

# Husserl on Depiction

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## Chapter 3

### A Genetic Phenomenological Theory of Image-Consciousness

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Following Husserl's Direction More Than Husserl

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# 3 A Genetic Phenomenological Theory of Image-Consciousness

Following Husserl's Direction More Than Husserl

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## 3.1 Introduction

Two trends have emerged in the scholarly literature concerning Husserl's image theory: the analysis of image-consciousness (*Bildbewusstsein*) and the analysis of phantasy (*Phantasie*).<sup>1</sup> First, there is a tendency to bridge Husserl's image theory with empirical sciences, such as cognitive sciences (Marbach 1993, Jansen 2005) and psychoanalysis (Bernet 2002, Brudzińska 2006). Second, there is an attempt to find commonalities between Husserl's analysis of image-consciousness and Anglo-American aesthetics (Brough 2012, Carreño Cobos 2013, Ijuin 2001, Lotz 2007, Mion 2018, Nanay 2016, Rozzoni 2017, Wiesing 2005). In this chapter, I propose an alternative by clarifying the overall picture of a genetic phenomenological theory of image-consciousness (*Genetische Phänomenologie des Bildbewusstseins*, hereafter GPB). The aim is to understand the conditions and motivations that lead to the experience of image-consciousness. To achieve this, we need to address three main questions:

1. What is the motivation behind Husserl's neutrality modification (*Neutralitätsmodifikation*) in non-aesthetic (or pre-aesthetic) image-consciousness?
2. What is the relationship between image-consciousness and kinaesthetic sensations?
3. How is image-consciousness explained from the perspective of time consciousness?<sup>2</sup>

The key to answering these questions lies in recognizing that image-consciousness, with its threefold structure, is a passive and layered consciousness. This perspective unveils the nature of Husserl's concept of image-consciousness, showing that bodily awareness in image-consciousness is distinct from perceptual bodily awareness and imaginative bodily awareness. The crux of my argument is that within the multi-layered structure of image-consciousness, three types of border crossings occur: Positing/neutrality, cognitive/value, and passive/active.

Given that Husserl never elaborated on genetic phenomenology of image-consciousness, my conception of GPB proposes an alternative path that Husserl could have pursued. Following some introductory considerations (Section 3.1), I outline the basic structure of image-consciousness to substantiate an interpretation of GPB (Section 3.2). I propose that GPB clarifies the basic structure of Husserl's concept of image-consciousness (Section 3.2.1) and explain the three interpretative principles of GPB (Section 3.2.2). Based on these considerations, I present three questions that my account of GPB must answer to prove correct (Section 3.3). I then propose the "as-if I cannot" ("Tch kann nicht also") model to explain the appearance of an image object (Section 3.4). In addition, I anticipate two possible objections to GPB and propose solutions to each of them (Sections 3.5.1 and 3.5.2). In my concluding remarks, I demonstrate that my interpretation of GPB opens rich potential for Husserl's analyses of image-consciousness (Section 3.6).

In this chapter, the term "genetic phenomenology" is broadly construed. Genetic phenomenology refers to an approach that traces the structure of conscious experience to its most fundamental (passive) levels and then investigates the processes of constitution from these foundational levels.<sup>3</sup> Husserl's later analysis, particularly his exploration of constitution at the level of "secondary passivity" (*sekundäre Passivität*) (Husserl 1991b, 19), can be understood as genetic phenomenology in this broad sense. It adopts the perspective of "relative" differentiation between passive and active intentionality inherent in the motivational nexus within the multi-layered structure of consciousness (see Husserl 1991a, § 37–41; 1999, § 23).<sup>4</sup> I define "multi-layered" as a concrete multi-structured experience that includes the temporal structure of the present, with retention (*Retention*) and protention (*Protention*), and the spatial structure, with background consciousness.

## 3.2 The Main Points of GPB

This section is dedicated to exploring the fundamental structure of image-consciousness, which serves as the foundation for the main inquiries of GPB addressed in subsequent sections. It consists of two parts: First, the threefold structure of image-consciousness (Section 3.2.1), and second, an interpretation of passive conflict in image-consciousness (Section 3.2.2).

### 3.2.1 The Threefold Structure of Image-Consciousness

In 1904/5, Husserl distinguished three objectivities of image-consciousness (Husserl 1980, 18–19, 29; 2005, 20–21, 30): The physical image (*das physische Bild*), the image object (*Bildobjekt*), and the image subject (*Bildsujet*). The physical image or the physical thing (*Bildding*) refers to a tangible object, such as a photograph or canvas. The image object emerges in the physical object

and possesses what Husserl refers to as “the depictive function” (*abbildende Funktion*) (Husserl 2005, 21). The image subject (*Bildsujet*) is the represented or depicted object (Husserl 2005, 20–21). For example, consider a photograph of a young child. The photograph as a tangible object constitutes the physical image, the image object is the figure (*Figürchen*), the photographically appearing image of a child, and the image subject is “[the] actual child with red cheeks, blond hair” (Husserl 2005, 21). Husserl describes these three components or “objectivities” (*Gegenständlichkeiten*) as being “interwoven” (“*ineinander gewoben*”) (Husserl 1980, 29; 2005, 30). Consequently, “multiple apprehensions (*Auffassungen*) interpenetrate (*durchdringt*) each other” (Husserl 1980, 82). However, a resemblance and conflict exist between the image object and image subject. Husserl refers to this phenomenon as a double conflict, involving the image object and the physical image (referred to as conf-OP), and the conflict between the image object and image subject (referred to as conf-OS). In one unified experience of image-consciousness, three apprehensions interpenetrate (*durchdringt*) one another in relation to their respective objectivity. The following three features of image-consciousness can be extracted from this observation:

