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Continuity and Change in the Historiography of Contemporary Japan

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Nation-State and Progressivism (1945–Present)

Odanaka Naoki

This chapter aims to survey historiographical development in contemporary Japan, paying attention to changes in the ideas of history spanning the period from the end of World War II (1945) to the present, namely the contemporary period. We focus on two concepts or entities, "nation-state" and "progressivism," in unfolding our discussion.[1]

Nation-state here refers to a state that sought to unite its inhabitants by giving them a common identity as a "nation" to fulfill the task of catching up with the leading state, the UK since the 19th century, which had become a political, economic, and military superpower as a result of the Industrial Revolution that commenced as early as the eighteenth century and was completed in the nineteenth century. This task is referred to as "modernization" in this chapter, and a nation is defined as a fictionalized community based on a "shared given identity," created for modernization. Progressivism refers to the stance that history is a process of progress; here "progress" refers to situations wherein the present is better than the past and the future is better than the present.

This chapter focuses on the nation-state because historians in contemporary Japan have either written about the establishment and consolidation of the nation-state or criticized and opposed it. Historical description or the stance of narrating the history of a nation-state to contribute to its establishment and consolidation is called "national history." Using this terminology, the historiography of contemporary Japan can be plotted on the axis of affirming or denying national history. This chapter focuses on progressivism because, until the 1960s, the various currents of Japanese historiography shared some form of progressivism that viewed history as a process of progress. Since then, historiography has oscillated between two stances toward progressivism: criticism or negligence and conscious or unconscious affirmation.

Moreover, the nation-state and progressivism did not emerge independently. First, both were products of the nineteenth century. Of course, the origin of the nation-state can be traced back to earlier periods, such as eighteenth-century UK, whereas the germ of progressivism can be found in the seventeenth-century Enlightenment. However, it was not until the nineteenth century that the two became widely popular and permeated people's mindsets. Behind this was the aforementioned policy of catching up to the UK in modernization, and the development of science, especially natural science, was a tool to achieve this goal. It is no coincidence that Johann Fichte, who delivered a series of lectures titled "To the German Nation" in Berlin in 1807 that preached the necessity of building a German nation-state at a time when there was none, was appointed three years later as

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the first president of the university founded in the same city. If the nation-state was the mobilizing framework required to catch up to and overtake UK, the natural sciences were the means to that end, to be developed "from top-down." In the latter half of the century, the rapid top-down development of natural science in the German states (later Germany) and other Western countries instilled the belief in history being progressive, that is to say, the notion of progressivism, in the common people. Thus, the nation-state and progressivism became linked in the sense that "the nation-state is the bearer of progress."

In this chapter, we analyze the Japanese historiography of three chronological periods in terms of its stance toward the nation-state and progressivism. The period from the opening of Japan to the world with the arrival of the black ships (1853) to World War II (1939–1945), when the prototype of contemporary Japanese historiography was formed, is considered the "prehistory" in this chapter, during which Japanese historians viewed both the nation-state and progressivism positively. The first period refers to the time from the end of World War II (1945) to *Anpo Tōsō* 安保闘争, the mass movement against the renewal of the Japan–US Security Treaty, in 1960. During that period, too, the nation-state and progressivism were viewed in a fundamentally positive light, while transitioning from "Empire of Japan" to "Japan." The second period extended from the end of *Anpo Tōsō*. During this period, both the nation-state and progressivism gradually became objects of suspicion and criticism. The third period is from the end of the Cold War to the present, wherein historians seek alternatives to the nation-state and progressivism as concepts and realities that can serve as the basis for historiography and ideas of history.

Prewar Period as Prehistory (1853–1945)

It is well-known that the arrival of the black ships, or the US East India Fleet, led by Commodore Matthew Perry, in Edo Bay, was the catalyst for Japan's modernization. However, some people, including the upper echelons of the Tokugawa shogunate, had already been informed of the UK's victory and Qing China's defeat in the Opium War (1839–1842). As a neighbor of great power, China's defeat was a shock. The arrival of the black ships made the situation worse.

Thus began a serious examination by some politicians and intellectuals of how and why UK and United States had come to be such powerful military powers. This consideration began with research and understanding of the present status of these Western countries but eventually shifted to their "history." Fukuzawa Yukichi 福沢諭吉, the greatest opinion leader of the Meiji period, published his book *Seiyō Jijō* 西洋事情 (Western Situations) just before the Meiji Restoration, wherein he analyzed and introduced the current situation in Western countries. In its preface he wrote, "in order to know the political customs of each country, it is no better than to read its history," clearly stating his position that the differences between Japan and Western countries were the result of their respective histories.[2]

This interest in history was the product of three elements that arose from a sense of crisis and fear of Japanese colonization, fostered by the *de facto* colonization of China following the Opium War. First, the perception of a "hierarchy consisting of the West as the advanced nations, and the East, or Japan and China, as the backward ones." Second, the historical view that "a lagging region needs modernization to become an advanced region." Third, the policy issue of "catching up, or modernization, as a means of avoiding being colonized and the necessity of nation-state building as a precondition for such advancement." Of course, Japan could not remain in the "East" forever, but needed to become a member of the "West" through modernization. In the report titled "Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the United States and Europe," the so-called Iwakura Mission (1871–1873), which included most of the key figures of the new government established

after the Meiji Restoration, adopted the trichotomy of "the advanced West, the lagging South, and the in-between East," and presented a recognition of Japan's current status—or rather, its desire to rise from the "South" toward the "West."[3] In his newspaper article "Datsua Ron" 脱亜論 (Out of Asia) published in 1885, over a decade after the Meiji Restoration, Fukuzawa also wrote, "the spirit of the Japanese people has already broken out of the perverse Asia and has come to Western civilization," whereas Korea and China, both in the East,

> are no different from a hundred thousand years ago in their love for the old customs and manners. . . . In the current trend of Eastern civilization, there is no way to maintain their independence. We have to say Goodbye to our Eastern friends: We have to go out of Asia.

