemployed; in the somewhat better cases, it is one in ten. Unlike most other indicators of structural integration, the differences between cities within one country can be immense. It seems that the *local* labour market situation, especially pertaining to job availability, influences the unemployment level to a significant extent. The two smallest cities in our survey, Basel and

Table 10.7 *Unemployment rates of second-generation Turks with low-educated parents, by two cities in each country (in %)*

	Austria	Belgium	Switzerland	Germany	France	Netherlands	Sweden
Capital city	22.7	32.1	17.3	15.6	11.5	13.7	12.9
Second city	10.4	17.6	1.5	8.0	19.0	16.5	X

Source: TIES survey 2007-2008

Linz, and medium-size Frankfurt offer the most favourable local labour markets.

Like job status, educational level also has a large impact on unemployment risk. As [table 10.8](#) shows, early school leavers are two to three times more frequently unemployed than better-educated respondents. This also means that countries with high numbers of early school leavers are overall more affected by unemployment in the Turkish second generation.

Early school leavers are particularly vulnerable on the labour market. However, they are not necessarily the only group who is unable to transfer educational attainment into workforce participation, as the cases of higher-educated second-generation Turks in Sweden and Belgium clearly show. In all cities, second-generation Turks are more often unemployed than their peers of native-born parentage. In Germany, Austria and Belgium, these differences can mostly be explained by lower educational credentials. In Brussels, for example, the local employment situation is very difficult for people with an educational profile like that which predominates the Turkish second generation. In a number of cities, however, actual outcomes differ from what we would expect based on educational credentials. In Stockholm, Zurich, Paris, Antwerp and in both Dutch cities, second-generation Turks do much worse than we would expect. As seen in [chapter 6](#), differences in Stockholm and Paris could partly be traced back to age and gender effects across the sampled groups. With these effects controlled, second-generation Turks are still more often unemployed, but the difference is no longer significant. Yet for the two cities in the Netherlands and in Antwerp and Zurich, significant differences remain after controlling for individual characteristics. In these cities, unequal treatment or discrimination could be a relevant factor. Another possible explanation is that access to middle- and higher-level jobs greatly depends on specific social and family networks, which are less accessible to the children of immigrants than to their peers with native-born parents.

Table 10.8 *Unemployment rates of second-generation Turks with low-educated parents, by education credentials (in %)*

	Early school leavers	Apprenticeship	Higher education
Austria	27.8	3.6	5.1
Belgium	33.8	17.7	15.5
Switzerland	17.6	6.7	7.1
Germany	31.1	5.3	0.0
France	26.7	13.3	9.1
The Netherlands	17.5	15.5	10.0
Sweden	12.5	10.5	18.8

Source: TIES survey 2007-2008

Interestingly, the difference in unemployment between second-generation Turks and comparison group members is small or almost non-existent when looking at those with low education. For jobs at the foot of the labour pyramid, second-generation Turks apparently do not suffer from much discrimination because respondents of native-born parentage little desire this work. They probably also have good access to these jobs through their own networks. However, in Sweden, France and the Netherlands, the considerable groups of second-generation Turks who are high achievers do want to move into middle- and higher-level jobs, and here they face a different kind of competition. It seems that if given a choice, many employers prefer respondents of native-born parentage. Certain segments of the labour market seem more open for Turks, while others are more difficult to enter. Such market segmentation poses significant hindrances for the more successful share of the second generation to validate its educational credentials in the workforce.

In sum, labour market outcomes present a polarised situation. Between a quarter and a third of second-generation youth no longer in full-time school is either unemployed or non-active on the labour market. Unless their partner has a paid job, they must live off welfare state provisions. They also tend to reside in the most deprived neighbourhoods, their children are likely to go to the worst performing schools and their family incomes are close to official poverty levels. The size of this marginal group differs across Europe, but it is substantial in every country. Germany is the country with the largest Turkish community – more than half of the Turkish diaspora in Europe lives in Germany – but it also has one of the largest groups on the lower rungs of the ladder. The German case substantially weighs down our overall evaluation of the position of second-generation Turks with low-educated parents in Europe.

At the same time, we may conclude that between half and two thirds of second-generation Turks have experienced upward social mobility, as compared to their parents. Compared to their mothers, women have taken the greatest step forward. Young second-generation Turkish women whose mothers only attended a few years of primary school or were even illiterate are now working in skilled, white-collar and professional jobs. Education is the key here: better credentials ease people's way up. The upwardly mobile children of Turkish immigrants generally have much brighter prospects than their peers who stagnated at low educational levels. They also more often marry well-educated partners with full-time jobs, which results in substantially higher family incomes. This affords them the chance to move out of their rather deprived neighbourhoods and/or buy their own home. This group's children will grow up in far more favourable conditions than their parents and also face better circumstances than the children of low-educated second-generation Turks.

