WHO OWNS WAR?

The State and the Role of Non-State (Armed) Actors in Modern Warfare

NL ARMS – 2024





Edited by
MONICA DEN BOER,
JAN WILLEM HONIG,
MARTEN ZWANENBURG,
JOEP AARTS

LEIDEN
UNIVERSITY PRESS

Who Owns War?

WHO OWNS WAR?

The State and the Role of Non-State (Armed) Actors in Modern Warfare

Edited by

Monica den Boer, Jan Willem Honig, Marten Zwanenburg & Joep Aarts

Leiden University Press

The Open Access edition was made possible by a contribution from The Netherlands Defence Academy


Cover design: Andre Klijsen
Cover illustration: HYORO, Koen Zinnemers
Lay-out: Crius Group, Hulshout
Printer: Antilope De Bie Printing, Duffel

Every effort has been made to obtain permission to use all copyrighted illustrations reproduced in this book. Nonetheless, whosoever believes to have rights to this material is advised to contact the publisher.

ISBN 9789087284640
e-ISBN 9789400605015 (e-PDF)
e-ISBN 9789400605459 (e-PUB)
https://doi.org/10.24415/9789087284640
NUR 689

© 2025, Faculty of Military Sciences, Netherlands Defence Academy / Leiden University Press, Rapenburg 73, 2311 GJ Leiden

All rights reserved. Without limiting the rights under copyright reserved above, no part of this book may be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means (electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise) without the written permission of both the publisher and the editors of the book.



Creative Commons Licence CC BY-NC-ND (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/deed)

Contact EU General Product Safety Regulation (GPSR): productsafety@lup.nl

Table of Contents

List of Abbreviations 9

List of Figures and Tables 13

Introduction 15
Jan Willem Honig, Monica den Boer, Marten Zwanenburg & Joep Aarts

PART I: Categories of Non-State (Armed) Actors in War 31

Chapter 1. The Strategic Cohesion of Organised Armed Groups: Towards a Historically Informed Socio-Normative Approach 33
Jan Willem Honig

Chapter 2. The Diversification of Civilian Agency in Armed Conflict and the Protection of Civilians under International Humanitarian Law 57
Arjen Vermeer & Steven van der Put

Chapter 3. The Resistance Operating Concept: Towards Modern-Day People's War 77
Martijn Rouvroije

Chapter 4. Fuelling Instability in the Ukraine War: The Questionable Loyalty of Non-State Actors in Cyberspace 99
Peter Pijpers & Lotte Nietzman

Chapter 5. How Iranian Weapons' Technology Increases Ansar Allah's Reach 119
Ralph Savelsberg, Mark Voskuijl & Frederik Mertens

Chapter 6. Information and Communications Technology Companies on the Battlefield: Explanations and Implications 147
Eric Pouw, Paul Ducheine, Peter Pijpers & Kraesten Arnold

Chapter 7. Private Non-State Actors as Norm-Keepers in Armed Conflict: The Role of the Private Sector in Ensuring Compliance with International Humanitarian Law 175
Marten Zwanenburg

Chapter 8. Navigating Non-State Dynamics: A Literature Review on Private Military and Security Companies 197
Erik de Waard, Bart Wielders, Michael Rustenhoven & Chiel Conijn

Chapter 9. Expansion or Restraint? China's Use of Private Military and Security Companies along the 'Belt and Road Initiative' in Asia and Africa 223
Thijs Cremers & Maarten Rothman

Chapter 10. Can the Impact of Non-State Actors Be Predicted? Impressions of Contemporary Approaches to War Forecasting 243
Hans Melissen & Peter Schuur

PART II: Cases of Non-State (Armed) Actors in War 271

Chapter 11. Fighting or Writing? Dutch Volunteers in the Anglo-Boer War: Motivation, Loyalty, Effectiveness and Self-Representation 273
Henk de Jong

Chapter 12. The Pope's Divisions on the March: Soft Power and the Catholic Church 303
Theo Brinkel

Chapter 13. The Battle for Recognition: National Liberation Movements and Military Assistance During the Decolonisation of Southern Africa 329
Tycho van der Hoog

Chapter 14. Fighting the State: The Comparative Advantages and Disadvantages of the Tamil Tigers in Their Separatist Struggle against the Sri Lankan Government 355
Georg Frerks

Chapter 15. Cohesion and Conflict Outcomes in Nagorno-Karabakh 375
Feike Fliervoet

General Bibliography 393

About the Editors 443

About the Authors 445

List of Abbreviations

ABM	Agent-based Modelling
AI	Artificial Intelligence
ANC	African National Congress
ANM	Armenian National Movement
AP	Additional Protocol
APF	Azerbaijan Popular Front
APT	Advanced Persistent Threats
ARFD	Armenian Revolutionary Federation–Dasnaktsutyun
ASALA	Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia
ASBM	Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile
AzCP	Azerbaijani Communist Party
BRI	Belt and Road Initiative
CENTCOM	(United States) Central Command
CEO	Chief Executive Officer
CFA	Cease-Fire Agreement
CIDG	Civilian Irregular Defense Group
CCP	Chinese Communist Party
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
COIN	Counterinsurgency
CT	Counterterrorism
CTI	Cyber Threat Intelligence
DDoS	Distributed Denial-of-Service
DIME	Diplomacy, Information, Military, Economy
EO	Executive Outcomes
EU	European Union
eFP	Enhanced Forward Presence
FRELIMO	Liberation Front of Mozambique
GNC	Guidance, Navigation and Control
GNSS	Global Navigation Satellite Systems
GoSL	Government of Sri Lanka
GPC	Great Power Competition
GWOT	Global War on Terror
HRDD	Human Rights Due Diligence
ICANN	Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers
ICC	International Criminal Court

ICJ	International Court of Justice
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
ICT	Information and Communication Technology
ICTC	Information and Communications Technology Companies
ICTR	International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
IDF	Israeli Defence Forces
IHL	International Humanitarian Law
IRA	Irish Republican Army
IT	Information Technology
IW	Irregular Warfare
KASP	Lithuanian National Defence Volunteer Forces (also 'NDVF')
LLM	Large Language Modelling
LTTE	Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
MEL	Mobile Erector-Launcher
ML	Machine Learning
MPRI	Military Professional Resources Inc.
NAA	National Army of Azerbaijan
NAMPA	Namibia Press Agency
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NDC	National Defence Committee
NDS	(United States) National Defense Strategy
NDVF	Lithuanian National Defence Volunteer Forces (also 'KASP')
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NKAO	Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast
NKR	Nagorno-Karabakh Republic
NS(A)A	Non-State (Armed) Actors
NSHQ	NATO Special Operations Headquarters
OAG	Organised Armed Group
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
ODA	Operational Detachment Alpha (United States Green Berets Army SOF)
OSS	Office of Strategic Services
PAP	People's Armed Police
PLA	People's Liberation Army
PLAN	People's Liberation Army of Namibia
PMC	Private Military Contractor
PMSC	Private Military and Security Company
PRO	Partnered Resistance Operations
PSC	Private Security Company
RF	Russian Federation

RIPE	Regional Internet Registry for Europe, Middle East and Central Asia
ROC	Resistance Operating Concept
ROG	Resistance Operational Guidance
SADF	South African Defence Forces
SAS	Special Air Service
SDC	State Defence Committee
SF	US Army Special Forces 'Green Berets'
SOCEUR	(United States) Special Operations Command Europe
SOE	Special Operations Executive
SOF	Special Operations Forces
SSR	Soviet Socialist Republic
SWANU	South West Africa National Union
SWAPO	South West Africa People's Organisation
SWIFT	Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication
TDF	Territorial Defence Forces
UAS	Unmanned Aircraft System(s)
UCAS	Unmanned Combat Aerial System(s)
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNGP	United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights
UNIN	United Nations Institute for Namibia
UNSC	UN Security Council
USSOCOM	United States Special Operations Command
VJTF	Very High Readiness Joint Task Force
XAI	Explainable Artificial Intelligence

List of Figures and Tables

Figure 4.1	Number of cyber-attacks	107
Figure 5.1	Weapon components seized by the US Navy in January 2024	121
Figure 5.2a	Debris of the Samad-3 loitering munitions	124
Figure 5.2b	Debris of the Wa'aed loitering munitions	124
Figure 5.3	Step-by-step estimation of the aerodynamic characteristics based on geometry derived from pictures available in the public domain	126
Figure 5.4a	Calculated fuel efficiency of the Qasef loitering munition	126
Figure 5.4b	A simulation of the terminal flight phase trajectory	126
Figure 5.5	Houthi propaganda image of a Tufan missile on display in Sana'a in September 2023	131
Figure 5.6	Ballistic missiles to scale: Scud-B/ Shahab-1 (a), reconstruction of the Scud-B (b), Iranian Shahab-3 (c), reconstruction of the Shahab-3 (d), Ghadr-F on display in Tehran (e), Houthi Tufan in Sana'a (f) and a reconstruction (g). Original images via FARS, Satyar Emami/FARS News Agency, AFP/Getty images and Al-Yemen TV	132
Figure 5.7	Simulated maximum range of a Tufan when launched from Dhayhan, in northwest Yemen, towards Israel	133
Figure 5.8	Houthi ASBMs and their Iranian counterparts to scale: Khalij Fars (a), reconstruction (b), Houthi Easif (c), Iranian Raad-500 (d), Raad-500 reconstruction (e), Houthi Tankil (f), Iranian BM-250 (g), BM-250 reconstruction (h) and Houthi Faleq ASBM (i). Original images via Atta Kenare/ AFP/GettyImages, Yemeni Press, X, al-Masirah television network, Export Centre of the Ministry of Defence of the Islamic Republic of Iran and al-Masirah television network	136
Figure 6.1	The information environment including cyberspace	151
Figure 6.2	Backbone and activities in the information environment	156
Figure 9.1	Interaction of concepts of PSC, PMC and PMSC	224
Figure 9.2	Positioning of the western and Russian PMSCs	233
Figure 9.3	Extension of Arnold graph with development of Chinese PMSCs	236

Figure 10.1	Number of scholarly publications on non-state actors in armed conflicts over the past 25 years, as indexed by Google Scholar	253
Figure 10.2	Sizes of Armies A and B as a function of time. Although it is known at t = 4 that Army A will win, it takes until t = 25 until it outnumbers army B	258
Figure 11.1	'n Rustige uurtje. Hollanders op commando. 1900 / A calm moment. Dutchmen on commando	280
Figure 11.2	Battlefield at Elandslaagte, 21 October 1899. Collection Zuid-Afrikahuis 23.2	288
Table 5.1	Overview of Ansar Allah's UCAS and loitering munitions arsenal	125
Table 5.2	Overview of attacks by Houthi UAS on shipping in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden and on ground targets in Israel	127
Table 5.3	Houthi ballistic missile attacks on Israel	130
Table 5.4	Ships hit by Houthi ASBMs	135
Table 8.1	Search report	199
Table 8.2	Theme 1 literature review	201
Table 8.3	Theme 2 literature review	203
Table 8.4	Theme 3 literature review	205
Table 8.5	Theme 4 literature review	207
Table 8.6	Theme 5 literature review	208
Table 8.7	Theme 6 literature review	209

Introduction

Jan Willem Honig, Monica den Boer, Marten Zwanenburg & Joep Aarts

In the initial three decades after the end of the Cold War, academics, politicians, and professional militaries worried about the loss of 'ownership' of states over violent conflict to non-state actors. While interstate warfare had waned to the point of disappearance, across the globe, weak and failing states were seen to spawn a profusion of armed groups that collapsed societies into brutal disorder. The change from the relative stability of the Cold War and the long-established orderliness of preparation and planning for interstate warfare led to the claim that the world had turned decisively away from outmoded interstate war and moved into an age of 'new wars'. The most pessimistic analysts claimed that even strong states would struggle to withstand the onslaught of non-state-controlled armed groups because they neither understood the nature of the threat nor possessed an effective military capability to counter it. With state control and ownership over war and warfare slipping away, more excitable analysts predicted a 'coming anarchy' of a Hobbesian struggle of all against all.[1]

Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the pendulum has seemingly decisively swung back to the primacy of interstate war. The current official narrative calls for the Western states allied in NATO and the EU to leave behind an exceptional interlude of humanitarian interventions and expeditionary warfare. Governments which for decades half-heartedly engaged with the distant interventions they ordered must once again firmly take the reins over national defence. The gap which had opened up between society and an underfunded and undermanned military must be closed. The public interest commands that governments, armed forces, and nations once more prepare for war by deploying the bureaucratic powers that only the modern state can bring to bear. In returning to the historical mean of great power (geo)politics, the immediate past appears an unhappy outlier marked by politically and militarily largely unsuccessful and unsatisfactory wars and can conveniently be forgotten.

It may be true that we have returned to a more familiar pattern of international politics and war, and it may also be true that renewed major interstate conflict poses the greatest and most immediate threat to global order, but dismissing wholesale the relevance of the years from the collapse of Yugoslavia in 1991 to the

fall of Kabul in 2021 may be too rash a step. The prophets of the 'new wars' may have preached their cause too zealously, but the apostles of the return of 'old wars' must be careful not to fall into the same trap. The war in Ukraine gives cause for caution. While the regular Russian and Ukrainian armed forces may have borne the brunt of the fighting, they were joined by a hodgepodge of difficult-to-denominate armed groups and unarmed private actors that were not exclusively mobilised, commanded, and controlled by the state. The Russian state hired a 'regular' army, in terms of equipment and operations, which deployed in preference to the state armed forces to the more difficult front sectors and went on to stage a coup (the Wagner Group). Less familiar was the appearance of armed units created by political parties, oligarchs, companies (such as Gazprom in Russia), local communities, and even bands of 'concerned citizens' who chose their own theatre and mode of operations. The efforts on the frontline were further supported by private citizens, from the world over, with money, equipment, and technical skills (forming the 'IT army' of Ukraine', for example), and companies who made their advanced technologies available (like Elon Musk's Starlink and the data analytics firm Palantir).

The presence of non-state actors and the challenge to state control over both interstate and intrastate war and warfare persist. We may therefore not be fully leaving behind one period in which non-state actors were the main threat to return to a fully familiar period in which states once again dominate the threat picture and control the conduct of war. The persistence of non-state actors raises a host of fundamental, and urgent, questions. Do we overplay the contrast between state-controlled war and non-state uncontrolled warfare? If not limited to particular periods, are non-state actors perhaps also not limited to some special cases or types of conflict? Are they instead a generic, integral part of war and warfare? Or, in a dramatically changing world, is the role and variety of non-state actors in war increasing? Are the armed forces of the state as strong and effective as we keep being told and as the success story of the rise of the West supposedly proves? These are key questions that frame the contributions to this volume. By offering a variety of detailed studies, the chapters collected in this volume aim to provide a basis for further reflection and open up cross-disciplinary perspectives, in the context of the questions just posed, on the role, relationship and interaction between state and non-state actors.

In this introduction, we will first explain the special relationship between the state and war and why there is a general consensus in the modern Western literature on the importance of the state controlling, or as we put it, 'owning' war in the sense of taking full responsibility over the phenomenon. Next follows a section explaining, with a brief reference to a vast and diffuse body of literature, what we understand by the actors that avoid and threaten state ownership over war. The literature uses many different terms, but we have chosen to draw the lines around the phenomenon broadly and call them 'non-state (armed) actors', or NS(A)As for

short. The word 'armed' appears in brackets because we include actors which may not employ direct physical violence but who nonetheless can play a critical role in war and warfare. Private companies that operate in the cybersphere are an example, but so in a very different way is the Vatican. Technically a sovereign state, it abjures that critical tool of state, the ability to resort to the use of armed force, while counting one in six of the world's population as its 'citizens', many of whom face armed conflict. As we will develop in more detail in the second section, what we are interested in, in short, is organised actors who are not counted as part of that select group of established sovereign states and which arrogate the right to involve themselves, in competition and in collusion with those states, with war and warfare. We then explain the prism through which the editors of this volume advised their contributors to approach the issue, before moving to the customary section where we announce and summarise the substance of each chapter.

The State and War

The concept of the state in Western political thought is inextricably linked, since Hobbes and Weber, with the idea of a monopoly of force.[2] The ability of the state to monopolise force allows it to keep the peace within its borders and protect itself and its population and territory against external threats. The control over force in defence of the national public interest provides the state with its essential legitimacy. The ways in which the state establishes and maintains itself are a two-step process: either by coercion (as in an authoritarian or totalitarian state) or by consent (as in a democracy), the population can be made to transfer the powers of mobilisation and organisation of national resources to the state and pay for the security apparatus through taxation. Thus emerges a 'win-win' situation for the nation united by the state: the state maximises national security capabilities through centralisation with – in democracies at least – maximum legitimacy. The ability to mobilise and organise military power through resource extraction and, consensual or enforced, popular legitimacy is generally regarded as the success formula that led the state to become the globally dominant form of political organisation. The classic accounts of the rise of the state emphasise how, over time, superior military capacity gave states a comparative power advantage over less efficient partisan, private interest and non-state armed groups. Viewed through a power struggle lens, the state is the stronger organisation which, if the critical bureaucratic ingredients of resource extraction and military organisation come together, is bound to prevail over smaller, fragmented armed groups.[3]

The general material benefits, as indicated, have been significant: domestic peace and stability and the best conceivable instrument for protecting national

independence in an uncertain world.[4] But states possess a further specific benefit: centralised control over armed forces means that violence can be applied in a deliberate, directed and so discriminatory fashion. Or to put it slightly differently, force can be used in a regulated manner. Domestically, the monopoly of force invites regulation and accountability if a state – as it should be for the sake of its internal stability – is interested in maintaining popular legitimacy and loyalty.

In interstate conflict, regulation poses more of a challenge. However, one key reason states might embrace a regulative, restraining framework (as embodied most prominently in international law) is ultimately rooted in prudence: the patterns and predictability in behaviour engendered by customs and laws provide a hedge against wars spiralling out of control and losing any and all political instrumentality and utility.[5] In short, they are a means of avoiding war ending up being fought only for war's sake. A second reason is that international law provides a framework for judging the relative legitimacy of wars and enemies. A common international language defining the lawfulness or unlawfulness and the justice and injustice in means and ends serves to reinforce the instrumentality of war and limits its destructive powers.[6] This is reflected inter alia in the seminal work of Thomas Franck.[7]

In short, material and moral reasons make the case for state control over war a strong one. The state is widely regarded as the most efficient and effective war-making machine ever created by humankind. It remains the most widely accepted benchmark for harnessing military power and providing security.[8] Not surprisingly, the literature on political and military organisation possesses an inherent bias against non-state actors. It not only exhorts states to bring the actors under their wing, but it also expects states to prevail in any armed contest.

What is therefore surprising is that success against disruptors of state control has not been much in evidence recently. Non-state armed actors have put up a stiff fight against Western states and, even if they have not defeated the latter's armed forces outright on the field of battle, they have forced them and their political masters to give up and withdraw from such places as Afghanistan and Iraq. In 2021, the Taliban decisively defeated the Western state-building project in Afghanistan. The victory proved not only Western ineffectiveness in supporting this agenda with military and political means, but also a defeat for the Western state-based model of building indigenous armed forces. The Afghan state army collapsed in a matter of days, just as their Iraqi brethren had in 2014 in the face of the onslaught by ISIS. The Iraqi state was more fortunate than the Afghan one, but that was largely due to the intervention of irregular Shi'a militias. In Yemen, Libya, Syria, the Sahel and elsewhere, the fight between insurgents and different conceptions of state and state-building continues with no clear end in sight. The examples do not stop there and extend to interstate conflict: in 2015 and again in 2022, Russian regular army

advances in Ukraine were brought to a halt after the self-mobilisation of non-state-controlled volunteers who rushed to the frontlines.[9]

In addition, there is also the growing intrusion onto the interstate battlefield of private commercial actors. The appearance of private military and security companies is a phenomenon that goes back some time but until recently seemed largely associated with proxy wars and wars of choice. The deployment of a US company like MPRI in the 1990s to advise the Croatian armed forces was a convenient means of avoiding direct US intervention in the Yugoslav war, yet also of influencing events in line with foreign policy goals. Later in Afghanistan and Iraq, the widespread employment of 'hire-and-fire' specialist PMSCs to support operations appeared a useful and efficient use of scarce state resources by Western states. One would, however, have expected that when wars came closer to home and involved higher political stakes, states would once again bring these resources under centralised control. That does not appear to be happening with the war in Ukraine.

Surprisingly for an apparent classic interstate conflict, the war in Ukraine is showing up the limits of state mobilisation, instead of its purported strengths. Despite the seriousness of the threat, European states, including Ukraine and Russia, are struggling to mobilise the available national resources for war. All rely, to a degree perhaps not seen since the French Revolution, on private initiative and on privately-owned and supplied resources to provide states with personnel, materiel and other support assets. Are we witnessing a break in history? There is ample reason, therefore, to study the emergence, resilience and success of non-state (armed) actors in war and warfare.

Non-State (Armed) Actors and War

The study of non-state (armed) actors and their relationship to war is a large, diffuse, and fragmented field. There are many findings and claims, with little coherence and many contradictions. This is a consequence, first, of the many groups that can be identified and the many types under which they can be classified – and for which there is no agreed catch-all term of overall classification. By comparison, the 193 sovereign member states of the United Nations are a model of tidiness in type, sub-types, and numbers. Second, the groups and the supposed phenomenon they represent are studied by different academic disciplines. Historians, sociologists, political scientists, and international lawyers – to name the most prominent – come to the table with different concerns, theories, and methodologies. Third, most suffer from the challenge of encountering an issue that they see as different from the prevailing norm or analytical paradigm that is dominated by the concept of the state. Non-state (armed) actors who meddle in war offer no obvious common point

of departure for analysis because they lack the unity of a specific, inscribed organisational rationality which flows from definable interest and produces predictable circumscribed modes of behaviour.

The number of entry points is too vast to develop a simple, unitary definition of the general phenomenon. It is therefore tempting, as the literature overwhelmingly does, to look at either particular aspects or specific groups, with the more ambitious trying to group some together to achieve some degree of generalisation. Nathasa Ezrow in her (very useful) introductory text on 'violent' non-state actors lists well over six hundred modern titles.[10] We will therefore refrain from offering a literature overview for practical reasons. Pragmatism further dictated that for an annual that is produced by members of one institution, we must defer to the expertise and interests of the contributors. Paradoxically perhaps, the initial idea to focus on non-state armed actors had to be broadened to non-state (armed) actors. That is perhaps very expansive, but also usefully illustrates various ways in which non-state actors can influence others without partaking in the fighting themselves.

Contributing authors have therefore been left free to choose their own denomination for 'their' NS(A)As. They have chosen labels that fit their particular group, cause or mode of operation best. A rich panoply, with familiar and less familiar terms, is the result. Some are associated with insurgency and state-building, like separatists (Frerks), irregulars (Fliervoet) and national liberation movements (Van der Hoog), or very specifically, Ansar Allah in Yemen (Savelsberg, Voskuijl and Mertens). Others refer to business entities: private military and security companies (De Waard, Wielders, Rustenhoven and Conijn, Cremers and Rothman, as well as Melissen and Schuur), information and communications technology companies (Pouw, Ducheine, Pijpers and Arnold), or more broadly, the private sector (Zwanenburg) and non-state cyber actors (Pijpers and Nietzman). More unusually, two contributions address the participation of civilians in war (Rouvroije, and Vermeer and Van der Put), while also unusually, one addresses the role of the Catholic Church (Brinkel). Finally, one considers volunteers, that is nationals from one state serving another (de Jong), and as mentioned, one chooses organised armed groups as the preferred label (Honig).

Still, some common, central points of departure need to be set out. We already mentioned that the volume looks at actors who are not counted as part of that selected group of established sovereign states and which arrogate the right to involve themselves, in competition and in collusion with those states, with war and warfare, with or without the direct use of force. So we, like the literature overwhelmingly does, also set our analysis against the benchmark of the state. The choice was further reinforced by the fact that the contributors are employed by a state benchmark organisation, the national armed forces of the Netherlands. However, it is the notable suspicion of non-state (armed) actors widely shared

by the literature which provided a frame for suggestions to the contributors. The central concerns, which are already implied in the discussion of the beneficial relationship between state and war, can be whittled down to three interrelated factors. The first is the issue of loyalty, which in the case of NS(A)As is quickly presumed to be to themselves, and not to the good of the wider society in which they operate. The second is their lack of accountability to this wider society, with the result that war and violence escape from the regulatory effect imposed by the state's presumed inherent sense of public responsibility. Non-state actor violence therefore tends to be unconstrained and transgressive. The third is the question of their effectiveness, both in the sense of these actors achieving their own selfish goals (since an expectation of such effectiveness by its members can be presumed to play a major role in their genesis), but especially in terms of their competition with state-controlled and directed armed forces.

The last point reflects back on the first two of loyalty and accountability. It leads one to investigate them anew. Could it be that NS(A)As possess hitherto underestimated or misrecognised sources of loyalty – which after all are a precondition for cohesion and military effectiveness? Furthermore, could it be that NS(A)As accept some degree of accountability to wider society because it facilitates their operation (whether it be in terms of recruiting people and garnering public support, in the case of armed actors, or in the case of the private enterprise, business) – which could further improve their effectiveness in the competition with state armed forces?

One unusual implication of this approach is that it also allows the inclusion of civilians and the Catholic Church as non-state actors. Both have a special status in being unarmed and possessing a special protective status of non-combatants in war. They are therefore in a sense independent of the state and not part of the 'state-at-war'. At the same time, though, they are each in a different way drawn into war as independent actors: civilians as a resource that can – deliberately or unintentionally – adopt combatant status, and the Church as an entity that has a responsibility to protect the faithful (and indeed all humans) from war.

The three issues of loyalty, accountability, and effectiveness reaching into wider society also apply to private commercial actors. Although the academic literature may generally be highly critical, the claim that private industry can effectively provide greater efficiency and better delivery than government has been a major force in the developed economies' politics since the Reagan Administration in the US and the Thatcher government in the UK in the 1980s. It also spread to the core competency of the state, the provision of national security, notably through PMSCs and IT companies. Again, this raises important questions about how sceptical one should be about their loyalty and need for traditional forms of state-related accountability.

The suggestion to prioritise loyalty, accountability, and military effectiveness as guiding principles for understanding non-state (armed) actors in war aimed to open up novel perspectives. For the contributors, it presented a rich array of possibilities, while it is hoped that readers find it a useful and informative framework for contextualising the contributions.

The Contributions to the Volume

Anyone with experience of editing volumes or organising other types of research projects will not be surprised that not all contributors followed the editors' suggestions closely. As they should, they let themselves be guided primarily by the nature and character of their chosen topics and the analytical possibilities their disciplinary and experiential backgrounds offered. The volume is divided into two parts. The first will discuss key current issues related largely to non-state actors in war, which are generally classified as civilian in nature. The second part of the book analyses a series of specific cases involving non-state armed actors, historical and contemporary.

Part I is subdivided into two separate themes relating to the involvement of civilian non-state actors in war. The first discusses the use of civilians in war from a legal and practical military operational perspective, and the second addresses the question of the loyalty and accountability of the private sector with particular reference to cyber operators and private military and security companies. But before these, in an opening chapter, Jan Willem Honig develops a general, sociologically inspired conceptual framework for understanding what he calls the 'strategic cohesion' of non-state armed actors. He argues that the ties that bind armed groups to society, which provide a key precondition to their military and political effectiveness, have been under-researched as a result of the bias in the literature towards the state as a benchmark model. His framework looks beyond the classic state-derived possibilities of coercion and nationality by focusing on the example of pre-state European history. Key to his model is a mapping of societally shared and supported ideas regarding the right forms of social solidarity, authority, and recruitment. Such a model, he claims, can help us understand what underpins the formation of loyal and accountable military actors and what makes them socio-politically effective. As such, the chapter aims to provide a novel approach to analysing the relative contemporary success of non-state armed actors against state-armed actors.

Honig implies that historically the distinction between military and civil society was unusual. The growing modern conviction that the two are separate and that civilians have a special protected status implies that civilians have in effect become

a peculiar kind of non-state actor: on the one hand, they need to be kept out of war but, on the other hand, they constitute the key reservoir for military power. This leads to major practical challenges. In the chapter, 'The Diversification of Civilian Agency in Armed Conflict and the Protection of Civilians under International Humanitarian Law', Arjen Vermeer and Steven van der Put discuss whether current international humanitarian law permits states resorting to the utilisation of civilians in their national war effort. They argue that historical state practice, 'operational and by way of [official] statements', as well as international humanitarian law itself does not 'ban all actions which could potentially endanger civilians'. They conclude that civilians must have adequate protection, but only if it meets a 'feasibility standard' and is not overridden by the needs of national defence.

The theme of civilian participation in war is developed further in Martijn Rouvroije's 'The Resistance Operating Concept: Towards Modern Day People's War'. He looks at an instance in contemporary military thinking which envisages that civilians would play a major role in war. With most Western countries only possessing small active professional forces, it is not surprising that their militaries are considering ways of strengthening national defence capabilities by demanding increased societal engagement. One of the ideas gaining traction at the moment is the so-called 'Resistance Operating Concept' which calls for civilians, as an enemy advances into national territory, to resist occupation. As Rouvroije explains, the idea is rich in historical intellectual and practical precedents, stretching, via Marxist concepts of insurgency, all the way back to Clausewitz's notion of people's war. Historically, however, these types of operations have acquired a reputation for descending into extreme spirals of violence. To avoid this, Rouvroije explains that current thinking in NATO is evolving towards constituting the resistance on a formal, professional military basis with the forces engaging in conventional rather than irregular type operations. The Concept therefore is evolving towards the creation of more formal territorial defence forces rather than clandestine, underground stay-behind organisations. Developing effective operational techniques and fortifying the national will to resist remain major challenges. The special forces community is taking a leading interest in the training and support of these forces, complementing their (possibly dwindling) role in expeditionary warfare and foreign military assistance.

Melissen and Schuur also look at the use of civilians in war, but from a mathematical perspective. They focus on the predictability of war, listing some contemporary approaches to forecasting the onset and duration of conflicts. They investigate the possibilities for statistical predictions in warfare and conclude that such predictions face important challenges. Similarly, despite the high expectations surrounding Artificial Intelligence (AI), the potential for this technology to contribute meaningfully to prediction in war remains highly uncertain. This is largely the

result of a lack of relevant data, particularly where non-state actors are concerned. The chapter then turns specifically to the use of Private Military Companies, and the use of mathematical forecasting techniques to predict the influence of this type of armed non-state actor on conflict dynamics. The authors conclude that despite also having their limitations, such techniques can offer valuable insights into the quantitative aspects of potential conflict scenarios.

The next set of chapters in Part I analyses civilian cyber actors. Pijpers and Nietzman start off by noting the high hopes that exist in some quarters that cyberweaponry in the hands of major powers could replicate and even extend the international stability which the superpowers enjoy as a consequence of their possession of nuclear weapons and a mutual assured destruction capability. The purported ability, or immanent threat, of cyber capabilities to totally paralyse societies and make them defenceless, however, has not been brought under sufficient state control and remains in the hands of an ever-increasing number of private actors of highly varied and therefore questionable loyalty. As the war in Ukraine already illustrates, they expect that political division and instability internationally will increase as a result.

Pijpers and Nietzman's analysis links into the argument that Ralph Savelsberg, Mark Voskuijl, and Frederik Mertens make with respect to technological 'pockets of excellence' which give relatively weak actors great reach in influencing by 'holding hostage' far more powerful actors. In their chapter 'How Iranian Weapons Technology Increases Ansar Allah's Reach', they look at the unmanned aerial and missile capability that the Yemeni Houthi movement of Ansar Allah, the 'Supporters of God', has been using to threaten Israel and international shipping in the Red Sea since Hamas attacked Israel in October 2023. They note that an offensive technological 'pocket of excellence' employed by 'a relatively weak and primitive non-state/semi-state actor with limited technological and industrial potential, supported by a local minor power' can have an 'outsized strategic impact' which may be 'far greater than their purely military effectiveness would warrant' by holding at risk the interests of other powers over worryingly large distances. They conclude that this dynamic can also play out in other conflicts, like the limited Russian air offensive that is tying up major scarce Ukrainian air defence resources. Just as with cyber, it raises the strategically vexing issue of either paying the high price of protection against an in itself not majorly destructive risk or choosing the uncertain and even more expensive road of escalating and attempting offensively to destroy the capability.

Pouw, Ducheine, Pijpers, and Arnold build further on the same theme and look at the operational implications of the employment of private information and communications technology companies (ICTCs) in warfare. They underline the current massive and critical dependence of states and their armed forces on these

companies: 'Not states but ICTCs are in a dominant position in cyberspace'. The central power ICTCs exercise resides essentially in controlling the 'informational' sphere. By disaggregating information power into a number of forms, they then attempt to outline the ways in which these are critical to fighting power. Like Pijpers and Nietzman, they question the loyalty of these companies. Judging by the many companies active in and around Ukraine, they claim that this currently inescapable dependence 'may endanger the … application of fighting power' and so critically add to the vulnerability of states. The authors see their loyalty, at least on the Ukrainian/Western side, as determined by a whole host of factors, including selfish strategic and economic interests, as well as moral and reputational concerns. All these are inextricably linked yet potentially pulling in different directions. The authors conclude that it is exceedingly hard for states and their armed forces to get a grip on these companies as they operate across many jurisdictions the whole world over. This diffuses and limits the opportunities for shoring up their accountability. In short, in the view of the four authors, ICTCs 'practically keep the world in a stranglehold'.

The final tranche of chapters in Part I strikes a more optimistic note, however. In part, that is a result of their choice of a different starting point. Whereas the previous three chapters depart from a focus on technology and technological possibility, the next three chapters start from the perspective of private companies doing business, which, by implication, means that these actors open themselves up to the external discipline of the markets they serve. They thus highlight a different possible dynamic applying to non-state actors than do the technologically focused contributions. It leads the authors – cautiously – to see the pressures of complying with the wishes and demands of their employers, who are usually states, as producing a regulatory effect which reduces the private sector's independence and selfishness and induces them to show a degree of public loyalty and accountability. Market forces, through competition, moreover, also put a premium on providing an effective product.

In his 'Private Non-State Actors as Norm-Keepers in Armed Conflict: The Role of the Private Sector in Ensuring Compliance with International Humanitarian Law', Marten Zwanenburg opens by explaining the reasons for private companies, including those that provide international security services, to seek compliance with international humanitarian law (IHL), before setting out a number of practical steps in which the sector can contribute. He notes that private companies do not have a direct legal IHL obligation; so much depends on the promotion of norms (of which he gives existing examples), backed up by the obligation of states to 'ensure respect' for IHL.

While Zwanenburg addresses the private sector broadly and includes examples of IT companies and PMSCs, the next two chapters focus specifically on PMSCs.

Erik de Waard, Bart Wielders, Michael Rustenhoven, and Chiel Conijn provide a comprehensive literature review of the major themes in the massive body of English-language articles that have appeared between 2000 and 2024. As they indicate, the academic literature has mostly been stimulated by concerns about the behaviour of PMSCs and the consequent perceived need for regulation. These concerns mostly relate to what they summarise as 'human rights violations and prolongation of conflicts', as well as transparency issues. Importantly, however, they also draw attention to the fact that PSMCs received a massive boost from the 1990s onwards 'as complementary security partners [to state armed forces] in expeditionary crisis response operations'. A major driver behind the 'commercialisation of security' was the claim of their providing a service at better cost and with greater efficiency and effectiveness than the state's security apparatus. Although the literature gives 'no clear-cut answer' to the question of whether they did, they note the value of market competition and client government oversight to ensure value for money and that effective support for national security objectives is delivered. Furthermore, they mention that PSMCs are largely staffed by former military personnel 'accustomed to high military standards and a Western modus operandi' and that in Iraq, PSMCs 'structurally outperformed local contractors and in many cases even regular U.S. troops'. This suggests a beneficial confluence in norms between state actors and non-state actors which may distinguish PMSCs from IT firms.

The private sector may thus find it hard to escape the modern state as the ultimate contractor and paymaster with the attendant regulatory pressures. The question of the quality and the weight of these pressures does open up the intriguing question of whether control is better assured through the workings of the free market or the coercive state. Or, to put it pointedly, whose PMSCs are a more reliable partner in delivering national foreign and security policy goals: US, Chinese or Russian companies? The final contribution to Part I, in which Thijs Cremers and Maarten Rothman investigate China's use of PMSCs in Africa, addresses this very question.

Cremers and Rothman show that Chinese PSMCs are much more clearly a direct extension of state policy than their US brethren. They have this in common with Russia, but they differ from both US and Russia in that China is far more restrained and careful in what it allows them to do. The authors describe that the PMSCs merely provide security for Chinese commercial operations by, often state-owned, enterprises in Africa. In effect, they play a subordinate, tightly regulated, minor role in the Chinese foreign policy of expansion by economic means, as exemplified in the 'Belt and Road' initiative. And even that minor security role is further restrained by the concern of the Chinese government not to be seen to be interfering in the internal affairs of countries where it develops business interests. This means, for instance, that their possession and possible use of firearms are carefully circumscribed. In short, Chinese PMSCs possess nothing like the paramilitary capabilities

of Russian and some US PMSCs. The authors do note the existence of pressures and opportunities which might see their role expanding, like the growing need for mineral resources and the retreat of Russia, though they remain sceptical that it will.

Part II considers the cases of a variety of non-state armed actors. It approaches them largely from an effectiveness point of view and proceeds in roughly chronological order. First off is Henk de Jong's 'Fighting or Writing: Dutch Volunteers in the Anglo-Boer War, Motivation, Loyalty, Effectiveness and Self-Representation'. He analyses the Dutch nationals who volunteered (at the risk of losing their citizenship) to join the fight for independence of the South African Boer Republics of the Orange Free State and Transvaal against the British Empire between 1899–1902. Their numbers were small and militarily insignificant, but they were highly motivated, indignant at what we would now classify as a 'war of aggression' against two small sovereign states which were considered democratic for the white settler population. De Jong shows that the volunteers found it difficult to fit in and offer a meaningful direct contribution to the war. Despite very few possessing any military experience, the obvious place for them seemed to be on the front lines. Those experiences proved overwhelmingly disappointing, especially when the Boers began losing. Nonetheless, the volunteers remained deeply loyal to the cause and, as De Jong shows, devised narrative strategies to keep the flame alive and camouflage a disagreeable reality. Ultimately, their influence and effectiveness lay more on a political than a military level in the promotion of the Boer cause in their memoirs by abstracting the war into 'a story of perseverance, sacrifice, and victory in the long run'.

Theo Brinkel addresses a very different non-state actor in his 'The Pope's Divisions on the March: Soft Power and the Catholic Church'. The Catholic Church takes a deep, long-standing interest in war. Headquartered in a territory that is recognised as a sovereign state, the Holy See counts some one in six humans as members and represents them – without military and economic means of power – as a globally operating 'sui generis non-state actor'. Using Joseph Nye's concept of soft power, Brinkel investigates the role of the Church across four cases: the end of communist rule in Europe, the peace process in Northern Ireland, and the current wars in Ukraine and between Israel and Hamas. He argues that the Pope and Church represent an effective combination of ends, ways, and means in conflict mediation: a consistent philosophy forms the foundation for the operation of an enormous, permanent organisation through a network with a global outreach.

The next chapter forms the second contribution, which focuses on the southern African region. Tycho van der Hoog's 'The Battle for Recognition: National Liberation Movements and Military Assistance during the Decolonisation of Southern Africa' analyses the successful insurgency strategy pursued in particular by the South West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO) to take over power in

Namibia. Contrary to conventional wisdom and official narratives, this was not primarily achieved through armed struggle. Rather, Van der Hoog argues, SWAPO cunningly played into international expectations that they formed a state-in-waiting which pursued its central goal by armed force. This narrative was critical to unlocking international assistance and recognition for the organisation at the expense of competitors who advocated a more peaceful route to power. Actual progress on the battlefield – which anyway offered little positive prospects against a much more powerful and effective white South African army – mattered little compared to the legitimacy SWAPO gained for itself and which put it in a powerful position to seize power when the apartheid regime peacefully collapsed, and its armed forces withdrew from Namibia.

In the case studied by Georg Frerks, the non-state secessionist armed actor was less successful. In 'Fighting the State: The Comparative Advantages of the Tamil Tigers in Their Separatist Struggle against the Sri Lankan Government', Frerks argues that in this case military effectiveness played a role, but to this should be added gradual failure, relative to the Sri Lankan government, across six further 'dimensions': rebel governance and territorial control, mobilisation strategies, loyalty and legitimacy, ideology and symbolism, unity versus division and international support. Eventually, the comprehensive failure across all these dimensions resulted in decisive military defeat in 2009. The case could thus be read as a competition in state-building where the established state ultimately won out against the upstart.

With Feike Fliervoet's contribution, we move our focus to the Caucasus and what also can be seen as a case of competitive state-building. In her 'Cohesion and Conflict Outcomes in Nagorno-Karabakh', Fliervoet adopts a very different perspective and analytical framework from Frerks. Her focus is on the relative military and political cohesion between the two contenders for control over Nagorno-Karabakh, a territory located within the Azerbaijani state populated by an Armenian majority population which sought independence. At first, the better-equipped and much larger Azerbaijani army suffered defeat at the hands of Armenian irregulars. Fliervoet argues that this was due to political division translating into military ineffectiveness in Azerbaijan, while simultaneously the rebels achieved political and military cohesion and unity with support from the Armenian state and the diaspora community. When this cohesion waned, and Azerbaijan's slowly grew over a period of twenty-five years, the stage was set for a rematch in 2020 in which Azerbaijan achieved a lightning victory. She concludes that 'it is not the state or non-state designation of an army that determines its military prowess, but rather the extent to which political cooperation can be translated into military cohesion and, subsequently, battlefield success'. Fliervoet's contribution thus provides a modern case study amplifying Honig's argument on 'strategic cohesion' in the opening chapter.

A number of red threads may – cautiously – be suggested. First, on the basis of the sample of cases presented – and this is of course a limited one – the independence and self-centredness of NS(A)As appears constrained and checked by the political environment that produces and ultimately sustains them. Second, their effectiveness is not primarily determined by calculations of raw military power and battlefield technique. Socio-political conditions ultimately make or break them. The battlefield only confirms. Third, NS(A)As should be seen as subject to a strategic calculus, partly self-generated and imposed, partly externally determined or influenced. These claims may not be wholly surprising, but with respect to the issue of NS(A)As it means that, however unpleasant and suspicious many may find their behaviour, they are generally not as uncontrolled as often believed and feared. They can therefore be more powerful than simple anarchic destructive actors. And because the power of all states is never absolute and the will of their peoples never fully undivided, NS(A)As will persist. Finally, this volume brings together contributors from an unusually wide range of disciplines. Even if they do not fully succeed in bringing out the red threads, the extremely rich and varied set of references and the very substantial bibliography should prove a useful aid for further multi- and interdisciplinary research.

Notes

1 Kaplan, 'The Coming Anarchy' (1994); Van Creveld, *On Future War* (1991); id., *The Rise and Decline of the State* (1999); Münkler, *The New Wars* (2004) and Kaldor, *New and Old Wars* (1999).

2 Weber, 'Zweiter Vortrag: Politik als Beruf'.

3 For example, Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States*, and more concisely: id., 'War Making and State Making as Organized Crime'; Mann, *The Sources of Social Power*.

4 For a recent rather deterministic account claiming the coercive state is the key engine for peace and prosperity, see Morris, *War, What Is It Good For? The Role of Conflict in Civilisation*.

5 Prudence tempering the naturally existing power struggles is seen as a key virtue in classical realism: Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, p. 10.

6 For some historical treatments, see Best, *Humanity in Warfare*; Howard, Andreopoulos and Shulman, eds, *The Laws of War*; and Koskenniemi, *The Gentle Civilizer of Nations*.

7 Franck, *Fairness in International Law and Institutions*.

8 Davis and Pereira, eds, *Irregular Armed Forces and Their Role in Politics and State Formation*, pp. 6–7; Ezrow, *Global Politics and Violent Non-State Actors*, pp. 4 and 10 (Kindle ed.). An indication of the strong pull the state exercises is provided by the lawyers who contributed to this volume: all capitalise the State. None of the other contributors do so.

9 Arel and Driscoll, *Ukraine's Unnamed War*; Käihkö and Honig, 'Ukraine's Not-So-Whole-of-Society at War'.

10 Ezrow, *Global Politics and Violent Non-State Actors.*

Bibliography

Arel, Dominique, and Jesse Driscoll. *Ukraine's Unnamed War: Before the Russian Invasion of 2022*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2022.

Best, Geoffrey. *Humanity in Warfare*. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1980.

Davis, Diane E., and Anthony W. Pereira, eds. *Irregular Armed Forces and Their Role in Politics and State Formation*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003.

Ezrow, Natasha. *Global Politics and Violent Non-State Actors*. Los Angeles: Sage, 2017.

Franck, Thomas. *Fairness in International Law and Institutions*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998.

Howard, Michael, George J. Andreopoulos and Mark R. Shulman, eds. *The Laws of War: Constraints on Warfare in the Western* World. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1994.

Käihkö, Ilmari, and Jan Willem Honig. 'Ukraine's Not-So-Whole-of-Society at War: Force Generation in Modern Developed Societies'. *Parameters: The US Army War College Quarterly* 55, no. 1 (Spring 2025), pp. 25–38. doi: 10.55540/0031-1723.3329.

Kaldor, Mary. *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era*, 3rd ed. Cambridge: Polity, 2012; orig. 1999.

Kaplan, Robert D. 'The Coming Anarchy'. *The Atlantic* (February 1994).

Koskenniemi, Martti. *The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law, 1870–1960*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.

Mann, Michael. *The Sources of Social Power*, 4 vols. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986–2012.

Morgenthau, Hans J. *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, 4th ed. New York: Knopf, 1967; orig. 1948.

Morris, Ian. *War, What Is It Good For? The Role of Conflict in Civilisation, From Primates to Robots*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2014.

Münkler, Herfried. *The New Wars*, tr. Patrick Camiller. Cambridge: Polity, 2004. (orig. *Die neuen Kriege.* Hamburg: Rowohlt, 2004).

Tilly, Charles. 'War Making and State Making as Organized Crime'. In *Bringing the State Back In*, edited by Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Theda Skocpol. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985, pp. 169–191.

Tilly, Charles. *Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990–1990*. Oxford: Blackwell, 1990.

Van Creveld, Martin. *On Future War*. London: Brassey's, 1991 (published in the US under the title *The Transformation of War*).

Van Creveld, Martin. *The Rise and Decline of the State.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.

Weber, Max. 'Zweiter Vortrag: Politik als Beruf'. In *Geistige Arbeit als Beruf: Vier Vorträge vor dem Freistudentischen Bund*, by Max Weber. Munich & Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1919.

PART I

Categories of Non-State (Armed) Actors in War

CHAPTER 1

The Strategic Cohesion of Organised Armed Groups: Towards a Historically Informed Socio-Normative Approach

Jan Willem Honig

Abstract

The success and resilience of contemporary Organised Armed Groups (OAGs) against Western state armed forces presents a puzzling phenomenon since the dominant narrative of the course of European history supposedly proves that regular armies proved the decisive antidote to OAGs. This chapter argues that this narrative overrates the relative resilience and effectiveness, and the resulting strategic-level cohesion, of state-sponsored armed forces while misconstruing and underrating the sources of OAG cohesion. It is proposed that a triad of normatively defined social structures – recruitment, solidarity and authority – accounts for this critical strategic-level cohesion. The finding that state structures are not an essential or better provider of cohesion is highly relevant to the understanding of the contest between state and non-state actors.

Keywords: Military cohesion, Organised armed groups, State formation, Hans Delbrück, Military effectiveness, Military resilience

1.1 Introduction

Organised Armed Groups – OAGs for short – have become a major issue in modern war.[1] Whether it be in intra-state conflicts around the globe, or more curiously as the introduction to this volume notes, in the interstate conflict in Ukraine, OAGs have proliferated. Their persistence, and in Ukraine, their remarkable appearance, seems out of step with the march of history. In a Western historicist narrative that is not entirely free from determinist and self-congratulatory undertones, OAGs appear an anomaly that was slated for extinction. Their supposed unreliability and selfishness, and their lack of accountability, always made them brutal wild-cards in war. Critically, they do not easily fit the modern organisational principles that, after a long historical evolution, are believed to undergird superior military efficiency and effectiveness. If they fit a pattern, they appear most similar to the pre-modern – and that makes their re-appearance doubly worrying. Not only do

OAGs represent a regression to crueller, more anarchic times, when might alone made right, but their resurgence surprisingly also calls into question the efficacy of the very structures that once overcame them: the state and its loyal, regular army. It seems worthwhile therefore to investigate the issue of relative military efficiency and the role of alleged key OAG weaknesses – to wit, their lack of loyalty and accountability to no one but themselves.

In the narrative of how states and regular armies subdued the violent anarchy of non-state armed groups, cohesion plays a central part. Without superior cohesion, undergirded by loyalty and accountability to state power, armies and their states would not have succeeded in defeating the OAGs of yore. Whatever other advantages Western states may have accrued – wealth and technology spring immediately to mind – all presume a foundational ability to generate superior cohesive military power. Indeed, without higher-quality military cohesion the West and its state-system arguably would not have established global dominance.

The re-emergence of OAGs and the new-found vulnerability of states and their regular armies to them is thus a disconcerting issue. The first objective of this chapter is to probe the historical narrative that elevated the idea of the regular army to the pinnacle of military cohesion and efficiency. This is done through a critical discussion of the modern paradigmatic narrative by way of an exemplary proponent, the German military historian Hans Delbrück (1848–1929).[2] Choosing Delbrück has several advantages. First of all, he developed a coherent and parsimonious framework for explaining why state armies defeated the non-state competition. Second, his framework has over time become so widely accepted that its central claims and assumptions are no longer questioned. This has directly nurtured the inflated, yet unquestioned expectations regarding the strategic effectiveness of state-controlled regular forces in the fight against OAGs. Thirdly, there is also a positive reason to go back to Delbrück: he put the critical issue of cohesion in a broader context than is the case nowadays. Whereas cohesion is now primarily studied as a small unit, tactical phenomenon, for Delbrück tactical cohesion could not be understood in isolation from a higher level political and strategic context. The literature now takes that for granted, but it merits revisiting.

Pinpointing the sources of this higher level, strategic form of cohesion provides the second objective of the chapter. It seeks to arrive at a better understanding of OAGs by identifying the key determinants of their socio-political embeddedness from which they draw their strategic cohesion, and hence their resilience and effectiveness. The determinants proposed are recruitment, solidarity and authority structures. These arguably play a critical role in underpinning the resilience and cohesion of OAGs and account for their wider social function and behaviour.

Yet, the structures are easily misunderstood and often somewhat elusive because of their soft normative nature. This is especially so if measured against a

modern state context where state-citizen relations are habitually seen as monopolistically regulated by the hard material sanctions of reward and punishment. To bring the structures into better focus, rather than concentrating on contemporary OAGs, I go back in time and revisit the late 16th century Low Countries. One reason is that the region where, as in so many places now, OAGs thrived was an environment of weak and hotly contested state power. More critically, however, a historical example that is part of the European story that lies at the root of our modern biases against OAGs, can help lead to two important realisations. First, by showing how we misinterpret our own heritage and give it short shrift, it can make us better aware of the dangers of getting contemporary OAGs that are part of different cultures very wrong. By bringing out the importance of difference and possibility, and so illustrate the malleability and variability of socio-normative structures, we can nonetheless alert ourselves better to what enduring socio-structural categories encompass. It can make us see that whereas the state is but one possible form of political organisation, all socio-political structures which want to go to war have to find structures which can hold authority over people, recruit them for war and engender solidarity among them.

But before turning to analysing the historical framework and socio-political embeddedness of OAGs, let me briefly explain how the literature generally approaches cohesion and why it might be more usefully contextualised within a socio-normative strategic-level framework.

1.2 Approaching Cohesion

Cohesion has been much studied, primarily by sociologists and psychologists, on the tactical, small unit level.[3] Modern scholarship tends not to engage directly or deeply with the higher levels of military and political cohesion. For example, in a recent overview chapter 'On Cohesion', sociologist Anthony King notes 'its failure to recognize political and ideological factors'.[4] That is perhaps an overly harsh judgement, but in general terms the trend-setting US literature dating back to the Second World War has tended to find politics and ideology a less immediately important field of enquiry than battlefield cohesion. The literature overwhelmingly assumes that higher-level cohesion is fundamentally assured if there exists a compact between people, armed forces and government on foreign policy objectives.[5] Although the strength of the compact could vary, as exemplified by the contrast between the Second World War and Vietnam, political cohesion – which Charles Moskos termed 'latent ideology' – was essentially viewed as extraneous to the basic mechanisms that governed small unit cohesion and anyway something that democracies, like the USA, were the most adept at achieving and sustaining.[6]

This research exhibited little interest in political or cultural variation or, for that matter, in history. That said, much modern historical research has not disagreed with the findings of military sociology and psychology. In a wide-ranging review of literature concerning early 20th century Western culture and combat, historian Alexander Watson cautiously concludes that 'common humanity rather than cultural diversity' is the ultimate source of wartime cohesion and resilience.[7] One reason for such a verdict is the employment of the narrow benchmark, shared by all the modern cohesion literature, of combat performance and the associated assumption that the arbiter of decisive success in war lies at the tactical, physical fighting level. Another is the assumption of the existence of a clear distinction between 'peaceable' civilians and a 'martial' military and the requirement therefore of a distinct, and supposedly timeless, professionalising mechanism of changing one into the other.[8] The assumptions regarding the centrality of combat performance and professionalism reveal an overwhelming bias towards modern, Western conditions and societal preferences. Extending them to OAGs does not work well because the dividing line between civilian and soldier is much more fluid and combat that values 'professional', 'decisive' efficiency may not possess the same centrality. Understanding 'common humanity' in this way reinforces the puzzle of why OAGs should pose such a challenge to regular armed forces. Watson does not clear this up when he nonetheless also admits that:

> while the ingredients of martial excellence – realistic training, small-unit cohesion, ideological attachment, exemplary leadership, and adequate physical support – appear to have been universal, armies' widely differing abilities to implement and embody these factors was greatly determined by their societal and political environments.[9]

Watson thereby maintains a sharp dichotomy between essentially fixed 'martial' demands and ever changing societal and political spheres. This understanding can also be found in the recent 'performative turn' in the cohesion literature which assumes the 'uncivil' nature of military training regimes and calls for a narrowly specialist 'task cohesion'.[10] In such approaches, society and politics are generally counted as an inhibitor to achieving what are assumed to be universally applicable, professional standards of military efficiency.

In this chapter, the focus will be on an intermediate, strategic level of cohesion that sits between the tactical and political levels as this can be considered the linchpin in the process which ensures that tactical units can deliver higher order socio-politically desired effects. In the abstract, I distinguish three general sources of strategic cohesion, which can each possess a horizontal and vertical aspect, as well as a hard, material, and soft, emotional, element. First, cohesion can be imposed upon soldiers from above through coercion. The threat and exemplary

administration of physical punishment – draconian discipline – can make armies cohere and act together under a superior will. A second way is the offer of reward, usually material. This can either be handed down by a superior authority, in the form of wages, or be group-generated, for example through the acquisition of loot. Thirdly, soldiers may be animated to act cohesively by feelings of loyalty, either (or ideally both) towards each other or towards a higher authority. Cohesion (and by implication, military effectiveness) that is coerced or bought, is generally regarded as greatly inferior to cohesion that is engendered by vertical feelings of national loyalty in particular. As the discussion of Delbrück will underline, loyalty aroused in soldiers and then channelled by the modern nation-state is widely believed the superior form. And, if the state so desires, it has the added advantage of commanding maximum respect for the laws of war. By contrast, pay and coercion are not believed to effectively inoculate against anti-social and lawless behaviour and especially not in war's chaotic and dangerously violent environment. Therefore, the argument goes, in the absence of the nation-state's emotional and material disciplining power, OAGs stand apart from society and so will naturally gravitate towards misbehaviour and excessive violence.

However, this reasoning might misjudge the importance of the nation-state as the key source of supra-small unit loyalty and exaggerate the degree of social isolation of OAGs. To judge whether this is the case, recruitment, solidarity and authority structures merit particular investigation. These are interesting not so much in their material manifestation as in the way they represent and tie in with wider socio-normative concerns. It is not unreasonable to assume that the need to recruit manpower would entail an effort to appeal to 'familiar' social networks held together by shared norms regarding acceptable forms of military service. Military solidarity structures, likewise, can be assumed to gravitate towards socially acceptable forms and not simply be mediated by the hard and narrow rules of combat efficiency or selfish elite interest. Finally, command authority is likely governed by prevailing norms regarding the vertical bonds of loyalty between (what we now term) officers and their men on the one hand and their social and political superiors on the other. Exploring these lines of inquiry would help explain why OAGs can display strong strategic resilience, even in the face of suffering sustained tactical defeats.

1.3 The Sources of Superior Strategic Cohesion: The Paradigmatic Narrative

The views on the 'right' and 'wrong' forms of cohesion which underpin the contemporary OAG debate are rooted in the supposed proof offered by the European military historical record. The paradigmatic narrative that was constructed by

military historians and military professionals in the 19th and early 20th century discerned a progressive storyline towards steadily increasing military effectiveness and superior forms of cohesion which drove out others represented by OAGs. This narrative was constructed around a history that traced the perfection of the art of war. A summation, and arguably *the* most sophisticated one, is the four-volume 'History of the Art of War in the Framework of Political History' by the German historian Hans Delbrück. This substantial work, which appeared at the beginning of the last century and was revised both before and after the First World War, covered Western military history from Antiquity to Napoleon.[11] It relied on certain key assumptions about what constituted the 'right' art of war and how it could best be attained. These assumptions still underpin and pervade, mostly silently, modern understandings, including those pertaining to strategic cohesion.[12] Therefore, Delbrück's exemplary work warrants a critical dissection.

Delbrück followed the Prussian general and military theorist, Carl von Clausewitz, in positing that war was the use of force to make an enemy do one's political will and that this objective was best achieved by making an enemy defenceless through destruction of his means of resistance.[13] This strategic aim has expressed itself throughout history most clearly and effectively in battle. Battle was central to Delbrück's project (and a legion of PhD students supplied him with analyses of major individual battles). The ability to fight a decisive, destructive battle required disciplined, cohesive forces as they could follow the superior, directive will of their commander. Without cohesion and order in the ranks victory in battle could not be achieved, and without this tactical ability battle could not be used to achieve the overall aims of the war. Delbrück's second central premise was that order and cohesion were a product of the prevailing 'political framework' and especially the reigning *Staatsverfassung*, a term which should be understood as the organisational framework that politically fuses nation and government. Its form and solidity predetermined the nature and effectiveness of the tactical unit on the battlefield, which in turn provided the foundation for an effective and artful strategy.

The story Delbrück constructed was one that privileged two sources of cohesion: the state and the nation. Delbrück saw the state as the major mechanism for organising what was the most fundamental and natural source of superior cohesion: bloodline. The Germanic tribes which brought down the Roman Empire, were such a prototypical example of national cohesion that they merited a full separate volume in his series. Although they lacked the 'political unity' (i.e., a modern state) to weld together their *Völkerschaften*, or tribes, they still possessed the key constituent cohesive unit of *Geschlechter* or kin groups, which was 'not arbitrarily constituted, but held together within the natural context of procreation and nurturing [Zeugung]'.[14] Consisting of '400 to 1,000, perhaps also sometimes up to 2,000 souls', they supplied the socio-military building blocks that wore down

the Roman legions. The tribes however did not operate very artfully because the connection between the 'free men' with their local leaders and kings was a loose one in the prevailing political framework. Their 'Stolz und Trotz', or 'pride and defiance', resisted subjugation,[15] and economic development was insufficient to provide kings with the wherewithal to mobilise and sustain them in large formations. The tribes fought well in small units because of their immediate sense of kinship. But their rudimentary tactics did not add up to artful strategy and the impossibility of strategy meant that the order of the Roman Empire was replaced by the disorder of the Middle Ages.

In the Middle Ages, monarchical political authority weakened. As the Germanic tribes gave up their semi-nomadic lifestyles by settling in the territory of the former Empire and subjugating its population, their kings struggled to maintain order. The rule of the 6th–7th century Merovingian royal dynasty over the Franks provides a telling example:

> The new analphabetic state rulers were not able to create a bureaucracy with account keeping, and neither did the Franks let themselves be disciplined, nor could the agricultural economy support a disciplined army funded by taxes. The unwarlike popular levies [of poor Gallo-Roman peasants] are without value: on this basis no military constitution is possible other than in the form of a special military class, and in a territorial state this constitution cannot be bureaucratic but must become feudal.[16]

This feudal system produced only small numbers of 'quality warriors',[17] who engaged in their own selfish pursuits once kings made them economically independent through the gifting of agricultural land in the form of fiefs. Warfare was privatised and the prevailing tactics were the tactics of the duel. Decisive battle all but disappeared and with it, strategy.

The Middle Ages thus represented something of an unfortunate interlude in the development of the art of war. Nations were unable to give bureaucratic form to their natural inclination to band together and subject themselves to a higher will representative of the public interest. Instead, the special group interests of a fragmented feudal nobility prevailed. Delbrück reflected a *Zeitgeist* that the nation-state represented the pinnacle of socio-political development and brought with them the highest form of military organisation. It is therefore not surprising that he did not always explain with great precision the political framework within which the detailed evidence had to be understood. He relied on a sympathetic readership which did not question the importance and beneficial existence of state, nation and modern European military organisation and operational practice.[18]

To Delbrück, and his contemporaries, the deep valley that was the Middle Ages was crossed when cohesive, mass infantry armies reappeared. Massed infantry was

more powerful and more capable of artful success than small, feudal cavalry armies because they relied on more developed economic and national support structures. Hence the closely packed squares of Swiss pikemen offered the first clear evidence that the art of war finally resumed its upward march in the 14th century. The Swiss, a Germanic tribe, combined mass with modern cohesion and discipline. Their finest hour came in 1476–77 when they decisively smashed the forces of feudalism in the great battles of Granson, Morat and Nancy and ended the imperial dreams of that most chivalrous knight, Charles the Bold, Duke of Burgundy. If the Swiss eventually underperformed it was because their tactical, national cohesion was not matched by the development of statehood and commensurate strategic cohesion. They became mercenaries who served, not their own national political interest, but the interests of other rulers and their nascent states. In other words, by serving the foreign interests of the highest bidder they fatally compromised their strategic utility and effect. As with the Germanic tribes, horizontal tactical cohesion without vertical strategic cohesion provided only a fleetingly successful model.

The European monarchies nonetheless built on this model. They tried to exploit horizontal cohesion while expanding the vertical ties of loyalty to themselves. However, surprisingly, for all the political wisdom rediscovered in the Renaissance, they did not follow the logical step of national state army formation. Instead, Delbrück writes,

> Progress followed a route which no theorist had proposed, no philosopher had constructed, and no one had foreseen. The mercenary bands were not replaced by a soldiery of a different [read: national] origin, but instead they changed character and now stayed permanently with the colours to become standing armies.[19]

So, over time companies of mercenaries were no longer recruited for each war, but monarchs established permanent standing armies of regularly paid soldiers. Economic development and attendant population growth facilitated this process. They enabled the state, with a steadily improving tax collecting bureaucracy, to mobilise the increasingly abundant manpower. Armies grew not only larger but, due to their permanence, could also be trained better. Vertical cohesion among the soldiers, who hailed from many different nations and were often pressed into service or forced into it out of economic desperation, was only weakly assured by years of tedious garrison life and low pay. The key element keeping armies together was coercive discipline – an unreliable instrument as proven by the extremely high rates of desertion in early modern standing armies.[20]

Delbrück sees the state emerge as an organism which initially exists independently of people (whom it treats as an object) and government.[21] He thereby neatly sidesteps the thorny issue in Wilhelmine Germany and elsewhere in Europe

of which constitutional relationship between people and ruler benefits national defence most: democracy or monarchy (and which explains why he did not continue his history beyond Napoleon).[22] Germany is fortunate that empire and nation overlap after unification in 1871. National conscription henceforth creates an effective, cohesive army which embodies the fusion between monarchical state and people. Regime type matters less than the confluence of state and nation. Delbrück can therefore also sidestep a core element of the French Revolutionary legacy. He is not totally blind to the democratic revolutionary forces that animated the French army after 1789 (although the word 'democracy' barely features in his work), but, in the end, 'for us [i.e., Delbrück] the only thing that is decisive is the new army constitution [*Kriegsverfassung*], which first gave birth to new tactics and from which a new strategy blossomed'.[23] It is thus not the French democratic *Staatsverfassung* that gave French armies their cohesive edge, but, as subsequently in Germany, a *Kriegsverfassung* rooted in national self-awareness.

Delbrück explained the logic behind these new tactics, embodied in the loose formations of *tirailleurs* or skirmishers which swarmed across the French Revolutionary battlefields, in the summation that appears towards the end of his final volume:

> the entire art of war moves between two poles or fundamental forces: the bravery and the competence of the individual, and the cohesion, the solidity of the tactical body. The two extreme forms are on the one hand the knight, who is completely geared towards individual performance, and the salvo-firing infantry battalion of Frederick the Great in which the individual is pressed like a part into a machine in a way that can even make unwilling elements useful. *Tirailleur* combat, regulated and directed from above, tries to unite the advantages of the tactical unit with the advantages of the goodwill of the individual. Precondition for this adaptation therefore is soldier material which can be assumed to bring goodwill. The mercenaries of old possessed such goodwill when they let themselves be hired voluntarily. These armies however could only be small. The growth in army size brought with it a worse type of soldier. The new idea of defence of the Fatherland not only brought a further enlargement, but also in this mass a will so superior that on its back new tactics could be developed.[24]

This sums up a view that is drenched in political-ideological biases which continue to underpin narratives of 'proper' army order. If so desired, it could also be combined seamlessly with increasing liberal-democratic proclivities.[25] Individual, patriotically inspired goodwill would naturally be reinforced by the individual's stake in regime and state which democracy guaranteed. Patriotism and democracy – separately or together, depending on political preference – continue to be considered the most effective cornerstones of a politically and strategically cohesive

army. This is the socio-political construct that successfully wrested violence from the hands of OAGs. The story seems so straightforward that it no longer requires questioning. A mark of its self-evidence is the shift in focus in cohesion research since 1945 to the tactical level, that is, the place where the main remaining issue must be overcome: humanity's deep, innate fear of unnatural, violent death.[26]

Although there exists a realisation that the European model is not universal (or universally appreciated), it is nonetheless puzzling that Western and Western-type armed forces, despite their supposed superior tactical cohesion and combat efficiency, are struggling to get the better of the OAGs that are on the rise around the world. The issue of vertical strategic cohesion seems therefore to demand renewed attention. As a starting point, Delbrück's framework remains useful because it does not see cohesion as merely a small unit, tactical (or micro-analytical) concept. Particularly valuable is the subordination of the tactical to the strategic and the positioning of the whole within a 'political framework'. Delbrück may have attached too much providential power to the state and he may also have overvalued nationalism and the importance of battlefield decision, but the idea that armed forces derive their cohesion and effectiveness from broader socio-political structures is worth emphasising with respect to both OAGs and regular armies.

1.4 The Social Embeddedness of OAGs

The common framing of OAGs as representing private self-interest, as opposed to the higher public, national interest mediated by state authority, indicates that OAGs are not regarded as an integral part of society and that their interests conflict with those of wider society. As human societies are often seen as predominantly civilian in nature and thus unarmed and peaceful, this perception accentuates both the victim status of civilians and the foreignness of OAGs. It is readily assumed that private violence must historically, as it is now in Western liberal countries, have been deemed socially unacceptable by the majority. Therefore, those recruited for such a socially dubious occupation as the military must come from the margins of society under the (mis)direction of a selfish and quarrelsome elite. Greed and desperation are seen as prime motivators for becoming a common soldier, just as power and riches are for the opportunistic warlord.[27] Their wars are thus also generally considered a form of extreme anti-social behaviour, in which the perpetrators' marginal position in society pushes their use of force towards brutality and atrocity. Extreme violence is a weapon of the unregulated and illegitimate, used to promote an indefensible position.

In the modern liberal-democratic variant of Delbrück's nationalist thesis, civil society overcame this scourge by funding – with the fruits extracted from their

industrious middle classes – the state which organised and disciplined a 'regular' army.[28] This army was the ultimate guarantor of internal and external security. With the spread of states across the globe, the re-emergence of OAGs is logically seen as resulting from the failure of some states to provide properly for their people. States in which extractive mechanisms are only used to serve the narrow, private self-interest of a small elite and to fund coercive structures, are vulnerable either to other factions which eye the riches to which control of the state gives access, or to popular uprising.[29] If state capacity is insufficiently developed to effect a more equitable division of national spoils, or if economic development is deficient, then popular dissatisfaction is likely to give rise to OAGs (as in Sudan and Yemen recently, or also in the Congo, Libya, Somalia, Mali, Iraq and Afghanistan). These, in all likelihood commanded by selfish politico-military entrepreneurs and drawing their manpower from the destitute and desperate, fight each other and oppress and exploit a civil society in an increasingly desperate struggle to squeeze whatever sustenance can be had from a society without a functioning economy. The ensuing disorder brings brutal warfare engulfing civilians.[30]

The cohesion of such groups, however, should be weak. The armies of the desperate and dispossessed should be no match for the well-ordered and disciplined ranks of a properly constituted regular army. And if no such is available in-country, the introduction of a foreign professional force should have little difficulty in dealing with such unpopular forces. Recent Western interventions tell a different story, however. OAGs have proved a tenacious enemy. Even more puzzling is the weakness of indigenous 'civil society' support for the foreign forces of order. Why have the populations in Iraq and Afghanistan preferred being left to the forces of anarchy and internal disorder and not overwhelmingly and openly sided with the intervention forces? Could it be that the OAGs are embedded more deeply within their local societies than the paradigmatic Western narrative suggests? Do they perhaps possess sources of cohesion and sustenance that are not easily trumped by those of modern Western-type armies? And critically, do these reach beyond the small primary group, and its concern with immediate survival, and instead rely on a broader, socially supported and strategically operative form of cohesion?

These possibilities can be developed further by first questioning the ways in which OAGs are raised. Europe's history can offer instructive lessons. While the traditional view of past OAG recruitment may be little different from contemporary understandings of their modern brethren, a fresh look at the evidence offers a different picture that presents material assistance for re-framing contemporary OAG analysis. The prevailing perceptions of the late medieval and early modern mercenary market and the press gangs that supposedly roamed Europe to fill the standing armies of the 18th century, rely on an assumption that early modern military recruitment utilised an essentially unregulated, free market of ample,

cheap and (very) low quality supply meeting ample demand. A typical view by the esteemed French military historian André Corvisier holds that these armies were

> a refuge for all those who desired to escape constraints of all kinds: sons rebelling against parental authority or fleeing punishment, evading family constraints; young men unable to endure social constraints, the restrictions of the parish, village or district community; or with no taste for work and thus avoiding judicial control; delinquents … men threatened by lawsuits or using the enlistment bonus to pay serious debts …. Enlistment was a means of escaping from miserable poverty. Recruiting was easiest in times of scarcity and famine.[31]

This is an army, to cite three other prominent historians in one breath, in which 'stateless' (*apatride*) equates to 'faithless' and an 'absolute conscienceless mentality'.[32] Such judgements can be transferred with minor adjustment to modern OAGs. The rootless, socially excluded and poor are widely believed to provide the foot-soldiers for the groups that roam the battlefields of West, East North and Central Africa, as well as the Greater Middle East.

However, an alternative look at early modern European patterns of recruitment and organisation suggests that this view is exaggerated and may even be fundamentally mistaken. Commanders were concerned with recruiting and maintaining a loyal, dependable soldiery and relied on extensive social, affinity networks to put together their armed groups. The absence of state authority did not impair this system that relied on personal connection and patronage. What is more, the emerging state armies, arguably, were weaker because the relative remoteness of monarch and government and the abstract quality of the state weakened the all-important personal, vertical bonds of loyalty.