He clearly recognized the situation that Japan was taking the step toward the "West" by building a nation-state in a hierarchy consisting of "the lagging East and the advancing West." In other words, Japan was modernizing:[4] a true declaration of "moving away from Asia into Europe," and it is easy to see the progressivist view of history behind it.

To a large extent, the government shared a similar view of history. To catch up with Western countries through modernization, the government established institutions of higher education, namely universities, as receptacles for "importing" Western institutions, science, and technology. As a part of this effort, in 1887, Ludwig Riess, a distant disciple of Leopold von Ranke, the father of academic history, was invited to teach Western history at the Imperial University (later the University of Tokyo). The establishment of the Departments of History (1889) and National History (1889), the merger of the two departments (1904), and the establishment of three sections in the Department of History (National History, Eastern History, and Western History) completed the framework for history education, a tripartite system that was rarely seen in the rest of the world yet still exists in Japan today.[5]

For Japan, in continually "moving away from Asia toward Europe" after the Sino-Japanese (1894–1895) and the Russo-Japanese wars (1904–1905), these three historical fields each had distinctive goals. National History was to chart the progress of Japan as a modernizing nation-state; Eastern History explored the causes for delays in the regions that Japan, or the "West in the East," ought to colonize or dominate; and Western History was to study the secrets of success of its former ideals and present-day colleagues, the Western empires. The "East, Japan, and the West" was not only a model of geographical division of the world but a framework of geo-historical understanding based on the dynamic hierarchy of "the East below, the West above, and Japan rising (or supposedly rising) between the two." As a framework for global consciousness, it became a popular concept not only for the government but also among the general public.

The situation was no different for Marxist thought and historiography imported into Japan at the beginning of the twentieth century. For example, Noro Eitarō 野呂榮太郎, in his first full-scale general history of the Japanese economy, based on the Marxist view of history, presented the following rough outline of the history of the production system. The dominant system in ancient Japan were the clans, wherein land was privately owned by the clan (a blood group) and cultivated by slaves. Following the Taika Reform (645), this system was replaced by a feudal one wherein peasants, who were initially serfs, cultivated land in manors comprising land privately owned by the lords. The feudal system was maintained for more than 1000 years and abandoned with the Meiji Restoration, a form of civil revolution (bourgeois revolution). The Meiji government granted freedom of migration, occupation, and contracts, and capitalism was established, wherein capitalists privately owned the means of production, such as farms and factories, and allowed workers to work there. Noro then declared, "Now the only solution

to all contradictions is revolution," and looked beyond capitalism to the advent of a socialist production system.

It goes without saying that this picture was based on the historical periodization presented by Karl Marx: slavery, feudalism, capitalism (later monopoly capitalism, finance capitalism, state monopoly capitalism, or imperialism), and socialism.[6] Granted, Noro did not overlook the fact that the capitalism established after the Meiji Restoration was a special kind with "absolute despotic forces" as the political ruling class. However, he attributed this to the Meiji Restoration, Japan's civil revolution, being incomplete. The historical periodization should be "slavery, feudalism, capitalism, and socialism," and this development should be seen as progress from the former, a lagging system of production, to the latter, an advanced system, especially socialism. His view of history was also progressivist.

Moreover, he was not without a global perspective, evident in his citation of "the turn of world capitalism into imperialism" as one of the origins of the insufficiency of the civil revolution that brought about the peculiarity of Japanese capitalism. For Noro, a Marxist, the "nation" as a community was always divided into ruling and ruled classes, and the "state" was the site of struggle between the two. In this sense, he cannot be considered as an advocate of nation-state building. However, his interest in the state of world capitalism eventually led him to discuss the possibility of a socialist revolution in a country, namely Japan. He considered the actor who could drive progress from the clan system to socialism as nobody but "Japan,"[7] This may have been a natural choice for Noro, an activist who devoted his life to the possibility of a socialist revolution in Japan.[8]

However, Noro's hope remained unfulfilled, as Japan had already begun its invasion of Manchuria with the Mukden Incident (1931) and suppressed all anti-government and non-governmental ideas and movements, ranging from socialism to liberalism. In the historical community, Fukuzawa's lineage and Marxist historiography were both forced into silence, and academic historiography stalled. What remained was the *Kōkoku Shikan* 皇国史観 (imperial view of history), a seemingly ultraprogressive but in fact anti-progressive stance that advocated *Kindai no Chokoku* 近代の超克 (overcoming modernity), aiming to create and narrate the miraculous history of imperial Japan.[9] Thus, the *Kōkoku Shikan* swept Japan's historical academy through the entire World War II period.

From Defeat to *Anpo Tōsō* (1945–1960)

On September 2, 1945, on the deck of the USS *Missouri* in Tokyo Bay, Japan signed Instrument of Surrender, thus ending World War II. The victorious Allied Forces demanded that Japan, as a nation-state that had abandoned its colonies, once again pursue modernization, including democratization. Almost a century after the arrival of the Black Ships in Edo Bay, now Tokyo Bay, what would later be called the "second opening of the country to the world" began.