10.5 Social relations and identification

Identification, belonging and social segregation take centre stage in debates on integration in Europe. As [chapter 8](#) on identity argued, these issues are not only about relations between minority groups versus the ‘majority’. Successful integration in middle-sized and large cities must also be assessed more and more in terms of people’s capacity to cross ethnic boundaries and deal with others from a wide range of cultural backgrounds. Being integrated into multi-ethnic networks and feeling at ease in a multi-cultural environment is an important asset for feeling at home in an increasingly diverse city.

Measuring for this, two indicators in the TIES survey inquire into the ethnic background of respondents’ three closest friends at age fifteen and three closest friends at the time of the interview. [Table 10.9](#) shows the percentage of Turkish respondents who cited having, as fifteen year olds, only friends of Turkish origin (column 1) and the percentages of those with ethnically mixed friendships (column 2 and 3). The outcomes show clear differences between the cities.

In all cities,³ more than half of second-generation Turks had best friends of another ethnic background at age fifteen; in most, non-Turkish peers comprised the majority of closest friends (column 3). Ethnically mixed friendship groups have become the reality in many European cities. As also shown in [chapter 8](#), the second generation seems to lead the way in this tendency (with even more resonance among second-generation Moroccans and former Yugoslavians), while youth of native-born parentage had the least ethnically mixed friendship group at the same age.

Table 10.9 *Share of non-Turkish three closest friends at age fifteen among second-generation Turks with low-educated parents (in %)*

	<i>Only Turkish friends</i>	<i>One non-Turkish friend</i>	<i>Two or three non-Turkish friends</i>
Vienna	36.3	26.8	36.9
Linz	29.2	34.9	35.8
Zurich	4.6	4.6	90.8
Basel	10.0	15.8	74.2
Berlin	49.1	27.5	23.4
Frankfurt	27.0	29.6	43.4
Paris	13.5	14.2	72.3
Strasbourg	20.6	21.1	58.3
Amsterdam	25.8	22.0	52.3
Rotterdam	45.8	19.1	35.1
Stockholm	15.1	17.0	67.9

Source: TIES survey 2007-2008

The most mixed friendship groups were found in Zurich, Basel and Paris. This partly has to do with these cities' size and types of Turkish community. In Zurich (as well as Basel), community members are very spread out, living all over the city. In Paris, Turks are relatively small compared to other ethnic groups. In Stockholm, we see internal divisions in the Turkish community, one encompassing sizable populations of Christian Turks and Kurds from Turkey that subsequently form their own smaller communities. The city with the largest Turkish community in Europe is Berlin, where it is *demographically* simply more feasible to interact exclusively with fellow Turks. But another factor is the community's concentration in a limited number of neighbourhoods. This is the case in Vienna and Rotterdam. Second-generation Turks in Strasbourg are also concentrated in certain neighbourhoods, but because of the city's less rigorous secondary education tracking, this group more often had ethnically mixed friendship groups at age fifteen. In Berlin and Vienna, education proves noticeably influential: we find a significant effect of the lower vocational education track, which greatly increases the likelihood that respondents will be friends only or predominantly with peers of Turkish descent.

The differences across the cities are less substantial when it comes to closest friends of native-born parentage. As [table 10.10](#) shows, somewhere between a third and half of second-generation Turks in the eleven cities analysed here cited no friends of native-born parentage at age fifteen. From this, we indirectly deduce that a large share of their non-Turkish friends were youngsters of other ethnic minority groups.

The situation in the two Swiss cities seems to offer the best circumstances to 'blur' boundaries (Alba 2009) between the majority group and the children of Turkish immigrants, while the boundaries seem to have been

Table 10.10 *Share of friends of native-born parentage at age fifteen among second-generation Turks with low-educated parents (in %)*

	<i>No friends of native parentage</i>	<i>One friend of native parentage</i>	<i>Two or three friends of native parentage</i>
Vienna	53.5	38.9	7.6
Linz	43.4	37.7	18.9
Zurich	32.2	40.2	27.6
Basel	33.2	36.7	30.0
Berlin	56.1	31.0	12.9
Frankfurt	38.2	36.8	25.0
Paris	42.2	26.0	31.8
Strasbourg	41.7	37.2	21.1
Amsterdam	54.5	32.6	12.9
Rotterdam	69.5	22.1	8.4
Stockholm	49.1	34.0	17.0

Source: TIES survey 2007-2008

brightest for youth in Rotterdam, Vienna and Berlin. In combination, [tables 10.9](#) and [10.10](#) reveal three types of outcomes: a) growing up mostly with Turkish peers (Rotterdam, Vienna, Linz, Berlin and Frankfurt); b) growing up in a 'non-white', ethnically mixed environment and friendship group (Amsterdam, Paris, Strasbourg and Stockholm); and c) Zurich and Basel present a case with native-born parentage youth being part of a wider ethnically mixed circle of friends.

