

Trends in Latin American International Relations

Shifting Alliances in the New World (Dis)Order

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Part IV

Conclusions

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Part IV

Conclusions



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Concluding Remarks: Latin America's International Options in the Age of Trump 2.0

Peter Birle and Claudia Zilla

Introduction

The concluding remarks of this book cannot avoid addressing the developments that have shaken the world since the start of the second administration of Donald Trump took office in the United States in January 2025. Many of the issues at the top of the new president's agenda have direct implications for Latin America. These include the fields trade, migration, security, counter-narcotics, environment, and climate. This chapter first outlines the US administration's known policies and announcements that are expected to have an impact on Latin America. It then discusses the specific implications for Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, Colombia, and Chile, the countries whose foreign policies have been examined in detail in this book, and how their governments have responded to the new situation. A third section is devoted to the consequences of the new US policy for Latin America's relations with further external powers (China, Russia, and the European Union). The chapter concludes with a look at the regional dynamics in Latin America in the face of the changed world situation.

Announcements and first measures of the Trump government

When a Brazilian reporter asked President Trump at the signing of executive orders shortly after his inauguration how he saw the relationship between the US and Latin America and Brazil, Trump replied: "Great. They need us a lot more than we need them. We don't need them. They need us. Everybody needs us."¹ This contempt for Latin America as a partner of the US runs through the entire rhetoric and policies of the new administration. Journalist Andres Oppenheimer speaks of a "needless display of political arrogance that will do little to advance U.S. interests in the region."² In his inaugural address, Trump reiterated his call for the US to take over the Panama Canal, spoke of the evils of drug cartels, and an alleged "invasion" of immigrants, but neither acknowledged US involvement and responsibility in shared problems nor presented any positive agenda for US foreign policy towards Latin America.

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Trump's Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, is of Cuban descent and speaks fluent Spanish, as does his deputy, Christopher Landau. Some observers have interpreted these appointments as good news for Latin America, although Rubio has been known as a hardliner who is expected not only to take a tougher line on the authoritarian regimes in Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela, but also to be less friendly towards any democratic governments that the US administration considers "woke", "disrespectful", or "unfair" to the US. The president has made it abundantly clear that he does not see Latin America as an opportunity, but only as a problem. Without explicitly mentioning the region, almost all of the measures planned as part of the "Make America Safe Again" campaign have direct implications for a number of Latin American countries. These include the extension of the border wall with its southern neighbour Mexico, the deployment of the armed forces and the National Guard to secure the border, the tightening of asylum laws, the mass deportation of foreigners without legal status in the US, and the designation of foreign criminal actors as terrorist organisations. As part of its "America First" trade policy, the US government is using tariffs, or the threat of rising tariffs, to force other countries to make concessions.³

Repercussions for Mexico

Former Mexican President Andrés Manuel López Obrador repeatedly emphasised his view that the best foreign policy is a good domestic and development policy (see Chapter 17 by Günther Maihold). For his successor from the same political party, President Claudia Sheinbaum, who took office in October 2024, such a strategy is proving impossible. One of the biggest foreign policy challenges for the new government is dealing with the Trump administration and the related issues of migration, trade, and the drug economy.

There are currently an estimated 38.4 million people of Mexican origin living in the US. Of these, about 11.5 million are Mexican-born migrants, of whom about 4 million are undocumented. The mass deportations announced by Trump will affect Mexico more than almost any other country in the region. They will not only exacerbate the social situation in Mexico, but there will also be negative economic consequences. In 2024, remittances from Mexicans living abroad amounted to more than \$63 billion, about 3.4% of Mexican GDP. Moreover, 96% of these come from the US (LLYC 2025, 6).