This situation impacted the historical academy as well. The *Kōkoku Shikan* disappeared, branded as either "reactionary" or "mythical," and Marxist historiography, which had been suppressed, was restored to new heights. In the period of confusion and poverty that immediately followed the war, Marxist historiography attracted many people by advocating two themes: progressivism, which argued that history was progressing (or had to progress) from capitalism to socialism; and class struggle theory, which holds that progress is achieved through the opposition of the ruled classes, such as peasants and wage laborers, to the ruling classes, including the capitalists. Marxist historiography defined the *Kōkoku Shikan* as a myth or "non-science" and called itself "science," claiming superiority over it. According to Marxist historians, the transition from

slavery (the clan system in Japan) to feudalism, capitalism, and socialism was a "law," and finding evidence of it in history made the Marxist historiography a science.[10]

Marxist historiography has several shortcomings—or rather, blind spots. One is the question of how peasant farmers, wage laborers, and other members of the ruled class, who are responsible for the transition from capitalism to socialism in postwar Japan, can gain consciousness of themselves as "bearers of the transition." In fact, the question of consciousness was beyond the grasp of the majority of Marxist historians. In the popular understanding of Marxist thought, "the base (economic factors such as the production system) determines the superstructure (mental factors such as consciousness and ideology)," and therefore, it is thought that the state of consciousness can be automatically determined by economic factors. Thus, there is an excess of economic research and dearth of superstructural research in Marxist historiography.

However, is the relationship between superstructure and base uniquely determined? Evidently, looking back at history or our surroundings, this is not possible. This question gave rise to a research trend that recognizes a certain independence and autonomy in superstructures and explores the relationship between the two. In the historical community, this trend was represented by Ōtsuka Hisao 大塚久雄, a specialist in UK economic history, and those who shared his problematics called *Hikaku Keizaishi Gakuha* 比較経済史学派 (Comparative Economic History School). Inspired by Max Weber's concept of "elective affinity," Otsuka argued that people's religious consciousness played a part in determining their economic behavior. His thesis, as well as that of *Hikaku Keizaishi Gakuha*, were accepted by those who sought economic recovery and democratization or modernization, and exerted a broad social influence. The academic and social influence of *Hikaku Keizaishi Gakuha* persisted throughout the 1960s.[11]

It should be noted that the Marxist historiography and *Hikaku Keizaishi Gakuha*, which led the historical academy for some time after the war, shared much of the nation-state framework and the progressivist view of history and, in that sense, did not differ from many other historical trends since the opening of the country.

In the former case, Marxist historians saw the postwar situation in Japan as an opportunity for progress, or "the transition from capitalism to socialism," according to the law of history, and some contributed research to this progress. Progressivism is evident here. For many Marxist historians who subscribed to the class-struggle view of history, the attribute of "nation" was to be avoided as an entity because it masked the conflict between the ruling and the ruled classes; however, the "state" was implicitly assumed as a unit where socialism should be established.[12]

In contrast, historians of *Hikaku Keizaishi Gakuha*, such as Ōtsuka, viewed postwar Japan's modernization, including economic recovery and democratization, as progress, and explored history and made social statements to promote this progress in Japan. For them who did not necessarily adopt a class-struggle view of history, the bearer of modernization was the "nation," and the role of the "state" was to mobilize all the people in the direction of modernization. Furthermore, they considered that what should be modernized was "Japan" as a space, namely the state. This is a typical stance of the nation-state framework of thought.

Not all historians at the time shared a stance emphasizing the nation-state and progressivism. In this regard, we should first focus on the writings of Eguchi Bokurō 江口朴郎, a specialist in contemporary history who took the position of Marxist historiography. As early as 1950, he argued that history should be viewed globally, stating that "there is emerging a new kind of interaction of the capitalist world as a whole, distinct from the development of capitalism in each region." Eguchi took this stance because he viewed capitalism at that time as global "imperialism."[13] Another scholar who deserves special attention is Takeuchi Yoshimi 竹内好. Takeuchi's lifework was to compared modernity and modernization in Japan

and China. He argued for two types of modernization in the East: "In China, even counter-revolution was transformed into revolutionary energy," whereas "Japanese modern history was a repetition of a type in which the energy of revolution was transformed exactly into counterrevolution." He even wrote, following John Dewey, that "China succeeded in modernization and Japan failed." Behind this recognition was the historical understanding that Japan's modernization had led to imperialism before World War II and involuntary democratization after the war, whereas China's modernization resulted in resistance to colonization and independence of its own accord.[14] This was a fundamental critique of the progressive view of history, which was based on the hierarchy of "the East, the Westernizing Japan, and the West," and had a profound impact on the historical community, especially in the fields of Eastern and Japanese history.

From *Anpo Tōsō* to the End of the Cold War (1960–1989)

In 1960, a mass movement arose in Japan against the revision of the Japan–-US Security Treaty, the largest mass resistance in the postwar period. However, the movement, *Anpo Tōsō*, ended in defeat, and the new cabinet of Ikeda Hayato 池田勇人 as prime minister gained broad support from the people with its *Shotoku Baizo Keikaku* 所得倍増計画 (income-doubling plan). Thus began the "era of economic boom," and the Japanese economy experienced full-fledged rapid growth accompanied by accelerated modernization in various aspects of society, including urbanization, popularization of middle and higher education, and the emergence of a large new middle class. These developments reinforced confidence in the nation-state and progressivism. However, the acceleration of modernization also meant the appearance of its side effects, such as pollution and token democracy, accompanied by skepticism about the nation-state and progressivism.