The picture does not change much when it comes to the ethnic background of respondents' current three closest friends. As adults, second-generation Turks in Berlin and Vienna also have the most Turkish circles of friends. Meanwhile, in Stockholm and Zurich, multi-ethnic friendship groups are more frequent. In most cities, friendship circles have become more Turkish over time, especially so in Strasbourg and Zurich. Notably influential factors again include the size of the Turkish community in absolute numbers, its concentration in certain neighbourhoods and socio-economic position. The least favourable socio-economic indicators are in Berlin and Vienna, where we find that unemployed respondents and those not actively looking for a job (mostly women) significantly more often have solely Turkish closest friends. The fact that they do not participate in environments conducive to encountering a broad array of people, such as the labour market and higher educational institutions, seems to foster mainly in-group relations vis-à-vis their own community. Their situation contrasts with the better-educated second-generation Turks in Stockholm and Paris (and, to a lesser extent, in the two Swiss cities). Socio-economically, these groups do much better, and are also in more frequent contact with other ethnicities (including those of native-born parentage).

Partner choice is another important indicator for social relations and, following Gordon's model of 'straight-line assimilation', it has often been presented as a sort of litmus test for integration. We agree with Song (2009) that this is an overstatement: marriage within one's own ethno-national group is not necessarily the ultimate expression of segregation or failed integration, as much as marrying a partner of native-born parentage does not automatically lead to becoming a recognised member of the majority group. Intermarriage can, however, obviously be interpreted as another way of boundary-crossing, but international comparisons reveal how, in most diasporic groups, intermarriage rates in the second generation tend to be low (cf. Schneider, Chavez, Waters & DeSipio 2012). The TIES results for second-generation Turks show a very consistent pattern across the seven countries. The overwhelming majority marries a partner from the same ethno-national origin group (between 86 per cent in France and 97 per cent in Sweden). This applies not only to respondents with low-educated parents (for more details, see [chapter 7](#)), and it includes partners born in Turkey as much as partners who are fellow second-generation Turks.

Closely tied up with the second generation's social relations and how they relate to the society they were born into are identity formation and feelings of belonging. Chapter 7 discusses factors influencing their feelings of belonging to national categories (being French, Swedish, Dutch, etc.). Looking specifically at Turkish respondents with low-educated parents, table 10.11 analyses the prevalence of weak identification with the majority society.

Table 10.11 *Weak or very weak feelings of national belonging among second-generation Turks with low-educated parents (in %)*

	<i>Austria</i>	<i>Switzerland</i>	<i>Germany</i>	<i>France</i>	<i>The Netherlands</i>	<i>Sweden</i>
Weak or very weak	25.7	15.4	19.8	23.9	24.8	23.6

Note: Because this set of questions was organised differently in Belgium, the Belgian results are excluded.

Source: TIES survey 2007-2008

The table shows a considerable share of respondents with weak and very weak feelings in all countries. These similar numbers indicate that several key factors – respondents being overwhelmingly citizens of the survey countries, having closest friends of native-born parentage and socio-economic scores – seem to make no substantial difference here. As shown, Sweden's respondents score high on all three measurements, though their degree of non-identification with being Swedish is comparatively high. At the other end, we have rather positive identification results in Germany, where respondents rank so poorly in educational and labour market results, as well as have high instances of Turkish-only friends. Only in Switzerland do second-generation Turks fulfil our expectation of having a less problematic sense of national belonging, combined with high levels of interacting with people of native-born parentage and a reasonable overall socio-economic position.

Our assumption is that, on the one hand, people have a personal need to feel at home somewhere and to connect to those around them. On the other hand, it makes a difference whether people accept them. We therefore expect respondents' assessment of their interaction with people of native-born parentage to play an important intermediary role with respect to whether they can feel at home and feel they 'belong'. As such, the TIES survey asked second-generation Turks about their feelings towards the population of native-born parentage. Most did not have cold feelings. Those who had cold or neutral (being the middle position between cold and warm) feelings significantly more often expressed a weak national identity; those who had warm feelings more often expressed a strong national identity. We found the warmest feelings towards people of native-born parentage among second-generation Turks in Germany and Switzerland – between half and two

third expressed such feelings – while the Dutch and Austrian contexts were least warm – with only a third expressing such feelings. As we can interpolate from how respondents feel towards others, notably those coming from a different ethnic background, boundary-drawing mechanisms seem to have a major impact on the strength of one's national identity.

To claim national belonging as a Muslim or a second-generation Turk is rather problematic in all seven countries. It is a contested identity, particularly because of the highly pronounced 'ethnic' component in the definition of 'ethno-national' identity. For this reason, in many countries, it was more conducive to identify with one's city of residence – yielding a much more open identity – and is something also often promoted by cities themselves. Second-generation Turks in Stockholm and in the two Dutch cities, especially, identified much more with their city than with the nation. The group showing weak city identity, as compared to weak national identity, was only half as big in both Sweden and the Netherlands. Similarly strong feelings of city belonging were found in Switzerland and France, as [table 10.12](#) shows.