That personal bonds of loyalty were prized is reflected in a surprisingly uniform nomenclature across Europe for military organisational forms. Throughout much of the Middle Ages, the key military unit was the noble lord with his household, which included his kin but, depending on the lord's economic means, ambition and success, extended more widely to people who were 'familiar' to him and his kin.[33] In the later Middle Ages, this system morphed into one that went under the labels of companies led by captains.[34] The denomination of the leader as captain or 'head', instead of lord, may be taken to mark that the relationship between leader and followers becomes more impersonal and less socially restricted. However, the idea of the company, which contains the words for sharing bread together, remains one that prizes a close, personal connection. To the extent that historians have studied the topic, this is backed up by the patterns of recruitment. They sought to avoid forced conscription as well as the poor.[35] The general preference was for a voluntary association between soldier and captain, underpinned by a mutual sense of affinity. There was a further strong bias towards men of some

means – which was underlined by the expectation that they acquire their own equipment.[36]

The administrative records studied by historians as a primary source on recruitment are usually silent on these personal bonds of familiarity and solidarity.[37] However, from other types of sources one can better see that the relationship between captain and men is habitually described in familial terms. In a letter from 1574, the Spanish captain and nobleman Francisco de Valdes addressed his (mutinying) men in Flanders as 'muy magnificos señores y hijos mios' (my magnificent gentlemen and children) and signed 'su padre que los ama y servira' (your father who loves and serves you).[38] Although the verbal genuflection may be read as marking a degree of desperation to get his men back into line, the labels are significant. Valdes clearly believed that the respectful form of address fulfilled legitimate, mutual expectations. Mutiny was, moreover, a permissible collective and therefore highly regulated endeavour, suggesting horizontal and vertical ties remained operative even in the exceptional circumstance of mutiny.[39] The main issue was furthermore not simply monetary. If pay arrears (which were standard practice) mattered most, then, as one major historian concluded, 'all the troops would have revolted'.[40] Instead, one oft-cited motive was humiliation by superiors,[41] suggesting again a strong desire to maintain proper vertical bonds.

The personal connection was not lost in the next stage of organisation with regiments under colonels. Even though the nomenclature no longer immediately recalled a familial bond between officers and men, the accepted practice of ownership of the regiment by the colonel betrayed a continuing sense that they had a special duty of care for their men, stronger and more important than that represented by a distant emergent state bureaucracy.[42]

Late medieval captains and early modern colonels, even of Swiss and Hussite mercenary units, continued to be drawn overwhelmingly from the nobility.[43] Since nobility was judged synonymous with a martial ethos, military service thus was a special calling that a 'gentleman and soldier' performed out of a sense of duty to his estate and on which basis he could also command authority and respect from his soldiery. It would, however, be a mistake to think that nobles grasped any and every opportunity to exhibit selfish martial behaviour and that great unruliness ensued. Loyalty to a higher authority mattered. This authority had a strong personal aspect and was nested in a web of complex conditionality. Familiarity, which implied mutual obligation, was a key aspect, but what mattered equally was whether the relationship was a rightful one. Lords, captains and colonels could only go to war if they provided military service to a rightful overlord who pursued a just cause. A simple contract to provide service in return for pay was insufficient. That would have made them mercenaries – a universally detested category of people that never included oneself but, much like the modern label of terrorist, only others accused

of not pursuing rightful war. National allegiance was not a primary factor in this web either. Instead, the personal bond grounded in familiarity and affinity implied identification with the overlord's legitimate cause. The combination of these two elements solidified the solidarity network and determined the cohesive strength of the OAG.

The practical importance of this normative framework underpinning strategic cohesion can be illustrated by reference to a famous late 16th century treatise, the 'Discours politiques et militaires', by the French Huguenot captain, François de La Noue. It also shows the subtle, and easy to miss, differences from modern understandings of the sources of strategic cohesion. He entitled his 9th *Discours:* 'Que ceste grande affection que les François ont d'aller cercher les guerres estrangeres, leur est maintenant plus nuisible que profitable', which can be seemingly straightforwardly translated as 'That this great affection which the French have of going in search of foreign wars, is today more detrimental to them than profitable'.[44] However, it does not mean that a discourse follows advising against fighting abroad for selfish pecuniary gain. The careful choice of words instead sums up the moral-political ambiguities and tensions that required careful negotiation and remained vital ingredients for maintaining strategic cohesion: the negative/positive meaning of 'affection', as both fad and expression of genuine love of war as a vocation and legitimate interest; the material/immaterial sense of 'profitable', of war offering legitimate and illegitimate opportunities for obtaining both plunder and reputational gain, and the adjective 'estrangeres' denoting a particularly risky type of war — not in the sense of betraying one's own nation or state, but in finding the rightful ways of serving a rightful cause and authority with one's company which would maintain, exploit and even enhance strategic cohesion.

La Noue's own experience in the 'foreign' territories of the Netherlands in 1572 illustrates some of the practical challenges. In that year, La Noue found himself besieged in Mons with his Huguenot company. This was one of the early military events in the so-called Eighty Years' War as the result of which, as conventional history has it, the Protestant Dutch Republic emerged as an independent state from the clutches of despotic Catholic Spanish overrule. The easy labels to apply to besieged and besiegers would be Protestant and Catholic, or native Dutch rebels (or freedom fighters) *versus* foreign Spanish government troops. However, this is overly modern and simplistic. Contemporaries distinguished a town garrison composed of the city's population and a number of 'foreign' companies. The modern literature habitually describes them as Walloon, French, German and English companies, which easily misleads a modern reader into viewing them as foreign nationals (except for the Walloons) and therefore as illegitimate fighters. Such a reading obscures further what makes the town's defenders strategically coherent and wrongly suggests that they are mercenaries, men without any cause

but money. Contemporaries used regional denotations as well, but the common alternative of the captain's name indicates that his socio-political affiliation is the more important thing to look for: what solidarity network do they belong to and which individual with authority do they serve?

The fate of these companies after Mons surrenders, confirms this. The Walloons, French and townspeople are executed by the victorious besiegers. The German and English companies, however, are permitted 'to marche awaie in … order and libertie of minde' under the commander of all the town's forces, Count Louis of Nassau.[45] The reason for the sorry fate befalling the Walloon companies and townspeople is that they are judged rebels against their rightful Spanish-Hapsburg king, Philip II, while the French Huguenot companies are deemed rebels against their rightful king and ally of Philip, Charles IX. What may surprise modern readers more than the extreme punishment meted out to rebels, is that the English and German companies and the town's commander are saved because they could claim to serve a sovereign prince, William, the Prince of Orange, the elder brother of Louis of Nassau. Though in one interpretation the Low Countries' rebel leader against Philip, in another reading William possessed the right to wage war against his fellow prince as sovereign of the principality of Orange, in the south of France. The victorious 'Spanish' commander, in this early stage of revolt, made the more merciful choice permitted by the politico-strategic *mores* of the time.

He also chose overtly to ignore a key source of solidarity that tied the 'rebels' together politically: their Protestant faith. This (and fulfilling his martial vocation) was the key reason for joining the fight for La Noue (who had extricated himself from Mons just in time) and his affinity. Perhaps not surprisingly, La Noue later advocated the use of 'forces naturelles' over 'les estrangers' – but that did not mean relying on one's own nationals, but rather on men who formed part of the more traditional web of legitimately warring solidarities.[46] This was a complicated and tricky socio-political environment to negotiate for any captain and his company but it did not entail the mere selfish pursuit of material gain. At the root of this perhaps strange form of regulated warfare, lay forms of vertical, strategic cohesion that structured and strongly embedded OAGs within political society and which also formed the basis for regulated warfare.

The affinity networks that governed recruitment and organisation, even more so than the web of rules governing conduct, possessed a great deal of permanence and solidity. This is reflected further in the striking level of militarisation of society. Some historians rightly speak of an 'osmosis between "civil" and "military" activities', which highlights that the civil had not yet emerged as a distinct recognised category.[47] And it is not simply the nobility whose search for loyal armed followers relied on durable solidarity networks that stretched its tentacles deep into society. The many fortified towns of the region contained communities within their walls

which in times of emergency could mobilise the *entire* adult population, and also a good number of children.[48] Even the countryside, where Delbrück saw the 'unwarlike country folk' reside, had a population which possessed a significant readiness for collective use of force. The old Germanic idea of communal defence (*lantweri* or *landwehr*)[49] had never completely disappeared and opportunities to resist armed raiders from the many feuding communities and counties, or engage in a little raiding against neighbours themselves, occurred at regular intervals.[50] For the maritime parts of the country, one can add the opportunities offered by seaborne trade of which licenced privateering, on the captain and company model, was an integral part. The effectiveness and cohesion of these various forces may have varied significantly, but the existence of this vast pool of willing manpower, organised in affinity networks that were prepared for and accustomed to insecurity, violence and warfare, means that a stable and socially resilient infrastructure existed in which OAGs thrived.[51]

Even this brief analysis of the Low Countries' experience indicates that the issue of strategic cohesion can be understood very differently from the established, Delbrückian, nation-state focused narrative. What is in evidence is a form of strategic cohesion which largely operated without the coercive and remunerative powers of the state or the supposedly natural lure of national identity. The great social capacity for organised warfare of early modern society leads to three general observations. First, it is too simplistic to see early modern OAGs as composed of a violent and uncontrollable minority of outcasts. The extensive recruitment, solidarity and authority structures suggest otherwise. Second, these structures both drew on and sustained a thoroughly militarised society that did not clearly recognise civil and military as distinct categories. OAGs were thus deeply embedded in society not only in structural but also normative terms. This helps explain why conflict in this period was so intractable and why state structures struggled to assert authority. With their fundamentally different recruitment, command and loyalty structures, they could not assert themselves but after a long period of slow normative change that elevated nation and state to its modern pinnacle of affection. In short, one should not exaggerate the existence of any 'natural' opportunity for the state to establish order with armed forces held together by coercion, reward, or feelings of national loyalty.

1.5 Conclusion: Implications for the Study of Modern OAGs

When one tries to connect the historically informed framework presented in this chapter to modern OAGs and asks similar questions regarding recruitment, solidarity and authority structures in order to get a sense of their strategic cohesion and

resilience, one generally draws a blank from the literature. Instead, one is offered tropes derived from the paradigmatic, nation-state-centred narrative outlined above. A common assumption is that OAGs must enjoy little core support among the population. The rank and file must be driven by poverty and despair. They are either victims of a rapacious and power-hungry elite of local warlords, or of prophets wielding some deformed, usually religiously based extremist ideology.[52] In short, they are assumed to lack strategic cohesion. One would therefore expect them easily to fold when faced by a force consisting of state-sponsored, national, ethnically blind and depoliticised armies of properly paid and professionally trained soldiers.

The direct experience of Western forces in irregular, expeditionary warfare of the past twenty-five years tells a different story. In Afghanistan, they never decisively got the better of the Taliban and in the end gave up and withdrew. In Iraq, they struggled with a little more success, but a modicum of order never included the successful rebuilding of a unitary state defended by a national army. ISIS was largely defeated, but that was arguably due to a combination of the 'foreignness' of the movement and many of its adherents,[53] and the resistance of local, militia-type Kurdish and Shi'a OAGs. The Western-trained Iraqi regular state army collapsed on first contact with ISIS in 2014. So did the regular Afghan national army in 2021, after abandonment by the West.

Even when it comes to regular, interstate war closer to home, in Ukraine one witnesses the strange phenomenon of the relative ineffectiveness of state structures in mobilising society for war. Instead, as the introduction to this volume elaborates, there is a great reliance on volunteerism, whether it concerns finding recruits for the armed forces or industrial support. It is notable that neither Ukraine nor Russia, after three years of major war and with little immediate prospect of major success for either, have implemented the classic means of nation-state defence, full conscription. This suggests that social structures that recruit effectively, induce loyalty and hold authority are escaping from the control of classic state structures. What is more, to the extent that the state still controls armed forces, they represent only part of the society those states claim to govern and defend. This may not immediately surprise in the case of the oligarchic Russian state (although for a state built on the centralised, coercive models of the Czarist and Soviet states it does). In the case of the democratic Ukrainian state that is fighting for its survival, the development does raise questions not heretofore usually associated with the modern history of nation-states.

All this suggests that the Western nation-state and its particular type of army organisation is no sure incubator of 'forces naturelles' and that insurgent 'estrangers' are increasingly better able to tap into a social infrastructure that can sustain significant recruitment levels and instil effective fighting practices. The

implication is that we should no longer ignore the issue of strategic cohesion and that it is time to revisit the paradigmatic narrative that nation-state armed forces possess the highest possible levels of strategic cohesion and therefore constitute the pre-eminent instrument of military superiority. A recognition seems overdue that this form of organisation offers but one model of military effectiveness that moreover may have had its time without a clear recognition of the strengths of their rising competitors. For the study of alternatives, it seems useful to begin an investigation with the proposed triad of normatively defined social structures: recruitment, solidarity and authority. They, after all, determine the strength of OAG embeddedness within society on which their military resilience is predicated. In that way, to once more recall La Noue's words, we can find the ultimate source of their 'affection' for war.

Acknowledgements

The author thanks his 'Organized Armed Groups' project partners Jann Kleffner and Lisa Hultman at the then Swedish National Defence College for support and suggestions, as well as David Trim and Mats Berdal for their comments. He also thanks Ilmari Käihkö for the opportunity to present a very early version of this chapter at the workshop on 'The Origins of Military Cohesion: Broadening the Perspective', at the Swedish Defence University, 3–4 December 2015. The author finally gratefully acknowledges funding from the Swedish Research Council, grant, 421-2010-1771, for the project 'Organised Armed Groups and the Laws of War: Challenges and Prospects'.

Notes

1 The nomenclature varies. I prefer OAG over, for example, 'Non-State Armed Actor', which sets up (with potentially dire consequences, as this chapter will argue) the 'state armed actor' as a positive benchmark; or the overly diffuse 'armed group'. The adjective 'organised' implies a level of strategic control and direction and so serious potential socio-political effect and danger. It was therefore the term chosen in the Swedish Research Council-funded project which supported research for this chapter. See also Kleffner, 'The Applicability of International Humanitarian Law to Organized Armed Groups', p. 444, n. 1.

2 Despite Delbrück's importance, no full intellectual biography exists. The seminal introduction remains Craig, 'Delbrück: The Military Historian'.

3 For example, Siebold, 'The Essence of Military Group Cohesion' and King, *The Combat Soldier*.

4 King, 'On Cohesion', p. 10.

5 Stouffer, *The American Soldier*, Vol. 2: *Combat and Its Aftermath*; Stouffer et al., *Studies in Social Psychology in World War II*; Sarkesian, ed., *Combat Effectiveness*; Kellett, *Combat Motivation*.

6 Moskos, *The American Enlisted Man*, p. 147.
7 Watson, 'Culture and Combat in the Western World, 1900–1945', p. 545.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
10 King, 'On Cohesion', pp. 10–12.
11 Delbrück, *Geschichte der Kriegskunst*, 4 Vols. An English translation by Walter J. Renfroe Jr was published as *History of the Art of War* by the University of Nebraska Press in 1990.
12 Almost any history of the evolution of warfare will do: e.g., Strachan, *European Armies and the Conduct of War*; McNeill, *The Pursuit of Power*; Seabury and Codevilla, *War: Ends and Means*; Jones, *The Art of War in the Western World*; and Nolan, *The Allure of Battle*. For different approaches, see Van Creveld, *The Culture of War* and Whitman, *The Verdict of Battle.*
13 Clausewitz, *On War*, Bk I, Ch. 1, § 2 and Ch. 2.
14 Delbrück, *Geschichte*, II, p. 3.
15 Ibid., p. 9.
16 Ibid., p. 460.
17 Ibid., p. 459.
18 See also Hintze, *Staatsverfassung und Heeresverfassung*.
19 Delbrück, *Geschichte*, IV, p. 255.
20 For an excellent revisionist narrative, undermining the nationalist and mercenary narratives, see Berkovich, *Motivation in War.*
21 Delbrück, *Geschichte*, IV, p. 257.
22 For France, where this made for great overt political instability, see Challener, *The French Theory of the Nation in Arms*. See also Hippler, *Citizens, Soldiers and National Armies* and Walter, *Preußische Heeresreformen.*
23 Delbrück, *Geschichte*, IV, p. 467.
24 Ibid., pp. 473–474.
25 For example, Paret, *Yorck and the Era of Prussian Reform*, p. 76 (citing Delbrück).
26 See the extensive discussion on 'Fear and Loathing' in Mann, *On Wars*, pp. 311–412, esp. 361–377.
27 Corvisier, *Armées et sociétés en Europe*; Mann, *On Wars*, pp. 201–202; McCord, *The Power of the Gun*; Honig, Review of *Söldner aus Böhmen*; Giustozzi, *Empires of Mud*; Marten, *Warlords*; Trabulsi and Raford, *Warlords Inc.*
28 Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States*; Downing, *The Military Revolution and Political Change*; Porter, *War and the Rise of the State*.
29 Berdal and Malone, eds, *Greed & Grievance*; Cheng, *Extra-Legal Groups in Post-Conflict Liberia.*
30 Münkler, *Die neuen Kriege*; Kaldor, *New and Old Wars*.
31 Quoted in Trim, 'Fighting "Jacob's Wars"', p. 67, from Corvisier, *Armées*, pp. 144–145.
32 Contamine, *La guerre au Moyen Age*, p. 205; Redlich, *The German Military Enterpriser*, I, p. 118; Oman, *A History of the Art of War*, p. 38.
33 Bloch, *La société féodale*; McFarlane, *England in the Fifteenth Century*; Heers, *Le clan familial au Moyen Age.*
34 Contamine, *Guerre*, pp. 275–306.
35 Trim, 'Fighting "Jacob's Wars"', pp. 224–286.
36 Contamine, *Guerre*, pp. 325–326; Wood, *The King's Army*, p. 97.
37 Ibid., pp. 91–92, 135–138. For the deep prosopographical, genealogical and topographical knowledge required, see the introduction in McFarlane, *The Nobility of Later Medieval England*, esp. p. xxviii.

[38] Reproduced in facsimile in Parker, *The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road*, p. 201. This is not an isolated example: cf. ibid., p. 200 and L. Van der Essen, 'Kritisch onderzoek', XII, 1 (1950), I, p. 16 and XV, 4 (1953), III, p. 6.

[39] Parker, *Army of Flanders*, pp. 185–206. See also Trim, 'Ideology, Greed and Social Discontent', pp. 47–61.

[40] Parker, *Army of Flanders*, p. 198.

[41] Ibid., pp. 199–202.

[42] Which, contrary to the conventional narrative, remained highly effective into the 18th century: Berkovich, *Motivation*.

[43] Redlich, *Military Enterpriser*, I, p. 413; Hitz, *Kämpfen um Sold*, pp. 115, 162; Tresp, *Söldner aus Böhmen.*

[44] De La Noue, *Discours politiques et militaires*, pp. 209–228.

[45] Thomas Churchyard, quoted in Trim, 'Fighting "Jacob's Wars"', p. 76.

[46] Ibid., p. 74.

[47] Bély, Bérenger and Corvisier, *Guerre et paix dans l'Europe*, I, pp. 23–24.

[48] For the 1572–1573 siege of Haarlem, see the eye-witness account by Verwer, *Memoriaelbouck*, pp. 29, 34, 50, 94, 106.

[49] Verbruggen, 'De militaire dienst in het Graafschap Vlaanderen', pp. 437, 446–449; De Graaf, *Oorlog om Holland*, pp. 36–38.

[50] For example, Van Nierop, *Treason in the Northern Quarter*, pp. 86, 88, 107.

[51] Gunn, Grummitt and Cools, *War, State, and Society in England and the Netherlands*; Trim, 'Army, Society and Military Professionalism in the Netherlands during the Eighty Years' War', pp. 268–289.

[52] For a discussion of the literature regarding Afghanistan, see Honig and Käihkö, 'An Exemplary Defeat: The West in Afghanistan'.

[53] Bourhous, Poignant Khafagi and Tartir, 'Strengthening Social Cohesion in the Nineveh Plains of Iraq'.

Bibliography

Bély, Lucien, Jean Bérenger and André Corvisier. *Guerre et paix dans l'Europe du XVIIe siècle*, 2nd ed. Paris: Sedes, 1991, Vol. I.

Berdal, Mats, and David M. Malone, eds. *Greed & Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars.* Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 2000.

Berkovich, Ilya. *Motivation in War: The Experience of Common Soldiers in Old-Regime Europe.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017.

Bloch, Marc. *La société féodale.* Paris: Albin Michel, 1978; orig. 1939–1940.

Bourhous, Amal, Emelie Poignant Khafagi and Alaa Tartir. 'Strengthening Social Cohesion in the Nineveh Plains of Iraq: Issues of Common Concern and Local Cooperative Solutions', Stockholm: SIPRI Research Policy Paper (August 2024).

Challener, Richard D. *The French Theory of the Nation in Arms, 1866–1939*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1955.

Cheng, Christine. *Extra-legal Groups in Post-Conflict Liberia: How Trade Makes the State*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018.

Clausewitz, Carl von. *On War,* tr. J. J. Graham, introd. Jan Willem Honig. New York: Barnes & Noble, 2004.

Contamine, Philippe. *La Guerre au Moyen Age*, 6th ed. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2003.

Corvisier, André. *Armées et sociétés en Europe de 1494 à 1789*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1976.

Craig, Gordon A. 'Delbrück: The Military Historian', in Peter Paret, ed. *Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986, pp. 326–353.

De Graaf, Ronald. *Oorlog om Holland, 1000–1375*. Hilversum: Verloren, 1996.

Delbrück, Hans. *Geschichte der Kriegskunst im Rahmen der politischen Geschichte*, Vol. IV: *Neuzeit.* Berlin: De Gruyter, 1920.

Delbrück, Hans. *Geschichte der Kriegskunst im Rahmen der politischen Geschichte,* Vol. II: *Die Germanen*, 3rd ed. Berlin: De Gruyter, 1921.

Downing, Brian M. *The Military Revolution and Political Change: Origins of Democracy and Autocracy in Early Modern Europe.* Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992.

Giustozzi, Antonio. *Empires of Mud: Wars and Warlords in Afghanistan*. London: Hurst, 2009.

Gunn, Stephen, David Grummitt and Hans Cools. *War, State, and Society in England and the Netherlands, 1477–1559*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.

Heers, Jacques. *Le clan familial au Moyen Age: Étude sur les structures politiques et sociales des milieux urbains*. Paris: Quadrige, 1993.

Hintze, Otto. *Staatsverfassung und Heeresverfassung*. Dresden: Zahn & Jaensch, 1906; tr. as 'Military Organization and the Organization of the State'. In *The Historical Essays of Otto Hintze*, edited by Felix Gilbert. New York: Oxford University Press, 1975.

Hippler, Thomas. *Citizens, Soldiers and National Armies: Military Service in France and Germany, 1789–1830*. Abingdon: Routledge, 2008.

Hitz, Benjamin. *Kämpfen um Sold: Eine Alltags- und Sozialgeschichte schweizerischer Söldner in der Frühen Neuzeit*. Cologne: Böhlau, 2015.

Honig, Jan Willem, and Ilmari Käihkö. 'An Exemplary Defeat: The West in Afghanistan, 2001–2021', *Armed Forces & Society* 49, no. 4 (October 2023), pp. 989–1000. https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X221101364.

Honig, Jan Willem. Review of *Söldner aus Böhmen, Im Dienst deutscher Fürsten: Kriegsgeschäft und Heeresorganisation im 15. Jahrhundert*, by Uwe Tresp. *German History* 24, no. 2 (2006), pp. 295–296. https://doi.org/10.1177/0266355406024002O8.

Jones, Archer. *The Art of War in the Western World*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1989.

Kaldor, Mary. *New and Old Wars: Organised Violence in a Global Era*, 3rd ed. Cambridge: Polity, 2012.

Kellett, Anthony. *Combat Motivation: The Behavior of Soldiers in Battle*. Boston: Kluwer-Nijhoff, 1982.

King, Anthony. *The Combat Soldier: Infantry Tactics and Cohesion in the Twentieth and Twenty-First Centuries*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.

King, Anthony. 'On Cohesion'. In *Frontline: Combat and Cohesion in the Twenty-First Century*, edited by Anthony King. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015, pp. 3–23.

Kleffner, Jann K. 'The Applicability of International Humanitarian Law to Organized Armed Groups' *International Review of the Red Cross* 93, no. 882 (June 2011), pp. 443–461. doi: 10.1017/S181638311200001X.

La Noue, François de. *Discours politiques et militaires*, ed. F. E. Sutcliffe. Geneva: Droz, 1967.

Mann, Michael. *On Wars*. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2023.

Marten, Kimberley. *Warlords: Strong-Arm Brokers in Weak States*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2012.

McCord, Edward A. *The Power of the Gun: The Emergence of Modern Chinese Warlordism.* Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1993.

McFarlane, K. B. *The Nobility of Later Medieval England*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973.

McFarlane, K. B. *England in the Fifteenth Century: Collected Essays*. London: Hambledon, 1981.

McNeill, William H. *The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force, and Society since A.D. 1000*, 2nd ed. Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1984.

Moskos, Charles. *The American Enlisted Man: The Rank and File in Today's Military*. New York: Sage, 1970.

Münkler, Herfried. *Die neuen Kriege*. Berlin: Rowohlt, 2004.

Nolan, Cathal J. *The Allure of Battle: A History of How Wars Have Been Won and Lost*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2017.

Oman, Charles. *A History of the Art of War in the Sixteenth Century*. London: Methuen, 1937.

Paret, Peter. *Yorck and the Era of Prussian Reform, 1807–1815*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1966.

Parker, Geoffrey. *The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road, 1567–1659: The Logistics of Spanish Victory and Defeat*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972.

Porter, Bruce D. *War and the Rise of the State: The Military Foundation of Modern Politics*. New York: Free Press, 1994.

Redlich, Fritz. *The German Military Enterpriser and His Work Force*. Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1964, Vol. I.

Sarkesian, Sam C., ed. *Combat Effectiveness: Cohesion, Stress, and the Volunteer Military*. Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1980.

Seabury, Paul, and Angelo Codevilla. *War: Ends and Means*. New York: Basic Books, 1989.

Siebold, Guy L. 'The Essence of Military Group Cohesion'. *Armed Forces & Society* 33, no. 2 (2007), pp. 286–295.

Stouffer, Samuel A. *The American Soldier*, Vol. 2: *Combat and Its Aftermath*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1949.

Stouffer, Samuel A., et al., *Studies in Social Psychology in World War II: Measurement and Prediction*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1950.

Strachan, Hew. *European Armies and the Conduct of War*. London: Allen & Unwin, 1983.

Tilly, Charles. *Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990–1990*. Oxford: Blackwell, 1990.

Trabulsi, Andrew, and Noah Raford, eds. *Warlords Inc.: Black Markets, Broken States, and the Rise of the Warlord Entrepreneur*. Berkeley, Calif.: North Atlantic Books, 2015.

Tresp, Uwe. *Söldner aus Böhmen, Im Dienst deutscher Fürsten: Kriegsgeschäft und Heeresorganisation im 15. Jahrhundert*. Paderborn: Schöningh, 2004.

Trim, David J.B. 'Ideology, Greed and Social Discontent in Early Modern Europe: Mercenaries and Mutinies in the Rebellious Netherlands, 1568–1609'. In *Rebellion, Repression, Reinvention: Mutiny in Comparative Contexts*, edited by Jane Hathaway. Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2001, pp. 47–61.

Trim, David J.B. 'Fighting "Jacob's Wars": The Employment of English and Welsh Mercenaries in the European Wars of Religion: France and the Netherlands, 1562–1610'. PhD Diss., King's College London, 2002.

Trim, David J.B. 'Army, Society and Military Professionalism in the Netherlands during the Eighty Years' War'. In *The Chivalric Ethos and the Development of Military Professionalism*, edited by David J.B. Trim. Leiden: Brill, 2003, pp. 268–289.

Van der Essen, L. 'Kritisch onderzoek betreffende de oorlogvoering van het Spaanse leger in de Nederlanden in de XVIe eeuw'. *Mededelingen van de Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie voor Wetenschappen, Letteren en Schone Kunsten van België* XII, 1 (1950), and XV, 4 (1953).

Van Creveld, Martin. *The Culture of War*. Stroud: Spellmount, 2008.

Van Nierop, Henk. *Treason in the Northern Quarter: War, Terror, and the Rule of Law in the Dutch Revolt*, tr. J. C. Grayson. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2009.

Verbruggen, J.F. 'De militaire dienst in het Graafschap Vlaanderen'. *Tijdschrift voor Rechtsgeschiedenis* 26 (1958), pp. 437–465.

Verwer, Willem Janszoon. *Memoriaelbouck, Dagboek van gebeurtenissen te Haarlem van 1572–1581*, ed. J. J. Temminck. Haarlem: Schuyt, 1973.

Walter, Dierk. *Preußische Heeresreformen, 1807–1870, Militärische Innovation und der Mythos der 'Roonschen Reform'*. Paderborn: Schöningh, 2003.

Watson, Alexander. 'Culture and Combat in the Western World, 1900–1945'. *Historical Journal* 51, no. 2 (2008), pp. 529–546. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0018246X0800681X.

Whitman, James Q. *The Verdict of Battle: The Law of Victory and the Making of Modern War*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2012.

Wood, James B. *The King's Army: Warfare, Soldiers, and Society during the Wars of Religion in France, 1562–1576*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

CHAPTER 2

The Diversification of Civilian Agency in Armed Conflict and the Protection of Civilians under International Humanitarian Law

Arjen Vermeer & Steven van der Put

Abstract

States have consistently employed civilians during situations of national defence. Yet, such practice seems at odds with the status of civilians as a protected group in international humanitarian law. Considering the practice of states using civilians for national defence purposes, this chapter explores the legality of this practice under contemporary international humanitarian law, most notably the principles of distinction and precaution. Despite authoritative statements to the contrary and concerns over the protection of civilians, our analysis of the general protection of civilians evident in international humanitarian law, the principle of distinction, and the principle of precaution ultimately suggests that the practice of using civilians for national defence purposes does not violate the obligations of a state under international humanitarian law.

Keywords: Civilian agency, Protection of civilians, International Humanitarian Law, Distinction, Precautions

2.1 Introduction

Traditional military roles of the state are now fulfilled in part or supplemented by civilians or private parties. Instead of their legally assumed passivity in an armed conflict, recent conflicts have seen calls by state parties for civilians to become actively engaged in conflict-related activities. Examples of this diversification of civilian agency include state instructions on manufacturing Molotov cocktails,[1] calls for an IT army,[2] and state-issued apps which enable civilians to report an adversary's positions or troop movements.[3] In a similar fashion, we have seen a greater involvement of corporate parties in armed conflict at the invitation of a state party to that conflict in cyber defence of states' assets and space-enabled communication for military forces.[4] These more technologically enabled uses have also been supplemented by a wide employment of private military and security companies and the involvement of partisan groups.

The increased diversification of civilian agency by parties to an armed conflict challenges the traditional considerations underlying international humanitarian law (IHL). Most notably, these developments might be problematic when we examine the principle of distinction under IHL and its function of protecting the civilian population against the harmful effects of armed conflict.

This contribution aims to analyse how states' activation of citizens and private parties in an armed conflict relates to their obligations under the principle of the protection of the civilian population against the dangers arising from hostilities and the principle of distinction. It puts the spotlight on the role of the state vis-à-vis civilians and considers whether the diversification of civilian agency undermines the protection afforded by the principle of distinction and, consequently, may lead to more human suffering as it broadens the battlefield *ratione personae* and *loci* and may have an eroding effect on IHL as a whole.

To place this argument in the proper historical context, the first section contains a broad consideration of this practice throughout history. This shows that the use of civilians is not something new, but that there is a broad range of historical precedents. Yet, we can see that international law has consistently moved towards a greater emphasis on the protection of civilians. The second section describes this development. It will argue that there is indeed a broad protection of civilians found in IHL which could challenge some of this practice of using civilians in defence scenarios. The third section will consider the application of the protective principles in IHL to the practice of civilianisation, leading to a conclusion and a consideration of whether states' use of civilians in this context should be seen as a violation of IHL.

2.2 The History of Civilian Involvement in Armed Conflict

In 1870, Friedrich Engels had already considered the role of civilians during armed conflict. Reflecting on civilians becoming increasingly active during ongoing armed conflicts, he stated that:

> Today, in 1870, there are hardly enough statements that this is a lawful way of conducting war and that interference of the civilian population or of persons not recognized officially as soldiers may be put down with fire and the sword just as if it were banditry. This might all have been done in the time of Louis XIV or Frederick II, when war was conducted solely between armies, but, beginning with the American war of independence and coming right up to the Civil War in America, the participation of the population in war became the rule and not the exception both in Europe and in America.[5]

As noted here, we had indeed seen a steady increase of civilians participating in armed conflict since the American revolution, with the concept of citizen-militia becoming prominent.[6] In a similar fashion, we had seen similar activity of civilians participating in the French revolution.[7] In further examples, we have seen heads of state also appeal to the general population to participate in defence in situations of crisis.

A striking example here would be the statement by Tsar Alexander I, who in response to the imminent invasion by Napoleon stated that:

> The enemy has crossed our frontiers and is continuing to carry his arms into Russia, seeking to shake the foundations of this great power by his might and seductions … We now appeal to all our loyal subjects, to all estates and conditions both spiritual and temporal, to rise up with us in a united and universal stand against the enemy's schemes and endeavours.[8]

Such historical examples highlight how this has been common practice for an extended period.[9]

We also see this reflected in legal practice from this time. Examining the Lieber code of 1863, it is visible that Francis Lieber envisioned a limited recognition of this possibility of civilian participation in armed conflict. In article 51, he stated that:

> If the people of that portion of an invaded country which is not yet occupied by the enemy, or of the whole country, at the approach of a hostile army, rise, under a duly authorized levy 'en masse' to resist the invader, they are now treated as public enemies, and, if captured, are prisoners of war.

The recognition of these levies as both public enemies and prisoners of war seems to indicate that there is indeed a legal recognition, although limited, for civilians to participate in armed conflict. As noted by Crawford, this also seems to be reflected throughout broader historical practice. In her considerations on this topic, she emphasised that:

> Rather than offering a detailed test for what kinds of acts result in the loss of civilian immunity, thus re-emphasizing that civilians should not take direct part in hostilities, international law has instead chosen to 'reward' certain kinds of civilian participation by granting civilians combatant status.[10]

This seemingly confirms the consideration that instead of emphasising that civilians should not participate in armed conflict at all, there seems to be a limited recognition that they can. States have, seemingly, emphasised that such a practice is conditional, instead of outright banned.

Such a conditional viewpoint has led to the practice still being used during contemporary times. As a first example, this can be seen in the Scandinavian countries' 'total defence' concepts, which also emphasise the role civil society plays in countering foreign aggression.[11] Likewise, some have claimed that in many cases civilians should form the 'first line of defence', seeing them actively engaging in hostilities.[12] Others have extensively written on the use of the civilian population in scenarios of national defence.[13] Far from being a historical novelty, all of this suggests that many states still actively use civilians in this 'defence' context. This point appears to be confirmed by the use of civilians as a line of defence against the Russian invasion of Ukraine.[14]

However, under the contemporary legal framework, such practices might be considered more challenging. Whereas previously IHL was mainly concerned with banning certain means and methods of warfare, with the adoption of the Geneva conventions it has moved more towards a regime of protected persons.[15] A key factor here is the 'clear conceptual divide between those entitled to participate in hostilities on the one hand, and those who lack such a right in exchange for being spared during fighting, on the other hand.'[16]

The legal separation between combatants on the one hand, and the protected groups on the other, challenges some of the historical precedents referred to here. Instead of a traditional, binary divide, we have seen increasingly that such a binary approach is challenged. The distinction is instead posed 'as a contingent concept, and they/it [added by authors] operate according to a continuum along which everything is a matter of degree and subtle gradation.'[17] This contribution aims to further explore how this practice interacts with the changed legal framework regarding the conduct of hostilities. In doing so, it examines whether, under the current legal framework, which since the adoption of the Geneva conventions has emphasised protection of civilians, it can still be considered legal to use civilians to supplement/augment the armed forces. The next section will start these considerations by describing the general protection of civilian populations against the effects of hostilities.

2.3 General Protection of the Civilian Population Against the Effects of Hostilities

IHL is a subset of international law regulating armed conflict. It is mainly considered to serve two purposes: to protect those who are not or no longer directly participating in hostilities and to regulate the means and methods of warfare.[18] Part of that first purpose is the protection afforded to the civilian population against the effects of hostilities. As there are particular principles and rules implementing the protection of the civilian population, it is worthwhile to consider whether Article 51(1) of the first Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 (AP I) has legal implications for the diversification of civilian agency by a belligerent

as it expresses the general rule on the protection of the civilian population.[19] In particular, we analyse whether the protection of the civilian population covers the protection of civilians under a belligerent's authority as opposed to enemy civilians not under the authority of that belligerent.

Section 2.3 will consider the topic in three subsections. First, consideration will be given to how IHL has developed the protection of civilians as a concept. This development will serve as an introduction to how the concept of the protection of civilians is currently interpreted in IHL, arguing that there are strong grounds for assuming that civilians are indeed protected. As a last consideration, this section will consider if the protection of the civilian population would be limited to 'attacks' as that term is understood in IHL, or if it would also apply in a broader fashion.

2.3.1 Development of the protection of the civilian population

Throughout history wars were mostly fought without much legal restraint. The protection of civilians was not a priority in the regulation of warfare.[20] This began to change at the end of the 19th century, owing in part to 18th century events, including the development of conscript armies with their distinct features, such as uniforms, and the philosophies of Rousseau who wrote in 1762:

> So war is a relation not between man and man but between state and state, and individuals are enemies only accidentally, not as men nor even as citizens but as soldiers; not as belonging to their country but as defenders of it. And the only enemies a state can have are other states; not men, because there can't be a real settled relation between things as radically different as states and men.[21]

Yet, it took another century to codify Rousseau's paradigm of 'enemy' and legitimate targets. In the St. Petersburg Declaration of 1868 one starts to see the contours of the protection of the civilian population and the principle of distinction. The St. Petersburg Declaration clarified that 'the only legitimate object which States should endeavour to accomplish during war is to weaken the military forces of the enemy.'[22] Other, non-binding texts further teased out the protection of the civilian population, such as the Final Protocol of the Brussels Conference (1874) and the Oxford Manual (1880). Article 1 of the latter instrument is instructive: 'The state of war does not admit of acts of violence, save between the armed forces of belligerent States. Persons not forming part of a belligerent armed force should abstain from such acts.'[23] Both instruments are also clear that civilians participating in a *levée en masse*, an 18th century concept indicating a spontaneous mobilisation and taking up of arms in unoccupied territory to defend their homes and country against invading forces, are considered belligerents and part of the armed forces.[24] While a *levée en masse* was considered a legal

exception, it is worth noting that these late 19th century regulations dealt with the then existing ways and means of warfare, meaning that the fighting was mainly done at the frontlines where on the approach of the enemy civilians could spontaneously rise to defend their dwellings.[25] The protection of the civilian population was further developed in the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 and their annexed Regulations, albeit in a limited fashion 'as the population barely suffered from the use of weapons, unless it was actually in the combat zone itself.'[26] The rules of the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions reflected that reality. This reality changed because of the development and use of various (long range) means and methods during the First World War and, even more so, during the Second World War. Such means and methods consisted, for example, of balloons, planes and rockets which allowed targeting behind the front lines, affecting civilians greatly.[27] The practice of these wars led the ICRC to observe that '[a]s a result the customary rule [of distinction] was affected to such an extent that one might have wondered whether it still existed.'[28] It took until 1977 for states to explicitly reaffirm the existence and importance of the general protection of the civilian population and its core implementing principle of distinction in AP I, at a time when the distinction between combatants and civilians had already been blurred. This blurring is even more true today. While we note in this regard the discussion surrounding so-called 'unprivileged' and 'unlawful' combatants,[29] the large-scale attacks on civilian infrastructure,[30] and the attacks on private homes,[31] the diversification of civilian agency by belligerent parties in contemporary armed conflicts tends to erode this principle even further.

2.3.2 General protection of the civilian population

AP I reaffirmed and developed the relevant rules pertaining to the conduct of hostilities laid down in the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907. These rules were grouped in Part IV of AP I concerning the civilian population. Section I of Part IV AP I is devoted to the general protection of the civilian population against the effects of hostilities. It complements the regime laid down in the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 on the protection of civilians in armed conflict which mainly deals with the treatment of civilians in the hands of the adverse party to the armed conflict.

During the negotiations of what would become AP I the ICRC proposed a rule on the general protection of the civilian population and objects of a civilian character against the dangers resulting from hostilities[32] 'that found the widest possible adherence.'[33] Nonetheless, the drafters did not write such a general rule in AP I as a separate article. Some experts suggest this may have led 'to ambiguity since the detailed rules for protection, contained in subsequent draft Articles, repeated the principle in rather less absolute terms.'[34] There thus was a clash of perspectives on the need for and, if so, the extent to which a rule would codify the principle of the

protection of the civilian population. This was underscored by some of the opposing amendments made by states at the drafting stages.[35] States finally compromised on the language used in Article 51(1) AP I, which reads in part: 'The civilian population and individual civilians shall enjoy general protection against dangers arising from military operations.'[36] The ICRC Commentary stresses that Article 51 AP I:

> is one of the most important articles in the Protocol. It explicitly confirms the customary rule that innocent civilians must be kept outside hostilities as far as possible and enjoy general protection against danger arising from hostilities.[37]

The terms 'civilian' and 'civilian population' are used throughout AP I irrespective of the state to which they belong. Kalshoven, however, submits that the rules were written with the civilian population of the enemy state in mind.[38] It is thus all but clear from a textual interpretation of Article 51(1) AP I whether states are under an obligation to prevent their own civilians from participating in hostilities. Also, there is nothing in the *travaux préparatoires* of the 1977 Additional Protocols to suggest that the drafters intended to imply a legal duty on the part of states to abstain from encouraging or facilitating own civilians or under their authority to directly, or indirectly for that matter, participate in hostilities as part of the protection afforded to them against the dangers resulting from hostilities.

Subsequent practice relevant for the interpretation of the general protection of civilians, in particular the principle and rule of distinction, has not been shown as susceptible to that interpretation either. To the contrary, as shown in section 2.1, recent instances of the mobilisation of civilians are not met with protest by other states or organisations. However, a notable exception can be found in the jurisprudence of the Colombian Constitutional Court – which was cited with approval by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. The Colombian Constitutional Court has interpreted Article 13 AP II, applicable in non-international armed conflict (corresponding with Article 51(1)(2). and (3) AP I applicable in international armed conflict) to mean the following:

> Firstly, as stated in the rule regarding immunity of the civilian population (Art. 13), the parties have the general obligation to protect civilians from the dangers arising from military operations. From this follows, as stated in paragraph 2 of this same article, that the civilian population as such may not be the object of attack, and acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to spread terror are prohibited. General protection of the civilian population from the dangers of war also implies that it is not in keeping with international humanitarian law for one of the parties to involve the population in the armed conflict, as in so doing it would turn civilians into participants in the conflict and would thus expose them to military attacks by the adverse party.[39]

This interpretation of the general principle of protection is certainly laudable, but one cannot but question its legal and practical soundness. While the drafters of the 1977 Additional Protocols held different views on the general principle of protection of the civilian population, even states leaning heavily towards the humanitarian side of the spectrum did not draw such inferences. In fact, their proposed amendments to strengthen the general rule on the protection of civilians were rejected.[40] In the context of one such proposed amendment, Kalshoven holds that: 'This formulation comes as close as possible to the (utopian) idea of absolute immunity for the civilian population.'[41] The judgement of the Colombian Constitutional Court must be treated with similar caution not to push an interpretation to an unrealistic level as that too would have an eroding effect on IHL and the protection of civilians. Nonetheless, one could deem the rule as one of due diligence as the ICRC Commentary to Article 51(1) AP I seems to allude to,[42] even though an amendment to tone down the principle explicitly to include a feasibility standard was rejected during the negotiations.[43] It is however clear from the foregoing that the extent of the afforded protection and the corollary legal obligations remain contested, particularly with regards to the diversification of civilian agency. It is certainly conceivable that the principle of the protection of the civilian population presented here has no independent normative content, other than arguably reminding states that they should implement IHL in good faith and with the protection of the civilian population in mind.

The question then remains if this would also entail that states should not be entitled to employ their citizens in a combat or combat related function. However, the next sub-section will, before diving into these substantive considerations, first consider if these principles also apply outside the context of attacks. This as attacks have often represented the primary avenue through which we have considered these principles.

2.3.3 Limitations on the protective nature of IHL

As noted, distinction and precautions have often been linked with the concept of attacks. We already see this in the appearance of both these as primary rules, as they are found in Part IV of AP I, dealing with the general protection of the civilian population against the effects of hostilities. We find both the foundational rule of distinction here, in Article 48, Article 51(1) and the obligation to take precautions in Article 57 of AP I, seemingly posing a strong link with the concept of attack as defined in IHL.[44]

This link is most evident in the context of the obligation to take precautions, as Article 57 AP I refers explicitly to the obligation to take precautions 'in attack'. It is also supported by further reference to the substantive obligations found in the article, highlighted in par 1 and par 2(ii):

> In the conduct of military operations, constant care shall be taken to spare the civilian population, civilians and civilian objects. With respect to attacks, the following precautions shall be taken:
> take all feasible precautions in the choice of means and methods of attack with a view to avoiding, and in any event to minimizing, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects.

The wording implies an obligation that is limited to actual attacks being conducted.

Such a narrow perspective would make it challenging to argue that the principles would apply to states calling on their citizens to take up arms. Whereas they might conduct attacks, IHL certainly limits what counts as an attack in legal terms. The basis of this definition is formed by Article 49(1) AP I, which states that '"Attacks" means acts of violence against the adversary, whether in offence or in defence.' The definition of attack is further clarified, and we find a further reference that 'the term "attack" means "combat action"'.[45] And, while individual citizens might conduct attacks when they are deployed, their deployment would not qualify as an attack due to them not being a direct use of force.[46]

Yet, there are also arguments made that the considerations of both precautions and distinction should be broader. A first indication of such an expansion is found in the case law of the International Court of Justice. In the *Nuclear Weapons* advisory opinion, the Court stated that 'methods and means of warfare, which would preclude any distinction between civilian and military targets, … , are prohibited.'[47] Here, no explicit link is made between the concept of an attack and the principle of distinction, offering grounds for arguing that the principle would extend beyond being explicitly linked to the concept of attack. We have seen similar reasoning in the case law of the Colombian constitutional court cited above and accepted by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.[48]

Taking this to be a broader obligation also seems to do justice to the notion of these concepts (distinction and the affiliated principle of precaution) as a principle of IHL. As noted, these favour a broader interpretation compared to rules, as these represent a broader, still legally binding category. They have also been referred to as the 'skeleton of the entire branch of IHL.'[49] We further see support for such a broad obligation in the commentary to AP I, which in its consideration of Article 58 states that:

> It is not concerned with laying down rules for the conduct to be observed in attacks on territory under the control of the adversary, but with measures which every Power must take in its own territory in favour of its nationals, or in territory under its control.

Indeed, commentators have also noticed that this obligation to, as much as possible, spare the civilian population represents a crucial characteristic of IHL.[50]

Taking this as a starting point, arguments can thus also be made for a broader interpretation of the relevant principles which would support a conclusion that they would not only be limited to attacks. In such a way, an argument can be made that these considerations could still be relevant whenever we consider the practice of states actively employing their own citizens in the defence of the country.

Relying on the underlying motivation behind IHL, this contribution would argue that there is value in such a broader approach and that these principles should not be considered to be purely limited to the concept of attacks. Such an approach would also support their relevance to the situation in which states activate their citizens in an armed conflict. The next section will consider what this would entail regarding the legal obligations of states when they chose to do so.

2.4 The Principles of IHL and States Employing Private Citizens

Considering the current issue at hand, namely that of states activating citizens, then leads to a convoluted debate. On the one hand, we have certain limitations posed in IHL. Yet, we have also seen that states have and are still engaging in this practice, especially when it is considered needed. This last section aims to further consider the legal IHL framework in this regard and whether the use of civilians in this fashion would be permitted under IHL through an analysis of the principles of distinction and precautions.

2.4.1 The principle of distinction

Article 48 AP I codifies the principle of distinction for the first time in history and is considered the 'basic rule'. It lies at the core of the protection of the civilian population and is considered one of the 'cardinal' and 'intransgressible' principles of IHL.[51] Article 48 AP I reads:

> In order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian population and civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly shall direct their operations only against military objectives.

The principle of distinction is clearly part of customary international law.[52] It seems a straightforward principle aimed at mitigating the risks to (own) civilians due to the hostilities and, thus, effectuating their protection. It balances that interest with

the interest of effectively prosecuting military operations[53] and, thus, represents a balance between humanity and military necessity.

The principle of distinction requires a distinction to be made at all times between persons (civilians vs. combatants/persons taking a direct part in hostilities) and objects (civilian objects vs. military objectives). However, there is another dimension that should be highlighted and that is the obligation of members of the armed forces to distinguish themselves from the civilian population to the maximum extent feasible.[54] This part of the obligation 'is for the purpose of promoting the protection of the civilian population from the effects of hostilities.'[55] To that end, belligerents are required, inter alia, to take so-called passive precautions,[56] but also to evacuate the civilian population in certain circumstances, to set up safety zones and not to use civilians as human shields. This does not mean states are under an obligation not to involve civilians in the war effort. IHL neither privileges nor explicitly prohibits civilians from directly taking part in hostilities.[57] However, there is a legitimate expectation they should refrain from involvement in hostilities. Nonetheless, we agree with some experts that a good faith interpretation of the principle of distinction prohibits activating civilians 'if the specific intent is to avoid obligations or to implement unlawful actions.'[58]

This is not to say that some states and organisations are not concerned by the diversification of civilian agency today and the impact it has on the principle of distinction. But no-one has framed this as a legal duty not to involve civilians in the war effort quite like the Colombian Constitutional Court (see section 2.2). By way of illustration, one could point to a recent report of the Global Advisory Board on digital threats during conflict, convened by the ICRC – the guardian of IHL, which observes that:

> While IHL is built on the cardinal principle of distinction between what is civilian and what is military, the growing civilian involvement in military operations through digital means, and the use of civilian digital infrastructure for military purposes, risks blurring the lines between the two and thus undermining this fundamental premise.[59]

It then recommends, using hortatory language only, that: 'Belligerents should not encourage civilians to take a direct part in hostilities through digital operations' and '[b]elligerents should therefore reverse the trend of encouraging civilians to take part in digital operations related to an armed conflict, and not provide them with the means to do so.'[60] Further, belligerents must take steps 'to ensure that these civilians are aware of and comply with IHL, and be conscious of the implications of directly participating in hostilities.'[61] The latter statement can be traced to a particular rule of IHL, namely that states must ensure respect for IHL by civilians under their authority in all circumstances.[62]

With regards to the quote above taken from the report of the Global Advisory Board on digital threats during conflict, it highlights the question of whether states are prohibited from undermining the principle of distinction by blurring the lines between what is civilian and what is military and risking civilians becoming legitimate targets. Indeed, some experts object to such blurring.[63] Sassòli, for instance, argues in the context of PMSCs: 'if a State wants to respect the principle of distinction in good faith, it may not entrust civilians with conduct that constitutes direct participation in hostilities.'[64]

One cannot escape the conclusion that capitalising on civilian agency for combat and related tasks may indeed exacerbate the risks to civilians, those who do and those who do not directly participate in hostilities. Yet, with the exception of a few commentators, it has generally not been argued, certainly not by states, that this practice is – or should be – categorically banned by the principle of distinction. Such interpretations are more visible, however, when we look at some of the considerations regarding the principle of precautions.

2.4.2 The principle of precautions

Legally, the framing of Article 57 AP I, the obligation of states to take active precautions, seems to be quite clear. Both the wording of the article, making a reference to 'incidental damage' and the subsequent commentary, which listed a number of factors such as the precision of weapons to conclude that 'All these factors together must be taken into consideration whenever an attack could hit incidentally civilian persons and objects.'[65] Yet, whenever states would 'activate' their civilians to join in hostilities, they would no longer fall under such incidental damage, making the obligation to take active precautions less relevant in this context.

More interesting are the considerations under Article 58 AP I requiring states to take precautions against the effects of attacks. Examining the commentary, we can see that it places a different obligation on states. The ICRC commentary quite clearly states that parties 'must also cooperate by taking all possible precautions for the benefit of their own population as is in any case in their own interest.'[66] Reading such commentary very strictly, it could potentially be interpreted as states being under an obligation to take all possible measures to protect civilians from any of the dangers encountered in armed conflict. Yet, states have been critical of such a strict interpretation. This was already visible during the initial considerations of these articles, exemplified by the Italian response to these obligations of precautions, which stated that:

> While reaffirming the need for faithful application of the provisions for protecting the victims of armed conflicts, the Italian delegation would reiterate that none of the provisions

> of those Parts should be interpreted as preventing a State from organizing effectively the safeguarding of its national security and the defence of its territory.[67]

This seemingly challenges a very strict interpretation of the article and seems to support a more limited one.

Support for such an interpretation can also be found in the article. Whereas it certainly places states under an obligation to separate military objects and civilians, ensuring that the civilians have adequate protection, it must do so only in a manner that is feasible. The reference to a feasible standard would seemingly support the consideration that this is not an absolute obligation which continually applies but should be judged against a standard of what is militarily feasible in armed conflict. The statements by the French delegation would also support such an interpretation, stating that in practice such a consideration would amount to an advantage to the aggressor, challenging the crucial idea of the equality of belligerents underlying IHL.[68]

Likewise, Cameroon had supported this interpretation by arguing for an interpretation that would not impede any rights the country had to defend itself. It explicitly stated that it believed this article to not pose any limitations on the way the country could organise its defence, noting that:

> In the view of his delegation, none of the provisions of that Protocol could be interpreted as limiting in any sense the right of any State – and in a very special sense the United Republic of Cameroon – to organize the defence of the national territory. It was convinced, moreover, that those provisions were so carefully worded that no such interpretation was permissible.[69]

In such a way, it remains unlikely that the consideration that the principle of precautions would impede the right of states to activate civilians and participate in the national defence of a state would find sufficient support to become a valid legal interpretation.

Further supporting these considerations, we could also point towards subsequent practice after the adoption of AP I. Subsequent practice can provide a valid tool for interpreting the treaty obligations states hold, provided it is conducted by relevant parties.[70] In this way, international law emphasises that states should be able to rely on past statements and precedents.[71]

When we then look at this, we have seen that states have generally not seen themselves as limited in employing their citizens for the national defence. Examples have been plentiful throughout the historic section, but more notable is that we still currently see states actively employing these total defence policies. Such practice would seemingly be at odds with a strict interpretation of the obligation to take

precautions, and one that would include states not being allowed through this principle to employ their citizens in such a way.[72]

The notion that this self-defence mechanism would be allowed is further supported by reference to the balance between military necessity and humanitarianism found in IHL. The appearance of the word 'feasible' seems to lead to a consideration that states would be allowed to invoke the concept of military necessity in this context.[73] Reference to such a feasibility notion, combined with the perspectives by states referred to above seem to support that consideration.

2.5 Conclusion

It is undoubtedly the case that IHL contains protective elements that emphasise the protection of civilians. Both the principle of distinction and precautions represent key tenets here, which place an obligation on states to protect civilians. Yet, it seems that states have consistently argued that both of these foundational aspects of IHL would not limit them in employing civilians to augment or supplement their armed forces. In this sense, the practice of the diversification of civilian agency for national defence purposes thus does not seem to undermine IHL.

State practice, operational and by way of statements, seems to support the notion that the IHL principles and rules on the general protection of civilians, distinction and precautions should not be interpreted in such absolute terms. IHL does not ban all actions which could potentially endanger civilians, but should be interpreted in a more limited specific way. Accepted methods of interpretation of international law strongly support such a conclusion.

Ultimately, it thus seems to be the case that whereas IHL emphasises the protections granted towards civilians, this protection is not absolute. Indeed, we have consistently seen an emphasis on IHL being the law applied during armed conflict. From this perspective, it also makes sense that while attempting to protect civilians as much as possible, it will not needlessly limit the national defence of states.

Notes

1 Pickrell, 'Ukraine Urges Kyiv Residents to "make Molotov Cocktails"'.

2 Kirichenko, 'Ukraine's Volunteer IT Army Confronts Tech, Legal Challenges'.

3 James, 'Military Information Sharing by Ukrainian Citizens in the Digital Environment'.

4 See, for example, Smith, 'Defending Ukraine: Early Lessons from the Cyber War'; Paton-Walsh, Marquardt, Davey-Attlee and Gak, 'Ukraine Relies on Starlink for Its Drone War'.

5 Quoted in Trainin, 'Questions of Guerrilla Warfare in the Law of War', p. 540.

[6] See, for examples, Murphy, 'The American Revolutionary Army and the Concept of Levee en Masse', pp. 13, 13–14.
[7] Crawford, 'Tracing the Historical and Legal Development of the Levée en Masse', pp. 329, 331–336.
[8] Quoted in ibid., p. 336.
[9] See also the statement by Wilhelm III in ibid., p. 336.
[10] Crawford, *Identifying the Enemy*, p. 26.
[11] For an overview of these policies, see Wither, 'Back to the Future?', p. 61.
[12] See the remarks by Spencer in 'MDO Conference Video'.
[13] Dach, *Der totale Widerstand*.
[14] James, 'Military Information Sharing by Ukrainian Citizens'; Kirichenko, 'Ukraine's Volunteer IT Army'; Paton-Walsh et al., 'Ukraine Relies on Starlink'; Pickrell, 'Ukraine Urges Kyiv Residents'; Smith, 'Defending Ukraine'.
[15] Kolb, 'Of Hague Law and Geneva Law'.
[16] Kleffner, 'From "Belligerents" to "Fighters" and Civilians Directly Participating in Hostilities', p. 317.
[17] Based on the consideration of humanitarian actors, but likewise applicable to the practice of civilians being encouraged to participate in armed conflict. See Sutton, 'Enacting the "Civilian Plus"', p. 446.
[18] See, amongst a wealth of literature, Kleffner, 'Scope of Application of International Humanitarian Law', p. 50 and Melzer, *International Humanitarian Law*, p. 17.
[19] Article 51(1) AP I states that 'the civilian population and individual civilians shall enjoy general protection against dangers arising from military operations'.
[20] As Grotius wrote in his book *De Jure Belli ac Pacis* (1625)): 'In general, killing is called a right of war' (Book III, Ch. iv, v.i) and 'How far this right to inflict injury extends may be perceived from the fact that the slaughter even of infants and of women is made with impunity, and that this is included in the law of war' (Ibid., ix, I).
[21] Rousseau, *The Social Contract* (1762), Book I, Ch. IV, pp. 4–5.
[22] St. Petersburg Declaration, 29 November–11 December 1868, Preamble. A direct precursor can be found in the Lieber Code (1863), Art. 22.
[23] Final Protocol of the Brussels Conference (1874) and the Oxford Manual (1880).
[24] Final Protocol of the Brussels Conference (1874), Art. 10 and the Oxford Manual (1880), Art. 2(4).
[25] Interestingly, a *levée en masse* is also recognised when the civilians 'act in response to an order by their Government'. ICRC, *Commentary on Geneva Convention III*, Art. 4, p. 67.
[26] Sandoz, Swinarski and Zimmermann, *Commentary of Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949*), par. 1865.
[27] See Bothe, Partsch and Solf, *New Rules for Victims of Armed Conflicts*, p. 315.
[28] Sandoz, Swinarski, and Zimmerman, *Commentary*, par. 1866 (addition by the authors).
[29] Dörmann, 'The Legal Situation of "Unlawful/Unprivileged" Combatants', p. 45.
[30] Schmitt, 'Ukraine Symposium'.
[31] Abraham, '"Lavender"'.
[32] ICRC, *Conference of Government Experts*, p. 81 (Draft Article 40).
[33] Kalshoven, 'The Conference of Government Experts': pp. 18, 32.
[34] Ibid., p. 32.
[35] Compare, for example CE/COM III/PC 2 (United States of America) and CE/COM III/PC 42 (Romania) in ICRC, *Conference of Government Experts*, pp. 65 and 73.
[36] Note that, first, this article only comes after the Basic rule of Article 48 AP I (the principle of distinction), see Section 2.3 of this contribution. Second, that the remainder of Article 51 AP I (which is additional to other applicable rules of international law) is to give effect to the protection mentioned

in Art. 51(1) AP I. Among them is the rule that "Civilians shall enjoy the protection afforded by this section, unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities" (Art. 51(3) AP I).

37 Sandoz, Swinarski and Zimmerman, *Commentary*, par. 1923.

38 Kalshoven, 'Civilian Immunity and the Principle of Distinction', p. 855.

39 Colombia Constitutional Court, *Case No. C-225/95*, Judgment of 18 May 1995, par. 30 (original in Spanish, unofficial translation). See also, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, *Case of the 'Mapiripán Massacre' v. Colombia*, Judgment of 15 September 2005, par. 114.

40 CE/COM III/PC 37 and 42 in ICRC, *Report on the Work of the Conference*, p. 72.

41 Kalshoven, 'Conference of Government Experts', p. 33.

42 Sandoz, Swinarski and Zimmermann, *Commentary*, par. 1935: 'There is no doubt that armed conflicts entail dangers for the civilian population, but these *should be reduced to a minimum*.' (italics in original).

43 CE/COM III/PC 2 (United States of America) in ICRC, *Report on the Work of the Conference*, p. 65: 'The Parties to a conflict shall, to the maximum extent feasible, endeavour to protect civilians and non-military objects against the dangers resulting from hostilities.'

44 Protocol additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the protection of victims of international armed conflicts (Protocol I) 8 June 1977, UNTS 1125(3), Art. 49.

45 Sandoz, Swinarski and Zimmermann, *Commentary*, par. 1880.

46 See also for example the debate regarding the status of sieges as an attack, briefly summarised in Sassòli, 'New Challenges and Old Problems for International Humanitarian Law'.

47 International Court of Justice, *Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons*, par. 95

48 See fn. 39 above.

49 Van den Boogaard, 'Reimagining IHL Principles Part I: The Wrong Principles'.

50 Corn, 'Precautions to Minimize Civilian Harm'.

51 International Court of Justice, *Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons*, par. 78–79.

52 ICRC, *Customary International Humanitarian Law*, Rules 1–24. Rules 1 and 7 reflect Article 48 AP I.

53 Schmitt, 'Discriminate Warfare', pp. 85, 87–88.

54 See, e.g., Corn, 'Targeting, Distinction and the Long War', pp. 135, 146 and 152. This due diligence standard can be traced to the interpretation of the word 'protection' in Article 48 AP I. 'In general the word "respect" implies the concept of sparing the persons and objects concerned, and not attacking them, while the word "protection" implies an act of positive aid and support.' Sandoz, Swinarski, and Zimmermann, *Commentary*, par. 1872. Some commentators have noted that 'The negative obligation not to attack or harm implied by the word "respect" obviously applies to the side conducting an attack; but it also obligates the defender to refrain from doing harm to the civilian population under his control. The affirmative obligation to protect actively can have relevance only to the Party that has the capability to take the appropriate protective measures.' See Bothe, Partsch, and Solf, *New Rules*, pp. 322–323.

55 Ibid., p. 324.

56 Further considered later in this section.

57 Art. 51(3) AP I.

58 Sassòli, *International Humanitarian Law*, p. 547.

59 ICRC, *Global Advisory Board on Digital Threats during Conflict*, p. 11.

60 Ibid.

61 Ibid.

62 CA 1 GC I-IV and Art. 1(1) AP I.

63 See, e.g., Mačák and Vignati, 'Civilianization of Digital Operations' and Rodenhäuser and Vignati, '8 Rules for "Civilian Hackers"'.

64 Sassòli, *International Humanitarian Law*, p. 547.

65 Sandoz, Swinarski and Zimmermann, *Commentary*, par. 2213.

66 Ibid., par. 2240.

67 *Official Records*, VII, p. 222.

68 Ibid., p. 194.

69 Ibid., p. 220.

70 The legal basis of this is found in Article 31(3)(b) and Article 32 of the Vienna Convention on the law of treaties. Article 31 here would require a universal adoption by all parties, whereas Article 32 would suffice with a more limited acceptance by parties to the conventions but can then only be employed as a secondary means of interpretation.

71 Buga, *Modification of Treaties by Subsequent Practice*, pp. 69–70.

72 Wither, 'Back to the Future?'

73 Hayashi, 'Requirements of Military Necessity', pp. 39, 58.

Bibliography

Abraham, Yuval. '"Lavender": The AI Machine Directing Israel's Bombing Spree in Gaza'. *+927 Magazine*, 3 April 2024. https://www.972mag.com/lavender-ai-israeli-army-gaza/.

Boogaard, Jeroen van den. 'Reimagining IHL Principles Part I: The Wrong Principles'. *Articles of War* (blog), 8 December, 2020. https://lieber.westpoint.edu/reimagining-ihl-principles-part-i-wrong-principles/.

Bothe, Michael, Karl Josef Partsch and Waldemar A. Solf. *New Rules for Victims of Armed Conflicts: Commentary on the Two 1977 Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 2013.

Buga, Irina. *Modification of Treaties by Subsequent Practice*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018.

Colombia Constitutional Court. *Case No. C-225/95, Re: File No. L.A.T.-040* (Judgement of 18 May 1995).

Corn, Geoffrey. 'Precautions to Minimize Civilian Harm Are a Fundamental Principle of the Law of War'. *Just Security* (blog). 8 July 2015. https://www.justsecurity.org/24493/obligation-precautions-fundamental-principle-law-war/

Corn, Geoffrey. 'Targeting, Distinction and the Long War: Guarding Against Conflation of Cause and Responsibility'. *Israel Yearbook of Human Rights* 46 (2016), pp. 135–170.

Crawford, Emily. *Identifying the Enemy: Civilian Participation in Armed Conflict.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015.

Crawford, Emily. 'Tracing the Historical and Legal Development of the Levée en Masse in the Law of Armed Conflict'. *Journal of the History of International Law* 19, no. 3 (2017), pp. 329–361.

Dach, Hans von. *Der totale Widerstand. Eine Kleinkriegsanleitung für Jedermann*. Rorbas: Schweizer Unteroffiziersverband, 1957.

Dörmann, Knut. 'The Legal Situation of "Unlawful/Unprivileged" Combatants'. *International Review of the Red Cross* 85 (2003), pp. 45–74.

Grotius, *De Jure Belli ac Pacis* (1625). Tr. Francis W. Kelsey (1925). Clark, N.J.: *The Lawbook Exchange*, 2021.

Hayashi, Nobuo. 'Requirements of Military Necessity in International Humanitarian Law and International Criminal Law'. *Boston University International Law Journal* 28, no. 1 (2010), pp. 39–140.

ICRC. 'Global Advisory Board on Digital Threats during Conflict, Final Report, Protecting Civilians against Digital Threats during Armed Conflict: Recommendations to States, Belligerents,

Tech Companies, and Humanitarian Organizations'. Geneva: ICRC, 2024. https://shop.icrc.org/protecting-civilians-against-digital-threats-during-armed-conflict-recommendations-to-states-belligerents-tech-companies-and-humanitarian-organizations-pdf-en.html.

ICRC. 'Conference of Government Experts on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, Geneva, 3 May–3 June 1972 (Second Session)'. Geneva: ICRC, 1972. https://library.icrc.org/library/docs/CD/CEG_1972_DOCUMENTS_ENG_3.pdf.

Inter-American Court of Human Rights. *Case of the 'Mapiripán Massacre' v. Colombia*, (Judgement of 15 September 2005).

International Court of Justice. *Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons*. Advisory Opinion of 8 July 1996.

James, Luke. 'Military Information Sharing by Ukrainian Citizens in the Digital Environment: DPH? – Blurring of Lines Between Civilian and Military Actors in Ukraine'. *Opinio Juris* (blog), 12 September 2022. http://opiniojuris.org/2022/09/12/military-information-sharing-by-ukrainian-citizens-in-the-digital-environment-dph-blurring-of-lines-between-civilian-and-military-actors-in-ukraine/.

Kalshoven, Frits. 'The Conference of Government Experts on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts (Second Session), 3 May–2 June 1972'. *Netherlands Yearbook of International Law* 3 (1972), pp. 18–61.

Kalshoven, Frits. 'Civilian Immunity and the Principle of Distinction'. *American University Law Review* 31 (1982), pp. 855–896.

Kirichenko, David. 'Ukraine's Volunteer IT Army Confronts Tech, Legal Challenges'. CEPA, 27 November 2023. https://cepa.org/article/ukraine-volunteer-it-army-confronts-tech-legal-challenges/.

Kleffner, Jann. 'From "Belligerents" to "Fighters" and Civilians Directly Participating in Hostilities: On the Principle of Distinction in Non-International Armed Conflicts One Hundred Years after the Second Hague Peace Conference'. *Netherlands International Law Review* 54, no. 2 (2007), pp. 315–336.

Kleffner, Jann. 'Scope of Application of International Humanitarian Law'. In *The Handbook of International Humanitarian Law*, edited by Dieter Fleck. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021.

Kolb, Robert. 'Of Hague Law and Geneva Law'. *Articles of War* (blog), 29 November 2023. https://lieber.westpoint.edu/of-hague-law-geneva-law/.

Mačák, Kubo and Mauro Vignati. 'Civilianization of Digital Operations: A Risky Trend'. *Lawfare*, 5 April 2023. https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/civilianization-digital-operations-risky-trend.

Melzer, Nils. *International Humanitarian Law: A Comprehensive Introduction*. Geneva: ICRC, 2016.

Murphy, Orville T. 'The American Revolutionary Army and the Concept of Levee en masse'. *Military Affairs* 23, no. 1 (1959), pp. 13–20.

NATO. 'MDO Conference Video: Contemporary Perspectives', 12 July 2022. https://arrc.nato.int/news-room/archive/2022/mdo-conference-video-contemporary-perspectives.aspx.

Official Records of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, Vol. VII (1978).

Paton Walsh, Nick, Alex Marquardt, Florence Davey-Attlee and Kosta Gak. 'Ukraine Relies on Starlink for Its Drone War. Russia Appears to Be Bypassing Sanctions to Use the Devices Too'. *CNN*, 26 March 2024. https://www.cnn.com/2024/03/25/europe/ukraine-starlink-drones-russia-intl-cmd/index.html.

Pickrell, Ryan. 'Ukraine Urges Kyiv Residents to "Make Molotov Cocktails" as Russia Advances and Even Shows People How to Make Them'. *Business Insider*, 25 February 2022. https://www.businessinsider.com/ukraine-kyiv-residents-molotov-cocktails-russia-advances-2022-2.

Rodenhäuser, Tilman and Mauro Vignati. '8 Rules for "Civilian Hackers" during War, and 4 Obligations for States to Restrain Them'. *EJIL:Talk*! 4 October 2023. https://www.ejiltalk.org/8-rules-for-civilian-hackers-during-war-and-4-obligations-for-states-to-restrain-them/.

Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. *The Social Contract* (1762). Tr. Jonathan Bennett (2017).

Sandoz, Yves, Christophe Swinarski and Bruno Zimmermann. *Commentary on Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977*. Geneva: ICRC, 1987.

Sassòli, Marco. *International Humanitarian Law: Rules, Controversies, and Solutions to Problems Arising in Warfare*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2019.

Sassòli, Marco. 'New Challenges and Old Problems for International Humanitarian Law', *Articles of War* (blog), 3 April 2024. https://lieber.westpoint.edu/new-challenges-old-problems-international-humanitarian-law/.

Schmitt, Michael N. 'Discriminate Warfare: The Military Necessity-Humanity Dialectic of International Humanitarian Law'. In *Protecting Civilians During Violent Conflict: Theoretical and Practical Issues for the 21st Century*, edited by David W. Lovell and Igor Primoratz. London: Routledge, 2012.

Schmitt, Michael N. 'Military Necessity and Humanity in International Humanitarian Law: Preserving the Delicate Balance'. *Virginia Journal of International Law* 50 (2010), pp. 795–839.

Schmitt, Michael N. 'Ukraine Symposium: Attacking Power Infrastructure Under International Humanitarian Law'. *Articles of War* (blog), 20 October 2022. https://lieber.westpoint.edu/attacking-power-infrastructure-under-international-humanitarian-law/.

Smith, Brad. 'Defending Ukraine: Early Lessons from the Cyber War'. *Microsoft* (blog), 22 June 2022. https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2022/06/22/defending-ukraine-early-lessons-from-the-cyber-war/.

Sutton, Rebecca. 'Enacting the "Civilian plus": International Humanitarian Actors and the Conceptualization of Distinction'. *Leiden Journal of International Law* 33, no. 2 (2020), pp. 429–449.

Trainin, I.P. 'Questions of Guerrilla Warfare in the Law of War'. *American Journal of International Law* 40, no. 3 (1946), pp. 534–562.

Wither, James Kenneth. 'Back to the Future? Nordic Total Defence Concepts'. *Defence Studies* 20, no. 1 (2020), pp. 61–81.