In the late 1960s, based on the intellectual foundation laid by predecessors in the historical field, such as the aforementioned Eguchi and Takeuchi, a historiography emerged whose basic stance was skeptical and critical of the nation-state and progressivism. First, faced with a situation wherein the Diet forcibly passed a revision of the Japan–US Security Treaty against the will of most Japanese people, and wherein public opinion rapidly became depoliticized with talk of an "era of economic boom," Japanese historians began to address the questions of whether the modernization of Japan since the opening of the country had followed the appropriate path, whether there were signs of another modernization, and if there were none, why this was. They called those who could have been the bearers of another modernization *minshū* 民衆 (the people), and began to explore their consciousness, thoughts, and actions. This research trend is called *minshūshi* 民衆史 (people's history). The distinctive feature of *minshūshi* is that it did not define the ruled class based on their position in the production system, such as wage laborers or peasants, but on their status in society and politics, calling them *minshū* and analyzing their consciousness and ideas. This was an attempt to succeed Marxist historiography in terms of its emphasis on the dominant-subordinate relationship and to overcome its weakness of focusing on the base.[15]

For example, Yasumaru Yoshio 安丸良夫, a leading scholar of *minshūshi*, noted that the vast majority of Japanese people lived their lives by acquiring everyday norms such as diligence, thrift, modesty, and filial piety, either voluntarily or autonomously, and considered them as self-evident. Yasumaru called these norms *Tsūzoku Dōtoku* 通俗道徳 (conventional morality), and argued that they "motivated people toward intense self-discipline, which in turn gave rise to the illusion that all difficulties could be resolved through self-transformation and discipline.

This illusion gave the objective world less importance as an object of inquiry and made it extremely difficult to see through the machinations of the state and the ruling class." He further stated that while "the success of modernization and capitalism from above" was the "larger historical framework" for the establishment of the conventional morality, "the success of the conventional moral-type movement was an absolute condition for supporting modernization and capitalization from above at the popular level." In summary, a complementary relationship exists between the two. However, Yasumaru pointed out the existence of opportunities to break this complementary relationship loop in the peasant revolts of the Edo period and some folk religions, such as Maruyama-kyō 丸山教, and saw in them the possibility of another kind of modernization with *minshū* as bearers.[16] Irokawa Daikichi 色川大吉, focusing on the people's movement aspect of *Jiyū Minken Undō* 自由民権運動 (Freedom and People's Rights Movement), a social and political reform movement in the early Meiji period, argued that "the underground river of the Freedom and People's Rights Movement flowed as a historical undercurrent," and presented four undercurrents: frustration, nationalism, demands for civil liberties, and anti-establishment thought.[17]

The *minshūshi* trend represented by Yasumaru and Irokawa investigated the history of counterculture; they explored the possibility of another modernization, against the mainstream and popular trend of "high economic growth equals modernization" of the 1960s and the "100th anniversary of the Meiji Restoration" in 1968.

The late 1960s, when the study of *minshūshi* flourished, was truly an "age of counterculture," characterized by the emergence of baby boomers as college students and social actors. Some went on to graduate school to become researchers of history and rejected the research outcomes and styles of the preceding generation. This generational shift signaled the emergence of a "counterculture" in the historical field.

Perhaps the most vivid expression of this shift was the 1972 launch of the journal *Shakai Undō Shi* 社会運動史 (History of Social Movements). It was published as a coterie journal of *Shakai Undō Shi Kenkyūkai* 社会運動史研究会 (Society for Social Movement History), the core of which comprised young historians born in the 1940s who had studied Western history in graduate school or had just begun their careers as faculty members at various universities. Until the publication of the tenth and final volume in 1985, *Shakai Undō Shi* served as a meeting ground for the counterculture to the establishment of the historical academy, which comprised members of the preceding generation.[18]

A characteristic of historians who gathered around *Shakai Undō Shi Kenkyūkai* was that they referred to the various movements in which the people, wage workers, and other members of the ruled class in society were actors of "social movements," and foregrounded the autonomy of such movements as spontaneously emerging from the "world of labor." This implies that the emphasis on the domination-subordination relationship in society was inherited from Marxist historiography. On the other hand, the emphasis on the autonomy of social movements implied criticism of Marxist historiography, which tended to lean toward a theory wherein activists who understood Marxism would lead the ruled class.

The student uprisings or youth revolts that broke out simultaneously in various parts of the world in 1968 were motivated, in part, by the concern and criticism that ongoing modernization was leading to a controlled and disciplined society. Most of the young historians who gathered around *Shakai Undō Shi Kenkyūkai* shared this concern and criticism and participated in the so-called "Daigaku Funsō" 大学紛争 (University Conflict) that erupted in Japan in 1968. For them, not only the ruling class but also Marxist activists calling for the overthrow of the existing ruling class stood on the side of discipline and control insofar as they called themselves leaders of

the ruled classes in the social movement. The same was true of Marxist historians who embraced Marxism, which promotes guidance and subjugation, and constituted the establishment of the historical community.

However, as they grew older, the historians associated with *Shakai Undō Shi* also constituted the leading members of historical community. This may seem, at first glance, an irony of history; however, to some extent, it was a natural consequence. Many were graduates of the Faculty of Letters, University of Tokyo, considered the echelon of the academic community of historical study in Japan.

In the 1970s, new trends from historical communities around the world, such as the *Annales* school (France), labor history (UK), social structure history (Germany), and world-system theory (United States), swept across Japan. Among these, the *Annales* school and world-system theory had the greatest impact on Japanese historiography.

First, the *Annales* school can be divided into several generations, of which the third generation of historians, who formed their scholarship at the intellectual crossroads with cultural anthropology, were accepted in Japan. Representative historians include Maurice Agulhon, Robert Mandrou, Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie, and Jacques Le Goff, who approached the history of people's daily lives using concepts such as "sociability" and "mentality."

Ninomiya Hiroyuki 二宮宏之, a specialist in French history, was instrumental in introducing their work in Japan.[19] During the 1960s, Ninomiya studied in Paris for an extended period, where he had close contact with third generation of *Annales* school historians. In the mid-1970s, after his return to Japan, he began actively introducing the research achievements of the *Annales* school, particularly those of the third generation. This research, along with labor and social structure history, would later be called *Shakaishi* 社会史 (social history). Ninomiya published a journal called *Shakaishi Kenkyū* 社会史研究 (Journal of Social History) and supervised a *Shakaishi* book collection to popularize the subject. *Shakaishi*, which clarified the food, clothing, housing, human relations, time-space consciousness, or family structure of ordinary people in history, transcended the historical academic world and attracted the interest of the general public, triggering a phenomenon known as the "*Shakaishi* boom."[20]

The characteristic stance of the third generation of the *Annales* school, influenced by cultural anthropology, was to focus on the "unchanging" rather than the "changing," and on the "synchronic" rather than the "diachronic." As people's daily lives do not change rapidly and drastically, this stance was the opposite of progressivism. Moreover, the people who interested them were not members of a particular state or nation but people everywhere. This concern is very different from that of traditional historiography, which was once tasked with spinning the story of nation-states.