Table 10.12 *City identity strength among second-generation Turks with low-educated parents (in %)*

City identity		Austria	Switzerland	Germany	France	Netherlands	Sweden
Strong or very strong	Capital city	29.1	63.4	36.8	51.0	63.4	64.8
	Second city	38.5	58.3	40.8	32.9	63.6	X
Weak or very weak	Capital city	31.1	13.4	19.3	21.9	7.3	13.6
	Second city	18.3	14.2	19.1	45.7	12.9	X

Source: TIES survey 2007-2008

In six out of the eleven cities we surveyed, second-generation Turks showed a stronger identification with the city than did their respective comparison groups. In the five other cities, we found the same result when going down to the neighbourhood level. This shows that weak national identity does not mean that this group would not feel 'at home' where they grew up and live.

For a considerable share of second-generation Turks, the strongest form of identification was ethno-national origin. Their low rates of intermarriage and fewer cases of respondents with mixed friendship groups, notably the case in Germany and Austria, can lead to a depiction of this group as one with a high degree of social cohesion, limited contacts with the majority society and low identification with the nation they live in. Similar findings have fuelled the debate about a supposed Turkish *Parallelgesellschaft*. This public image, however, needs some fine-tuning according to other findings that provide contrast or at least nuance. The TIES survey found that second-generation Turks more often than youth of native-born

parentage have friendship groups comprising people with different ethnic backgrounds from their own. The Turkish community's tight social cohesion is well documented, although we found that when they live more spread out over a city or are demographically less visible as a group, Turks much more often engage in friendships with other ethnicities. Employment and higher labour market segments, as they are starting to become accessible to second-generation Turks, also foster more diverse social relations. Weak identification is a reaction to context, depending on feelings of being welcome and accepted by youth of native-born parentage, but also on the perceived degree that all relevant institutions and sectors of society stand open to them. City identity generally offers a more open and inclusive identity category, therefore attracting much higher levels of identification. Second-generation Turks strongly feel that they are Berliners, Amsterdammers and Viennese. In some cases, they feel this more so than their peers of native-born parentage.

10.6 Culture and religion

The European media and the political debate covered by it seem to feed on reports of 'culture clashes' and incompatible religions that come head to head. As observed in [chapters 8 and 9](#), respectively on identity and religion, we see the greatest differences between youth of Turkish (and other immigrant) origin and those of native-born parentage when it comes to issues of faith. Between two thirds and three quarters of comparison group respondents claimed to have no religion. This is the result of a major secularisation process that happened in cities within one or two generations, although a lot of these respondents still grew up with religion in their families. By contrast, religion is important for the majority of second-generation Turks. In the Netherlands, we find the largest gap (71 per cent) between religious second-generation Turkish youth and non-religious youth of native-born parentage. The smallest gap is in Switzerland (26 per cent)

Table 10.13 *Second-generation Turks with low-educated parents and youth of native-born parentage who say they practise a religion (in %)*

	<i>Austria</i>	<i>Belgium</i>	<i>Switzerland</i>	<i>Germany</i>	<i>France</i>	<i>Netherlands</i>	<i>Sweden</i>
Second-generation Turks	86.3	91.3	58.9	72.4	94.0	91.3	71.9
Youth of native parentage	37.0	30.1	32.9	22.5	42.9	20.5	12.4

Source: TIES survey 2007-2008

due to there being both more religious respondents of native-born parentage and more non-religious second-generation Turks.

In general, Islam, by far the most common religion among second-generation Turks in Europe, imposes more rules on a person's daily life than most common forms of Christianity, notably including restrictions on food and alcohol consumption as well as sexual activity. The prominence of alcohol at parties, bars, clubs and in the general nightlife scene among young European urbanites creates potential social discrepancies between religious and areligious youth within the Turkish second generation itself as well as between them and youth of native-born parentage.

In all cities, a minority of second-generation Turks state having no religion, some because they were not raised in a religion, while others state they no longer have a religion. In Sweden and Germany, this is true for a quarter; in Switzerland, for almost half. It is important to see the areligious group in light of Turkey's longstanding secular tradition. In many aspects, debate concerning the role of Islam in society is much more polarised in Turkey than in Europe. Political parties, TV stations and newspapers are fiercely divided over the issue. The secular and the religious largely live separate lives, particularly in Turkish cities though this is also reflected in the deep fissures within the Turkish diaspora in Europe. As discussed in [chapter 8](#), non-religious groups in Europe tend to live in more varied neighbourhoods, interact in more diverse circles of friends and distribute their time in different places throughout the city. The two groups also have highly disparate opinions when it comes to the central domains in which religion imposes restrictions, such as eating habits, premarital sex and gender equality.