1. Through interpenetration (*Durchdringung*), we can see the subject in the image (*im Bilde*) (see Husserl 2005, 31–33, 89).
2. There is a resemblance (*Ähnlichkeit*) between the image object and image subject.<sup>5</sup>
3. The double conflict (*Widerstreit*) is indispensable for the realization of image-consciousness (Husserl 2005, 55).

For (1), the “interpenetration” underpins the intuitiveness (*Anschaulichkeit*) of image-consciousness (see Husserl 2005, 30–34, 44, 54). For (2), the resemblance is characterized as internal resemblance (*innere Ähnlichkeit*) (see Husserl 1980, 31; 2005, 32), distinguished from external resemblance, as “something attached to the image appearance in a merely external way” (Husserl 2005, 31). The moment of resemblance is responsible for the depictive (*darstellende*) function as the “pictorializing moment” (*verbildlichendes Moment*) (Husserl 1980, 50; 2005, 54). Importantly, Husserl treats “representative” (*repräsentierende*) and “depictive” (*abbildende*) synonymously (Husserl 2005, 21). For (3), and the discussion in Section 3.2.2, it is crucial to conceptualize this conflict as “one double conflict.” From (2) and (3), I contend that resemblance (*Ähnlichkeit*) and conflict (*Widerstreit*) constitute fundamental aspects of image-consciousness.

### **3.2.2 A Double Conflict as Passive Conflict in the Case of Image-Consciousness**

In this subsection, I elucidate three core points regarding the threefold structure presented in Section 3.2.1.

First, I interpret the threefold structure not as an aesthetic pleasure (*ein ästhetisches Gefallen*) which is founded (*fundiert*) (Husserl 1976, 266; 1991b, 7–9; see also Section 3.5.1 and endnote 12), but as a primitive and intuitive underlying awareness. Put simply, image-consciousness occurs spontaneously and not by volition. It is worth noting that Husserl uses terms like “tinction” (*Tinktion*) (Husserl 1980, 26; 2005, 27) and “fuse into” (*verschmelzen*) (Husserl 1980, 46; 2005, 50) to express the intuitiveness of image-consciousness. He also employs “interpenetration” and “interwoven” to explain the fusion occurring through resemblance and conflict.

Second, the moment of resemblance between the image object and image subject implies a primitive resemblance (i.e., similarity in form and color) belonging to the relatively lower layer of consciousness (awareness) as an essential factor contributing to the representative (depictive) function. This is a type of cognitive function that enables us to perceive the image subject in an image object and, thus, is not specific to aesthetic or artistic experiences. This primitive resemblance underpins the intuitiveness of interpenetration that enables us to perceive “something else” (image subject) within the image object (see Husserl 2005, 61, 31, 184–186). Husserl described the core feature of image-consciousness as “the characteristic of representation by means of resemblance, the characteristic of seeing in an image” (*“den Charakter der Repräsentation durch Ähnlichkeit, den Charakter des Schauens im Bild”*) (Husserl 1980, 26; 2005, 28).

Third, although the conflict (*Widerstreit*) can be abstractly distinguished as two conflicts (conf-OP and conf-OS), it essentially constitutes a “double” and “passive conflict,” which is indispensable to primordial and ordinary image-consciousness.<sup>6</sup> Husserl describes the two separately for convenience. He states that the conflict is not two separate conflicts but one “conflict in a double sense” (*“ein Widerstreit in doppelten Sinne”*) (Husserl 2005, 55; Sepp 1996, 2012; Ijuin 2001, 2011). (The discussion in Section 3.5.2 will elucidate the significance of this point.) If we underestimate the dual nature of the conflict, we fail to grasp the intuitiveness of the phenomenon of perceiving something else (image subject) within an image (image object). “Something else” is not here and now, despite being intuitively present.

The core of phenomenological genesis lies in the characteristic of neutrality (“as-if”) in image-consciousness.<sup>7</sup> The close connection (*Zusammenhang*) between conflict and neutrality (“as-if”), as Husserl always emphasized, cannot be explained solely by either conf-OP or conf-OS. Although we can redirect our attention to any of the three objectivities (i.e., physical image, image object, image subject), we cannot distinguish the underlying phenomenon of interpenetration. This is why the threefold structure does not belong to a higher layer of consciousness, but to a lower layer of consciousness (awareness). The interpretation of “passive conflict” has the advantage of being able to clarify the constitutive moment for neutrality modification. Here, we find a primordial form of genetic phenomenology. My interpretations not only enable us

to understand the threefold structure consistently within Husserl's account of image-consciousness, but they also offer clues for exploring the passive constitution of image-consciousness. The passive constitution of image-consciousness – the subject of GPB – becomes apparent only when it is underpinned by the threefold structure.