CHAPTER 3

The Resistance Operating Concept: Towards Modern-Day People's War

Martijn Rouvroije

Abstract

The interplay between the state and its population is gaining prominence in the current zeitgeist of increasing military mobilisation in Europe. A population centric approach is typically ascribed to the realms of irregular warfare (IW) and special operations forces (SOF). Renewed interest in irregular warfare and civil defence within the NATO SOF-community spurred the publication of the Resistance Operating Concept (ROC) which focuses on planning for a clandestine civilian stay-behind organisation to resist and counter partial or total occupation by a belligerent actor. Several European militaries are developing such resistance capabilities as part of their response to increased threats to their territorial integrity in light of Russian aggression against Ukraine. This chapter relates ongoing preparations and overt allied support to military units and stay-behind capacities to a historic lineage of irregular war, tracing back to Clausewitz's conception of 'people's war' as popular resistance against invasion. Overt allied support to a nation's territorial defence forces (TDF) contains elements of Clausewitz's people's war with a strong emphasis on professionalisation because of the concentration into formal military formations. Therefore, these efforts do not constitute a clean break with the historical trend towards separating a nation's population from warfare as it is performed by professionalised militaries. Moreover, the current operationalisation involving territorial defence forces resembles more the Clausewitzian people's war as arming the people against foreign invasion than the typical notion of Marxist or Maoist people's war relating to ideologically motivated revolutionary guerrilla movements that aim to topple a government. The modern day Clausewitzian people's war regarding a nation's Total Defence provides the opportunity to shape the national character by increasing the total resistance potential of a nation, its military and its population against a possible foreign invasion and occupier.

Keywords: Resistance Operating Concept, Territorial Defence Forces, Total Defence, Irregular Warfare, Special Operations Forces, Deterrence

3.1 Introduction

Clausewitz's *Bekenntnisdenkschrift* and lectures on small war are as relevant today as when they first appeared in the early nineteenth century.[1] The past decade's aggressive behaviour of the Russian Federation (RF) towards its neighbours, especially against Ukraine during the ongoing Russian-Ukrainian war, placed a renewed emphasis on the preparation against military incursions and invasions in European national security agendas. The publication of the Resistance Operating Concept (ROC) in 2019 exemplifies the renewed interest in irregular warfare and civil defence as part of national security by the European Special Operations Forces community, most notably by the United States Special Operations Command Europe (SOCEUR).[2] The ROC focuses on national stay-behind civilian resistance efforts during partial or total occupation by a belligerent actor and advocates small nations to prepare against invasion and establish resistance organisations in advance as part of the nation's total defence. The ROC defines resistance as:

> a nation's organized, whole-of-society effort, encompassing the full range of activities from nonviolent to violent, led by a legally established government (potentially exiled/displaced or shadow) to re-establish independence and autonomy within its sovereign territory that has been wholly or partially occupied by a foreign power.[3]

Since the ROC's publication, conceptual thought on resistance has continued to what is now called Partnered Resistance Operations (PRO) where allies provide support to states in their efforts to establish resistance capabilities in advance.[4] Though the ROC identifies external support as a critical success factor in the liberation of occupied territory, it does not explicitly address allied support in the preparation of stay-behind resistance organisations doctrinally to the same extent as the organisation of the resistance itself.[5]

The chapter highlights how the overt military operationalisation of the ROC contains elements of Clausewitzian 'small war' and combines elements of partisan and people's war strands into modern day Clausewitzian people's war. The chapter aims to provide clarification on the origins of the ROC, the ROC's relationship with US irregular warfare doctrine, and discusses the current role that allied militaries play in supporting a nation's preparation of resistance organisations for the host nation's national defence. This chapter highlights that whereas the ROC advocates a broader involvement of the population in the establishment of a clandestine stay-behind resistance component, the overt military operationalisation of the resistance concept actually more closely resembles territorial defence through regionally organised conventional military reserves. This modern-day people's war provides the opportunity to shape the national character in order to

increase the resistance potential of a nation and its population against a foreign occupier.

3.2 The ROC's Irregular War Context

The ROC proposes strong interactions between the state and its population, not only during warfare but also into possible occupation, and is a continuation in the lineage of unconventional warfare concepts and doctrine. The interplay between the state and its population is a recurrent aspect in the current zeitgeist of increasing military mobilisation and its prominence is captured in the term Total Defence or Comprehensive Defence. A population centric approach is typically ascribed to the realm of irregular warfare and it is interesting how prominent actors within that community, special operations forces (SOF), intend to interact with populations in order to prepare against possible aggression from the Russian Federation. The drive towards Clausewitzian people's war in Europe has been present since the watershed event: the Russian annexation of the Crimean Peninsula in 2014. The speed and apparent ease with which Russian forces were able to take control of the peninsula's infrastructure, military bases and governmental facilities highlighted a deficiency in deterrence against fait accompli events. The 'Little Green Men' approach takes advantage of attribution uncertainty and the time that political decision-making processes require before a response is undertaken against an action that is between the clear peace versus war dichotomy. This gap has since been a driver of thought on hybrid warfare in academic and policy circles and is applied to other theatres such as the Baltic states.[6]

The annexation of Crimea spurred thinking on hybrid threats and analysis on NATO's force posture and its deterrent capability, especially focusing on the smaller Baltic nations as their militaries are considered too small by themselves to deter or prevent a Russian border incursion. This situation drove increased US military diplomacy and engagement in the Baltic region and NATO followed suit with its 'enhanced Forward Presence' (eFP).[7] Prior to the deployment of NATO multinational battle groups in 2016, RAND ran a series of wargames analysing the defence of the Baltic states and NATO responses. RAND found that the Russian military would be able to rapidly defeat and conquer the Baltic states, but that a relatively limited NATO deployment of forces would prevent a quick Russian victory; although remaining insufficient to deny and counter Russian incursions completely.[8] In order to deter the Russian Federation from invading the Baltics, the relatively limited additional force posturing in conjunction with Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) NATO reserves therefore rested on deterrence by punishment to be activated by the loss of NATO's eFP as tripwire forces.[9] The impossibility of assessing one's deterrent

posture with absolute certainty before conflict occurs leaves room for debate on the efficacy of NATO's force posture and deterrent strategy.[10]

When conventional measures do not completely cover the total threat potential, the resulting uncertainty leaves a gap to be addressed for strategic planning. Following the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, NATO is revising its forces posture, including in the Baltics, and is expected to increase its force posture and reserve capacity.[11] From the 2014 Crimean fait accompli until a more robust force posture is realised, the need for considering alternative measures to fill the deterrence gap remains high. This is where the ROC presents its strategic value in its complementarity along NATO's conventional forces.[12]

Constituting large-scale regular military formations takes time and necessitates a complementary effort to enhance the Baltic nations' immediate deterrent posture until larger conventional NATO formations are deployed.[13] Moreover, the level of necessary NATO military commitment to be prepositioned in the region remains debated, based on uncertainty over whether it would provide a sufficient deterrent against a Russian invasion of the Baltics. The costs and effort of training several hundred individuals to operate as a stay-behind resistance organisation could impose asymmetrically larger costs for a potential occupier in order to consolidate its territorial gains in comparison to the upfront cost incurred by the defender.[14] The call for increased involvement of a nation's population in support of or in participating in war comes from a small, although vocal, group within military circles: the special operations community with the United States' SOCEUR as a driving force in conjunction with several European nations' SOF.

The Resistance Operating Concept is nested in United States doctrine on irregular warfare and unconventional warfare: two sets of doctrine that place heavy emphasis on special operations forces. The result is that a special operations forces community, often considered as the pinnacle of professionalism and elitism in warfare, is advocating for the broader involvement of the population in the national effort to resist possible invasion and occupation by a foreign power: modern day professional war increasingly involving the people in war. In Europe, the ROC nests within Total Defence concepts by explicitly incorporating societal resiliency and a stay-behind resistance component as part of a nation's defence.[15] Additionally, the ROC traces a European lineage of Cold War stay-behind organisations: both the stay-behind reconnaissance units under military command and the civilian stay-behind resistance cells that were usually led by intelligence agencies. Oftentimes, these sprung up during the Second World War and were continued during the Cold War by European SOF-units and intelligence organisations such as in the Netherlands, Belgium and the United Kingdom.[16]

Parallel to the NATO political and military processes that aim to bolster the conventional military force and deterrence posture in the Baltic states, a

complementary operational concept has been in the making under the auspices of SOCEUR. The ROC has been in the making since 2014 before being published in its definitive format in 2019.[17] The ROC is the freely available result of numerous conferences, seminars, workshops, exercises and expert panels championed by a US special operations theatre component command: SOCEUR. The ROC aims to address the perception that the Baltic states are easy targets for military incursions, even when relying on strong alliance structures, by mobilising their civilian population for national defence.[18] In doing so, the ROC draws heavily from US unconventional warfare doctrine, historical case studies on the Second World War and Cold War resistance movements and partisan warfare methods in order to provide a common understanding amongst European allies. The ROC positions itself as a planning tool for developing resistance capabilities that counter invasion and occupation through irregular means, deny the adversary an easy military and political consolidation, and address the (conventional) military imbalances in the Baltic states' military power vis-à-vis the Russian Federation.[19]

SOCEUR's driving force in the ROC process is rooted in its Cold War special operations doctrine and history in the European theatre and closely related to the US army's special forces or 'green berets'. US irregular warfare concepts define IW's focus as: 'a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations. IW favours indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capabilities, in order to erode an adversary's power, influence, and will.'[20] The inclusion of 'other capabilities' in the definition opens the possibility towards harnessing the population's power and will as part of irregular warfare. This is, according to US doctrine, either performed in support of a friendly nation state through 'stability operations', 'counter-terrorism', 'counter-insurgency', or 'foreign internal defence': all indicating different forms of military support to a friendly nation in countering insurgencies, resistance organisations or terrorists internally.[21] In contrast, a focus on supporting and enabling a resistance movement is coined as 'unconventional warfare' that is doctrinally defined as: 'activities that are conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power….'[22] This term has a historic connotation of US support to insurgent or resistance groups in order to overthrow a hostile (to US interests) government. A recent example is the successful campaign in 2001 that overthrew the Taliban government in Afghanistan by embedding US army Special Forces (SF) teams within the Northern Alliance in conjunction with US air power.[23] This irregular type of warfare – fighting differently and in contrast to, and either complementing or in substitution of, large conventional formations – was and remains central to the irregular warfare proposition and the US army's Special Forces role: they are the custodians within the US military of irregular and unconventional

warfare for partnering with foreign militaries and groups in support of US interests. The Cold War political environment and military balance-of-forces played a crucial role in constituting the US army's Special Forces, as exemplified by John F. Kennedy's speech in 1962 noting their role in 'another type of warfare' to contrast large-scale conventional warfare and nuclear weapons in the long-term competition against the Soviet Union.[24]

3.3 Mobilising the People

Conventional militaries focus on engaging the adversary's military in order to influence its respective government. Such professionalised warfare between regular standing armies operates relatively unrelatedly to the civilian populations. Several historical drivers for the professionalisation of war into regular standing formations come to the fore: whether it results from a nation's internal suspicion towards arming its population, the increasing technical and organisational complexity of the means for warfare, or whether it follows from an increasingly formalised and legal distinction between the soldiery and the people.[25] In contrast to such a division between the population and the military, the ROC aims to encourage the nation's population outside of the regular armed forces to prepare during peacetime for adversity, invasion and occupation. In doing so, it aims to increase the population's absolute potential for resistance by increasing the nation's resilience.

The ROC is explicit in its aim to 'foster pre-crisis resiliency through Total Defence (also known as Comprehensive Defence), a "whole-of-government" and "whole-of-society" approach, which include interoperability among its forces and those of its allies and partners.'[26] The ROC defines resilience as 'the will and ability to withstand external pressures and influences and/or recover from the effects of those pressures or influences.' Measures to achieve resilience are not solely military and include non-military and societal preparations such as natural disaster preparation and relief, media literacy and governmental strategic communications.[27] Such non-military preparations are transferable to a nation's defence against military invasion as the Russo-Ukrainian war shows, where Ukraine has to evacuate inhabitants from cities under threat of invasion or flooding and where civilian organisations provide response and relief to victims of Russia's prolonged bombing campaign against civilian infrastructure. In the context of the ROC, *resilience* encompasses all preparations and deterrence efforts before invasion whereas *resistance* is the whole-of-society effort, nonviolent to violent, to re-establish independence and autonomy within its sovereign territory from occupation by a foreign power.[28]

In parallel with increasing the total society's potential for resistance, the ROC aims to mobilise a larger relative portion of the population in support of resistance when the need arises in comparison to a situation where no pre-crisis Total Defence planning occurred, whether in active or passive form.[29] The ROC therefore is a concept rooted in, and aimed towards, mustering the passions of the people in service to national security and support for war and resistance to invasion and occupation. In sum, the ROC aims to bring civilian efforts and a nation's population into closer alignment and cooperation with the government by fostering a closer relationship between the people with the government and the military, covering the constitutive parts of Clausewitz's triad.[30]

3.4 Clausewitzian People's War

Clausewitzian 'small war' is complementary to regular warfare with 'partisan' and small unit actions to harass the enemy, foraging for supplies from the enemy as well as the local civilian population, and to gather intelligence on the enemy.[31] Where regular warfare increasingly became professionalised and codified in customs and law, irregular warfare ('small war') in Clausewitz's times was considered the abandonment of such rules and practices typically associated with small scale skirmishes, raids and ambushes.[32] During Clausewitz's time there was a debate on the distinction between small versus major wars and on the possibilities of small war's contribution to major war campaigns.[33] Such small war tactics could be considered supportive to the major war campaign in order to manoeuvre favourably towards a decisive battle, or a defining feature of a limited war when decisive major war campaigning was not undertaken because strategically limited objectives did not warrant the required spending of resources for such campaigns.[34] For both uses, small parties of light, manoeuvrable troops familiar with the local terrain and people were employed to perform such partisan warfare.

The other type of small war manifest in Clausewitz's legacy, 'people's war', constituted the revolutionary or counter-revolutionary motivations that would arouse the population to take up arms against a government, a revolutionary movement or foreign invader.[35] This type of warfare has since been equated with insurgencies, rebels, militias, and guerrilla movements but in Clausewitz's time the usage of the term placed more emphasis on the motivation to defend one's property, families and communities by local self-defence forces in the nation's defence.[36] Clausewitz's chapter on 'the people in arms' explains why and how a nation should mobilise to resist, not only by means of a conventional military effort but also by widespread participation by the population in armed resistance to support a military campaign against the occupier.[37] This popular resistance is to function in tandem to the regular

military efforts to resist foreign occupation as depicted in his statement: 'to be realistic, one must therefore think of a general insurrection within the framework of a war conducted by the regular army, and coordinated in one all-encompassing plan.'[38] The function of the irregular popular resistance is explained as:

> By its very nature, such scattered resistance will not lend itself to major actions, closely compressed in time and space. Its effect is like that of the process of evaporation: it depends on how much surface is exposed.... Like smouldering embers, it consumes the basic foundations of the enemy forces. Since it needs time to be effective, a state of tension will develop while the two elements interact. This tension will either gradually relax, if the insurgency is suppressed in some places and slowly burns itself out in others, or else it will build up to a crisis: a general conflagration closes in on the enemy, driving him out of the country before he is faced with total destruction.[39]

Current efforts that operationalise national resistance through organising Territorial Defence Forces (TDF) parallels with Clausewitz's arming of the people spirit and follows along the lines of what the ROC is advocating for: a resistance movement within the general population to harass, deny rear area and supply line security, incite fear in the enemy, and to invigorate the national spirit to unify, mobilise and resist the foreign invader. Clausewitz even labelled such wars 'in which a people fights on its own territory for its freedom and independence' as 'the most beautiful of wars'.[40] If the occupied people maintain their resistant spirit they can deny the occupier complete consolidation of the occupied territory and provide fertile ground for future operations and resistance activities. Clausewitz stresses that such popular resistance needs to continuously strike a balance between concentrating force in time and space to perform armed actions versus the need to remain 'nebulous and elusive' in order to deny the enemy concrete points of counterattacking the resistance movement.

It should be noted that Clausewitz's people's war in his *Bekenntnisdenkschrift* differs from Maoist and post-Maoist concepts of people's war not so much in the employed methods related to guerrilla warfare but in their respective desired end-state. Both interpretations are forms of resistance against a larger perceived force and advocate for the application of violence to achieve the movement's ends. Both interpretations of people's war advocate for widespread, dispersed civilian involvement in the form of support to or active participation in rebellion and guerrilla warfare against a conventionally organised adversary. The difference between Maoist versus Clausewitzian people's war exists in their origin. Maoist people's war is revolutionary and aims to seize power through establishing and developing a counter-state. The recourse to guerrilla warfare is due to asymmetry between the initially small revolutionary movement that opposes a larger established

government and military apparatus.[41] On the contrary, Clausewitzian people's war is counter-revolutionary and aims to maintain the power of the government against a foreign invader. The recourse to guerrilla warfare is the result of the requirement to mobilise a greater portion of the population for the defence of the nation than is in active military service. The employment of guerrilla warfare is not necessarily due to the relative smallness of the defending nation's total military force but due to the immediate need to defend the localities at risk of foreign invasion. Mobilising territorial defence units provides additional strategic defence capacities against an invading military force because these local units need to spring into immediate independent action even when conventional military support is not present or available. Both forms of people's war advocate for civil-military interaction, however in Clausewitzian people's war the government engages with the population in defence of maintaining its legitimacy that is threatened by foreign invasion. Maoist people's war aims to develop legitimacy for its revolutionary cause amongst the population in order to overthrow the government. The origin of either form of resistance against its adversary remains relevant when invasion turns into occupation and the resistance acts to discredit the occupier's legitimacy and resist de-facto rule of the occupied territory. Even though the resisting population then aims to oust the occupiers which could be arguably revolutionary in nature, their cause is based on their aim to reinstate their government's rule and restore the lost legitimacy, whereas Maoist people's war develops legitimacy from the ground up and aims to overthrow a government.

3.5 Professionalising People's War

The central challenge for comprehensive national defence lies in mobilising military and non-military actors towards a common goal: increased willingness and preparations to bolster national security and preparations for possible occupation by a foreign power. Especially civilian actors are difficult to direct in such a coherent manner to ensure the level of unity of effort that Total Defence concepts require.[42] Championing such comprehensive efforts has been taken up by the special forces community through the ROC and the NATO Comprehensive Defence concept drafted by its special forces headquarters NSHQ.[43] However, it is difficult for militaries to directly address civilian efforts due to distinctions made between civilians and combatants in international humanitarian law. That distinction affects peacetime military preparations also by requiring the formal militarisation of those civilians who are willing to perform armed resistance. This leaves militaries in a contradictory role when they advocate for active civilian resistance in a manner depicted by the ROC: militaries are legally directed to interact with or against other militaries

when armed activities are concerned and moreover, operationally the proposed clandestine civilian resistance networks should be compartmentalised away from military actors in order to ensure their secrecy and survival against a potential foreign invader. It is therefore logical that advocating for national resistance capabilities is strongest from military circles, who can play a role in preparing for armed resistance; however, the military might not be the prime actor to prepare civilian resistance which leaves a large residual element of non-military and non-violent resistance to be championed and led by other government departments or intelligence agencies.[44] Such a division of roles is in line with historical examples such as the military NATO stay-behind units vis-à-vis the intelligence-led civilian stay-behind elements during the Cold War. Military stay-behind units and civilian stay-behind networks were led by the military chain of command and national intelligence services respectively and compartmentalised from each other to maintain security.[45]

A common way of mobilising a larger portion of the population for national security is to constitute military reserve units that are organised and geared towards localised armed defensive operations. These units are often designated as Territorial Defence Forces (TDF), Volunteer Based Forces, National Guard or Home Guard. Militarising these volunteers into formal units in the nation's armed forces resolves some legal issues concerning the distinction and protection of civilians and the status of combatants within armed conflict. Constituting such units results in opportunities for SOF to interact with these local reserve formations: with either SOF or the volunteer unit in the lead and at the tactical, operational or strategic levels (or a combination thereof).[46] Such a partnership between SOF and Territorial Defence Forces is what SOCEUR proposes in its Resistance Operational Guidance (ROG) as it highlights that TDF can provide access to the local population in order to mobilise them for national resistance because TDF are 'ideally suited to support underground elements and can identify or build the civilian component of national resistance.'[47] NATO SOF's role in support of the clandestine civilian resistance is therefore indirect as it is directed through militarised national reserve formations. This conceptualisation of national resistance through SOF partnering with TDF has become practice in two recent cases: Ukraine and Lithuania.

For example, in Ukraine, the Ministry of Defence, and the commander of Ukrainian SOF in particular, coordinates the development of resistance capabilities as stipulated in Ukraine's law 'On the Foundations of National Resistance'.[48] This law was adopted on 16 July 2021 but only entered into force on 1 January 2022. Even though the law went into effect during a period where such a large-scale invasion was to be prevented through diplomatic pressure and deterrence by detection and the conflict had been raging since 2014 in the Donbas, this left little time to prepare resistance networks with civilian integration before the large-scale invasion by Russia in February 2022. An early review of Ukrainian resistance efforts indicates

they are more focused on 'overt and armed resistance to invasion over clandestine resistance to occupation.'[49] These efforts are therefore less characteristic of the civil-military state coordinated clandestine networks that the ROC describes, and more akin to the overt military response in defending against invasion through local militia working alongside the professional military. This is partly due to the large-scale national response required at short notice against the Russian invasion in February 2022, which yielded only limited time for the preparation of civilian resistance networks at scale along the potential frontlines before the escalation of hostilities. Over time and during occupation, endemic clandestine resistance to occupation networks spawned locally in Russian-occupied Ukrainian territories, not only under the direction of Ukrainian SOF but also interacting with Ukrainian intelligence and law enforcement agencies. When these networks support or interact with military efforts, they often perform intelligence gathering, reconnaissance, and damage assessment activities to enable the conventional military's long-range precision strike capabilities to campaign far behind the front lines.[50] Another role that these civilian networks perform is a myriad of nonviolent resistance activities to undermine Russian occupation and therefore defy Russia's consolidation of occupied territories.[51] Both the nonviolent and the clandestine nature of their activities aim to increase these civilian networks' chances of survival and reduce possible blowback and reprisals by the Russian occupying forces.

In Lithuania, preparations for large-scale national resistance are under way. Organisations such as the Lithuanian Riflemen's Union – a civilian paramilitary organisation – or the Lithuanian National Defence Volunteer Forces (NDVF or 'KASP' in Lithuanian) – an active reserve segment of the Lithuanian Armed Forces – are increasingly integrated within its national defence structures through legislation, defence planning and training.[52] Both organisations are brought under military or governmental command structures, aim to coordinate military and civilian activities, and include both armed and unarmed elements to prepare for territorial defence, civil defence, relief efforts and the maintenance of public order. The constitution and scaling up of these Territorial Defence Forces is more akin to overt preparations for resistance to invasion through organised local militias than the preparations the ROC describes in preparing clandestine networks aimed to resist occupation. These national developments are accompanied by international partnering and training with for instance the United States' Army Special Forces. This cooperation entails financing of training facilities and participation in training and exercises. An example of the latter is US SOF training small unit armed guerrilla tactics to Lithuanian armed forces' reserve KASP, much in line with the Special Forces' roots in irregular warfare.[53] This tactical cooperation between the United States Special Forces and the Lithuanian armed forces is accompanied by top-level interaction between the Lithuania and the United States' Special Operations

Command (USSOCOM) where the Lithuanian (Vice) Minister of Defence and the commander of USSOCOM regularly meet to discuss the cooperation between the two countries' SOF.[54] The Lithuanian case is an example where support to resistance at the tactical level professionalises resistance to invasion and simultaneously strengthens ties between Lithuania and the United States.

Both cases present a pathway for how a broader part of the population outside of the military can be mobilised for national defence: in the case of Ukraine right before and during a large-scale invasion and for Lithuania in preparation of and in order to deter a possible invasion by a foreign power. Even though these contexts differ vastly, the two examples are similar in their goal of fostering a martial national character in order to deter or resist invasion. Such efforts to increase societal awareness, resiliency and martial character are necessary even before a tangible threat to national security arises because the scale of modern warfare places a heavy burden on nations and their populations. In order to attain the ultimate goal of regaining national sovereignty after foreign invasion, the population is expected to bear the hardships of invasion, prevent the occupier the opportunity to consolidate its grip on occupied territories, and retain commitment and support for allied liberation. According to Clausewitz, people's war contains an essential part of the nation's spirit to resist foreign occupation:

> No matter how small and weak a state may be in comparison with its enemy, it must not forego these last efforts, or one would conclude that its soul is dead.... A government that after having lost a major battle, is only interested in letting its people go back to sleep in peace as soon as possible, and, overwhelmed by feelings of failure and disappointment, lacks the courage and desire to put forth a final effort, is, because of its weakness, involved in a major inconsistency in any case. It shows that it did not deserve to win, and, possibly for that very reason was unable to.[55]

Whilst the overt operationalisation might not directly fall in line with the underground elements as described in the ROC, it is a fundamental step on the ladder towards widespread mobilisation of the population for national resistance: ranging from active duty to reserve military service to civilian protest or in ultimo as part of a clandestine civilian stay-behind resistance organisation.

3.6 Modern-Day People's War in Europe

How do irregular warfare and SOF relate to the modern-day people's war that the ROC alludes to? Recently, the US established its irregular warfare value proposition in relation to the US's strategic shift from the Global War on Terror (GWOT) towards

Great Power Competition (GPC). Even before the large-scale Russian invasion into Ukraine in 2022, the US already asserted in its National Defense Strategy 2018 (NDS) that terrorism has been supplanted by great power competition as the main threat towards national security.[56] Especially for the United States' special forces community this policy shift could have had major consequences as the US SOF were organised for and tactically very adept in counter-terrorism (CT) operations. These capabilities would not necessarily translate well into a context of great power competition: SOF therefore requires transitioning into the new era of great power competition.[57] Both American and European SOF need to adjust themselves towards the increased focus on working with allies and partners in order to deter escalation or fight when deterrence fails. Though tactical activities might not change considerably at the level of the SOF operator; the context and location where these will be performed are radically different from the expeditionary GWOT deployments and missions. SOF is confronted with a transition from activities in a highly militarised environment during missions in Iraq and Afghanistan for example, to a mission set that emphasises long term relations, trust, human connections and common training and preparation for what might come in the long term over performing highly kinetic activities against immediate problems. The challenge this policy transition poses to SOF is exemplified by the following statement made by an US Special Forces operator:

> I was recruited … with the promise of killing or capturing terrorists; my NCO assessor at selection described our purpose as partnership; I participated in the ROBIN SAGE [Unconventional Warfare] Exercise; upon arrival at my [Special Forces Team], my Team Sergeant focused on [Direct Action], Team Leader on [Unconventional Warfare], Company Commander on competition with China and Russia (whatever that means), and my Battalion Commander seemed most concerned with language currency.[58]

Following the publication of the 2018 US NDS, an unclassified summary of the NDS irregular warfare portion was published in 2020 as the 'Irregular Warfare Annex to the National Defense Strategy' which renewed the value proposition of irregular warfare to a focus on imposing costs and dilemmas to its adversaries in times of great power competition.[59] The IW Annex emphasises both the threat of the adversary's IW and the risk of assigning IW solely to SOF. Irregular threats, either in non-military form or below the threshold of war, remain a constant and lasting form of competition and warfare by non-state actors but also increasingly by states.[60] By focussing solely on traditional military-on-military warfare, nations risk that adversaries move into irregular approaches when the conventional military balance deters such traditional aggression. Therefore, no nation can solely develop their professional military capabilities in a vacuum without considering the societies in which they operate and from which they originate.

The Irregular Warfare Annex also serves as a counterweight to the 'boom and bust cycle' where the military drive towards large-scale conflict and combat operations results in a cycle where previous experience in irregular warfare quickly dissipates in favour of a single focus on traditional warfare: for example, the shift from Vietnam towards the US military's AirLand Battle in the 1980s. The current trend in many European nations towards bolstering and realigning their armed forces for the Eastern-European theatre provides fertile ground for a similar cyclical move away from irregular warfare and its related people-centric focus in favour of regular large-scale military formations. This places European militaries in danger of large-scale war myopia with a single focus on the adversary's military capabilities whilst overlooking the human domain in the same theatre. A human domain that not only constitutes the adversary's population but more importantly also the population at home and their willingness to persevere and support national resistance against foreign invasion: both in preparations beforehand and during fighting such a conflict.

Changes in the structural strategic environment have led to new perspectives on national security, the role of NATO, the current level of Baltic national security and military deterrence posture, and the role of irregular warfare – and special operations forces in particular – as complementary to traditional warfare and conventional military formations instead of being the leading paradigm. For SOF, the external environment drives SOF away from their recent experiences in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency. However, internally, SOF have historical roots and lineages that enable them in re-applying the past's experiences in irregular warfare and insurgencies that can complement the conventional military in times of great power competition. The current SOF irregular warfare trend is less resembling of the typical unconventional warfare experience in Afghanistan during 2001 – where small special forces detachments partnered with local resistance groups in order to overthrow a government – or to the unconventional warfare days of the SOE and OSS in the Second World War conducting sabotage and supply drops to local resistance elements. It is harkening back to the US Special Forces' 'Civilian Irregular Defense Group' and 'strategic hamlet' programmes in Vietnam during the early 1960s.[61] Those programmes inserted US army Special Forces teams – Operational Detachment Alpha's (ODA's) – into remote South-Vietnamese villages in order to train the population and prepare the village's perimeter to defend against the communist insurgents in conjunction with and under the leadership of the continuously present US special forces team. The current interaction of SOF with Territorial Defence Forces coincides more with the CIDG's partnered and long-term approach to irregular warfare and prepares for professionally organising paramilitary voluntary units rather than clandestine civilian underground resistance. Therefore, even though the ROC aims to harness the populations' passions

for resistance, the current trend of SOF partnering with TDF leads volunteering civilians into military reserve formations.

The overt military support coincides with Clausewitz's exemplary function that the TDF can perform in order to encourage the general popular resistance where he states that:

> a commander can more easily shape and direct the popular resistance by supporting the insurgents with small units of the regular army. Without these regular troops to provide encouragement, the local inhabitants will usually lack the confidence and initiative to take to arms.[62]

Thus, support from allied SOF in the form of doctrine and training to the TDF could attract those parts of the population most enthusiastic about joining and performing armed resistance and subsequently inspire others to do so or to support the resistance through other means and activities. In doing so, TDF formations coincide more with Clausewitz's Landwehr concept than with his general arming of the people, Landsturm.[63] In his Landwehr concept, Clausewitz advocated for the mobilisation of one third of Prussia's men between 18 and 45 who were not yet in the regular army and who were physically able to bear arms in regular formations and provided with weapons in open arsenals.[64] Such a 'limited' form of popular mobilisation, short of a complete general arming of the population, balances the state's monopoly on violence and popular allegiance to the nation with the need for a resistance capability aimed at preventing foreign occupation.

These TDF formations trend towards the professionalisation of war because of its limited scope in mobilising the people and therefore does not constitute a complete break in the historical trend towards separating people's war from professional war.[65] However, this does not mean that these efforts are in vain in respect to the ROC; harnessing and organising the 'early-adopters' of the population lays the groundwork for tapping into the rest of the population. There remain ample opportunities for the people to contribute to national resistance during all phases of conflict, by violent but also through non-violent means.[66]

3.7 Conclusion

The publication of the Resistance Operating Concept under SOCEUR's auspices spurred a renewed interest in irregular warfare and civil defence within the NATO SOF-community. The ROC focuses on national stay-behind civilian resistance efforts during partial or total occupation by a belligerent actor. Currently, overt military

resistance capabilities are under development and being communicated in several European nations as part of their response to the shifting geopolitical security environment and potential threats to their national security. Allied support of resistance in the overt military form to territorial defence forces contains elements of Clausewitz's people's war with a strong emphasis on professionalisation because of the concentration into formal military formations. These efforts can therefore not be considered as a clean break with a historical trend towards separating professional war from people's war. To the contrary, it is a development that integrates both forms of Clausewitzian small war by mobilising the population for national defence. It combines both the small unit formations and tactics of partisan war and the intrinsic motivation for taking up arms as is typical in people's war in Clausewitz's time. No wonder Clausewitz coined this overlap of fighting spirit between the state, the military and the people as 'the most beautiful of wars'.[67] However, even though the Baltic states might not fully comply with Clausewitz's requirements for successful popular resistance, the ROC, TDF and allied SOF support provide the means to shape the national character of the nation in order to increase the resistance potential of a nation and its population against a foreign occupier.[68] Clausewitz condemned those states that would not be willing to resist invasion by any means and subsequently would not prepare their population for such action. He considered those states as being not only undeserving of successful resistance, but probably unable to win in the first place because of such unwillingness to mobilise.[69]

In conclusion, allied external support to resistance is operationally and legally directed in such a manner that these resistance efforts move away from the ROC's original focus on underground stay-behind-organisations, and is directed to formal military Territorial Defence Forces. The current overt military operationalisation and allied support for armed resistance therefore equates to professionalising people's war and in effect turns regular what has been historically coined irregular warfare.

Notes

1 Daase and Davis, *Clausewitz on Small War*, chs. 2 and 3.

2 First printing in November 2019 by Special Operations Command Europe and Swedish Defence University and subsequently published online in 2020: Fiala, *Resistance Operating Concept*.

3 Ibid., p. xv.

4 Special Operations Command Europe, *SOCEUR Resistance Operational Guidance*.

5 Fiala, *Resistance Operating Concept*, p. 20.

[6] See Kilcullen, *The Dragons and the Snakes,* concerning Russia's efforts to exploit the time-gap of delayed responses and the binary logic between war and peace in the West, and Libiseller, 'Hybrid Warfare', concerning the upsurge in interest and reference to the term hybrid war(fare) since 2014.

[7] Fiala and Pettersson, 'ROC(K) Solid', pp. 17–19.

[8] Schlapak and Johnson, 'Reinforcing Deterrence'.

[9] Jakobsen, 'Causal Theories of Threat and Success', pp. 187–188; Reiter and Poast, 'The Truth about Tripwires', pp. 33–43 and 51.

[10] Veebel, Viljar, 'Are the Baltic States and NATO on the Right Path'. The impossibility to assess with certainty is because 'absolute' remains at best 'conditionally binary' in the context of deterrence against future threats. Consider the polemic in 2016 between the authors of the RAND report and Michael Kofman in a series of *War on the Rocks* commentaries: Schlapak and Johnson, 'Outnumbered, Outranged, and Outgunned'; Kofman, 'Fixing NATO Deterrence'; Mueller, Schlapak, Johnson and Ochmanek, 'In Defense of a Wargame'.

[11] NATO, 'Military Presence in the East' and Deni, 'New NATO Force Model', pp. 2–3.

[12] Fiala, 'Resistance Resurgent', pp. 113–115 and Fiala, 'Legitimizing the Resistance', pp. 152–153. Instead of complementarity, one scholar advocates the total replacement of conventional militaries in favour of 'professional irregular forces': Fabian, 'Professional Resistance Forces', pp. 187–196 and Fabian, 'Are the Baltics Really Undefendable', pp. 1–3.

[13] Fiala, 'Resistance Resurgent', pp. 109 and 113–115.

[14] Ibid., pp. 109, 111 and p. 122.

[15] See Wither, 'Back to the Future?', pp. 61–81, for an overview of Total Defence concepts amongst Nordic countries.

[16] Sinai, 'Eyes on Target: "Stay-Behind" Forces During the Cold War', pp. 690–693.

[17] Fiala, 'Special Operations Command Europe: Resistance Operating Concept' and Fiala, *Resistance Operating Concept,* pp. xiii, xv.

[18] Ibid., p. ix.

[19] Fiala and Pettersson, 'ROC(K) Solid', pp. 25–27; Fiala, 'Special Operations Command Europe: Resistance Operating Concept'.

[20] US DoD, *Irregular Warfare*.

[21] US DoD, *Joint Publication 3-05 Special Operations*, Chapter II-2, figure II-1.

[22] Ibid., p. xi.

[23] Andres, Wills and Griffith, 'Winning with Allies', pp. 124–160 and Biddle, 'Allies, Airpower, and Modern Warfare', pp. 161–176.

[24] Tracy, 'Another Type of Warfare', pp. 14–22.

[25] Honig, 'People's War vs Professional War', pp. 133–136.

[26] Fiala, *Resistance Operating Concept*, p. 1.

[27] Ibid., p. xv.

[28] Ibid., p. 5.

[29] Definitions and the level of military-civil cooperation or integration vary between concepts of 'Total Defence'. The common denominator is that all 'Total Defence' concepts aim, in differing ways and to differing extents, to involve the civilian population with the government's help in the service of national security.

[30] Fiala, *Resistance Operating Concept*, p. 2. Note how the actors' 'allies' and 'population' do not overlap with subsequent consequences for allied support to resistance.

[31] Heuser, 'Small Wars in the Age of Clausewitz', pp. 140–149; Heuser, 'Exploring the Jungle of Terminology', pp. 742–746; Fonck and Satterfield, 'The Essence of War', pp. 768–777 and Deruelle, 'Sixteenth-Century Antecedents', pp. 755–757.

[32] Heuser, 'Exploring the Jungle of Terminology', p. 742.
[33] Heuser, 'Small Wars in the Age of Clausewitz', pp. 145–146.
[34] Satterfield, *Princes, Posts and Partisans*.
[35] Heuser, 'Small Wars in the Age of Clausewitz', pp. 149–158; Heuser, 'Exploring the Jungle of Terminology', pp. 746–749.
[36] Ibid., p. 749 and Scheipers, 'The Most Beautiful of Wars', pp. 48, 53–55.
[37] Clausewitz, *On War*, Book VI, ch. 26, pp. 479–483 and Daase and Davis, *Clausewitz on Small War*, ch. 5, 'The Arming of the People: Volksbewaffnung', pp. 221–226. Note the difference in translation of the title.
[38] Clausewitz, *On War*, Book VI, ch. 26, p. 480.
[39] Ibid.
[40] Scheipers, 'The Most Beautiful of Wars', pp. 54, 62 and Clausewitz, *Historical and Political Writings*, p. 283.
[41] Marks and Rich, 'People's War in the 21st Century', pp. 409–410.
[42] Stringer, 'SOF: The Integrators for Total Defense and Resistance', pp. 66–67.
[43] NATO Special Operations Headquarters (NSHQ), *Comprehensive Defence Handbook*, Vol. I.
[44] Runts, 'The Backbone: The Role of the Armed Forces in the Resistance Movement', p. 123.
[45] Sinai, 'Eyes on Target: 'Stay-Behind' Forces During the Cold War'.
[46] Jones and Mehan, 'Stronger Together', pp. 141–155.
[47] Special Operations Command Europe, *Resistance Operational Guidance*, pp. 13–14.
[48] Jones and Bryant Love, 'Resilience and Resistance 2.0', pp. 31–32.
[49] Ibid.
[50] Danylyuk, 'Against the Odds'; Farrell, 'Inside Occupied Ukraine's Most Effective Resistance Movements'.
[51] Krohley, 'Ukrainian Civilians Are Pioneering the Art of Resistance'.
[52] Skėrytė, 'Lithuanian Parliament Expands Activities of Riflemen's Union', and Lithuanian National Radio and Television (LRT), 'Lithuania Sets Up Wartime Civilian Force'.
[53] Trevithick, 'U.S. Special Ops and Lithuanian Reservists Practiced Waging Guerrilla War'; U.S. Special Operations Command Europe, '10th Special Forces Group & KASP'; U.S. Special Operations Command Europe, *Saber Junction 20*; US Department of Defense, 'Green Berets Mentor U.S., Albanian and Lithuanian Forces'; US Department of Defense, 'Lithuanian KASP and US SOF Train Irregular Warfare'; US Department of Defense, 'U.S. SOF Train With Lithuanian Forces.'
[54] Ministry of National Defence, Republic of Lithuania, 'Cooperation between the Lithuanian and the U.S Special Operations Forces', and id., 'National Defence Minister Met with Commander of U.S. Special Operations Command'.
[55] Clausewitz, *On War*, Book VI, ch. 26, p. 483.
[56] US Department of Defense, 'Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America', as quoted in Koven, 'Competing with Great Powers', p. 68.
[57] Ibid. and Horncastle and Maclennan, 'Where Eagles Err', pp. 49–51; Lewis, 'Special Operations Forces' Role in Political Warfare', pp. 179–182.
[58] Croot, *There Is an Identity Crisis in Special Forces*, p. 41.
[59] US Department of Defense, 'Summary of the Irregular Warfare Annex', p. 3. For more on cost imposition, GPC and SOF, see: Brands and Nichols, *Cost Imposition in the Contact Layer*.
[60] US Department of Defense, 'Summary of the Irregular Warfare Annex', p. 4.
[61] Jones and Mehan, 'Stronger Together', p. 142, highlight this Vietnam example. See also Kelly, *Vietnam Studies: U.S. Army Special Forces 1961–1971*; Piasecki and Guerin. 'Civilian Irregular Defense Group in Vietnam', pp. 177–193.

[62] Clausewitz, *On War*, Book VI, ch. 26, p. 482.

[63] Daase and Davis, *Clausewitz on Small War*, ch. 4, 'On the Political Advantages and Disadvantages of the Prussian Institution of the Landwehr', pp. 217–220 and ibid., p. 221, n. 2.

[64] Ibid., pp. 217 and 221.

[65] Honig, 'People's War vs Professional War', pp. 143–145.

[66] For an in-depth analysis focusing on how civilians in the Baltic State can contribute to resistance and regaining national sovereignty, see Binnendijk and Kepe, 'Civilian-Based Resistance in the Baltic States'.

[67] Scheipers, 'The Most Beautiful of Wars', pp. 54, 62 and Clausewitz, *Historical and Political Writings*, p. 283.

[68] Clausewitz, *On War*, Book VI, ch. 26, p. 480: '1) The war must be fought in the interior of the country; 2) It must not be decided by a single stroke; 3) The theater of operations must be fairly large; 4) The national character must be suited to that type of war; 5) The country must be rough and inaccessible ….'

[69] Ibid., p. 483.

Bibliography

Andres, Richard B, Craig Wills and Thomas Griffith. 'Winning with Allies: The Strategic Value of the Afghan Model'. *International Security* 30, no. 3 (Winter 2005/2006), pp. 124–160.

Biddle, Stephen D. 'Allies, Airpower, and Modern Warfare: The Afghan Model in Afghanistan and Iraq'. *International Security* 30, no. 3 (Winter 2005/2006), pp. 161–176.

Binnendijk, Anika, and Marta Kepe. 'Civilian-Based Resistance in the Baltic States: Historical Precedents and Current Capabilities'. Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, 2021.

Brands, Hal, and Tim Nichols. 'Cost Imposition in the Contact Layer: Special Operations Forces and Great-Power Rivalry'. Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 2021.

Clausewitz, Carl von. *Historical and Political Writings*, ed. and tr. Peter Paret and Daniel Moran. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2014.

Clausewitz, Carl von. *On War*, ed. and tr. Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984.

Croot, Edward C. 'There is an Identity Crisis in Special Forces: Who Are the Green Berets Supposed to Be?' Fellows Strategy Research Project Monograph. Carlisle, Penn.: US Army War College, 2020.

Daase, Christopher, and James W. Davis, eds. *Clausewitz on Small War*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015.

Danylyuk, Oleksandr V. 'Against the Odds: Lessons from the Ukrainian Resistance Movement'. *RUSI Commentary*, 4 July 2023. https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/against-odds-lessons-ukrainian-resistance-movement (Accessed 20 May 2024).

Deni, John R. 'The New NATO Force Model: Ready for Launch?' *NATO Defence College Outlook*, no. 4 (2024), pp. 1–7.

Deruelle, Benjamin. 'The Sixteenth-Century Antecedents of Special Operations "Small War"'. *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 25, no. 4 (2014), pp. 754–766.

Fabian, Sandor. 'Are the Baltics Really Undefendable?' *RUSI Newsbrief* 40, no. 9 (2020), pp. 1–3.

Fabian, Sandor. 'Professional Resistance Forces as a Defence Framework for Small Countries'. *Security: Theory and Practice* 48, no. 3 (2022), pp. 187–196.

Farrell, Francis. 'Inside Occupied Ukraine's Most Effective Resistance Movements'. *Kyiv Independent*, 9 January 2024. https://kyivindependent.com/image-draft-there-is-no-doubt-in-victory-inside-occupied-ukraines-most-effective-resistance-movements/ (Accessed 20 May 2024).

Fiala, Otto. 'Special Operations Command Europe: Resistance Operating Concept'. Unclassified PowerPoint Briefing, May 2019. https://nsiteam.com/social/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/U-SMA-Brief-SOCEUR-Resistance-Operating-Concept.pdf (Accessed 15 April 2024).

Fiala, Otto. *Resistance Operating Concept*. MacDill Air Force Base, Fla: Joint Special Operations University Press, 2020.

Fiala, Otto. 'Resistance Resurgent: Resurrecting a Method of Irregular Warfare in Great Power Competition'. *Special Operations Journal* 7, no. 2 (2021), pp. 109–135.

Fiala, Otto. 'Legitimizing the Resistance'. *Journal on Baltic Security* 8, no. 1 (2022), pp. 151–170.

Fiala, Otto, and Ulrica Pettersson. 'ROC(K) Solid Preparedness: Resistance Operations Concept in the Shadow of Russia'. *PRISM* 8, no. 4 (2020), pp. 17–28.

Fonck, Bertrand, and George Satterfield. 'The Essence of War: French Armies and Small War in the Low Countries (1672–1697)'. *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 25, no. 4 (2014), pp. 767–783.

Heuser, Beatrice. 'Small Wars in the Age of Clausewitz: The Watershed between Partisan War and People's War'. *Journal of Strategic Studies* 33, no. 1 (2010), pp. 139–162.

Heuser, Beatrice. 'Introduction: Exploring the Jungle of Terminology'. *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 25, no. 4 (2014), pp. 741–753.

Honig, Jan Willem. 'People's War vs Professional War: Which Has the Future in Europe?' In *Beyond Ukraine: Debating the Future of War*, edited by Tim Sweijs and Jeffrey H. Michaels. London: Hurst, 2024, pp. 125–145.

Horncastle, James R., and Jack Adam Maclennan. 'Where Eagles Err: Contemporary Geopolitics and the Future of Western Special Operations'. *Special Operations Journal* 7, no. 1 (2021), pp. 43–54.

Jakobsen, Peter Viggo. 'Causal Theories of Threat and Success: Simple Analytical Tools Making It Easier to Assess, Formulate, and Validate Military Strategy'. *Scandinavian Journal of Military Studies* 5, no. 1 (2022), pp. 177–191.

Jones, Derek, and Brian Mehan. 'Stronger Together: The Integration of a Nation's Special Operations Forces and Voluntary-Based Formation in Comprehensive and Total Defence'. *Security: Theory and Practice* 48, no. 3 (2022), pp. 141–155.

Jones, Derek, and J. Bryant Love. 'Resilience and Resistance 2.0: Initial Lessons of Ukraine and the Implications of Resilience and Resistance Efforts to Deter and Respond to Invasion and Occupation by Revisionist Powers'. *Security: Theory and Practice* 48, no. 3 (2022), pp. 21–40.

Kelly, Francis J. '*Vietnam Studies: U.S. Army Special Forces 1961–1971*'. Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1973. https://history.army.mil/html/books/090/90-23-1/CMH_Pub_90-23-1.pdf.

Kilcullen, David. *The Dragons and the Snakes: How the Rest Learned to Fight the West*. London: Hurst, 2020.

Kofman, Michael. 'Fixing NATO Deterrence in the East or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love NATO's Crushing Defeat by Russia'. *War on the Rocks*, 12 May 2016. https://warontherocks.com/2016/05/fixing-nato-deterrence-in-the-east-or-how-i-learned-to-stop-worrying-and-love-natos-crushing-defeat-by-russia/ (Accessed 15 April 2024).

Koven, Barnett S. 'Competing with Great Powers through Competitive Strategy and Unconventional Warfare'. *Special Operations Journal* 7, no. 1 (2021), pp. 68–86.

Krohley, Nicholas. 'Ukrainian Civilians Are Pioneering the Art of Resistance: Nonviolent Tools are Undercutting the Russian Occupation'. *Foreign Policy*, 28 February 2024. https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/02/28/ukrainian-civilian-resistance-movements-women-war-mavkas/ (Accessed 20 May 2024).

Lewis, Steve. 'Special Operations Forces' Role in Political Warfare'. *Special Operations Journal* 5, no. 2 (2019), pp. 179–187.

Libiseller, Chiara. '"Hybrid Warfare" as an Academic Fashion'. *Journal of Strategic Studies* 46, no. 4 (2023), pp. 858–880.

Lithuanian National Radio and Television (LRT). 'Lithuania Sets Up Wartime Civilian Force: Explainer'. 5 May 2024. https://www.lrt.lt/en/news-in-english/19/2264481/lithuania-sets-up-wartime-civilian-force-explainer (Accessed 15 May 2024).

Marks, Thomas A., and Paul B. Rich. 'Back to the Future: People's War in the 21st Century'. *Small Wars and Insurgencies* 28, no. 3 (2017), pp. 409–425.

Ministry of National Defence, Republic of Lithuania. 'Cooperation between the Lithuanian and the U.S Special Operations Forces Improves Our National Security'. *Ministry of National Defence News*. 30 March 2023. https://kam.lt/en/cooperation-between-the-lithuanian-and-the-u-s-special-operations-forces-improves-our-national-security/ (Accessed 10 May 2024).

Ministry of National Defence, Republic of Lithuania. 'National Defence Minister Met with Commander of U.S. Special Operations Command Gen. Bryan Fenton visiting Lithuania'. *Ministry of National Defence News*. 15 September 2023. https://kam.lt/en/national-defence-minister-met-with-commander-of-u-s-special-operations-command-gen-bryan-fenton-visiting-lithuania/ (Accessed 10 May 2024).

Mueller, Karl, David A. Schlapak, Michael W. Johnson and David Ochmanek. 'In Defense of a Wargame: Bolstering Deterrence on NATO's Eastern Flank'. *War on the Rocks*, 14 June 2016. https://warontherocks.com/2016/06/in-defense-of-a-wargame-bolstering-deterrence-on-natos-eastern-flank/ (Accessed 15 April 2024).

NATO, Special Operations Headquarters (NSHQ). *Comprehensive Defence Handbook*, Vol I. Edition A, Version 1, December 2020. https://www.nshq.nato.int/Library/DownloadFile/e8a86ab2-cbf4-900e-3fcc-c3daa451c067.

NATO. 'NATO's Military Presence in the East of the Alliance'. *North Atlantic Treaty Organization*, 8 December 2023. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_136388.htm (Accessed 15 May 2024).

Piasecki, Eugene G. and Luke C. Guerin. 'Civilian Irregular Defense Group in Vietnam'. In *The Competitive Advantage: Special Operations Forces in Large-Scale Combat Operations*. Edited by Robert M. Toguchi and Michael E. Krivdo. Fort Leavenworth, Ks.: Army University Press 2019, pp. 177–193.

Reiter, Dan, and Paul Poast. 'The Truth About Tripwires: Why Small Force Deployments Do Not Deter Aggression'. *Texas National Security Review* 4, no. 3 (2021), pp. 33–53.

Runts, Mareks. 'The Backbone: The Role of the Armed Forces in the Resistance Movement'. *Journal on Baltic Security* 8, no. 1 (2022), pp. 120–130.

Satterfield, George. *Princes, Posts and Partisans: The Army of Louis XIV and Partisan Warfare in the Netherlands (1673–1678)*. Leiden: Brill, 2003.

Scheipers, Sibylle. '"The Most Beautiful of Wars": Carl von Clausewitz and Small Wars'. *European Journal of International Security* 2, no. 1 (2016), pp. 47–63.

Schlapak, David A., and Michael W. Johnson, 'Reinforcing Deterrence on NATO's Eastern Flank: Wargaming the Defense of the Baltics'. Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, 2016.

Schlapak, David A., and Michael W. Johnson. 'Outnumbered, Outranged, and Outgunned: How Russia Defeats NATO'. *War on the Rocks*, 21 April 2016. https://warontherocks.com/2016/04/outnumbered-outranged-and-outgunned-how-russia-defeats-nato/ (Accessed 15 April 2024).

Sinai, Tamir. 'Eyes on Target: 'Stay-Behind' Forces During the Cold War'. *War in History* 28, no. 3 (2021), pp. 681–700.

Skėrytė, Jūratė. 'Lithuanian Parliament Expands Activities of Riflemen's Union'. *Lithuanian National Radio and Television (LRT)*, 8 November 2022. https://www.lrt.lt/en/news-in-english/19/1816497/lithuanian-parliament-expands-activities-of-riflemen-s-union. (Accessed 10 May 2024).

Special Operations Command Europe. 'SOCEUR Resistance Operational Guidance (Draft)'. 10 June 2022. Unclassified.

Stringer, Kevin D. 'Special Operations Forces (SOF): The Integrators for Total Defense and Resistance'. *Journal on Baltic Security* 8, no. 1 (2022), pp. 65–75.

Tracy, Jared M. 'Another Type of Warfare: U.S. President John F. Kennedy's Address to the West Point Class of 1962'. *Veritas* 19, no. 1 (2023), pp. 14–22.

Trevithick, Joseph. 'U.S. Special Ops and Lithuanian Reservists Practiced Waging Guerrilla War Against Russia'. *The Warzone*, 30 June 2019. https://www.twz.com/19186/u-s-special-ops-and-lithuanian-reservists-practiced-waging-guerrilla-war-against-russia. (Accessed 10 May 2024).

US Department of Defense. 'Green Berets Mentor U.S., Albanian and Lithuanian Forces During Allied Spirit VIII'. *Utah National Guard*. 2 March 2019. https://ut.ng.mil/Site-Management/News-Article-View/Article/2007935/green-berets-mentor-us-albanian-and-lithuanian-forces-during-allied-spirit-viii/ (Accessed 10 May 2024).

US Department of Defense. 'Lithuanian KASP and US SOF Train Irregular Warfare at Saber Junction 18'. *Defense Visual Information Distribution Service*. 27 September 2018. https://www.dvidshub.net/news/294586/lithuanian-kasp-and-us-sof-train-irregular-warfare-saber-junction-18#:~:text=The%20KASP%20is%20part%20of,aggression%2C%E2%80%9D%20said%20Major%20M (Accessed 10 May 2024).

US Department of Defense. 'U.S. SOF Train With Lithuanian Forces'. *Defense Visual Information Distribution Service*. 12 March 2022. https://ut.ng.mil/Site-Management/News-Article-View/Article/2007935/green-berets-mentor-us-albanian-and-lithuanian-forces-during-allied-spirit-viii/ (Accessed 10 May 2024).

US Department of Defense. 'Irregular Warfare: Countering Irregular Threats Joint Operating Concept'. Joint Chiefs of Staff Doctrine Publication, 17 May 2010. https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/concepts/joc_iw_v2.pdf?ver=2017-12-28-162021-510 (Accessed 20 April 2024).

US Department of Defense. 'Joint Publication 3-05 Special Operations'. Joint Chiefs of Staff Doctrine Publication, 16 July 2014. https://irp.fas.org/doddir/dod/jp3_05.pdf (Accessed 20 April 2024).

US Department of Defense. 'Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America'. Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2018.

US Department of Defense. 'Summary of the Irregular Warfare Annex to the National Defense Strategy'. Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2 October 2020. https://media.defense.gov/2020/Oct/02/2002510472/-1/-1/0/Irregular-Warfare-Annex-to-the-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.PDF (Accessed 20 April 2024).

US Special Operations Command Europe. '10th Special Forces Group & KASP'. *Twitter*, 20 June 2019. https://x.com/us_soceur/status/1141645372042948608 (Accessed 10 May 2024).

US Special Operations Command Europe. 'Saber Junction 20'. *Facebook*, 10 September 2020. https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=10157749706823196&set=a.440825833195 (Accessed 10 May 2024).

Veebel, Viljar, and Illimar Ploom. 'Are the Baltic States and NATO on the Right Path in Deterring Russia in the Baltic?' *Defense & Security Analysis* 35, no. 4 (2019), pp. 406–422.

Wither, James Kenneth. 'Back to the Future? Nordic Total Defence Concepts'. *Defence Studies* 20, no. 1 (2020), pp. 61–81.

CHAPTER 4

Fuelling Instability in the Ukraine War: The Questionable Loyalty of Non-State Actors in Cyberspace

Peter Pijpers & Lotte Nietzman

Abstract

A paradoxical stability reigned during the Cold War-era. While the nuclear threat could destroy the planet several times over, there was geopolitical stability in the bipolar system: the mutually assured destruction averted all-out-war – but did not prevent minor conflicts or war through proxies. This is what is known as the Stability/Instability paradox. The end of the Cold War-era heralded the end of the strategic parity and increased instability, conflict, and violence which in turn queried the relevance of the Stability/Instability paradox. However, with the inception of cyberspace, a new domain of strategic competition and rivalry emerged. As with nuclear weapons, generating large scale cyber-capacities to engage in competition or conflict appeared to be the prerogative of powers with global reach, including the US, China, and Russia. Though the attributes of cyber-capacities differ from nuclear weapons, the concept of the Stability/Instability paradox seemed similarly applicable to cyberspace since there was stability in great-power competition without discounting the instability due to cyber-related subversive activities by their proxies. The analogy was contested not least since the influx of non-aligned non-state actors, including commercial entrepreneurs, raises concerns about their status as belligerent parties but moreover on their loyalty. The authors argue that with the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine and subsequent war, the Stability/Instability paradox is no longer applicable. Since assertive non-state actors, operating in cyberspace, are often not affiliated to or under control of the great powers, their presence in cyberspace will serve as a catalyst to increase political division and instability as it can no longer be balanced off with the stability we see on the level of great powers.

Keywords: Stability/Instability paradox, Cyberspace, Non-state actors, Cyberspace operations, Russo-Ukraine war

4.1 The End of an Era

> Deterrence comes from having enough weapons to destroy the other's cities; this capability is an absolute, not a relative, one.[1]

The Cold War was dominated by the overwhelming number of nuclear weapons possessed by the United States and the Soviet Union.[2] The destructive potential of these weapons and the danger of escalation and subsequent mutually assured destruction paradoxically resulted in a bipolar nuclear stability. Inherently connected to this great power stability were non-nuclear conflicts and limited wars fought between proxy-states, loyal to the US or the Soviet Union, creating instability in a variety of degrees – ranging from skirmishes in Latin-America to the Cuban Missile crisis and the Korean and Vietnam wars.[3] Snyder and later Jervis characterised this nuclear predicament as the Stability/Instability paradox.[4]

The end of the Cold War-era, and hence the end of the political and military balance of the bipolar system, saw a rise in instability, conflict, and violence. With the emergence of cyberspace, in that same timeframe, a new domain of strategic competition appeared in which rivalry took place predominantly by hegemons. This resulted in increased tension between states and eroded the brittle stability even further: the peace dividend came at a price.

The fragile post-Cold War stability between Russia and the West was finally shattered by the 2014 annexation of Crimea and subsequent 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. With the Russo-Ukraine war, a contemporary hybrid conflict unfolds in which physical, virtual, and cognitive effects are achieved, making use of all instruments of power available: on the ground, at sea, in the air, but also in cyberspace. We not only observe a merging of these instruments, dimensions, and domains (in a far from coordinated manner), we first and foremost witness the influx of new non-state actors becoming involved in the virtual dimension of the conflict, without becoming belligerent parties. These non-state actors – ranging from sympathising hacker groups to ICT firms – actively support one of the parties in the war, often making use of informational means (words, data, binary code, videos, memes) in the opaque grey zone between war and peace, without necessarily being affiliated to one of the hegemons but pursuing their own goals.

In the Russo-Ukraine war the kinetic engagements dominate the news whilst cyberattacks are only covered by media sparsely. It appears that aside from the eye-catching Viasat-attack that impacted telecommunication systems in Ukraine on the eve of the invasion, few offensive attacks took place in cyberspace.[5] This, however, could not be further from reality.[6] Below the fog of kinetic battle, thousands of cyberattacks have taken place, mostly carried out by non-state actors.[7]

After states realised that activities in cyberspace not only facilitated commerce and communication but could also have malign effects, cyberspace-capacities became tools of power – some even of strategic value. As it is not only our personal data or the electrical grid that is jeopardised, but with it the very existence of open and democratic societies, cyber equivalents of Pearl Harbour were coined as well as the occasional framing of cyberspace as 'the new nuclear weapon'. The concept of a cyber-Pearl Harbour first emerged in the early 1990s in the US cyber security discourse.[8] The cyber-Pearl Harbour in general is oftentimes used as a metaphor for a cyber-attack with a catastrophic, physical impact. In 2012, US Defence Secretary Leon Panetta described it as follows:

> An aggressor nation or extremist group could use these kinds of cyber tools to gain control of critical switches. They could, for example, derail passenger trains or even more dangerous, derail trains loaded with lethal chemicals. They could contaminate the water supply in major cities or shutdown the power grid across large parts of the country. The most destructive scenarios involve cyber actors launching several attacks on our critical infrastructure at one time, in combination with a physical attack on our country. Attackers could also seek to disable or degrade critical military systems and communication networks. The collective result of these kinds of attacks could be a cyber Pearl Harbour; an attack that would cause physical destruction and the loss of life. In fact, it would paralyze and shock the nation and create a new, profound sense of vulnerability. As director of the CIA and now Secretary of Defense, I have understood that cyber-attacks are every bit as real as the more well-known threats like terrorism, nuclear weapons proliferation and the turmoil that we see in the Middle East.[9]

Additionally, Stuxnet, the digital 'warhead' that sabotaged Iran's uranium enrichment program shows how its existence has inaugurated a new age of warfare, one in which a digital attack is believed to have the same destructive capability as a megaton bomb.[10] Considering the range of threats the struggle for cyberspace represents, from the erosion of privacy to weakened critical infrastructure, one could argue the contest for control of the internet is as complex and dangerous as the one surrounding nuclear weapons during the Cold War – and with that quite possibly as dangerous for humanity as a whole. While scholars often argue that the comparison is flawed,[11] the idea that cyberspace can achieve strategic effects remains.[12]

In assessing the strategic balance between states in cyberspace, Lindsay and Gartzke analysed whether the Stability/Instability paradox could likewise be valid for cyberspace and concluded that, while there is no perfect fit, the underlying rationale could apply.[13] At present, the question is, given the cyber dimension of the current Russo-Ukraine war, whether that notion still stands or whether the influx of non-affiliated non-state actors will undermine the paradoxical rationale

and increase instability in cyberspace.[14] We will argue that the rationale behind comparing the nuclear Stability/Instability paradox with cyberspace has changed: cyberspace does not replace the nuclear era capacities, it rather is an add-on to nuclear and conventional means.

In this introduction as well as in the next section we will first briefly describe the analogy between the original (nuclear) Stability/Instability paradox and cyberspace. After that we will describe activities in cyberspace and represent a theoretical frame on how to analyse the effects of cyberspace activities. We will then provide an overview of cyber operations witnessed during the Russo-Ukraine war and argue why it makes sense to stretch the category of non-state actors in yet another direction, namely that of individuals. Next, we will categorise them using the theoretical frame to determine whether the Stability/Instability paradox can still be applied to operations in cyberspace. Based on the assessments, we will conclude with some reflections for future warfare.

The chapter has some limitations. Firstly, cognisant of the wider activities of non-state actors in armed conflicts, this chapter solely focuses on activities of non-state actors in cyberspace, and secondly, only makes use of data available in open sources.[15]

4.2 The Stability-Instability Paradox in Cyberspace

The core elements of the Stability/Instability paradox – great power nuclear stability and unstable proxy wars – could be transferred to cyberspace. To start with, similar to the nuclear model, near-peer cyber-powers have a common interest; one of the core elements of the coercion-doctrine.[16] Hegemonic powers such as Russia, China, and the US, are highly dependent on the internet connectivity for their economy, intelligence and politics, and will therefore be reticent to rock the boat.[17]

The rationale behind this is that great cyber-powers have the ability to craft and build the capacities to execute destructive cyber operations that could change the balance of power between states. They will, however, refrain from using them as they are deterred by the capacities of their peers, but also since they are dependent on cyberspace – and therefore restrained to act.[18] At the same time state proxy actors, Advanced Persistent Threats (APT), and (non-attributable) non-state actors cause instability in cyberspace.[19] These smaller cyber-powers have a so-called lower digital attack surface and are therefore less vulnerable and more prone to engage in low-level digital espionage and hacktivism – hindrances such as Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks or defacements that do not have a deterrent or escalatory effect.[20] And thus, the attacks that do occur are usually trivial and reversible, rather than significantly and seriously damaging.[21] 'We see little to none of the

most dangerous behaviour but a great deal of provocative friction', write Lindsay and Gartzke, and thus, 'it turns out that cyber revolutionaries and cyber sceptics are both partially correct'.[22] Following this line of thought, the core elements of the Stability/Instability paradox could be transferred to cyberspace.

The non-state actors engaged in war currently are, however, less dependent on the hegemonic cyber powers. Most of them are, in effect, no longer 'proxies' but rather non-affiliated actors which are not loyal to larger cyber-powers nor are they controlled by them. Most of the non-state actors active in the cyber sphere since the outbreak of the war in Ukraine in 2022 are unaffiliated to states. They choose their allegiance based on commercial or opportunistic arguments and will leave the battlefield once they are exposed or when technical thrill is lacking. This premise would undermine the Stability/Instability rationale. To assess whether the Stability/Instability paradox is still a viable concept for cyberspace, a classification of activities and their effects will be presented.

4.3 Effects and Activities in Cyberspace

Numerous categorisations exist for activities, operations or campaigns executed in or via cyberspace. Greenberg highlights that a distinction can be made between activities that could lead to 'cyberwar', as used by Arquilla and Ronfelt or Clarke and Knake,[23] and cyberespionage, cybercrime and information operations via cyberspace – which are not labelled as cyberwar.[24] The definitions of cyberwar and cyberwarfare have changed over time; from tactics confined to the periphery of war to cyberattacks that could themselves be a weapon of war. The current war in Ukraine has again provided impetus for this discourse.[25]

Arnold, Ducheine and Pijpers argue that in a geopolitical context three cyber-related categories of activities exist. The dawn of cyberspace has strengthened existing activities – digital espionage operations and digital influence (soft-cyber) operations – but also enabled a new one – one that focusses on digital undermining (hard-cyber).[26] Hard cyber operations are activities in the virtual dimension that undermine cyberspace itself with binary code, in order to modify or manipulate data and to degrade or destroy the ICT infrastructure. This results in (virtual and/or physical) effects *in* cyberspace – similar to Arquilla's notion of 'cyberwar'. Digital influence operations in contrast use cyberspace as a vector (without affecting it) and target the (human) cognitive dimension of groups or audiences, entailing content, words, memes, and footage as 'weapons'.[27]

Gartzke and Lindsay categorise cyber activities based on the effects they achieve.[28] The first category contains activities that have low costs and high (strategic) rewards and would include the 'cyber-Pearl Harbour' or a digital lockout (i.e.,

shutting down the internet). These forms of cyber-attacks are, however, less realistic since most cyber-operations consume time and resources, are far from inexpensive and often generate a limited effect.[29] Less mythical, according to Gartzke and Lindsay, are cyber operations that support other (military or political) campaigns. Examples of operational complements are digital espionage for kinetic or political campaigns, or operations that disrupt control systems of (critical) infrastructure. They are less useful as independent cyber operations but have the power to increase effectiveness in other domains. The final category are tactical hindrances. These activities are easy to engage in and come at low costs but will achieve limited payoffs. Cyber hindrances entail stealing licences or digital repositories of universities, hacktivism including DDoS attacks, defacement or phishing attempts.

Cyberspace is not a domain in which strategic effects can easily be achieved, but that does not mean that it cannot have strategic value.[30] In line with the above-mentioned operational complements, Smeets and Harknett argue that cyber-activities can be enablers or force-multipliers for conventional capabilities.[31] But they can also provide independent assets with the possibility to achieve strategic outcomes without resorting to war. Smeets makes a distinction between 'countering values' and 'countering force' cyber capabilities, which is useful for the analysis of the Stability/Instability paradox in cyberspace.[32] The former includes targeting national assets of strategic value which can include vital infrastructure, while the latter (counter force) involves targeting operationally relevant assets in support of a larger campaign such as the Israeli 2017 Operation Orchard.[33] The latter can also cause minor effects via a DDoS attack. Smeets' 'countering force' activities therefore encompass the second and the third category of operational complements as well as the tactical hindrances as described by Gartzke and Lindsay.

Based on the academic discourse above, it can be deduced that applying the Stability/Instability paradox to cyberspace implies that, even though some call it mythical, in theory, big cyber-powers will be able to engage in counter value attacks, paralysing or severely disrupting the critical infrastructure of their peers, whereas the parallel development of their capacities creates strategic stability. At the same time, there will be an unstable contestation with a countering force-effect in the realm of espionage, criminal activities, and undermining digital hindrances including hacks, DDoS and defacements.

This conceptual framework of cyber effects will now be used to assess the cyberspace-related non-state actors' activities in the Russo-Ukraine war (in section 4.4) to make an assessment on whether the Stability/Instability paradox is still a viable concept in cyberspace (in section 4.5).

4.4 The Russo-Ukraine War and the Effects in Cyberspace

The Russian Federation and Ukraine have a long and troubling history, one that – in recent decades – was also written in cyberspace. On the eve of the invasion, on 24 February 2022, the most prominent and destructive Russian attack was executed, which targeted the US firm Viasat that operated the KA-SAT satellite communication system for, among others, Ukraine, other parts of Europe and Northern Africa. The attack made use of the destructive wiperware dubbed 'AcidRain',[34] disabling thousands of terminals for satellite communications, resulting in the loss of battlefield communications particularly in the region close to Kyiv, making Ukrainian forces virtually blind to Russian troop positions and movements.[35] The Viasat attack was probably intended to provide (counter force) operational support to the military operation by undermining the enemy forces' ability to defend or counterattack. The effect of the attack however was limited. One reason for this was that Elon Musk's Starlink satellite system quickly restored Ukraine's internet communications.[36] Another was that the attack was probably limited by design.[37] Although the attack on Viasat was effective in disrupting a large part of the Ukrainian military and civil communication infrastructure, it did not destroy the entire system since the Russian military depended on it as well.

The 2022 Russian invasion was not the start of the cyberattacks on Ukraine. Apart from the cyber dimension of the annexation of Crimea in 2014, Ukrainian infrastructure was targeted in 2015 and 2016 during 'BlackEnergy' cyber-attacks,[38] resulting in an outage of electricity in large parts of Ukraine, and in 2017 the NotPetya attack targeted the Ukrainian fiscal system.[39] In the months before the invasion, pro-Russian hackers executed rather straightforward DDoS-attacks temporarily taking down the government websites of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defence and the Armed Forces, but also of Internet Service Providers and national banks.[40] Hackers (including the malicious cybergroup UNC1151) also defaced the websites of dozens of Ukrainian government organisations with manipulated political imagery and provocative propaganda messages.[41] Mid-January 2022 wiperware was placed on the ICT infrastructure of government agencies providing emergency response functions. The wiperware used, coined 'Whispergate', was a form of malware disguised as ransomware. Whispergate did not lock the data but erased it, destroying the start-up mechanism rendering the infected ICT infrastructure useless.[42] Apart from these digital disruptive and hacktivist operations, digital influence operations were witnessed, such as the leaking of personal data of 2 million Ukrainian citizens via the FreeCivilian site.[43] In such operations cyberspace is used as a vector to target the cognitive dimension of adversaries, meaning that the aim is to mess with the human mind. During this period, Russian agents or sympathisers were not the only ones active. In January 2022 the Belarusian Cyber Partisans executed Operation Scorned Heat, which disrupted

the Railway electronic ticket system for passengers but in parallel tampered with the Russian on-ward movement via the Belarusian railway system.[44]

Before the 2022 invasion, the bulk of the attacks in cyberspace were executed by state or state-affiliated actors and were one-sided, originating from Russian agents including the GRU (Sandworm, Fancy Bear/APT 28), SVR (Cozy Bear/APT 29) and FSB.[45] In the weeks after the invasion by Russian forces, the dynamics changed. It is likely that Russia had planned a swift invasion, but when that failed, they had to revisit their campaign plan.[46] From then on, Russian state-led cyber operations – which require substantial lead time – were sloppy and, overall, ineffective, though some exceptions exist such as the December 2023 attack on Kievstar, causing a severe outage of mobile phone traffic.[47] Moreover, after the February 2022 period we, firstly, witnessed the influx of non-state actors engaging in the conflict – hackers and digital activists but also ICT firms supporting either the Russian or Ukrainian side.[48] Pro-Russian cyberattacks targeted the logistics and transportation sector inside Ukraine, the main line of communication to both transport weapon systems and military supplies eastward and refugees westwards.[49] Hacker collective Anonymous declared war on Russia,[50] and ICT firms chipped in: Microsoft provided cyber security support and shared Russian tactics and techniques.[51] Secondly, Ukrainian state-led (or -initiated) agencies became involved in the conflict in cyberspace. The IT Army of Ukraine was created in support of Ukraine in order to fight Russia on the digital front.[52] Finally, cyber activities outside the Ukrainian battlespace increased, encompassing a wider area including adjacent states and strategic partners – both state (EU) and non-state. Initiatives like the ones mentioned above touch upon the question of whether individuals can be regarded as non-state actors too. Already in 2018, the New York Times reported that the U.S. Cyber Command had targeted individual Russian hackers in order to deter them from engaging in conduct that could affect the organisation and outcome of the US mid-term elections.[53] Moreover, it is important to emphasise that a state as such can never be criminally charged with a crime, therefore the use of criminal law for the attribution of cyber incidents is exclusively related to acts carried out by individuals, which can be non-state, state-sponsored or even directly employed by a state.[54] The question is whether the private initiatives of non-state cyber actors and their questionable loyalty to the higher political agenda of the major powers, changes the danger of escalation.