The world-system theory, proposed by Immanuel Wallerstein in the 1970s, immediately spread throughout the humanities and social sciences worldwide. Kawakita Minoru 川北稔, a specialist in UK history, played a major role in introducing this theory to Japan.[21] He began his research by critically examining the theories of *Hikaku Keizaishi Gakuha* which emphasized the role of the nation-state in modernization, and argued that the Industrial Revolution, the starting point of modernization, was initiated by the UK because it was the first to seize business opportunities in international trade amid the unification of the world since the Age of Discovery. Wallerstein's world-system theory had a major influence on arriving at this conclusion. Kawakita translated almost all of Wallerstein's works into Japanese and promoted the spread of the theory in Japan.

In short, from the 1960s, skepticism and criticism of the nation-state and progressivism emerged, which shocked and influenced many historians. Then came the year 1989.

From the End of the Cold War to Today (1989–Today)

The year 1989 was truly one of global upheaval: in February, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) troops withdrew from Afghanistan; in June, the People's Republic of China (PRC) witnessed the Tiananmen Square protests and, in Poland, *Solidarnosc* (Solidarity) won the general election; in November, Germany saw the fall of the Berlin Wall. In December, US and USSR leaders declared the end of the Cold War. Also in March, the invention of the World Wide Web provided an opportunity for the Internet, which had been opened to commercial use the previous year, to become more accessible.

The end of the Cold War, coupled with the emergence of China as a political and economic player through its reform and open-door policies (1978) and the introduction of a socialist market economy (1992), was initially perceived as bringing about "globalization" wherein the world would become a single political and economic unit. Typical of this perception is Francis Fukuyama's famous article, "The End of History?"[22] Furthermore, the rapid spread of the Internet gave birth to a borderless cyberspace that seemed to promote the unification of the world based on liberal democracy and market economy.

However, things did not proceed so simply. First, boundaries between East and West disappeared, but new boundaries were drawn, or old boundaries that had once existed but had been frozen under the East-West conflict were thawed and reappeared. In Eastern Europe, the Czech Republic and Slovakia were divided, and in Yugoslavia, a civil war—not a cold but hot one—broke out, resulting in the loss of many lives. In East Asia, Japan and South Korea, which under the Cold War had both belonged to the "West" and faced off against China and North Korea, representing the "East," entered into conflict over the issue of former *Jūgun Ianfu* 従軍慰安婦 (military comfort women). Moreover, the vast cyberspace created by the Internet was expected to be a place of scientific and democratic discussions, in the sense that evidence was presented and everyone respected each other's discourse on an equal footing. However, in reality, the forum has become a chaotic discourse space, where racism, revisionism, and other baseless discourse are disseminated, and abusive language is hurled at any discourse that conflicts with one's own.

In response to these changes in reality, historiography must also evolve. Today's Japanese historiography is full of new trends; here we would like to highlight three of them that have emerged, or are attempting to emerge in response to changing realities, which we believe are important from the perspective of this chapter's discussion of the nation-state and progressivism.

First, global history, which occupies a firm place in Japanese historical scholarship owing to changes in the real world, such as the advancement of globalization. Nevertheless, global history implies a critique of the historiography that emphasized nation-states. The idea that the unit of history should be the globe rather than the nation-state has been advocated by the world-system theory since Wallerstein, and in Japan, it has become a household concept among historians since Kawakita's introduction of this theory. In addition, attempts have been made to depict global history by exploiting Japan's location in Asia. For example, Akita Shigeru 秋田茂 began his research career as a specialist in UK imperial history, but his perspective has consistently been on "Asia," as he attempted to elucidate how U.K. imperialist policies changed the international order and economic structure of Asia and the impact these changes on the home country, the UK.[23] Momoki Shirō 桃木至郎, who specializes in Southeast Asian history, advocates the concept of *Kaiiki Ajia* 海域アジア (Maritime Asia), not only for Southeast Asia but Asia as a whole. Behind this concept is the recognition that the globe connected by the sea (rather than land-based nation-states) should be the unit of analysis for historiography.[24]

Second, memory studies should be mentioned. At the end of the Cold War, new boundaries were drawn, old boundaries re-emerged, and the legitimacy of these boundaries was often sought in individual and collective memories as well as in the histories constructed on their basis. However, there is no guarantee that these boundaries are consistent with those of a state, much less of a nation-state, nor is there any guarantee that the re-manifestation of old boundaries will be a progressive event.

"Memory" became an important issue in Japanese historiography when a controversy arose over former *Jūgun Ianfu* concerning their memories and testimonies. The controversy began in 1991, when a former *Jūgun Ianfu* held a press conference under her own name. The fact that she was able to come forward and criticize Japan, which had been a part of the "West," was due to the fact that the Cold War had ended two years earlier, effectively lifting the ban on criticism of Japan, which had been tacitly held until then. The boundary that once existed between Japan and Korea (the Korean Peninsula), between the ancient suzerain state (Japan) and its ancient colony (Korea), thawed after nearly half a century, and the concrete history of the former *Jūgun Ianfu* came to the fore. A controversy began over the truthfulness of the memories and testimonies of these women,[25] which took on political overtones and provoked great social debate. Meanwhile, it posed the historical academy the question of how to deal with memories, whether personal or collective, which are subjective in nature, and specifically how to evaluate their factuality, objectivity, and truthfulness.