The trade relationship between Mexico and the US is asymmetric, but the two economies are closely intertwined. Mexico is the most important trading partner of the US. In 2024, bilateral trade reached more than \$776 billion. Mexico exported more than \$466 billion in goods to the US, accounting for 82% of its total exports. US exports to Mexico were much lower at just over \$309 billion, 16% of total US exports (LLYC 2025, 6). The introduction of 25% tariffs on Mexican goods on February 1, initially suspended for a month and then confirmed by Trump at the beginning of March 2025, will also lead

to cost increases in the US, but the damage to the Mexican economy is certain to be far more dramatic. The Trump administration has justified the tariffs on Mexico not primarily on economic grounds, but as a punitive measure, arguing that the Mexican government is not doing enough to curb illegal migration and the flow of fentanyl into the US. The synthetic opiate fentanyl is responsible for a large number of deaths in the US.⁴

In the run-up to the final implementation of the US “punitive tariffs” on March 4, 2025, Sheinbaum tried to strike a balance between emphasising Mexico’s sovereignty and showing goodwill towards the US through direct talks with Trump and a series of measures. Shortly after Trump’s election in early December 2025, Mexican authorities seized more than a tonne of fentanyl in raids.⁵ On January 13, 2025, the Mexican government unveiled “Plan México”, which aims to boost domestic industry and reduce imports from China. The plan is seen not only as an attempt by Mexico to reduce its huge trade deficit with the Asian power, which was around \$105 billion in 2023, but also as a concession to the US, which accuses Mexico of serving as a backdoor for Chinese goods to enter the US.⁶ On February 27, 29 alleged members of major drug cartels were extradited to the US, including individuals long targeted by the US.⁷ The Mexican government hoped that such measures would prompt the US to make concessions on tariffs. At the same time, President Sheinbaum sent a constitutional reform initiative to Congress emphasising that Mexico will not accept foreign intervention under any circumstances, after the Trump administration designated six Mexican cartels as foreign terrorist organisations and threatened military action against drug production sites. It remains to be seen how bilateral relations will evolve. At least in the short term, the Mexican government has few options to reduce its heavy dependence on the US. Rather, the question will be what negative impact Trump’s punitive tariffs will have on the US economy itself, and whether this can persuade the government to change course.

Repercussions for Brazil

From the outset, the third presidency of President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva in Brazil, which started in January 2023, faced major challenges in reversing the foreign policy damage caused by the administration of former President Jair Bolsonaro (see Chapter 14 by Andrea Ribeiro Hoffmann). It included negative effects not only on the Brazilian Foreign Ministry as an institution, but also on Brazil’s role in Latin America and on the global stage. After a rather positive development of relations with the US administration under President Biden since 2023, the Lula government now has to deal with a US administration that is ideologically much closer to Bolsonaro than to the current president.

Brazil is far less dependent on the US than Mexico. Nevertheless, the US is Brazil’s second most important trading partner, accounting for around 10% of total exports. It plays a role primarily as a market for oil, steel,

aircraft, and agricultural products such as sugar, coffee, orange juice, ethanol, and beef. The bilateral trade balance is relatively even, unlike in the case of Mexico. Steel, aluminium, and ethanol are products on which possible US tariffs could have the greatest impact. Both countries are among the world's most important agricultural producers and compete in a number of products (LLYC 2025, 24). If President Trump relies on agricultural subsidies again, as he did in his first term, Brazil may find it difficult to compete in the international market. US companies are also among the most important investors in Brazil, particularly in sectors such as technology, energy, and manufacturing. A deterioration in bilateral relations would have a negative impact on the investment climate.

The issue of migration is not as prominent on the bilateral agenda as it is in US–Mexico relations, but Brazilians are among the largest Latin American communities in the US, with 1.3 million people, many of whom are in the country illegally. Remittances from Brazilians amounted to around \$4.5 billion in 2023 (LLYC 2025, 25).

Disagreements between the Lula and Trump administrations are likely to arise with regard to environmental and climate policy. While the Lula administration is seeking to improve its international standing in the fight against climate change, the Trump administration has taken a diametrically opposed course. Under Lula, Brazil has re-joined the Paris climate agreement, while the US under Trump has initiated its withdrawal. Brazil will host the United Nations Climate Change Conference COP30 in 2025, while the US has announced that it will not participate. Under Trump, Brazil is not expected to receive any US support in its efforts to preserve the Amazon or achieve other climate policy goals. This example also shows that the strategic development options for Latin America towards a more sustainable economy, as outlined by Andres Musacchio in this book, cannot hope for US support under President Trump.