Up to January 2024, the Cyber Peace Institute registered more than 3,250 cyber-attacks related to the Russo-Ukraine war.[55] Analysing the data, two aspects catch the eye: firstly, more than 90% of all attacks came from non-state actors.[56] At the time of writing there are 91 pro-Russian cyber collectives and 47 pro-Ukrainian ones.[57] The collectives – with illustrious names such as Zarya Legion, Cyber Dragon, Killnet 2.0, People's CyberArmy or NoName057(16) on the Russian side and NAFO,

Saint Javelin, Anonymous (Italy), IT Army of Ukraine and Hack your Mom on the Ukrainian – are nearly all engaged in DDoS and hack (intrusions) activities, and most of them are not affiliated to, or under control of, a state.[58]

Secondly, 95% of all state and non-state activities were tactical hindrances, most prominently DDoS operations, which could be labelled as counter force rather than counter value. The majority of the offensive activities that have been registered were DDoS attacks as well, supplemented with defacement (Figure 4.1). Hack-and-leak operations and the instalment of mal- and ransomware, have a limited effect on the course of the war.[59]




Figure 4.1: Number of cyber attacks[60]

The lion's share of the cyber operations is 'counter force' in nature and executed by non-state actors. Of interest are the wipers that have been used, mainly in the run-up to the invasion and the few weeks thereafter. In total 19 wiperware attacks were registered, 13 of which were executed by state actor Russia.[61] Wiperware attacks serve as operational support to the military campaign in shaping the battlefield to cripple or undermine the Ukrainian defences and can be labelled as counter force assets.[62] There is a proclivity for operational complements (espionage and wiperware) being executed by state rather than non-state actors.

Pro-Russian state and non-state actors also conducted cyber-enabled operations – disruptive propaganda, and disinformation campaigns (both mainstream and

social media) – to influence target audiences.[63] False narratives were distributed via government-controlled websites (e.g., RT and Sputnik) amplifying aligned framed messages,[64] propaganda and the spreading of disinformation through exploited social media services.[65] The main purpose of Russian influence operations is to demoralise the Ukrainian population, and to drive a wedge between Ukraine and its Western allies. Influence operations are also used to target domestic Russian audiences and Russian diaspora to smoothen the domestic public sentiments towards the on-going war.[66] Narratives used are Western Russophobia, a sensitive topic to Russian diaspora or ethnic Russians living in Ukraine, the 'denazification and demilitarisation' of Ukraine and the endemic corruption within the Ukrainian government.[67]

Ukraine similarly employed digital influence operations, whilst exploiting social media. From the invasion on, President Zelensky has addressed his population online and kept up the morale of his troops in doing so, affecting the cognitive dimension of both friend and foe.[68] The story of a Ukrainian fighter pilot, 'the Ghost of Kyiv', went viral online. Another occurrence concerned the bold response of Ukrainian troops defending Snake Island after Russia's Black Sea Fleet flagship 'The Moskva' demanded their surrender. Of strategic importance is the fervent on-line strategic communication by Zelensky (hence state-led) to foreign parliaments that result(ed) in diplomatic support and, moreover, in the supply of funds, military systems and ammunition. Since the invasion, social media has facilitated Zelensky to internationalise Ukraine's cause and to persuade (Western) democratic countries to support his country. In this sense, the states-led use of digital influence operations using the internet and social media are counter value operations that can have a strategic impact.

4.5 Revisiting the Stability/Instability Paradox

The analysis of cyber operations in the Russo-Ukraine war, first, highlights that the lion's share of the cyber activities in the current war are DDoS attacks, hindrances carried out by non-state actors. These non-state actors are no proxies of state actors, though some of them can be labelled as either pro-Russian or pro-Ukrainian. These hindrances have little to no effect on the development of the war itself. While wiperware-attacks (executed by state actors) do have destructive, counter force effects, the strategic – counter value – impact is generated by influence operations that use cyberspace as a vector.[69] A second deduction concerns the fact that, in contrast to the nuclear paradox, it appears that in the cyberspace paradox both stability and instability roam in the same domain – namely cyberspace activities – whereas in the nuclear paradox the domains are different: nuclear versus conventional.

Do these results regarding the impact of cyber operations and the (non-state) actors involved, affect the Stability/Instability paradox? The hypothesis of the

cyber-related version of the Stability/Instability paradox is that great cyber-powers have the ability to engage in counter value attacks by which they could paralyse or destroy (the critical infrastructure of) their peers. Their peers will, therefore, not indulge in warfare since the parallel development of their capacities deters attacks, *ipso facto* creates strategic stability. Moreover, great cyber-powers have an interest in the well-functioning of the internet (or cyberspace in general). At the same time there is an unstable contestation by smaller, less digitalised states in the realms of hacktivism and digital espionage.

On the one hand, the paradox could still apply as the analysis of cyber activities in the Russo-Ukraine war does not refute the notion that stability exists between big cyber-powers able to apply counter value attacks, simply because the war is not between big cyber-powers – nor is there a wider war between great cyber-powers such as China, the US or Russia.

On the other hand, the results would prompt a rethinking of whether the paradox still applies to cyberspace. First, the war in Ukraine made it clear that cyberspace does not replace traditional means and capacities of engaging in conflict. The cyberspace paradox-hypothesis isolates activities in cyberspace, while in practice these must be added to nuclear and conventional capacities and threats. Second, regarding the actors involved in cyberspace, the instability is not caused by small states that act as sub-contracted proxies, but predominantly non-state actors. Moreover, the cyber dimension of the Russo-Ukraine war shows that some of these non-state actors are affiliated to the great powers themselves (Fancy Bear (APT 28) to Russia or Comment Panda (APT 1) to China) but most are not affiliated to a state at all (Anonymous or Killnet). This raises a question on the loyalty of these actors and the control major power states could have over them. The hacktivist collective Anonymous operates 'against organizations and individuals with whom they disagree[d]', and is not affiliated to Ukraine but did declare war on Russia.[70] Conversely, Killnet is known to be a pro-Russian hacker group and predominantly engages in data exfiltration attacks against Western entities. Recently, however, it was exposed by Russian state media after claims that the collective started targeting the Russian Federation.[71] The uncertainty and arbitrariness that is associated with the question of loyalty creates unpredictability and instability in the cyberspace arena. Furthermore, it is questionable if the imbalance between major powers and small states or even non-state actors exists in cyberspace. There is no 'entry-fee' to enter the arena, and skill, tools and software are easily accessible and inexpensive, contrary to nuclear weapons. In that sense smaller states and non-state actors have an asymmetrical advantage in cyberspace. Finally, while in the original Stability/Instability paradox the strategic effects are caused by nuclear means, the strategic effects in the cyberspace domain are not caused by destructive hard-cyber means but by digital influence operations. Though influence operations in cyberspace can

have a counter value impact, these activities will probably not have the potential to actually deter actors (state or non-state) from engaging in a strategic competition the way nuclear weapons have. The hard cyber-attacks (such as wiperware) have a counter force effect and would – in terms of the nuclear Stability/Instability paradox – rather replace the conventional (instability) activities than the nuclear (stability). To sum up, major states struggle to use cyber with strategic effects. And non-state actors pose little danger as their effects are predominantly seen on the tactical level.

Based on the current developments witnessed in the cyber domain of the Russo-Ukraine war, the Stability/Instability paradox as envisioned for the nuclear era does not (or no longer) apply to cyberspace. Lindsay and Gartzke argued that it is an imperfect fit but stated that the rationale behind it was still valuable. Based on the (preliminary) lessons from the Russo-Ukraine war, it however is no longer tenable to argue that the Stability/Instability paradox applies to cyberspace. Activities in cyberspace – especially digital influence operations – can have a strategic (counter value) impact and can even be coercive in nature but they will hardly be the weapon of choice (for nuclear powers) when an opponent needs to be deterred. Moreover, there is only a weak affiliation between the great powers in cyberspace and the smaller non-state actors including tech-firms. It is difficult to maintain that the non-state actors causing mayhem in cyberspace are sub-contracted by the great cyber-power, and consequently the loyalty of these actors in relation to great power is questionable. Finally, the war in Ukraine made clear that the rationale behind comparing the nuclear Stability/Instability paradox with cyberspace has changed: cyberspace does not replace the nuclear era capacities, it rather is an add-on to nuclear and conventional means.

4.6 Reflection on Future Wars

The main question addressed in this chapter was whether the notion that the Stability/Instability paradox can be applied to cyberspace still stands. In general, it does not. The emergence of cyberspace did not usher in a new nuclear era, meaning that cyberspace-capacities have not replaced nuclear weapons. But the idea behind the paradox must not be discarded altogether.

Strategic stability still is created by the reluctance of great nuclear powers to engage in an all-out nuclear war, not by a parity of cyber-means. The notion that instability is created by limited wars fought by smaller proxy states in the conventional realm is no longer viable. Currently, conventional limited wars fuelling instability have been taken over, or are being complemented, by permanent competition in cyberspace. And while the great power states still create stability,

cyber competition – generating instability – is not executed by proxy states but by (non-aligned) non-state actors. Due to the lack of loyalty of non-state actors and the lack of control by states, the nexus or trade-off between the stability and instability realm which existed in the nuclear era is not applicable in cyberspace.

This conclusion leads to a few reflections for future conflicts. The first reflection is that new (non-state) actors have emerged on the battlefield and these actors are there to stay. Non-state actors ranging from hacker-collectives such as Anonymous or Killnet to ICT-firms (Starlink, Microsoft) can and will take positions in the phase of permanent competition in cyberspace and will be conducive to instability, not least since the behaviour of these actors (which cannot be linked to a state-actor) is often not covered by international law – which governs the behaviour of states.

The second reflection is on the fact that great powers roam in the remit of counter value effects and generate strategic stability, either through their cyber power or through their nuclear arsenal. Despite the reluctance of great powers to act, conflicts of interest between these states still need to be resolved. In the nuclear Stability/Instability paradox, a conventional conflict would emerge between proxies of the major powers. At present it would be possible that these conflicts are settled in cyberspace by non-state actors. However, the connection between the great powers and non-state cyber actors is far less settled than (it was) between the great powers and their nuclear-era proxies. This linkage can be ideological but could also be financial, in which case allegiances or coalitions between state and non-state actors can change swiftly, especially during times of conflict.[72] And thus the capriciousness of non-state actors can induce instability and cause an escalatory effect whereby skirmishes could evolve into unwanted (cyber) warfare.

Finally, if the conflicts in the age of persistent competition are dominated by conflicts in cyberspace or with cyber means, it needs to be considered that these activities have a highly covert or secretive guise, in contrast to conventional limited wars that balanced off the great power stability. Secrecy is not conducive to the transparency in the conflicts nor to attributing the origin of the activities. It is highly likely that cyber activities during conflict are therefore underreported and, sometimes, wrongly attributed to great power stability.

Notes

1 Jervis, 'Why Nuclear Superiority Doesn't Matter', p. 618.

2 Snyder, 'The Balance of Power and the Balance of Terror'; Lieber, Review of 'The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy' by Robert Jervis.

3 Freedman, 'Ukraine and the Art of Limited War', pp. 8–12.

4 Snyder, 'Deterrence and Power', pp. 163–78; Jervis, 'Why Nuclear Superiority Doesn't Matter'.

5 Smeets, *No Shortcuts: Why States Struggle to Develop a Military Cyber-Force*.
6 Mironova, 'Russia's Invasion of Ukraine Is Also Being Fought in Cyberspace'.
7 Cyberknow, 'Russia-Ukraine War: Update 27.'
8 Lawson and Middleton, 'Cyber Pearl Harbor'.
9 US Department of Defense, 'Remarks by Secretary Panetta on Cybersecurity'.
10 Zetter, *Countdown to Zero Day: Stuxnet and the Launch of the World's First Digital Weapon*.
11 Gartzke and Lindsay, 'Weaving Tangled Webs: Offense, Defense, and Deception in Cyberspace', p. 317.
12 Harknett and Smeets, 'Cyber Campaigns and Strategic Outcomes'.
13 Lindsay and Gartzke, 'Coercion through Cyberspace: The Stability-Instability Paradox Revisited'.
14 Taillat and Douzet, 'Collective Security and Strategic Instability in the Digital Domain', p. 362.
15 For activities of non-state actors in other domains, see Rothman, 'This Has Triggered a Civil War: Russian Deterrence of Democratic Revolts'.
16 Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, p. 1.
17 Xi Jinping, 'Work Together to Build a Community of Shared Future for Mankind'.
18 Gartzke and Lindsay, 'The Cyber Commitment Problem and the Destabilization of Nuclear Deterrence', p. 220.
19 APT are advanced persistent threats, which are actors that have funds and time to execute larger and more complex cyber operations. Due to the resources available, these actors are associated with states while those states often deny that affiliation. See Redpacket Security, 'APT Trends Report Q2 2020: The Most Remarkable Findings, Southeast Asia and Korean Peninsula'; Mandiant, 'APT 1: Exposing One of China's Cyber Espionage Unit'.
20 Defacements or defacement attacks occur when malicious actors penetrate a website and replace its content with their own messages.
21 Lindsay and Gartzke, 'Coercion through Cyberspace', p. 212.
22 Ibid., p. 184.
23 Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 'Cyberwar Is Coming!'; Clarke and Knake, *Cyber War*.
24 Greenberg, 'The WIRED Guide to Cyberwar'.
25 See Vićić and Mehta, 'Why Russian Cyber Dogs Have Mostly Failed to Bark'.
26 Pijpers and Arnold, 'Conquering the Invisible Battleground'; Ducheine, Pijpers, and Arnold, 'The "Next" War Should Have Been Fought in Cyberspace, Right?'; Ducheine, Van Haaster and Van Harskamp, 'Manoeuvring and Generating Effects in the Information Environment'.
27 Lupion, 'The Gray War of Our Time', pp. 329–330; Walton, 'What's Old Is New Again'.
28 Lindsay and Gartzke, 'Coercion through Cyberspace'; Smeets and Work, 'Operational Decision-Making for Cyber Operations', pp. 95–96.
29 Borghard and Lonergan, 'Cyber Operations as Imperfect Tools of Escalation', pp. 125–131; Gartzke, 'The Myth of Cyberwar'.
30 Maschmeyer, 'The Subversive Trilemma: Why Cyber Operations Fall Short of Expectations'.
31 Harknett and Smeets, 'Cyber Campaigns and Strategic Outcomes'.
32 Smeets, 'The Strategic Promise of Offensive Cyber Operations', pp. 93–96.
33 Referring to the 2017 Israeli Operation 'Orchard' in which electronic warfare and cyberspace operations (undermining Syria's Air Defence System with the 'Suter' programme) supported a (kinetic) air raid, see for example Soesanto, 'A Digital Army', pp. 29–30.
34 Guerrero-Saade and Van Amerongen, 'AcidRain'.
35 Blessing, 'Revisiting the Russian Viasat Hack'.
36 Hyunjoo Jin, 'Musk Says Starlink Active in Ukraine as Russian Invasion Disrupts Internet'.
37 Maschmeyer, 'Cyber Conflict and Subversion'.

[38] Lee, Assante, and Conway, 'Analysis of the Cyber Attack on the Ukrainian Power Grid'.
[39] Greenberg, 'The Untold Story of NotPetya'.
[40] Pell, 'Contextualizing Last Week's Malicious Cyber'.
[41] UNC1151 is affiliated to the state of Belarus, see Polityuk, 'Ukraine Suspects Group Linked to Belarus Intelligence'.
[42] Burt, 'Malware Attacks Targeting Ukraine Government'.
[43] Digital Forensic Research Lab, 'Russian Hybrid Threats Report'.
[44] Schrijver and Ducheine, 'Cyber-Enabled Influence Operations'.
[45] Soldatov and Borogan, 'Russian Cyberwarfare: Unpacking the Kremlin's Capabilities'.
[46] Johnson, 'The First Phase of the Russian Invasion of Ukraine 2022'.
[47] Tychchenko, 'Russian Hackers Infiltrated Kyivstar System'.
[48] Duguin and Pavlova, 'The Role of Cyber in the Russian War against Ukraine'.
[49] Microsoft Threat Intelligence, 'A Year of Russian Hybrid Warfare in Ukraine', p. 8.
[50] Milmo, 'Anonymous: The Hacker Collective That Has Declared Cyberwar on Russia'.
[51] Burt, 'Disrupting Cyberattacks Targeting Ukraine'; Antoniuk, 'Microsoft Identifies New Hacking Group'.
[52] Soesanto, 'Ukraine's IT Army'; id., 'The IT Army of Ukraine'; Fendorf, 'The Dynamics of the Ukrainian IT Army's Campaign'.
[53] Mačák, 'On the Shelf, But Close at Hand'.
[54] Broeders, De Busser and Pawlak, 'Three Tales of Attribution in Cyberspace'.
[55] Cyber Peace Institute #Ukraine, https://cyberconflicts.cyberpeaceinstitute.org/.
[56] See: https://cyberconflicts.cyberpeaceinstitute.org/threats, and The Cybertracker by Cyberknow, https://cyberknow.medium.com (accessed: March 2024). On that date 3,255 attacks had occurred, 189 (5.8%) of which were executed by states. The activities by states included influence operations, DDoS, malware and wiperware attacks, and hack-and-leak operations.
[57] According to Cyberknow update 24, July 2023, see https://cyberknow.medium.com/update-24-2023-russia-ukraine-war-cybertracker-20-july-ec64cfef38a0
[58] There is a general understanding of which cyber entities are state actors (the Russian GRU, Sandworm or the UKR GUR) and which are not. Some though are sometimes labelled state agents and sometimes not, most prominently the IT Army of Ukraine.
[59] Similar trends are seen in the Hamas-Israel war, see the Cybertracker of Cyberknow, in which 65 actors are engaged in DDoS, Defacement and Hack and Leak operations, https://twitter.com/Cyberknow20/status/ 1778037181204058592 (accessed 14 April 2024).
[60] Based on https://cyberconflicts.cyberpeaceinstitute.org/threats. Note that the data presented here is to be seen as an illustration given the fact that a considerable number of cyber-related activities are executed covertly – especially digital espionage and intelligence gathering activities. See also Wilde, 'Cyber Operations in Ukraine: Russia's Unmet Expectations'; Soldatov and Borogan, 'Russian Cyberwarfare: Unpacking the Kremlin's Capabilities'.
[61] Some nine wiperware 'families' have been identified, including Whispergate, AcidRain and Industroyer 2. Between mid- and late-2022 Russian agents used numerous variants of CaddyWiper, see Arnold and Dorst, 'Wiperware: Een nieuw cyberwapen voor de militaire toolbox?'
[62] Smeets, 'The Strategic Promise of Offensive Cyber Operations', p. 95.
[63] Dov Bachmann, 'Hamas–Israel: TikTok and the Relevance of the Cognitive Warfare Domain'; Kleisner and Garmey, 'Tactical TikTok for Great Power', pp. 12–14.
[64] See for example the website donbasstragedy.info (created 26 November 2021), which pushes posts like 'Kyiv has begun to create a "human shield" of the civilians of Donbass' (24 Feb 2022).
[65] Smith, 'Defending Ukraine: Early Lessons from the Cyber War'.

66 Molendijk, 'Morale and Moral Injury among Russian and Ukrainian Combatants'.
67 Lichtenstein et al., 'Framing the Ukraine Crisis'.
68 Zelensky, 'We Are Here to Defend Our Independence'.
69 Arnold et al., 'Assessing the Dogs of Cyberwar', pp. 251–252.
70 Anon., 'About Anonymous'.
71 Jones, 'Leader of Pro-Russia DDoS Crew Killnet "Unmasked" by Russian State Media'.
72 Grossman, Kello, Shires and Smeets, 'Public-Private Collaboration in Ukraine and Beyond'.

Bibliography

Anon. 'About Anonymous' from https:/anonymoushackers.net/anonymous-history/. (Accessed 7 August 2024).

Arnold, K.L. and S. van Dorst. 'Wiperware: Een nieuw cyberwapen voor de militaire toolbox?' *Militaire Spectator* 192, no. 11 (2023), pp. 512–525.

Arnold, Kraesten, Peter Pijpers, Paul Ducheine and Peter Schrijver. 'Assessing the Dogs of Cyberwar: Reflections on the Dynamics of Operations in Cyberspace during the Russo-Ukrainian War'. In *Reflections on the Russian-Ukrainian War*, edited by Maarten Rothman, Lonneke Peperkamp and Sebastiaan Rietjens. Leiden: Leiden University Press, 2024, pp. 231–256.

Arquilla, John and David Ronfeldt. 'Cyberwar Is Coming!' *Comparative Strategy* 12, no. 2 (Spring 1993), pp. 141–165.

Blessing, Jason. 'Revisiting the Russian Viasat Hack: Four Lessons About Cyber on the Battlefield', American Enterprise Institute, 2 September 2022.

Borghard, Erica D. and Shawn W. Lonergan. 'Cyber Operations as Imperfect Tools of Escalation'. *Strategic Studies Quarterly* 13, no. 3 (2019), pp. 125–131.

Broeders, Dennis, Els de Busser and Patryk Pawlak. 'Three Tales of Attribution in Cyberspace: Criminal Law, International Law and Policy Debates'. The Hague Program for Cyber Norms Policy Brief (2020).

Burt, Tom. 'Disrupting Cyberattacks Targeting Ukraine'. *Microsoft* (blog), 7 April 2022. https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2022/04/07/cyberattacks-ukraine-strontium-russia/.

Burt, Tom. 'Malware Attacks Targeting Ukraine Government'. *Microsoft* (blog), 15 January 2022. https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2022/01/15/mstic-malware-cyberattacks-ukraine-government/.

Clarke, Richard A. and Robert K. Knake. *Cyber War: The Next Threat to National Security and What to Do about It?* London: Routledge, 2010.

Cyber Peace Institute #Ukraine. https://cyberconflicts.cyberpeaceinstitute.org/threats. (Accessed: March 2024).

Cyberknow. Cybertracker. https://cyberknow.medium.com. (Accessed: March 2024).

Digital Forensic Research Lab. 'Russian Hybrid Threats Report: A Push to Recognize Ukrainian Regions as Independent States'. *Atlantic Council,* January 2022.

Dov Bachmann, Sascha. 'Hamas–Israel: TikTok and the Relevance of the Cognitive Warfare Domain'. *The Defence Horizon Journal,* 11 March 2024. https://tdhj.org/blog/post/hamas-israel-tiktok-war/.

Ducheine, Paul, Jelle van Haaster and Richard van Harskamp. 'Manoeuvring and Generating Effects in the Information Environment'. In *Winning without Killing: The Strategic and Operational Utility of Non-Kinetic Capabilities in Crisis*. NL ARMS Netherlands Annual Review of Military Studies 2017, edited by Paul Ducheine and Frans Osinga. The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2017, pp. 155–179.

Ducheine, Paul, Peter Pijpers and Kraesten Arnold. 'The "Next" War Should Have Been Fought in Cyberspace, Right?' In *Beyond Ukraine: Debating the Future of War*, edited by Tim Sweijs and Jeff Michaels. London: Hurst, 2024.

Duguin, Stéphane and Pavlina Pavlova. 'The Role of Cyber in the Russian War against Ukraine: Its Impact and the Consequences for the Future of Armed Conflict'. *EU Policy Department for External Relations*, September 2023. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2023/702594/EXPO_BRI(2023)702594_EN.pdf.

Fendorf, Kyle. 'The Dynamics of the Ukrainian IT Army's Campaign in Russia'. *Lawfare*, 15 June 2023. https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/the-dynamics-of-the-ukrainian-it-army-s-campaign-in-russia.

Freedman, Lawrence. 'Ukraine and the Art of Limited War'. *Survival* 56, no. 6 (2014), pp. 7–38.

Gartzke, Erik. 'The Myth of Cyberwar: Bringing War in Cyberspace Back Down to Earth'. *International Security* 38, no. 2 (2013), pp. 41–73.

Gartzke, Erik and Jon R. Lindsay. 'Weaving Tangled Webs: Offense, Defense, and Deception in Cyberspace'. *Security Studies* 24, no. 2 (2015), pp. 316–348.

Gartzke, Erik and Jon R. Lindsay. 'The Cyber Commitment Problem and the Destabilization of Nuclear Deterrence'. In *Bytes, Bombs and Spies: The Strategic Dimensions of Offensive Cyber Operations*, edited by Herbert S. Lin and Amy Zegart. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2019, pp. 195–234.

Greenberg, Andy. 'The Untold Story of NotPetya, the Most Devastating Cyberattack in History'. *Wired*, 22 August 2018.

Greenberg, Andy. 'The WIRED Guide to Cyberwar'. *Wired Magazine*, 2023.

Grossman, Taylor, Monica Kello, James Shires and Max Smeets. 'Public-Private Collaboration in Ukraine and Beyond'. *Binding Hook*, 2024. https://bindinghook.com/articles-binding-edge/public-private-collaboration-in-ukraine-and-beyond/.

Guerrero-Saade, Juan Andres and Max van Amerongen. 'AcidRain: A Modem Wiper Rains Down on Europe'. *Sentinel Labs*, March 2022.

Harknett, Richard J. and Max Smeets. 'Cyber Campaigns and Strategic Outcomes'. *Journal of Strategic Studies* 45, no. 4 (2022), pp. 534–567.

Hyunjoo Jin. 'Musk Says Starlink Active in Ukraine as Russian Invasion Disrupts Internet', 27 February 2022.

Jervis, Robert. 'Why Nuclear Superiority Doesn't Matter'. *Political Science Quarterly* 94, no. 4 (1979), pp. 617–633.

Johnson, Rob. 'The First Phase of the Russian Invasion of Ukraine 2022'. Oxford Changing Character of War Centre, 16 March 2022. https://www.ccw.ox.ac.uk/news/rob-johnson-writes-essay-on-ukraine.

Jones, Connor. 'Leader of Pro-Russia DDoS Crew Killnet "Unmasked" by Russian State Media'. *The Register*, 27 November 2023. https://www.theregister.com/2023/11/27/leader_of_prorussia_ddos_crew/. (Accessed 23 May 2025).

Kleisner, Theodore W. and Trevor T. Garmey. 'Tactical TikTok for Great Power Competition: Applying the Lessons of Ukraine's IO Campaign to Future Large-Scale Conventional Operations'. *Military Review* (July-August 2022), pp. 23–43.

Lawson, Sean and Michael K. Middleton. 'Cyber Pearl Harbor: Analogy, Fear, and the Framing of Cyber Security Threats in the United States, 1991–2016'. *First Monday* 24, no. 3 (March 2019). https://doi.org/10.5210/fm.v24i3.9623.

Lee, Robert, Michael Assante and Tim Conway. 'Analysis of the Cyber Attack on the Ukrainian Power Grid'. *SANS Industrial Control Systems Security Blog*, 2016.

Lichtenstein, Denis, et al. 'Framing the Ukraine Crisis: A Comparison between Talk Show Debates in Russian and German Television'. *International Communication Gazette* 81, no. 1 (2019), pp. 66–88. https://doi.org/10.1177/1748048518755209.

Lieber, Robert J. Review of *The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy* by Robert Jervis. *Science* 227, no. 4698 (22 February 1985), p. 935. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.227.4689.935.a.

Lindsay, Jon R., and Erik Gartzke. 'Coercion through Cyberspace: The Stability-Instability Paradox Revisited'. In *The Power to Hurt: Coercion in Theory and in Practice*, edited by Kelly M. Greenhill and Peter J.P. Krause. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016, pp. 179–203.

Lupion, Miranda. 'The Gray War of Our Time: Information Warfare and the Kremlin's Weaponization of Russian-Language Digital News'. *Journal of Slavic Military Studies* 31, no. 3 (2018), pp. 329–353.

Mačák, Kubo. 'On the Shelf, But Close at Hand: The Contribution of Non-State Initiatives to International Cyber Law'. *AJIL Unbound* 113 (2019), pp. 81–86.

Mandiant. 'APT 1: Exposing One of China's Cyber Espionage Units'. 2013.

Maschmeyer, Lennart. 'Cyber Conflict and Subversion in the Russia-Ukraine War'. *Lawfare*, 11 June 2024.

Maschmeyer, Lennart. 'The Subversive Trilemma: Why Cyber Operations Fall Short of Expectations'. *International Security* 46, no. 2 (2021), pp. 51–90.

Mironova, Vera. 'Russia's Invasion of Ukraine Is Also Being Fought in Cyberspace'. *Atlantic Council*, 2023.

Molendijk, Tine. 'Morale and Moral Injury among Russian and Ukrainian Combatants'. In *Reflections on the Russian-Ukrainian War*, edited by Maarten Rothman, Lonneke Peperkamp and Sebastiaan Rietjens. Leiden: Leiden University Press, 2024, pp. 99–106.

Pell, Stephanie. 'Contextualizing Last Week's Malicious Cyber Activities against Ukrainian Government Websites and Systems'. *Lawfare*, 21 January 2022.

Pijpers, Peter, and Kraesten Arnold. 'Conquering the Invisible Battleground'. *Atlantisch Perspectief* 44, no. 4 (2020), pp. 10–14.

Redpacket Security. 'APT Trends Report Q2 2020: The Most Remarkable Findings, Southeast Asia and Korean Peninsula'. 30 July 2020. https://www.redpacketsecurity.com/apt-trends-report-q2-2020/.

Rothman, Maarten. 'This Has Triggered a Civil War: Russian Deterrence of Democratic Revolts'. In, *Deterrence in the 21st Century: Insights from Theory and Practice,* NL ARMS Netherlands Annual Review of Military Studies 2020, edited by Frans Osinga and Tim Sweijs. The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2020, pp. 311–325.

Schelling, Thomas C. *Arms and Influence*. Yale University Press, 1966.

Schrijver, Peter, and Paul Ducheine. 'Cyber-Enabled Influence Operations'. *Militaire Spectator* 192, no. 6 (2023), pp. 285–295.

Smeets, Max. 'The Strategic Promise of Offensive Cyber Operations'. *Strategic Studies Quarterly* (Fall 2018), pp. 90–113.

Smeets, Max. *No Shortcuts: Why States Struggle to Develop a Military Cyber-Force*. London: Hurst, 2022.

Smeets, Max, and J.D. Work. 'Operational Decision-Making for Cyber Operations: In Search of a Model'. *Cyber Defence Review* (Spring 2020), pp. 95–96.

Smith, Brad. 'Defending Ukraine: Early Lessons from the Cyber War'. *Microsoft* (blog), 22 June 2022. https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2022/06/22/defending-ukraine-early-lessons-from-the-cyber-war/.

Snyder, Glenn H. 'Deterrence and Power', *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 4, no. 2 (1960), pp. 163–178.

Snyder, Glenn H. 'The Balance of Power and the Balance of Terror'. In *The Balance of Power*, edited by Paul Seabury. San Francisco: Chandler, 1965.

Soesanto, Stefan. 'The IT Army of Ukraine Structure, Tasking, and Ecosystem'. *CSS Cyberdefense Report* (June 2022). https://css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/Cyber-Reports-2022-06-IT-Army-of-Ukraine.pdf.

Soesanto, Stefan. 'Ukraine's IT Army'. *Survival* 65, no. 3 (2023), pp. 93–106.

Soldatov, Andrei, and Irina Borogan. 'Russian Cyberwarfare: Unpacking the Kremlin's Capabilities'. *Centre for European Policy Analysis (CEPA)*, 2022.

Taillat, Stéphane, and Frédérick Douzet. 'Collective Security and Strategic Instability in the Digital Domain'. *Contemporary Security Policy* 40, no. 3 (2019), pp. 362–367.

Tychchenko, Kateryna. 'Russian Hackers Infiltrated Kyivstar System in May 2023 or Earlier – Security Service of Ukraine'. *Ukrainska Pravda*, 4 January 2024. https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2024/01/4/7435792/. (Accessed 4 August 2024).

US Department of Defense. 'Remarks by Secretary Panetta on Cybersecurity to the Business Executives for National Security'. 11 October 2012. https://content.govdelivery.com/accounts/USDOD/bulletins/571813.

Vićić, Jelena, and Rupal N. Mehta. 'Why Russian Cyber Dogs Have Mostly Failed to Bark'. *War on the Rocks*, 14 March 2022.

Walton, Calder. 'What's Old Is New Again: Cold War Lessons for Countering Disinformation'. *Texas National Security Review* (Fall 2022), pp. 49–72.

Wilde, Gavin. 'Cyber Operations in Ukraine: Russia's Unmet Expectations'. *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, December 2022.

Zelensky, Volodymyr. 'We Are Here to Defend Our Independence'. 25 February 2022, https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=WkNiYYzHeDs.

Zetter, Kim. *Countdown to Zero Day: Stuxnet and the Launch of the World's First Digital Weapon*. New York: Crown, 2014.

CHAPTER 5

How Iranian Weapons' Technology Increases Ansar Allah's Reach

Ralph Savelsberg, Mark Voskuijl & Frederik Mertens

Abstract

Purportedly in support of the Palestinians in the Israel-Hamas war, after the 7 October 2023 Hamas attack on Israel, Ansar Allah, the Yemeni Houthi movement, launched multiple attacks against Israel and ships in the Red Sea and Gulf of Oman using unmanned aerial systems and missiles. A technical analysis shows the increasing range of their weapons arsenal. They can reach much of the Middle East and can strike moving ships, with much of the technology and components for their weapons supplied by Iran. Thus, despite being a relatively weak and primitive non-state actor with limited technological and industrial potential, they gain more influence than their relative power should allow.

Keywords: Ansar Allah, Yemen, Unmanned aerial systems, Ballistic missiles, Anti-ship ballistic missiles, Flight performance

5.1 Introduction

The Yemeni civil war erupted in 2014, but its roots go far back. It is a toxic mix of Yemeni internal politics, resistance against the projection of Saudi power in Yemen, and the struggle between Saudi Arabia and Iran for mastery in the Arab world.[1] This already complicated cocktail of grievances and tensions is further fuelled by the long and ongoing history of conflict between Israel and the Arab world, as well as the support of the West in general and the USA in particular for Israel and Saudi Arabia. Moreover, to top off this noxious cocktail of woes, the growth of Yemeni Zaydi Islam adds a deep and aggressive religious component. This branch of Shia Islam is taking an ever more virulent form as the wars in the Middle East continue to fester.[2] For now, the 2022 cease-fire in Yemen has frozen the civil war and the Chinese-mediated rapprochement between Iran and Saudi Arabia has further stabilised the situation, but the conflict is far from resolved.[3]

Although considered a terrorist organisation by the US, the Houthi movement or Ansar Allah became the de facto governing faction in Northern Yemen

during the civil war. Subjected to an extensive air campaign by Saudi and allied air forces, it responded with its own attacks on Saudi Arabia and other targets on the Arabian Peninsula. At first, the Houthis employed legacy missile systems, but as their limited stocks became depleted, they started relying on an Iranian provided and locally modified arsenal of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) and ballistic and cruise missiles. As the war progressed, these attacks developed into a genuine missile campaign, in which the Houthis executed over 1,000 missile and 350 drone attacks between 2015 and 2022.[4] Although the ability of Saudi and allied missile defences to intercept these attacks grew noticeably during the war, it is likely that the strain and cost imposed by the Houthi missile campaign did play a role in the calculations of the Saudi government during the UN-brokered cease-fire negotiations.[5] Able to hold at risk most of the Arabian Peninsula, the danger of Houthi missile attacks was real and a continuous worry to the Saudi government and its allies, who tried to wage a war without it impacting on their own societies. Unable to suppress these missile strikes 'left of launch' even with an intensive air campaign, with (controversial) US support in the form of aerial targeting assistance and intelligence sharing, the inability of Saudi air defences to protect the entirety of the peninsula sufficiently, imposed a real strain on Saudi society.[6] In addition, the thousands of civilian casualties caused by the Saudi-led air campaign resulted in growing international pressure to find an end to this conflict.[7]

While the conflict in Yemen has died down, following the 7 October 2023 start of the Israel-Hamas war, Ansar Allah started missile attacks on Israel. On 19 October, USS Carney, an American destroyer operating in the Red Sea, intercepted several cruise missiles in flight, as well as unmanned aircraft heading for Israel.[8] On 31 October, Ansar Allah launched a ballistic missile at Eilat.[9] The Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) intercepted it using the Arrow 2 missile defence system.[10] Furthermore, in early December, purportedly in support of the Palestinians in the Israel-Hamas war, Ansar Allah vowed to attack ships in the Red Sea heading for Israel.[11] However, their attacks on merchant shipping already started prior to this. On 19 November, Houthi fighters hijacked a car carrier in the Red Sea and took its crew hostage.[12] This was followed by hundreds of attacks against ships in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, using UAS, anti-ship missiles and anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs). In response, in December 2023, the US started Operation *Prosperity Guardian*, with warships protecting merchant ships in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. Subsequently, the European Union undertook Operation *Aspides*. This has resulted in significant and sustained naval combat. The USS Carney alone, during a seven-month deployment to the region, was involved in 51 engagements, including against ASBMs.[13] In a further response to the attacks, US and UK forces conducted multiple air strikes on military facilities in Yemen, such as drone production facilities, launch sites and radar installations. The purpose of this response was to degrade the capability to

launch strikes. On 20 July 2024, in response to a UAS striking the outskirts of Tel Aviv, Israel attacked port facilities in Hodeida.[14]

It is remarkable that Ansar Allah has access to these weapons. Yemen has been subjected to a UN arms embargo since 14 April 2015.[15] Both military and commercial UAS fall within the scope of this embargo.[16] The military UAS used by Ansar Allah are typically of Iranian design but produced and assembled locally within Yemen. Critical components such as engines, sensors and electronic components for flight control are smuggled from abroad, however.[17] Similarly, missile components are externally sourced. Ships smuggling components, such as jet engines, missile seeker heads and warheads to the Houthis have been intercepted.[18] In January 2024, US Central Command (CENTCOM) announced that the US Navy intercepted a dhow off the coast of Somalia and released the photograph reproduced in Figure 5.1.[19]




Figure 5.1: Weapon components seized by the US Navy in January 2024. (Image credit: CENTCOM)

It clearly shows components of a C-802 anti-ship cruise missile, in the foreground, as well as five Scud ballistic missile engines and four matching turbopumps in the middle.

What is most surprising about the Houthi missile campaign is that a relatively weak and primitive non-state/semi-state actor with limited technological and industrial potential, supported by a local minor power (Iran), is capable of threatening and disrupting the Sea Lines of Communication through the Red Sea. The

combined efforts of the Western navies, including the commitment of US Navy carrier task forces, are proving insufficient to negate the Houthi threat with Sea and Air Power alone. This is a clear example of the potential strategic effects of a 'pocket of excellence', where the possession of even limited amounts of advanced weaponry can give an actor more influence than its relative power should allow. It is comparable with the leverage the Houthi missile arsenal has given them during their war with Saudi Arabia.

In this chapter, we take a closer look at some of Ansar Allah's weapons, their (often-Iranian) equivalents and the weapons' ranges. We start with a chronological overview of UAS used by Ansar Allah in attacks first conducted on Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and since the Israel-Hamas war, on Israel and on shipping in the region. Then, we address the origin of Houthi ballistic missiles and discuss the Tufan, which is the Houthi missile with the largest range and payload, in detail. This is followed by a comparison of Houthi ASBMs and their likely Iranian equivalents. Finally, we look at implications for (Western) air defences. The Houthis have also been using conventional anti-ship missiles and unmanned surface vehicles. These are not included in our analysis.

5.2 Houthi Attack UAS Performance

Since the early stages of the civil war, Ansar Allah has used UAS for various military applications. At first, two types of unmanned aircraft were employed. The Rased UAS was used for information, surveillance, reconnaissance, and target acquisition (ISTAR) missions and the Qasef-1 was used to conduct attacks on ground targets in Yemen.[20] The Rased is a small battery-powered vehicle with a flying-wing configuration. It weighs less than 3 kg and is most likely a modified version of the commercially available X-8 Skywalker drone, which only costs about 200 euros. The Qasef-1, on the other hand, is a much larger vehicle. It has a wingspan of approximately 3 metres and weighs as much as 65 kg.[21] The Qasef-1 has a close resemblance to the Iranian Ababil-2 UAS developed by the Iran Aircraft Manufacturing Industrial Company (HESA). In general, UAS can be used for a wide variety of tasks. However, the scope of the current chapter with respect to UAS is limited to the ability to attack ground or sea-based targets with relatively low-cost vehicles.

Attack UAS can be categorised in two main classes: Unmanned Combat Aerial Systems (UCAS) and Loitering Munitions. A UCAS can attack a target by dropping ordnance such as unguided bombs and subsequently return to base. Loitering munitions, also known as suicide or kamikaze drones, carry an explosive warhead on-board. Boulanin and Verbruggen define loitering weapons as follows: 'A hybrid

type of weapon system, which fits a niche between guided munitions and UCAS. Loitering weapons combine the purpose and attack mode of guided munitions (loitering weapons dive-bomb their targets) with the manoeuvrability of UCAS. They can loiter for an extended time to find and strike targets on the ground.'[22]

Arguably the first operational loitering munition was introduced back in 1989, by Israel Aerospace Industries. The loitering munition designated Harpy was designed for suppression of enemy air defences (SEAD).[23] Back then, it was an expensive state-of-the-art weapon system sought after by Air Forces worldwide.[24] China for example purchased an unknown number of Harpy loitering munitions from Israel. When China signed a contract to upgrade their Harpy loitering munitions, this led to tensions between China and the USA.[25] However, with the advances in miniaturisation of mechanical components and electronics, small UAS have become widely available at low cost. Consequently, the number of different types of loitering munitions has increased rapidly since 2015.[26] At present, loitering weapon systems are relatively low-cost and therefore available to non-state actors. Loitering munitions used by Ansar Allah such as the Qasef-1 are manufactured indigenously. Specialised components such as electronics and engines are sourced from abroad.[27]

5.2.1 Houthi attacks against ground targets in Yemen and Saudi Arabia

The first series of attacks on ground targets by means of UAS took place in the period from September 2016 until January 2017. Ansar Allah made use of the Qasef-1 UAS to attack ground forces of the United Arab Emirates on eleven occasions.[28] It can carry explosive payloads up to 30 kg and it has a flight range of approximately 175 km.[29] This flight range was calculated based on flight simulations following a detailed analysis of the aerodynamic characteristics, propulsion system characteristics and mass estimates using open-source information.

Following these first attacks, rapid developments took place. Key events took place in August and September 2019, when several oil refineries in Saudi Arabia situated far from the border with Yemen were successfully attacked by large numbers of loitering munitions and land cruise missiles. According to Ansar Allah, these attacks were part of their so-called first and second operation of economic deterrence against Saudi Arabia.[30] Ansar Allah used new types of long-range loitering munitions in those attacks. These were the Samad-2 and Samad-3 loitering munitions and a delta wing design, which later became known as the Wa'aed, shown in Figure 5.2. The Iranian and Russian designations are Shahed and Geran, respectively. A detailed analysis of the attacks based on extensive simulations is reported by Voskuijl et al.[31]




Figure 5.2: Debris of the Samad-3 and Wa'aed loitering munitions.[32]

Since then, the capabilities of Ansar Allah have been extended significantly and many attacks on targets in Yemen and Saudi Arabia have been conducted. The complete arsenal of loitering munitions and UCAS currently employed by Ansar Allah is displayed regularly in military parades such as those held in Hudaydah and Sana'a in September 2022.[33] The arsenal was also shown during weapon exhibitions.[34] Table 5.1 gives an overview based on an assessment of information available in the public domain up to November 2024. As mentioned in the previous section, Ansar Allah produces and assembles the UAS in Yemen and therefore has a continuous supply.

Table 5.1: Overview of Ansar Allah's UCAS and loitering munitions arsenal

Name (alternative name)	Configuration	Type	Flight range estimates [km]
Khatif-1	Conventional aircraft	Loitering munition	
Khatif-2	Conventional aircraft	Loitering munition	
Qasef-1 (Ababil-2T)	Canard	Loitering munition	140-210[35]
Qasef-2K (Ababil-2T)	Canard	Loitering munition	140-210[36]
Rased	Flying wing	UCAS	30*
Rujum	Hexa-copter	UCAS	53**
Samad-2	Conventional aircraft	Loitering munition	852-1033[37]
Samad-3	Conventional aircraft	Loitering munition	1831-2101[38]
Samad-4	Conventional aircraft	UCAS	2000[39]
Shihab	Conventional aircraft	Loitering munition	
Yafa (Jaffa)	Conventional aircraft	Loitering munition	>2600***
Wa'aed (Shahed-136)	Delta wing	Loitering munition	1350-1500[40]

***The X-8 Skywalker drone can fly 25 minutes at airspeeds up to 70 km/hr according to the manufacturer.[41]**
****The Rujum Hexa-copter is a modified YD6-1000S drone according to the UN Panel of Experts on Yemen.[42] The manufacturer Yangda claims a cruise speed of 72 km/hr and a flight endurance of 44 minutes with 2 kg of payload.[43]**
*****The Yafa is a modified Samad-3 with a new engine and a reduced explosive payload for increased range.[44]**

5.2.2 Assessment of UAS flight performance through computer modelling

Reliable technical data to assess the flight performance of the UCAS and loitering munitions are typically not available in the public domain. Nevertheless, it is possible to develop fairly accurate flight simulation models of these aircraft based on open-source data (primarily the yearly reports provided by the UN Panel of Experts on Yemen). If multiple pictures are available, it is possible to determine the geometry of a UAS. Based on the geometry, the aerodynamic characteristics can be estimated. This process is visualised in Figure 5.3 for the Qasef loitering munition.




Figure 5.3: Step-by-step estimation of the aerodynamic characteristics based on geometry derived from pictures available in the public domain (source of picture on the left: US Department of Defense photo taken by EJ Hersom).

The characteristics of the propulsion system can be estimated in a similar manner if the type of engine used is known, in combination with the size of the propeller. The mass and inertia of the vehicle can be estimated through a reversed aircraft design process. This whole reverse engineering process is described in detail for the Samad loitering munitions family by Voskuijl et al.[45] The resulting flight simulation models can be used to assess, for example, cruise performance (range, endurance, flight altitude and corresponding airspeeds) and the flight trajectories in the terminal flight phase. Figure 5.4 shows example results for the Qasef loitering munition.




Figure 5.4: Calculated fuel efficiency of the Qasef loitering munition (left) and a simulation of the terminal flight phase trajectory (right).

The process described above has been used to develop flight simulation models of the Qasef, Samad and Wa'aed loitering munitions.[46]

5.2.3 Houthi attacks against shipping and mainland Israel

In October 2023, the Houthi movement started to conduct attacks on international shipping in the Red Sea area and on ground targets in the southern part of Israel (Eilat). In some cases, the attacks are executed with only limited numbers of UAS, whereas in other cases larger numbers of UAS are used, in combination with missiles. The attacks are not restricted to merchant vessels. US and coalition warships are also being targeted on a frequent basis. The loitering munitions operated by Houthi forces, such as the Qasef, Samad and Shahed, most likely make use of GNSS-based navigation in combination with inertial navigation systems.[47] It is reported that Iranian spy ships are used to direct the drones towards their target.[48]

To date, the attacks with UAS have not been very successful. In some cases, limited damage was inflicted. For example, on 23 December 2023 several incidents took place, according to CENTCOM. Reportedly, a drone hit the merchant vessel Sai Baba, a crude oil tanker, albeit without causing injuries to the crew. On the same day, the Norwegian merchant vessel Blaamanen was attacked but the UAS missed. Finally, the USS Laboon was also targeted by four unmanned aircraft, and it successfully intercepted all of them. A noteworthy event took place on 9 March, according to CENTCOM, when as many as 37 UAS were launched from Houthi-controlled territory in Yemen, targeting US warships. Warships and fighter aircraft intercepted at least 28 drones and not a single warship or merchant vessel was damaged.

A summary of the attacks that took place in the timeframe October 2023–August 2024 is provided in Table 5.2. This summary is based on the daily reports provided by the Institute for the Study of War as part of their 'Iran update'.[49]

Table 5.2: Overview of attacks by Houthi UAS on shipping in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden and on ground targets in Israel

	Number of UAS involved in attacks on shipping in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden	Number of UAS involved in attacks on (southern) Israel and shipping in the Mediterranean	Number of attacks in which damage was inflicted	Number of UAS intercepted
October 2023	0	>13	2	9
November 2023	>5*	1	1	>5*
December 2023	>21	>15	3	30

	Number of UAS involved in attacks on shipping in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden	Number of UAS involved in attacks on (southern) Israel and shipping in the Mediterranean	Number of attacks in which damage was inflicted	Number of UAS intercepted
January 2024	21	0	1	19
February 2024	>39	>7	0	41
March 2024	>72	0	0	55
April 2024	30	1	1	20
May 2024	39	0	0	36
June 2024	46	8**	4	38
July 2024	34	5**	2	31
August 2024	14	0	0	14

*** The US destroyer Thomas Hudner shot down multiple one-way attack drones but exact numbers were not provided (source: US Central Command)**
**** Ansar Allah claimed these attacks but not all attacks can be independently verified. Furthermore, some of the attacks are conducted jointly with the Islamic Resistance in Iraq and cannot be attributed solely to Ansar Allah.**

The reports are not always clear about the exact number of UAS that were launched and intercepted and it is uncertain whether all incidents are reported. The actual figures are therefore most likely higher than those provided in Table 5.2. Based on these data only about five percent of the UAS hit their targets. Nevertheless, the overview shows a clear trend of an increasing number of attacks.

On 18 April 2024, Houthi leader Abdulmalik al Houthi claimed that ships in the Indian Ocean were attacked with UAS.[50] Although this claim is not confirmed, it shows the intention to extend the range of the threat. On 18 July 2024, a further notable event took place: a loitering munition successfully hit an apartment building in Tel Aviv, close to the US consulate. This attack was conducted with a new type of UAS designated Yafa (Jaffa). It is a modified version of the Samad-3 with a new engine and a reduced explosive payload weight. The UAS flew more than 2600 km and evaded Israeli air defences by using civilian flight corridors and a flight path over Eritrea, Sudan and Egypt.[51]

Even though, up to the time of writing, either warships, fighter jets or ground-based air defence systems successfully intercept many UAS, the Houthi movement is gradually gaining experience with this method and therefore the threat may increase over time.

5.3 Houthi Ballistic Missile Performance

Yemen's military already operated ballistic missiles prior to the civil war, most notably Scuds. Scud is the NATO reporting name for a family of ballistic missiles originally designed and built in the Soviet-Union. In 2002, the Spanish Navy intercepted and inspected a North Korean freighter, So San, in the Indian Ocean and found it was transporting North Korean versions of the Scud, the Hwasong-5 (Mars) and Hwasong-6, to Yemen, equivalents of the Soviet Scud-B and Scud-C, respectively. The Iranian equivalents are called Shahab-1 (Meteor) and Shahab-2. The freighter was allowed to continue to its destination.[52]

5.3.1 Houthi long-range missiles used against Saudi Arabia

According to an investigation by the UN Panel of Experts on Yemen, who were able to examine the wreckage of missiles used in Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia, several different types of missiles were involved. An attack on Ta'if, in July of 2017, involved a Hwasong-6, most likely from pre-war stock. However, an attack on Riyadh on 4 November 2017, over a distance close to 1,000 km, involved a new missile called the Burkan-2H. This most likely is a variant of the Qiam missile manufactured in Iran.[53] It is an advanced Scud derivative, with a longer range due to a lighter air-frame, longer propellant tanks, a smaller Guidance, Navigation and Control (GNC) compartment and a reduced warhead mass.[54] The panel assessed that Burkan-2H missiles were most likely shipped to Oman in sections to evade inspections, road-transported to Houthi-controlled Yemen and then locally assembled to form complete missiles, using know-how available from pre-war Scud operations by the Yemeni Armed Forces.[55] An even longer-ranged version of the Burkan, called Zulfiqar or Burkan-3, was unveiled in a 2019 propaganda video. It has a range of more than 1200 km and in 2022 was used in attacks against Dammam, on the Saudi Gulf coast.[56] Subsequently, a similar missile was fired against Abu Dhabi. This attack marked the combat debut of the US Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile defence system, which intercepted the missile.[57] Like the Burkan-2H, the Burkan-3 also likely is of Iranian origin. Its Iranian equivalent, named Rezvan, emerged during a parade in Tehran in 2022. Iran claims a 1400 km range.[58]

5.3.2 Houthi missile attacks against Israel

Based on open-source reporting, up to 27 May 2025, at least 37 Houthi ballistic missile attacks on Israel have taken place (listed in Table 5.3).[59] The attacks were suspended at the start of the Gaza-ceasefire in January 2025 but resumed after the ceasefire ended.

Table 5.3: Houthi ballistic missile attacks on Israel

Date	Alleged / reported target	Date	Alleged / reported target
31/10/2023	Eilat	04/01/2025	Haifa/ Hadera
09/11/2023	Eilat	13/01/2025	Jerusalem
14/11/2023	Eilat	14/01/2025	Jerusalem
06/12/2023	Eilat	18/01/2025	Jerusalem
02/02/2024	Eilat	18/01/2025	Eilat
22/02/2024	Eilat	18/03/2025	Nevatim Air Base
03/06/2024	Eilat	20/03/2025	Ben Gurion Airport
21/07/2024	Eilat	20/03/2025	Tel Aviv
15/09/2024	Tel Aviv	21/03/2025	Ben Gurion Airport
27/09/2024	Tel Aviv	23/03/2025	Central Israel
08/11/2024	Nevatim Air Base	27/03/2025	Ben Gurion Airport
11/11/2024	Nahal Sorek	27/03/2025	Tel Aviv
19/12/2024	Tel Aviv	30/03/2025	Central Israel
21/12/2024	Tel Aviv	03/04/2025	Unknown
24/12/2024	Tel Aviv	13/04/2025	Unknown
27/12/2024	Ben Gurion Airport	18/04/2025	Ben Gurion Airport
28/12/2024	Nevatim Air Base	23/04/2025	Unknown
30/12/2024	Unknown	26/04/2025	Haifa
03/01/2025	Jerusalem		

In almost all cases, the IDF claimed successful interceptions of the missiles. For instance, the attack on 9 November 2023 marked the combat debut of Arrow 3, which intercepts its target outside of the atmosphere.[60] The attacks did not cause significant damage, with two exceptions. In the attack on 19 December 2024, the missile's re-entry vehicle destroyed an empty school building.[61] In the subsequent attack, two days later, a re-entry vehicle hit a playground, lightly injuring 16 people.[62]

Houthi propaganda about the attacks showed launch footage of a Burkan-3, but the distance from Houthi-controlled Yemen to Eilat is at least 1700 km, exceeding its 1200–1400 km range. Just after the June 2024 attack, the Houthis claim to have used a new missile, called Palestine, that appears to be a variant of the Iranian Kheibar Shekan solid-propellant missile with a 1450km-range.[63] The targets of ballistic missile attacks in September and in November of 2024 were farther into Israel. Debris of one of the missiles, which Ansar Allah claimed was hypersonic, came down near

Ben Gurion Airport, approximately 1900 km from Yemen.[64] Images of the wreckage of subsequent attacks that appeared in Israeli media and on social media show that the missiles used in some of these attacks are Scud variants. How Ansar Allah manages to fly Scuds to these ranges is unclear, but it is possible through a further reduction in warhead mass combined with even longer propellant tanks than those in the Burkan-3.[65]

The most potent Houthi missile, in terms of range and payload, was displayed during the parade in Sana'a in September 2023. It is called Tufan, shown in Figure 5.5.



Figure 5.5: Houthi propaganda image of a Tufan missile on display in Sana'a in September 2023.[66]

At a first glance, it looks like a Scud. However, almost all Scud variants have a diameter of 0.88m and the size of the people in the image thus indicates the Tufan's diameter is significantly larger. Apart from its colour, externally the Tufan is identical to the Iranian Ghadr-F, for which Iran claims a 1950km-range.[67] This is a derivative of the Shahab-3, which is an Iranian version of a North Korean missile known as the Nodong or Hwasong-7. It essentially is a scaled-up version of the Scud, with a 1.25-metre body diameter and a similarly enlarged engine. Estimates of its maximum range vary between 800 and 1300km.[68]




Figure 5.6: Ballistic missiles to scale: Scud-B/ Shahab-1 (a), reconstruction of the Scud-B (b), Iranian Shahab-3 (c), reconstruction of the Shahab-3 (d), Ghadr-F on display in Tehran (e), Houthi Tufan in Sana'a (f) and a reconstruction (g). Original images via FARS, Satyar Emami/ FARS News Agency, AFP/Getty images and Al-Yemen TV.

Figure 5.6 shows the Shahab-3, a Ghadr-F and the Tufan, as well as a Scud-B, scaled using their respective diameters. The Ghadr-F has multiple features in a combination unique to this variant. It has a more compact GNC system mounted in a smaller compartment under the re-entry vehicle. The booster is longer than the Shahab-3's,

with a cable raceway that runs along the outside of the tanks, from the top of the engine compartment to the top of the cylindrical booster section. These changes point to longer propellant tanks. The oxidizer tank has been moved to the top, with the fuel tank underneath. This is clear from locations of the seams where the tank bulkheads connect to the outer shell. The missile has smaller stabilising fins to reduce aerodynamic drag and its re-entry vehicle appears to be identical to that of the Iranian Qiam. Figure 5.6 also shows reconstructions of the Shahab-3 and the Ghadr-F. While the available images of the Tufan are of insufficient quality to see where its tanks connect to the outer shell, it shares all the other features and the dimensions of the Ghadr-F. The long cable raceway is clearly visible in Figure 5.5. Given that Iran is the most likely source of the Houthis' advanced Scud versions, the Tufan most likely indeed is a Ghadr-F.

5.3.3 Targeting Israel using the Tufan

Using computer simulations, with missile parameters based on acceleration measurements, published information of the Shahab-3 engine, performance parameters published by Iran and the reconstruction shown in Figure 5.6, we could verify that the missile can indeed plausibly fly 1950km.[69] We also evaluate which parts of Israel are in range.




Figure 5.7: Simulated maximum range of a Tufan when launched from Dhayhan, in northwest Yemen, towards Israel.

The map in Figure 5.7 shows the results of simulations of the Tufan flight towards Israel, from Dhayhan, close to the border with Saudi Arabia. This is the northernmost Scud launch site reported by the UN Panel of Experts.[70] The black curve indicates the maximum range. All of Israel is in range from this launch site.

Little is known about how Ansar Allah operates their missiles. In Iranian service, the Shahab-3 and Ghadr-F are usually transported by and launched from mobile erector-launchers (MELs), with an example partially visible in Figure 5.6. These are modified low-loader trailers pulled by commercial tractor units. A so-called cradle supports the missile when in transit and raises it to vertical prior to launch. In propaganda footage of Burkan launches, the launchers are typically blurred, but Ansar Alah may have access to MELs. Nonetheless, transporting and launching Tufans will still be difficult, since they are considerably larger. Furthermore, given their apparently lightweight structure, it may not be possible to transport and erect them with the liquid propellant already in the missile, so support vehicles would be needed. This requires considerable preparation and infrastructure.

While the Houthis claim that their missiles are indigenous, this is not credible. Some parts may be manufactured locally. However, pre-war Yemen did not produce missiles and building the engines and turbopumps is particularly difficult. While, at the start of the war, Ansar Allah could rely on pre-war stock, it relies on Iran for its more recent missiles. It is unlikely that they will easily be able to operate missiles with significantly longer ranges, since Iranian ballistic missiles with longer ranges use either more volatile propellants or multiple stages.[71]

5.4 Houthi Anti-ship Ballistic Missiles

Anti-ship ballistic missiles are a relatively recent development. They fly ballistic trajectories but, unlike most ballistic missiles, they are equipped with a seeker system for terminal guidance and aerodynamic control fins for manoeuvring. A ship represents a relatively small target and may move during the ballistic missile flight. Thus, during the final phase of its flight, an ASBM will need to acquire the target ship and adjust its trajectory to hit it. In 2010, Iran reported developing an ASBM called the Khalij Fars (Persian Gulf). It has an optical seeker and steers using nose-mounted control fins. Iran claims a 300 km-range.[72] ASBMs fly at supersonic speeds, and, prior to the terminal manoeuvres, their intended target is unclear. Consequently, they are far more difficult to defeat than unmanned aircraft or (subsonic) anti-ship missiles. The Commanding Officer of the USS Carney talked about the speed of dealing with an incoming ASBM: ‘From start to finish, an engagement would last about nine to 20 seconds. That means the crew has seconds to see the

incoming missile, decide if it's a threat, make sure the topside is clear of any crew and engage. This all happens in fewer than 30 seconds.'[73]

5.4.1 Houthi ASBM attacks against shipping

The first reported Houthi ASBM attack took place on 3 December 2023, when the M/V Unity Explorer was attacked, with the missile missing the ship.[74] At first, few of the Houthi ASBMs found targets and those that did in most cases caused little damage. Table 5.4 lists ships hit by ASBMs, based on CENTCOM reporting.[75]

Table 5.4: Ships hit by Houthi ASBMs

Date	Ship name	Location	Outcome
15-1-2024	Gibraltar Eagle	Gulf of Aden	Ship damaged
16-1-2024	Zografia	Red Sea	Ship damaged
24-1-2024	Marlin Luanda	Gulf of Aden	Fire on ship extinguished
19-2-2024	Rubymar	Red Sea	Ship abandoned and sunk
22-2-2024	Islander	Gulf of Aden	Ship damaged
4-3-2024	MSC SKY II	Gulf of Aden	Ship damaged
6-3-2024	True Confidence	Gulf of Aden	Three crew killed and ship abandoned
25-3-2024	Huang Pu	Red Sea	Fire on ship extinguished
26-4-2024	Andromeda Star	Red Sea	Ship damaged
28-5-2024	Laax	Red Sea	Ship damaged
9-6-2024	Tavvishi	Gulf of Aden	Ship damaged
9-6-2024	Norderney	Gulf of Aden	Ship damaged

Most ships were able to continue to port. Rubymar, however, was abandoned by its crew and later sank.[76] The attack on True Confidence killed three crew members, after which it too was abandoned.[77] Norderney reportedly was hit by both an ASBM and a conventional cruise missile.[78]

Whether all these attacks involved ASBMs is unclear. Conventional short-range ballistic missiles may also have been launched against ships.[79] However, the location of the attack on Marlin Luanda indicates that a missile with terminal guidance was likely involved. It occurred roughly 100 km to the south of Aden.[80] The location closest to the coastline under Ansar Allah control is roughly 100 km inland, though, so this attack must have happened over a distance of at least 200 km. The odds of striking a ship from such a distance without terminal guidance are effectively zero.




Figure 5.8: Houthi ASBMs and their Iranian counterparts to scale: Khalij Fars (a), reconstruction (b), Houthi Easif (c), Iranian Raad-500 (d), Raad-500 reconstruction (e), Houthi Tankil (f), Iranian BM-250 (g), BM-250 reconstruction (h) and Houthi Faleq ASBM (i). Original images via Atta Kenare/AFP/GettyImages, Yemeni Press[81], X[82], al-Masirah television network, Export Centre of the Ministry of Defence of the Islamic Republic of Iran[83] and al-Masirah television network.

5.4.2 Possible Houthi ASBMs

Ansar Allah has displayed several possible ABSMs. During the 2022 parade in Sana'a, Ansar Allah displayed the Easif. The orientation of its canard control fins is different from the Iranian Khalij Fars, but otherwise it is similar. During the 2023 parade, Ansar Allah showed five more missiles that may have an optical seeker for targeting ships, called the Moheet, Tankil, Qasef-1, Al-Bahr Al-Amahr and Mayun. The Moheet appears to be a modified SA-2 Surface-to-Air Missile. Like the Easif, the Tankil and Qasef-1 likely are derivatives of Iranian missiles. Figure 5.8 shows comparisons of Houthi ASBMs and their likely Iranian counterparts, scaled with their respective diameters.

The Tankil seems to be closely based on the Iranian Raad-500. This is a ballistic missile with a claimed 500 km-range. Its Iranian version uses inertial navigation and GNSS to increase precision against stationary targets.[84] It was unveiled in 2020.[85] As a notable feature, it has a separating re-entry vehicle. Since this is smaller than the complete missile, it will be harder to detect using radar, which makes defence against it more difficult. Because of its optical seeker, the version displayed in Sana'a appears to have a shorter nose than the Iranian original. The shape of the Qasef-1 closely matches the Iranian BM-250, albeit with a nose-mounted optical seeker as well. The BM-250 is a close-range ballistic missile with a claimed range of 250 km.[86] There are no known Iranian equivalents of the Al-Bahr Al-Amahr and Mayun, but these may simply have not yet have been revealed. The Khalij Fars, Raad-500 and BM-250 are solid-propellant missiles, which makes them easier to operate and more mobile than the Scud-versions or the Tufan. So far, their effectiveness has been limited, but it seems likely that Ansar Allah's experience will feed Iranian improvements to the technology.

5.5 Conclusions

It is difficult to gauge all the motivations for the Houthi missile attacks since 7 October 2023. However, there is no doubt that the Israeli reaction to the Hamas attack and the religious and ideological underpinning of the Houthis play a major role in this regard. In the West, we tend to dismiss religion as a main driver of international relations, but we should not dismiss the name 'Ansar Allah' or 'Supporters of God' lightly: finding a way to coexist peacefully with believers who take the apocalyptic nature of their religion literally is a challenge for a modern secular world. Besides that, the Houthis obviously rely on Iran for its weapons technology, but a major question remains on how far Iran can influence Houthi behaviour – or

perhaps more importantly, on how far the different factions in Iranian politics can directly shape Houthi actions. In each case, we must resist the temptation to portray the Houthis merely as Iranian pawns whose attacks can be turned off and on if Teheran wills so. It seems reasonable to suggest that internal and religious Houthi drivers might be at least as, if not more, important than directions from their patron.

Whatever the Houthi motivations, there is little doubt their missile and UAS arsenals allow them to have an outsized influence that reverberates across the global stage. Their attacks on shipping in the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean create a major change in trade between Asia and Europe, forcing a major rerouting via the Cape of Good Hope with the attendant increase in time and cost, even if the amount of shipping available is able to take up the loss in capacity. Most of their missile and unmanned aircraft strikes on Israel have been intercepted. As the 18 July 2024 attack on Tel Aviv shows, however, there is always the danger that a missile might break through and cause an (un)lucky hit. Either or both could be enough to widen the conflict, which in the worst case could even engulf the entire Middle East – with disastrous consequences for the European and world economy if the flow of hydrocarbons was significantly disrupted, including knock-on effects for the War in Ukraine and the internal stability of the US and the EU.

For the West, there are many lessons to learn. The most direct tactical one – although with dire operational and strategic implications – is that warfighting consumes astounding amounts of expensive and scarce ammunition. At present levels, the combined Western production of air defence missiles is far below what is needed to reliably and comfortably sustain the fight against a non-state actor. By now, the wars in Ukraine and Gaza should have made it abundantly clear that war has a voracious appetite. Increasing the production rate of missiles and other expendables is one of the first priorities to be tackled. In addition, we should develop and deploy dedicated weapons systems that are 'good enough' to destroy the 'easier' targets and are affordable and easy to produce at scale.

Equally important is that a 'pocket of excellence' can have outsized strategic impact. The comparison with the British-Argentinian Falklands War of 1982 is clear: with just *five* air launched AM.39 Exocet missiles and *four* Super Étandard attack aircraft, the Argentinians managed to hold the British fleet and its crucial carriers at risk. This forced the British to shape their operations to minimalise the danger imposed by the Argentinian aircraft and missile combination, which in turn affected the efficiency of British air and naval operations. Today, technology has reached a level in which a non-state/semi-state actor can have even more impact, even with a comparatively negligible industrial and technological base. The Houthis can further amplify the effect of their missile and UAV arsenal through their geographic position to hold one of the main sea lines of communication at risk, while threatening the entire Middle East with direct missile attacks. Their

impact on peacetime societies is far greater than their purely military effectiveness would warrant. We should expect that other malevolent actors – be they state or non-state – have taken heed and are looking for such 'pockets of excellence' with strategic potential.

However, it is vital not to overestimate the potential of the Houthi missile arsenal. Up to now, its most dire impact has been felt in the naval domain: at sea, a relatively limited number of high value targets can be struck, damaged and potentially sunk. This offers a missile-armed actor a chance to do considerable and militarily relevant damage with even a small number of weapons. US and European countermeasures left and right of launch have kept the losses of ships to missile and unmanned aircraft attack relatively limited. Up until now, the Houthis have only been able to inflict minimal damage and casualties on Israel, allowing in turn for relatively restrained Israeli reactions and preventing further escalation.

This brings us to the difference between holding at risk a peacetime society and brute warfighting potential: once the fighting starts, it is not so much the fact that you *can* inflict damage that counts, but the *amount* of damage you can inflict and keep inflicting. This is particularly important when gauging the potential impact of a missile campaign, for there is only so much damage scarce and expensive missiles can do, even if they are precision weapons. However dreadful Ukrainian casualties inflicted by the Russian missiles are, the military impact of the Russian missile campaign almost pales into insignificance compared to the amount of damage a proper air campaign can inflict.[87] One just has to compare Mariupol with Kyiv to see the difference between the two and how important the amount of damage compared to the ability to inflict damage is. The war in Ukraine proves again that a society at war can accept losses that would be unthinkable in peacetime.

In war, 'acceptable losses' are of a different order of magnitude. Before one starts drawing huge A2/AD bubbles in which Houthi (or any) missiles hold everything at risk and in which one would hesitate to venture with ships, aircraft or troops, the question of how much damage these missiles might effectively inflict when numbers, capabilities, countermeasures and targets are all taken into consideration should be considered. It might be that even a small 'pocket of excellence' can have such outsized impact that it weighs heavily on operations. With advanced technology coming into the hands of ever more actors, this might happen ever more often in the future – especially if political considerations make even limited losses unacceptable. However, it might equally be the case that the damage that can be inflicted is manageable, even in a relatively limited conflict. If the West wishes to restrain actors like the Ansar Allah, it will have to accept the unpleasant reality that even these foes can inflict serious but sustainable damage. For when we do so and make clear that we do so, this is as much a deterrent as the ability to defeat their weapons or inflict crippling damage.

Notes

1 Robinson, 'Yemen's Tragedy: War, Stalemate and Suffering'.
2 Ahmed and Shamsan, 'Analysis: Origins of Houthi Supremist Ideology'.
3 Nevola, 'Yemen and the Red Sea: Rising Tensions Threaten Peace Process and International Security'.
4 Nevola, 'Beyond Riyadh, Houthi Cross-border Warfare 2015–2022'.
5 Nagi, 'Catching Up on the Back-channel Peace Talks in Yemen'.
6 Robbins, Shah and Dalton, 'U.S. Support for Saudi Military Operations in Yemen'.
7 Lee, Kelly and Mirza, 'Saudi-led Airstrikes in Yemen Have Been Called War Crimes'.
8 Copp and Baldor, 'US Military Shoots Down Missiles and Drones'.
9 Al Jazeera, 'Yemen's Houthis Say They Launched Ballistic Missile, Drones at Israel'.
10 Michaelson, 'Israel Says It Intercepted Missile Fired by Houthis'.
11 Reuters, 'Yemen's Houthis Warn Ships in Red Sea to Avoid Travel to Israel'.
12 Debre and Gambrell, 'Yemen's Houthi Rebels Hijack an Israeli-linked Ship in the Red Sea'.
13 Mongilio, 'Destroyer USS Carney Returns Home After Seven-Month Deployment, 51 Houthi Engagements'.
14 Michaelson, Kierszenbaum and Graham-Harrison, 'Israel Strikes Yemen Port after Houthi Rebels Attack Tel Aviv'.
15 UN Meetings Coverage and Press Releases, 'Security Council Demands End to Yemen Violence, Adopting Resolution 2216 (2015), with Russian Federation Abstaining'.
16 UN Security Council (UNSC), 'Final report of the Panel of Experts on Yemen', 2018.
17 UNSC, 'Final report of the Panel of Experts on Yemen', 2020.
18 US Central Command, 'Operational Brief USS Forrest Sherman/Normandy Dhow Interdiction'.
19 See: https://twitter.com/CENTCOM/status/1747214405291716688.
20 UNSC, 'Final report of the Panel of Experts on Yemen', 2018.
21 Van Braak, 'Vliegprestaties van de Qasef'.
22 Boulanin and Verbruggen, 'Mapping the Development of Autonomy in Weapon Systems'.
23 Defense Update, 'Harpy Air Defense Suppression System'.
24 Jane's Defence Weekly, 'Harpy Heralds New Customers'.
25 FlightGlobal, 'USA and Israel in Crisis over China Harpy Deal'.
26 Voskuijl, 'Performance Analysis and Design of Loitering Munitions.
27 UNSC, 'Panel of Experts on Yemen', 2020.
28 UNSC, 'Panel of Experts on Yemen', 2018.
29 Van Braak, 'Vliegprestaties van de Qasef'.
30 UNSC, 'Panel of Experts on Yemen', 2020.
31 Voskuijl, Dekkers and Savelsberg, 'Flight Performance Analysis of the Samad Attack Drones Operated by Houthi Armed Forces'.
32 UNSC, 'Panel of Experts on Yemen', 2020.
33 Voskuijl et al., 'Flight Performance Analysis'.
34 UNSC, 'Letter Dated 2 November 2023 from the Panel of Experts on Yemen Addressed to the President of the Security Council'.
35 Van Braak, 'Vliegprestaties van de Qasef'.
36 Ibid.
37 Voskuijl et al., 'Flight Performance Analysis'.
38 Ibid.