### **3.3 The Three Questions and Answers to Them**

In this section, I present the three questions along with their corresponding answers to facilitate an understanding of GPB. To reiterate the questions mentioned in Section 3.1:

1. What is the motivation behind Husserl's neutrality modification (*Neutralitätsmodifikation*) in non-aesthetic (or pre-aesthetic) image-consciousness?
2. What is the relationship between image-consciousness and kinaesthetic sensations (*kinästhetische Empfindungen*)?
3. How is image-consciousness explained from the perspective of time consciousness?

GPB's response to Question 1 asserts that in the realm of image-consciousness, neutrality modification is prompted by the appearance of the image object (see Husserl 2005, 694). The primary justification for this response stems from GPB's interpretation of the threefold structure, particularly the concept of "one double conflict" in passive intentionality (as discussed in Sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2). More specifically, the neutrality of image-consciousness does not depend on the voluntary and conscious (free active) change of attitude stemming from aesthetic interest; rather, it is motivated by the appearance of the image object. If we assume that image-consciousness is an aesthetic experience, we may be inclined to seek the phenomenological origin of neutrality solely within the free conscious attitude itself. Although we can switch attention freely to some extent, in such cases, this "free" attitude differs in meaning and scope from the one mentioned earlier. Put simply, there must be a trigger that prompts us to switch our attention. Within the framework of the threefold structure, the appearance of the image object serves as the catalyst for a shift in the direction of the subject's attention (or interest). Our freedom to change our attitude is restricted in such a way that our attention always "returns to the image-object" (Husserl 2005, 40; see Ijuin (2005)). It is crucial for GPB to prove that the appearance of image objects motivates neutrality modification exploring how and to what extent conflict prompts the subject's shift in attention, even in the context of image-consciousness as an aesthetic experience. By using GPB, I investigate the connection between the motivator and the motivated, tracing it back to the underlying non-(or pre-)aesthetic image-consciousness. In

addressing Question 2, GPB elucidates this relationship from the perspective of kinaesthetic motivation.

At the heart of GPB's response to Question 2 lies the notion that the specificity of the appearance of the image object resides in "the fact that the motivations belonging to the constitution of its spatiality are *anomalous*" (Husserl 2005, 581). For Husserl, "motivations" refer to "kinaesthetic motivations" (*kinästhetische Motivationen*) (Husserl 1973, 275), as indicated by his mention of "changes in orientation" (*Orientierungsveränderungen*) (Husserl 1980, 486; 2005, 581) immediately after the quote. "Anomalous" signifies abnormality in comparison to perception, representing the normal abnormality within normal image-consciousness. In the same text quoted above (from 1912), Husserl notes the close nexus between abnormality and the lack of "belief" in the appearance of the image object (Husserl 2005, 584). This "lack of belief" implies the characteristic of neutrality in image-consciousness (Husserl 1976, § 109–111). Note, this "belief" is not a propositional attitude, but a perceptual belief in the existence of objects and the surrounding world. Husserl referred to this as "positing" (*Setzung*).

GPB interprets the passage as Husserl deepening the inner nexus between neutrality and the appearance of an image object, a concept grounded in the threefold structure (Question 1). In other words, GPB explores the relationship between image-consciousness and kinaesthesia from the perspective of the abnormality of kinaesthetic motivation in image-consciousness. The viability of this claim depends on our ability to uphold the fundamental distinction between illusion, which engages positing (*setzende*) consciousness, and image-consciousness, characterized by neutral consciousness, within the domain of "perceptual" (*perzeptive*) appearance. Therefore, it is necessary to clarify whether the distinction between image-consciousness (neutral) and illusion (positing) is maintained when traced back to the dimensions of their respective spatial constitution. While there is variance in kinaesthetic motivation between paintings and wax figures, the comparison between statues and wax figures raises further inquiry (Husserl 2005, 581–589; cf. Ijuin 2016).<sup>8</sup> Husserl consistently sought to distinguish between illusion (positing) and image-consciousness (neutrality) (Husserl 2005, 43–44, 581–589). GPB aims to thoroughly trace the genesis of this distinction. Question 2 thus prompts us to rethink the meaning and scope of the concept of image-consciousness (see Question 3). To achieve this, GPB aims to explore the genesis of the neutrality modification rooted in bodily awareness (kinaesthesia), rather than in the active change of attention. In Section 3.4, I propose an "as-if I cannot" bodily model to substantiate this inquiry.