Bilateral conflicts may intensify over the regulation of social media. As early as 2024, a dispute arose over the platform X, owned by Elon Musk. It was taken off the grid for weeks in Brazil by order of the Brazilian Supreme Court because Musk had refused to comply with local law. Musk complained about censorship, but ultimately complied with the Brazilian requirements and X was allowed to go back online. In February 2025, a similar conflict arose regarding the US video platform Rumble, which is widely used by right-wing influencers. After Rumble refused to block the account of a Brazilian streamer living in the US who is under investigation in Brazil for hate speech and spreading misinformation, the Brazilian Supreme Court ordered Rumble to be blocked. The Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, part of the US State Department, then accused Brazil of encroachment, censorship, and violations of freedom of expression.⁸

The relationship between Brazil and China, which has been Brazil's most important trading partner since 2009, is perhaps the most potentially contentious on the Brazilian–US agenda. In the context of the growing

geopolitical conflict between the two great powers, the US has been disturbed, not only since Trump took office, by Brazil's allowing Chinese investors such as Huawei into technology areas such as 5G, which the US considers sensitive for security reasons.

Despite considerable pressure from the US, Brazil has so far stuck to this course (Westhuizen 2024). Brazil and China also share membership of the BRICS+ alliance, which Brazil will temporarily chair in 2025. Trump has threatened to impose 100% tariffs on the BRICS+ countries if they promote de-dollarisation, i.e. replacing the US dollar as the global reserve currency with other currencies.

Brazil is well known for its foreign policy pragmatism, and Lula has so far adopted a cautious tone avoiding direct criticism of the Trump administration. However, he has also made it clear that respect is a two-way street. As Lula emphasised at a press conference, although he is interested in good relations with the US: "It's very simple. If he imposes tariffs on Brazilian products, there will be reciprocity from the Brazilian side." This would also be in line with Brazil's approach in similar situations in the past. The country is very conscious of its status and will not tolerate being lectured by a US administration. Rather, it is likely that Brazil—at least under a Lula government—would turn even more to other partners such as China, India, and Russia.⁹

Repercussions for Colombia

In Chapter 16, Eduardo Pastrana and Diego Vera characterise the foreign policy of Colombian President Gustavo Petro, in office since August 2022, as a combination of progressive ideology and populist leadership. They describe his anti-elitist and confrontational discourse, as well as his critical stance towards the US, NATO, and the OECD. Within days of Trump's inauguration, however, it became clear that such a stance towards the new US administration would be difficult to maintain.

Petro tried to resist the way the US government was carrying out the deportation of undocumented foreigners. On January 27, 2025, he refused to allow two US military deportation flights into Colombian airspace, demanding a humane return. Trump responded with a message on his social media platform, Truth Social. He accused the "very unpopular" Petro of endangering US national security. As a result, the US would immediately impose a 25% tariff on all imports from Colombia, a travel ban on Colombian government officials and "all allies and supporters", and sanctions on Colombia's treasury, banking, and financial sectors. The tariffs would rise to 50% after one week. Petro initially responded to the news by announcing that Colombia would then also impose punitive tariffs, but just one day later the White House announced that "the Colombian government has agreed to all of President Trump's conditions, including the unrestricted acceptance of all illegal immigrants from Colombia who will be repatriated from the United States, including by military aircraft".¹⁰

The US is Colombia's most important trading partner, accounting for almost 30% of total exports. As in many other cases, the bilateral trade relationship between the two countries is highly asymmetrical, with US exports to Colombia accounting for less than 1% of total US exports. A free trade agreement, in force since 2012, offers Colombian goods easier access to the US market. The incident at the end of January showed how fragile the Colombian economy is, and how little it can afford a major trade and tariff conflict with the US (LLYC 2025, 15).

More than 2.5 million Colombians live in the US, including some 300,000 undocumented migrants. More than 14,000 Colombians have been deported from the US since 2024. Remittances from migrants from the US play an important role for Colombia, totalling more than US\$4.6 billion in 2024 (LLYC 2025, 16).

For many decades, Colombia was one of the US's closest partners in Latin America. Cooperation focused on security, drug trafficking, counter-insurgency, trade, and the environment. For a long time, Colombia received massive US assistance in eradicating illicit crops, strengthening the security forces, and fighting drug, arms and human trafficking. Since the inauguration of the Petro administration, the first left-wing government in Colombia's modern history, bilateral relations have cooled considerably. This is expected to continue and intensify under President Trump.