However, this challenge had already been faced by historians in the area of research known as "oral history." Oral historians are primarily concerned with individual oral records, which are usually based on memories. One oral historian deserving special mention is Hokari Minoru 保苅実. In his analysis of oral historiographies of Australian aboriginal people, he argues that what is important for historiography is not *Rekishi no Jijitsu Sei* 歴史の事実性 (historical factuality), but *Rekishi eno Shinshi sa* 歴史への真摯さ (sincerity toward history).[26] Although Hokari did not have time to describe in detail *Rekishi eno Shinshi sa*, it should be considered as a radical suggestion that we must take into account criteria other than factuality, objectivity, and truthfulness, in judging the importance of historical materials, including memories and oral records.

Memory studies in Japan are ongoing in terms of the development and range of methodology and theory. They have been strongly influenced by trends in the real world, especially in international politics. In fact, in Japan, the cutting edge of memory studies has been in research on Eastern Europe, which was most affected by the end of the Cold War. For example, Hashimoto Nobuya 橋本伸也, a leader of this trend, conducted a detailed analysis of how individual and collective memories have been used or created by *Realpolitik* in Eastern Europe, including the former Soviet territories.[27]

Third, public history is to be mentioned. Suga Yutaka 菅豊 defines public history as "a historical practice in which historians, who are experts in history, create and present history in a public space together with . . . the public." In other words, it is an activity in which historical research—or rather, historical practice—is advanced through horizontal communication between historical specialists (historians) and non-specialists (the public).[28] Public history can be practiced in a variety of venues, including museums, online spaces, and various media, suggesting that the development of public history is a response by professionals to the emergence of a large number of non-professionals who speak out about history, especially in cyberspace. Moreover, public history cannot be considered as a dedication to progressivism, since there is no guarantee that the knowledge produced through communication between experts and non-experts will result in "facts."

In general, public history is an ongoing trend that is being formed and developed, and it is too early to say how it will evolve or what impact it will have on the Japanese historical community.

To conclude, contemporary Japanese historiography has moved from a stance of "evaluating the nation-state and progressivism positively (or negatively)," which arose from the national task of "catching up to the UK and other Western countries" since the opening of country to the world and the Meiji Restoration, to a stance of relativizing both goals or conducting research from a position unrelated to either. Historiography must reflect the trends of the real world, and it is possible that the attitude toward "nation-states and progressivism" will once again become a major point of contention in the future. In any case, as the first quarter of the twenty-first century draws to a close, Japanese historiography is changing and will continue to change.[29]

Notes

1 For arguments that have influenced this chapter in terms of its approach, see Nakano Toshio, *Ōtsuka Hisao to Maruyama Masao* (Ōtsuka Hisao and Maruyama Masao) (Tokyo: Seidosha, 2001); Nishikawa Nagao, *Kokkyo no Koekata* (Beyond Borders) (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobo, 1992); Nishikawa, *Kokumin Kokka Ron no Shatei* (The Range of Nation-State Theory) (Tokyo: Kashiwa Shobo, 1998); Nishikawa, *"Shin" Shokuminchi Shugi Ron* (On The "New" Colonialism) (Tokyo: Heibonsha, 2006); Nihei Norihiro, *"Volunteer" no Tanjō to Shuen* (The Birth and Demise of "Volunteerism") (Nagoya: Nagoya Daigaku Shuppankai, 2011).

2 Fukuzawa Yukichi, *Seiyō Jijō* (Western Situation), in *Fukuzawa Yukichi Chosakushu*, vol. 1 (Tokyo: Keio Daigaku Shuppankai, 2002, first published in 1866/1868/1870), 10.

3 Kume Kunitake, *Tokumei Zenken Taishi Beio Kairan Jikki* (Real Record of the Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary's Visit to America and Europe), 98 Kan (section 98), (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1982, first published in 1878, Vol. 5). On this point, see Tanaka Akira, "Meiji Zenhanki no Rekishi Henkaku Kan" (Ideas of Historical Change in the First Half of the Meiji Era), in *Rekishi Ninshiki*, ed. Tanaka Akira and Miyaji Masato (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1991), 505.

4 Fukuzawa Yukichi, "Datsua Ron" (Out of Asia), in *Fukuzawa Yukichi Chosakushu*, Vol. 8 (Tokyo: Keio Daigaku Shuppankai, 2003, first published in 1885), 262–263. See Hirayama Hiroshi, *Fukuzawa Yukichi no Shinjitsu* (The Truth about Fukuzawa Yukichi) (Tokyo: Bungeishunju, 2004).

5 See Hiroki Hisashi, "1890 Nendai no Academism Shigaku" (Academic Historiography in the 1890s), and Nakano Hiroki, "Shigaku no 'Junsei' to 'Ohyō'" (Historiography's 'Genuine' and 'Applied'), both in *Kindai Nihon no Historiography*, ed. Matsuzawa Yūsaku (Tokyo: Yamakawa Shuppansha, 2015).

6 See, for example, Karl Marx, *Shihonshugiteki Seisan ni Senkōsuru Shokeitai* (Various Forms Preceding Capitalist Production) (translated by Tejima Seiki, Tokyo: Otsuki Shoten, 1963, originally written in 1857–8).

7 Noro Eitarō, *Nihon Shihonshugi Hattatsu Shi* (History of the Development of Capitalism in Japan) (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1983, first edition in 1930), vol. 1, 133, 138, 252, 255. Not all Marxist historians have depicted history with the state as an actor. For an early example of an attempt to depict history as an intersection of the activities of actors beyond the state, see Hani Gorō, "Tōyō ni okeru Shihonshugi no Keisei" (The Formation of Capitalism in the East), in *Meiji Ishin Shi Kenkyu*, ed. Hani Gorō (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1978, first edition in 1932).