Question 3 prompts us to inquire about the extent to which the uniqueness of image-consciousness can be preserved when considering the perspective of time consciousness. In essence, it raises the question of whether the concept of image-consciousness maintains its distinction from both perception and phantasy when

examining the lower layers of consciousness (see endnotes 3, 4, and Section 3.1). A clue to answering this question lies in a temporal characterization of “the appearance of a not now *in the now*” (“*Erscheinung eines Nicht-Jetzt im Jetzt*”) (Husserl 1980, 47–48; 2005, 51) in respect to the appearance of the image object. This “not now” does not signify a mode of perception as an actual (*wirklich*) “negation of [the] actual present” (e.g., the past or future); instead, it refers to a “neutralized present,” which is an “as-if present.” Meanwhile, the “now” in “in the now” refers to the actual perceptual present. From the perspective of time consciousness, Husserl asserts that in image-consciousness, there is a boundary crossing between actuality (*Wirklichkeit*) and neutrality (*Neutralität*).

Here, Husserl clearly and descriptively grasps the crossing of a boundary between perception (actual time) and phantasy (as-if time) in image-consciousness. More importantly, this crossover, realized in image-consciousness, represents a crossing of boundaries between realms that are sharply distinguished in his epistemological framework (see Husserl 1976, § 103, § 114; see also Section 3.5.1). This insight highlights the peculiarity and excellence of Husserl’s concept of image-consciousness. However, our challenge lies in understanding how the “simultaneous” coexistence of reality and neutrality (as-if) is achieved as we navigate between the two in the unified experience of image-consciousness. In other words, we need to answer how this crossing is realized in image-consciousness.

The characterization of “the appearance of a not now *in the now*” underpins GPB’s interpretation of the threefold structure and the theory’s direction. It identifies a close nexus between time consciousness (Question 3) and neutrality modification (Questions 1 and 2) as a phenomenon occurring within the dimension of the phenomenological genesis of the image object in appearance. For instance, when investigating the relationship between image-consciousness and habitus, it’s crucial to initially clarify the boundary between perceptual time (actual time) and phantasy time, referred to as as-if time (*Zeit Als-ob*), within the context of habit formation in lived image-consciousness. The process of habits in image-consciousness should be explored by focusing on the crossover between actuality and neutrality.

In short, unlike in the case of phantasy, in the realm of image-consciousness, the oscillation or “boundary crossing” between actuality and neutrality is not entirely controllable. Therefore, the ways in which crossing the border between actuality and neutrality (fictionality) in phantasy and in image-consciousness are formed must also differ.<sup>9</sup> It is here that we need to tread carefully when attempting to apply Husserl’s findings on phantasy – such as ego-splitting in phantasy (Cavallaro 2017) – to GPB. I discuss how the introduction of the concept of “perceptual phantasy” obscures the heart of matter in Section 3.5.

It becomes evident that the threefold structure embodies an uncontrollable crossover between actuality and neutrality in image-consciousness. This prompts us to revisit Question 2; it necessitates an examination of the nature of

the boundary crossing between actuality and neutrality in image-consciousness and the process of habit formation at the level of bodily awareness (kinaesthesia). In the next section, I present a model of bodily consciousness.

### 3.4 The “as-if I cannot” Quasi-Bodily Model

In this section, I present a model of kinaesthesia in image-consciousness to deepen GPB’s answers to the three questions.<sup>10</sup> I have discussed this model in detail elsewhere (Ijuin 2004); therefore, I only outline it in this chapter. I call this quasi-embodiment model the “as-if I cannot model.” In this model, image-consciousness is characterized by a constant dynamic tension between the notion that “I can” act (*Ich kann*) (Husserl 1991b, 253) and the notion that I act “as-if I can.” The former represents the ability of kinaesthesia in the perception of physical objects, while the latter reflects the capacity of “as-if” kinaesthesia in the realm of phantasy.<sup>11</sup> In this tension, ego-splitting occurs between perceptual bodily awareness and imaginative bodily awareness. Consequently, they work together to impose *as-if* (quasi) constraints on bodily experience. This imaginative, yet effective self-restraint, the “as-if I cannot,” is neither voluntary nor conscious. It is an imaginative “quasi-bodilyness” (*Quasi-Leiblichkeit*) peculiar to image-consciousness (cf. Husserl 2004, 351).

The “as-if I cannot” model of our unconscious stance works as follows: I am sitting in my chair, staring at a photo of my dear friend on the desk in front of me. On the desk are volumes of Husserl’s works and a coffee cup. Of course, I can turn the photo upside down, just as I can with the book and cup on my desk. However, I am unconsciously and naturally aware that if I flip the picture over, then this experience, that is, the image-consciousness, will end. Therefore, I will not flip the photo over because I want my current experience to continue. Put simply, I take a different stance toward the photograph than I do toward the books and cups. Moreover, my perception of the cup and my phantasy (e.g., of a centaur) are different. In the case of the former, the ongoing perception cannot be stopped if I turned the coffee cup over. In the case of phantasy, however, it is “as if” I could run up Mt. Everest *at will* with a centaur, regardless of the current states of affairs. In contrast, the image-consciousness body (bodily ego) takes a self-restraint; therefore, in lived experience, we adopt self-restraint without realizing it.