Repercussions for Argentina

María Cecilia Míguez' contribution on Argentine foreign policy (Chapter 13) relates to the administration of Alberto Fernández (2019–2023). Under his successor, Javier Milei, who took office in December 2023, there have not only been tectonic shifts in Argentina's domestic, economic and social policy (Zilla 2024), but also a U-turn in foreign policy. Hardly any other incumbent Latin American president is ideologically closer to Donald Trump than Milei, who is an ardent admirer of the US president and tech billionaire Elon Musk. The latter is expected to push ahead with a similar slashing of the state apparatus and all forms of state regulation under the new US government as the "chainsaw man" Milei has been practising in Argentina since the end of 2023. Milei's rejection of feminism, diversity, equality, inclusion, immigration, abortion, and environmental protection, which he sees as part of the "mental virus of woke ideology" and "the great epidemic of our time [and] the cancer that must be eradicated", his biological choice of words is not only frighteningly reminiscent of the rhetoric of the last military dictatorship in Argentina (1976–1983), but also broadly in line with views held in the camp of the new US president—although Milei is even more radical in this respect than many in the US.¹¹

In terms of foreign policy, Milei had already sought proximity to the previous US administration under Joe Biden, and this tendency has intensified under Trump. The US is Argentina's second most important trading partner,

although the country's exports to the US (2024: \$6.5 billion) represent only about 8% of its total exports. For imports (2024: \$6.2 billion), the figure is 10.2%. The Milei government is interested in a free trade agreement with the US, but this would not only contradict the rules of MERCOSUR, but is also unlikely given the trade policy of Trump, who is not interested in agreements but in "deals". Argentina is hoping for the intervention of the US government in its negotiations with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for a new stand-by loan (LLYC 2025, 30).

With a population of around 300,000, Argentinians living in the US are not among the diasporas that are the focus of Trump's deportation policy. Moreover, there is ideological agreement between the two governments on migration and the (restrictions on the) rights of migrants, so that the Milei government is already showing signs of introducing similarly rigid border controls with the neighbouring countries of Bolivia and Paraguay as the US has with Mexico (LLYC 2025, 30).

Extreme geopolitical alignment with the US led the Milei government to announce in February 2025 that it would follow the US's withdrawal from the World Health Organization (WHO). The reasons given for this were similar to those of the Trump administration.¹² The Argentine government also quickly modified its position on Ukraine and aligned with the new US policy toward the European country. During his first year in office, Milei was one of the most vocal supporters of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky at the international level. Following the Trump administration's rapprochement with Russia and the increasing criticism of Zelensky's government, Argentina abstained at the UN General Assembly on February 24, 2024 on a resolution introduced by Ukraine but rejected by the US to mark the third anniversary of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, in which Russia was explicitly named as an aggressor. Argentina's foreign minister, Gerardo Werthein, even echoed Trump's recent call for early elections in Ukraine, which the government there has rejected, citing the ongoing war.¹³

Repercussions for Chile

Of the five countries whose foreign policy are examined in this volume, Chile is probably the one least directly affected by the Trump administration's agenda. However, it is clear that the foreign policy guidelines that President Gabriel Boric has adopted since taking office in 2022, particularly the gender and environmental principles (see Chapter 15 by Raúl Bernal-Meza and Sergio González Pizarro), cannot hope for any support from the Trump administration.

The US is an important trading partner for Chile, but with a share of 15.1% of its total exports and 20.1% of its total imports, it was only in second place in 2023, well behind China, which accounted for 39.4% of Chilean exports and 23.2% of imports.¹⁴ The bilateral trade balance is positive for the US, with a surplus of more than \$8 billion in 2023. Since 2003,

Chile has benefitted from a free trade agreement with the US that eliminated tariffs on all trade in goods. In addition, US companies are among the most important foreign investors in Chile. If the US were to impose tariffs on Chile as well, this would significantly reduce the competitiveness of Chilean exports, which in some areas compete directly with US products (LLYC 2025, 16).

As in the case of Argentina, the Chilean diaspora in the US, at around 190,000 people, less than 1% of the Hispanic population, is not among the problem cases identified by the US government. Chile is the only Latin American country that has benefited from a visa waiver programme. Given the strict security and immigration policies of the new US administration, there is concern in Chile that this privilege could soon be terminated (LLYC 2025, 27).