8 For the "Japanese Capitalism Debate" that involved many adherents of Marxists in Japan in the 1930s, see Yasuba Yasukichi, "Anatomy of the Debate on Japanese Capitalism," *The Journal of Japanese Studies* 2-1 (1975): 63–82.

9 For information on Hiraizumi Kiyoshi, a leading advocate of the *Kōkoku Shikan* and a professor of national history at the Faculty of Letters of Tokyo Imperial University, see Wakai Toshiaki, *Hiraizumi Kiyoshi* (Kyoto: Minerva Shobo, 2006).

10 For a representative achievement of Marxist historiography during and immediately after the end of World War II, see Ishimoda Tadashi, *Chuseiteki Sekai no Keisei* (The Formation of the Medieval World) (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1985, first edition in 1946). As a testimony to the state of historical scholarship at the time, see Amino Yoshihiko, *Rekishi to siteno Sengo Shigaku* (Postwar Historiography as History) (Tokyo: Kadokawa Shoten, 2018, first edition in 2007).

11 Ōtsuka's essays are collected in *Ōtsuka Hisao Chosakushu* (Works of Ōtsuka Hisao) (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1969–1986). The following works are representative examples of works by historians of *Hitaku Keizaishi Gakuha*. The works of Ōtsuka's contemporaries include Suzuki Keisuke, *America Keizai Shi Kenkyu Josetsu* (Introduction to the Study of American Economic History) (Tokyo: Nihon Hyoronsha, 1949); Takahashi Kōhachirō, *Kindai Shakai Seiritsu Shi Ron* (The History of the Formation of Modern Society) (Tokyo: Nihon Hyoronsha, 1947); Takahashi, *Shimin Kakumei no Kozo* (The Structure of Civil Revolution) (Tokyo: Ochanomizu Shobo, 1950); Matsuda Tomoo, *Doitsu Shihonshugi no Kiso Kenkyu* (A Basic Study of German Capitalism) (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1967). Works by historians who were disciples of Ōtsuka and his colleagues include Ishizaka Akio, *Oranda gata Bōeki Kokka no Keizai Kōzō* (The Economic Structure of the Dutch Trading State) (Tokyo: Miraisha, 1971); Okada Tomoyoshi, *Igirisu Shoki Rōdō Ripprō no Rekishiteki Tenkai* (The Historical Development of Early British Labor Legislation) (Tokyo: Ochanomizu Shobo, 1961); Fujise Kōji, *Kindai Doitsu Nōgyō no Keisei* (The Formation of Modern German Agriculture) (Tokyo: Ochanomizu Shobo, 1967); Funayama Eiichi, *Igirisu ni okeru Keizai Kōsei no Tenkan* (The Transformation of Economic Composition in Britain) (Tokyo: Miraisha, 1967); Yoshioka Akihiko, *Igirisu Jinushisei no Kenkyu* (A Study of the British Landlord System) (Tokyo: Miraisha, 1967). For more details on *Hikaku Keizaishi Gakuha*, see Odanaka Naoki, "In Search of a Way to Form the Autonomous People: The Actuality, Social Influence, and Internationality of Historical Studies in the Second Half of the 20th Century in Japan," in *Western Historiography in Asia*, ed. Q. Edward Wang et al. (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2020), section 2; Tsuneki Kentarō, *"Shisō" to siteno Ōtsuka Shigaku* (Otsuka School as "Thought") (Tokyo: Shinsensha, 2013).

12 This was owing to a political line conflict in the "East" between "socialism in one country" and "world socialism," and to the choice of position of each Marxist historian.

13 Eguchi Bokurō, *Teikokushugi to Minzoku* (Imperialism and Ethnicity) (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 2013, first published in 1954), 48.

14 See also Takeuchi Yoshimi, "Nationalism to Shakai Kakumei" (Nationalism and Social Revolution), in *Takeuchi Yoshimi Selection*, vol. 1 (Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Hyoron Sha, 2006, first published in 1951), 169; Takeuchi, "Nihon Jin no Chūgoku Kan (Image of China for Japanese People), in *Takeuchi Yoshimi Selection*, vol. 2 (Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Hyoron Sha, 2006, first published in 1949), 152. See also Takeuchi, "Kutsujoku no Jiken" (A Humiliating Event), in *Takeuchi Yoshimi Selection*, vol. 1 (Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Hyoron Sha, 2006, first published in 1953); Takeuchi, "Kihonteki Jinken to Kindai Shiso" (Fundamental Human Rights and Modern Thought), in *Takeuchi Yoshimi Selection*, vol. 1 (Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Hyoron Sha, 2006, first published in 1960).

15 For *Minshūshi*, see Carol Gluck, "The People in History," *The Journal of Asian Studies* 38 (1978): 25–50.

16 Yasumaru Yoshio, *Nihon no Kindaika to Minshū Shisō* (Modernization of Japan and Popular Thought) (Tokyo: Heibonsha, 1999, first published in 1974), 80, 443.

17 Irokawa Daikichi, *Meiji Seishinshi* (History of the Meiji Spirit), vol. 1 (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2008, first published in 1968), 69. The works of Irokawa, one of leading figures of *Minshūshi*, contain Irokawa, *Meiji no Seishin* (The Spirit of Meiji) (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobo, 1968); Irokawa, *Jiyu Minken* (Liberty and People's Rights) (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1981); Irokawa, *Minshūshi no Hakken* (The Discovery of People's History) (Tokyo: Asahi Shinbunsha, 1984).