With a vibrant music and dance club scene, Berlin is the capital of secular Turkish nightlife and culture, something that resonates in other European cities. Successful Turkish DJs from Berlin get booked in all major European cities and Berlin's Turkish gay and lesbian scene is renowned continent-wide. However, the Turkish community's diversity – one facet being its lively Berlin scene – is mainly commented and reflected upon by second-generation Turks themselves, as evidenced in internet forums and via social media catering to Turkish youth. The greater public discourse is ignorant of this internal multifacetedness, simply conflating Turks with religious Muslims.

At the same time, most second-generation Turks do see themselves as Muslims. The TIES survey was able to show in greater depth what this means for second-generation Turkish Muslims across European cities. As argued in [chapter 9](#), 'being religious' leaves much room for interpretation. Of those who call themselves Muslim in France, Sweden, Switzerland and Belgium, a third or more say they never pray. One in five of the religious respondents in these countries never go to a mosque. In Switzerland, two thirds of these respondents do not actively practise their religion. Some say

they take part in Ramadan festivities, but that is about all they do as far as Islamic practice goes. Second-generation Turks in Austria, the Netherlands and Germany seem to be the most actively practising Muslims. About three quarters of respondents in Vienna follow the Islamic customs of observing Ramadan, eating halal food, doing daily prayers and going to the mosque either strictly or quite regularly. In Amsterdam, this group comprises two thirds of the respondents; in Berlin and Frankfurt, about a third. The most publicly visible marker of female Muslim religiosity is the headscarf. About half of religious second-generation Turkish women in Austria, Germany and the Netherlands said they wear a headscarf outside the home. By contrast, in the two Swiss cities, only one in ten women stating they practise a religion wear a headscarf; in France, this number is one in five.

In the public debate we see a preoccupation about the role that 'political' Islam plays in the Muslim diaspora in Europe. This is often juxtaposed with the idea of a 'modern', 'Western' Islam. Although what is actually meant by 'modern' remains murky, one recurring discursive theme is the separation of state and church (or in this case, mosque) – where religion is seen as a private matter between a religious person and God. We delved into this issue in the TIES survey via two particular questions. On the one hand, if respondents agreed with the statement that religion should be the ultimate political authority, we labelled their strain of Islam 'political'. If respondents did *not* agree with the statement that Islam is the only and ultimate political authority and agreed with the statement that religion should be a private matter between a religious person and God, we labelled their strain of Islam 'modern'. Of the religious second-generation Turks with low-educated parents we interviewed in seven countries, between half (in Germany) and four fifths (in Sweden) could be labelled 'modern'. A much smaller group we identified as adhering to 'political' Islam. The latter were usually very observant in their religious practices and often held more conservative views on gender roles and other social aspects.

The group in favour of a more 'political' Islam is, by far, largest in Germany, with 28 per cent of respondents identifying in this way,⁴ women and men being equally represented. Almost half this group expressed a weak feeling of belonging to Germany, but a strong Turkish identity. The women in this group often did not participate on the labour market. Half of the group also reported having experienced hostility because of their reli-

Table 10.14 *Religious second-generation Turks (with low-educated parents) practising 'modern' or 'political' Islam (in %)*

	Austria	Belgium	Switzerland	Germany	France	Netherlands	Sweden
'Modern' Islam	64.6	64.7	85.5	57.9	77.1	63.9	89.9
'Political' Islam	11.8	17.2	7.7	27.9	14.3	10.4	5.6

Source: TIES survey 2007-2008

gious beliefs – this is significantly more than among ‘modern’ religious second-generation Turks in Germany.⁵ While both higher- and lower-educated second-generation Turks identify as Muslim, the attraction to ‘political’ Islam is significantly correlated to educational levels. Contrary to the prevalent media image of highly educated second-generation youth being involved in ‘political’ Islam, this type of Islam is noticeably more rooted among the low-educated group members. In Berlin, the city with the highest share of respondents advocating a ‘political’ Islam, almost half (43 per cent) of the early school leavers belong to this group; this was true for 6 per cent of the better educated. The second-largest group was in Vienna, where the figures are 18 per cent for early school leavers and 3 per cent for the higher educated.

A second important factor is the institutionalisation of Islam. In Germany, we found that second-generation Turks whose fathers more often went to the mosque and who were sent to attend Koran school were more often advocates of ‘political’ Islam. But in the Netherlands, we saw a reverse trend. Children of fathers who frequently went to the mosque and who sent them to Koran school were more moderate and less often advocated this strain of Islam. We thus conclude that religious institutions in the two countries have opposite effects. It would be worth investigating why this is so. Could it be a result of the Dutch government’s support and funding of Turkish Islamic organisations, in contrast to Germany’s leaving this almost entirely for the Turkish and the Saudi Arabian governments to do?