As discussed, image-consciousness is characterized as a unique crossover between perception (positing) and phantasy (neutrality). Based on this characterization, I propose the “as-if I cannot” model, which combines Husserl’s findings regarding both (“I can” and “as-if I can”). The key to linking these two distinct types of kinaesthesia is “self-restraint.” This self-restraint imposes a restriction on a person’s movement and only confines them within the current image-consciousness experience. In other words, this restraint is purely imaginative. One can thus take the imaginative stance of “as-if I cannot.” Although I am

capable of taking an imaginative stance characterized by “as-if” I can move freely, this imaginative stance in fact effectively restrains me, prompting me to behave “as-if I cannot.”

This example may raise the question of whether kinaesthesia in image-consciousness should be characterized as neutral consciousness, essentially equivalent to the total imaginative (phantastic) “as-if I can” in the case of phantasy. The answer is simple: No. After all, as I sit in my chair, I gaze at the photograph with my eyes. I observe the faces of my friends *in* the photograph (*hereinanschauen in dem Bild*). In this regard, it’s important to recall that neutrality modification in image-consciousness is driven by the connection between the appearance of the image object and kinaesthesia (Husserl 2005, No. 17; see Ijuin (2016)). One could also ask: Is “abnormal” kinaesthesia not just perceptual kinaesthesia that corresponds to a mode of perception? Again: No. If this were the case, the distinction between illusionary perception and image-consciousness, in the dimension of kinaesthetic motivation, would not matter at all. This is inconsistent with Husserl’s basic position that maintained a difference between the two. There must be a kinaesthesia specific to image-consciousness that cannot be reduced to either the kinaesthesia of perception or the kinaesthesia of phantasy.

This “as-if I cannot” model provides a clue to understanding the relationship between image-consciousness, the body, and habits. It illuminates unconscious self-restraint in lived experience. The “as-if I cannot” phenomenon is a negative capability of bodily awareness in our ordinary experience. In ordinary image-consciousness, we feel restricted, even though we can move, and do otherwise. This phenomenon, however, does not occur in the case of perception, nor in the case of phantasy.

Therefore, reframing the question of “what image-consciousness is” into the question of “how image-consciousness emerges” and incorporating the “as-if I cannot” model demonstrates the potential for Husserl’s phenomenological theory of image-consciousness.

### **3.5 Objections and Answers**

This section addresses two potential objections. First, it addresses the objection to the accuracy of my interpretation of GPB (Section 3.5.1). Second, it addresses the objection to the uniqueness of GPB (Section 3.5.2).

#### ***3.5.1 The First Possible Objection: Is It an Accurate Presentation of Husserl’s Theory?***

One might argue that GPB does not faithfully represent Husserl’s theory. However, I maintain that it constitutes a rational reconstruction that is carried out with an appropriate conceptual shift, based on a strict textual interpretation

aligning with Husserl's method of analysis. Put simply, GPB is consistent with Husserl's written work and could have been presented by Husserl himself.

While the account I present here is abbreviated (cf. Ijuin 1997, 2001, 2011), I emphasize the crucial change in Husserl's analysis of image-consciousness from a guide for comparative analysis between perception and phantasy toward a guide for phenomenological reduction. Consequently, Husserl came to treat image-consciousness as an aesthetic experience in the search for an affinity between phenomenological reduction (attitude) and aesthetic experience (attitude).<sup>12</sup> The relationship between the appearance of the image object and neutrality in image-consciousness, understood as forming a threefold structure, remained unclear. In this sense, a tension or inconsistency emerges between Husserl's reevaluation of the concept of imagery (*Bildlichkeit*), which he deemed "without depiction" in 1918 (i.e., the introduction of "perceptual phantasy" in the case of theatrical performance) (Husserl 2005, 616ff), and the threefold structure outlined in 1904/5. Consequently, the revision threatens the concept of image-consciousness entirely (Ijuin 2001, 2011). Many researchers acknowledge the tension between Husserl's early and later theories and view this revision in a positive light (Carreño Cobos 2013; Marbach 1980; Sepp 1996; Shum 2015; Rozzoni 2017). However, more attention should be directed toward the issue of compatibility between the revision and the threefold structure. My account of GPB endorses, in general, Husserl's late analysis of genetic phenomenology; however, I want to maintain aspects of his early analysis of image-consciousness (i.e., the threefold structure). GPB attempts to alleviate the tension between the early and late accounts through a rational reconstruction.

GPB explores the development of Husserl's theory of image-consciousness in conjunction with the development of his phenomenology. Therefore, it is not necessary to connect Husserl's theory to other theories, such as "seeing in" (Wollheim 1980) and "make-believe" (Walton 1990), or to Merleau-Ponty's theory of painting (Merleau-Ponty 1964; cf. Ijuin 2001).<sup>13</sup> Husserl's comparative analysis between perception and phantasy from 1904/5 to 1909 leads to a deepening of his analysis of time consciousness. Ultimately, this not only serves as a driving force for genetic phenomenology but also provides the impetus for enhancing the practical and ethical analysis of phenomenology. Unfortunately, Husserl did not revisit the concept of image-consciousness in the perspective of such overall development of his phenomenology.