18 *Shakai Undō Shi* (10 vols., 1972–1985). Representative works by historians who gathered at *Shakai Undō Shi Kenkyukai*, include Kitahara Atsushi, *Italia Gendaishi Kenkyū* (Studies in Contemporary Italian History) (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2002); Kinoshita Ken'ichi, *Daini Teisei to Paris Minshu no Sekai* (The Second Empire and the World of the Paris People) (Tokyo: Yamakawa Shuppansha, 2000); Kiyasu Akira, *Kakumeiteki Syndicalism* (Revolutionary Syndicalism) (Tokyo: Kawade Shobo Shinsha, 1972); Kiyasu, *Yume to Hanran no Faubourg* (Dream and Rebellion in Faubourg) (Tokyo: Yamakawa Shuppansha, 1984); Kiyasu, *Kindai France Minshū no 'Ko to Kyōdōsei* ("Individuality and Solidarity" of Modern French People) (Tokyo: Heibonsha, 1994); Kondō Kazuhiko, *Tami no moral* (Popular Moral) (Tokyo: Yamakawa Shuppansha, 1993); Sagara Masatoshi, *Shakai Undō no Hitobito* (Actors of Social Movements) (Tokyo: Yamakawa Shuppansha, 2014), among others. For *Shakai Undō Shi* and *Shakai Undō Shi Kenkyūkai*, see Odanaka, "In Search of a Way to Form the Autonomous People," section 3; Okamoto Michihiro, "The Social Movement History as a Social Movement in and of Itself," in *Engaged Historian*, ed. Stefan Berger (Oxford: Bergharn Books, 2019), 185–204; Okamoto et al., eds., *Rekishi toshite Kioku toshite* (As a History, as Memories) (Tokyo: Ochanomizu Shobo, 2013).

19 Ninomiya Hiroyuki, *Zentai wo Miru Me to Rekishika tachi* (Eyes that See the Whole and Historians) (Tokyo: Bokutakusha, 1986); Ninomiya, *Rekishigaku Saikō* (Rethinking History) (Tokyo: Nihon Editor School Shuppanbu, 1994).
20 *Shakaishi Kenkyu* (8 vols., 1982–1988); *Shakaishi* series (Social History Collection) (24 vols., Tokyo: Heibonsha, 1978–1990). Representative works on social history include Abe Kin'ya, *Hamelin no Fuefuki Otoko* (The Pied Piper of Hamelin) (Tokyo: Heibonsha, 1974); Amino Yoshihiko, *Mouko Shurai* (The Mongolian Raid) (Tokyo: Shogakukan, 1974); Kiyasu Akira, *Paris no Sei Getsuyoubi* (Saint Monday in Paris) (Tokyo: Heibonsha, 1982); Tsunoyama Sakae and Kawakita Minoru, eds., *Rojiura no Daiei Teikoku* (The British Empire in the Back Alley) (Tokyo: Heibonsha, 1982); and Rachi Chikara, *Aoki Danube no Ranchiki* (Sprees and Blue Danube) (Tokyo: Heibonsha, 1988), among others. On social history in Japan, see Odanaka, "In Search of a Way to Form the Autonomous People," section 4; Hasegawa Mayuho, "Challenges of 'Social History' in Japan," *Odysseus* 9 (2015): 49–65.
21 Kawakita Minoru, *Kōgyōka no Rekishiteki Zentei* (Historical Precondition of Industrialization) (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1983); Kawakita, *Minshū no Daiei Teikoku* (British Empire for the People) (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1990); Kawakita, *Satoh no Sekaishi* (World History of Sugar) (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1996).
22 Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History?" *The National Interest* 16 (1989): 3–18.
23 Akita Shigeru, *Igirisu Teikoku to Asia Kokusai Chitsujo* (British Empire and the Asian International Order) (Nagoya: Nagoya Daigaku Shuppankai, 2003); Akita, *Teikoku kara Kaihatsu Enjo e* (From Empire to Development Assistance) (Nagoya: Nagoya Daigaku Shuppankai, 2017); Akita, ed., *Asia kara Mita Global History* (Global History from an Asian Perspective) (Kyoto: Minerva Shobo, 2013).
24 Momoki Shirō, ed., *Kaiiki Asia Shi Nyūmon* (Introduction to the Study of Maritime Asian History) (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2008).
25 For more information on the *Jūgun Ianfu* controversy, see Yoshimi Yoshiaki, *Jūgun Ianfu* (Military Comfort Women) (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1995); Hata Ikuhiko, *Ianfu to Senjō no Sei* (Comfort Women and the Sexual Behavior in the Battlefields) (Tokyo: Shinchosha, 1999).
26 Hokari Minoru, *Radical Oral History* (Radical Oral History) (Tokyo: Ochanomizu Shobo, 2004). For more on oral history, see also Mikuriya Takashi, *Oral History* (Oral History) (Tokyo: Chuo Koron Shinsha, 2002).
27 See Hashimoto Nobuya, *Kioku no Seiji* (The Politics of Memory) (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2016); Hashimoto, ed., *Funsouka saserareru Kako* (The Conflicted Past) (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2018).
28 Suga Yutaka et al., *Public History Nyūmon* (Introduction to Public History) (Tokyo: Bensei Shuppan, 2019), 8.
29 New research trends that are not taken up in this chapter but should be focused on in recent years include history of emotions, and environmental histories among others. In addition, this chapter did not mention the "linguistic turn" that shook the world historical academy in the 1980s. This is because, when the linguistic turn was imported to Japan, it was introduced as a theory asserting that it is impossible to approach historical facts and was met with unnecessary opposition or excessive caution from the majority of historians. Further, to the best of my knowledge, no historical study that fully digested the linguistic turn has emerged in Japan. See Tomiyama Takao, "Gengoronteki Tenkai Ikō" (After the Linguistic Turn), *Shiso* 838 (1994): 1–3; Ueno Chizuko, *Nationalism to Gender* (Nationalism and Gender) (Tokyo: Seidosha, 1998).