Another important component of the public debate on Islam concerns questions of gender equality and sexual freedom. The TIES survey results show that being religious impacts respondents’ opinions on these issues indeed. But we also find incongruity within the religious group itself, particularly in the realm of sexuality. For example, almost half of the ‘modern’ Muslim respondents agreed that it is fine for women to engage in premartial sexual activity under certain circumstances. Questions about gender equality produced a similar pattern. Those who adhere to a ‘modern’ Islam share similar thoughts with their peers of native-born parentage in response to statements such as ‘Education for girls is less important than for boys’ and ‘Women should not be in leading positions over men in the workplace’. The conviction that men and women are equal is firmly rooted within the majority of the second generation – including the large majority of practising Muslims. This does not, however, negate the fact that each country has a group, comprising between 10 and 25 per cent of respondents, holding quite different opinions about women than those held by the majority of city youth overall.⁶ In Switzerland and Sweden, this group is smallest, one reason possibly being that the two countries’ Turkish communities are more diverse than elsewhere: both comprise many Alevites and Christian Turks, who generally show more progressive attitudes.

Germany's large nonreligious group practically holds the same opinions as their comparison group, though they seem to have little influence on their religious peers; Germany's community seems quite polarised, especially in Berlin. In all countries, it is the higher educated who hold the most progressive opinions on these issues. The more conservative views seen in Austria and Germany are an indirect result of their much higher shares of low-educated second-generation Turks.

10.7 The integration of the Turkish second generation in Europe

The overall socio-economic position of the Turkish second generation in Europe is thus perplexing. In terms of immigrant 'success stories', is the glass half full or half empty? Both perspectives could be defended with the data presented above. A considerable group of second-generation Turks occupies a rather marginal position in society, its members being non-active on the labour market, unemployed or stuck in unskilled jobs. They do not show much social mobility relative to their parents. In Germany, the country with the largest Turkish community, this demographic forms about one third of second-generation Turks with low-educated parents. It is this more negative example of integration – or lack thereof – that is often reflected in the media and politics.

However, it can also be argued that the glass is half full. In all seven countries, between half to two thirds of the Turkish second generation occupy a stable lower- to upper-middle-class position. This group has moved considerably high up on the social ladder relative to their parents. Some members have taken a spectacular step in just one generation. This more positive – and, in fact, predominant – picture gets considerably less attention than the more negative one concerning a smaller group.

This book has endeavoured to answer an even more important question than whether the glass is half full or half empty. The TIES results demonstrate that the integration context is paramount here, for the institutional arrangements in the 'receiving society' are what create the very capacity of a group to find its place and position. At the same time, our results show that no one particular integration context is the most favourable for – to go with the metaphor – filling the glass. Across and within the thematic fields covered in this volume, some countries show more favourable results than others. There are a number of institutional arrangements that, in sum, have the potential to merit being labelled 'good practice'. An early start in an educational institution and a late selection between vocational and academic tracks prove crucial for school success. An inclusive apprenticeship system smoothenes the way to working life. Alternative or long routes through the vocational column make it possible to reach higher education at later ages, even for those from more disadvantaged familial starting

positions. Comprehensive school systems are not always more inclusive than stratified systems because they, too, create a bottom category of pupils who has difficulties accessing good labour market positions. Especially for this group, a well-developed apprenticeship system would be valuable. In all countries, unemployment is particularly high among early school leavers; school systems producing high percentages of them also produce high unemployment. At all costs, youth should thus be encouraged to pursue education until they obtain at least a degree above lower secondary education.

Differences in institutional arrangements on the labour market result in varied labour market outcomes. Welfare state arrangements that allow women to combine paid and care work stimulate labour market participation among a group who has traditionally not entered the workforce. But, we also found traces of evidence for a special form of labour market segmentation: second-generation Turks with higher education diplomas have difficulties entering professional jobs. A glass ceiling for children of immigrants now seems visible. The evidence for this is still weak because the second generation is just entering the labour market and it's possible they simply need more time to make a full-on entry. Nonetheless, these first indications – supported by the rapidly rising number of highly educated second-generation Turks looking for jobs in Turkey and other non-EU economies – are alarming because these are students who made it into higher education 'against all odds' (Crul, Zhou, Lee, Schnell & Keskiner 2012). If even *they* feel excluded from local and national labour markets, a potentially powerful negative message is being transmitted to their younger siblings and cousins in the community.

For over 25 years, a main explanatory factor for the low socio-economic status of certain groups of immigrants and their children was the low socio-economic background of their parents and their supposed 'distance from education' (what has been referred to in German as *Bildungsferne*). Our comparison across countries, however, shows that children whose parents share the same socio-economic characteristics and display the same attitudes towards school institutions and education, in general, still show radically different outcomes. Children of low-educated immigrants who are unable to give homework help (much less talk about the importance of school) almost certainly end up as early school leavers in one national context; yet, in another, they make it into higher education by leaps and bounds. This type of contrast evinces the relevance of the integration *context* when seeking explanations for deficits in structural participation.