[39] Conflict Armaments Research, 'Dissecting Iranian Drones Employed by Russia in Ukraine'.
[40] Ibid.
[41] See: http://skywalkermodel.com/en/76.html#inspire-1-pro-overview-s3.
[42] UNSC, 'Letter dated 2 November 2023.'
[43] Institute of War, 'Iran Update'.
[44] Campa, Braverman, Tyson, Moore and Carter, 'Iran Update, July 22, 2024'.
[45] Voskuijl et al., 'Flight Performance Analysis'.
[46] Ibid.
[47] Conflict Armaments Research, 'Dissecting Iranian drones'.
[48] Faucon, Lieber and Lubold, 'Iranian Spy Ship Helps Houthis Direct Attacks on Red Sea Vessels'.
[49] Institute of War, 'Iran Update'.
[50] Tyson, Soltani, Jhaveri, Mills, Braverman, Campa, Moore, Parry and Carter, 'Iran Update, April 18, 2024'.
[51] Campa et al., 'Iran Update, July 22, 2024'.
[52] Masson, 'Les missiles des Houthis: prolifération balistique et groupes armés non-étatiques'.
[53] UNSC, 'Panel of Experts on Yemen', 2018.
[54] Savelsberg, 'Burkan-1 and 2'.
[55] UNSC, 'Panel of Experts on Yemen', 2018.
[56] Savelsberg, 'Houthi "Terror" Scuds Now Threaten Most of Saudi Arabia'.
[57] Hudson and Gould, 'THAAD, in First Operational Use, Destroys Midrange Ballistic Missile in Houthi Attack'.
[58] Tehran Times, 'Iran Discloses Surface-to-Surface Ballistic Missile with 1,400-km Range'.
[59] Based on reporting in Israeli media, specifically the *Times of Israel*: https://www.timesofisrael.com, last updated on 27 May 2025.
[60] Fabian, 'Israel's Arrow 3 Has Made Its 1st-ever Interception'.
[61] Staff, '"Luckily There Were No Children"'.
[62] Staff, 'Missile Fired from Yemen Explodes in South Tel Aviv'.
[63] Shapira, 'Houthis Claim to Launch a New Ballistic Missile Toward Israel'.
[64] Fabian and Staff, 'Ballistic Missile Fired from Yemen Triggers Sirens across Central Israel'.
[65] Savelsberg, 'Open-source analysis of Houthi MRBMs'.
[66] Image via https://yemnews.net/index.php/news/2023-10-23-07-10-11.
[67] Savelsberg, 'Analysis: Houthi Targeting of Israel Suggests New, Longer-range Missile in Play'.
[68] Missile Defense Project, 'Shahab-3'.
[69] Savelsberg, 'Analysis: Houthi Targeting of Israel' and id., 'Open-source Analysis of Houthi MRBMs'.
[70] UNSC, 'Panel of Experts on Yemen', 2018.
[71] Savelsberg, 'Beyond the 2000 km Range Limit, Iranian IRBMs'.
[72] Van Donkersgoed, 'A Performance Assessment of the Anti-ship Ballistic Missile "Khalij Fars"'.
[73] Mongilio, 'Destroyer USS Carney'.
[74] See: https://twitter.com/CENTCOM/status/1731424734829773090.
[75] Official Account of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), https://twitter.com/CENTCOM.
[76] Associated Press in Dubai, 'Rubymar Ship Attacked by Houthi Rebels Finally Sinks in Red Sea'.
[77] Spender, Cheetham and Gardner, 'Three Killed in Houthi Missile Attack on Cargo Ship in Gulf of Aden'.
[78] US Central Command, 9 June 2024, https://twitter.com/CENTCOM/status/1799925028118515947
[79] Vavasseur, 'Several New Major Incidents in the Red Sea'.
[80] The Maritime Executive, 'Trafigura Tanker on Fire After Being Hit by Houthi Missile in Gulf of Aden'.

[81] See: https://www.yemenipress.net/archives/321355.
[82] See: https://twitter.com/fatherland9/status/1703296855650529422.
[83] See: https://mindexcenter.ir/node/1435.
[84] Namidi, 'Iran's Ballistic Missile Arsenal Is Still Growing in Size, Reach, and Accuracy'.
[85] Al Jazeera, 'Iran Shows Missile, Launches Satellite Which Fails to Reach Orbit'.
[86] Export Centre of the Ministry of Defence of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 'BM-250 Surface to Surface Ballistic Missile Weapon System'.
[87] Mertens, 'The Dangers and Limitations of the Russian Missile Campaign'.

Bibliography

Ahmed, N. and M. Shamsan. 'Analysis: Origins of Houthi Supremist Ideology'. Commonspace.eu, 23 August 2022. https://www.commonspace.eu/analysis/analysis-origins-houthi-supremacist-ideology.

Al Jazeera. 'Iran Shows Missile, Launches Satellite Which Fails to Reach Orbit'. 9 February 2020. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/2/9/iran-shows-missile-launches-satellite-which-fails-to-reach-orbit.

Al Jazeera. 'Yemen's Houthis Say They Launched Ballistic Missile, Drones at Israel'. 31 October 2023. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/10/31/israel-says-it-shot-down-aerial-target-near-red-sea-city-of-eilat.

Associated Press in Dubai. 'Rubymar Ship Attacked by Houthi Rebels Finally Sinks in Red Sea'. 3 March 2024. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/mar/02/stricken-ship-attacked-by-houthi-rebels-sinks-in-red-sea.

Boulanin, V. and M. Verbruggen. 'Mapping the Development of Autonomy in Weapon Systems'. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, November 2017.

Braak, W. van. 'Vliegprestaties van de Qasef', BSc. Thesis, Netherlands Defence Academy, 2021.

Campa, K., A. Braverman, K. Tyson, J. Moore and B. Carter. 'Iran Update, July 22, 2024'. Washington, D.C.: Institute for the Study of War.

Conflict Armaments Research. 'Dissecting Iranian Drones Employed by Russia in Ukraine'. November 2022. https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/7a394153c87947d8a602c3927609f572.

Copp, T. and L.C. Baldor. 'US Military Shoots Down Missiles and Drones as It Faces Growing Threats in Volatile Middle East'. *Associated Press*, 20 October 2023. https://apnews.com/article/yemen-navy-warship-missiles-intercepted-2f5fc9c8a3737f762b29d5c53ec08a5b.

Debre, I. and J. Gambrell. 'Yemen's Houthi Rebels Hijack an Israeli-linked Ship in the Red Sea and Take 25 Crew Members Hostage'. *Associated Press*, 20 November 2023. https://apnews.com/article/israel-houthi-rebels-hijacked-ship-red-sea-dc9b6448690bcf5c70a0baf7c7c34b09.

Defense Update. 'Harpy Air Defense Suppression System'. 3 April 2006. https://defense-update.com/20060403_harpy.html.

Donkersgoed, R. van. 'A Performance Assessment of the Anti-ship Ballistic Missile "Khalij Fars"', MSc. Thesis, Netherlands Defence Academy, 2022.

Export Centre of the Ministry of Defence of the Islamic Republic of Iran. 'BM-250 Surface to Surface Ballistic Missile Weapon System'. 2023. https://mindexcenter.ir/node/1435.

Fabian, E. 'Israel's Arrow 3 Has Made Its 1st-ever Interception, Downing Likely Yemen-fired Missile'. *Times of Israel*, 9 November 2023. https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/israels-arrow-3-has-made-its-1st-ever-interception-downing-likely-yemen-fired-missile/.

Fabian, E., and T. Staff. 'Ballistic Missile Fired from Yemen Triggers Sirens across Central Israel'. *Times of Israel*, 15 September 2024. https://www.timesofisrael.com/ballistic-missile-fired-from-yemen-triggers-sirens-across-central-israel/.

Faucon, B.D. Lieber, and G. Lubold. 'Iranian Spy Ship Helps Houthis Direct Attacks on Red Sea Vessels'. *Wall Street Journal*, 22 December 2023.

FlightGlobal. 'USA and Israel in Crisis over China Harpy Deal'. *FlightGlobal*, 4 January 2005. https://www.flightglobal.com/usa-and-israel-in-crisis-over-china-harpy-deal-/58275.article.

Hudson, J. and J. Gould. 'THAAD, in First Operational Use, Destroys Midrange Ballistic Missile in Houthi Attack'. *Defense News*, 21 January 2022, https://www.defensenews.com/land/2022/01/21/thaad-in-first-operational-use-destroys-midrange-ballistic-missile-in-houthi-attack/.

Jane's International Defence Review. 'Harpy Heralds New Customers'. *Jane's International Defence Review* (1997).

Lee, J.S., M. Kelly and A. Mirza. 'Saudi-led Airstrikes in Yemen Have Been Called War Crimes, Many Relied on U.S. Support'. *Washington Post*, 4 June 2022.

Masson, J. 'Les missiles des Houthis: prolifération balistique et groupes armés non-étatiques'. Paris: Fondation pour la recherche stratégique, December 2018. https://www.nonproliferation.eu/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/201811.pdf.

Mertens, F. 'The Dangers and Limitations of the Russian Missile Campaign'. The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, January 2024. https://hcss.nl/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/Dangers-and-Limitations-of-the-Russian-Missile-Campaign-HCSS-2024-V1.pdf.

Michaelson, R. 'Israel Says It Intercepted Missile Fired by Houthis at Port City of Eilat'. *Guardian*, 21 July 2024. https://www.theguardian.com/world/article/2024/jul/21/israel-says-intercepted-missile-fired-houthis-port-city-eilat.

Michaelson, R., Q. Kierszenbaum and E. Graham-Harrison. 'Israel Strikes Yemen Port after Houthi Rebels Attack Tel Aviv'. *Guardian*, 20 July 2024. https://www.theguardian.com/world/article/2024/jul/20/airstrikes-hit-yemens-hodeidah-port-after-israel-vows-revenge-for-houthi-attack.

Missile Defense Project. 'Shahab-3'. Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 31 July 2021. https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/shahab-3/.

Mongilio, H. 'Destroyer USS Carney Returns Home After Seven-Month Deployment, 51 Houthi Engagements'. *US Naval Institute News*, 20 May 2024. https://news.usni.org/2024/05/20/destroyer-uss-carney-returns-home-after-seven-month-deployment-51-houthi-engagements.

Nagi, A. 'Catching Up on the Back-channel Peace Talks in Yemen'. International Crisis Group, 10 October 2023. https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/yemen/catching-back-channel-peace-talks-yemen.

Namidi, F. 'Iran's Ballistic Missile Arsenal Is Still Growing in Size, Reach, and Accuracy'. Washington Institute for Near-East Policy, 13 December 2021. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/irans-ballistic-missile-arsenal-still-growing-size-reach-and-accuracy.

Nevola, L. 'Beyond Riyadh, Houthi Cross-border Warfare 2015–2022'. Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED) Project, 17 January 2023. https://acleddata.com/2023/01/17/beyond-riyadh-houthi-cross-border-aerial-warfare-2015-2022/.

Nevola, L. 'Yemen and the Red Sea: Rising Tensions Threaten Peace Process and International Security'. ACLED Conflict Watchlist 2024, 17 January 2024. https://acleddata.com/conflict-watchlist-2024/yemen/.

Reuters. 'Yemen's Houthis Warn Ships in Red Sea to Avoid Travel to Israel', 13 December 2023. https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/yemens-houthis-warn-ships-red-sea-avoid-travel-palestinian-territories-2023-12-12/.

Robbins, T., H.S. Shah and M. Dalton. 'U.S. Support for Saudi Military Operations in Yemen'. Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 23 March 2018. https://www.csis.org/analysis/us-support-saudi-military-operations-yemen.

Robinson, K. 'Yemen's Tragedy: War, Stalemate and Suffering'. New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1 May 2023. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/yemen-crisis.

Savelsberg, R. 'Analysis: Houthi Targeting of Israel Suggests New, Longer-range Missile in Play'. *Breaking Defense*, 13 December 2023. https://breakingdefense.com/2023/12/analysis-houthi-targeting-of-israel-suggests-new-longer-range-missile-in-play/.

Savelsberg, R. 'Beyond the 2000 km Range Limit, Iranian IRBMs'. Paper Presented at 2021 3AF Integrated Air and Missile Defence Conference, Nice, December 2021.

Savelsberg, R. 'Burkan-1 and 2, Open-source Analysis of Yemeni Scuds'. Paper Presented at 2019 3AF Integrated Air and Missile Defence Conference, Rome, May 2019.

Savelsberg, R. 'Houthi 'Terror' Scuds Now Threaten Most of Saudi Arabia'. *Breaking Defense*, 15 June 2021. https://breakingdefense.com/2021/06/houthi-terror-scuds-now-threaten-most-of-saudi-arabia/.

Savelsberg, R. 'Open-source Analysis of Houthi MRBMs'. Paper Presented at 2025 3AF Integrated Air and Missile Defence Conference, Thessaloniki, May 2025.

Shapira, B. 'Houthis Claim to Launch a New Ballistic Missile Toward Israel'. Alma Research and Education Center, Israel, 6 June 2024. https://israel-alma.org/2024/06/06/houthis-claim-to-launch-a-new-ballistic-missile-toward-israel.

Spender, T., J. Cheetham and F. Gardner. 'Three Killed in Houthi Missile Attack on Cargo Ship in Gulf of Aden'. *BBC News*, 7 March 2024. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-68490695.

Staff, T. '"Luckily There Were No Children": School Near Tel Aviv Ravaged by Houthi Missile Warhead'. *Times of Israel*, 19 December 2024. https://www.timesofisrael.com/lucky-there-were-no-children-school-near-tel-aviv-ravaged-by-houthi-missile-attack/.

Staff, T. 'Missile Fired from Yemen Explodes in South Tel Aviv, Lightly Injuring 16'. *Times of Israel*, 21 December 2024. https://www.timesofisrael.com/missile-from-yemen-explodes-in-south-tel-aviv-park-lightly-injuring-16/.

Tehran Times. 'Iran Discloses Surface-to-Surface Ballistic Missile with 1,400-km Range'. 23 September 2022. https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/476984/Iran-discloses-surface-to-surface-ballistic-missile-with-1400-km.

The Maritime Executive. 'Trafigura Tanker on Fire After Being Hit by Houthi Missile in Gulf of Aden'. 26 January 2024. https://maritime-executive.com/article/breaking-report-trafigura-tanker-hit-by-houthi-missile-in-gulf-of-aden.

Tyson, T., A. Soltani, A. Jhaveri, P. Mills, A. Braverman, K. Campa, J. Moore, A. Parry and B. Carter. 'Iran Update, April 18, 2024'. Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project, 2024.

UN Meetings Coverage and Press Releases. 'Security Council Demands End to Yemen Violence, Adopting Resolution 2216 (2015), with Russian Federation Abstaining'. 14 April 2015. https://press.un.org/en/2015/sc11859.doc.htm.

UN Security Council. 'Final report of the Panel of Experts on Yemen'. 26 January 2018 https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/letter-dated-26-january-2018-panel-experts-yemen-mandated-security-council-resolution.

UN Security Council. 'Final report of the Panel of Experts on Yemen'. 27 January 2020. https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/letter-dated-27-january-2020-panel-experts-yemen-addressed-president-security-council.

UN Security Council. 'Letter dated 2 November 2023 from the Panel of Experts on Yemen addressed to the President of the Security Council'. 2 November 2023. https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/S_2023_833.pdf.

US Central Command. 'Operational Brief USS Forrest Sherman/Normandy Dhow Interdiction November 2019/February 2020'. 9 February 2020. https://www.centcom.mil/Portals/6/Documents/Reports/20FEBslides.pdf.

Vavasseur, X. 'Several New Major Incidents in the Red Sea'. *Naval News*, 16 December 2023, https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2023/12/several-new-major-incidents-in-the-red-sea/.

Voskuijl, M. 'Performance Analysis and Design of Loitering Munitions: A Comprehensive Technical Survey of Recent Developments', *Defense Technology* 18, no. 3 (2022), pp. 325–343.

Voskuijl, M., T. Dekkers and R. Savelsberg. 'Flight Performance Analysis of the Samad Attack Drones Operated by Houthi Armed Forces'. *Journal of Science & Global Security* 28, no. 3 (2020), pp. 113–134.

CHAPTER 6

Information and Communications Technology Companies on the Battlefield: Explanations and Implications

Eric Pouw, Paul Ducheine, Peter Pijpers & Kraesten Arnold

Abstract

To keep up with the demands and dynamics that the Information Age imposes on their armed forces, states require a solid informational infrastructure to collect intelligence, support decision making processes and to coordinate and execute activities. The war in Ukraine, which is characterised by its cyberspace dimension, has seen an influx of non-state actors on the battlefield, including ICT-companies (ICTC), such as Microsoft and Starlink.

The examples of ICTC involvement in the war in Ukraine demonstrate the authoritative and therefore critical informational power position of ICTC in cyberspace, causing the relationship of states vis-à-vis ICTC to be a relationship of dependence by necessity, not of choice. As a consequence, states become vulnerable in their application of informational and military power as strategic instruments. This vulnerability becomes particularly apparent in wartime as a result of insecurities regarding the allegiance or loyalty of ICTC which may endanger the continued application of fighting power. In light of this, it is pivotal for states to gain a deep understanding of the interests and motivations of ICTC to appear at the frontlines of war, as well as those that could lead to the decision to withdraw.

Keywords: Information and communications technology companies (ICT-companies), Cyberspace, Information environment, Informational power, Fighting power

6.1 Introduction

During the early stages of its invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022, Russia disabled Viasat, a commercial satellite Internet communications provider crucial to Ukraine, by attacking it with malicious software (malware). Amongst others, the cyberattack resulted in the loss of battlefield communications, rendering Ukrainian forces virtually blind to Russian troop dispositions and movements.[1] Two days later, aiming to fix this 'black hole', Ukraine's Minister for Digital Transformation, Mykhailo Fedorov, directly approached SpaceX-CEO Elon Musk via Twitter with a request to roll out Starlink satellite Internet services in Ukraine.[2] Musk was quick to

reply: 'Starlink is now active in Ukraine. More terminals en route'.[3] Musk's decision to support Ukraine was his own; no contracts were signed, no costs were charged, at least not at that time.

While never designed for use in warfare, Starlink's availability to Ukrainian soldiers has proven to be indispensable to Ukraine's fighting power. Described as the 'essential backbone of communication on the battlefield',[4] its use has been particularly critical for drone warfare, for example to monitor enemy positions or to direct artillery and for unmanned attacks at sea. However, Starlink's use in this war has also made visible that the interests of war-fighting states and those of information- and communication technology companies (ICTC) may differ and even conflict.

When requesting Musk to support Ukraine with Starlink, Ukrainian officials' main concern was to restore communications to prevent defeat; they never realised they had put their fate in the hands of an ICTC-CEO.[5] This became apparent in September 2022, when Musk decided to deny Ukraine the use of Starlink for a surprise attack on Russian naval bases in Sevastopol, in Russian occupied Crimea.

Allegedly, Musk's decision to support Ukraine with Starlink was driven by humanitarian purposes, like restoring communications and supporting civilians, rather than allowing its use to enable offensive military operations that could provoke a larger conflict with unintended consequences, including a potential nuclear escalation – use for which he could be blamed. He felt that this, personal and commercial, interest outweighed the interests of Ukraine.[6] A similar clash of interests could be witnessed in October 2022, this time driven by financial imperatives: feeling increasingly less comfortable with the enormous costs of Starlink (estimated at 400 million USD annually), Musk insisted that the expense of supplying satellite Internet service in Ukraine should now be covered by the Pentagon, or else he would shut down connectivity to the system.[7]

Musk's wavering allegiance not only had a (potentially) negative impact on Ukraine's military efforts at the tactical level, but it also raised serious concerns about the possible strategic effects. Fears in the Pentagon that Musk 'would wake up one morning and just decide, like, he didn't want to do this anymore' eventually led to the signing of a contract between the Pentagon and SpaceX to secure future Ukrainian use of Starlink.[8]

Starlink is just one example of numerous ICTC offering support to Ukraine in its war against Russia. Similar backing has been provided by Microsoft, Google, and Amazon, to name a few. Of course, ICTC-support to a state is not new, nor special; the use of their products (e.g., Windows) and services (like cyber security and cyber threat intelligence) by government institutions, including the armed forces, is as common as it is for private individuals. As the example of Starlink demonstrates, the emergence of ICTC 'on the battlefield', however, adds a dimension to

contemporary warfare that merits further research. Central to this dimension is the notion that even though informational power is an (increasingly) essential power instrument of states,[9] the dominant position of ICTC in cyberspace implies that they exercise various expressions of that power throughout the information environment: as structural power, by owning the physical infrastructure of cyberspace (like intercontinental undersea cables), institutional power for being key in the governance of communications, and productive power for enabling the creation and distribution of digital content. The strength of this informational power of ICTC may seriously impact on and conflict with a state's ability to apply its sovereign powers – in particular, its military instrument of strategic power (hereinafter: military power) – to protect vital and strategic interests in a wartime situation.

This contribution firstly aims to explain why ICTCs 'suddenly' appeared at the frontlines of this war and whether this will be the case in future wars. As ICTCs are intrinsically linked to informational power, the concepts of the information environment at large and cyberspace in particular will be used as lenses through which this question will be answered. This allows us to determine the role and position of ICTCs in the information environment and cyberspace and the implications thereof for informational power. The second purpose of this contribution is to further examine the potential implications of ICTC involvement in wars on a state's ability to exercise the military power. As military power finds expression in the actual application of capabilities and resources by armed forces, we will use the military doctrinal concept of fighting power as a framework to assess these implications. Using the Russian-Ukrainian war as a case study, we thus seek to explain the prominent position and role of ICTC in war and the potential implications thereof for the development and application of states' (military) power.

Section 6.2 will set the stage, by briefly introducing the concepts and terms central to this contribution: the information environment, cyberspace and informational power. Section 6.3 will then explain the utility of the information environment and cyberspace for fighting power. Section 6.4 will take a closer look at the contributions of ICTCs in the Russian-Ukrainian War and their motives. In section 6.5, we will subsequently assess the potential implications of wartime involvement of ICTC for the development and application of fighting power, and hence for their relation to military power and informational power. In section 6.6 we will arrive at concluding thoughts.

While ICTC involvement in armed conflict raises significant legal and ethical issues, this contribution will not discuss these. In addition, the scope of this contribution is limited to the analysis of the position and role of ICTC in relation to the fighting power of states using the Ukraine war as a case-study; analyses of, or comparisons with ICTC in other or past conflicts or with other types of commercial entities are not included.

6.2 The Information Environment, Cyberspace and Informational Power

This section introduces the concepts of information environment, cyberspace and informational power.

6.2.1 The information environment

The concept of the information environment embodies an outlook on today's world, viewed through the lens of the increasing relevance of data and information. It is a reflection of the 'information revolution' since the late 20th century, in which information and communications technologies – such as computers, the Internet, smartphones, satellites, artificial intelligence (AI) and quantum computing – have shaped our economic, social and political decision-making processes worldwide, on all levels of human interaction. This era is commonly referred to as the Information Age.

For the purposes of this chapter, the information environment refers to the space in which data and information is already present or can be created and subsequently can be used (or abused) by any possible actor present in the information environment (i.e., governments, individuals, organisations, *bona fide* or *male fide*) to exert influence over other actors in order to attain strategic and operational effects. This may include the use of data and information by states to display military power.[10] Viewed from the perspective of peace, conflict and security, it is unsurprising that NATO has adopted the information environment as one of its key doctrinal concepts, defining it as the environment 'where humans and automated systems observe, orientate, decide and act upon information, and is therefore the principal environment of decision-making.'[11]

In today's world, information is a fundamental characterising factor of our day-to-day living environment. It can be conceptualised in different ways, symbolising different purposes, functions and characteristics.[12] First, it can be viewed as a resource for data that can be collected from all that is available in the environment in any shape or form (this may range from objects and events to sounds and smells), which can in turn be used for understanding a situation or context (e.g., a conflict in general, such as the Russian-Ukrainian war, or a particular tactical combat situation in a war, such as the situation on the ground in certain zones of hostilities in that war) and, subsequently, decision-making and command. Secondly, information can be viewed as a representation of knowledge available in physical, digital and cognitive form, which, together with data, forms a framework for an individual's understanding of a particular situation, which in turn shapes his or her decision making. Thirdly, information can be used as a message that is produced and distributed to influence the perception, attitude and behaviour of

another actor in a direction that is preferred by the sender. As such, information functions as a tool of influence or 'weapon'. A fourth conceptualisation of information concerns its function as part of the communication process inherent to every form of human interaction, which itself relies profoundly on human behaviour and sense-making processes.[13]

The manifestation of information in these four conceptualisations takes place – continuously and simultaneously – in three dimensions that, together, assist in characterising the information environment. This concerns, firstly, the cognitive dimension, which represents the beliefs, thoughts, opinions, norms, values, emotions, *et cetera* of individuals and societal groups. The physical dimension reflects information related to physical entities, such as objects or persons, and their geographical locations. The virtual dimension exemplifies the intangible digital identities that facilitate access to digital objects. This dimension did not exist until the introduction of cyberspace.

6.2.2 Cyberspace

Overlapping considerable parts of the information environment is cyberspace (see also Figure 6.1). As defined by NATO, cyberspace is '[t]he global domain consisting of all interconnected communication, information technology and other electronic systems, networks and their data, including those which are separated or independent, which process, store or transmit data.'[14] In terms of historical origins, cyberspace is a relatively new concept that has added a virtual and entirely man-made dimension to the existing physical and cognitive dimensions.[15]




Figure 6.1: The information environment including cyberspace

A significant part of cyberspace is made up of virtual identities and objects that together form the virtual dimension of the information environment. The virtual persona-layer, reflecting a human's collective or individual cognition, contains virtual identities, such as e-mail addresses, social media profiles, computer usernames or websites, by which individuals or organisations gain access to virtual objects (software and data). The virtual object-layer is essential for the digital creation, processing and storage of data, information, intelligence and knowledge made possible by computer programs (software), protocols, operating systems, IP-addresses or other digital data.

Another part of cyberspace is the tangible, physical network-layer of cyberspace, which overlaps with and forms part of the physical dimension of the information environment. This layer enables digital communication and connectivity. This includes all hardware, such as the network of computers, smartphones, servers, and data carriers, crucial to data creation, processing and storage,[16] as well as the objects, such as routers, modems, cables, WiFi-routers, and satellites with their ground stations, required for communication and connectivity.

The implications of the rise of cyberspace have been tremendous. Cyberspace furthered the accessibility of the information environment and will continue to do so due to fast-paced innovations, such as AI and quantum-computing.[17] Without cyberspace, gaining understanding of the cognitive dimension (e.g., sentiments) or physical dimension (e.g., troop locations) was not possible without physical contact or a physical vector, which required many resources and was time-consuming. With cyberspace being omnipresent in our lives, this can now be achieved remotely and near instantly via the virtual dimension, by anyone. Moreover, the amount of information contained within the information environment has been amplified with the availability and information wealth of cyberspace.[18]

Together, the information environment and cyberspace function as a space that enables actors to collect, disseminate and release information for communication, decision-making and exchange of knowledge. As such, it provides a basis for social interaction in a digital and interconnected world. As we will see later, this function is of great significance for the development and use of fighting power (sections 6.3 and 6.4). The next subsection, however, will briefly set out the concept of utilising information as a form of power.

6.2.3 Informational power

Informational power is part of a broader set of strategic power instruments displayed by states in their international relations, commonly referred to as DIME (diplomacy, information, military and economy).[19]

Diplomacy as a power instrument concerns the management of international relations by engaging in negotiations, dialogue, and cooperation to defend and

further national or international interests and values. Diplomats, international (governmental) organisations, alliances, international agreements, resolutions, cooperation, coordination, or norm development form the face of diplomacy.[20]

Economic power is an instrument ranging from consensual (as in loans) to compulsory (as in sanctions) activities to gain a comparative advantage,[21] and can be enlarged with the financial instrument of power. It covers passive elements (e.g., macro-economic characteristics) as well as active measures (assets freeze, investments, etc.).

Military power concerns a state's ability to use its armed forces to defend its interests, to advance strategic objectives or to influence international affairs. As will be further elaborated below in section 6.3, effective and efficient military power requires fighting power. Military power can be applied in various ways, from (treaty-based or ad hoc) peaceful cooperation based on shared values and norms, to armed conflict. The modalities, means and methods of military power may vary from physical weaponry to non-kinetic[22] and information-related capabilities, including operations to deny, disrupt, degrade, or destroy targeted digital infrastructure (hard cyber) and cyber-enabled subversive influence operations (soft cyber).[23]

Next to this classic DIME typology, other power instruments might be added,[24] to fully grasp the spectrum of instruments used to exert power in today's geopolitical arena, as witnessed in the war in Ukraine. Examples of these instruments are culture as a (soft) power element[25] (e.g., Radio Free Europe, China's Confucius institutes,[26] Soros' Open Society Foundation)[27] and lawfare (i.e., legal action or litigation[28] used strategically as an alternative for the military instrument[29] in conflict situations,[30] e.g., the US' indictments of foreign cyber operators).[31]

In view of the present chapter's focus on information, however, it is essential to further examine the meaning of informational power. This form of power can be understood in several ways. First, it can be viewed as the relative value of physical, cognitive or virtual information sources.[32] These sources may be observed by men and/or machine, enabling understanding and decision-making.[33] This substantive facet may ultimately be used to affect other actors, which can be viewed as compulsory power.[34] Secondly, it entails structures to communicate in terms of capabilities, procedures and as a medium or vector, such as traditional (physical) communication channels (e.g., newspapers), digital structures, such as social media platforms (e.g., TikTok, Facebook, X, Telegram), and the (intercontinental) glass fibre cable network and 4/5G networks and satellites for mobile Internet connectivity (e.g., Starlink). Ownership or (partial) control over these structures can be used to exert power. Thirdly, institutions overseeing, designing, and contributing to the flow of information may offer a powerbase as well, e.g., the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), or Regional Internet Registries (e.g.,

RIPE).[35] Fourthly, information has a productive aspect, i.e., to generate debate, to reproduce and reinforce discourse or messaging, to construct and disseminate new information, whether malevolent or benevolent. Consider the (alleged) role of TikTok, X (Twitter) and Facebook in marketing or elections.

As demonstrated, the information environment, including cyberspace, is used to gather, transfer, handle and produce information, enabling understanding and decision making. In addition, virtual information (i.e., data, software, protocols) is used as an instrument, as a vector and as a target to generate effects in this 'arena'. It also functions as a source and as a space to exert various forms of informational power: productive power, structural power; institutional power and compulsory power.

These features of the information environment and cyberspace, as well as the various forms of informational power greatly impact the functioning of global society and the capability of states to apply instruments of power to defend their position and role in it. This also applies to the application of military power. In the next section we will elaborate further on this element, by exploring the significance and utility of the information environment and cyberspace for a crucial exponent of military power: fighting power.

6.3 The Utility of the Information Environment and Cyberspace for Fighting Power

As mentioned above, fighting power is intrinsically linked with (the exercise of) military power as an instrument of state power. Before we delve into an analysis of the functionality or utility of the information environment and cyberspace for fighting power, we will briefly explain the concept of fighting power.

6.3.1 Fighting power

In short, fighting power is a military doctrinal concept used by states[36] that expresses the efficiency and effectiveness with which armed forces are capable of carrying out military operations. It consists of three components: the conceptual component, the physical component, and the mental component.[37]

The conceptual component is the 'coherent, intellectual basis and theoretical foundation for the deployment of military forces',[38] which finds expression in doctrines, strategies and concepts of operations on how military forces are to be deployed and how they are to use their capacities to reach military strategic and tactical goals. Providing input for the conceptual basis of military forces are strategic and political guidelines (such as strategies and policies); operational experience and evaluation (such as after action reviews and lessons learned reports); threat

analyses (such as intelligence reports and reports on geopolitical or technological developments); scientific and technological developments (such as military innovations, e.g., AI, cyber capacities, drones, as well as research and development studies, often in co-operation with universities and (military) industry); operational and tactical experiences, derived from exercises, training and deployment; international co-operation (such as EU and NATO doctrines and standards, best practices from other armies and experiences from multinational deployments); as well as ethical and legal frameworks.

The physical component – capacities – concerns the manpower and equipment required by the conceptual component to effectively carry out military operations in all domains of warfare (including the cyber domain) as well as all the (physical) preconditions required for the preparation (training, education and exercise) of troops.

Finally, the moral component refers to the mental and psychological factors that affect the readiness, motivation and resilience of soldiers to engage in combat. This component is determined by four aspects: the will to fight and win, leadership, responsible organisation of the deployment of available personnel and materiel, and perception.

Ultimately, for fighting power to become effective, each component must be optimised; together they must form a coherent synergy.[39]

6.3.2 Utility of the information environment and cyberspace

The question that follows is: what is the utility of the information environment and cyberspace for fighting power? Or alternatively, how can the information environment (and the aspects of information power deriving from it) augment fighting power?

First of all, the three dimensions of the information environment and the informational dynamics in and between them function as a framework for critical reflection on the strategic use of information in those dimensions to obtain a position of advantage relative to an audience to accomplish a mission, also dubbed 'information manoeuvring'.[40] This reflection serves to augment the conceptual dimension of fighting power, as it offers input for strategic visions, policies, military doctrine, plans, etc. regarding the position, role and function of information in military operations.[41] This, in turn, impacts the development of the physical component (including the cyber capabilities), for example because of equipment or technology purchased as a result of insights gained from the thinking about the use of fighting power in the information environment and cyberspace, or of the moral component, for example as a result of social or political reluctance to permit the military the use of cyberspace as a training area for digital military operations,[42] which may negatively impact their motivation.

Secondly, the information environment and cyberspace offer cognitive, virtual or physical information sources that can be observed in order to gain an understanding of the cause and context of a situation or conflict, the capabilities of opposing forces, favourable and neutral audiences, as well as of the 'interrelated networks of political, military, economic, social, infrastructure and information systems, each exerting pressure and influence on the others.'[43]

Thirdly, cyberspace and the information environment serve as a backbone for communication and information sharing and facilitate faster and more effective decision-making as well as coordination and synchronisation through command and control (orchestration), which is specially made possible by the virtual dimension and cyberspace.

Finally, the information environment functions as the arena that allows for the manoeuvring with fighting power, i.e., for the deployment of capacities (act) in accordance with the decision taken. This requires instruments or tools (a.k.a. information as a weapon) taken from the very information environment, e.g., in the form of malware or content. This instrument is then transmitted through one of the dimensions (e.g., land, air, cyberspace) serving as a vector, targeting an element in one of the layers of the information environment, e.g., a virtual object.[44] Action thus takes shape via activities in or via the three dimensions: cognitively, such as an influence campaign; virtually, for example via a computer hack; or physically, for example by aerial bombardment. That being said, the cognitive dimension is perhaps the most relevant dimension for fighting power, as it is here that fighting power must be directed at the vulnerabilities of a particular audience (foe, friend, or neutral) and eventually result in influencing its thinking process, decision-making and behaviour in order to obtain an advantage that contributes to the accomplishment of a mission.[45]

In sum, relying on the backbone structure, this process of observe, understand, decide, orchestrate and act is continuous: the effects of the application of fighting power form the impetus for (another) cycle of observation, understanding, decision-making, *et cetera* (by the actor itself, or by others, such as the opponent). This backbone and process is reflected in Figure 6.2.




Figure 6.2: Backbone and activities in the information environment.

As will be demonstrated in the next section by using the Russian-Ukrainian war as an example, ICTC play a crucial role in this backbone and process, even though their contributions and motives may differ significantly.

6.4 ICTC in the Russian-Ukrainian War: Contributions and Motives

As has been the case for many other states engaged in armed conflict, it has become clear that Ukraine's survival heavily depended and still depends on external support. On the one hand, Ukraine has received support – diplomatic/political, intelligence, economic/financial and military – from other states, predominantly coming from members of NATO and the EU.[46] On the other hand, Ukraine's survival also relied on the backing of ICTC, in a wide range of cyberspace-related sectors.[47] This section explores their contributions and motivations.

One area in which ICTC support has proved to be vital is cybersecurity. Based on cyber threat intelligence (CTI) prior to the actual invasion and in anticipation of Russian cyberattacks,[48] Ukraine had increased its resilience in cooperation with the US and the UK (initially on-site and later remotely)[49] and a variety of ICTC, such as Microsoft, Mandiant, ESET, Amazon Cloud Services.[50] They provided Ukraine with advice and fixes for Russian cyber-attacks and technical and security services.[51] Google expanded the availability of Project Shield, free software designed to protect vulnerable and under-resourced news-websites with 'media, elections, and human rights related content'[52] against Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks, thus ensuring the continuation of critical services provided by the Ukrainian government. Microsoft, Amazon Web Services, and Google also assisted Ukraine by virtually relocating vital government data to cyber infrastructure outside its territory.[53] Thus, by active incident response and information sharing with Ukraine, cybersecurity firms and allied defenders likely disrupted Russia's destructive cyberattacks.[54]

Other companies have supported Ukraine by making available intelligence through their commercial satellite services. Google's satellite service Google Maps has been used by Ukrainian forces in the early days of the war to locate and subsequently attack Russian troops. When discovering that the Russians used this tool in a similar fashion, Google disabled certain features to shield Ukrainian forces from attacks. Additionally, the company developed an air raid alert application to safeguard Ukraine's citizens from Russian bombardment.[55] Companies such as Palantir Technologies, Planet Labs and Blacksky Technology provided geospatial imagery for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance purposes, often in combination with AI and open-source information.

Ukraine has also received cyber-tech support in the field of Artificial Intelligence (AI). Clearview AI, a U.S.-based company, has provided AI-based facial recognition software. The company's search engine matches individuals' faces to a database of more than twenty billion images collected from the Internet's social media platforms, including the Russian social media service VKontakte.[56] Ukraine utilised the technology, which it received free of charge, to 'identify the faces of the Russian military who were killed or captured, check people at checkpoints, and search for missing persons'.[57] AI-based support can further be found with respect to qualification of objects on the battlefield,[58] electronic warfare, encryption, cybersecurity, drone warfare, autonomous ships, undersea drones and unmanned ground vehicles, to name a few areas.[59] In the same vein, communication systems have been provided: Elon Musk's Starlink, mentioned in the introduction, is one example.

Social media platforms and their parent companies – such as Facebook (Meta), X (Twitter), YouTube, TikTok, and Telegram – have not only become primary sources of real-time data that can inform strategic decisions both domestically and internationally but have also emerged as critical battlegrounds for disseminating narratives aimed at influencing public opinion and troop morale. Meta, for example, took extensive steps to monitor and curb disinformation spread by Russia-controlled media outlets.[60] At the same time, Ukrainian state officials and organs – for example President Zelensky and the two Ukrainian intelligence services (HUR and SBU) – have made extensive use of these platforms for so-called (soft) cyber-enabled influence operations.[61] Moving beyond that purpose, these platforms have also been used to prepare for and conduct hard cyber operations. Ukraine's Twitter handle @ITarmyUKR,[62] for example, is used to muster personnel, including hackers and hacktivists, to collect vulnerabilities (in software and protocol), to coordinate and conduct cyberattacks.[63] Motivations for ICTC support to Ukraine and Russia differ. Understanding the true interests of these ICTC is, however, crucial, as it sheds light on the involvement of non-state actors in geopolitical conflicts and war, their potential to influence international affairs, and may have an impact on the fighting powers of states.

Clearly, the principal interests of ICTC to support during war are strategic and economic. Ukraine, as a pro-Western and democratic state with a strong and growing digital economy forms an important sales and investor market for ICTC. Therefore, ICTC have an interest in keeping this sector stable by offering their support, even if it is free of charge.

Another important incentive, particularly with respect to support in cybersecurity, is to prevent future damage from Russian cyber threats, not merely because of its disrupting effects on international security, but also ICTC.

Besides strategic, economic and cybersecurity motivations, ICTC appear also to be driven by moral and PR considerations. For example, in a statement on

3 November 2022 expressing hope that 'other tech companies will similarly step forward to sustain support that is vital not only for Ukraine, but for international stability and the protection of fundamental rights across Europe and around the world', Microsoft's CEO Brad Smith announced that Microsoft would extend its technology support to Ukraine free of charge throughout 2023, and that it would commit data and support, for example to 'nonprofits and humanitarian organizations operating in Ukraine, Poland and elsewhere in the European Union' or 'international organizations aiding Ukraine and addressing war crimes against civilians.'[64] While such support is reflective of ideological considerations, based on ethical, humanitarian and international security concerns, it may also have been driven by reputational concerns, to satisfy expectations of customers and investors that 'their' company will stand up against aggression and violations of human rights and international humanitarian law.

A final incentive for ICTC-behaviour in the Ukraine war has been the compelling nature of international sanctions imposed after the 2022 invasion, which heavily impacted services offered by ICTC to Russian clients.[65] The access of state-owned Russia Today (RT) and Sputnik news in Europe and, in some cases, globally, was restricted. Conversely, as a consequence of Russian legislation, services of Twitter, YouTube, and Google were banned in the Russian Federation.[66] Moreover, many companies (e.g., broadband providers such as Lumen and Cogent)[67] service providers (PayPal) and vendors (Apple, Microsoft)[68] decided to stall services beyond the level required by the sanctioned regime.[69] Shortly after the Russian invasion, the Vodafone telecommunication company cut off communication in large parts of the Russian-occupied Donbas region, rendering pro-Russian separatists digitally incapacitated.[70] Stalling and reducing services beyond the sanctions and legal requirements can arguably be explained on moral grounds and on (long term) marketing and public relations considerations.

Although outside the scope of ICTC, perhaps to be regarded as a waiver for incompleteness, it should be noted that institutions that are considered to form the core of the Internet, e.g., ICANN and RIPE, notwithstanding the pressure that was exerted upon them, have remained neutral in this conflict.[71] Others organisations, such as SWIFT, responsible for virtual financial messaging between banks, were forced to stall services as a result of international sanctions.[72]

As previously concluded, the utility of the information environment (and cyberspace) for fighting power of the state lies in its capability to enable the collection and dissemination of information for communication, understanding, decision making and action. As the examples of ICTC support to Ukraine demonstrate, the products and services of ICTC play a pivotal, if not indispensable, role in facilitating this capability, implying that ICTC are of great significance for the utility of the information environment. This is not surprising given the roles and subsequent

position of ICTC in cyberspace. In the next section, we will further highlight these roles and the position of ICTC in cyberspace and their significance for informational power and subsequently address the implications of wartime exertion of informational power for military power.

6.5 Implications of ICTC (Wartime) Involvement

6.5.1 Roles and position of ICTC in cyberspace and their significance for informational power

Not states but ICTC are in a dominant position in cyberspace. This position evolves from ICTC's roles as creator, custodian and as regulator in cyberspace. This dominant position of ICTC is reflected in the various expressions of informational power: compulsory, structural, institutional and productive.

As the principal creators of cyberspace, ICTC are responsible for the development and production of (nearly)[73] all infrastructure, technology and services of the three layers of cyberspace. This applies to the physical infrastructure and technology required for data production, data storage, data transmission, and connectivity as well as the plethora of digital products and closed-off digital ecosystems offered and controlled by ICTC.[74] As the custodians of data and information, ICTC wield influence by offering services for data storage and protection of the cyber infrastructure and data.[75] As such, the ICTC wield structural power. Structural power also can be recognised as ICTC also own and operate the principal social media platforms and networks.[76]

The social media platforms, alongside the virtualisation of mainstream media, are central to the notion of productive power as they are used to signal, accelerate, transmit issues and initiate public debate: whether benevolent or malicious. Ownership, e.g., of the social media platforms, also entails compulsory power. This is evident if consumers do not comply with a service or platform agreement and – when in violation – are ousted of expelled from the services.

Moreover, ICTC play a key role in the regulation and governance of cyberspace, which denotes a display of institutional power. Examples are content moderation vis-à-vis the freedom of expression, privacy and data protection, cybersecurity standards, AI, cryptocurrencies and block chain, and property rights on digital content. Ownership and structural positioning offers an opportunity to set rules and standards, and to determine how cyberspace must be governed commensurate to their business, moral, social, economic or political interests.[77] Examples of this direct and indirect norm-making capacity by ICTC are Apple with global standards based on patents such as iOS and the Apple Store where quality standards are set;

policies for content moderation (e.g., how to handle hate speech); and lobbying to influence government policy and regulation to protect their interest.[7][8]

The application (or ability to apply) informational power by ICTC has – at least – two implications for states and warfare. First of all, informational power (by virtue of the ICTC) can be used alongside military power in conflict and war. This is evident when looking at strategic cyber enabled influence operations. Secondly, informational power is also recognised as a key feature in fighting power as some of the capacities (e.g., satellite connectivity) or concepts (e.g., information manoeuvring) rely on the provision of ICTC's services. In the next section we will explain what this means for military power.

6.5.2 Implications for fighting power

Previously, we concluded that the information environment serves as a resource for forms of information taken from the cognitive, virtual and physical dimensions that enables understanding and decision making, provides a backbone for communication and information sharing and functions as an arena for action (in various dimensions). Given ICTC's roles and position in cyberspace and subsequent significance for the utility of the information environment, it is not surprising that states rely on and closely work together with ICTC for the development and support of fighting power.

First of all, by virtue of their structural and institutional power, products and services of ICTC play a critical role in the empowerment of the use of cyberspace (and the information environment) for military operations. As such, these products and services contribute to all three components of fighting power. This also becomes clear from the examples of ICTC support to Ukraine previously mentioned, showing that various ICTC have provided resources that were used to generate understanding, enabling decision making, orchestrations and ultimately action (like in cyber threat intelligence, satellite imagery, geo positioning data). Additionally, they provided products and services to guarantee and reinforce the backbones, i.e., the various communication systems, be it satellite, GSM or ISP, to enable the activities undertaken in the information environment: observe, understand, decide, orchestrate and act (see Figure 6.2). Starlink is the obvious example used for communication and orchestration. Another example is Twitter as a platform, with the @ITArmyUKR account as a means for communication, acquisition and harvesting of potential vulnerabilities. In terms of components of fighting power, these features qualify as capacities (in the physical, including non-kinetic, component).

Secondly, considering the opportunities to wield compulsory and productive power, it is also fair to say that ICTC enable action, or in military terms, operations.

Action can be recognised in the examples above. Taking a broad approach, it is the shutting down of services upon request (PayPal) or the refusal to do so (ICANN) that represents the use of compulsory power that can be exercised indirectly through the ICTC. The use of social media platforms, whether by President Zelensky or by the SBU and HUR, to launch and conduct cyber-enabled influence campaigns to generate international (public, political, economic and military) support serves as a clear example of productive power. So do Russia's disinformation campaigns launched through RT or Sputnik (although hampered abroad through sanctions). Once again, these services can be regarded as capacities, part of fighting power.

When considering the information environment and cyberspace as an arena in which action – offensively or in defence – is taken (using compulsory and/or productive power), it is also fair to state that tools (instruments or weapons) and vectors (the Internet or glass fibre seabed cables) used to address targets (virtual identities and objects) are part of the infrastructures owned or services offered by the ICTC. Once again, this tooling (or weaponising) and the vectors can be regarded as (non-physical and physical) capacities. Moreover, viewing the information environment as the operational context, the conceptual notion of information manoeuvring contributes to fighting power as it explains how the use of capacities can be planned and executed to acquire beneficial 'positions' or outcomes and effects.[79]

6.5.3 The other side of the coin

As becomes clear from the above, the – direct or indirect – use of and profiting from the informational powers that ICTC represent ultimately offers advantages for states and their armed forces in terms of fighting power and the potential for the effective use of military power. Nonetheless, the force of informational powers of ICTC also has several downsides, which may ultimately affect the development or use of fighting power.

First, the dominant position of ICTC in cyberspace raises concerns on the functioning of the information environment. This can be attributed to what has been dubbed 'digital feudalism': by exploiting existing legal frameworks and policies in some areas and the absence thereof in others, ICTC – Big Tech in particular – essentially control whether, where, when, how and under which conditions data and information can be digitally created, stored, analysed, structured, disseminated, manipulated, used, et cetera.[80] A consequence of this is the monopolisation of information. With their use of features like content moderation, paywalls, AI and algorithms, as well as their regulatory power, ICTC are in a position to limit the access to, the diversity of, and the quality of information. In essence, for billions of customers all over the world, including governments and armed forces, ICTC are

the gatekeepers of the virtual dimension and are therefore the decisive factor in how other actors in the information environment perceive information, what they decide and subsequently where and how they act. This not only impacts individuals, but first and foremost states: as ICTC literally 'sit' on information, their information position has become stronger than that of states and their intelligence services.[81] Combined with their enormous financial power, which in some instances exceeds that of states,[82] ICTC have used their structural power (or 'platform power')[83] and institutional position to gain privileged access to public authorities and international fora, to set standards and to form coalitions to protect their interests, as recent examples demonstrate.[84] In doing so, ICTC are increasingly injecting themselves in, interfering with or seem to be taking over traditional governmental functions, including in the realm of national and international security.[85]

A second negative effect is the change in participative behaviour of actors in the information environment as a consequence of the erosion of user trust regarding ICTC's handling of data and information. This follows, firstly, from the ICTC's role in relation to manipulated and harmful information, such as misinformation, disinformation and hate speech. As owners of the main social media platforms, ICTC are the principal enablers of this type of information. Examples of the impact thereof on democratic processes,[86] public discourse and social cohesion[87] are numerous. Likely on economic grounds, ICTC have been reluctant to take preventive or mitigating measures. Measures that have been introduced – such as fact checking and internal oversight boards – have been criticised for failing to meet basic standards, such as transparency and independency.[88] In other instances, ICTC have overhauled preventive measures.[89] At the same time, ICTC use their power to influence initiatives by states to regulate ICTC's role in the spread of disinformation[90] or to challenge existing laws.[91] In other instances, states are too slow to adopt laws[92] or allow disinformation to take place under the pretext of free speech.[93] Ultimately, this undermines the confidence of audiences with respect to accountability and governance of ICTC and the ability of the information environment to assist them in making decisions based on information from sources that have historically been considered relatively credible, such as news media, scientific institutions and government organisations. Eventually, the loss of confidence causes people to retreat into online communities that reinforce their own beliefs, further limiting their access to diverse and credible information and critical thinking. Its polarising effects ultimately not only negatively affect dialogue and cooperation at the individual and group level, but also undermine broader societal and democratic processes, such as elections.

As becomes clear, ICTC near-absolute dominance in cyberspace has created an information environment that makes it possible to handle information in ways that were previously unthinkable. On the other hand, it has created an unbalanced

relationship between ICTC and the users of its products and services; a relationship that is characterised by an almost complete degree of dependence. Put otherwise, if ICTC-dominance were to implode suddenly, it would affect almost every aspect of our daily lives, with severe consequences for global economy, safety and society. It is therefore fair to say that ICTC practically keep the world in a stranglehold, notwithstanding the moral and legal shortcomings of their practices. These dynamics also apply to the relationship of states with ICTC with respect to the fighting power of their armed forces.

6.6 Concluding Remarks

The rise of cyberspace and the near-universal spread of Internet connectivity, now connecting a majority of over 5 billion people worldwide, has resulted in a change in character of social behaviour.[94] Virtualisation and digitisation has permeated – and therefore changed – all forms of social interaction,[95] including the social construct of war. As a consequence, the information and military instruments of power as strategic instruments of state power have evolved as well.

ICTC play a major role in this development. As was demonstrated by assessing cases taken from the war in Ukraine, ICTC's roles and position as creators, guardians and regulators of cyberspace have provided them with authoritative structural, institutional, compulsory and productive informational powers. As such, ICTC prove to be of indispensable value to the development and functioning of the so-called information environment, also in relation to warfighting.

This dominant informational power position of ICTC also impacts the development of the fighting power of the armed forces of states. This explains the increased appearance of ICTC on the frontlines of war and underscores our assessment that they will play a prominent role in future warfare.

As we have seen, ICTC provide the communication backbone of cyberspace. Their products and services facilitate the collection of information from the cognitive, virtual and physical dimension to observe and understand the operating environment, the subsequent decision making and orchestration of desired effects and the actions to achieve those, and finally the action itself. As an arena where digitised social interaction (*in ultimo* including warfighting) takes place, ICTC provide information on threats and vulnerabilities that can be exploited through tooling (instruments or 'weapons'). Their networks serve as a vector for the tools targeting the virtual identities, virtual objects or hardware and are therefore crucial in the development of a state's ability to exercise fighting power. Ultimately, as capacities and concepts benefit from the services offered by ICTC, these entities contribute to the effectiveness of fighting power.

However, the dominant power position of ICTC may come at a price. As the vast majority of states are unable to develop the digital technology required to adapt the fighting power of their armed forces to today's world, they are forced to fall back on the products and services that only ICTC can provide. The relationship of states vis-à-vis ICTC is therefore a relationship of dependence, by necessity, not of choice. Of course, this overdependence on ICTC makes states vulnerable in their application of informational and military power as strategic instruments. While this vulnerability may become apparent in a pre-war phase when the main focus is on the development of fighting power, it could be further aggravated in wartime as a result of insecurities regarding the allegiance or loyalty of ICTC. In light of this, it is essential that states gain a deep understanding of the interests and motivations of ICTC to appear at the frontlines of war, as well as those that could lead to the decision to withdraw.

Notes

1 Howell O'Neill, 'Russia Hacked an American Satellite Company One Hour before the Ukraine Invasion'.

2 Fedorov, Myhailo. Tweet ('while you try to colonize Mars …'), Twitter (now X), 26 February 2022. https://x.com/FedorovMykhailo/status/1497543633293266944.

3 Elon Musk (@elonmusk), X, 26 February 2022, https://x.com/elonmusk/status/1497701484003213317.

4 Farrow, 'Elon Musk's Shadow Rule'.

5 Ibid.

6 Roulette, 'SpaceX Curbed Ukraine's Use of Starlink Internet for Drones'.

7 Marquardt, 'Exclusive: Musk's SpaceX Says It Can No Longer Pay for Critical Satellite Services in Ukraine, Asks Pentagon to Pick Up the Tab'.

8 Farrow, 'Elon Musk's Shadow Rule'.

9 Ducheine and Pijpers, 'The Missing Component in Deterrence Theory: The Legal Framework'.

10 Other instruments of national power are diplomatic, informational, and economic measures and activities. Together with the military instrument of national power, these instruments form the widely used acronym DIME, or Diplomacy, Information, Military, Economic.

11 NATO, 'MC 422/3 NATO Military Policy for Information Operations'. See also NATO, 'AJP-3.10 Allied Joint Doctrine for Information Operations', November 2009.

12 Timmer and Ducheine, 'Conceptual Manoeuvring: The Interpretation of Information Manoeuvre within the Netherlands Ministry of Defence', pp. 545–546.

13 McCreadie and Rice, 'Trends in Analyzing Access to Information. Part I: Cross-Disciplinary Conceptualizations of Access', pp. 46–48.

14 NATO, 'AJP-3.20 Allied Joint Doctrine for Cyber Operations', Edition A, Version 1, January 2020.

15 Ducheine, Van Haaster and Van Harskamp, 'Manoeuvring and Generating Effects in the Information Environment'.

16 Also called 'physical network layer', see NATO, 'AJP-3.20', p. 3.

17 Van Keulen, 'Digital Force: Disrupting Life, Liberty and Livelihood in the Information Age'.

[18] Ducheine, Pijpers and Zwanenburg, 'Rapport Tanden voor de leeuw – een voor haar doel en op haar taak berekende krijgsmacht in de informatie-omgeving', p. 23. See also Van Haaster, 'On Cyber: The Utility of Military Cyber Operations during Armed Conflict', pp. 70–84; Van Keulen, 'Digital Force', pp. 19–38.

[19] Mann, 'The Sources of My Sources', pp. 499–502; Schroeder, 'Introduction: The IEMP Model and Its Critics'; UK Ministry of Defence, 'Joint Doctrine Publication 0-01: British Defence Doctrine (2011)', pp. 1–6; US Joint Chiefs of Staff, 'Joint Publication 1: Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States (2013)', I-12.

[20] For diplomacy in the realm of cyberspace, see for example the Group of Governmental Experts on Advancing Responsible State Behaviour in Cyberspace in the Context of International Security (UNGGE) at <https://www.un.org/disarmament/group-of-governmental-experts/> and the Open-Ended Working Group on Developments in the Field of ICTs in the Context of International Security (OEWG), at <https://www.un.org/disarmament/open-ended-working-group/>.

[21] Giumelli, 'Winning without Killing: The Case for Targeted Sanctions'.

[22] Ducheine, 'Non-Kinetic Capabilities: Complementing the Kinetic Prevalence to Targeting'; Wiltenburg, 'Security Force Assistance: Practised but not Substantiated'.

[23] Ducheine, Van Haaster and Van Harskamp, 'Manoeuvring and Generating Effects in the Information Environment'; Schrijver and Ducheine, 'Cyber-enabled Influence Operations: The Case of the Belarusian Cyber-Partisans.

[24] Nye, 'Hard, Soft, and Smart Power'.

[25] Ibid., pp. 10–14.

[26] 'U.S. and China: Hard and Soft Power Potential', pp. 39–50.

[27] See <https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/who-we-are>.

[28] See for example Russia's false accusations on Ukraine's acts of genocide in the UN Security Council: Radio Free Europe, 'Ukraine Tells UN's Top Court Russia Using "False" Genocide Allegations as Pretext for War'.

[29] Sari, 'Hybrid Threats and the Law: Concepts, Trends and Implications'; Voetelink, 'Reframing Lawfare'.

[30] Ibid.

[31] See, for example, US Department of Justice, 'Five Russian GRU Officers and One Civilian Charged for Conspiring to Hack Ukrainian Government'; US Department of Justice, 'Six Russian GRU Officers Charged in Connection with Worldwide Deployment of Destructive Malware and Other Disruptive Actions in Cyberspace'; Horowitz, 'Italy Orders Seizure of Migrant Rescue Ship; Sullivan and Weiser, Sullivan and Weiser, 'U.S. Seizes North Korean Ship for Violating Sanctions'; Bellinger, 'Suing China over the Coronavirus Won't Help'.

[32] UK Ministry of Defence, 'Joint Doctrine Publication 04 (JDP 04): Understanding and Decision-Making', pp. 2–5.

[33] Ducheine, Van Haaster and van Harskamp, 'Manoeuvring and Generating Effects in the Information Environment'.

[34] In the terminology used by Betz and Stevens, 'Chapter One: Power and Cyberspace'. See also the four categories by Barnett and Duvall, 'Power in International Politics', p. 43: compulsory, structural, institutional and productive power.

[35] ICANN is responsible for the Domain Name System (DNS); Regional Internet Registry for Europe, Middle East and Central Asia (RIPE) registers Internet Protocol (IP) addresses and Autonomous System Numbers (ASN).

[36] See for example NATO, 'AJP-01 Allied Joint Doctrine'.

[37] Although this is a Western view of fighting power, it also reflects how other, non-Western, actors consider military capabilities. And while these components relate to military fighting power, the present authors regard them as equally relevant to the 'fighting power' of any other instrument of power.

[38] See Ministry of Defence of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, 'Netherlands Defence Doctrine', June 2019, p. 72.

[39] Ducheine, Zwanenburg and Pijpers, 'Rapport Tanden voor de leeuw', p. 30.

[40] Timmer and Ducheine, 'Conceptual Manoeuvring', pp. 545–546.

[41] Pijpers and Ducheine, '"If You Have a Hammer": Shaping the Armed Forces' Discourse on Information Maneuver'.

[42] Ducheine, Zwanenburg and Pijpers, 'Rapport Tanden voor de leeuw', p. 22.

[43] Commonly referred to as 'operations environment. See NATO, 'AJP-01 Allied Joint Doctrine', p. 94.

[44] Pijpers, and Arnold, 'Conquering the Invisible Battleground'.

[45] Timmer and Ducheine, 'Conceptual Manoeuvring', p. 550.

[46] https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_192648.htm; https://european-union.europa.eu/priorities-and-actions/eu-support-ukraine_en.

[47] The overview below is not intended to display a complete picture but merely offers examples available in open sources.

[48] Weymouth, 'Volodymyr Zelensky: "Everyone Will Lose" If Russia Invades Ukraine; Sonne, Ryan and Hudson, 'Russia Planning Potential Sabotage Operations in Ukraine, U.S. Says'.

[49] Martin, 'US Military Hackers Conducting Offensive Operations in Support of Ukraine, Says Head of Cyber Command'.

[50] Bateman, 'Russia's Wartime Cyber Operations in Ukraine', p. 14.

[51] Google Threat Analysis Group and Mandiant, 'Fog of War: How the Ukraine Conflict Transformed the Cyber Threat Landscape'.

[52] Brandom, 'Google Launches New Anti-DDoS Service Called "Project Shield"'.

[53] The rationale behind this relocation of government data was (and is) the assumption that Russian attacks on data centres in Western states – and under the protection of these (mostly U.S.) companies – were deemed less likely to occur, as the states involved would consider such attacks as armed attacks by Russia, which would result in escalation of the conflict to a degree not desired by Russia.

[54] Microsoft Threat Intelligence Centre, 'A Year of Russian Hybrid Warfare in Ukraine', p. 5.

[55] Malik, 'Google Adds Air Raids Alerts to Android Phones in Ukraine'.

[56] Paresh and Dastin, 'Ukraine Has Started Using Clearview AI's Facial Recognition during War'.

[57] Quote from Yevgeny Yenin, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, retrieved from the Clearview AI website at https://www.clearview.ai/ukraine.

[58] For example, MilitaryNewsUA, Tweet ('Ukrainian Saker Scout drone with artificial intelligence'), 25 January 2024, https://twitter.com/i/status/1750444954298577263.

[59] For example, Schrijver, '"The Wise Man Will Be Master of the Stars": The Use of Twitter by a Military Intelligence Service in Wartime'.

[60] Meta, 'Meta's Ongoing Efforts Regarding Russia's Invasion of Ukraine'.

[61] Schrijver, 'The Wise Man Will be Masters of the Stars', pp. 77–96. HUR is Ukraine's military intelligence service, SBU the internal security agency.

[62] See: https://x.com/ITArmyUKR

[63] Soesanto, 'The IT Army of Ukraine'.

[64] Smith, 'Extending Our Vital Technology Support for Ukraine'.

[65] Sanger, 'Piercing the State's Corporate Veil: Using Private Actors to Enforce International Norms'.

[66] Bond and Allyn, 'Russia Is Restricting Social Media'.

67 Madory, 'Updated: Cogent and Lumen Curtail Operations in Russia'.

68 Microsoft, 'Microsoft Suspends New Sales in Russia'.

69 Isidore, 'Why Many Businesses Are Getting Tougher on Russia Than Sanctions Require'.

70 McDaid and Corr, 'The Mobile Network Battlefield in Ukraine'.

71 ICANN, 'Letter from Göran Marby to Mykhailo Fedorov', 2 March 2022.

72 The Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) is a messaging service that substantially facilitates information exchange between banks and other financial institutions. SWIFT connects more than 11,000 entities worldwide. See European Council, 'EU sanctions against Russia explained'.

73 Very few states produce their own hardware and software, often via state-controlled or owned companies. Examples are China, Russia, India, Iran and North-Korea.

74 Examples of such ecosystems are those offered by Apple with iOS and the App Store, the marketplace and cloud services of Amazon, and the search engines, e-mail service Gmail and operating system Android of Google.

75 Examples are Palo Alto Networks, CrowdStrike, Fortinet, and CloudFlare.

76 Examples are Facebook, X, YouTube, Instagram, LinkedIn, TikTok, Snapchat, WhatsApp, WeChat and Discord.

77 Sommer, Matania, and Hassid, 'The Rise of Companies in the Cyber Era and the Pursuant Shift in National Security'.

78 For example, companies such as Google and Facebook actively participated in the debate around the GDPR in the EU.

79 See the definition of Information Manoeuvre above in paragraph 3.2, fn. 40.

80 Passchier, *De vloek van Big Tech*. Examples of existing laws and policies are free trade rules, patent and copyright laws, and tax laws; domains that remained unregulated for a long time are data and privacy protection and laws and policies against disinformation and hate speech.

81 For example, the provision of intelligence products by private companies – using open-source information – is a fast-growing sector, with governments and the private sector as clients. See, for example, Tucker and Robson-Morrow, 'Intelligence Outsourcing for Non-Traditional Clients: The Rise of Private Sector Intelligence Providers'.

82 Some ICTC are wealthier than the GDP of certain countries. For an overview, see Lishchuck, 'How Large Would Tech Companies Be if They Were Countries?'. See also the yearly 'Global Ranking of the Top 100 Public Companies by Market Capitalisation' provided by Price Waterhouse Coopers, for example their 2024 Report at https://www.pwc.co.uk/services/audit/insights/global-top-100-companies.html?WT.mc_id=CT1-PL50-DM2-TR3-LS3-ND30-TTA9-CN_Captial-Markets-Assurance-Global-Top-100-Companies-Annual-Report-. See also Forbes, 'Top 100 Digital Companies'.

83 Van Dijck, Nieborg, and Poell, 'Reframing Platform Power'.

84 See, for example, Elon Musk's meetings with European party leaders Nigel Farage (Reform UK), Georgia Meloni (Fratelli d'Italia), Alice Weidel (Alternative für Deutschland): Zakrzewski, 'Elon Musk Goes Global with His Playbook for Political Influence'. See also Meta's CEO, Mark Zuckerberg's decision to cancel its fact-checking programme to protect his interests against the Trump Administration: Nix, Oremus, and Gregg, 'Meta Ends Fact-Checking, Drawing Praise from Trump' and Khanal, Hongzhou Zhang, and Taeihagh, 'Why and How is the Power of Big Tech Increasing in the Policy Process? The Case of Generative AI'.

85 Sommer, Matania, and Hassid, 'The Rise of Companies in the Cyber Era and the Pursuant Shift in National Security'.

86 A recent example is the role of TikTok to influence the 2024 elections in Romania, Mann, 'Covert TikTok Campaign Blamed in Pro-Russian Romanian Candidate's Surge'.

[87] See, for example, the polarising effects of social media content on the Israel-Hamas conflict: Dwoskin, 'A Flood of Misinformation Shapes Views of Israel-Gaza Conflict'. See also Stieglitz and Ross, 'The Impact of Social Media on Social Cohesion: A Double-Edged Sword' and Ezung and Koza, 'The Influence of Social Media on Public Discourse: Examining How Social Media Shape Popular Opinion', p. 4.

[88] See, for example, Satariano, 'Facebook's Oversight Board Faults Its Policy on Preferential Treatment'. On basic standards for improvement of transparency, see for example Amnesty International, 'Amnesty International Position on the Proposals for a Digital Services Act and a Digital Markets Act, March 2021'.

[89] Nix, Oremus and Gregg, 'Meta Ends Fact-Checking, Drawing Praise from Trump'.

[90] Bank and Vanken, 'How Big Tech's Revolving Doors Erode EU Antitrust Laws'.

[91] See Minkin and Beckel, 'Big Tech Ramps Up Lobbying as Industry Seeks to Thwart Legislation to Protect Kids Online'.

[92] Passchier, *De vloek van Big Tech*.

[93] See, for example, the Executive Order of US President Trump, issued on 25 January 2025, in which he forbids federal censorship to secure freedom of speech, see The White House, 'Restoring Freedom of Speech and Ending Federal Censorship'.

[94] For example, Haidt, *The Anxious Generation: How the Great Rewiring of Childhood Is Causing an Epidemic of Mental Illness*.

[95] See Van Keulen, 'Digital Force'; Van Haaster, 'On Cyber'.

Bibliography

Books and Journal Articles

Barnett, Michael, and Raymond Duvall. 'Power in International Politics'. *International Organisation* 59, no.1 (2005), pp. 39–75.

Bateman, Jon. 'Russia's Wartime Cyber Operations in Ukraine: Military Impacts, Influences, and Implications'. *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*. December 2022. https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2022/12/russias-wartime-cyber-operations-in-ukraine-military-impacts-influences-and-implications?lang=en.

Betz, David, and Tim Stevens. 'Chapter One: Power and Cyberspace'. *Adelphi Series* 51, no. 424 (2011), pp. 35–54. doi: 10.1080/19445571.2011.636954.

Dijck, José van, David Nieborg and Thomas Poell. 'Reframing Platform Power'. *Internet Policy Review* 8, no. 2 (2019). doi: 10.14763/2019.2.1414.

Ducheine, Paul, and Peter Pijpers. 'The Missing Component in Deterrence Theory: The Legal Framework'. In *Deterrence in the 21st Century: Insights from Theory and Practice*, edited by Frans Osinga and Tim Sweijs. NL ARMS Netherlands Annual Review of Military Studies 2017. The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2021.

Ducheine, Paul, Jelle van Haaster and Richard van Harskamp. 'Manoeuvring and Generating Effects in the Information Environment'. In *Winning without Killing: The Strategic and Operational Utility of Non-Kinetic Capabilities in Crisis*, Netherlands Annual Review of Military Studies 2017, edited by Paul Ducheine and Frans Osinga. The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2017.

Ducheine, Paul. 'Non-Kinetic Capabilities: Complementing the Kinetic Prevalence to Targeting'. In *Targeting: Challenges of Modern Warfare*, edited by Paul Ducheine, Michael Schmitt, and Frans Osinga. The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2015.

Giumelli, Francesco. 'Winning without Killing: The Case for Targeted Sanctions'. In *Winning without Killing: The Strategic and Operational Utility of Non-Kinetic Capabilities in Crises*, Netherlands Annual Review of Military Studies 2017, edited by Paul Ducheine and Frans Osinga. The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2017.

Haaster, Jelle van. 'On Cyber: The Utility of Military Cyber Operations during Armed Conflict'. PhD diss., University of Amsterdam, 2019.

Haidt, Jonathan. *The Anxious Generation: How the Great Rewiring of Childhood Is Causing an Epidemic of Mental Illness*. New York: Penguin, 2024.

Khanal, Shaleen, Hongzhou Zhang and Araz Taeihagh. 'Why and How Is the Power of Big Tech Increasing in the Policy Process? The Case of Generative AI'. *Policy and Society*, 44, no. 1 (2025), pp. 52–69. https://doi.org/10.1093/polsoc/puae012.

Keulen, Roy van. 'Digital Force: Disrupting Life, Liberty and Livelihood in the Information Age'. PhD diss., Leiden University, 2018.

Łoś, R. 'U.S. and China: Hard and Soft Power Potential'. *International Studies: Interdisciplinary Political and Cultural Journal* 22, no. 1 (2018), pp. 39–50. https://doi.org/1018778/1641-4233.22.03.

Mann, Michael. 'The Sources of My Sources'. *Contemporary Sociology* 42 no. 4 (2013), pp. 499–502. https://doi.org/10.1177/0094306113491546c.

McCreadie, Maureen, and Ronald Rice. 'Trends in Analyzing Access to Information. Part I: Cross-Disciplinary Conceptualizations of Access'. *Information Processing and Management* 35 (1999), pp. 45–76.

Ministry of Defence of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. 'Netherlands Defence Doctrine'. June 2019.

NATO. 'AJP-01 Allied Joint Doctrine', Edition F, Version 1. December 2022.

NATO. 'AJP-3.10 Allied Joint Doctrine for Information Operations'. November 2009.

NATO. AJP-3.20, 'Allied Joint Publication for Cyber Operations', Edition A Version 1. January 2020.

NATO. 'MC 422/3, NATO Military Policy for Information Operations'.

Nye, Joseph S. 'Hard, Soft, and Smart Power'. In *The Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy*, edited by Andrew Cooper, Jorge Heine, and Ramesh Thakur. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.

Passchier, Reijer. *De vloek van Big Tech: De juridisch-technologische wortels van constitutioneel verval en digitaal feodalisme.* Meppel: Boom Juridisch, 2024.

Pijpers, Peter, and Paul Ducheine. '"If You Have a Hammer": Shaping the Armed Forces' Discourse on Information Maneuver'. *International Journal of Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence* 36, no. 3 (2023), pp. 1164–1183. https://doi.org/10.1080/08850607.2023.2197560.

Pijpers, Peter, and Paul Ducheine. 'Influence Operations in Cyberspace: How They Really Work'. In *Hybridity, Conflict, and the Global Politics of Cybersecurity*, edited by Fabio Cristiano and Bibi van den Berg. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2023.