Repercussions for Latin America's relations with other external powers

The shift in US foreign policy is also affecting Latin America's relations with other external powers. Among the most important of these relations are those with China, Russia, and the European Union (EU). In Chapter 7, Benjamin Creutzfeldt analyses China's growing involvement in Latin America since the beginning of the 21st century. During this time, China has become the most important trading partner for many countries in the region and has also invested heavily in strategic infrastructure such as ports. China's strong presence in Latin America has long been a thorn in the side of the US, not only for economic but also for security reasons. During his second term, Donald Trump seems determined to curb China's presence in the region. This applies to strategic infrastructure such as the Panama Canal, large deep-water ports and other infrastructure projects, but also to trade. The US is particularly concerned about China's presence in Mexico, which has grown enormously in recent years. According to Brenda Estefan, Chinese investment does not formally violate the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), but the idea that the US's main geopolitical rival is deeply intertwined with its main trading partner and southern neighbour is intolerable to Trump (Estefan 2025).

The Trump administration's diplomacy based on threats was quickly successful against the government of Panama. Even before Trump took office, he had openly discussed the possibility of annexing the Panama Canal, refusing to rule out the use of military force. He cited China's alleged control of the canal and the "unfair" treatment of the US by the Panamanian operating company. Panama's president, José Raúl Mulino, insisted that sovereignty over the canal lay with his country under the 1977 Carter-Torrijos treaty, but at the same time made major concessions to the US. He announced that he would investigate two port concessions near the canal held by Chinese companies and that the US Navy would be given preferential access to the canal. More importantly, he announced that Panama would withdraw from China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) infrastructure programme.¹⁵

It is doubtful whether other Latin American countries will be so quick to respond to calls to reduce China's presence in areas that the US sees as a security risk. However, the approach taken by the US under Trump shows that the idea of many Latin American countries to maintain good relations with as many countries as possible, no matter how strong the geopolitical rivalries between them, in the sense of an "active non-alliance policy" (see Chapter 10 by Federico Merke), is likely to face considerable obstacles in the coming years. Ultimately, however, the policy of threats could even have the opposite effect on the US, especially if it simultaneously loses its attractiveness as an economic partner through a protectionist tariff policy. This shows once again that US policy towards Latin America lacks positive incentives for its southern neighbours.

While the Trump administration's approach to China and its consequences for Latin America are within the bounds of what could be expected after developments during his first presidency and under the Biden administration, the sudden change in US foreign policy towards Russia came as a big surprise. As Alexandra Sitenko describes in Chapter 8, in the 21st century Russia has established diplomatic relations with all Latin American countries and economic cooperation with many of them. Given Latin America's traditional efforts to diversify foreign economic relations, Russia became an interesting partner. The Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, condemned by nearly all democratic countries in the region, led to more restraint towards Russia. However, most countries refused to join Western sanctions against Russia and were criticised for doing so, not least by the US. This made the Trump administration's sudden rapprochement with Russia all the more surprising. Brazil, for example, was repeatedly criticised for continuing its economic relations with Russia as normal after 2022. When President Lula called for peace talks between Russia and Ukraine in 2023 and accused the US of "fuelling" the war by exporting arms to Ukraine, these statements were met with strong criticism from the US administration. Meanwhile, the US government is taking a very similar line (though without including Ukraine in negotiations with Russia, as Lula had called for).

At this stage, it is difficult to foresee what the change in US policy will mean for Latin American–Russian relations in the medium and long term. It does, however, provide countries in the region with good reasons for further developing their relations with Russia.

The question of how a change in US foreign policy might affect relations between Latin America and the EU arose as early as the first Trump presidency. Some observers predicted at the time that the cooling of transatlantic and inter-American relations could lead to a renewed European–Latin American alliance. New opportunities would arise for closer cooperation in policy areas such as climate change, the fight against drugs, migration and trade, where Latin America and the EU share a greater consensus and differ from the nationalist position of the US (Gratius 2017). Many of the measures envisaged by Trump at the time did not go beyond the rhetorical level,

given the domestic political context in the US, which placed certain limits on implementation. In both Latin America and Europe, most governments adopted a wait-and-see approach and sought to maintain constructive relations with the US. In its foreign and security policy strategy papers published since 2016, the EU has identified potential areas for closer cooperation with Latin America, but not developed a real strategic perspective for deepening bi-regional cooperation (Birle 2018).