The most compelling evidence for this is found in the ways that school systems and labour markets select. This should not come as much of a surprise, since young people spend between thirteen and twenty years in education. Institutional arrangements in school and work leave a huge impact, diminishing differences based on group or parental characteristics in

Sweden and France and increasing them in Germany and Austria. Lower-class children of native-born parentage are often affected by this same system logic. However, we found what we called a ‘multiplier effect’. When school system factors, like late start or early selection, work negatively for lower-class children of native-born parentage, they have even more negative effects on children of immigrants. On the flipside, when school systems provide extra opportunities, for example, by offering a long route or ‘second chances’, the second generation profits even more from the facilities than do children of native-born parentage. For the negative effect, the explanations are relatively simple: besides their low education levels, immigrant parents need to bridge language gaps and negotiate unfamiliarity with the local school system. Systems that demand parents provide practical help, guidance and informed choices penalise those children who lack such support. Factors producing the *positive* multiplier effect have been far less studied. We suppose that they are mainly found in immigrants’ and their children’s high aspirations, persistence and sometimes more sensitive awareness of, and appreciation for, life opportunities. Others have labelled this the ‘second generation advantage’ (Kasinitz, Mollenkopf, Waters & Holdaway 2008) and ‘immigrant optimism’ (Kao 2004) – potential resources still lacking sufficient recognition by policymakers, educational practitioners and potential employers.

In terms of social relations and identity, we also identified the influence of the integration context. In general, context has a weaker penetration on the more private indicators (partner choice) and group-based indicators (‘ethno-national’ feelings of belonging) while, in more public domains (inter-ethnic relations and national feelings of belong), context matters more.

Populist parties across Europe have argued that young Muslims place religious beliefs above everything else, with little attachment to the society and nation they were born into and live in. Our results prove contrary, showing that only a minority feels weakly connected to the nation-state and claims religious authority above political authority. Populists and anti-Islamists hold multiculturalism responsible for allowing an activist fundamentalist Islam to flourish in Europe. However, we found the largest group of respondents advocating some sort of ‘political’ Islam in Germany, which is one of the countries with the least developed multicultural policies and lowest level of equal state provisions for mosques and teaching Islam at school. By contrast, in Sweden, the country with the most prominent multicultural policies and welfare state provisions, the group advocating ‘political’ Islam is actually smallest. Second-generation Turks in Germany also most often report religious-based hostility; those in Sweden do so the least. ‘Political’ Islam thus seems to thrive least in a tolerant ‘multiculturalist’ environment.

This TIES evidence is doubly relevant for Europe's debate on integration. First, the national comparison holds a mirror up to each country's performance. We must look to see in which areas countries score well and where they lag behind. Are certain integration problems inherent to particular group characteristics or could different policies (at least partly) prevent them? Secondly, with one of the biggest social engineering projects in history underway – the building of the European Union – successful integration policies become more pertinent. So far, the EU has mostly concentrated its efforts in creating a common migration policy. *Integration* policies have remained the remit of national and local governments. The EU, however, has an example to set. Pressure to adopt good integration practices will only continue to grow in a globalised world where migration is a permanent, omnipresent phenomenon. A demand for sound studies on the integration context will rise the more we see our past failures for what they are and feel the urgency to implement best practices.

10.8 The changing face of European cities

Nowadays, the observation that Western European cities are becoming increasingly diverse compels almost everybody to think of *ethnic* diversity. Metropolises across the continent that each harbour at least 150 nationalities are no longer an exception, but the rule. Religious diversity, with Islam as Europe's most prominent 'new' religion, changes the urban landscape, too. These trends index the presence of the global within the local, i.e. the internationalisation of the city. Alongside these 'new' forms of diversity, cities accommodate older forms of plurality, manifested in heterogeneity across class, age, gender and sexual orientation. The growing diversity in large European cities thus challenges the clearly defined 'mono-ethnic mainstream' once represented by people of 'native white' descent. In the US, many metropolitan areas with a longer history of migration have evolved into 'majority-minority' cities: no single ethnic group – including 'native whites' – can claim a numeric majority anymore. Larger European cities are rapidly moving in the same direction. This has major ramifications for how we understand 'integration'. It poses the question of to what degree, and for how much longer, 'native whites' can be the yardstick for measuring the integration of other ethnic groups?

Demographic change is one important element of the changing face of European cities. Another is the increasing diversification within and among immigrants and their children. The sizable group of successful second-generation members identified in the TIES survey in many aspects resembles the prototypical 'yuppies' of native-born parentage. Something similar occurs at the other end of the social ladder: unemployed early school leavers of native-born parents tend to live their lives more and more among peers

of immigrant origin and have economically, socially and linguistically already begun to resemble – and sometimes emulate – them.

First-generation labour migrants almost always were positioned at the bottom of society. This is no longer true for their native-born children. That fact challenges our ideas about who is well integrated and who is not. According to this volume's education and labour market outcomes, failed integration into an education system is the result of leaving school prematurely. Along these lines, a second-generation Turkish student in higher education is thus better integrated than a student of native origin who only holds a secondary school diploma. The same applies to the labour market. Someone of native-born parentage who does unskilled work on a temporary contract is considered less integrated into the labour market than a second-generation Turkish professional with a fixed contract. The increasing likelihood that ethnic minorities will be hierarchically ranked above 'majority' group members challenges dominant ideas of 'integration problems'. Taking cues from a share of the scientific literature, we are used to defining the children of immigrants as 'well integrated' if and when they occupy similar positions to the children of native-born parents. But then, how do we interpret a situation in which children of immigrants outperform children of native-born parentage at school and/or at work?