Pijpers, Peter, and Kraesten Arnold. 'Conquering the Invisible Battleground'. *Atlantisch Perspectief*, 44, no. 4 (2020), pp. 10–14.

Rodriguez, C.A., T.C. Walton and C. Hyong. 'Putting the "FIL" into "DIME": Growing Joint Understanding of the Instruments of Power'. *Joint Force Quarterly* 97, no.2 (2020).

Schrijver, Peter, and Paul Ducheine. 'Cyber-enabled Influence Operations: The Case of the Belarusian Cyber-Partisans'. *Militaire Spectator* 192, no.11 (2023), pp. 284–295.

Schrijver, Peter. '"The Wise Man Will Be Master of the Stars": The Use of Twitter by a Military Intelligence Service in Wartime: The Case of the GUR 77. In *Reflections on the Russia-Ukraine War*, edited by Maarten Rothman, Lonneke Peperkamp and Bas Rietjens. Leiden University Press, 2024, pp. 77–95.

Schroeder, Ralph. 'Introduction: The IEMP Model and Its Critics'. In *An Anatomy of Power: The Social Theory of Michael Mann*, edited by J.A. Hall and Ralph Schroeder. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015.

Sommer, Udi, Eviatar Matania and Nir Hassid. 'The Rise of Companies in the Cyber Era and the Pursuant Shift in National Security'. *Political Science* 75, no. 2 (2023), pp. 140–164. doi: 10.1080/00323187.2023.2278499.

Timmer, Marije, and Paul Ducheine. 'Conceptual Manoeuvring: The Interpretation of Information Manoeuvre within the Netherlands Ministry of Defence'. *Militaire Spectator* 192, no. 11 (2023), pp. 542–555.

Tucker, Katherine, and Maria Robson-Morrow. 'Intelligence Outsourcing for Non-Traditional Clients: The Rise of Private Sector Intelligence Providers. *Intelligence and National Security* (2025), pp. 1–20. https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2024.2437958.

UK Ministry of Defence. 'Joint Doctrine Publication 0-01: British Defence Doctrine' (2011).

US Joint Chiefs of Staff. 'Joint Publication 1: Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States' (2013).

Wiltenburg, Ivor. 'Security Force Assistance: Practised but not Substantiated'. *Militaire Spectator* 188, no. 2 (2019), pp. 88–99.

Reports and Online Sources

Amnesty International. 'Amnesty International Position on the Proposals for a Digital Services Act and a Digital Markets Act', March 2021. https://www.amnesty.eu/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Amnesty-International-Position-Paper-Digital-Services-Act-Package_March2021_Updated.pdf.

Bank, Max, and Bram Vanken. 'How Big Tech's Revolving Doors Erode EU Antitrust Laws. EU Observer'. 28 October 2024. https://euobserver.com/news/ar1234f8b4.

Bateman, Jon. 'Russia's Wartime Cyber Operations in Ukraine: Military Impacts, Influences, and Implications'. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, December 2022. https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2022/12/russias-wartime-cyber-operations-in-ukraine-military-impacts-influences-and-implications?lang=en.

Bellinger III, John. 'Suing China over the Coronavirus Won't Help: Here's What Can Work'. *Washington Post*, 23 April 2020. https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/04/23/suing-china-over-coronavirus-wont-help-heres-what-can-work/.

Bond, Shannon, and Bobby Allyn. 'Russia is Restricting Social Media: Here's What we Know'. *NPR*, 21 March 2022. https://www.npr.org/2022/03/07/1085025672/russia-social-media-ban.

Brandom, Russell. 'Google Launches New Anti-DDoS Service Called 'Project Shield'. *The Verge*, 21 October 2013. https://www.theverge.com/2013/10/21/4862724/google-launches-new-anti-ddos-service-called-project-shield

Dwoskin, Elizabeth. 'A Flood of Misinformation Shapes Views of Israel-Gaza Conflict'. *Washington Post*, 14 October 2023. https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2023/10/14/propaganda-misinformation-israel-hamas-war-social-media/.

European Council. 'EU Sanctions against Russia Explained'. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions-against-russia-explained/

Farrow, Ronan. 'Elon Musk's Shadow Rule'. *New Yorker*, 21 August 2023. https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2023/08/28/elon-musks-shadow-rule.

Fedorov, Myhailo. Tweet ('while you try to colonize Mars …'), Twitter (now X), 26 February 2022. https://x.com/FedorovMykhailo/status/1497543633293266944.

Google Threat Analysis Group and Mandiant. 'Fog of War: How the Ukraine Conflict Transformed the Cyber Threat Landscape'. February 2023. https://services.google.com/fh/files/blogs/google_fog_of_war_research_report.pdf.

Horowitz, Jason. 'Italy Orders Seizure of Migrant Rescue Ship'. *New York Times*, 20 November 2018. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/20/world/europe/italy-aquarius-seizure-order.html.

ICANN. 'Letter from Göran Marby to Mykhailo Fedorov'. 2 March 2022. https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/correspondence/marby-to-fedorov-02mar22-en.pdf.

Isidore, Chris. 'Why Many Businesses Are Getting Tougher on Russia Than Sanctions Require'. *CNN*, 3 March 2022. https://edition.cnn.com/2022/03/03/business/business-go-beyond-russian-sanctions/index.html.

Lishchuck, Ruslana. 'How Large Would Tech Companies Be if They Were Countries?' *MacKeeper Blog*, 13 August 2021. https://mackeeper.com/blog/tech-giants-as-countries/.

Madory, Doug. 'Updated: Cogent and Lumen Curtail Operations in Russia'. *Kentik*, 7 March 2022, https://www.kentik.com/blog/cogent-disconnects-from-russia/.

Malik, Aisha. 'Google Adds Air Raids Alerts to Android Phones in Ukraine'. *TechCrunch*, 10 March 2022. https://techcrunch.com/2022/03/10/google-adds-air-raid-alerts-to-android-phones-in-ukraine/?guccounter=2.

Man, Joseph. 'Covert TikTok Campaign Blamed in Pro-Russian Romanian Candidate's Surge'. *Washington Post*, 5 December 2024. https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2024/12/05/tiktok-romania-president-russia-infulence/.

Marquardt, Alex. 'Exclusive: Musk's SpaceX Says It Can No Longer Pay for Critical Satellite Services in Ukraine, Asks Pentagon to Pick Up the Tab'. *CNN*, 14 October 2022. https://edition.cnn.com/2022/10/13/politics/elon-musk-spacex-starlink-ukraine/index.html.

Martin, Alexander. 'US Military Hackers Conducting Offensive Operations in Support of Ukraine, Says Head of Cyber Command'. *Sky News*, 1 June 2022. https://news.sky.com/story/us-military-hackers-conducting-offensive-operations-in-support-of-ukraine-says-head-of-cyber-command-12625139.

McDaid, Cathal, and Rowland Corr. 'The Mobile Network Battlefield in Ukraine: Part 3'. *Adaptive Mobile Security*, 2022.

Meta. 'Meta's Ongoing Efforts Regarding Russia's Invasion of Ukraine'. 26 February 2022. https://about.fb.com/news/2022/02/metas-ongoing-efforts-regarding-russias-invasion-of-ukraine/.

Microsoft Threat Intelligence Centre. 'A Year of Russian Hybrid Warfare in Ukraine'. 15 March 2023. https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/sites/default/files/documents/s9zfme-rssdn/2023-03-15-Microsoft-A-year-of-Russian-hybrid-warfare-in-Ukraine-MS-Threat-Intelligence.pdf.

Microsoft Threat Intelligence Centre. 'Destructive Malware Targeting Ukrainian Organizations'. 15 January 2022.

Microsoft. 'Microsoft Suspends New Sales in Russia'. *Microsoft Official Blog*, 4 March 2022. https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2022/03/04/microsoft-suspends-russia-sales-ukraine-conflict/.

MilitaryNewsUA. Tweet ('Ukrainian Saker Scout Drone with Artificial Intelligence'), 25 January 2024. https://twitter.com/i/status/1750444954298577263.

Minkin, Amelia and Michael Beckel. 'Big Tech Ramps Up Lobbying as Industry Seeks to Thwart Legislation to Protect Kids Online'. *IssueOne*, 22 October 2024. https://issueone.org/articles/big-tech-ramps-up-lobbying-as-industry-seeks-to-thwart-legislation-to-protect-kids-online/.

Musk, Elon (@elonmusk). Twitter (now X), 26 February 2022. https://x.com/elonmusk/status/1497701484003213317.

Nix, Naomi, Will Oremus and Aaron Gregg. 'Meta Ends Fact-Checking, Drawing Praise from Trump'. *Washington Post*, 7 January 2025. https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2025/01/07/meta-factchecking-zuckerberg/.

O'Neill, Patrick Howell. 'Russia Hacked an American Satellite Company One Hour Before the Ukraine Invasion'. *MIT Technology Review*, 10 May 2022. https://www.technologyreview.com/2022/05/10/1051973/russia-hack-viasat-satellite-ukraine-invasion/.

Paresh, Dave, and Jeffrey Dastin. 'Ukraine Has Started Using Clearview AI's Facial Recognition During War'. *Reuters*, 14 March 2022. https://www.reuters.com/technology/exclusive-ukraine-has-started-using-clearview-ais-facial-recognition-during-war-2022-03-13/.

Price Waterhouse Coopers. 'Global Ranking of the Top 100 Public Companies by Market Capitalisation', April 2024. https://www.pwc.co.uk/services/audit/insights/global-top-100-companies.html?WT.mc_id=CT1-PL50-DM2-TR3-LS3-ND30-TTA9-CN_Captial-Markets-Assurance-Global-Top-100-Companies-Annual-Report-.

Radio Free Europe. 'Ukraine Tells UN's Top Court Russia Using "False" Genocide Allegations as Pretext for War', 19 September 2023. https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-tells-un-russia-false-genocide-war-pretext/32599619.html.

Roulette, Joey. 'SpaceX Curbed Ukraine's Use of Starlink Internet for Drones – Company President', *Reuters*, 9 February 2023. https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/spacex-curbed-ukraines-use-starlink-internet-drones-company-president-2023-02-09/.

Sanger, Andrew. 'Piercing the State's Corporate Veil: Using Private Actors to Enforce International Norms'. *EJIL: Talk!* 17 March 2022. https://www.ejiltalk.org/piercing-the-states-corporate-veil-using-private-actors-to-enforce-international-norms/.

Sari, Aurel. 'Hybrid Threats and the Law: Concepts, Trends and Implications'. *Hybrid Centre of Excellence Trend Report* 3 April 2020. https://www.hybridcoe.fi/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/Hybrid-CoE-Trend-Report-3.pdf.

Satariano, Adam. 'Facebook's Oversight Board Faults Its Policy on Preferential Treatment'. *New York Times*, 21 October 2021. https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/21/business/facebook-oversight-board-members-criticism.html.

Shumpenthung, Ezung, and Kekhronei O Koza. 'The Influence of Social Media on Public Discourse: Examining How Social Media Shape Popular Opinion'. *International Journal of Contemporary Research in Multidisciplinary* 3 no. 6 (2024). doi: https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.14252454.

Smith, Brad. 'Extending Our Vital Technology Support for Ukraine'. *Microsoft* (blog), 3 November 2022. https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2022/11/03/our-tech-support-ukraine/.

Soesanto, Stefan. 'The IT Army of Ukraine: Structure, Tasking, and Ecosystem'. *CSS Cyberdefense Report*, June 2022. https://css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/Cyber-Reports-2022-06-IT-Army-of-Ukraine.pdf.

Sonne, Paul, Missy Ryan and John Hudson. 'Russia Planning Potential Sabotage Operations in Ukraine, U.S. Says'. *Washington Post*, 14 January 2022. https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/russia-ukraine-invasion-sabotage-operations/2022/01/14/769314a2-754f-11ec-8ec6-9d61f7afbe17_story.html.

Stieglitz, Stefan, and Björn Ross. 'The Impact of Social Media on Social Cohesion: A Double-Edged Sword'. *Media and Communication* 10, no. 2 (2022). https://doi.org/10.17645/mac.v10i2.5792.

Sullivan, Eilleen, and Benjamin Weiser. 'U.S. Seizes North Korean Ship for Violating Sanctions'. *New York Times*, 9 May 2019. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/09/us/politics/wise-honest-north-korea-ship-seized.html.

The White House. 'Executive Order: Restoring Freedom of Speech and Ending Federal Censorship'. 25 January 2025. https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/01/restoring-freedom-of-speech-and-ending-federal-censorship/.

US Department of Justice. 'Five Russian GRU Officers and One Civilian Charged for Conspiring to Hack Ukrainian Government'. 6 September 2024. https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/five-russian-gru-officers-and-one-civilian-charged-conspiring-hack-ukrainian-government,

US Department of Justice. 'Six Russian GRU Officers Charged in Connection with Worldwide Deployment of Destructive Malware and Other Disruptive Actions in Cyberspace, 19 October 2020. https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/six-russian-gru-officers-charged-connection-worldwide-deployment-destructive-malware-and.

Valovic, Tom. 'Big Tech Companies Are Becoming More Powerful Than Nation-States'. *Metapsychosis: Journal of Consciousness, Literature and Art*, 13 May 2024. https://metapsychosis.com/big-tech-companies-are-becoming-more-powerful-than-nation-states/.

Weymouth, Lally. 'Volodymyr Zelensky: "Everyone Will Lose" If Russia Invades Ukraine'. *Washington Post*, 20 January 2022. https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2022/01/20/ukraine-russia-zelenksky-interview/.

Zakrzewski Cat. 'Elon Musk Goes Global with His Playbook for Political Influence'. *Washington Post*, 5 January 2025. https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2025/01/04/elon-musk-uk-germany-canada-far-right/.

CHAPTER 7

Private Non-State Actors as Norm-Keepers in Armed Conflict: The Role of the Private Sector in Ensuring Compliance with International Humanitarian Law

Marten Zwanenburg

Abstract

This chapter argues that the private sector can play an important role in ensuring compliance with International Humanitarian Law (IHL). It finds that it has not been widely accepted yet that companies have IHL obligations directly. Notwithstanding this, their position enables them to influence the degree to which IHL is respected. The chapter discusses and categorises a number of ways in which they can do so. It then looks at the obligations of States under IHL with respect to private companies aimed at promoting compliance with IHL. It finds that States must take measures not only to ensure that private actors respect IHL, but also to address acts by the private sector that facilitate IHL violations by a party to a conflict.

Keywords: Armed conflict, Compliance, IHL, Non-state actor, Private companies

7.1 Introduction

Max Weber argued that the monopoly of the lawful use of physical force is central to the modern State. He defined the State as an organisation 'that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory.'[1] This idea of the State as being the only entity which can legitimately use force has been central to international relations theory for a long time. It was also reflected in international law in general, and International Humanitarian Law (IHL) in particular. Until relatively recently, IHL was regarded as a branch of international law that involved only States.[2] States were the actors that developed rules of IHL, either in the form of adopting treaties or contributing to the formation of customary international law. They were also the only entities that were bound by IHL. Finally, they were the ones responsible for ensuring compliance with its rules.

With the adoption of the four Geneva Conventions in 1949, non-state armed groups were also recognised as a relevant actor in IHL. Common Article 3 of those conventions is addressed to 'each Party to the conflict' in a non-international armed conflict, thus also encompassing such groups. The adoption of common Article 3 constituted an acknowledgement that in practice, the State monopoly on the use of force was not absolute.[3] Although the use of force by non-state armed groups was still considered illegitimate, it was recognised that such groups used force and that rules were needed to regulate it.[4] Making IHL applicable to non-state armed groups also implied that they have a role to play in ensuring respect for the law. Indeed, the obligation to 'respect and ensure respect' for the Geneva Conventions laid down in their common Article 1 also applies to these groups. Nowadays, organised armed groups are accepted next to States as the principal actors in IHL.

Organised armed groups are however not the only category of non-state actor that play a role in armed conflicts. Private companies are also increasingly acknowledged as a relevant category in this respect. This includes firstly so-called private military and security companies (PMSCs). It also includes other companies, such as for example Elon Musk's Starlink that provides internet access for the Ukrainian armed forces and social media companies that cooperate with efforts to secure evidence of Russian war crimes in Ukraine. The literature on private companies in the specific context of IHL has thus far focused in particular on the duties of such companies to respect IHL and the obligations of States to enforce such respect.[5] It has done so to a large extent in the specific context of PMSCs.[6] Much less attention has been paid to what the private sector can contribute to ensuring respect for IHL, however.

This chapter discusses the role that the private sector can play in ensuring respect for IHL. As such, it is concerned with the theme of non-state actors in armed conflict and accountability, one of the themes running through this book. Various other chapters in this volume focus on the accountability of non-state actors in conflict, i.e., non-state actors as the subjects of accountability. In contrast, this chapter is concerned with the role that a particular category of non-state actor plays in ensuring accountability, both of other non-state actors and of States.

After this introduction, the chapter will first discuss the status of the private sector in IHL (section 7.2). In the next section, it will look at the different ways in which the private sector can and does contribute to ensuring respect for IHL (section 7.3). The fourth section will examine the interaction between the State and the private sector, focusing in particular on obligations on the State to regulate that sector (section 7.4). The chapter concludes with some final remarks (section 7.5).

7.2 The Status of the Private Sector in IHL

As was noted in the introduction, traditionally IHL revolved primarily if not entirely around States. This focus on States is evident in IHL treaties such as the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the first Additional Protocol to those conventions of 1977 (AP I). Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, as well as Additional Protocol II (AP II) to those conventions, also address one particular kind of non-state actor, namely organised armed groups.[7] The same is not the case for other non-state actors, however. IHL treaties were not drafted with private companies in mind.[8] It is a reflection of this fact that IHL treaties contain very few references to such companies. The only direct reference is in Article 53 of Geneva Convention I of 1949. This provision prohibits the use of the emblem of the Red Cross other than by those entitled to do so under the convention.[9] The article refers specifically to the use 'by individuals, societies, firms or companies either public or private.' It thus appears to impose an obligation not to use the Red Cross directly upon private companies.

Another provision in an IHL treaty refers to private companies in a more indirect way. Article 4 (4) of Geneva Convention III provides that 'persons who accompany the armed forces without actually being members thereof, such as … supply contractors' under certain conditions become prisoners of war when they fall into the power of the enemy. It may be noted that the provision when speaking of supply contractors appears to refer to individuals. However, in practice armed forces usually hire private companies as supply contractors. The individuals referred to in the article are then employees of such a company.

Potentially an even more indirect reference is in the provisions in the Geneva Conventions and AP I that require parties to the treaties to enact legislation necessary to provide effective penal sanctions for persons committing so-called 'grave breaches' of these treaties. It has been suggested that the term 'person' can be read as not only including natural persons, but also legal persons.[10] A 'legal person', sometimes also referred to as 'juridical person', can be defined as an:

> [e]ntity, as a firm, that is not a single natural person, as a human being, authorized by law with duties and rights, recognized as a legal authority having a distinct identity, a legal personality. Also known as artificial person, juridical entity, juristic person, or legal person.[11]

The increasingly important role that private companies play in armed conflicts has led to attention being paid to the question of whether such companies have obligations of their own under IHL. To be able to have such obligations, they must have international legal personality. This is because only entities with such legal personality can have rights and obligations under international law.[12] The term

'legal personality under international law' is often used interchangeably with the term 'subject of international law'.[13]

Some authors argue that corporations, like individuals, can now be regarded as subjects of international law. Kelly for example writes that 'companies may not escape through the ever-shrinking historical loophole that they are not "states" and, therefore, not subjects of international law.'[14] Others state that there is an emerging recognition that a particular kind of private company, transnational corporations, are at least partial subjects of international law.[15] Such recognition however, appears to be controversial at best, and not necessarily acknowledged in the field of IHL.[16] Moreover, the prevailing view still seems to be that 'in principle, however, corporations do not have international legal personality.'[17] The consequence of this is that they cannot have rights and obligations of their own under IHL. This is acknowledged in the literature.[18]

At the same time, it is pointed out that States may impose obligations on private companies under their domestic legislation, including where such legislation is aimed at implementing IHL.[19] Indeed, it is often considered that persons, including legal persons, are bound by IHL through being subject to the jurisdiction of a State that is bound by IHL. It is presumably on this basis that the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) states that 'a business enterprise carrying out activities that are closely linked to an armed conflict must also respect applicable rules of international humanitarian law.'[20] This view is not necessarily new, although previously it was primarily referred to in the context of individual persons rather than companies. Its application to private companies is something of the last few decades.

This approach also finds support in the 'Montreux Document on Pertinent International Obligations and Good Practice for States Related to Operations of Private and Military Security Companies during Armed Conflict'.[21] This document was adopted in 2008, and resulted from an international process launched by Switzerland and the ICRC. It is a non-legally binding document that sets out relevant international legal obligations and good practices of States in relation to PMSCs. The document states that 'PMSCs are obliged to comply with international humanitarian law or human rights law imposed upon them by applicable national law, as well as other applicable national law'.[22]

7.3 Role for the Private Sector in Ensuring Compliance

7.3.1 Private actors in IHL treaties

If private companies do not have obligations of their own under IHL, they also cannot have an obligation to ensure compliance with IHL rules under international law. This is not to say that IHL treaties do not envisage a role for actors other than States in ensuring compliance. Article 89 AP I provides for a role for the United Nations (UN) in situations of serious violations of the Geneva Conventions or the Protocol, in providing that in such situations the States parties undertake to act, jointly or individually, in co-operation with the United Nations and in conformity with the United Nations Charter. This role for the UN does not derive from the treaties themselves, as the UN is not a party to those treaties. In practice, the organisation does play an important role in efforts to ensure compliance with IHL.[23]

Another non-state actor that IHL treaties and associated instruments accord an important role in ensuring compliance with IHL is the ICRC. Each of the four Geneva Conventions provides for humanitarian activities by the ICRC for the protection of the groups protected by those conventions.[24] The ICRC commentary to this article makes clear that:

> When pursuing its protection activities in the context of an armed conflict, the ICRC aims to ensure that the relevant rules of humanitarian law or other fundamental rules protecting persons in situations of violence are observed and implemented by the authorities.[25]

This role is expressed even more clearly in the Statutes of the International Movement of the Red Cross and Red Crescent. These Statutes provide in Article 5 (2) (c) that one of the tasks of the ICRC is to:

> undertake the tasks incumbent upon it under the Geneva Conventions, to work for the faithful application of international humanitarian law applicable in armed conflicts and to take cognizance of any complaints based on alleged breaches of that law.[26]

These Statutes were adopted by the International Conference of the Red Cross in 1986. All States parties to the Geneva Conventions are represented in that conference. In other words, all those States agreed to the ICRC carrying out this task. Based on this, the ICRC is sometimes referred to as the 'guardian of IHL'.[27]

Apart from the UN and the ICRC, IHL treaties do not refer to any other non-state actor as having a role in ensuring compliance with IHL, including private companies. In practice, however, the private sector can and sometimes does play such a role. In the rest of section 7.3 of this chapter, different forms this can take

will be discussed. These range from abstaining from committing violations of IHL themselves to contributing to ensuring accountability for breaches of IHL.

7.3.2 Not committing breaches of IHL

It is rather obvious that one way in which private companies can contribute to respecting IHL is by not violating it themselves. This aspect of ensuring compliance by private companies will therefore not be discussed in any detail.

It was explained above that the prevailing view is that IHL does not impose obligations directly on private companies, but that it is nevertheless considered that they are bound by IHL. Such companies and their personnel can therefore breach rules of IHL.

This was already illustrated in post-Second World War case law. In cases before United States military courts under Control Council Law No. 10, following the trial before the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, several leaders of industry were convicted of war crimes. In the Flick case, two defendants, Friedrich Flick and Bernhard Weiss, were convicted of war crimes through the use of slave labour, the deportation for labour of civilians of German-occupied territories, and the use of prisoners of war for war operations.[28] In the I.G. Farben case, all 24 defendants were leaders in the I.G. Farben industrial concern. Five of them were convicted of committing war crimes and crimes against humanity through participating in the enslavement and deportation for slave labour of civilians from German-occupied territories and of German nationals.[29] In the Krupp case, the lead defendant, Alfried Krupp, and eight other defendants, had been members or deputy members of Krupp's Managing Board, while the three others had held similar high-ranking positions. All but one of the defendants were found guilty of war crimes and crimes against humanity by participating in the murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, imprisonment, torture, and use for slave labour of civilians who came under German control, German nationals, and prisoners of war.[30]

In recent years, there has been particular attention towards respect for IHL by private military and security companies. This is partly the result of the increasing use of such companies by States. A number of incidents involving PMSCs in the 2000s also focused attention on such companies in relation to IHL. One of these concerned the use of PMSCs for interrogation of detainees by the United States in Iraq. At least two contractors supplied translators to the military personnel that interrogated Iraqi detainees in the Abu Graib detention facility. One of these translators was accused of instructing guards to 'soften up' detainees for interrogations.[31] These allegations led to a civil complaint against one company, CACI, by three former detainees.[32] On 12 November 2024, a jury found CACI liable for its role in the torture of Iraqi men and ordered it to pay each of the three plaintiffs $3

million in compensatory damages and $11 million in punitive damages, for a total of $42 million.[33] Another incident concerned the killing of 17 persons by employees of the Blackwater PMSC in Nissour Square, Iraq, on 16 September 2007. Four of the employees were tried and convicted in a United States federal court for murder, manslaughter and firearms charges.[34] The four were subsequently pardoned by President Trump. The Chair-rapporteur of the UN Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries stated that the pardon violated the US' obligations under IHL and more broadly undermined humanitarian law and human rights at the global level.[35]

The Wagner group, a PMSC based in Russia, has been the subject of many allegations of IHL violations. This has primarily been the case in relation to the prominent role that this group played for some time in the conflict between Russia and Ukraine after the Russian invasion of February 2022.[36] Allegations have included torture and extrajudicial executions of Ukrainian prisoners of war, targeted attacks on civilians, and the denial of quarter. But the allegations of war crimes by Wagner group personnel have not been limited to Ukraine. For example, in 2021 there were reports of IHL violations committed in the Central African Republic, including the killing of civilians and the looting of private homes.[37] In 2023, Human Rights Watch accused the Wagner group of committing violations of IHL in Mali, including torture of detainees and summary execution.[38]

The examples above illustrate that private companies and their personnel may violate IHL. Such companies may be PMSCs which are directly involved in an armed conflict, like the Wagner group in Ukraine. They may also be private companies that become involved in violating IHL without participating in hostilities, like the German companies that committed violations during the Second World War.

7.3.3 Complicity in violations of IHL by others

Apart from committing violations of IHL themselves, private companies and their personnel can also support the commission of such violations by others. Such support is often referred to in terms of complicity.

Assistance for violations of international law by private companies can be 'neutral' or not. Neutral assistance refers to conduct by a private company that arises from ordinary day-to-day commercial transactions and is not specifically directed toward the commission of international crimes.[39] Non-neutral assistance refers to assistance that is directed toward such commission. The issue of when precisely assistance crosses the threshold to non-neutral is complex and contested.[40] It is also not important for the purposes of this chapter, as both forms of assistance are antagonistic to ensuring compliance with IHL.

Corporate complicity in violation of IHL can take many different forms. Kaleck and Saage-Maaß, in their discussion of such complicity in the context of

international criminal law, distinguish between two typical scenarios in which business actors can participate in international crimes. The first is the cooperation of corporations with military regimes and dictatorships, and the second the involvement of corporations in (civil) war and other conflict zones.[41] Within these two categories, various forms of complicity can be identified, which are not necessarily confined to one of the above-mentioned scenarios.

One way in which a company can assist others in violating IHL is by providing military and intelligence services to others. For example, a PMSC could train soldiers for a military operation, where that operation then leads to violations of IHL. It has been suggested that this was the case with the American PMSC MPRI, which trained Croatian armed forces during the period that these forces carried out Operation 'Storm'. This operation's objective, which it achieved, was to retake the Krajina region, which had been controlled by separatist ethnic Serbs since early 1991. During this operation war crimes were committed on a large scale by Croatian forces.[42] It has been suggested that MPRI was not only involved in training soldiers but also participated in the planning of operation 'Storm' which took place in 1995.[43] In any event, local Croatian forces, using what they had learned, were able to defeat Serb forces. In the course of doing so, they carried out what the New York Times has called one of the worst episodes of ethnic cleansing.[44] Although it is uncertain that MPRI intended to assist the Croatian armed forces in doing so, one would probably not have been possible without the other. In 2010, a number of victims of operation 'Storm' submitted a claim against MPRI, based on the assistance provided by MPRI to the Croatian armed forces. The claim alleged that MPRI was complicit in genocide and aided and abetted a crime against humanity. The claim was dismissed because the judge held that he lacked jurisdiction under the US Alien Torts Statute.[45]

Another example may be satellite companies that have provided satellite imagery to Russia. It has been alleged that US satellite companies have provided such imagery which is then used by Russia to aim cruise missiles in the armed conflict with Ukraine.[46] The Atlantic magazine reported that US satellite imaging companies Maxar and Planet have produced imagery of Ukrainian sites later hit by Russian missiles. It has been alleged that many of the strikes using such missiles were not aimed at military objectives or were disproportionate, in violation of IHL. If the satellite companies did provide the imagery, this is highly likely to be an example of 'neutral' assistance. The United States has accused the Chinese satellite company Spacety of providing satellite imagery to the Wagner group, which was used to enable combat operations by the group.[47] This has led the United States to impose sanctions on the company.

A second way in which a company can assist others in violating IHL is by providing financial support. Such assistance can take the form of providing banking

services. An example of a bank that has been accused of doing so and becoming complicit in war crimes is BNP Paribas. In 2017, three NGOs filed a claim before a French court on the basis of complicity in genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. They accused the bank of agreeing to transfer a large amount of money from an account of its client the National Rwandan Bank to the Swiss account of an arms dealer. They allege that this enabled the purchase of arms used during the Rwandan genocide.[48] Such support can also take the form of making direct payments to an actor that is violating IHL. For example, the company Chiquita Brands admitted that from 1997 to 2004 it made payments to the United Self-Defence Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia, AUC), a paramilitary organisation that was involved in the fight with insurgent groups in Colombia.[49] The AUC was responsible for widespread war crimes. In 2023, the Colombian Attorney-General's office announced that the head and former head of the coal mining company Drummond will be prosecuted for financing the AUC in a bid to protect assets and ensure the free operation of Drummond's mine in the Cesar province of Colombia.[50]

A third way in which a company can assist others is by providing means other than financial that can be used to violate IHL. An early example of this is provided by the so-called 'Zyklon B' case before a British military court sitting in Hamburg after the Second World War. Two German businessmen, Bruno Tesch and Karl Weinbacher, were accused of providing poison gas for the extermination of allied nationals interned in concentration camps. They were convicted of a violation of the laws and usages of war.[51]

There is also more recent case law concerning persons working in the private sector being convicted of war crimes. This includes two cases from the Netherlands. In 2018, the Supreme Court of the Netherlands upheld the conviction of Guus Kouwenhoven.[52] Kouwenhoven supplied arms to one of the parties during the second Liberian Civil War between 1999 and 2003. He was convicted of being an accessory to war crimes. Frans van Anraat was a Dutch businessman who, from 1984 until 1988, sold large quantities of a chemical that is a key component in the manufacture of mustard gas to Saddam Hussein's Iraq. The chemical was in fact used for this purpose by Iraq in its war with Iran. In 2009, the Supreme Court of the Netherlands upheld van Anraat's conviction for complicity in war crimes.[53]

In September 2023, the trial of the chairman and former CEO of Lundin Energy, a Swedish oil company, started in Sweden.[54] The two defendants are being tried for complicity in war crimes carried out by the Sudanese army and allied militia in southern Sudan from 1999 to 2003. It is alleged that the company asked the Sudanese government to secure a potential oil field, knowing this would mean seizing the area by force. This made the executives complicit in war crimes that were then carried out by the Sudanese army and an allied militia against civilians.

7.3.4 Taking measures to contribute to respect

The sections above discussed ways in which a private company can contribute to ensuring respect for IHL by abstaining from certain conduct. A company can also take positive action towards that goal. The private sector can exert considerable influence on parties to armed conflicts and other relevant actors. There are different instruments that recognise that private companies have an important role to play both in preventing becoming involved in violations of human rights and by extension IHL, as well as in broader efforts to improve the situation in the countries in which they operate. In this context, the notion of human rights due diligence (HRDD) has emerged as a key concept. HRDD has been defined as 'a process through which enterprises can identify, prevent, mitigate and account for how they address their actual and potential adverse human rights impacts.'[55] The notion of HRDD has been incorporated in various instruments, starting with the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights adopted in 2011 (UNGP).[56] Although these Guiding Principles are not legally binding, they are considered the 'global authoritative standard on business and human rights'.[57] The UNGP also led to and influenced other international standards. Among these, of particular relevance for the present chapter is the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Guide on Heightened Human Rights Due Diligence for Business in Conflict-Affected Contexts.[58] A document that is specific to PMSCs is the Montreux Document which was already referred to above. With the exception of the latter, these documents focus specifically on human rights. They also provide useful guidance on how private companies can contribute to ensuring compliance with IHL.

Taking such guidance into account, the remainder of this section will focus on discussing several measures that companies can take to end ongoing IHL violations or prevent new ones. This discussion is by no means exhaustive: what measures are appropriate needs to be determined on a case-by-case basis.

One measure a private company can take to contribute to respect for IHL is by including this topic in the contracts it concludes. A company can integrate respect for human rights and IHL in contracts with subcontractors and other contracts it concludes to be able to carry out its activities. What is included in contracts can play an important role in requiring or creating incentives for those other parties to respect the law.[59] If these provisions have been included in the contract, this also creates more possibilities to leverage appropriate behaviour by the other party.[60] Regarding the contract between the private company and its principal, which will often be a State, the emphasis is often on the responsibility of the State to take into account human rights and IHL. For example, the Montreux document in its section on good practices for contracting States, provides for including 'contractual clauses and performance requirements that ensure respect for relevant national

law, international humanitarian law and human rights law by the contracted PMSC.'[61] However, the initiative to consider international law in contracts need not come only from the side of a State, but can also come from the company. This is reflected in the 'Principles for responsible contracts'. This document was developed by John Ruggie as Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises. The document provides guidance to negotiators in integrating human rights risk management into contract negotiations between a State and a business investor.[62]

Another measure that a company can take is to use its influence. Several documents refer to this as 'leverage'. The guidance tool for companies entitled 'Doing Business with Respect for Human Rights', developed by Oxfam and other civil society organisations, explains that:

> Leverage is defined as the ability to effect change in the wrongful practices of a third party that causes harm. In other words, leverage is a company's ability to influence the behaviour of others.[63]

There is a wide range of steps a company can take to use its leverage. The guidance tool names a number of them, from local capacity building to collective action with business peers, governments, international organisations or civil society organisations.

A third measure that a company can take is to exit the relationship or country concerned. The commentary to the Guiding Principles states that in situations in which a business enterprise lacks the leverage to prevent or mitigate adverse impacts and is unable to increase its leverage, it should consider ending the relationship.[64] The Guiding Principles as well as other documents underline that in considering such a decision, credible assessments of potential adverse human rights impacts of doing so should be taken into account.[65] An example of a company that ended cooperation based on conduct in an armed conflict is the Japanese company Itochu, which in 2024 ended a cooperation agreement with the Israeli company Elbit, which works closely with the Israeli Defence Forces. The Japanese company cited the provisional measures imposed by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on Israel in the case brought by South Africa as the reason for doing so.[66] In this order, the ICJ imposed a number of measures on Israel because it found it plausible that Israel was violating at least some of its obligations under the Genocide Convention.[67] It seems that the company did not want to be cooperating with a company that closely works with forces allegedly responsible for violating those obligations.

7.3.5 Role in securing accountability

In addition to taking the kinds of measures to promote compliance with IHL discussed in the previous sections, the private sector can also contribute to ensuring accountability for violations of IHL.

One way of doing this is to give financial support to accountability mechanisms. For example, in 2007 Microsoft Singapore, a subsidiary of the Microsoft Corporation, donated $100,000 to the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC).[68]

The private sector can also contribute by making available their products and services. For example, most of the satellites in space that are capable of taking images of the earth are owned and operated by the private sector. It is increasingly acknowledged that these can play an important role in securing evidence of violations of IHL. In Ukraine for example, private satellite companies are supporting the securing of evidence of war crimes by providing satellite imagery.[69] They inter alia help locate mass graves and identify military units.[70] The important role that satellite imagery can play in securing accountability for IHL violations is increasingly recognised, although it is also pointed out that it comes with its own challenges.[71] For example, it may be difficult to analyse satellite images, leading to uncertain or erroneous results.[72]

Social media companies potentially also have an important role to play in securing evidence of IHL violations. The enormous amount of information available on Facebook, YouTube and other social media platforms means that these also contain much information that can be used as evidence. Information from social media has already played an important role in a number of domestic war crimes trials.[73] It has also been used in the context of the International Criminal Court (ICC). In one case, the arrest warrant that the ICC issued was largely based on evidence collected from social media.[74] It has been noted that the use of social media in investigations of international crimes is making social media companies an increasingly important actor in this field.[75] They can use this role to support accountability for violations of IHL. It is clear that social media companies are aware of this. In a June 2023 decision by the Oversight Board of Meta, the Board stated that 'Meta is in a unique position to assist in the preservation of evidence that may be of relevance in prosecuting international crimes and supporting human rights litigation.'[76] It recommended that:

> Meta should commit to preserving, and where appropriate, sharing with competent authorities evidence of atrocity crimes or grave human rights violations, such as those specified in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, by updating its internal policies to make clear the protocols that it has in place in this regard.[77]

It appears that Meta is still considering this recommendation. In September 2023, it reported that it was continuing to assess the feasibility of actions in this area in order to support international investigative and accountability processes.[78] If Meta were to take action to preserve and share evidence of potential war crimes, this could constitute an important contribution to ensuring compliance with IHL.

7.4 Responsibility of States in Relation to the Role of the Private Sector

Section 7.3 discussed various ways in which the private sector can contribute to respect for IHL. As was pointed out in section 7.2 however, private companies do not have an obligation of their own under international law to do so. It is primarily States that have obligations under IHL. This raises the question of how these State obligations relate to measures by private companies aimed at promoting compliance with IHL.

First, States parties to the Geneva Conventions have an obligation to search for persons alleged to have committed or ordered 'grave breaches' of the Conventions. The four Geneva Conventions and AP I define a limited set of violations of provisions of those treaties as grave breaches, which are considered especially serious. States parties to these treaties are also obliged to bring such persons before their own courts or to extradite such a person to another party that has made out a 'prima facie' case. This obligation concerns everyone within the territory of the State concerned or under its jurisdiction, regardless of their nationality. It extends to personnel of private companies. It is useful to emphasise that the obligation also covers persons who are alleged to have ordered grave breaches to be committed. This brings managers who do not actually carry out the conduct that violates IHL themselves within the scope of the provision. Although this may not be the usual case, it cannot be excluded that a manager exercises the authority required to be able to order war crimes. In international criminal law, this criterion is described as requiring 'the accused to have possessed some position of authority that enabled him/her to compel another person to commit the offence pursuant to the order.'[79] An example of a case in which a manager of a company was found to exercise such control over personnel is the case of Musema before the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR).[80] Musema was director of a tea factory during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. He was prosecuted inter alia for allegedly having transported armed attackers and ordering them to attack Tutsis. The trial chamber held that at the time of the alleged events Musema exercised de jure power and de facto control over the factory workers.[81]

The obligations regarding grave breaches referred to above are relevant in cases where personnel of private companies violate IHL themselves, as well as in certain cases where they contribute to such violations by others.

With regard to violations of those provisions in the Geneva Conventions and AP I which are not defined as grave breaches, the treaties require States parties to take measures for the suppression of acts contrary to these provisions. This implies an obligation to take measures to ensure that violations are stopped and to prevent their repetition.[82] The treaties leave discretion to States which measures to take. Where relevant, such measures can be aimed at private companies. For example, a State can include civil or criminal responsibility of companies in its domestic legislation.[83] Many States appear to have provided for this in their domestic legislation.[84]

Another relevant provision is common Article 1 to the Geneva Conventions. This provision obliges States parties to 'respect and ensure respect' for their provisions. The obligation to 'ensure respect' has an internal dimension, as well as an external dimension which is more controversial. The external dimension concerns the obligation to ensure respect by (other) parties to an armed conflict, rather than by their own armed forces and population referred to as the 'internal' dimension. Under this obligation, States must do everything reasonably in their power to ensure respect for the Geneva Conventions by other States and organised armed groups that are party to a conflict.[85] This dimension is not directly relevant to this chapter, in contrast to the internal dimension. The latter includes the obligation to ensure respect by the whole population over which that State exercises authority.[86] This includes private companies over which the State exercises jurisdiction.[87] It has been pointed out that the obligation to ensure respect not only concerns the State having to ensure respect by private actors in situations where those private actors violate IHL themselves, but extends to the State having to prevent conduct by such actors facilitating the commission of IHL violations by a party to a conflict.[88] This includes conduct that is lawful but that interferes with, or facilitates the violation or interference with, IHL.[89] Arguably, the obligation could even include taking measures to encourage private companies to themselves promote respect for IHL, as discussed in sections 7.3.4 and 7.3.5 above. Such an interpretation would take into account the important role that companies can play in ensuring respect for IHL, and thereby align with the object and purpose of the treaties. It is acknowledged that such an interpretation would make the obligation to ensure respect a far-reaching one. This is mitigated however by the fact that the obligation to ensure respect is an obligation of means, not of result. As with the obligation to suppress violations of IHL discussed above, there are many different ways in which States can implement the obligation to ensure respect in respect of private companies. Some examples have been referred to in the rest of this chapter, such as prosecuting business leaders or imposing sanctions. Another example is the so-called 'discouragement policy' of the Dutch government. Under this policy, the government does not support activities of companies that contribute directly to the building or maintenance of Israeli settlements in the occupied Palestinian Territory, or which facilitate those

settlements. If companies consult the Dutch government about such activities, they are informed that the government considers such activities to be undesirable.[90] In this way, companies are encouraged to refrain from supporting Israeli settlements considered to be in violation of IHL. Although there have been allegations that the policy is not implemented systematically and that it does not go far enough, it appears that it goes further than many other Western States are willing to go.[91]

This section found that States have obligations under IHL that require them to take measures that support a role for the private sector in promoting respect for IHL. Provisions in IHL treaties concerning the punishment of grave breaches and the suppression of other violations are mostly concerned with criminal sanctions for individuals, including personnel of private companies. The obligation to ensure respect however imposes a far-reaching obligation on States in relation to private companies, although this is mitigated to some extent by the fact that the obligation is one of due diligence.

7.5 Conclusion

This chapter aimed to shed light on the role that the private sector can play in ensuring respect for IHL. As such, it focused not only on private companies themselves respecting IHL, but also on how they can contribute to respect for IHL by others. In particular the latter aspect has been under-researched in the existing literature. The chapter argued that private companies can play an important role in ensuring respect for IHL.

It was found that although there are calls for recognising that private companies have obligations of their own under IHL, this has so far not been widely accepted yet. The position that companies have however enables them to influence the degree to which IHL is respected in armed conflicts. The focus in the existing literature is largely on the detrimental role that companies can play. This chapter focused on a potential beneficial function they may have by looking at how they can contribute to ensuring respect for IHL. The chapter discussed and categorised a number of ways in which they can do so. These range from not violating IHL themselves to supporting accountability mechanisms. It also provided examples from past and current conflicts to illustrate the different categories.

The chapter then turned to the question of how the obligations of States under IHL relate to measures by private companies aimed at promoting compliance with IHL. Because private companies do not have an IHL obligation, State duties can potentially strengthen the normative basis for such measures. It was established that States have an obligation to suppress violations of IHL. This implies that they must take measures to ensure that violations of IHL are stopped and repetition

is prevented. This may require actions affecting private companies, including criminal prosecution of personnel of businesses.

The obligation to 'respect and ensure respect' for IHL was found to be of particular importance, because it provides the basis for an obligation requiring States to take measures not only to ensure that private actors respect IHL, but also to address acts by the private sector that facilitate the commission of IHL violations by a party to a conflict. This includes conduct that is in itself lawful under domestic and international law. It was argued that the obligation may even include a due diligence duty to take measures to encourage private companies themselves to promote respect for IHL.

Notes

1 Weber, 'Politics as a Vocation', pp. 77, 78.

2 See for example Green, *The Contemporary Law of Armed Conflict*, p. 54.

3 Moir, *The Law of Internal Armed Conflict*, pp. 30–88.

4 Cullen, *The Concept of Non-international Armed Conflict in International Humanitarian Law*, p. 22.

5 See for example Gillard, 'Business Goes to War: Private Military/Security Companies and International Humanitarian Law', p. 525.

6 See for example Francioni and Ronzitti, eds., *War by Contract: Human Rights, Humanitarian Law, and Private Contractors*.

7 The UN working group on the use of mercenaries appears to consider that common Article 3 forms the basis of private companies to be bound by IHL. It has stated that 'According to common article 3, it applies to all actors on the territory of the State affected by armed conflict, including State and non-State actors, such as individuals and corporations.' See A/HRC/42/42, 11. This is however a misreading of common Article 3, which imposes obligations only on parties to an armed conflict in a non-international armed conflict. Although it cannot be excluded that a private company could meet the criteria for becoming such a party, this would only be the case in exceptional situations.

8 Bismuth, 'Mapping a Responsibility of Corporations for Violations of International Humanitarian Law Sailing between International and Domestic Legal Orders', p. 220.

9 Geneva Convention I, Article 53.

10 Bismuth, 'Mapping a Responsibility', p. 207.

11 The Law Dictionary, https://thelawdictionary.org/juridical-person/.

12 Portmann, *Legal Personality in International Law*, p. 8.

13 Brölmann and Nijman, 'Legal Personality as a Fundamental Concept of International Law', p. 678.

14 Kelly, *Prosecuting Corporations for Genocide*, p. 60.

15 Nowrot, 'Transnational Corporations as Steering Subjects in International Economic Law: Two Competing Visions of the Future?', p. 829.

16 But see Mongelard, 'Corporate Civil Liability for Violations of International Humanitarian Law', p. 670.

17 Crawford, *Brownlie's Principles of Public International Law*, p. 111.

18 Gillard, 'Business Goes to War', p. 530.

19 Ibid., p. 546.

[20] ICRC, *Business and International Humanitarian Law*, p. 14.
[21] Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs and ICRC, *Montreux Document*.
[22] Ibid., p. 14.
[23] See in more detail Zwanenburg, 'The United Nations and International Humanitarian Law'.
[24] Article 9 of Geneva Conventions I–III and Article 10 of Geneva Convention IV.
[25] ICRC, *Commentary on the First Geneva Convention*, p. 411.
[26] ICRC, *Statutes of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement*.
[27] See e.g., Ghesquiere, 'The Implementation of International Humanitarian Law and the International Committee of the Red Cross', p. 475.
[28] 'The Flick Trial, Trial of Friedrich Flick and Five Others'.
[29] 'The I.G. Farben Trial, Trial of Carl Krauch and Twenty-two Others'.
[30] 'The Krupp Trial of Alfried Felix Alwyn Krupp and Eleven Others'.
[31] Barakat, 'Retired General's Testimony Links Contractor to Abu Graib Abuses'.
[32] Moench, 'Abu Graib Military Contractor Trial Set to Start 20 Years After Shocking Images of Abuse'.
[33] Suhail Najim Abdullah Al Shimari, et al. v. CACI Premier Technology, Inc.
[34] Apuzzo, 'Blackwater Guards Found Guilty in 2007 Iraq Killings'.
[35] UN, 'US Pardons for Blackwater Guards and 'Affront to Justice' – UN Experts'.
[36] See e.g., Sauer, 'Wagner Mercenary Admits "Tossing Grenades" at Injured Ukrainian PoWs'.
[37] Walsh, 'Russian Mercenaries Are Driving War Crimes in Africa, U.N. Says'.
[38] Human Rights Watch, 'Mali: New Atrocities by Malian Army, Apparent Wagner Fighters'.
[39] Hajdin, 'Neutral Business Assistance and the Limits of Complicity Under International Criminal Law'.
[40] See e.g., Michalowski, 'Doing Business with a Bad Actor', p. 405.
[41] Kaleck and Saage-Maaß, 'Corporate Accountability for Human Rights Violations Amounting to International Crimes', p. 702.
[42] Bonner, 'War Crimes Panel Finds Croat Troops "Cleansed" the Serbs'.
[43] Lehnart, 'Individual Liability of Private Military Personnel under International Criminal Law', p. 1022.
[44] Wayne, 'America's For-Profit Secret Army'.
[45] District Court for the Eastern District of Illinois, Jovic and others v. L-3 Services Incorporated and Engility Holdings Incorporated.
[46] Wood, 'A Suspicious Pattern Alarming the Ukrainian Military'.
[47] Jones, 'U.S. Sanctions Chinese Satellite Firm for Allegedly Supplying SAR Imagery to Russia's Wagner Group'.
[48] Reuters, 'NGOs File Suit Alleging BNP Paribas Complicity in Rwandan Genocide'.
[49] For a discussion see Wesche, 'Business Actors, Paramilitaries and Transitional Criminal Justice in Colombia', p. 478.
[50] Acosta, 'Colombia Accuses Drummond Executives of Funding Paramilitary Group'.
[51] Trial of Bruno Tesch & Others (the Zyklon B case), Vol. I, p. 10.
[52] Supreme Court of the Netherlands, The Prosecutor v. Guus Kouwenhoven.
[53] Supreme Court of the Netherlands, The Prosecutor v. Frans van Anraat. See for a discussion of the Kouwenhoven and Van Anraat cases, Sluiter and Yau, 'Aiding and Abetting and Causation in the Commission of International Crimes: The Cases of Dutch Businessmen van Anraat and Kouwenhoven', p. 304.
[54] Ringstrom, 'Former Oil Firm Executives Go on Trial in Sweden over Sudan War Crimes'. See for an analysis, Klamberg, 'Prosecuting Corporate Executives for War Crimes in Sudan', p. 887.

55 Bueno and Bright, 'Implementing Human Rights Due Diligence through Corporate Civil Liability', p. 791.
56 UN, 'Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights' (2011).
57 International Bar Association, *IBA Practical Guide on Business and Human Rights for Business Lawyers* (2016), p. 13.
58 UN, *Guide on Heightened Human Rights Due Diligence for Business in Conflict-Affected Contexts* (2022).
59 UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, *The Corporate Responsibility to Protect Human Rights: An Interpretive Guide* (2012), p. 48.
60 UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, *Corporate Responsibility*, p. 48.
61 Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs and ICRC, *Montreux Document*, p. 18.
62 UN, *Principles for Responsible Contracts: Integrating the Management of Human Rights Risks into State-Investor Contract Negotiations: Guidance for Negotiators* (2015).
63 Shift, Oxfam and Global Compact Network Netherlands, *Doing Business with Respect for Human Rights: A Guidance Tool for Companies* (2016), p. 69.
64 UN, *Guiding Principles*, p. 22.
65 Ibid.; UN, *Guide on Heightened Human Rights Due Diligence*, p. 35.
66 Reuters, 'Japan's Itochu to End Cooperation with Israel's Elbit amid Gaza War'.
67 International Court of Justice, 'Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in the Gaza Strip (South Africa v. Israel)'.
68 Emtseva, 'Philanthrocapitalism, Transitional Justice and the Need for Accountability'.
69 Siddiqui, 'FBI Working with US Companies to Collect War Crime Evidence in Ukraine'.
70 Bender, 'Satellite Companies Join the Hunt for Russian War Crimes'.
71 Lyons, 'Documenting Violations of International Humanitarian Law from Space', p. 739.
72 Ibid., p. 761.
73 See e.g., Aksamitowska, 'Digital Evidence in Domestic Core International Crimes Prosecutions: Lessons Learned from Germany, Sweden, Finland and The Netherlands', p. 189.
74 Irving, 'And So It Begins… Social Media Evidence in an ICC Arrest Warrant'.
75 Hamilton, 'Social Media Platforms in International Criminal Investigations', p. 219.
76 Meta, Oversight Board, 'Armenian Prisoners of War Video'.
77 Ibid.
78 Meta, 'Update: Israel and Palestine: Human Rights Due Diligence', p. 14.
79 Ventura, 'Ordering', p. 293.
80 ICTR, Alfred Musema v. Prosecutor.
81 Ibid., para. 880.
82 ICRC, *Commentary on the Second Geneva Convention*, p. 1057.
83 For example, see Ramasastry and Thompson, 'Commerce, Crime and Conflict: Legal Remedies for Private Sector Liability for Grave Breaches of International Law'.
84 Ibid. See regarding civil responsibility: Bismuth, 'Mapping a Responsibility', p. 221.
85 ICRC, *Commentary on the First Geneva Convention*, p. 48.
86 ICRC, *Commentary on the Second Geneva Convention*, p. 53.
87 Drummond, 'Ensuring Respect for IHL by, and in Relation to the Conduct of Private Actors', p. 63.
88 Ibid., p. 65.
89 Ibid.
90 Kamerstukken II (Parliamentary Records) 2022/23, 21501-02, nr. 2648, 3 May 2023, p. 7.
91 For criticism, see for example Stichting Onderzoek Multinationale Ondernemingen, 'Handel met Israëlische nederzettingen'.

Bibliography

Literature

Acosta, Luis Jaime. 'Colombia Accuses Drummond Executives of Funding Paramilitary Group'. *Reuters*, 31 May 2023. https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/drummond-colombia-executives-be-tried-financing-paramilitary-group-2023-05-31/.

Aksamitowska, Karolina. 'Digital Evidence in Domestic Core International Crimes: Lessons Learned from Germany, Sweden, Finland and The Netherlands'. *Journal of International Criminal Justice* 19, no. 1 (March 2021), pp. 189–211. https://doi.org/10.1093/jicj/mqab035.

Apuzzo, Matt. 'Blackwater Guards Found Guilty in 2007 Iraq Killings', *New York Times*, 22 October 2014.

Barakat, Matthew. 'Retired General's Testimony Links Contractor to Abu Graib Abuses'. *Military Times*, 16 April 2024.

Bender, Bryan. 'Satellite Companies Join the Hunt for Russian War Crimes'. *Politico*, 6 April 2022. https://www.politico.com/news/2022/04/06/satellite-russian-war-crimes-00023386

Bismuth, Regis. 'Mapping a Responsibility of Corporations for Violations of International Humanitarian Law Sailing between International and Domestic Legal Orders'. *Denver Journal of International Law & Policy* 38, no. 2 (2010), pp. 203–226.

Bonner, Raymond. 'War Crimes Panel Finds Croat Troops 'Cleansed' the Serbs'. *New York Times*, 31 March 1999.

Brölmann, Catherina, and Janne Nijman. 'Legal Personality as a Fundamental Concept of International Law'. In *Concepts for International Law: Contributions to Disciplinary Thought*, edited by Jean d'Aspremont and Sahib Singh. London: Edward Elgar, 2017.

Bueno, Nicolas, and Claire Bright. 'Implementing Human Rights Due Diligence through Corporate Civil Liability'. *International & Comparative Law Quarterly* 69 (2020), pp. 789–818.

Crawford, James. *Brownlie's Principles of Public International Law*, 9th ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019.

Cullen, Anthony. *The Concept of Non-international Armed Conflict in International Humanitarian Law*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.

Drummond, Catherine. 'Ensuring Respect for IHL by, and in Relation to the Conduct of Private Actors'. In *Ensuring Respect for International Humanitarian Law*, edited by Eve Massingham and Annabel McConnachie. London: Routledge, 2020, pp. 63–82.

Emtseva, Julia. 'Philanthrocapitalism, Transitional Justice and the Need for Accountability'. *Justieinfo.net*, 12 October 2020. https://www.justiceinfo.net/en/45639-philanthrocapitalism-transitional-jusstice-need-accountability.html.

Francioni, Francesco, and Natalino Ronzitti, eds. *War by Contract: Human Rights, Humanitarian Law, and Private Contractors*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.

Ghesquiere, Stefaan. 'The Implementation of International Humanitarian Law and the International Committee of the Red Cross'. In *Armed Conflicts and the Law*, edited by Jan Wouters, Philip de Man and Nele Verlinden. Cambridge, Antwerp, Portland: Intersentia, 2016, pp. 445–483.

Gillard, Emanuela-Chiara. 'Business Goes to War: Private Military/Security Companies and International Humanitarian Law'. *International Review of the Red Cross* 88 (2006), pp. 525–572.

Hajdin, Nikola R. 'Neutral Business Assistance and the Limits of Complicity Under International Criminal Law'. *Michigan Journal of International Law* 45, no. 3 (2024), pp. 381–440. https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4560065.

Hamilton, Rebecca J. 'Social Media Platforms in International Criminal Investigations'. *Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law* 52, no. 1 (2020), pp. 213–223.

Human Rights Watch, 'Mali: New Atrocities by Malian Army, Apparent Wagner Fighters', 24 July 2023.

ICRC. *Statutes of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement*. (Accessed 4 May 2024).

ICRC. *Commentary on the First Geneva Convention*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016.

ICRC. *Commentary on the Second Geneva Convention*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017.

International Bar Association (IBA). 'IBA Practical Guide on Business and Human Rights for Business Lawyers' (2016).

Irving, Emma. 'And So It Begins… Social Media Evidence in an ICC Arrest Warrant'. *Opinio Juris*, 17 August 2017. https://opiniojuris.org/2017/08/17/and-so-it-begins-social-media-evidence-in-an-icc-arrest-warrant/.

Jones, Andrew. 'U.S. Sanctions Chinese Satellite Firm for Allegedly Supplying SAR Imagery to Russia's Wagner Group'. *SpaceNews*, 27 January 2023. https://spacenews.com/u-s-sanctions-chinese-satellite-firm-for-allegedly-supplying-sar-imagery-to-russias-wagner-group/.

Kaleck, Wolfgang and Saage-Maaβ, Miriam. 'Corporate Accountability for Human Rights Violations Amounting to International Crimes: The Status Quo and its Challenges'. *Journal of International Criminal Justice* 8 (2010), pp. 699–724.

Kelly, Michael J. *Prosecuting Corporations for Genocide*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016.

Klamberg, Mark. 'Prosecuting Corporate Executives for War Crimes in Sudan'. *New York University Journal of International Law & Politics* 54 (2022), pp. 887–939.

Koenig, Alexa. 'Meta's Oversight Board Recommends Major Advance in International Accountability'. *Just Security*, 22 June 2023. https://www.justsecurity.org/87015/metas-oversight-board-recommends-major-advance-in-international-accountability/.

Lehnart, Chia. 'Individual Liability of Private Military Personnel under International Criminal Law'. *European Journal of International Law* 19, no. 5 (2008), pp. 1015–1034.

Lyons, Joshua. 'Documenting Violations of International Humanitarian Law from Space: A Critical Review of Geospatial Analysis of Satellite Imagery during Armed Conflicts in Gaza (2009), Georgia (2008), and Sri Lanka (2009)'. *International Review of the Red Cross* 94 (2012), pp. 739–763.

Meta, 'Update: Israel and Palestine Due Diligence', 1 September 2023. https://humanrights.fb.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/September-2023-Israel-and-Palestine-HRDD-Meta-Update.pdf.

Meta Oversight Board. 'Armenian Prisoners of War Video'. 13 June 2023. https://www.oversightboard.com/decision/FB-YLRV35WD.

Michalowski, Sabine. 'Doing Business with a Bad Actor: How to Draw the Line Between Legitimate Commercial Activities and Those that Trigger Corporate Complicity Liability'. *Texas International Law Journal* 50 (2015), pp. 403–464.

Mikler, John. *The Political Power of Global Corporations*. Cambridge: Polity, 2018.

Moench, Mallory. 'Abu Graib Military Contractor Trial Set to Start 20 Years After Shocking Images of Abuse'. *Time*, 14 April 2024.

Moir, Lindsay. *The Law of Internal Armed Conflict*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.

Mongelard, Eric. 'Corporate Civil Liability for Violations of International Humanitarian Law'. *International Review of the Red Cross* 88 (2006), pp. 665–691.

Nowrot, Karsten. 'Transnational Corporations as Steering Subjects in International Economic Law: Two Competing Visions of the Future?' *Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies* 18, no. 2 (2011), pp. 803–842.

Portmann, Roland. *Legal Personality in International Law*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.

Ramasastry, Anita and Robert C. Thompson. 'Commerce, Crime and Conflict: Legal Remedies for Private Sector Liability for Grave Breaches of International Law', *FAFO* (2006).

Reuters. 'Japan's Itochu to End Cooperation with Israel's Elbit amid Gaza War', 5 February 2024. https://www.reuters.com/business/japans-itochu-end-cooperation-with-israels-elbit-over-gaza-war-2024-02-05/.

Reuters. 'NGOs File Suit Alleging BNP Paribas Complicity in Rwandan Genocide', 29 June 2017. https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSKBN19K1HR/.

Ringstrom, Anna. 'Former Oil Firm Executives Go on Trial in Sweden over Sudan War Crimes'. *Reuters*, 5 September 2023. https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/sudan-war-crime-trial-ex-oil-firm-executives-starts-sweden-2023-09-05/.

Sauer, Pjotr. 'Wagner Mercenary Admits "Tossing Grenades" at Injured Ukrainian PoWs'. *Guardian*, 18 April 2023. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/apr/18/wagner-mercenary-admits-tossaing-grenades-at-injured-ukrainian-pows.

Shift, Oxfam and Global Compact Network Netherlands. 'Doing Business with Respect for Human Rights: A Guidance Tool for Companies' (2016).

Siddiqui, Zeba. 'FBI Working with US Companies to Collect War Crime Evidence in Ukraine'. *Reuters*, 26 April 2023. https://www.reuters.com/world/fbi-working-with-us-companies-collect-war-crime-evidence-ukraine-2023-04-26/.

Sluiter, Göran and Sean Yau. 'Aiding and Abetting and Causation in the Commission of International Crimes: The Cases of Dutch Businessmen van Anraat and Kouwenhoven'. In *The International Criminal Responsibility of War's Funders and Profiteers*, edited by Nina Jørgenson. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020, pp. 204–328.

Stichting Onderzoek Multinationale Ondernemingen. 'Handel met Israëlische nederzettingen'. 13 December 2023. https://www.somo.nl/nl/handel-met-israelische-nederzettingen-ministerie-negeert-interne-waarschuwingen/.

Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs and ICRC, *Montreux Document on Pertinent International Obligations and Good Practice for States Related to Operations of Private and Military Security Companies during Armed Conflict.* Geneva, 2008.

UN Human Rights Council. 'Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises', John Ruggie, 'Principles for Responsible Contracts: Integrating the Management of Human Rights Risks into State-Investor Contract Negotiations: Guidance for Negotiators'. UN Doc. A/HRC/17/31/Add.3, 25 May 2011.

UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. 'The Corporate Responsibility to Protect Human Rights: An Interpretive Guide' (2012).

UN. 'Principles for Responsible Contracts: Integrating the Management of Human Rights Risks into State-Investor Contract Negotiations: Guidance for Negotiators' (2015).

UN Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries as a Means of Violating Human Rights and Impeding the Exercise of the Right of Peoples to Self-determination. 'Relationship between Private Military and Security Companies and the Extractive Industry from a Human Rights Perspective'. UN Doc. A/HRC/42/42, 29 July 2019.

Ventura, Manuel J. 'Ordering'. In *Modes of Liability in International Criminal Law*, edited by Jérôme de Hemptinne, Robert Roth, Elies van Sliedregt, Marjolein Cupido, Manuel J. Ventura and Lachezar Yanev. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2019, pp. 284–306.

Walsh, Declan. 'Russian Mercenaries Are Driving War Crimes in Africa, U.N. Says'. *New York Times*, 27 June 2021. https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/27/world/asia/russia-mercenaries-central-african-republic.html.

Weber, Max. 'Politics as a Vocation'. In *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, edited by Hans H. Gerth and Charles W. Mills. New York: Oxford University Press, 1948, pp. 77–128.

Wesche, Philipp. 'Business Actors, Paramilitaries and Transitional Criminal Justice in Colombia'. *International Journal of Transitional Justice* 13 (2019), pp. 478–503.

Wood, Graeme. 'A Suspicious Pattern Alarming the Ukrainian Military'. *The Atlantic*, 18 March 2024. https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2024/03/american-satellites-russia-ukraine-war/677775/.

Zwanenburg, Marten. 'The United Nations and International Humanitarian Law'. *Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law*.

Case law

International Court of Justice, 'Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in the Gaza Strip (South Africa v. Israel)', Order on Provisional Measures, 26 January 2024.

US District Court, Eastern District of Virginia, Suhail Najim Abdullah Al Shimari, et al. v. CACI Premier Technology, Inc., 12 November 2024.

Supreme Court of the Netherlands, The Prosecutor v. Guus Kouwenhoven, ECLI:NL:HR:2018:2336.

District Court for the Eastern District of Illinois, Jovic and ors v L-3 Services Incorporated and Engility Holdings Incorporated, 69 F. Supp. 3d 750, September 24, 2014.

Supreme Court of the Netherlands, The Prosecutor v. Frans van Anraat, ECLI:NL:HR:2009:BG4822.

ICTR, Alfred Musema v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-96-13-A, Appeals Chamber Judgement, 16 November 2001.

ICTR, The Prosecutor v. Alfred Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-T, Trial Chamber Judgement, 27 January 2000.

The Flick Trial, Trial of Friedrich Flick and five others, [1947] US Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, Case No.48 found in Law reports of the trials of war criminals by the UN (Vol. IX) (1949).

The I.G. Farben Trial, Trial of Carl Krauch and twenty-two others [1948] US Military Tribunal, Nuremberg Case No. 57 found in Law reports of the trials of war criminals by the UN (Vol. X) (1949).

The Krupp Trial of Alfried Felix Alwyn Krupp and eleven others [1948] US Military Tribunal, Case No. 58 found in Law Reports of trials of war criminals, UN war crimes Commission: The I.G. Farben and Krupp Trials (Vol.10).

Trial of Bruno Tesch & Others (the Zyklon B case), UNWCC, Vol. I.

CHAPTER 8

Navigating Non-State Dynamics: A Literature Review on Private Military and Security Companies

Erik de Waard, Bart Wielders, Michael Rustenhoven & Chiel Conijn

Abstract

Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) are quintessential examples of non-state actors. They are commercial service providers that conduct military and security tasks traditionally considered the responsibility of the state. This chapter aims to answer the following research question: What core themes emerge in journal articles on PMSCs published between 2000 and 2024? The literature review has, among other things, uncovered that, within the evolving international security landscape, a new form of PMSC loyalty has surfaced. For PMSCs supporting Western militaries, upholding international law and respecting human rights is critical for maintaining loyalty as on-the-ground partners. Russian and Chinese PMSCs, however, are expected to demonstrate a stronger form of geopolitical loyalty, defending sensitive national interests abroad.

Keywords: Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs), Literature review, Accountability, Loyalty, Effectiveness

8.1 Introduction

Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) represent the commercialisation of security. They are quintessential examples of non-state actors, providing commercial military and security services that have traditionally been the responsibility of the state. Therefore, a chapter on PMSCs contributes to a holistic understanding of non-state actors by examining a sector that has had a major impact on security matters over the past two decades. In different forms and shapes, private armies and military companies have been around throughout history.[1] It was especially the Cold War period that gave PMSCs a bad reputation, for these 'career mercenaries' were accused of fuelling all kinds of proxy wars for personal gain.[2] The negative sentiment turned in the 1990s when, following the example of the US, Western countries increasingly perceived PMSCs as legitimate auxiliary forces to efficiently

scale-up, complement, or take the place of their dramatically reduced regular forces.[3] This development really gained traction during the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.[4] Looking back in time, one could argue that Singer laid the foundation for the revival of scholarly interest in the growing importance of PMSCs in international security.[5] After his seminal 2008 work 'Corporate Warriors' many more books have been published on, for example, PMSCs' evolutionary dynamics, legal and ethical concerns, regulatory considerations, and actual PMSC deployments.[6] Recently, a new stream of research has emerged on the rise of Russian and Chinese state-controlled PMSCs.[7] Despite this extensive book-oriented body of knowledge, a published review of journal articles on PMSCs is not yet available. Although books provide comprehensive overviews and in-depth explorations of the rise and modus operandi of PMSCs, the combined cumulative explorative effect of journal articles allows researchers to trace the development of ideas and present state of the art insights. Also, journals often publish work by a wide range of scholars from different institutions, countries, and disciplinary backgrounds. This diversity leads to a richer array of perspectives, methodologies, and conclusions, providing an exhaustive understanding of PMSCs. Given these as yet untapped advantages, the present chapter provides a literature review that is based on the following research question: Which core themes emerge in journal articles on PMSCs that have been published between 2000 and 2024? The distinct periodisation in the main question has been chosen for a specific reason: the turn of the 21st century marked a significant expansion in the role and presence of PMSCs globally. Studying the period from 2000 onwards allows for a longitudinal analysis of how agency has evolved with the rise of non-Western PMSCs. Existing research is strongly focused on the deployment of Western PMSCs hired by states to replace or supplement their regular forces. This traditional outsourcing relationship is likely to result in specific behavioural consequences regarding accountability, loyalty, and effectiveness. However, it is worth exploring whether a similar form of agency also applies to, for example, Russian and Chinese PMSCs. Therefore, this literature review serves as a starting point for discussing non-state actor accountability, loyalty, and effectiveness from different PMSC perspectives.

8.2 Literature Review Approach

We conducted a qualitative review of the PMSC literature based on four distinct phases: (1) scoping, (2) searching, (3) selecting, and (4) synthesising.[8] First, the scope was defined by unpacking the existing Web of Science database on military PMSC studies. This leading scholarly platform provides access to the contents of an extensive number of academic journals. The adjective 'military' refers to a focus

on PMSCs for expeditionary military activities instead of private and domestic security tasks. This specification excludes, for example, the deployment of private security actors in border control processes and all kinds of privatised public order management initiatives. Second, the search phase concentrated on defining the relevant keywords and synonyms for accurately covering the topic of military PMSCs. The result of this concept analysis was translated into the following search query:

> "private militar*" OR "private security" OR "private warrior" OR "mercenar*" OR "outsourcing security" OR "contracting security" OR "non state actor" OR "NSA" OR "privatization of security" OR "commercial militar*" OR "commercial security" OR "PMC" OR "PMSC"

The database search was conducted from 5 February to 1 March 2024. The query returned 611 hits. Third, after the application of the inclusion and exclusion criteria, the dataset contained 39 selected publications (see Table 8.1). A hit was included if the title, abstract or keywords contained one or more keywords from the search query. Next, the references of all 39 articles were screened. Based on this step, 32 interesting additional studies were identified. Then a final relevancy check was conducted by scanning the abstracts of all 71 results line-by-line. Ten articles were excluded because they either dealt with private security firms conducting civilian security tasks, such as shopping centre or office building surveillance in Western societies, or discussed non-state actor dynamics unrelated to PMSCs, mostly focusing on NGOs. Hence, the actual research sample counted 61 journal articles. Fourth, to synthesise the content of the articles, they were uploaded in the NVivo software package for qualitative analysis.[9] Studying the introduction, discussion, and conclusion sections resulted in a cascading coding framework of primary and secondary codes. After analysing the coding results, the authors collectively identified six core themes. These will be explained separately in the following section.

Table 8.1: Search report

	Hits	In/exclusion selection	Bibliography check	Relevancy check	Total
Web of Science hits	611	39	+32	-10	61

8.3 Explanation of the Themes

Six themes surfaced after qualitatively analysing the introduction, discussion, and conclusion sections of the articles in the research sample. These themes will be discussed next, categorising the articles into sub-groups and offering a short

summary of the key insights. An overview table is provided for each theme. The most prominent theme, addressed in 31 of the 61 articles, is coded as *Countries and Regions,* which refers to a relationship between PMSC operations and a specific country or region (see Table 8.2 below). Two subcategories stand out. One group of fourteen studies concentrates on the countries that hire the services of PMSCs. The US and China predominate this stream of literature. As the leading country when it comes to using PMSCs, but also as the home base of some of the most renowned PMSCs, the US serves as a focal case in eight of the reviewed articles. Based on recent major military deployments, especially the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, US considerations for hiring PMSC services and operational consequences of outsourcing military tasks to PMSCs are brought to the fore.[10] The four studies that focus on China take a different stance, addressing the country's challenge of securing overseas economic interests in fragile, mostly African, states. For its well-known Belt and Road initiative, China increasingly relies on PMSCs to protect assets and personnel.[11] However, in most cases these private firms have no legal powers abroad and are forced by their host countries to operate unarmed. As such, the studies make clear that China is looking for solutions to make such private security efforts more robust, while at the same time offending a host nation must be prevented.