To anticipate another criticism, one might argue that GPB overlooks the development of Husserl's image theory. As I have previously outlined (Ijuin 2001, 2011), Husserl's revision cannot be immediately regarded as a mature analysis of image-consciousness. This is due to a tension between the revision of his own theory, in which he proposed the image concept without depiction (*Abbildlichkeit*) in 1918 (Husserl 1980, 514–515; Husserl 2005, 616, see Ijuin 2001, 2011), and the threefold structure. If my reading is correct, the neutrality of the threefold structure arises from the neutrality of the appearance of

the image object. However, in the revised theory, the genesis of neutrality in image-consciousness is solely attributed to the attitude of “disinterestedness” (*Interesselosigkeit*) that characterizes aesthetic experience.<sup>14</sup> This is why, from the perspective of GPB, it is not possible to regard the concept of *perzeptive Phantasie* as a mature form of the concept of *Bildbewusstsein*. (Further discussion on this will be provided in Section 3.5.2).

The root of this issue lies in the dual nature of Husserl’s concept of image-consciousness. He does not clearly distinguish between image-consciousness and aesthetic pleasure (*ästhetisches Gefallen*); the latter belongs to aesthetic experience (Husserl 1976, 266; 2005, 461–466). The distinction between value-reception (*Wertnehmung*) and image-consciousness is also ambiguous (Husserl 1991b, 8–11). Put bluntly, he cannot definitively answer the question of whether the concept of image-consciousness pertains to “cognitive experience” or “value experience” (Ijuin 2016). The consideration of the relationship between cognition and value in the development of Husserl’s phenomenology is a critically important theme for current Husserl studies. However, many scholars have not paid enough attention to the importance of this problem.<sup>15</sup> The rational reconstruction of GPB aims to address this issue, analyzing lower consciousness before the distinction between aesthetic and non-aesthetic experiences. It maintains that the threefold structure is the underlying cognitive structure.

### **3.5.2 The Second Possible Objection: Is GPB Really a Unique Approach?**

Some may question the uniqueness of the GPB, asking what is the difference between recent studies published on this topic and GPB? Current research has been centered on Husserl’s mature genetic phenomenological analysis of phantasy that already explains genetic phenomenology concerning image-consciousness. I concede that the concept of “perceptual phantasy” is introduced in the theoretical context of the revision of the content-apprehension schema, along with the distinction between presentation (*Gegenwärtigung*) and representification (*Vergegenwärtigung*) (see Husserl 2005, 323–327). Husserl’s theory of phantasy can also be said to have deepened his theoretical work in general, especially through the analysis of pure phantasy (*reine Phantasie*).

It is well known that the revision (dissolution) of the content-apprehension schema prompted genetic phenomenology. Both Husserl’s analyses of perception and phantasy are oriented toward development of genetic phenomenology. However, it is important to bear in mind that even if the genetic phenomenological analysis of phantasy succeeds, it by no means guarantees the genetic phenomenological analysis of image-consciousness. As illuminated by the threefold structure, the phenomenological origin of neutrality in image-consciousness differs from that found in phantasy. The origin of image-consciousness depends on how the boundary between positing (perception) and neutrality (phantasy) is navigated within consciousness (awareness) at the level

of the appearance of the image object. If the concept of image-consciousness is replaced by the concept of “perceptual phantasy” in Husserl’s mature analyses, determining the phenomenological genesis of this transition becomes challenging.<sup>16</sup>

We should pay attention to the concept of “perceptual phantasy” carefully. Husserl writes, “We then have, specifically, perception [*Perzeption*] and phantasy (imagination) [*Phantasie (Imagination)*] as particular antitheses within intuitiveness” (Husserl 1980, 332; 2005, 404). Here, we should not underestimate the fact that Husserl points out the split (*Kluft*) between *Perzeption* and *Phantasie* (Husserl 1976, 253). The concept of “perceptive Phantasie,” if not oxymoron, risks obscuring the issue itself if we accept it at face value. I do not intend to deny the possibility of this concept; however, if we adopt it, it is necessary to thoroughly investigate its paradoxical aspects from a systematic perspective. If we do not pay enough attention to this problem, it would be difficult to understand the motivator–motivated nexus (*Zusammenhang*) between the appearance of an image object and neutrality modification, as well as the difference between image-consciousness and kinaesthesia. This also constitutes a great loss to the fulfillment of the potential of Husserl’s analysis of image-consciousness.