Today's situation is different in many ways. First, since 2023, the long-stagnant bi-regional cooperation between the EU and Latin America has been given a new impetus. Bi-regional summits resumed after a long hiatus, and in December 2024 the EU and MERCOSUR signed the Association Agreement that had been under discussion for more than two decades, although it has yet to be ratified (see Chapter 9 by Peter Birle). Second, just over a month into the second Trump presidency, it is abundantly clear that US foreign policy is undergoing a fundamental shift. In the light of numerous statements by high-level US politicians, it is becoming increasingly difficult to continue to speak of a community of democratic values between the EU and the US; in this context, it is worth recalling the speech of US Vice President J.D. Vance at the Munich Security Conference in January 2025. It is no longer even clear whether the US administration still regards the EU as an ally or whether it is working towards its disintegration. The reliability of the US as a military umbrella within NATO is also in question. In the coming months, Trump is expected to follow through on his announcements by imposing massive tariffs on EU exports. These developments pose enormous challenges for the EU and its member states, including the need for a massive increase in defence spending. There is also the risk of a trade war with the US.

What does all this mean for EU–Latin America cooperation? It is difficult to make predictions. Of course, it would make sense to ratify the EU–MERCOSUR agreement as soon as possible and to intensify bi-regional cooperation on trade, the fight against climate change, the transition to a sustainable economy and many other areas. However, both regions are far from homogeneous, with very different approaches towards the Trump administration and its policies on both sides of the Atlantic. In this respect, even in the current situation, it is unlikely that there will be a unified European–Latin American vision for future global development. It remains to be seen how much attention and resources will be devoted in both regions to deepening bi-regional cooperation. This would certainly be desirable in terms of maintaining a rules-based global order and defending democratic values.

Regional dynamics

Finally, let us take another look at the regional dynamics in Latin America. Argentinean political scientist Juan Gabriel Tokatlian stresses that even in the current situation, there is no regional position towards the US, as Latin

America is experiencing its greatest political fragmentation and division since the 1960s. He speaks of Balkanisation and expects the current situation with the US to lead to bilateral agreements, with each country trying to get the best deal for itself.¹⁶ The suspension of an emergency meeting of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), called at short notice at the instigation of the Colombian government in the context of the conflict with the Trump administration over deportation flights with military aircraft, may have been a first taste of such developments. The Honduran government, in its capacity as *pro tempore* chair, had invited the meeting to discuss the environment, migration and the unity of Latin America and the Caribbean. The decision to cancel the meeting only a short time later highlights the differences and difficulties in reaching consensus on important issues on the international agenda.¹⁷

Several contributions to this book have shown how fragile cooperation within the region is (see Chapter 12 by Gian Luca Gardini, Chapter 2 by Detlef Nolte, and Chapter 5 by José Antonio Sanahuja). At the same time, the historical and structural framework and the specific characteristics of the “convivial configuration” in Latin America are long-lasting and are not fundamentally challenged by changes of government. Fundamentally, there is a strong will to cooperate in the region, usually developed within a diplomatic culture of mutual tolerance and non-interference, and based on consensual consultation. Moreover, as Chapter 11 on feminist foreign policy by Claudia Zilla shows, some countries have ventured into new approaches to foreign policy in the pursuit of greater (gender) justice and are cooperating in this field. This constellation contributes to peaceful interaction despite considerable regional asymmetries and inequalities, but it has clear limits in terms of the possibility of regionally binding agreements, common regional policies, and a common positioning of Latin America as an actor in international and global fora beyond general demands and declarations of intent (Birle 2024).

In an era of geopolitisation and rearmament, Latin America and the Caribbean remain one of the world’s lowest spenders on defence. In 2023, military expenditure amounted to around \$59.3 billion.¹⁸ Brazil is the largest spender in absolute terms at \$28.9 billion, while Colombia is the largest spender as a percentage of GDP at 2.9%.¹⁹ And it is a nuclear-weapon-free zone, as mandated by the Treaty of Tlatelolco, signed in 1947. It is to be hoped that, in the context of great power competition and the growing importance of hard power, the region will remain insulated from these trends and will be as resistant as possible to being marginalised from shaping the world order or instrumentalised as a battleground. The majority of Latin American countries are committed to the multilateral tradition, support the UN system and international law, and promote the international environment that is necessary for social and economic development.

Notes

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