The other subgroup contains twenty-one articles that deal with areas in which PMSCs were deployed. To be precise, Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, Croatia, Africa, and the Arab uprising are used as contextual cases. Nine of these focus on Africa, making it a key region under academic scrutiny regarding the use of PMSCs. The security conditions of countries like Angola, Burundi, Congo, Ghana, Nigeria and Sierra Leone are analysed and related to the use of PMSCs, particularly explaining why African governments decide to outsource military and public order tasks. These studies, for example, show that the global war on terror has incentivised several regimes to utilise Western PMSC security sector reform initiatives to pursue their own authoritarian ambitions.[12] Also, one study explains why policy stasis on the regulation of PMSC deployment on the African continent occurs. It stresses that many African states prefer to be supported by Western national militaries instead of PMSCs that they, based on historical grounds, still perceive as untrustworthy, profit-seeking mercenaries.[13] Leander's work is also important to mention here, because it offers a comprehensive picture of the market dynamics – demand, supply, and externalities – that shape security outsourcing on the African continent.[14] She warns that privatising security can invoke a self-perpetuating cycle of PMSCs consciously directing the security demands of their clients to keep generating new business opportunities. Eventually, this will undermine public security at large, because resources are drained from local security forces, which seriously affects the security professionalisation of weak African states.

Table 8.2: Theme 1 literature review

		I. Countries and regions	
		A. Hiring countries	B. Deployment areas
1	Adamo 2020[15]		X
2	Akcinaroglu 2013[16]		X
3	Avant 2016[17]	X	
4	Biaumet 2017[18]		X
5	Caglar 2020[19]	X	X
6	Daumann 2023[20]		X
7	Dunigan 2014[21]	X	
8	Faulkner 2019[22]		X
9	Fisher 2015[23]		X
10	Fitzsimmons 2013[24]		X
11	Fitzsimmons 2024[25]		X
12	Gwatiwa 2016[26]		X
13	Kinsey 2021[27]		X
14	Krahmann 2017[28]	X	
15	Krahmann 2019[29]		X
16	Leander 2005[30]		X
17	Li 2009[31]	X	
18	Moussa 2023[32]		X
19	Paalo 2023[33]		X
20	Pereira 2023[34]	X	
21	Petersohn 2013[35]	X	X
22	Ramirez 2019[36]	X	
23	Rosén 2008[37]		X
24	Schouten 2020[38]		X
25	Spearin 2014[39]	X	X
26	Spearin 2018[40]	X	
27	Spearin 2022[41]	X	
28	Swed 2022[42]	X	X
29	Van Meegdenburg 2015[43]	X	
30	Varin 2018[44]		X
31	Yuan 2022[45]	X	
Total		14	21

With five related articles Iraq forms another key area of interest. Three of these five studies concentrate on the consequences of PMSCs using violence against locals, either citizens or insurgents. Based on quantitative database research, Fitzsimmons found that PMSC's armed conduct did not provoke reprisal attacks, but counter violence mainly resulted from contingencies beyond these firms' control.[46] Interestingly, Caglar paints a different picture on this matter.[47] He argues that contractors made the Iraqi security puzzle more complex and violent as their armed involvement grew. Rosen studied the Iraqi case for another purpose. He investigated why the war in Iraq became a catalyst for extraterritorial security outsourcing.[48] From a practical point of view, he argues that underdeveloped post-invasion security sector reform plans and a badly managed cash flow of reconstruction efforts created a business opportunity for PMSCs to take on loads of extra work. From a conceptual stance he points to a shifting neutrality paradigm. In short, PMSCs were deemed ideal for post-conflict security tasks in Iraq, because they neither belonged to the Iraqi state nor the coalition partners' military.

The second theme is coded *PMSC characteristics*. It consists of twenty-three articles that pay attention to distinctive organisational aspects of PMSCs. Table 8.3 presents this selection, which has been sub-coded into three main groups: (1) Proliferation of PMSCs, (2) services of PMSCs, and (3) nature of PMSCs. The first category involves seven articles that explain why the extraterritorial private security industry has grown so much during the last two decades. These studies either discuss the evolutionary dynamics of PMSCs based on recent engagements or unravel the added value of PMSCs in the international security assemblage. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, but also the fight against Boko Haram in Nigeria predominate the former set of studies. Regarding the latter, two specific articles are worth mentioning because of the shared aim of theory development. First, Mahoney theorises the relationship between market structure and PMSC dependence, concluding that monopsony, in which a limited number of clients control demand, is the best market structure for the outsourcing of military force.[49] Second, drawing on International Relations and Comparative Politics theory, Kruck offers a framework on the proliferation of PMSCs drawing on US, UK, French, and German patterns of security privatisation.[50]

Ten articles delve into the variety of services that PMSCs can provide, such as training, security, logistics, intelligence, maintenance, and consultancy. In relation to UN peacekeeping missions, Østensen critically remarks that when conducting such tasks PMSCs tend to benefit themselves by using their authority and professional expertise to purposefully direct strategic and operational decision-making.[51] Spearin explains that in the beginning the Canadian government preferred to outsource support tasks during the preparatory phase of a mission or when a mission area was deemed calm and safe.[52] With the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan,

a validated distinction between safe and unsafe operations could no longer be made. As such, legal and liability concerns about contractor employment were perforce set aside and PMSCs were increasingly being hired for more risky tasks and deployed in non-permissive environments.

Also interesting to mention regarding the services that PMSCs provide is Cusumano's work.[53] This study introduces military role conception as an important underlying factor for deciding on the type of service to outsource. Comparing the US and UK, it is respectively the specialised warfighting versus the multi-purpose military self-image that has affected outsourcing choices. Whereas the US easily hires PMSCs to conduct armed security and military training activities to concentrate the capacity of regular forces on actual combat performance, the UK is more reluctant to do so, because these tasks are believed to be part of the portfolio of the British armed forces themselves. Tasks outsourced by the British were typically unarmed logistical activities, such as base support, transportation, and equipment maintenance.

Table 8.3: Theme 2 literature review

		II. PMSC Characteristics		
		A. Proliferation of PMSCs	B. PMSCs' services	C. Nature of PMSCs
1	Adamo 2020[54]	X		
2	Cusumano 2015[55]		X	
3	Daumann 2023[56]		X	
4	Dunigan 2014[57]		X	
5	Fisher 2015[58]		X	
6	Fitzsimmons 2013[59]			X
7	Grassiani 2017[60]			X
8	Heinecken 2014[61]		X	
9	Jefferies 2002[62]	X		
10	Joachim 2014[63]			X
11	Joachim 2012[64]			X
12	Krahmann 2016[65]		X	
13	Kruck 2014[66]	X		
14	Mahoney 2017[67]	X		
15	Ostensen 2013[68]		X	
16	Paalo 2023[69]		X	

		II. PMSC Characteristics		
		A. Proliferation of PMSCs	B. PMSCs' services	C. Nature of PMSCs
17	Petersohn 2013[70]	X		
18	Radziszewski 2020[71]		X	
19	Ramirez 2019[72]			X
20	Rosén 2008[73]	X		
21	Spearin 2014[74]		X	
22	Swed 2023[75]	X		
23	Varin 2018[76]			X
Total		7	10	6

The third subgroup consists of seven articles that deal with the nature of PMSCs, concentrating on the military culture of PMSCs, the mercenary stigma that still surrounds them, and the general public perception of PMSCs. Fitzsimmons' article on military culture points to Blackwater's dominant bellicose behavioural norms as the main reason for the excessive use of violence this company exercised in Iraq. His conclusions are based on a detailed comparison between Blackwater and DynCorp – another major US PMSC that was deployed to Iraq under the same contractual conditions, but its operators showed far more restraint in the use of force.[77] Four articles in this category bring up the mercenary stigma that plagues the PMSC industry, either stressing that actual mercenary organisations continue to exist and are also still being used or that PMSCs actively try to shake off this bad reputation by consciously adopting a legitimate business and humanitarian identity.[78] A study on the opinions of US citizens about the use of PMSCs brings two key insights to the fore. First, a majority of people are not in favour of using PMSCs due to the profit motive of these companies and their potential lack of accountability. Second, a substantial number of respondents also have a positive opinion, because in comparison with regular forces PMSCs are believed to show superior fiscal efficiency.[79]

Governance is the third theme. This thematic cluster consists of nineteen articles. Of this selection eleven studies deal with the topic of PMSC regulation, four discuss the details of contracting, two unravel legal points of interest, and three deal with assessing PMSC performance (see Table 8.4 below). Since security contracting has increasingly been showing signs of normalisation, controlling PMSC deployment through solid regulatory measures has become a key subject in academic literature.[80] Where the performance of most organisations is monitored through independent bodies checking compliance with international standards (e.g.,

International Standardisation Organisation), the PMSC industry largely lacks such a formalised benchmark and accreditation structure. With this exceptional position in mind, De Nevers investigates the effectiveness of self-regulation by PMSCs.[81] She concludes that neither the US-based International Peace Operation Association (IPOA) nor the UK-based British Association of Private Security Companies (BAPSC) relies on a performance monitoring and sanctioning framework to control member organisations. Macleod and Dewinter-Schmitt explain that even the hesitant auditing and certification steps that have been taken to improve human rights-related PMSC conduct fail to take root, because of an auditing knowledge deficit and a lack of transparency and oversight in the regulatory organisational constellation.[82] The rise of Russian-affiliated PMSCs makes the situation even more challenging. According to Ranito, this development has set back the PMSC regulatory process in time, demanding immediate international attention.[83] Apart from regulation, according to Daumann, good behaviour on the part of the PMSC can only be expected when a client possesses sufficient economic and military coercive power to enforce consequences for misconduct.[84] Weak states are especially vulnerable to non-compliance by private militaries, because they lack such resources.

Table 8.4: Theme 3 literature review

		III. Governance			
		A. Regulation	B. Contracting	C. Legal aspects	D. Performance assessment
1	Adamo 2020[85]	X			
2	Avant 2016[86]	X			
3	Bruneau 2013[87]		X		
4	Daumann 2023[88]				X
5	Daumann 2024[89]				X
6	De Nevers 2009[90]	X		X	
7	De Nevers 2010[91]	X			
8	Dunigan 2014[92]	X			
9	Fahn 2015[93]		X		
10	Gwatiwa 2016[94]	X			
11	Krahmann 2016[95]	X			
12	Krahmann 2017[96]				X
13	Macleod 2019[97]	X			
14	Ranito 2021[98]	X			

		III. Governance			
		A. Regulation	B. Contracting	C. Legal aspects	D. Performance assessment
15	Saner 2019[99]			X	
16	Spearin 2014[100]		X		
17	Tzifakis 2015[101]		X		
18	Van Meegdenburg 2015[102]	X			
19	Wolf 2007[103]	X			
Total		11	4	2	3

As the formalised starting point for outsourcing, the way to award and manage contracts is crucial to mitigate possible PMSC service delivery impediments. Tzifakis and Huliaras conclude that contracting states generally manage contracts with PMSCs poorly.[104] In addition, Bruneau argues that attracting and retaining sufficiently knowledgeable contracting and purchasing professionals is problematic for the government, because these experts can do much better financially in the business sector.[105] Fahn points to the intricate triangular relationship between intervening state, host state, and PMSC that makes the contracting process quite challenging. These three actors almost always have divergent interests, which means that drawing up a contract that is suitable for all is almost impossible to realise. From a legal stance De Nevers problematises the status of PMSCs under international humanitarian law (IHL), especially when hired for armed activities where the risk of being pulled into hostilities is high, for example in an asymmetrical conflict. Hence, instead of becoming increasingly reliant on such companies, countries should actually be more reluctant to hire PMSCs.[106] Saner's study brings to the fore that the ruling regulatory landscape affecting the PMSC sector is marked by ambiguity stemming from diverse political and judicial frameworks at the national, regional, and international levels, making it necessary to determine internationally approved legal and political principles for the hiring and performance monitoring of PMSCs.[107] Krahmann adds that the inherently intangible and socially constructed nature of security makes evaluating PMSC performance based on observable and measurable contract indicators extremely challenging.[108] Paradoxically, the performance measurement difficulties have not prompted PMSCs to look for ways to better quantify the actual impact they have on civilian populations and the security environment at large. Instead, they have focused performance attention on measurable activities and countable assets that can be easily scrutinised by government auditors.

The fourth theme includes 16 articles that refer to the specific *Operational setting* for which PMSCs are used. It is subdivided into two dimensions, namely (1) type of operation and (2) institutional context. See Table 8.5 for the articles concerned. Fourteen articles lay emphasis on the type of operation that a PMSC is involved in, such as counter terrorism, counter insurgency, and peace support operations. Yet, civil war or asymmetrical conflict dominates this group of studies. The key message here is that the use of PMSCs in a context of civil war may prolong the fighting or risk the recurrence of hostilities, because PMSCs tend to become part of the security conundrum or try to maximise profit by trying to prolong the fighting.[109] Seven articles concentrate on the institutional contexts (i.e., UN, NATO, CSDP) in which the hiring of PMSCs can take place. The use of PMSCs in UN operations is discussed most frequently. Jeopardising the impartiality of the UN, securitising local communal life, and affecting UN decision-making, are key problems brought up in these studies.[110]

Table 8.5: Theme 4 literature review

		IV. Operational setting	
		A. Type of operation	B. Institutional context
1	Akcinaroglu 2013[111]	X	
2	Bamigboye 2022[112]	X	
3	Bara 2022[113]	X	
4	Caglar 2020[114]	X	
5	Coleman 2018[115]	X	X
6	De Groot 2022[116]	X	X
7	De Nevers 2009[117]	X	
8	Faulkner 2019[118]	X	
9	Giumelli 2014[119]		X
10	Krahmann 2016[120]		X
11	Krahmann 2019[121]	X	X
12	Moussa 2023[122]	X	
13	Ostensen 2013[123]	X	X
14	Radziszewski 2020[124]	X	
15	Spearin 2018[125]	X	X
16	Varin 2018[126]	X	
Total		14	7

The fifth theme is labelled *PMC drawbacks*. Three topics emerge in this selection of eleven articles: (1) unwanted security consequences, (2) human rights violations, and (3) transparency (see Table 8.6). Six studies bring up unwanted security consequences that are typically related to the use of PMSCs. The general line of reasoning is that the deployment of PMSCs in a hotspot severely complicates security matters. Several consequences are brought up in this debate such as securitisation, societal militarisation, escalation of violence, and deprivation of regular armed forces.[127] Four studies emphasise the risk of human rights being violated by PMSCs. Scrutinising the Commercial Military Actor Dataset, Penel and Petersohn find that although most outsourcing relationships involving PMSCs show compliance with international human rights norms, there is also a segment that consciously circumvents these normative restraints when the costs of non-compliance are low.[128] The other studies confirm that when clients can dodge accountability, the chance of human rights abuses increases.[129] According to Østensen, privatising security is tricky because a lack of transparency makes PMSCs hard to control. These companies have become rather intertwined with state actors, UN agencies and departments, and private or hybrid organisations, making accountability for rule violations difficult to determine.[130]

Table 8.6: Theme 5 literature review

		V. PMSC Drawbacks		
		A. Unwanted Security Consequences	B. Human Rights Violations	C. Transparency
1	Caglar 2020[131]	X		
2	Daumann 2024[132]		X	
3	Fisher 2015[133]	X		
4	Fitzsimmons 2013[134]	X		
5	Heinecken 2014[135]	X		
6	Krahmann 2016[136]		X	
7	Krahmann 2019[137]	X		
8	Leander 2005[138]	X		
9	Macleod 2019[139]		X	
10	Ostensen 2013[140]			X
11	Penel 2022[141]		X	
Total		6	4	1

The sixth theme is about *civil-military relations*. Nine articles address this topic from two angles, either discussing different partnering constellations or concentrating on the agency dynamics of such relationships (see Table 8.7 below). The underlying sentiment of the former set of studies is to learn from actual security collaboration practices between government agencies and private actors. Overall, these studies are quite positive about the added value of this way of organising security. The complementary capabilities of both public and private security providers could offer a synergistic system of intelligence gathering, surveillance, community education, and operations.[142] This applies to a military context as well as a public sphere of, for example, guarding commercial and domestic infrastructure.[143] Schouten and Miklian's work stretches the discussion by introducing and analysing the 'Business for Peace' (B4P) initiative that is aimed at not only elevating PMSCs but multinational corporations in general as committed peace actors. Criticism also resonates in some studies. When it comes to civil-military relations in a setting of security sector reform (SSR), a more holistic approach is required according to Biaumet.[144] He supports his argumentation with two successful yet unorthodox Burundian examples of informal sentinels protecting public places and turning former bandits into legit country-side guards. Based on a series of interviews with Swedish military officers, Berendtsson brings up recruitment and retention issues, explaining that soldiers increasingly decide to leave the armed forces and continue their professional career at a PMSC.[145]

Three studies introduce agency as a valuable concept for addressing the complexities of civil-military outsourcing relationships where one actor (the principal) delegates authority to another (the agent). Fahn and Hadjer argue that the key agency problem of interest misalignment is even more prevalent in a PMSC deployment context, because with an intervening state and a host nation two distinct principles with mostly diverging concerns are present.[146] Moreover, Krahmann points to extended principal–agent chains that may emerge because of contractors relying on sub-contractors to do the job.[147] His study shows that NATO struggled to keep control over the chain of PMSCs working in Afghanistan.

Table 8.7: Theme 6 literature review

		VI. Civil military relations	
		A. Partnering	B. Agency
1	Berndtsson 2013[148]	X	
2	Biaumet 2017[149]	X	
3	Dorn 2007[150]	X	
4	Fahn 2015[151]		X

		VI. Civil military relations	
		A. Partnering	B. Agency
5	Kinsey 2021[152]	X	
6	Krahmann 2016[153]		X
7	Moussa 2023[154]		X
8	Paalo 2023[155]	X	
9	Schouten 2020[156]	X	
Total		6	3

8.4 Discussion and Conclusion

The articles examined closely align with the Western security narrative of the past two decades, in which PMSCs are regarded as complementary security partners in expeditionary crisis response operations. It appears that Western scholars view the hiring of PMSCs as risky and therefore closely monitor this development by highlighting adverse consequences through their research and making concrete improvement proposals. The primary dangers they emphasise are human rights violations and the prolongation of conflicts. Referring to accountability as one of the key concepts in this edited volume, two important academic questions permeate the academic interest for PMSCs. First, to what extent did PMSCs adhere to the applicable international laws and regulations concerning armed conflict? Second, from a more proactive and normative perspective, what regulatory measures should be implemented to ensure that PMSCs do not abuse or exploit the monopoly on violence for their own gain? In her study on the self-regulatory behaviour of PMSCs, De Nevers makes it clear that accountability through norm compliance can only come to fruition when states also take full responsibility.[157] Governments too often seem to accept weak PMSC self-regulation to avoid making sensitive privatised military outsourcing arrangements too publicly transparent. Additionally, regulatory efforts suffer because citizens generally show little interest in the matter. When public pressure is lacking, national governments do not feel urged to tighten control over the PMSC industry, which has an international character and can evade regulation by operating across different state jurisdictions.

Despite this important academic attention, the dominance of the Western accountability narrative in the PMSC debate is also quite remarkable. After all, over the past fifteen years, the international security landscape has significantly transformed, with state-sponsored private proxy forces increasingly being utilised to achieve strategic objectives of states.[158] The literature review only lightly touches

upon this trend, discussing the problem of Russian-affiliated quasi-mercenary organisations setting back the hesitant international PMSC regulation effort, and mentioning the struggle of Chinese PMSCs to protect overseas economic interests without having local legal support. In both cases the motivation to deploy privatised forces clearly differs from the Western crisis response and security sector reform narrative. When focusing on Western and non-Western strategies for using PMSCs, loyalty emerges as an interesting concept deserving further academic attention. As a starting point, it could be argued that, in the case of the former, loyalty involves a PMSC being a reliable on-the-ground partner of national militaries. In order to become and remain a loyal partner, PMSCs are required to uphold international law and respect human rights. Regarding the latter, PMSCs often act as privatised autonomous agents of a state's foreign and economic policy, demonstrating a higher order of geopolitical loyalty. Defending sensitive national interests abroad, in the most extreme case by offering a principal country the opportunity to play the card of plausible deniability, differs significantly from being a trustworthy service provider within an overarching military formation.

Concentrating on the question of whether the use of PMSCs benefits military effectiveness, our review of journal articles gives no clear-cut answer. It offers a variety of case studies highlighting both the positive and negative implications of hiring PMSCs for military tasks. Still, some interesting issues emerge. On the one hand, like regular businesses, the behaviour of PMSCs is primarily guided by market discipline. They tend to downscale service delivery when competitive rivalry is absent and insufficient oversight is exercised.[159] On the other hand, Leander explains that PMSCs largely consist of operators with backgrounds in Western armed forces and are therefore accustomed to high military standards and a Western modus operandi.[160] This military professionalism makes them a valuable security asset for hiring governments. In fact, in Iraq, PMSCs have structurally outperformed local contractors and in many cases even regular U.S. troops.[161] Moreover, in crisis situations where the international community is hesitant to intervene for various reasons, PMSCs can provide a quick and qualified alternative.[162]

With the growing academic interest in the hybridisation of warfare, a broader but related avenue for further research concerns the development of a PMSC typology.[163] Building on Singer's seminal work, Arnold has already introduced an analytical framework to categorise Russian and well-known Western PMSCs.[164] This could serve as a starting point for a more comprehensive typology that also incorporates other forms of PMSC conduct, such as those in the context of China's Belt and Road Initiative. Additionally, Turkey is a relevant actor to consider, as the Turkish PMC SADAT is increasingly visible as a proxy force for President Erdoğan's foreign policy, supporting allies, promoting the Turkish arms industry, and propagating Islamist ideology both domestically and abroad in Syria, Libya, and

Azerbaijan.[165] Accountability, loyalty, and effectiveness could serve as key variables in developing a theory-driven non-state actor typology of PMSCs, transcending the current Western narrative and the grouping of individual cases.

Notes

1 Axelrod and Dubowe, *Mercenaries*.

2 Voß, 'Plausibly Deniable: Mercenaries in US Covert Interventions during the Cold War'.

3 Duffield and Donini, *Global Governance and the New Wars*; Kinsey, *Corporate Soldiers and International Security*.

4 Fitzsimmons, *Private Security Companies during the Iraq War*; Lovewine, *Outsourcing the Global War on Terrorism*.

5 Singer, *Corporate Warriors*.

6 Spearin, *Private Military and Security Companies and States*; Pattison, *The Morality of Private War*; Cameron and Chetail, *Privatizing War*; Andreopoulos and Kleinig, *Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) and the Quest for Accountability*; Kinsey, *Private Contractors and the Reconstruction of Iraq*; Fitzsimmons, *Private Security Companies during the Iraq War*.

7 Jones et al., *Russia's Corporate Soldiers*; Wilson, *The Wagner Group*; Arduino, *China's Private Army*. See also the chapter by Cremers and Rothman in this volume.

8 Jesson, Lacey, and Lydia Matheson, *Doing your Literature Review*; Snyder, 'Literature Review as a Research Methodology'.

9 Jackson and Bazeley, *Qualitative Data Analysis with NVivo*.

10 Van Meegdenburg, 'What the Research on PMSCs Discovered and Neglected'; Avant, 'Pragmatic Networks and Transnational Governance of Private Military and Security Services'; Çaglar, 'Privatization of Security in Iraq with US Intervention'; Dunigan, 'The Future of US Military Contracting: Current Trends and Future Implications'; Krahmann, 'From Performance to Performativity: The Legitimization of US Security Contracting and Its Consequences'; Petersohn, 'The Effectiveness of Contracted Coalitions'; Ramirez and Wood, 'Public Attitudes toward Private Military Companies'; Swed, 'The Afghanistan War's Legacy: The Reimagining of the Outsourcing of War and Security'.

11 Spearin, 'UN Peacekeeping and Chinese Private Security Companies'; Li, 'Major Security Challenges to China's Belt and Road Initiative'; Yuan, 'China's Private Security Companies and the Protection of Chinese Economic Interests Abroad'; Pereira et al., 'Chinese Private Security Companies and the Limit of Coercion'.

12 Fisher and Anderson, 'Authoritarianism and the Securitization of Development in Africa'.

13 Gwatiwa, 'Private Military and Security Companies Policy in Africa'.

14 Leander, 'The Market for Force and Public Security'.

15 Adamo, 'The Terrorist and the Mercenary: Private Warriors Against Nigeria's Boko Haram'.

16 Akcinaroglu and Radziszewski, 'Private Military Companies, Opportunities, and Termination of Civil Wars in Africa'.

17 Avant, 'Pragmatic Networks and Transnational Governance of Private Military and Security Services'.

18 Biaumet, 'The Sentinel and the Rebel: Multi-choice Policing in Burundi and the State-Centered Approach of Security Sector Reform'.

19 Çaglar, 'Privatization of Security in Iraq'.

[20] Daumann, 'The Client's Struggle to Control Private Military Companies Effectively'.
[21] Dunigan, 'The Future of US Military Contracting: Current Trends and Future Implications'.
[22] Faulkner, 'Buying Peace? Civil War Peace Duration and Private Military & Security Companies'.
[23] Fisher and Anderson, 'Authoritarianism and the Securitization of Development in Africa'.
[24] Fitzsimmons, 'Wheeled Warriors: Explaining Variations in the Use of Violence by Private Security Companies in Iraq'.
[25] Fitzsimmons, 'Contracting Blowback? The Use of Violence by Private Security Companies and Insurgents during the Iraq War'.
[26] Gwatiwa, 'Private Military and Security Companies Policy in Africa'.
[27] Kinsey and Krieg, 'Assembling a Force to Defeat Boko Haram: How Nigeria Integrated the Market into its Counterinsurgency Strategy'.
[28] Krahmann, 'From Performance to Performativity'.
[29] Krahmann and Leander, 'Contracting Security: Markets in the Making of MONUSCO Peacekeeping'.
[30] Leander, 'The Market for Force and Public Security'.
[31] Li, 'Major Security Challenges to China's Belt and Road Initiative'.
[32] Moussa, 'Privatizing Security and Authoritarian Adaptation in the Arab Region since the 2010–2011 Uprisings'.
[33] Paalo et al., 'Exploring Hybrid Security Strategies in Ghana: State and Private Sector Partnerships'.
[34] Pereira et al., 'Chinese Private Security Companies and the Limit of Coercion'.
[35] Petersohn, 'The Effectiveness of Contracted Coalitions'.
[36] Ramirez and Wood, 'Public Attitudes toward Private Military Companies'.
[37] Rosén, 'Commercial Security: Conditions of Growth'.
[38] Schouten and Miklian, 'The Business–Peace Nexus: 'Business for Peace' and the Reconfiguration of the Public/Private Divide in Global Governance'.
[39] Spearin, 'Canada and Contracted War: Afghanistan and Beyond'.
[40] Spearin, 'Since You Left: United Nations Peace Support, Private Military and Security Companies, and Canada'.
[41] Spearin, 'UN Peacekeeping and Chinese Private Security Companies'.
[42] Swed, 'The Afghanistan War's Legacy'.
[43] Van Meegdenburg, 'What the Research on PMSCs Discovered and Neglected'.
[44] Varin, 'Turning the Tides of War: The Impact of Private Military and Security Companies on Nigeria's Counterinsurgency against Boko Haram'.
[45] Yuan, 'China's Private Security Companies'.
[46] Fitzsimmons, 'Contracting Blowback?'
[47] Çaglar, 'Privatization of Security in Iraq with US Intervention'.
[48] Rosén, 'Commercial Security'.
[49] Mahoney, 'Buyer Beware: How Market Structure Affects Contracting and Company Performance in the Private Military Industry'.
[50] Kruck, 'Theorising the Use of Private Military and Security Companies: A Synthetic Perspective'.
[51] Østensen, 'In the Business of Peace: The Political Influence of Private Military and Security Companies on UN Peacekeeping'.
[52] Spearin, 'Canada and Contracted War'.
[53] Cusumano, 'The Scope of Military Privatisation: Military Role Conceptions and Contractor Support in the United States and the United Kingdom'.
[54] Adamo, 'The Terrorist and the Mercenary'.
[55] Cusumano, 'The Scope of Military Privatisation'.
[56] Daumann, 'The Client's Struggle'.

[57] Dunigan, 'The Future of US Military Contracting'.
[58] Fisher and Anderson, 'Authoritarianism and the Securitization of Development in Africa'.
[59] Fitzsimmons, 'Wheeled Warriors'.
[60] Grassiani and Diphoorn, 'Introduction: Ethnographies of Private Security' 1.
[61] Heinecken, 'Outsourcing Public Security: The Unforeseen Consequences for the Military Profession'.
[62] Jefferies, 'Private Military Companies – A Positive Role to Play in Today's International System'.
[63] Joachim and Schneiker, 'All for One and One in All: Private Military Security Companies as Soldiers, Business Managers and Humanitarians'.
[64] Joachim and Schneiker, 'New Humanitarians? Frame Appropriation through Private Military and Security Companies'.
[65] Krahmann, 'NATO Contracting in Afghanistan: The Problem of Principal-Agent Networks'.
[66] Kruck, 'Theorising the Use of Private Military and Security Companies'.
[67] Mahoney, 'Buyer Beware'.
[68] Østensen, 'In the Business of Peace'.
[69] Paalo et al., 'Exploring Hybrid Security Strategies in Ghana'.
[70] Petersohn, 'The Effectiveness of Contracted Coalitions'.
[71] Radziszewski and Akcinaroglu, 'Private Military & Security Companies, Conflict Complexity, and Peace Duration'.
[72] Ramirez and Wood, 'Public Attitudes toward Private Military Companies'.
[73] Rosén, 'Commercial Security'.
[74] Spearin, 'Canada and Contracted War'.
[75] Swed, 'The Afghanistan War's Legacy'.
[76] Varin, 'Turning the Tides of War'.
[77] Fitzsimmons, 'Wheeled Warriors'.
[78] Jefferies, 'Private Military Companies: A Positive Role'; Joachim and Schneiker, 'New Humanitarians?'; Joachim and Schneiker, 'All for One and One in All'; Varin, 'Turning the Tides of War'.
[79] Ramirez and Wood, 'Public Attitudes toward Private Military Companies'.
[80] Wolf, Deitelhoff, and Engert, 'Corporate Security Responsibility: Towards a Conceptual Framework for a Comparative Research Agenda'.
[81] De Nevers, 'The Effectiveness of Self-Regulation by the Private Military and Security Industry'.
[82] Macleod and Dewinter-Schmitt, 'Certifying Private Security Companies: Effectively Ensuring the Corporate Responsibility to Respect Human Rights?'.
[83] Ranito and Mayer, 'Normalization of Mercenary-like Private Military and Security Companies: The Need for Re-securitization of Regulation'.
[84] Daumann, 'The Client's Struggle'; Daumann, 'Potential Negative Externalities of Private Military Entrepreneurs from an Economic Perspective'.
[85] Adamo, 'The Terrorist and the Mercenary'.
[86] Avant, 'Pragmatic Networks'.
[87] T. C. Bruneau, 'Contracting Out Security'.
[88] Daumann, 'The Client's Struggle'.
[89] Daumann, 'Potential Negative Externalities'.
[90] De Nevers, 'Private Security Companies and the Laws of War'.
[91] De Nevers, 'The Effectiveness of Self-regulation'.
[92] Dunigan, 'The Future of US Military Contracting'.
[93] Fahn and Hadjer, 'Optimal Contracting with Private Military and Security Companies'.
[94] Gwatiwa, 'Private Military and Security Companies Policy in Africa'.

[95] Krahmann, 'NATO Contracting in Afghanistan'.
[96] Krahmann, 'From Performance to Performativity'.
[97] Macleod and Dewinter-Schmitt, 'Certifying Private Security Companies'.
[98] Ranito and Mayer, 'Normalization of Mercenary-like Private Military and Security Companies'.
[99] Saner, Uchegbu, and Yiu, 'Private Military and Security Companies: Legal and Political Ambiguities Impacting the Global Governance of Warfare in Public Arenas'.
[100] Spearin, 'Canada and Contracted War'.
[101] Tzifakis and Huliaras, 'The Perils of Outsourcing Post-conflict Reconstruction: Donor Countries, International NGOs and Private Military and Security Companies'.
[102] Van Meegdenburg, 'What the Research on PMSCs Discovered and Neglected'.
[103] Wolf, Deitelhoff, and Engert, 'Corporate Security Responsibility'.
[104] Tzifakis and Huliaras, 'The Perils of Outsourcing Post-conflict Reconstruction'.
[105] Bruneau, 'Contracting Out Security'.
[106] De Nevers, 'Private Security Companies and the Laws of War'.
[107] Saner, Uchegbu, and Yiu, 'Private Military and Security Companies: Legal and Political Ambiguities'.
[108] Krahmann, 'From Performance to Performativity'.
[109] Bara and Kreutz, 'To Buy a War but Sell the Peace? Mercenaries and Post-Civil War Stability'; Faulkner, 'Buying Peace?'; Radziszewski and Akcinaroglu, 'Private Military & Security Companies, Conflict Complexity'; Moussa, 'Privatizing Security and Authoritarian Adaptation'; Çaglar, 'Privatization of Security in Iraq with US Intervention'.
[110] De Groot and Regilme, 'Private Military and Security Companies and the Militarization of Humanitarianism'; Krahmann and Leander, 'Contracting Security: Markets in the Making'; Østensen, 'In the Business of Peace'; Spearin, 'Since you Left'.
[111] Akcinaroglu and Radziszewski, 'Private Military Companies, Opportunities, and Termination'.
[112] Bamigboye, 'Does Outsourcing Security to Private Security Companies Impact International Security and Counterterrorism?'.
[113] Bara and Kreutz, 'To Buy a War but Sell the Peace'.
[114] Çaglar, 'Privatization of Security in Iraq with US Intervention'.
[115] Coleman and Nyblade, 'Peacekeeping for Profit? The Scope and Limits of "Mercenary" UN Peacekeeping'.
[116] De Groot and Regilme, 'Private Military and Security Companies and the Militarization of Humanitarianism'.
[117] De Nevers, 'Private Security Companies and the Laws of War'.
[118] Faulkner, 'Buying Peace?'.
[119] Giumelli and Cusumano, 'Normative Power under Contract? Commercial Support to European Crisis Management Operations'.
[120] Krahmann, 'NATO Contracting in Afghanistan'.
[121] Krahmann and Leander, 'Contracting Security: Markets in the Making'.
[122] Moussa, 'Privatizing Security and Authoritarian Adaptation'.
[123] Østensen, 'In the Business of Peace'.
[124] Radziszewski and Akcinaroglu, 'Private Military & Security Companies, Conflict Complexity'.
[125] Spearin, 'Since You Left'.
[126] Varin, 'Turning the Tides of War'.
[127] Fisher and Anderson, 'Authoritarianism and the Securitization'; Krahmann and Leander, 'Contracting Security: Markets in the Making'; Çaglar, 'Privatization of Security in Iraq with US Intervention'; Fitzsimmons, 'Wheeled Warriors'; Heinecken, 'Outsourcing Public Security: The Unforeseen Consequences'; Leander, 'The Market for Force and Public Security'.

[128] Penel and Petersohn, 'Commercial Military Actors and Civilian Victimization in Africa, Middle East, Latin America, and Asia, 1980–2011'.
[129] Krahmann, 'NATO Contracting in Afghanistan'; Macleod and Dewinter-Schmitt, 'Certifying Private Security Companies'.
[130] Østensen, 'In the Business of Peace'.
[131] Çaglar, 'Privatization of Security in Iraq with US Intervention'.
[132] Daumann, 'Potential Negative Externalities'.
[133] Fisher and Anderson, 'Authoritarianism and the Securitization of Development in Africa'.
[134] Fitzsimmons, 'Wheeled Warriors'.
[135] Heinecken, 'Outsourcing Public Security: The Unforeseen Consequences'.
[136] Krahmann, 'NATO Contracting in Afghanistan'.
[137] Krahmann and Leander, 'Contracting Security: Markets in the Making'.
[138] Leander, 'The Market for Force and Public Security'.
[139] Macleod and Dewinter-Schmitt, 'Certifying Private Security Companies'.
[140] Østensen, 'In the Business of Peace'.
[141] Penel and Petersohn, 'Commercial Military Actors and Civilian Victimization'.
[142] Paalo et al., 'Exploring Hybrid Security Strategies in Ghana'.
[143] Dorn and Levi, 'European Private Security, Corporate Investigation and Military Services'; Kinsey and Krieg, 'Assembling a Force to Defeat Boko Haram'.
[144] Biaumet, 'The Sentinel and the Rebel'.
[145] Berndtsson, 'Exploring PSC-Military Relations: Swedish Officers and the Private Security Sector in Peace Operations'.
[146] Fahn and Hadjer, 'Optimal Contracting'.
[147] Krahmann, 'NATO Contracting in Afghanistan'.
[148] Berndtsson, 'Exploring PSC-military Relations'.
[149] Biaumet, 'The Sentinel and the Rebel'.
[150] Dorn and Levi, 'European Private Security, Corporate Investigation'.
[151] Fahn and Hadjer, 'Optimal Contracting'.
[152] Kinsey and Krieg, 'Assembling a Force to Defeat Boko Haram'.
[153] Krahmann, 'NATO Contracting in Afghanistan'.
[154] Moussa, 'Privatizing Security and Authoritarian Adaptation'.
[155] Paalo et al., 'Exploring Hybrid Security Strategies in Ghana'.
[156] Schouten and Miklian, 'The Business–Peace Nexus'.
[157] De Nevers, 'The Effectiveness of Self-regulation'.
[158] Galeotti, 'Hybrid, Ambiguous, and Non-linear? How New is Russia's "New Way of War"?'.
[159] Penel and Petersohn, 'Commercial Military Actors'.
[160] Leander, 'The Market for Force and Public Security'.
[161] Petersohn, 'The Effectiveness of Contracted Coalitions'.
[162] Leander, 'The Market for Force and Public Security'.
[163] Caliskan, 'Hybrid Warfare Through the Lens of Strategic Theory'.
[164] Arnold, 'The Geo-economic Dimensions of Russian Private Military and Security Companies'.
[165] Jaklin, 'Sadat: Proxy Force – Informal Security Structure – Turkey's Group Wagner?'.

Bibliography

Adamo, Antonino. 'The Terrorist and the Mercenary: Private Warriors against Nigeria's Boko Haram'. *African Studies* 79, no. 3 (2020), pp. 339–359. https://doi.org/10.1080/00020184.2020.1788920.

Akcinaroglu, S., and E. Radziszewski. 'Private Military Companies, Opportunities, and Termination of Civil Wars in Africa'. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 57, no. 5 (October 2013), pp. 795–821. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002712449325.

Andreopoulos, George J., and John Kleinig. *Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) and the Quest for Accountability.* London: Routledge, 2015.

Arduino, Alessandro. *China's Private Army: Protecting the New Silk Road*. Singapore: Springer, 2018. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-7215-4.

Arnold, Thomas D. 'The Geoeconomic Dimensions of Russian Private Military and Security Companies'. *Military Review* 99, no. 6 (November-December 2019), pp. 6–18.

Avant, Deborah D. 'Pragmatic Networks and Transnational Governance of Private Military and Security Services'. *International Studies Quarterly* 60, no. 2 (June 2016), pp. 330–342. https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqv018.

Axelrod, Alan, and Michael Dubowe. *Mercenaries: A Guide to Private Armies and Private Military Companies*. Thousand Oaks, Calif.: CQ Press, 2014.

Bamigboye, Oluwaseyi Mike. 'Does Outsourcing Security to Private Security Companies Impact International Security and Counterterrorism?' *African Journal of Terrorism and Insurgency Research* 3, no. 2 (2022).

Bara, C., and J. Kreutz. 'To Buy a War but Sell the Peace? Mercenaries and Post-Civil War Stability'. *Security Studies* 31, no. 3 (May 2022), pp. 417–445. https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2022.2097890.

Berndtsson, J. 'Exploring PSC-Military Relations: Swedish Officers and the Private Security Sector in Peace Operations'. *Cooperation and Conflict* 48, no. 4 (December 2013), pp. 484–501. https://doi.org/10.1177/0010836713482554.

Biaumet, G. 'The Sentinel and the Rebel. Multi-Choice Policing in Burundi and the State-Centered Approach of Security Sector Reform'. *Crime Law and Social Change* 67, no. 3 (April 2017), pp. 333–351. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10611-016-9654-2.

Bruneau, T. C. 'Contracting Out Security'. *Journal of Strategic Studies* 36, no. 5 (October 2013), pp. 638–665. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2012.663254.

Çaglar, M.T. 'Privatization of Security in Iraq with US Intervention: The Role and Effects of Contracted Personnel and Private Military and Security Companies'. *Siyasal-Journal of Political Sciences* 29, no. 1 (March 2020), pp. 143–163. https://doi.org/10.26650/siyasal.2020.29.1.0027.

Caliskan, Murat. 'Hybrid Warfare through the Lens of Strategic Theory'. *Defense & Security Analysis* 35, no. 1 (2019), pp. 40–58.

Cameron, Lindsey, and Vincent Chetail. *Privatizing War: Private Military and Security Companies under Public International Law.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013.

Coleman, K.P., and B. Nyblade. 'Peacekeeping for Profit? The Scope and Limits of 'Mercenary' UN Peacekeeping'. *Journal of Peace Research* 55, no. 6 (November 2018), pp. 726–741. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343318775784.

Cusumano, E. 'The Scope of Military Privatisation: Military Role Conceptions and Contractor Support in the United States and the United Kingdom'. *International Relations* 29, no. 2 (June 2015), pp. 219–241. https://doi.org/10.1177/0047117814552142.

Daumann, Frank. 'Potential Negative Externalities of Private Military Entrepreneurs from an Economic Perspective'. *Defence and Peace Economics* 35, no. 2 (2024), pp. 206–226.

Daumann, Frank. 'The Client's Struggle to Control Private Military Companies Effectively'. *Defence and Security Analysis* 39, no. 4 (2023), pp. 432–451. https://doi.org/10.1080/14751798.2023.2240654.

De Groot, Tom, and Salvador Santino F Regilme Jr. 'Private Military and Security Companies and the Militarization of Humanitarianism'. *Journal of Developing Societies* 38, no. 1 (2022), pp. 50–80.

De Nevers, Renée. 'Private Security Companies and the Laws of War'. *Security Dialogue* 40, no. 2 (2009), pp. 169–190.

De Nevers, Renée. 'The Effectiveness of Self-Regulation by the Private Military and Security Industry'. *Journal of Public Policy* 30, no. 2 (2010), pp. 219–240.

Dorn, Nicholas, and Michael Levi. 'European Private Security, Corporate Investigation and Military Services: Collective Security, Market Regulation and Structuring the Public Sphere'. *Policing & Society* 17, no. 3 (2007), pp. 213–238.

Duffield, Mark R., and Antonio Donini. *Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging of Development and Security*. London: Zed Books, 2014.

Dunigan, M. 'The Future of US Military Contracting: Current Trends and Future Implications'. *International Journal* 69, no. 4 (December 2014), pp. 510–524. https://doi.org/10.1177/0020702014549677.

Fahn, M., and T. Hadjer. 'Optimal Contracting with Private Military and Security Companies'. *European Journal of Political Economy* 37 (March 2015), pp. 220–240. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2014.10.004.

Faulkner, C.M. 'Buying Peace? Civil War Peace Duration and Private Military & Security Companies'. *Civil Wars* 21, no. 1 (2019), pp. 83–103. https://doi.org/10.1080/13698249.2017.1406037.

Fisher, Jonathan, and David M Anderson. 'Authoritarianism and the Securitization of Development in Africa'. *International Affairs* 91, no. 1 (2015), pp. 131–151.

Fitzsimmons, Scott. 'Wheeled Warriors: Explaining Variations in the Use of Violence by Private Security Companies in Iraq'. *Security Studies* 22, no. 4 (October 2013), pp. 707–739. https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2013.844521.

Fitzsimmons, Scott. 'Contracting Blowback? The Use of Violence by Private Security Companies and Insurgents during the Iraq War'. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 47, no. 1 (2024), pp. 78–97.

Fitzsimmons, Scott. *Private Security Companies during the Iraq War: Military Performance and the Use of Deadly Force*. London: Routledge, 2016.

Galeotti, Mark. 'Hybrid, Ambiguous, and Non-Linear? How New Is Russia's "New Way of War"?'. *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 27, no. 2 (2016), pp. 282–301. https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2015.1129170.

Giumelli, Francesco, and Eugenio Cusumano. 'Normative Power under Contract? Commercial Support to European Crisis Management Operations'. *International Peacekeeping* 21, no. 1 (2014), pp. 37–55.

Grassiani, Erella, and Tessa Diphoorn. 'Introduction: Ethnographies of Private Security'. *Conflict and Society* 3, no. 1 (2017), pp. 1–7. https://doi.org/10.3167/arcs.2017.030101.

Gwatiwa, Tshepo T. 'Private Military and Security Companies Policy in Africa: Regional Policy Stasis as Agency in International Politics'. *Scientia Militaria: South African Journal of Military Studies* 44, no. 2 (2016), pp. 68–86.

Heinecken, L. 'Outsourcing Public Security: The Unforeseen Consequences for the Military Profession'. *Armed Forces & Society* 40, no. 4 (2014), pp. 625–646. https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327x13489974.

Jackson, Kristi, Pat Bazeley and Patricia Bazeley. *Qualitative Data Analysis with NVivo.* London: Sage, 2019.

Jaklin, David Christopher, 'Sadat: Proxy Force – Informal Security Structure – Turkey's Group Wagner?' In *Agents of Violence: Non-Governmental Armed Forces in Southwest Asia, North Africa and Beyond*, edited by Rüdiger Lohlker and Katharina Ivanyi. Leiden: Brill/Schöningh, 2024, pp. 1–24. https://doi.org/10.30965/9783657794478_002.

Jefferies, Ian D. 'Private Military Companies: A Positive Role to Play in Today's International System'. *Connections* 1, no. 4 (2002), pp. 103–125.

Jesson, Jill, Fiona M. Lacey and Lydia Matheson. *Doing Your Literature Review: Traditional and Systematic Techniques.* London: Sage, 2011.

Joachim, Jutta, and Andrea Schneiker. 'All for One and One in All: Private Military Security Companies as Soldiers, Business Managers and Humanitarians'. *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 27, no. 2 (June 2014), pp. 246–267. https://doi.org/10.1080/09557571.2013.867300.

Joachim, Jutta, and Andrea Schneiker. 'New Humanitarians? Frame Appropriation through Private Military and Security Companies'. *Millennium* 40, no. 2 (2012), pp. 365–388.

Jones, Seth G., Catrina Doxsee, Brian Katz, Eric McQueen, Joe Moye. *Russia's Corporate Soldiers: The Global Expansion of Russia's Private Military Companies.* Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2021.

Kinsey, Christopher. *Corporate Soldiers and International Security: The Rise of Private Military Companies.* Abingdon: Routledge, 2006.

Kinsey, Christopher. *Private Contractors and the Reconstruction of Iraq: Transforming Military Logistics*. London: Routledge, 2009.

Kinsey, Christopher, and Andreas Krieg. 'Assembling a Force to Defeat Boko Haram: How Nigeria Integrated the Market into Its Counterinsurgency Strategy'. *Defence and Security Analysis* 37, no. 2 (April 2021), pp. 232–249. https://doi.org/10.1080/14751798.2021.1919356.

Krahmann, E. 'From Performance to Performativity: The Legitimization of US Security Contracting and Its Consequences'. *Security Dialogue* 48, no. 6 (December 2017), pp. 541–559. https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010617722650.

Krahmann, E. 'NATO Contracting in Afghanistan: The Problem of Principal-Agent Networks'. *International Affairs* 92, no. 6 (November 2016), pp. 1401–1426. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2346.12753.

Krahmann, E., and A. Leander. 'Contracting Security: Markets in the Making of MONUSCO Peacekeeping'. *International Peacekeeping* 26, no. 2 (March 2019) pp. 165–189. https://doi.org/10.1080/13533312.2018.1557051.

Kruck, A. 'Theorising the Use of Private Military and Security Companies: A Synthetic Perspective'. *Journal of International Relations and Development* 17, no. 1 (January 2014), pp. 112–141. https://doi.org/10.1057/jird.2013.4.

Leander, Anna. 'The Market for Force and Public Security: The Destabilizing Consequences of Private Military Companies'. *Journal of Peace Research* 42, no. 5 (2005), pp. 605–622.

Li, N. 'Major Security Challenges to China's Belt and Road Initiative'. *East Asian Policy* 11, no. 2 (April–June 2019), pp. 95–103. https://doi.org/10.1142/s1793930519000205.

Lovewine, George C. *Outsourcing the Global War on Terrorism: Private Military Companies and American Intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan.* New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014.

Macleod, S., and R. Dewinter-Schmitt. 'Certifying Private Security Companies: Effectively Ensuring the Corporate Responsibility to Respect Human Rights?'. *Business and Human Rights Journal* 4, no. 1 (January 2019) pp. 55–77. https://doi.org/10.1017/bhj.2018.25.

Mahoney, C.W. 'Buyer Beware: How Market Structure Affects Contracting and Company Performance in the Private Military Industry'. *Security Studies* 26, no. 1 (January-March 2017), pp. 30–59. https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2017.1243912.

Moussa, E. 'Privatizing Security and Authoritarian Adaptation in the Arab Region since the 2010–2011 Uprisings'. *Contemporary Security Policy* 44, no. 3 (July 2023), pp. 462–490. https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2023.2214757.

Ostensen, Å.G. 'In the Business of Peace: The Political Influence of Private Military and Security Companies on UN Peacekeeping'. *International Peacekeeping* 20, no. 1 (February 2013), pp. 33–47. https://doi.org/10.1080/13533312.2012.761872.

Paalo, S.A., D.D. Arthur, A. Dramani, and S. Adu-Gyamfi. 'Exploring Hybrid Security Strategies in Ghana: State and Private Sector Partnerships'. *African Security Review*, 33, no. 1 (December 2023), pp. 81–97. https://doi.org/10.1080/10246029.2023.2286225.

Pattison, James. *The Morality of Private War: The Challenge of Private Military and Security Companies.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014.

Penel, Charlotte, and Ulrich Petersohn. 'Commercial Military Actors and Civilian Victimization in Africa, Middle East, Latin America, and Asia, 1980–2011'. *Journal of Global Security Studies* 7, no. 1 (March 2022): ogab029. https://doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogab029.

Pereira, R., A. Luquett, R. Forte, and M. Eslami. 'Chinese Private Security Companies and the Limit of Coercion'. *Small Wars and Insurgencies* 34, no. 8 (November 2023), pp. 1532–1557. https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2023.2256645.

Petersohn, Ulrich. 'The Effectiveness of Contracted Coalitions: Private Security Contractors in Iraq'. *Armed Forces & Society* 39, no. 3 (July 2013), pp. 467–488. https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X12459712.

Radziszewski, E., and S. Akcinaroglu. 'Private Military & Security Companies, Conflict Complexity, and Peace Duration: An Empirical Analysis'. *Small Wars and Insurgencies* 31, no. 7–8 (November 2020), pp. 1415–1440. https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2020.1784500.

Ramirez, M.D., and R.M. Wood. 'Public Attitudes toward Private Military Companies: Insights from Principal-Agent Theory'. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 63, no. 6 (July 2019), pp. 1433–1459. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002718797166.

Ranito, J.J., and C.T. Mayer. 'Normalization of Mercenary-Like Private Military and Security Companies: The Need for Re-Securitization of Regulation'. *International Politics* 58, no. 5 (October 2021), pp. 772–791. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41311-020-00271-3.

Rosén, Frederik. 'Commercial Security: Conditions of Growth'. *Security Dialogue* 39, no. 1 (2008), pp. 77–97.

Saner, R., A. Uchegbu, and L. Yiu. 'Private Military and Security Companies: Legal and Political Ambiguities Impacting the Global Governance of Warfare in Public Arenas'. *Asia Pacific Journal of Public Administration* 41, no. 2 (2019), pp. 63–71. https://doi.org/10.1080/23276665.2019.1622325.

Schouten, Peer, and Jason Miklian. 'The Business–Peace Nexus: "Business for Peace" and the Reconfiguration of the Public/Private Divide in Global Governance'. *Journal of International Relations and Development* 23 (2020), pp. 414–435.

Singer, Peter W. *Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2008.

Snyder, Hannah. 'Literature Review as a Research Methodology: An Overview and Guidelines'. *Journal of Business Research* 104 (2019), pp. 333–339. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbusres.2019.07.039.

Spearin, Christopher. 'Canada and Contracted War: Afghanistan and Beyond'. *International Journal* 69, no. 4 (December 2014), pp. 525–541. https://doi.org/10.1177/0020702014546703.

Spearin, Christopher. *Private Military and Security Companies and States: Force Divided.* London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017.

Spearin, Christopher. 'Since You Left: United Nations Peace Support, Private Military and Security Companies, and Canada'. *International Journal* 73, no. 1 (March 2018), pp. 68–84. https://doi.org/10.1177/0020702017740158.

Spearin, Christopher. 'UN Peacekeeping and Chinese Private Security Companies: Assessing Demand Factors for China'. *Defense & Security Analysis* 38, no. 1 (January 2022), pp. 91–105. https://doi.org/10.1080/14751798.2022.2030917.

Swed, O. 'The Afghanistan War's Legacy: The Reimagining of the Outsourcing of War and Security'. *Armed Forces & Society* 49, no. 4 (October 2023), pp. 1027–1034. https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X221101340.

Tzifakis, Nikolaos, and Asteris Huliaras. 'The Perils of Outsourcing Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Donor Countries, International NGOs and Private Military and Security Companies'. *Conflict, Security & Development* 15, no. 1 (2015), pp. 51–73.

Van Meegdenburg, Hilde. 'What the Research on PMSCs Discovered and Neglected: An Appraisal of the Literature'. *Contemporary Security Policy* 36, no. 2 (2015), pp. 321–345.

Varin, Caroline. 'Turning the Tides of War: The Impact of Private Military and Security Companies on Nigeria's Counterinsurgency against Boko Haram'. *African Security Review* 27, no. 2 (2018), pp. 144–157.

Voß, Klaas. 'Plausibly Deniable: Mercenaries in US Covert Interventions during the Cold War, 1964–1987'. *Cold War History* 16, no. 1 (2016), pp. 37–60. https://doi.org/10.1080/14682745.2015.1078312.

Wilson, Owen. *The Wagner Group: Yevgeny Prigozhin's Mercenaries and Their Ties to Vladimir Putin.* London: Gibson Square, 2023.

Wolf, Klaus Dieter, Nicole Deitelhoff, and Stefan Engert. 'Corporate Security Responsibility: Towards a Conceptual Framework for a Comparative Research Agenda'. *Cooperation and Conflict* 42, no. 3 (2007), pp. 294–320.

Yuan, Jingdong. 'China's Private Security Companies and the Protection of Chinese Economic Interests Abroad'. *Small Wars and Insurgencies* 33, no. 1–2 (February 2022), pp. 173–195. https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2021.1940646.

CHAPTER 9

Expansion or Restraint? China's Use of Private Military and Security Companies along the 'Belt and Road Initiative' in Asia and Africa

Thijs Cremers & Maarten Rothman

Abstract

This chapter compares the modus operandi of Chinese PMSCs with Western and Russian PMSCs. We focus on their relation to their home state's foreign policy and, consequently, the type of operations they undertake. The comparison allows us to draw on the extensive literature about Western and Russian PMSCs to supplement the more limited information about the Chinese. As all three are active in Asia and Africa, much of the chapter deals with their activities there. We find that Chinese PMSCs are limited by their home country's policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states to mostly defensive operations. The contrast with the activities of Russian PMSCs such as Wagner is especially clear. There are, however, signs that China is finding the constraints on its PMSCs too limiting.

Keywords: PMC, PSC, PMSC, Private Military Security Companies, China, Russia, US, development, evolution, comparison

9.1 Introduction

In today's world the Chinese initiative to build a new Silk Road, or the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), seems to have more far-reaching consequences than exploiting mere trade opportunities. This project is considered the path to restoring China as the Middle Kingdom in the world.[1] For this purpose, China is actively combining the several instruments of state power in order to secure and exploit Chinese interests. One of these instruments are nominally private military and security companies (PMSCs). In some locales, particularly in Africa and Asia, it seems China is looking for ways to physically secure its trade initiatives by using Chinese private security companies in foreign countries. This raises questions about the ways in which these PMSCs function as extensions of China's foreign policy apparatus. As with other Chinese companies, it is likely that they adhere to the state's policies but it is not readily apparent to which degree. This chapter employs a comparison between

Chinese PMSCs and their Russian and Western counterparts to get around the lack of transparency.

While there is no agreed or unambiguous definition on PMSCs in the literature, for the sake of clarity we will use the following working definition: Private Military and Security Companies *provide an array of security services, such as guard services, logistics and operational tasks during conflicts and wars*.[2] This definition leaves out companies providing security in peaceful circumstances, such as at airports or protecting private assets from break-ins and vandalism; the overlap with the tasks of PMSCs during conflict means these serve as recruiting grounds but they are not included in our discussion. The definition encompasses Private Military Companies (PMCs), Private Security Companies (PSCs) and Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs). While their modus operandi is different as they fulfil different roles, they all move within the security domain. A PSC is mainly concerned with defensive tasks (guard, protect, defend, etc.), whereas a PMC is equipped to execute the full range of military activities from defence to offence, including combat operations. A PMSC represents both worlds and has nowadays become the standard in the branch. For clarity, we will use the term PMSC to refer to PSCs, PMCs and PMSCs and will specify whenever deemed necessary. Figure 9.1 (below) represents the relationship between the three concepts within the Security domain.




Figure 9.1: Interaction of concepts of PSC, PMC and PMSC and the use of force. Model by authors.

In the West there has been a change in approach and acceptance towards the use of military contractors over the years. What initially started as an obscure no-go-mercenary-market has over the past decennia evolved into a free market of force. This market is controlled by self-regulatory bodies and documents (like the ICoCA and Montreux Document) which follow western thought on professionalism, ethics and International Humanitarian Law (IHL). These conditions meet the requirements of state-actors looking for skilled and military (or law-enforcement) trained personnel

to deploy in hot spots all over the world. This trend in privatising security, due to changes in global governance and security governance, has grown exponentially.

Outside the West the market for PMSCs has also grown.[3] But Russian and Chinese perceptions of military contractors are not the same. In the West there is no legal ban on doing business with a PSC, a PMC or a PMSC. However, for Russia and China this is more complicated. Since PMCs are legally forbidden in Russia, the use of the term PMSC offers opportunities to execute military style operations which would otherwise not be possible.[4] It offers a murky marketplace where state and 'private' companies meet and do business with each other. China has traditionally followed a non-interference policy when it comes to state sovereignty. The PLA (People's Liberation Army) and the PAP (People's Armed Police) are under tight and exclusive control of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the use of (lethal) force is strictly controlled. Since China's international economic growth, of which the BRI is the most visible element, this has become a serious problem when protecting Chinese citizens abroad.[5] Chinese use of PMSCs is therefore closely linked to the projection of Chinese influence abroad.

In the following sections we will use the above two categories (waves and modus operandi) to compare the activities of Chinese PMSCs with their Western and Russian counterparts. The first section sketches the development of Western companies in four successive waves and places Russian companies in the same interpretive frame. The section on Chinese PMSCs describes their recent re-emergence and their use by the Chinese state, using the same framework. These first two sections focus on the strategic level. In the third section we take a closer look at Western and Russian PMSCs' modes of operation, followed in the fourth section by a look at Chinese PMSC activities at the same level. We conclude with a comparative analysis of the three actors described in this chapter.

9.2 Western and Russian PMSCs: The Strategic Level

The first step is to set out some criteria by which we can analyse the activities of Chinese PMSCs. These we derive from Western practice and the literature on it. One, which will be discussed below, we borrow from Peter Singer and Thomas D. Arnold, who both classify PMSCs according to their distance to the frontline and the use of (lethal) force.[6] If we look at the different levels of warfare, this would be covering the operational and, in some cases, the tactical level. The distinction would not be very easy to make, and for the sake of clarity we will call this the operational level. The other level we describe has been derived from the history of Western PMSCs. Each of the four waves recognised in the literature represents a different relation between PMSCs and the states with which they interact. As

these interactions connect PMSC operations with the political and higher military purposes of state actors, we call this the strategic level.

In principle there are three states involved; for clarity we will use the same definitions as the Montreux Document of 2008: the *contracting state* being the state that hires them (or the state in which the client corporation is incorporated), the state on whose territory the PMSC operates (hereafter referred to as the *territorial state*), and the state from where the PMSC runs its business (the *home state*).[7] In some cases they are different states, in others it's the same state in two or even all three roles. To say that PMSCs serve only the interest of the client is too simple; they also have to reckon with the legal and political framework of the sending state, which frequently has as much, if not more, say over its actions as the client state. The state on whose territory they operate, on the other hand, does not always exert such influence over their actions, unless it's also the client or sending state.

The first time in recent history where States overtly used this form of contracting (as distinct from pre- and early modern mercenaries) was during the Second World War when the United States used contracted airpower. The American Volunteer Group, also known as Flying Tigers, was an American initiative led by major-general Claire Chennault to build up China's air force and defend China against the Japanese attacks during the Second World War.[8] The envisioned missions 'were to be carried out by American mercenaries, men released from the army and navy and paid by the United States government through a private corporation.'[9] The case of the Flying Tigers among others indicates that the US made use of PMSCs to augment its military force or fill personnel gaps in a wide range of military activities, 'even in instances where the chance of direct contact with the enemy was the goal.'[10] Due to the distance from other US forces and their supply chains, the Flying Tigers would have had to operate independently even if they were incorporated in the regular armed forces; this probably contributed to the decision to put the operation in the hands of a private contractor. This marks the first wave of the use of PMSCs on the modern battlefields.

The second wave of modern mercenarism dates back to shortly after the war when the British government was in desperate need of covert hired guns. After the Suez crisis in 1956, the port city of Aden (a British protectorate at the time) was considered the remaining cornerstone of British military interests in the Arab world. However, the popular coup in neighbouring Yemen, backed by Egyptian president Nasser, led to the overthrow of the King and Imam of North Yemen, Muhammad al-Badr. The British, supporting the Royalists, found themselves restricted by the international community when trying to protect their regional interests. Initially covert operations followed from weapon deliveries to military advice and training and eventually a clandestine mercenary operation in 1964 including former SAS men.[11] This series of events gave birth to the first commercial company of its kind,

Watchguard International: 'The idea behind the company was to safeguard British interests in places where the government was not able to act for whatever reason. WatchGuard International was created by SAS veterans, David Stirling and John Woodhouse in 1965. Their job was to provide, what is nowadays called Military Assistance and consisted of training foreign military units and providing support for their operations, particularly in the Middle East and Africa.[12] Although the company was short lived, ceasing to exist in 1972, 'it was to become the model for all future PMCs.'[13] In the UK numerous PMSCs took over the market after the demise of Watchguard International. One of these firms was KMS Ltd (Keenie Meenie Services) led by Major David Walker and other former SAS personnel. KMS Ltd specialised in the recruitment of (former) SAS soldiers, from the active and reserve units, to offer mercenary forces and bodyguards.[14] This firm, like others in the branch operated in the twilight of state support and plausible deniability in a time when proxy forces were a widespread tool to maintain the equilibrium between East and West. KMS Ltd was finally dissolved in 1988.

The third wave began with the founding of a South-African firm, named Executive Outcomes (EO) by Eeben Barlow in the late 1980s. Executive Outcomes was a product of its time, the downscaling of military apparatuses towards the end of the Cold War creating the need for a 'market oriented' back-up. In Africa in particular, as military aid from the two major power blocs wound down, states with weak militaries hired PMSCs to fight their civil wars. According to Barlow, his job was to advise and support the governments that hired them:

> We don't see ourselves as mercenaries. We are first of all contracted by a national government. We become part of their armed forces, we wear their uniforms, we follow their procedures and guidelines, we fall under the legal regulations of that country. So, in other words, we serve the country that contracts us. And yes, we get paid for it, but we certainly don't get paid to run around and cause chaos.[15]

EO served as a pioneer for other companies in the business. As Kinsey and Patterson stated in their book, *Contractors and War*: 'This is why contractors are now part of the military structure and integral to the point where they have become essential strategic assets. In their absence, most expeditionary operations could not be deployed nor sustained.'[16] During this period UK based Sandline International, considered to be EO's sister company, came to the foreground. This company provided combat support services, including lethal force, to democratically elected governments. According to Tim Spicer, CEO of Sandline International, they were a commercial company, operating in a free-market economy and thus had to meet the requirements of that market. That meant that they did not want any association with the contaminated term of mercenarism and had to become a legal (market)

entity working in the open.[17] Both EO and Sandline International created a more nuanced image of the industry than merely guns for hire. Before them, the general opinion was that these companies were no different than mercenaries. Spicer and Barlow distanced their companies and the industry from the rogue and edgy appearance of the mercenary by legitimising private companies in combat.[18] EO was dissolved at the end of 1998, but re-established in 2020 whilst Sandline ceased to exist on 16 April 2004 due to what it called 'a lack of governmental support for private military companies willing to help end armed conflicts in places like Africa.'[19]

The fourth wave started during the first decade of 2000. Erik Prince's Blackwater, DynCorp and Triple Canopy are among the best-known Private Military and Security Companies in the Western world which rose to prominence at the start of the 2000s. Blackwater had more or less become the standard for the business until the Nisour square massacre in Baghdad on 16 September 2007 led to its downfall. Blackwater was later rebranded, twice, into what is known today as Academi, a part of the Constellis Holdings.[20] As these companies operate in a free market, heavily influenced by public opinion, they had in any case to follow the rules and regulations of this free market in order to survive.[21] The Nisour square massacre lifted the veil of obscurity and made them public; to break free from the stigma of unreliable guns for hire these companies have publicly recommitted themselves to international standards based on western ethical principles.[22] This not only means that these companies have to meet proper economical standards like any other company or profit-organisation, but also international ethical standards like the Geneva conventions or the humanitarian law on conflicts as they represent a nation-state. By representing states, these companies automatically become the public face of these states and therefore vulnerable to public opinion. This vulnerability could lead to mistrust of clients which eventually would force them out of business.

More than a mere sequence of companies succeeding each other, the four waves represent different approaches to PMSCs. First wave companies provided additional capacity to wartime armies, their nominal independence made little difference other than reducing the demand on already strained supply chains. The second wave consists of ostensibly private organisations that are nevertheless to a large extent under the direction of their home state. Their function is to provide cover, or at least plausible deniability, for military support to an unrecognised regime or for coups d'état. Third wave PMSCs generally serve as substitutes for unreliable armed services in weak (developing) states. Perhaps due to the client's weak government finances, payment sometimes comes in the form of direct exploitation of natural resources. The fourth wave distinguishes itself from the third by its clients, who are generally strong (Western) states who prefer market-based military options for economic or ideological reasons in the same way

that they outsource other government functions. This wave shows clear similarities with the first wave since the actor who 'hires' military contractors in both cases is a strong (Western) state hiring its own veterans. In each wave except the third, the primary state actor influencing PMSC operations is the contracting state; in the fourth wave the contracting state is usually also the home state; only in the third wave is the territorial state predominant. The four waves can thus be read as different models describing the possible functions of PMSCs for their clients.

Like Western powers, Russia has used proxy forces in various formations at various times to exert influence on the world stage. The growth of Russian PMSCs can be tied to the collapse of the Soviet empire in the beginning of the 1990s. With the thaw of the Cold War, and the reconciliation between East and West also came the cutbacks in the Soviet and Russian Armed Forces. The unemployment rate among war veterans grew with the dismantling of these large armies and led to an influx of former soldiers looking for fortune in a profession they were trained for. These former military men started to regroup into small businesses in the market for force. Although illegal under Article 13.5 of the Russian Constitution,[23] these businesses flourished not only in conflicts in desolate parts of the world but also as secret instruments of power of the Russian government domestically and abroad: 'Russia has increased its use of PMCs as a tool of foreign policy, beginning around 2015. As CSIS data highlight, the number of countries where PMCs operate around the globe increased sevenfold between 2015 and 2021, from 4 countries in 2015 to 27 in 2021.'[24] Another CSIS report stated back in 2020 that Russia was expanding its influence in different parts of the world by using private military companies such as the Wagner Group: 'Russia's strategy is straightforward: to undermine US power and increase Moscow's influence using low-profile, deniable forces like PMCs that can do everything from providing foreign leaders with security to training, advising, and assisting partner security forces.'[25]

The story of the PMC Wagner (a part of which is now renamed Africa Corps) began with a group of former elite soldiers, inspired by the story of Eeben Barlow to make a profit off their military skill set.[26] Wagner does not have the same standards for professionality and ethics as western PMSCs; it first gained notoriety for the brutality of its African operations, then for its contribution to the Russian war effort in Ukraine, and finally for its mutiny.[27] Its modus operandi and track record in recent conflict areas (including the mutiny) show clear signs of Russian governmental connections. In December 2022 a RAND Corporation study stated:

> The Wagner Group increasingly operates less like a single organization and more like an umbrella of many entities, most likely under the control and direction of Russian government leaders. It is an outlier in the world of PMSCs. It is considered a mercenary group with close ties to the Russian government.[28]

We observe that Wagner's African operations fit rather well with the third wave. It derives a large share of its profit from plunder and exploitation of natural resources, rather than from wages. The contracting state, Russia, does gain influence in its area of operations but the territorial state also benefits: 'The Wagner Group is probably best understood as a clandestine collection of businesses with close ties to the Russian government – including financial facilitators, cut-outs, front companies, and shell companies to hide activities and investments.'[29]

9.3 Chinese PMSCs: The Strategic Level

China's use of PMSCs followed a rather different trajectory than Western or Russian uses. The Chinese state started licensing private security companies, known as Biaoju, in the late 18th century. The first of these under Zhang Heiwu from Shanxi province employed 500 martial arts-trained fighters to protect wealthy citizens and cash transports. The Biaoju system remained in place until the Chinese Revolution of 1948, when the Communist Party made security and defence a state monopoly. The state was even, via four state-affiliated companies, responsible for the protection of Chinese goods and infrastructure outside of its borders.[30] Private security companies were allowed again after 1984 as part of a range of economic reforms, though laws on carrying weapons remain restrictive. As the scope of Chinese activities abroad increased, Chinese PMSCs also increased their presence.

We should note that China's diplomatic and economic power (soft power) has been China's strength in its relations with African states up to now. China offers its partner states improvements in infrastructure, built by Chinese construction companies so that other Chinese companies may work more efficiently. Partner states also earn a share of the profits from the exploitation of (mostly) natural resources. The profits typically accrue to the partner state's government; China considers their use or distribution an internal matter that it should not interfere with. However, as hostilities towards Chinese SOE (State Owned Enterprises) grow, Chinese soft power alone appears insufficient. China seems to be revising its soft power strategy[31] and is investing in military (hard) power to protect its interests on the African continent, though as far as possible without undermining the soft power approach. Direct PLA involvement is therefore less appealing than more indirect means. China has instead used Chinese private security companies to protect her Chinese workforce (consisting of more than 590,000 Chinese personnel). These PMSCs avoid attracting attention and comparison with the Russian PMSC Wagner or the American Blackwater by working exclusively at Chinese facilities and not interfering in the internal politics of the African countries.[32] Like Russia, and in contrast with the West, China avoids confrontation over ethical issues as it

maintains that internal conflict falls under the rubric of state sovereignty and thus under the principle of non-interference. Unlike Russia, China has not gone so far as to support such governments against its domestic opponents by lending it aid through a Wagner-like PMSC.

This reorientation towards PMSCs is also showing itself in naval affairs. Though the Chinese navy joined international efforts to combat piracy in 2008, its efforts are supplemented with private protection. In response to frequent pirate attacks in the Strait of Malacca and off the coast of Somalia, Chinese ship owners are encouraged to embark PMSC personnel on their ships to protect the 'Maritime Silk Road.' Chinese PMSCs are reported to use 'floating armouries', vessels that sail in international waters where various national restrictions do not apply (though as the home state, China has other means to control their activities). One Chinese PMSC, Hua Xin, has also been authorised by the governments of Sri Lanka, Djibouti and Egypt to operate in their waters.[33]

Ironically or perversely (depending on one's point of view), China's piracy problem is a mirror image of its own operations in the South China Sea. There, Chinese fishing vessels attacked their counterparts in disputed waters in a display of hybrid warfare, these so-called 'little blue men' serving as an informal militia that can back up Chinese territorial claims while limiting escalation. Although an inexpensive force multiplier, this militia is a 'perversion of legal concepts or processes to counter an opponent' because of its civilian characteristics.[34]

It is clear from these developments that the Chinese government is analysing its foreign experiences and evaluating the different models available on the market. Western PMSCs are built on the basis of full legalisation, transparency and openness for national and international control, and independence from the state; force is only allowed in extremis. This implies a level of private ownership which is incompatible with current CCP-policy:

> The Russian model, by contrast, is predicated on near complete dependency on the state; illegal status and next to zero accountability for actions; and plausible deniability that could be enjoyed by the state and sponsors of these entities. This pattern, however, carries the risk of negative international publicity, and requires personnel with extensive fighting experience – an element that the Chinese military, unlike its Russian counterpart, does not have.[35]

China will probably go its own way. In order to secure Beijing's political and economic interests in strategically important areas, PMSCs will be used as instruments of China's toolbox but China will set its own rules.[36] Considering the careful consideration of the host state's interests, China's use of PMSCs best fits the first wave model, applied with more restraint than the Western and Russian examples

outlined above. The case of the Flying Tigers, as out-of-area troops partly under 'foreign' command therefore resembles what current Chinese PMSCs also encounter. While the government's influence on its PMSCs is clear, their use (rather than the deployment of PLA units) nevertheless puts some distance between it and the violence they necessarily apply to safeguard its interests. An element of plausible deniability – the main motive in the second wave model – is therefore also present.