Enrolled in the tertiary education institutions that grant Bachelor's degrees in the Dutch survey cities, between one third and half of the students are, according to the latest figures, of immigrant descent. Over the last ten years, their percentage had doubled, resulting in more and more second-generation youth becoming visible in the workforce as managers in commercial businesses, policymakers in the local civic administration and as professionals in the education and health sectors. With the entrance of the second generation into those positions, a gradual shift of power becomes visible. The next generation will reap the fruits, gaining access to crucial network contacts and resources important for succeeding in society. Immigrant parents generally did not have the opportunity to build up well-functioning ties to relations beyond their 'ethnic niches'. This is quickly changing. The successful second generation is now in the position to hire their own staff. We can only imagine that people of native descent who cannot accept being supervised or led by them will themselves experience serious integration problems. A new focus of study vis-à-vis the majority-minority dichotomy would therefore do well to look at individuals from the former majority population who are unable or unwilling to adapt to the transformations taking place.

Another set of interesting questions arises when we extend this type of reasoning to the realm of culture and social relationships. In Europe, the theory of 'multiculturalism' was developed during an era with a still clear-cut majority group. The main question in the multiculturalism debate was if the majority group would or would not grant minority groups certain

rights, despite their cultural differences. In the new majority-of-minorities reality, the *numerical* basis for this hierarchy disappears. Individuals – from a wide variety of ethnicities – will bring beliefs and values to the table that can only be negotiated with other groups, because no group will possess the critical mass or majority status to impose their will onto others. This new cosmopolitan mix of cultural beliefs and values that is part of the city identity will increasingly deviate from the national identity that still incorporates strong ‘mono-ethnic’ elements into its definitional criteria. Locally rooted urban identities prove to offer an alternative that is open to the new diversity of the city. Our research shows that the second generation is more often born and raised in European metropolises than children of native-born parentage. The latter have more often arrived as out-of-towners, students and workers who must adapt to ‘big city life’ and the competences required by a ‘super-diverse’ urban environment (cf. Vertovec 2006). In an acceleratingly mobile existence, ‘world cities’ have gained importance over nation-states. What, therefore, should be the benchmark with which we measure the integration of both second generations and people of native-born parentage? Is it more important to feel a sense of belonging to one’s city of residence or to feel French, German, Turkish, Moroccan, etc.?

In much research, successful integration (also referred to as assimilation and adaptation) is measured through social relationships with people of native parentage. If social relationships are cultivated within one’s own ethnic group, they are deemed ‘failed’ integration; if relationships are cultivated with members of native parentage they show ‘successful’ integration. Can we, however, still take relationships with people of native parentage as the yard stick for integration in such increasingly diverse cities? Among young people in Europe’s major cities, the group of native parentage may still be largest in relative terms, though no longer in absolute terms. In cities like Stockholm, Zurich and Paris, our results revealed that the majority of our respondents’ friendship groups is multi-ethnic. And we can see that the second generation is taking the lead here. They are the ones who more often and more easily cross and blur ethnic boundaries. In this regard, young people of native-born parentage show the most serious ‘integration problems’. More often than any second-generation group, the ‘majority’ seems to be in a mono-ethnic world, inhabiting an impervious parallel to the increasingly diversifying society around them.

Notes

- 1 It should be remembered that the TIES sampling criterion for the ‘Turkish’ group was for respondents to have one or both parents born in the state territory of Turkey. This selection makes no statement whatsoever on the linguistic, religious or identificational backgrounds of the parents.

- 2 For details on educational levels and degrees, see EDU codes in [chapter 5's](#) appendix.
- 3 Brussels and Antwerp are not accounted for because this cluster of questions was not asked in Belgium.
- 4 The two statements – that religion should be a private matter and that Islam is the only and ultimate political authority – do significantly negatively correlate in most countries. In Germany, however, a quarter of those respondents agreeing that religion should be a private matter between a religious person and God simultaneously sees religion as the only and ultimate political authority. This finding, amounting to 25 per cent of the respondents, is more frequent than in the other countries surveyed.
- 5 In general, reports of religiously motivated hostility are much more frequent in Germany than in the other countries; among the other religious respondents, one third reported experiencing them. In the Netherlands, Switzerland and Austria, that share is one in five respondents; in Belgium, one in ten; and in Stockholm, only one in 25.
- 6 In Germany, which shows the highest percentages of agreement with the two statements in the Turkish second generation, we find that one in ten comparison group members in the 18-35 age range also agrees with them. This is much higher than in all other countries.

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