It might also be suspected that the importance of conflict in the constitution of image-consciousness has already been pointed out, alongside with the importance of the conf-OP (de Warren 2010, Wiesing 1996; also see Section 3.2.2). The theoretical position emphasizing the conflict in image-consciousness can be called the “conflict-theory” (*Widerstreit-Theorie*) (de Warren 2010, Wiesing 1996).<sup>17</sup> (The other theory is the “attitude theory”; see endnote 14.) Unlike the conflict theory, GPB explores the process of how neutrality modification is triggered and motivated by the appearance of image objects, and the role kinaesthesia plays in image-consciousness. The difference between the conflict theory and GPB appears to lie in an interpretation of Husserl’s theory of conflict. To illustrate this point, I critically evaluate de Warren’s (2010) argument. I chose de Warren (2010) because, unlike other scholars (such as Wiesing (2005)), he utilizes the potential of Husserl’s text and explores Husserl’s analysis of the threefold structure with a broad research scope.

De Warren primarily deals with the conflict between the image object and the physical image, that is, conf-OP, and not the double conflict as passive conflict detailed in this chapter (see Sections 3.2.1, 3.2.2, and 3.5.2). Abstractly decoupled conflicts cannot explain how image-consciousness is formed. A separated conf-OP or conf-OS cannot constitute a phenomenon of the appearance of the image object. According to Husserl, a double conflict and resemblance (between the image object and the subject) intertwine to support the interpenetration and appearance of the image object, thereby constituting image-consciousness.

Furthermore, although de Warren correctly understands that “[Image] Consciousness is ‘doubled,’ in conflict with itself” (de Warren 2010, 326), he does not show that this duplication is only possible if conflict proceeds passively. Therefore, to understand how this duality contributes to the constitution of image-consciousness, it is necessary to interpret the threefold structure as a lower dimensional phenomenon (e.g., “passive conflict”). De Warren’s interpretation of conflict does not clarify how conflict constitutes the neutrality (as-if) of image-consciousness in the threefold structure. Moreover, de Warren does not mention the tension between the threefold structure and Husserl’s later revision of image-consciousness and fails to see the inconsistency between the two. De Warren may also regard the introduction of “perceptual phantasy” (*perzeptive phantasie*) as the maturation of Husserl’s image theory, although this does not cohere with the requirement of the double conflict. Considering the limitations of de Warren’s account, the concept of “perceptive phantasy” should not be regarded favorably as the matured form of image-consciousness, as demonstrated in Section 3.5.1.

### **3.6 Concluding Remarks**

I conclude this chapter by briefly summarizing my arguments and outlining the prospects of GPB. I utilize GPB to interpret the threefold structure as belonging to the lower layer of consciousness, occurring prior to aesthetic and non-aesthetic image-consciousness. My account of GPB maintains that the origin of image-consciousness is not attributed to a change in the subject’s conscious attitude. Instead, it is demonstrated by the appearance of the image object and how the lower consciousness enabling this appearance motivates the neutrality modification. This is achieved by tracing the phenomenon back to the underlying layers of consciousness. GPB thus paves the way for research to illuminate the underlying consciousness preceding the dualism of cognition/value by applying the “as-if I cannot model,” that is, a quasi-bodily model. Since GPB inherits the perspective of Husserl’s investigation of the specificity of image-consciousness, particularly the comparison between perception and phantasy, it also addresses the question of how it is possible to overcome the fundamental distinction between positional perception and neutrality in the unified consciousness of image-consciousness. Finally, I believe that GPB has further prospects in enhancing the phenomenology of creativity in line with the overarching development of Husserl’s phenomenology. In this chapter, I pointed out three types of border crossing – positing/neutrality, cognitive/value, and passive/active – that can be used to investigate the commonalities between image-consciousness and creativity.<sup>18</sup> By clarifying these borders, my account of GPB shows that Husserl’s analysis of images deepens the phenomenology of creativity. In other words, it shows the real possibility of fiction in the threefold structure as passive consciousness.<sup>19</sup>

## Notes

- 1 Husserl's "image theory" often includes both his theory of phantasy (*Phantasie*) and that of image-consciousness (*Bildbewusstsein*). The purpose of this study is to distinguish the two. The situation becomes more intricate concerning Husserl's term "imagination (*Imagination*).<sup>2</sup> In his 1904/5 lecture, Husserl asked whether phantasy can be regarded as a kind of image-consciousness that is equal to genuine imagination. However, from 1912 onward, Husserl primarily considered phantasy, rather than image-consciousness, as genuine imagination, focusing on the analysis of intuitive consciousness and the contrast between perception and phantasy.
- 2 These questions grow out of my previous work (Ijuin 2011). In this chapter, I aim to explicate and deepen the theory of GPB, which I first proposed in a Japanese-language work in 2001 (Ijuin 2001) and later expounded upon in a German paper in 2011 (Ijuin 2011).
- 3 In the narrow sense, genetic phenomenology often emphasizes the historicity of experience as opposed to static phenomenology, which focuses on the essential structure of consciousness as already constituted.
- 4 Husserl sees the distinction between active and passive intentionality as flexible (see Husserl 1966, 1991a, 1999).
- 5 I interpret resemblance (*Ähnlichkeit*)—"primitive resemblances (*primitive[n] Ähnlichkeit[en]*)" (Husserl 1980, 56; 2005, 61) in shape and color—as "similarity." Therefore, it may be more appropriate to use "similarity," rather than "resemblance" (see Ijuin 2001).
- 6 Hans Rainer Sepp interpreted the change in Husserl's theory of image as a change in emphasis from conf-OP to conf-OS (Sepp 1996). Later, Sepp clarified that the conflict should be regarded as a "passive" one, citing my paper and interpretation in this regard (Sepp 2012; Ijuin 2011).
- 7 In this chapter, I leave aside the question of distinction between "neutrality modification" and "as-if modification" (*Als-ob-Modifikation*) and treat them synonymously. Husserl often uses the terms "as-if," "quasi-," and "neutral" interchangeably.
- 8 According to Husserl, kinaesthesia is constitutive for spatiality in external (material) perception, thereby underpinning the consciousness of the reality of perception. However, as discussed in Section 3.4, Husserl suggests that the motivation for the constitution of spatiality in image-consciousness is anomalous. Recognizing the image-consciousness of a three-dimensional statue or the illusion of a wax doll is challenging because we must distinguish between the meaning of abnormality and normality regarding the constitution of spatiality. Although Husserl himself does not directly address this question, he grapples with the difficulty of determining the scope of the image-consciousness concept from this bodily dimension, in Husserl (2005, No. 17) (see Section 3.5.1).
- 9 If the essential difference between image-consciousness and phantasy is also valid for the lower passive layers of consciousness, I believe, it must be explored as a difference in the ego's habit formation, relating to both active and passive consciousness.
- 10 I learned during the draft stage that Bois and Fazakas discuss the bodily dimension of constitutive spatiality in the image (proposing the notion of "kinaesthetic rhythm") (Bois and Fazakas 2020). However, in doing so, they do not enter the exploration

of the problems inherent in Husserl's concept of image-consciousness, which are important to GPB (e.g., whether "image-consciousness" is replaced by non-depictive "perceptual phantasy"). They limit the scope of their discussion to specific types of images, which are related to figurative graphic arts. Moreover, the "as-if I cannot model" of the bodily dimension of image-consciousness discussed in this section complements the "conflict-rhythm" model of image-consciousness that I presented in another paper (Ijuin 2005).

- 11 Husserl's posthumous manuscripts (Husserl 2008) were published after I first presented this model (Ijuin 2004) and contain fragmentary descriptions of the kinaesthesia of phantasy. I will discuss how the recently published manuscripts support the correctness of GPB's direction in my forthcoming book, "*Das Bild und Flächen-Konstitution II (Zou to heimenkousei II) [Image and plane Constitution II]*."
- 12 When he introduced the method of phenomenological reduction, he was relying on this characterization (Husserl 2005, 519ff, 616ff; Ijuin 1997). For Husserl's view of art, see also Ijuin (2001).
- 13 This does not void GPB's potential to provide a useful perspective to productively bridge Husserl with Wollheim and others.
- 14 I call the position "attitude theory" (*Stellungnahme Theorie*) (e.g., Brough 2011, Ferencz-Flatz 2009, Marbach 1980, Sepp 1996), which finds the source of its neutrality of image-consciousness exclusively in aesthetic attitude. The "attitude theory" is contrasted with the "conflict theory" (see Section 3.5.2 and endnote 17).
- 15 This problem is closely related to the change in the relationship between objectifying and non-objectifying acts (Melle 1990). Yoshikawa characterized Husserl's later development of phenomenology as the "ethical turn" (Yoshikawa 2011; cf. Ijuin 2016).
- 16 The "passive conflict" with reality in "perceptual phantasy" (Husserl 2005, 612) should be distinguished from the "passive conflict" in image-consciousness, as perceptual phantasy lacks a "depictive function" in terms of its motivation for neutrality modification. The question of whether theater experience can be considered a typical example of image-consciousness experience is discussed in detail in another paper (Ijuin 2015).
- 17 For instance, Wiesing emphasizes the "conflict" in image-consciousness. However, as Ferencz-Flatz (2009) notes, Wiesing's conception of conflict does not adequately account for the difference between the conflict in the case of image-consciousness and illusion (Ijuin 2001). Wiesing appears to have pursued an account of image studies (*Bildwissenschaft*) that does not closely follow Husserl's philosophy. Although Brough (2012) has noted "the physical support," (Brough 2012, 547) and, if I understand him correctly, suggests the importance of the conflict between the physical image and the image object, he mainly emphasized the affinity between image-consciousness with aesthetic attitudes and phenomenological attitudes (Brough 2011). With that being said, Brough discusses this issue in separate contexts.
- 18 In my forthcoming book, *Das Bild und Flächen-Konstitution II*, I am currently working on a rational reconstruction of Husserl's phenomenology of creativity from the perspective of GPB.
- 19 I would like to thank all of the editors of this book, especially Dr. Mion, for the invitation to participate in this landmark project and her helpful comments to my earlier draft. I would also like to thank Professor Sepp for our insightful discussions and for providing me with opportunities to present my work.

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