9.4 Western and Russian PMSCs: The Operational Level

Moving from the interests of the states involved with PMSCs to their modes of operation, we take another model from the literature. Peter Singer classifies PMSCs according to their distance to the frontline: from military provider firms who actually deliver combat power, via military consultant firms who support with military advice and training, to military supplier firms operating in the rear and providing transport and logistical services.[37] The majority of Western PMSCs offer their services in the latter two areas, whereas Russian PMSCs are mostly known for their combat operations. However, since 2000, western PMSCs have become a more common face in conflict areas. These companies became an extra pair of gloves for a state to bring to the fight. The PMSCs were given permission to operate, and use legitimate force, on behalf of the states that hired them.[38]

Chapter 8 in this volume acknowledges several blind spots when categorising PMSCs from different parts of the world. It refers to Arnold and his analytical framework to better understand PMSC's behaviour. This model, which is based on Singer's typology of PMSCs can be used to characterise PMSCs. In his article *the Geoeconomic Dimensions of Russian Private Military and Security Companies*, Arnold has extended the range of Singer's typology by dividing lethal force into two separate segments; one for defensive purposes (PSC) and one for offensive purposes (PMC).[39] Besides this change, he visualised the typology in a graphic with an X-axis and a Y-axis. Important to understand is that Arnold's definition of PSCs therefore is not similar to the definition used in general. For clarity we will use the term PSC 2.0 to define Arnold's defensive PMSC.

In this model (in which we added the distinctive line, representing the level of force, between PSC 2.0 and PMC) we clearly see where the western and Russian PMSCs are positioned. Although this illustration does not include all actors involved in the business it shows that most western PMSCs remain on the left or more defensive side of the spectrum. For Russian PMSCs it shows a significant shift to the right side of the spectrum. The Wagner Group in particular has moved towards a more offensive posture in recent years. The combat operation in Deir-Al-Zour, Syria in 2018 (Battle of Khasham) and the operations in the Russia-Ukraine war in

2022–2023 underscore this more offensive posture. The shift to the right can partly be explained with the desire of the Kremlin to support friendly regimes, such as in Syria, and to extend their influence without openly deploying its military. Where Russian PMSCs initially were out for profit or to maintain Russian influence in other parts of the world, 'Moscow has rapidly fused these separate objectives and set its sights further afield toward fragile states beyond Russia's traditional sphere of influence. The convergence of objectives likely coincides with the increasing hybridisation of Russian businesses and the continuing evolution of its "power economy" concept.'[40]




Figure 9.2: Positioning of the western and Russian PMSCs.

In recent years African countries fed up with the interference of their former colonial masters often turned to Russia for this security assistance. Russia's foreign policy, in particular after the annexation of Crimea, was happy to offer these African nation states an alternative solution. Russian PMSCs served the dual purpose of providing military assistance for the African states who requested this support while increasing Russian influence. Since its first actions on the African continent Wagner has built up a questionable reputation: 'Wagner has an affinity for

large-scale direct-action missions, which, when used by PMCs, have historically not brought positive or lasting change.'[41] The Group has been accused of cruelties and committing war crimes in Africa, as well as in Ukraine.[42] From the perspective of Russia's foreign policy this is not necessarily an issue; the ability to cause problems is also a form of influence, one that can be wielded to harm the interests of Moscow's enemies. Ongoing conflicts in Mali and in Ukraine since 2019 show a further shift to the more offensive (military) side of PMSCs, made visible in the illustration above.

The Wagner Group or Africa Corps has been known for the exploitation (or trying to get hold) of natural resources on the African continent, specifically in Mali (gold), Libya (oil and gas), Sudan (gold) and the CAR (diamonds and gold) but also for providing military advice and training to African troops.[43] This is not an entirely new development. As sketched above, Western PMSCs of the third wave did the same. Moreover, while Western armies are currently leaving as African governments turn against them, Western PMSCs often stay behind. While they may sometimes be hired by private companies, their home states regulate the activities of those companies and thus indirectly authorise their deployment. In other cases, their employment by territorial states masks the interests of their home states. This is an essential part of the powerplay on the African continent. Under the veil of local employment, countries like the US (DynCorp/Amentum, MPRI, CACI, Triple Canopy, etc.), the UK (Aegis Defence Services, G4S, Erinys, Olive Group) and France (Secopex, Corpguard, Agemira and Amarante, etc.) have PMSC presence in countries across the African continent.[44] Western PMSCs mainly focus on support as a military supplier or military consultant firm mainly providing advice, training, logistics and transport. Wagner certainly takes on a more offensive role. But, while the various actors all abide by different rules set by their home states, they all safeguard their home state's economic interests and ensure a continued presence on the ground. What's interesting in this regard is that western PMSCs are working in the same areas as Russian and Chinese 'security' organisations.

9.5 China's PMSCs: The Operational Level

For Chinese PMSCs the story has a different beginning and shows a different development. In the first decade of the new century China's participation in UN missions across the African continent increased dramatically. At the same time, China heavily invested in the Sudanese oil sector, not only in money but also with Chinese contract workers. The peacekeepers were to serve the dual purpose of safeguarding Chinese economic interests and increasing China's diplomatic capital, possibly to a level where the country could influence the mandate of the mission. The peacekeepers could not provide the same level of protections as dedicated

troops but 'the presence of peacekeepers was better than nothing.'[45] However, the extension of the BRI since 2013 did not follow the same road map as peace operations across Africa; the countries which were of importance to Beijing were not necessarily the countries where the UN deployed their peacekeepers. This meant that China had to look for other means to secure their expanding interests: 'Whilst Chinese peacekeepers can offer a degree of protection for Chinese economic projects and the Chinese nationals who work them, PMSCs can offer a more focused and responsive presence overseas, a presence that is increasingly demanded by the Chinese leadership and citizenry.'[46] China thus decided to switch to hiring PMSCs; this development marks the starting point for our analysis in this section.

Chinese PMSCs are increasingly representing a considerable part of the domestic security landscape. The market has grown from 4,000 in 2013, employing over 4 million security personnel to 5,000 companies in 2017. But also in the international arena, Chinese PMSCs are ramping up. In 2018 the Mercator Institute for Chinese Studies counted 20 Chinese PMSCs who were internationally involved with over 3,000 employees. There is a visible influx of Chinese PMSCs in Central Asia: China Security Technology Group, Frontier Services Group (a joint venture by Blackwater's founder Erik Prince and China's CITIC Group), China Shield Consulting Service and China Security & Protection Group. In sub-Saharan Africa as well: Hua Xin Zhong An (HXZA), Frontier Services Group (FSG), Overseas Security Guardians (OSG), established by the ZhongJun JunHong Group, DeWe Security Service Group/Dulwich International Security Group (DeWe), China Security Technology Group (CSTG).[47] Initially, these PMSCs had a security only profile. This changed, roughly around 2017 after attacks on Chinese assets and workers connected to the BRI in Asia and Africa.[48]

To be able to make a proper comparison we use the typology of Singer, complemented with Arnold's alterations to characterise the rise of Chinese PMSCs, as we did for their Russian counterparts. We note that, though the volume of publications is growing, literature on Chinese PMSCs' operations is scarce. The Chinese companies who operate abroad have long managed to stay in the shadows, partly due to the fact that their main effort was in securing and protecting Chinese assets and nationals (SOEs) with consent and support of the territorial state. This has prevented media outcries as their modus operandi was less controversial than their Western or Russian counterparts. Another reason could be that although in name they are called 'Private' companies, there is clear interference and control by the Chinese government. These companies are not publicly traded and do not need to answer to their shareholders. Chinese PMSCs appear to have less latitude to chart their own course than their SOEs:

> China's private security companies (PSCs) in Africa are not fully 'private'. They are accredited by the government and mostly controlled by the state. They also consist mainly of veterans of the People's Liberation Army of China (PLA). These PSCs provide security and

protection for China's projects, citizens and diplomats in Africa, as part of its ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).[49]

Also, analysis focuses on the strategic level; it seems the presence of Chinese PMSCs alongside economic interests is reason enough for some observers to warn about growing Chinese influence, but it says little about their activities on the operational and tactical level. With these caveats, we nevertheless found sufficient data to extend the Arnold graph and plotted a series of dots in the graph to visualise the development of Chinese PMSCs.




Figure 9.3 Extension of Arnold graph with development of Chinese PMSCs.

The events in 2014 and 2016[50] gave Chinese PMSCs public visibility and positioned them closer to the military sphere than before. The evacuation of Chinese nationals can be considered a military support operation. This explains why we have plotted two of the Chinese PMSC events on the left side of the graph. The third and fourth events are plotted more to the right in the box of the PSC 2.0 (defensive purpose of lethal force). Maritime escort and protection of Chinese vessels is a task, excluded from the 1996 Law of the PRC on Control of Guns, which allows the Chinese PMSCs

to use arms. These escorts have slowly become a prominent service for international Chinese PMSCs.[51]

The fourth event represents a hostage release operation. According to media reports the operation was executed by the Sudanese Army and supported by armed contractors of an unnamed Chinese PMSC.[52] All the events listed are positioned in the middle of the Y–axis. representing some or indirect state control. The main reason for China to deploy PMSCs is to secure Chinese assets and interests, including Chinese citizens in foreign countries. However, according to a Chatham briefing paper from November 2021, Chinese foreign policy development is not solely imposed by the CCP. It's a combination of top-down CCP policy with the profit-motivated mission of its state-owned enterprises.[53]

As mentioned earlier, the 1996 'Law of the PRC on Control of Guns' restricts the use of fire-arms in China, but it does not restrict the use of arms overseas.[54] This ambiguity on the use of arms on Chinese soil and abroad in combination with the mantra of non-interference makes it understandable that Chinese PMSCs still show some reluctance in the use of (offensive) force. The primary goal of protection of Chinese persons and assets involves mostly defensive operations, only extraction of captured personnel requires a more offensive role. There remains a red line when it comes to the use of force which China will not cross lightly; this red line is visualised in the graph (on the X-axis) between PSC and PMC. However, the reluctance to use (lethal) force seems to fade to some extent as can be seen from the graph which shows a gradual shift to the right. We have already seen a shift from merely PSCs with a focus on security tasks to PMSCs with more military style operations; e.g., the Zhongjun Junhong Group established a local joint-venture in Kyrgyzstan to overcome legal restrictions to carry weapons.[55] This is blurring the lines between security and military (defensive to offensive) operations.

9.6 Conclusion

Countries in Asia and Africa host PMSCs from all over the globe. Western and Russian governments have been using these non-state actors as extensions of their formal foreign policy apparatus for decades. Chinese PMSCs emerged more recently, only being allowed to form in 1984, and gradually extending their activities to Africa and Asia in tandem with the extension of Chinese economic interests.

While Western states outsource operations to PMSCs mainly for economic reasons, Russian foreign policy uses its PMSCs to support friendly governments. This brings Russian PMSCs closer to the previous, third wave, model that sees them substitute for the weak or unreliable armies of their client states, often in civil wars and often in return for the direct exploitation of natural resources. Chinese PMSCs,

by contrast, have historically been sharply constrained by their home government's suspicion of private arms bearing and, particularly, by its non-interference policy. Their main task is to protect the personnel and assets of Chinese (often state-owned) enterprises, for which they are allowed limited means. However, recent hostage release operations have shown Chinese PMSCs in more offensive roles.

It seems that the extension of Chinese influence alone is reason for some to worry about the role of Chinese PMSCs. We have found little support for that worry in their operations so far. Comments about possible future operations such as this one are impossible to confirm or refute:

> Gradually, as opportunities open due to the retreat of Wagner forces, China is likely to utilize PSCs as a tool to expand its military and political influence in Africa as well as to secure for itself – and deny to its rivals – access to critical mineral resources.[56]

On the one hand, China's interest in the natural resources previously exploited by Wagner is hard to deny. On the other, their location in often civil war-torn countries makes them unattractive so long as reluctance to interfere in other countries' internal affairs lasts, even if PMSCs allow China more latitude than direct PLA involvement.

Notes

1 Ghafar and Jacobs, 'Beijing Calling'; Jie and Ridout, 'Who Decides China's Foreign Policy?'.
2 Pereira et al., 'Chinese Private Security Companies and the Limits of Coercion', p. 1532.
3 Pereira et al., 'Chinese Private Security Companies and the Limits of Coercion'.
4 Katz et al., 'Moscow's Mercenary Wars'.
5 Yuan, 'China's Private Security Companies and the Protection of Chinese Economic Interests'.
6 Singer, *Corporate Warriors*; Arnold, 'Geoeconomic Dimensions of Russian Private Military and Security Companies'.
7 ICRC, *The Montreux Document*.
8 Sanson, 'General Claire Chennault'.
9 Schultz, 'Enabling Operational Reach and Endurance: The Use of Contractors during World War II', p. 30.
10 Ibid., p. 39.
11 Curtis, 'Britain's Covert War in Yemen'.
12 O'Brien, 'PMCs, Myths and Mercenaries'.
13 Ibid.
14 Bloch and Fitzgerald, *British Intelligence and Covert Action*; Miller, 'British Security Firm Saladin Tries to Distance Itself from Police War Crimes Investigation'.
15 Ghanem, 'Eeben Barlow: Inside the World of Private Military Contractors'.
16 Kinsey and Patterson, *Contractors and War*, p. 1.
17 Kinsey, *Corporate Soldiers*, p. 46.

[18] Petersohn, 'Reframing the Anti-Mercenary Norm', p. 482.
[19] https://web.archive.org/web/20050828045604/http://www.sandline.com.
[20] https://www.constellis.com.
[21] Leander, 'The Market for Force and Public Security'.
[22] ICoCA, 'The Nisour Square Massacre'.
[23] Katz et al., 'Moscow's Mercenary Wars'.
[24] Jones et al., *Russia's Corporate Soldiers*.
[25] Katz et al., 'Moscow's Mercenary Wars'.
[26] Cremers and Bouwmeester, 'Russian Commercial Warriors on the Battlefield'.
[27] Ibid.
[28] Weinbaum et al., 'Mapping Chinese and Russian Military and Security Exports to Africa'.
[29] Jones et al., *Russia's Corporate Soldiers*.
[30] Kharief, 'China's Discrete Game in North Africa'.
[31] Liu and Gammon, 'The Unique Role of the Chinese Government in the Protection of Overseas Citizens'.
[32] Military Africa, 'China's Mercenaries in Africa'.
[33] Kharief, 'China's Discrete Game in North Africa'.
[34] Kraska, 'China's Maritime Militia Upends Rules on Naval Warfare'.
[35] Sukhankin, 'Chinese Private Security Contractors'.
[36] Ibid.
[37] Singer, *Corporate Warriors*, p. 91.
[38] Ray, 'Alessandro Arduino: The Rise of China's Private Military & Security Companies', 5:49.
[39] Arnold, 'Geoeconomic Dimensions of Russian Private Military and Security Companies'.
[40] Ibid., p. 11.
[41] Marco, 'Forces of Destabilization'.
[42] McFate, 'The Mercenaries behind the Bucha Massacre'.
[43] Nawaz, 'Kimberly Marten: A Look at the Wagner Group's Presence and Activities in Africa'; McGregor, 'Wagner's Influence Central African Republic Wanes as American PMC Enters the Scene'.
[44] Military Africa, 'China's Mercenaries in Africa'; Ruehl, 'Private Military Companies Continue to Expand in Africa'.
[45] Ghiselli, 'Interpreting China's Rise', p. 259.
[46] Spearin, 'UN Peacekeeping and Chinese Private Security Companies', p. 93.
[47] Yau and Van der Kley, 'The Growth, Adaptation and Limitations of Chinese Private Security Companies in Central Asia'.
[48] Chizzoni, 'Understanding the Chinese Private Security Contracting Industry'.
[49] Military Africa, 'China's Mercenaries in Africa'.
[50] Legarda and Nouwens, 'Guardians of the Belt and Road'.
[51] Batchu, 'Chinese Private Security Companies along the BRI'.
[52] Legarda and Nouwens, 'Guardians of the Belt and Road'.
[53] Jie and Ridout, 'Who Decides China's Foreign Policy?'.
[54] Chizzoni, 'Understanding the Chinese Private Security Contracting Industry'; Legarda and Nouwens, 'Guardians of the Belt and Road'.
[55] Yau and Van der Kley, 'The Growth, Adaptation and Limitations of Chinese Private Security Companies in Central Asia'.
[56] Lee and Wittman, 'Will China's Private Security Companies Follow the Wagner Group's Footsteps in Africa?'.

Bibliography

Arnold, Thomas D. 'Geoeconomic Dimensions of Russian Private Military and Security Companies'. *Military Review* 99, no. 6 (November–December 2019), pp. 6–18.

Batchu, Swati. 'Chinese Private Security Companies along the BRI: An Emerging Threat?' *Modern Diplomacy*, 25 September 2020. https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2020/09/25/chinese-private-security-companies-along-the-bri-an-emerging-threat/.

Bloch, Jonathan, and Patrick Fitzgerald. *British Intelligence and Covert Action*. London: Brandon & Junction Books, 1983.

Curtis, Mark. 'Britain's Covert War in Yemen'. *Declassified UK*, 5 October 2022. https://www.declassifieduk.org/britains-covert-war-in-yemen/.

Chizzoni, Emanuele. 'Understanding the Chinese Private Security Contracting Industry'. *The Security Distillery*, 15 March 2024. https://thesecuritydistillery.org/all-articles/understanding-the-chinese-private-security-contracting-industry.

Cremers, Thijs, and Han Bouwmeester. 'Russian Commercial Warriors on the Battlefield'. In *Reflections on the Russia-Ukraine War*, edited by Maarten Rothman, Lonneke Peperkamp and Sebastiaan Rietjens. Leiden: Leiden University Press, 2024, pp. 415–437.

Ghafar, Adel Abdel, and Anna L. Jacobs, 'Beijing Calling: Assessing China's Growing Footprint in North Africa'. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2019. https://policycommons.net/artifacts/4140875/beijing-calling/.

Ghanem, Yehia. 'Eeben Barlow: Inside the World of Private Military Contractors'. *Talk to Al Jazeera*. 5 January 2020. https://www.aljazeera.com/program/talk-to-al-jazeera/2020/1/5/eeben-barlow-inside-the-world-of-private-military-contractors.

Ghiselli, Andrea. 'Interpreting China's Rise in a Decentered World through the Lens of Peacekeeping and Antipiracy Missions'. *Chinese Political Science Review* 3, no. 3 (2018), pp. 252–269. https://doi.org/10.1007/s41111-018-0093-3.

ICoCA. 'The Nisour Square Massacre'. Undated. https://icoca.ch/case-studies/the-nisour-square-massacre. (Accessed 29 May 2025).

Jie, Yu, and Lucy Ridout. 'Who Decides China's Foreign Policy? The Role of Central Government, Provincial-Level Authorities and State-Owned Enterprises'. London: Chatham House, 19 November 2021. https://www.chathamhouse.org/2021/11/who-decides-chinas-foreign-policy.

Jie, Yu, and Jon Wallace. 'What Is China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)?' London: Chatham House, 19 December 2022. https://www.chathamhouse.org/2021/09/what-chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-bri.

Jones, Seth G., Doxsee, Catrina Katz, Brian McQueen and Eric Joe Moye. *Russia's Corporate Soldiers: The Global Expansion of Russia's Private Military Companies.* Center for Strategic and International Studies. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2021.

Katz, Brian, Seth G. Jones, Catrina Doxsee and Nicholas Harrington, 'Moscow's Mercenary Wars: The Expansion of Russian Private Military Companies'. Washington, D.C.: CSIS, September 2020. https://russianpmcs.csis.org/. (Accessed 29 May 2025).

Kharief, Akram. 'China's Discreet Game in North Africa: Private Military Companies'. Tunis: Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung, March 2022. https://rosaluxna.org/publications/chinas-discreet-game-in-north-africa-private-military-companies/. (Accessed 27 May 2025).

Kinsey, Christopher. *Corporate Soldiers and International Security: The Rise of Private Military Companies.* Abingdon: Routledge, 2006.

Kinsey, C., and M.H. Patterson. *Contractors and War: The Transformation of United States' Expeditionary Operations.* Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2012.

Kraska, James. 'China's Maritime Militia Upends Rules on Naval Warfare'. *The Diplomat*, 10 August 2015. https://thediplomat.com/2015/08/chinas-maritime-militia-upends-rules-on-naval-warfare/.

Leander, Anna. 'The Market for Force and Public Security: The Destabilizing Consequences of Private Military Companies'. *Journal of Peace Research* 42, no. 5 (2005), pp. 605–622. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343305056237.

Lee, Jong Min, and Samuel Wittman. 'Will China's Private Security Companies Follow the Wagner Group's Footsteps in Africa?' *The Diplomat*, 24 June 2023. https://thediplomat.com/2023/06/will-chinas-private-security-companies-follow-the-wagner-groups-footsteps-in-africa/.

Legarda, Helena, and Meia Nouwens. 'Guardians of the Belt and Road'. Berlin: MERICS, Mercator Institute for China Studies, 2018. https://www.merics.org/en/report/guardians-belt-and-road.

Liu, Lianlian, and Jessica Gammon. 'The Unique Role of the Chinese Government in the Protection of Overseas Citizens'. *International Review of Administrative Sciences* 88, no. 3 (2022), pp. 793–808. https://doi.org/10.1177/0020852320954278.

Marco, Anthony. 'Forces of Destabilization: Countering Wagner Group in the Sahel'. Washington, D.C.: Irregular Warfare Initiative, 4 April 2023. https://irregularwarfare.org/articles/forces-of-destabilization-countering-wagner-group-in-the-sahel/.

McFate, Sean. 'The Mercenaries behind the Bucha Massacre'. *Wall Street Journal*, 12 April 2022. https://www.wsj.com/articles/mercenaries-behind-bucha-massacre-russia-ukraine-putin-attack-terror-brutality-wagner-group-moscow-geneva-convention-war-crimes-atrocities-11649797041.

McGregor, Andrew. 'Wagner's Influence in Central African Republic Wanes as American PMC Enters the Scene'. *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 21, no. 19 (2024). https://jamestown.org/program/wagners-influence-in-central-african-republic-wanes-as-american-pmc-enters-the-scene/.

Military Africa, 'China's Mercenaries in Africa: A Growing Threat or a Strategic Partner?' *Military Africa*, 1 December 2023. https://www.military.africa/2023/12/chinas-mercenaries-in-africa-a-groweing-threat-or-a-strategic-partner/. (Accessed 29 May 2025).

Miller, Phil, 'British Security Firm Saladin Tries to Distance Itself from Police War Crimes Investigation'. *Declassified UK*, 18 September 2020, https://www.declassifieduk.org/british-security-firm-saladin-tries-to-distance-itself-from-police-war-crimes-investigation/.

Nawaz, Amna. 'Kimberly Marten: A Look at the Wagner Group's Presence and Activities in Africa'. *PBS Newshour*, 2023. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9S9TANZAdbU.

O'Brien, Kevin A. 'PMCs, Myths and Mercenaries: The Debate on Private Military Companies'. *RUSI Journal* 145, no. 1 (2000), pp. 59–64. https://doi.org/10.1080/03071840008446490.

Pereira, Ricardo, Ana Luquett, Rui Forte and Mohammad Eslami. 'Chinese Private Security Companies and the Limit of Coercion'. *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 34, no. 8 (2023), pp. 1532–1557.

Petersohn, Ulrich. 'Reframing the Anti-Mercenary Norm: Private Military and Security Companies and Mercenarism'. *International Journal: Quarterly of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs*, 69, no. 4 (2014), pp. 475–493. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0020702014544915.

Ray, Jody. 'Alessandro Arduino: The Rise of China's Private Military & Security Companies'. Podcast audio. *Exit Strategy Podcast* 45:162021. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1BMwWcKZaQU.

Ruehl, John P. 'Private Military Companies Continue to Expand in Africa'. *NE Global*, 31 August 2023. https://www.neglobal.eu/private-military-companies-continue-to-expand-in-africa/.

Sanson, Jerry P., 'General Claire Chennault and the Flying Tigers'. *64 Parishes*, 2023. https://64parishes.org/entry/general-claire-chennault-and-the-flying-tigers. (Accessed 29 May 2025).

Schultz, Jason W. 'Enabling Operational Reach and Endurance: The Use of Contractors during World War II'. Fort Leavenworth, Kan.: US Army Command and General Staff College, 2016. https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1022250.pdf.

Singer, Peter W. *Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry.* Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2008.

Spearin, Christopher. 'UN Peacekeeping and Chinese Private Security Companies: Assessing Demand Factors for China'. *Defense & Security Analysis* 38, no. 1 (2022), pp. 91–105. https://doi.org/10.1080/14751798.2022.2030917.

Sukhankin, Sergey. 'Chinese Private Security Contractors: New Trends and Future Prospects'. Washington, D.C.: Jamestown Foundation, 20 May 2020. https://jamestown.org/program/chinese-private-security-contractors-new-trends-and-future-prospects/.

Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs and ICRC, *Montreux Document on Pertinent International Obligations and Good Practice for States Related to Operations of Private and Military Security Companies during Armed Conflict*. Geneva, 2008.

Weinbaum, Cortney, Melissa Shostak, Chandler Sachs and John V., Parachini. 'Mapping Chinese and Russian Military and Security Exports to Africa'. Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, 13 December 2022. https://www.rand.org/pubs/tools/TLA2045-3.html.

Yau, Niva, and Dirk van der Kley. 'The Growth, Adaptation and Limitations of Chinese Private Security Companies in Central Asia'. Washington, D.C.: Oxus Society for Central Asian Affairs, 7 October 2020. https://oxussociety.org/the-growth-adaptation-and-limitations-of-chinese-private-security-companies-in-central-asia/.

Yuan, Jingdong. 'China's Private Security Companies and the Protection of Chinese Economic Interests Abroad'. *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 33, no. 1–2 (2022), pp. 173–195. https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2021.1940646.

CHAPTER 10

Can the Impact of Non-State Actors Be Predicted? Impressions of Contemporary Approaches to War Forecasting

Hans Melissen & Peter Schuur

Abstract

This chapter explores the predictability of war, using some contemporary approaches to forecasting the onset and duration of armed conflicts, focusing on the role of armed non-state actors. It further introduces novel mathematical models to examine the impact of deploying armed non-state actors in interstate warfare.

Keywords: predictability; forecasting

Der Krieg ist das Gebiet des Zufalls. In keiner menschlichen Tätigkeit muß diesem Fremdling ein solcher Spielraum gelassen werden, weil keine so nach allen Seiten hin in beständigem Kontakt mit ihm ist. Er vermehrt die Ungewißheit aller Umstände und stört den Gang der Ereignisse.

Carl von Clausewitz, *Vom Kriege* (1832), Book I, Ch. 3.

10.1 Introduction

Recent interstate conflicts have seen a proliferation of innovative strategies and technologies that challenge traditional war doctrines and the legal and ethical confines of warfare. Examples include cyberattacks targeting critical military and civilian processes, the deployment of autonomous weapon systems, and the deliberate targeting of medical and power facilities to destabilise populations. Strategic refugee displacement, hostage-taking, and the increased involvement of armed non-state actors further exemplify this shift.

This chapter examines the predictability of war and contemporary forecasting methods for its onset and conclusion. It cautions against misuse of statistics and unrealistic expectations regarding Artificial Intelligence (AI) in predicting armed

conflicts. Furthermore, it explores predictive models based on Lanchester's attrition and Bass's economic diffusion, with particular focus on some implications of employing private military companies in modern warfare.

10.2 Prediction and Forecasting

The predictive power that resulted from the scientific explainability of celestial and terrestrial phenomena with theories such as Newton's classical mechanics led to the 19th-century belief in causal determinism, epitomised by Laplace's demon, which posited that knowing the positions and velocities of all particles in the universe at a certain moment would allow exact determination of its past and future.[1] However, modern understanding refutes such determinism due to limitations in data storage, computational capacity, and processing time. Moreover, Einstein's theory of general relativity undermines the concept of simultaneity, whereas Heisenberg's uncertainty principle precludes absolute predictability at the particle level. While ensemble approaches in solid-state physics and thermodynamics enable predictions at the macro-scale such as weather patterns or metal fatigue, even these have limits.

Weather systems exemplify the extraordinary complexity of physical phenomena, making their forecasting particularly challenging. At a 1972 American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) meeting, Ed Lorenz introduced the 'butterfly effect' by famously asking, 'Does the flapping of a butterfly's wings in Brazil cause a tornado in Texas?' This concept, referring to the extreme sensitivity of weather-predicting differential equations to initial conditions, underscores their chaotic nature. Small variations in initial parameters can produce dramatically different long-term outcomes, fundamentally constraining predictability despite advances in computational power – a reality that persists, even though the disconcertingly correct answer to Lorenz's question is now known.[2]

10.3 Developments in War Prediction

10.3.1 Prediction and predictability of war

Our primary focus is on predicting specific metrics of interstate wars, like onset timing and duration.[3] However, predicting war presents unique challenges due to the critical role of human behaviour. While collective trends in large groups may exhibit some predictability, individual actions – often erratic yet pivotal – remain elusive. Unfortunately, on the world stage, political decision-making mechanisms

have developed that allow few individuals to exert disproportionately amplified influence on global events. For example, the Russian-Ukrainian conflict was probably significantly shaped by the ambitions of a limited number of individuals, and its resolution may also hinge on individual initiatives or moods.[4] Even if brain actions were entirely dictated by physiology, precise prediction would remain unattainable. Simulating a single brain cell for only one second would require over 100 quadrillion years on current computers.[5]

Although predictability is typically valued, unpredictability can confer strategic benefits in competitive arenas like warfare and sports.[6] In warfare, unpredictability is often essential for success.[7] If outcomes were entirely foreseeable, diplomacy would replace armed conflict. Thus, war's inherent unpredictability, compounded by its complexity, makes prediction particularly challenging.[8] For instance, predictions regarding the Ukraine conflict's duration were widely inaccurate, with estimates varying from months to years.[9] Sometimes, it remains doubtful whether unpredictable actions by world leaders stem from strategic doctrine or mere lack of strategy.[10]

The *predictability paradox* further complicates this issue.[11] The demand for accurate war predictions often arises from the desire to anticipate or prevent impending armed conflict, yet predictions risk being invalidated when decision-makers adapt their strategy accordingly, reflecting the inherent tension between determinism and free will.[12] This philosophical dilemma raises a practical challenge: what value does accurate prediction hold if its dissemination provokes actions that undermine its reliability? As in chess, there is no single, predictable outcome – only an unfolding of possible scenarios under dynamic interactions and decisions.

10.3.2 Prediction by human experts

In complex scenarios expert predictions are often relied upon, but is this advisable? Human reasoning can be persuasive yet flawed.[13] Experts do not consistently outperform informed laypersons.[14] For example, experts significantly underestimated the scale of the COVID-19 pandemic compared to laypeople;[15] terrorism experts' predictions about the pandemic's impact on non-state actors showed significant variability,[16] and many experts misjudged the likelihood of a Russian invasion of Ukraine.[17]

In a groundbreaking experiment, Bloomfield and Hales showed that participants confided heavily in observed patterns such as prior trend reversals (Gambler's fallacy) when predicting unpredictable randomly generated stock-like price movements.[18] This did not significantly improve their accuracy.[19]

Grossmann et al. argue that social scientists excel at predicting in controlled settings but struggle with real-world events due to oversimplified causal models,

confusion between levels of analysis, and failure to account for external factors beyond their preferred theories.[20] They call for more precise, bold predictions in the social sciences, advocating for broader foundational models like those in the natural sciences, supplemented with time-series data and greater intellectual humility.

Kahneman and Tversky's research on decision-making biases is particularly relevant to the challenges of war prediction.[21] Experts are susceptible to cognitive restrictions such as anchoring, confirmation, hindsight, egocentric, objectivity, and status quo biases, as well as apophenia, extension neglect, plausibility trap, linear thinking, disregard for the improbable, or false priors, among many others.[22] For example, television pundits often stray beyond their areas of expertise, shifting from deliberate, System 2 reasoning to faster but less reliable System 1 thinking.

Nevertheless, expert judgement remains indispensable when data are either scarce or overwhelming. Careful selection and validation of experts, along with mathematical aggregation of their forecasts, can further enhance predictive accuracy.[23] Moreover, fostering cohesive expert teams significantly improves forecasting validity.[24] As Michaels argues, 'external experts are especially well positioned to uncover structural vulnerabilities that threatening actors can exploit, discuss politically inconvenient trends, and offer actionable warnings.'[25]

Likewise, 'wisdom of crowds' also holds promise. Of thousands of volunteer forecasters in the Good Judgment Project,[26] 250 were identified as 'superforecasters'. Their aggregated predictions consistently outperformed individual experts in geopolitical forecasting competitions, showcasing the potential of collective intelligence in complex predictive challenges.

10.3.3 Statistics in war prediction

Lewis Richardson was among the earliest researchers to study warfare through a statistical lens.[27] He observed, for instance, that the annual number of wars follows a Poisson distribution.[28] While this finding did not provide insights into which wars would occur or their duration, it marked an important foundational step. Guo et al. note that armed conflicts differ in the extent to which they can be predicted and provide examples.[29] White swan events escalate naturally, follow statistical laws, and can be predicted to some extent. Black swan events erupt without precedent, do not follow statistical laws, and cannot be predicted.

That care should be taken when using statistics is exemplified by the following prediction made 18 months into the ongoing Russian-Ukrainian war: 'the probability that the war between Russia and Ukraine will be over within a year is fifty percent … The probability that it will last for another three years or more is twenty

percent'.[30] This prediction, based on Weibull distribution modelling, incorporates confidence intervals and appears well substantiated and quantified. However, it prompts critical questions about its validity. Is it realistic to base predictions for a modern war – marked by unprecedented drone and missile bombings, threats of nuclear escalation, attacks on civilian infrastructure, and global disruption of food and energy supplies – on data from conflicts fought 40 to 210 years ago, i.e., to assume that war duration in past and future satisfies one general statistical distribution? The profound temporal developments in contemporary warfare challenge this assumption.

Can the use of the Weibull distribution be justified for war duration prediction? The Weibull distribution, a continuous two- or three-parameter probability distribution, has proven highly versatile across diverse domains, including engineering, healthcare, and reliability analysis.[31] Unlike the normal distribution, which is underpinned by the central limit theorem and favoured for phenomena influenced by many small, independent factors, the Weibull distribution is grounded in the Fisher-Tippett-Gnedenko Extreme Value Theorem (1923–43). This theorem establishes the Weibull distribution as the limiting case for the minimum values of samples from almost any distribution, making it particularly suited to modelling scenarios involving a 'weakest link' concept, such as material failure. Generalisation to any phenomenon in which survival plays a role is therefore tempting, even in the absence of such an underlying principle.[32] However, it remains contentious whether the distribution obtained by lumping many essentially different wars together is fundamentally described by a Weibull distribution or whether Weibull is just malleable enough to provide a pragmatic approximation.

Statistical models thrive on repeatability. For example, the claim that a metal rod has an 80% chance of breaking after 20 bends can be tested and validated by repeating the experiment across hundreds of identical rods. By contrast, how can the claim that a war has a 50% chance of ending within a year be meaningfully verified? Whether the Russian-Ukrainian war ends in one month or ten years reveals little about the model's validity. Adding 'under this model' does not improve the credibility of the prediction if the limitations of the assumptions are not explored. Furthermore, how many wars of similar magnitude and nature would be required to evaluate such a prediction? Given the singularity of these conflicts, this question renders any such prediction unverifiable and nugatory.

Ultimately, statistical predictions for war durations face a fundamental epistemic challenge: their validity cannot be empirically verified within a human lifetime. As a result, while adoption of such models may appear methodologically rigorous, their practical and scientific value is questionable. Alternatives are to include temporal effects[33] or to resort to risk assessments and hazard rates.[34]

10.3.4 Agent-based modelling

Agent-based modelling (ABM) is a computational micro-scale technique for bottom-up modelling of phenomena arising from the interplay between entities.[35] In an attempt to understand the collective behaviour of the larger whole, a system is proposed using agents that behave according to heuristic interaction rules. Agents can be individuals or groups that behave similarly or differently. The hope and expectation are that complex macro-scale properties will reveal themselves as a result of simple micro-scale behaviour of the agents. ABM has found many applications in modelling,[36] in particular in computational social sciences.[37] Mehrab et al. describe an ABM simulation of forced migration from Ukraine.[38] ABM is used to study the dynamics of terrorist organisations,[39] and (civil) war,[40] but the approach appears to be still in its infancy.

Many software platforms provide support for designing and calculating ABM.[41] De Amorim Silva and Braga provide a review of ABM applied to more complex systems-of-systems.[42] Beerman shows the importance of a more accurate definition of agents in social modelling by including human errors, such as superficial observations, biases, limited grasp of a situation, and inaccurate perceptions.[43]

10.3.5 Artificial Intelligence, the Holy Grail for warfare prediction?

The release of OpenAI's ChatGPT (Generative Pre-trained Transformer) in late 2022, sparked global attention in Large Language Models (LLMs).[44] This natural language processing tool allows users to interact with an AI system via a simple web interface, often creating the illusion of conversing with an amiable, intelligent assistant knowledgeable about almost any subject. ChatGPT has demonstrated competence in tasks such as translation and text editing, both in natural and computational languages.[45] AI is already indispensable in contemporary military strategy and decision making.[46] Given the rapid advancements in data availability, model training, and generative AI, many speculate that these technologies may eventually predict the origins and trajectories of wars. While no established measure of attitudes toward AI in defence exists,[47] a recent survey of 90 first-year officer cadets at the Netherlands Defence Academy found that over 80 percent expressed confidence in AI's potential for war prediction.

Despite these expectations, the fundamental limitations of LLMs in reasoning, accuracy, and temporal awareness cast doubt on their applicability to forecasting armed conflicts. Consider, for example, how ChatGPT responds to mathematical queries. When asked to identify a unique mathematical property of the number 1957, ChatGPT-3.5 stated that it is a prime number that cannot be expressed as a sum of two squares. In reality, 1957 is not prime, and the purported uniqueness is mathematically invalid. The more advanced ChatGPT-4o made a similarly flawed

claim, asserting that 1957 factors as 3×653, when in fact, this product equals 1959. Although the model's output coincidentally contained a correct statement – that 1957 is the product of two primes, i.e., 19 and 103 – its reasoning was incorrect. ChatGPT is also very creative when asked to replace initials in submitted references to scientific publications with correct full first names. The provided first names perfectly match the last name but are rarely correct in the given context. These examples illustrate that while LLMs generate responses that appear authoritative and statistically likely, they do not engage in genuine reasoning or verification.

Given these fundamental limitations, the potential for LLMs to contribute meaningfully to war prediction remains highly uncertain. While LLMs produce coherent responses based on statistical patterns in their training data, they cannot 'understand' concepts or analyse causal relationships. Accurate predictions of war require the ability to process complex interdependencies between political, economic, social, and military variables – tasks that far exceed the capabilities of current LLMs.

While ChatGPT itself, when prompted, claims military applications such as predictive analysis for intelligence purposes, research has highlighted key deficiencies in LLMs that undermine their applicability to conflict forecasting. Beniwal et al. identify LLMs' struggles with logical reasoning and temporal coherence, both of which are essential for analysing the sequencing of events in warfare.[48] Similarly, Pham and Cunningham report that while LLMs' predictive abilities improve when embedded in fictional future narratives attributed to authoritative figures, their outputs remain unreliable.[49] Additionally, Heppell et al. warn that LLMs are highly effective at generating convincing disinformation that can evade detection by both human analysts and automated systems, raising further concerns about their validity and ethical use.[50] Nevertheless, research continues to explore the potential of AI in war prediction.[51]

In several fields where accurate forecasting is critical, AI has begun to outperform traditional techniques. Bao et al. conclude that deep learning models, particularly neural networks, have significantly enhanced stock market predictions, enabling even non-experts to develop models that surpass those built with years of professional experience.[52] Deng et al. present a comprehensive survey of AI methods for modelling human events based on social media data, demonstrating AI's ability to detect emerging societal trends.[53] Additionally, the European Centre for Medium-Range Weather Forecasts (ECMWF), long considered the gold standard in physics-based meteorology, faces increasing competition from AI-driven models.[54] Despite AI's successes in these domains, war prediction presents unique challenges. One important difference that sets these successful cases apart from war forecasting is their abundant availability of relevant, high-quality, highly detailed data.[55] Furthermore, unlike financial markets or weather systems, warfare is not governed by stable physical laws or recurring statistical patterns. Instead, it is shaped by an

intricate interplay of political, military, economic, psychological, historical, demographic, and cultural variables that interact on both micro and macro levels.[56] For instance, the unexpected death or survival of key individuals – such as Archduke Franz Ferdinand, Yevgeny Prigozhin, or Adolf Hitler – has significantly altered the course of history, triggering or influencing the course of armed conflicts. The ability to anticipate such contingencies remains beyond the reach of AI. Could an AI model trained solely on publicly available data have predicted Israel's September 2024 pager attack on Hezbollah?[57] The likelihood appears exceedingly low.

The principles and conduct of warfare are evolving at an accelerated pace, further diminishing the relevance of historical data for future conflict prediction. As Jensen et al. emphasise, AI should be regarded as a tool to augment human judgement rather than replace it.[58] Recognising AI's limitations is crucial, particularly given the risks of misuse, biases, reliability, deception, and falsification in high-stakes settings like war and military applications.[59]

While AI can provide valuable insights into specific aspects of military planning – such as evaluating emerging technologies and analysing logistics – its capacity to predict the outbreak of war remains fundamentally constrained. The inherent unpredictability of human behaviour, the fluidity of geopolitical landscapes, and the limitations of available data all contribute to AI's inability to generate highly reliable forecasts. Thus, while AI may enhance decision-making in warfare, it is unlikely to replace human strategic foresight in anticipating the onset and trajectory of conflicts.

Machine Learning (ML) has been used to predict terrorist attacks yielding type of weapons used and number of casualties.[60] Hybrid attacks were studied using ABM, where agents' decisions are informed by reinforcement learning.[61] ABMs have been combined with LLMs.[62]

10.3.6 Armed conflict databases

The increasing availability of open-source data in the field of armed conflicts,[63] alongside significant advancements in machine learning, offers the promise of improved predictive capabilities and early warning systems.

Databases such as the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (acleda data.com), the Global Terrorism Database (start.umd.edu/gtd), Uppsala Conflict Data Program (ucdp.uu.se), and the Global Dataset on Conflict Forecasts and News Topics catalogue key information, including the start and end dates, fatalities, locations, actors, and targets of hundreds of thousands of conflicts.[64] Focussed on non-state actors and PM(S)Cs are the Private Security Events Database (dataverse.harvard.edu), the Pro-Government Militias Database (https://militiasdb.sowi.uni-mannheim.de/militias-public), the Violent Non-State Actor Rivalry[65], the Non-State Actors in Armed Conflict Dataset (https://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/), the Non-State Actor Mass

Atrocity Dataset (https://www.ushmm.org/m/pdfs/Cyanne_Loyle_02142018.pdf), the Rebels' Armament Dataset,[66] the History of Armed Actors Dataset,[67] the Government and Armed Actors Relations Dataset (https://www.giga-hamburg.de/en/publications/research-data), the Commercial Military Actor Database (dataverse.harvard.edu), and the Armed Nonstate Actor Rivalry Dataset.[68] The data stem from various sources, often media reports, and are checked by human specialists. However, they are limited by the relatively low number of high-level parameters and consequent low resolution.

Nevertheless, Beaumais and Ramel note that while the trend to employ data science has been embraced in Germany, the Netherlands, and the United States in particular, countries such as France appear to have institutionalised considerable resistance not only to the possibilities offered by data science, but to quantitative data in general.[69] They attribute this to limited training in quantitative methods offered to French diplomats and military personnel, but also to a broader desire to protect 'digital sovereignty' in the international domain. Heuser et al. conclude that despite the efforts of generations of social scientists to the contrary, there is a growing consensus that forecasting is very limited in verisimilitude and that matters of war and peace will at best provide some indications of the very short term.[70]

Furthermore, the number of available parameters for the described incidents or wars is often limited to a few dozen to at most hundreds. It is very questionable whether this suffices to represent the complexity of war to provide predictions of adequate resolution and reliability.[71] While suitable for broad analysis, these datasets lack sufficient granularity for precise short-term predictions or long-term strategy development. They fail to capture deeper societal drivers or individual impact on conflicts. Critical, touchy-feely decisions resulting from behind-the-scenes political negotiations, personal motives, and tactical shifts often escape media coverage and mixed with incomplete, incorrect, or falsified information cannot be properly assessed or reliably factored into nuanced predictive models. As Murphy et al. argue, 'Even if comprehensive and granular data covering a range of conflict drivers were available, it would still be impossible to predict conflict with precision, given its complexity as a sociopolitical phenomenon with interlocking, nonlinear variables.'[72] Moreover, it remains doubtful whether data of the required quality and quantity, indispensable for AI algorithms to make meaningful predictions, will be available in time, as it is often in political and military strategic interest to withhold or falsify relevant information.

10.3.7 Explainable Artificial Intelligence

One significant disadvantage of employing AI over classical modelling techniques is the lack of accountability for its results, decisions, and predictions. AI-generated outcomes are derived from complex computations involving vast numbers of

parameters. Unlike those in classical models, these parameters lack intuitive, individual meaning due to the intricate and often opaque nature of AI algorithms, rendering them indecipherable 'black boxes'.[73] This opacity makes explaining AI-driven decisions, and justifying their application, particularly challenging. Accountability, however, is an indispensable requirement from legal, operational, and ethical perspectives, especially in the military domain, where AI adoption is rapidly advancing in both supervised and autonomous systems. In such high-stakes contexts, accountability is critical, as decisions can have life-or-death consequences. These concerns have driven the development of Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI), which seeks to enhance the transparency, comprehensibility, and accountability of AI decision-making processes.[74] Humanitarian organisations, such as the Red Cross, advocate for the exclusive use of XAI, while the U.S. Department of Defense prioritises explainability as a cornerstone of its AI system development and deployment. While XAI's focus on transparency appears commendable, caution is warranted against its uncritical adoption, because institutionalised accountability may inadvertently undermine individual responsibility.[75] This risk underscores the importance of balancing technological advancements with human oversight and ethical considerations.

10.3.8 Conclusions

The increasing complexity and amount of data in the study of war and conflict dynamics make the use of computational support for predictions inevitable. However, inherent limitations on the size and reliability seem to hamper the reliable application of AI for war prediction. The application of suitable mathematical models may also not yield accurate predictions, but insights into the quantitative aspects of possible scenarios may be relevant.[76] Incomplete knowledge can be supplemented with ab initio simulations, such as Agent-Based Modelling.

10.4. Non-State Actors and Their Impact on War Prediction

10.4.1 Non-State Actors in warfare

The involvement of non-state actors in armed conflicts has steadily increased.[77] This trend spans a wide range of activities, ranging from individual citizens engaging in fundraising or satellite imagery analysis to entrepreneurs leveraging their resources to support combatant parties. Additionally, terrorist organisations and regular armies outsource security, logistics, and even military operations to private

entities. As illustrated in Figure 10.1, scholarly interest in this topic has shown a consistent upward trajectory over the past 25 years.




Figure 10.1: Number of scholarly publications on non-state actors in armed conflicts over the past 25 years, as indexed by Google Scholar.

The primary aim of our study was to assess the extent to which forecasting techniques can illuminate the influence of armed non-state actors on conflict dynamics. To refine the scope, the analysis focuses on the deployment of private military companies (PMCs). PMCs are frequently contracted to supplement regular military operations, making their impact virtually indistinguishable from that of conventional forces. Consequently, we concentrate on 'rogue' PMCs – those intentionally deployed to circumvent legal frameworks and accountability by engaging in illicit military interventions.

10.4.2 Private Military Companies in warfare

A PMC is a privately owned company that provides military services to national governments, international organisations, and sub-state actors for financial remuneration.[78] The services offered are:

1 Engaging in combat operations;
2 Providing strategic advice, training, and operational planning;
3 Supporting logistics, maintenance, security, and intelligence services.

PMCs are often capable of matching the combat effectiveness of conventional military forces, and sometimes they operate with superior technological resources and advanced equipment.

The deployment of PMCs remains highly controversial. Since 2001, the United Nations Mercenary Convention has prohibited the use of mercenaries in armed conflict, and PMCs activities are often classified as mercenary operations as such. Nevertheless, the legal landscape varies by country. For instance, US citizens may legally work as military contractors, whereas Russian law explicitly prohibits PMC operations. Despite this ban, Russian PMCs frequently operate internationally, exploiting legal ambiguities by remaining unregistered and avoiding state taxation. Studies indicate that PMC behaviour in armed conflicts is often driven by opportunism. Competition among PMCs incentivises effective performance and accelerates conflict resolution. Conversely, in the absence of competition, PMCs may underperform to prolong conflicts to maximise financial gain.

PMCs are contracted for various reasons, including operational flexibility, ability to relieve regular forces by performing non-combat tasks, and capacity to circumvent international regulations. Moreover, financially constrained nations may compensate PMCs through access to valuable natural resources or wartime spoils.

10.4.3 Impact of rogue Private Military Companies on war predictions

A comprehensive taxonomy of PMCs remains elusive.[79] This is particularly pronounced in the case of so-called 'rogue' PMCs, whose definitions remain fluid due to their adaptive and opportunistic behaviour in response to shifting conditions.[80] These entities often operate covertly, presenting significant challenges for AI-driven systems to accurately track and analyse their activities from the sketchy and unreliable data available. Potential impacts of rogue PMCs on warfare, which informed the modelling in the next section, include:

- Rogue PMCs may be better equipped than regular military forces or exhibit greater agility in adopting new technologies.
- Conversely, they may be poorly trained, underequipped, and/or undermotivated, but draw on previously untapped resources such as ex-convicts or less experienced units on loan by friendly nations.
- Some rogue PMCs may engage in extreme brutality, including war crimes like rape, looting, and execution of POWs.[81] While such tactics can provide a strategic advantage by instilling fear in adversaries, they also risk escalating conflicts and provoking international condemnation.

10.5 Extending Lanchester's Attrition Model with Aspects of PMC Deployment

This section uses three new simple mathematical models with few parameters to show how insights can be gained from the influence of specific aspects of rogue PMC deployment on warfare. As the reviewers suggested that the intended audience of this volume might find mathematical formulations challenging, only essential formulas and brief descriptions are presented. More extensive mathematical details and results of the models introduced here will be reported at a later stage.

Although military strategy has been analysed for centuries, the first foundational models of warfare were independently developed during the First World War by Osipov and Lanchester in 1915 and 1916, respectively.[82] Lanchester's attrition model, which describes modern warfare involving medium-range weapons such as firearms, has since been widely adapted and continues to be useful for analysis.[83]

Section 10.5.1 extends Lanchester's square law by incorporating the effects of prisoners of war (POWs) and PMC operations. Section 10.5.2 integrates the Bass diffusion model to quantify the temporal impact of mastering new technologies on the dynamics of warfare. Section 10.5.3 utilises the Bass model to estimate the potential impact of ex-convict recruits in PMC forces.

10.5.1 Experiment 1: Lanchester's attrition model incorporating POWs and a rogue PMC

This section models a conflict scenario between two opposing forces, A and B. Army A is a regular army while B comprises predominantly regular soldiers, with a smaller contingent of hired PMC personnel. The model assumes that both armies engage in combat at fixed attrition rates, that POWs are captured at a proportional rate, and that combat personnel are proportionally allocated to guard POWs. A critical assumption is that PMC personnel execute all captured POWs, disregarding the Geneva Conventions.

Lanchester's square law arises when two armies engage in combat such that individual soldiers on each side can concentrate their attacks on their adversaries without interference.[84] Let $A(t)$ and $B(t)$ represent the number of deployable combatants in armies A and B at time t, respectively. Let a be the fixed attrition rate at which each combatant from Army A eliminates adversaries per unit of time, and b , the corresponding rate for Army B. Under Lanchester's attrition model, evolution of combatant numbers is governed by the following differential equations:

$$\frac{dA}{dt} = -bB, A(0) = A_0$$

$$\frac{dB}{dt} = -aA, B(0) = B_0$$

These equations reflect that the reduction in combatant numbers for each army is proportional to the number of combatant opponents. Over time, the development of combatant numbers depends on the initial forces sizes A_0 and B_0 and time t. If victory is defined as reducing the opposing army's combatants to zero, the following conditions apply:

$$\text{If } a A_0^2 > b B_0^2, \text{ Army } A \text{ will win,}$$

$$\text{if } a A_0^2 < b B_0^2, \text{ Army } B \text{ will win,}$$

$$\text{if } a A_0^2 = b B_0^2, \text{ neither side will prevail.}$$

Victory is therefore determined by the relative magnitude of $a A_0^2$ to $b B_0^2$. Improving technology (a) has a linear effect on outcomes, whereas increasing the initial force size impacts quadratically, reflecting the essence of Lanchester's square law. The model's solution also leads to explicit formulas for war duration remaining as a fraction of victorious soldiers.

This basic Lanchester model can adapt to scenarios where victory is defined by decimating the opposing force below a fixed critical fraction of its original size, or to account for attrition caused not only by casualties but also by capturing POWs. Let a represent the overall attrition (inclusive of imprisonment), γ_A denote the fraction of Army B's incapacitated soldiers captured by Army A, and δ_A represents the proportion of Army A's personnel allocated to guard these POWs. Equivalent parameters apply to Army B. Victory conditions are now influenced by an additional term $\Delta = a\gamma_A\delta_A - b\gamma_B\delta_B$, which accounts for the relative impact of POW management on each side:

$$\text{if } a A_0^2 > b B_0^2 + \Delta A_0 B_0, \text{ Army } A \text{ will win,}$$

$$\text{if } a A_0^2 < b B_0^2 + \Delta A_0 B_0 \text{ Army } B \text{ will win,}$$

$$\text{if } a A_0^2 = b B_0^2 + \Delta A_0 B_0, \text{ neither side will win,}$$

Again, formulas can be derived for the duration of war and proportions of remaining victors. Army B gains a strategic advantage ($\Delta > 0$), as fewer combatants are required for guard duty, as PMC forces execute their captives.

This example demonstrates how valuable insights into the impact of POW management and non-conventional military strategies on contemporary conflict outcomes can be obtained. The strength of the analytical approach is that general statements can be made for multiple model parameter values simultaneously. It

can be shown for instance that taking prisoners always prolongs war, and the prolongation can be quantified in terms of the model parameters. Limitations are that validity is limited by the simplicity of the model assumptions and the unknown parameter values.

10.5.2 Experiment 2: Lanchester's attrition meets Bass's diffusion

Although widely applied in strategic analysis, Lanchester's model remains distant from operational realities. Numerous studies have sought to enhance its realism and this section adds what we believe to be a new angle.[85]

The importance of technological innovation in warfare is evident. As Beccaro argues, destruction capacity is no longer a function of mere massive manpower and resources characteristic of state armies; smaller groups of irregular combatants equipped with advanced technology can inflict significantly greater damage than their predecessors.[86] Consequently, speed of technological adoption can be crucial in wartime. For example, mastering Additive Manufacturing critical battlefield component production requires time, delaying immediate deployment.

The adoption process can be effectively modelled using the diffusion framework proposed by Frank Bass.[87] In this model, the transition from old to new technology is governed by a time-dependent fraction, $F(t)$, representing the cumulative fraction of surviving soldiers who have mastered the new technology by time t, thereby achieving enhanced combat efficiency. The value of $F(t)$ increases monotonically from 0 (no adoption) to 1 (full adoption) over time. Bass proposes a differential equation for $F(t)$ that leads to:

$$F(t) = \frac{1 - e^{-(p+q)t}}{1 + \frac{q}{p} e^{-(p+q)t}},$$

where p (coefficient of innovation) and q (coefficient of imitation) are parameters between 0 and 1. If $q < p$, increase in $F(t)$ decreases monotonically (the '*blockbuster*' case), whereas if $q > p$, increase in $F(t)$ exhibits a bell-shaped graph (the '*sleeper*' case).

This fraction $F(t)$ can be integrated into the Lanchester equations to reflect the gradual adoption of new technology. While the resulting equations cannot be solved analytically, like in Section 10.5.1, they can be solved numerically for specific parameters selections. Figure 10.2 illustrates the progression of a conflict in which a smaller Army A secures victory through faster adoption of a new technology.




Figure 10.2: Sizes of Armies A and B as a function of time. Although it is known at t = 4 that Army A will win, it takes until t = 25 until it outnumbers Army B.

10.5.3 Experiment 3: Bass's model and influx of ex-convicts

Finally, we examine the following scenario: during an ongoing conflict between Nations *A* and *B*, the intelligence service of Army *A* closely monitors a PMC operating as a proxy for Nation *B* and identifies a significant expansion of its forces through recruitment from Nation *B*'s prisons. Convicts are offered acquittal or reduced sentences in exchange for participating in the conflict against Nation *A*. The intelligence service periodically estimates the PMC's growth and aims to forecast the influx of ex-convicts as well as the PMC's ultimate size.

To project the future growth of the ex-convict contingent, the Bass diffusion model introduced in Section 10.5.2 proves particularly effective. This approach is based on the premise that prisons function as social systems. Within such systems, there are *innovators* – individuals who independently seize opportunities (in this case, recruitment in exchange for acquittal) – and *imitators*, whose decisions are influenced by the behaviour of others. These dynamics fulfil the conditions required for applying the Bass diffusion model to convict recruitment. In this framework, the two parameters of Bass's model, along with the final number of ex-convicts deployed, remain unknown. Their values can be estimated through linear regression, provided at least three intermediate intelligence estimates are available.

10.6 Conclusions

Accurately predicting warfare remains an exceedingly difficult – if not impossible – task, due to the absence of sufficiently reliable, fine-grained data, the dominant influence of individual human behaviour, the strategic importance of covertness and unpredictability and the extremely complex interaction between. While AI appears poised to play an increasingly prominent role in this domain, data scarcity continues to present a formidable obstacle. This applies even more to the deployment of armed non-state actors, because the behaviour and dependency of individuals are even more volatile there.[88]

These limitations also apply to mathematical models. However, because these models make fewer assumptions about their predictive capabilities, they can still offer valuable insights into the quantitative aspects of potential conflict scenarios, as demonstrated in Section 10.5. In cases where empirical data is incomplete, alternative approaches such as *ab initio* simulations – particularly Agent-Based Modelling – can help supplement existing knowledge and refine strategic assessments.

Notes

1 Weinert, *Demons of Science: What They Can and Cannot Tell Us About Our World.*
2 Pielke et al., 'The Butterfly Effect: Can a Butterfly in Brazil Really Cause a Tornado in Texas?, pp. 14–18.
3 González, *The Quest to Automate Conflict, Militarize Data, and Predict the Future.*
4 De Mesquita, *The Dictator's Handbook: Why Bad Behavior Is Almost Always Good Politics*.
5 Bruininks, 'On the Road to Simulating Life with Molecular Detail'.
6 De Souza Barba, 'Controlling and Predicting Unpredictable Behavior', pp. 93–107.
7 Clausewitz, *Vom Kriege*.
8 McCullin, 'Exploring Predictability in Armed Conflict', pp. 147–165.
9 Gould et al., 'When Will the War in Ukraine End? Experts Offer Their Predictions'.
10 Li, 'Understanding the effect of madman leaders on economic sanctions', pp. 320–343.
11 Scriven, 'An Essential Unpredictability in Human Behavior'.
12 Syrakos, 'Free Will and the Paradox of Predictability'.
13 Arp et al., *Bad Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Fallacies in Western Philosophy*.
14 Galtung, 'What Did the Experts Predict?', pp. 123–145.
15 Recchia et al., 'How Well Did Experts and Laypeople Forecast the Size of the COVID-19 Pandemic?'.
16 Veilleux-Lepage et al., '"Terrorism Experts" Predictions Regarding the Effects of the COVID-19 Pandemic on the Activities of Violent Non-State Actors', pp. 41–58.
17 Driedger et al., 'Utility-Based Predictions of Military Escalation: Why Experts Forecasted Russia Would Not Invade Ukraine', pp. 544–560.
18 Bloomfield, 'Predicting the Next Step of a Random Walk', pp. 397–414; Dorst, Kevin. 'Bayesians Commit the Gambler's Fallacy'.

[19] Bao et al., 'Predicting the Unpredictable: New Experimental Evidence on Forecasting Random Walks'.

[20] Grossmann et al., 'When Expert Predictions Fail', pp. 113–123.

[21] Kahneman and Tversky, 'Intuitive Prediction: Biases and Corrective Procedures'.

[22] Wikipedia, 'List of Cognitive Biases'; Yeh, et al., 'CoCoLoFa: A Dataset of News Comments with Common Logical Fallacies Written by LLM-Assisted Crowds'.

[23] Mauksch et al., 'Who Is an Expert for Foresight? A Review of Identification Methods'; Collins et al., 'Performance-Weighted Aggregation: Ferreting Out Wisdom Within the Crowd', pp. 185–214.

[24] Ho et al., 'Measuring Probabilistic Coherence to Identify Superior Forecasters.'

[25] Michaels, 'Caught off Guard? Evaluating How External Experts in Germany Warned About Russia's War on Ukraine', pp. 420–442.

[26] Tetlock and Gardner, *Superforecasting: The Art and Science of Prediction*.

[27] Drazin, *Collected Papers of Lewis Fry Richardson*; Gleditsch, *Lewis Fry Richardson: His Intellectual Legacy and Influence in the Social Science*s.

[28] Richardson, 'Distribution of Wars in Time', p. 610.

[29] Guo et al., 'Retool AI to Forecast and Limit Wars', pp. 331–333.

[30] Fokkink and Lindelauf, 'When Will It End? Assessing the Duration of Putin's War with Ukraine', pp. 537–550.

[31] Gómez et al., 'An In-Depth Review of the Weibull Model with a Focus on Various Parameterizations', p. 56; Rinne, *The Weibull Distribution: A Handbook*.

[32] Vuchinich and Teachman, 'Influences on the Duration of Wars, Strikes, Riots, and Family Arguments', pp. 544–568.

[33] Petropoulos et al., 'Forecasting: Theory and Practice', pp. 705–771; Racek et al., 'Integrating Spatio-Temporal Diffusion into Statistical Forecasting Models of Armed Conflict via Non-Parametric Smoothing'.

[34] Beard et al., *The Era of Global Risk: An Introduction to Existential Risk Studies.*

[35] Antelmi et al., 'Reliable and Efficient Agent-Based Modeling and Simulation'.

[36] De Amorim Silva and Braga, 'Simulating Systems-of-Systems with Agent-Based Modeling: A Systematic Literature Review', pp. 3609–3617.

[37] Chattoe-Brown, 'Is Agent-Based Modelling the Future of Prediction?', pp. 14—155; Elsenbroich and Polhill, 'Agent-Based Modelling as a Method for Prediction in Complex Social Systems', pp. 133–142.

[38] Mehrab et al., 'Network Agency: An Agent-Based Model of Forced Migration from Ukraine', pp. 1372–1380.

[39] Kebir et al., 'Simulating Actors' Behaviors Within Terrorist Attack Scenarios Based on a Multi-Agent System', pp. 12–20; Knoke, David. *Network Collective Action: Agent-Based Models of Pandemics, Riots, Social Movements, Insurrections and Insurgencies*.

[40] Dacrema and Benati, 'The Mechanics of Contentious Politics: An Agent-Based Modeling Approach', pp. 163–198.

[41] Wrona et al., 'Overview of Software Agent Platforms Available in 2023', p. 348; Wang et al., 'A Survey on Large Language Model Based Autonomous Agents', pp. 1–26.

[42] De Amorim Silva and Braga, 'Simulating Systems-of-Systems with Agent-Based Modeling: A Systematic Literature Review', pp. 3609–3617.

[43] Beerman, 'To Err Is Human: The Effect of Mistakes in Social Simulations'.

[44] Hadi et al., 'Large Language Models: A Comprehensive Survey of Its Applications, Challenges, Limitations, and Future Prospects'; Minaee et al., 'Large Language Models: A Survey'; Geiss and Lahmann, *Research handbook on warfare and artificial intelligence*. Edward Elgar Publishing, 2024.

[45] Wolfram, *What Is ChatGPT Doing… and Why Does It Work?*

[46] Galdorisi and Tangredi, *Algorithms of Armageddon: The Impact of Artificial Intelligence on Future Wars*.

[47] Hadlington et al., 'The Use of Artificial Intelligence in a Military Context: Development of the Attitudes Toward AI in Defense (AAID) Scale'.

[48] Beniwal and Singh, 'Remember This Event That Year? Assessing Temporal Information and Reasoning in Large Language Models'.

[49] Pham and Cunningham, 'Can Base ChatGPT be Used for Forecasting without Additional Optimization?'.

[50] Heppell et al., 'Lying Blindly: Bypassing ChatGPT's Safeguards to Generate Hard-to-Detect Disinformation Claims at Scale'.

[51] Halawi et al., 'Approaching Human-Level Forecasting with Language Models'; Hsieh et al., 'Reasoning and Tools for Human-Level Forecasting'; Pratt et al., 'Can Language Models Use Forecasting Strategies?'; Hua et al., 'War and Peace (WarAgent): LLM-Based Multi-Agent Simulation of World Wars'; Shinde et al., 'Artificial Intelligence Approach for Terror Attacks Prediction Through Machine Learning'; Xu et al., 'AI for Social Science and Social Science of AI: A Survey'.

[52] Bao et al., 'Data-Driven Stock Forecasting Models Based on Neural Networks: A Review'.

[53] Deng et al., 'Advances in Human Event Modeling: From Graph Neural Networks to Language Models', pp. 6459–6469.

[54] Pasche et al., 'Validating Deep Learning Weather Forecast Models on Recent High-Impact Extreme Events'; Price et al., 'Probabilistic Weather Forecasting with Machine Learning', pp. 84–90.

[55] Rød et al., 'A Review and Comparison of Conflict Early Warning Systems', pp. 96–112.

[56] Anderton and Carter, *Principles of Conflict Economics*; Klement, *Geo-Economics: The Interplay Between Geopolitics, Economics, and Investments*.

[57] Helou et al., 'Pager Explosion in Beirut: An Unprecedented Event'.

[58] Jensen et al., 'Algorithms at War: The Promise, Peril, and Limits of Artificial Intelligence', pp. 526–550.

[59] Dal Forno et al., 'Fake News Detection Algorithms: A Systematic Literature Review'; Chen et al., 'Biases of Humans, of AI, and of Humans with AI'; Cohen et al., 'Deep Learning and the Prisoner's Dilemma: A Strategic Evaluation'; Dai et al., 'Are LLMs Prescient? A Continuous Evaluation Using Daily News as the Oracle'; Davis, 'Elevating Humanism in High-Stakes Automation: Experts-in-the-Loop and Resort-to-Force Decision Making'; Erskine and Miller, 'AI and the Decision to Go to War', pp. 135–147; Gallegos et al., 'Bias and Fairness in Large Language Models: A Survey'; Hunter and Bowen, 'We'll Never Have a Model of an AI Major-General: Artificial Intelligence, Command Decisions, and Kitsch Visions of War', pp. 116–146; Hutson and Plate, 'The Algorithm of Fear: Unpacking Prejudice Against AI and the Mistrust of Technology'; Logan, 'Tell Me What You Don't Know: Large Language Models and the Pathologies of Intelligence Analysis', pp. 220–228; Park et al., 'AI Deception: A Survey of Examples, Risks, and Potential Solutions'; Maas et al., 'Military Artificial Intelligence as a Contributor to Global Catastrophic Risk', pp. 235–260; Mavrogiorgos et al., 'Bias in Machine Learning: A Literature Review', p. 8860; Peterson, 'AI and the Problem of Knowledge Collapse', p. 3249; Galdorisi and Tangredi, *Algorithms of Armageddon: The Impact of Artificial Intelligence on Future Wars;* Rivera et al., 'Escalation Risks from Language Models in Military and Diplomatic Decision-Making', pp. 836–898; Shrivastava et al., 'Measuring Free-Form Decision-Making Inconsistency of Language Models in Military Crisis Simulations'; Shumallov et al., 'The Curse of Recursion: Training on Generated Data Makes Models Forget'; Sumita et al., 'Cognitive Biases in Large Language Models: A Survey and Mitigation Experiments'.

[60] Syllaidopoulos et al., 'A Comprehensive Survey on AI in Counter-Terrorism and Cybersecurity'. pp. 91740–91764.

[61] Padur et al., 'Using Agent-Based Modelling and Reinforcement Learning to Study Hybrid Threats'.

[62] Gao et al., 'Large Language Models Empowered Agent-Based Modeling and Simulation: A Survey and Perspectives'; Zhang et al., 'LLM-AIDSim: LLM-Enhanced Agent-Based Influence Diffusion Simulation in Social Networks', p. 29.

[63] Bowie, '40 Terrorism Databases and Data Sets', pp. 147–161; Singh, '20 Databases on (Violent and Armed) Conflicts', pp. 162–171.

[64] Mueller et al., 'Introducing a Global Dataset on Conflict Forecasts and News Topics'.

[65] Conrad et al., 'Introducing ViNSAR: Dyadic Data on Violent Non-state Actor Rivalry'.

[66] Mehltretter et al., *The Rebels' Armament Dataset (RAD) Codebook.*

[67] Otto et al., 'The Diversity of Non-state Armed Actors: The History of Armed Actors Dataset'.

[68] Powell and Florea, 'Introducing the Armed Nonstate Actor Rivalry Dataset (ANARD)', pp. 177–206.

[69] Beaumais and Ramel, 'Diplomats, Soldiers, and Armed Conflict Databases: Another French Exception?'.

[70] Heuser et al., 'Strategic Foresight and Future War: A Discussion of Methodologies', pp. 11–20.

[71] Cohen and O'Brien, 'The Russia-Ukraine War: A Study in Analytic Failure'.

[72] Murphy et al., 'The Promise of Machine Learning in Violent Conflict Forecasting'.

[73] Holland Michel, *The Black Box, Unlocked: Predictability and Understandability in Military AI.*

[74] Agrawal and Sharma, 'Review of Explainable Artificial Intelligence for Informed Decisions Making'; Wiratsin and Ragkhitwetsagul, 'Effectiveness of Explainable Artificial Intelligence Techniques for Improved Human Trust'; Zettl-Schabath, 'Proxy Wars in Cyber-Space', pp. 412–424.

[75] Wood, 'Explainable AI in the Military Domain', pp. 1–13.

[76] Strickland, *Mathematical Modeling of Warfare and Combat Phenomenon*; Anderton et al., *Principles of Conflict Economics.*

[77] Biddle, *Nonstate Warfare.*

[78] Bell, 'Private Military Company'.

[79] Cremers and Bouwmeester, 'Russian Commercial Warriors on the Battlefield; Ferreira, 'Conceptualizing Criminal Non-State Actors', pp. 9–30.

[80] Loyle, *Understanding Nonstate Actor Behavior.*

[81] Asal and Malet, 'Nobody More Terrible than the Desperate: Conflict Conditions and Rebel Demand for Foreign Fighters', pp. 135–153.

[82] Lanchester, *Aircraft in Warfare: The Dawn of the Fourth Arm.*

[83] Chung and Jeong, 'Analyzing Russia–Ukraine War Patterns Based on Lanchester Model Using SINDy Algorithm', p. 851.

[84] Mesterton-Gibbons, *Models of War and Other Group Conflicts*.

[85] Chung and Jeon, 'Analyzing Russia–Ukraine War Patterns Based on Lanchester Model Using SINDy Algorithm', p. 851.

[86] Beccaro, 'Non-State Actors and Modern Technology', pp. 780–802.

[87] Bass, 'A New Product Growth for Model Consumer Durables', pp. 215–227.

[88] Villota, 'Intelligence Analysis: Systems of Non-State Actors'; Yelaiev et al., 'Effectiveness of Forensic Computer Modeling for Predicting Wartime Crimes'.

Bibliography

Agrawal, Renuka, and Kanhaiya Sharma. 'An Extensive Review on Significance of Explainable Artificial Intelligence Models in Discrete Domains for Informed Decisions Making'. *Revue d'Intelligence Artificielle* 38, no. 3 (2024), pp. 957–968.

Anderton, Charles H., and John R. Carter. *Principles of Conflict Economics.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.

Antelmi, Alessia, Pasquale Caramante, Gennaro Cordasco, Giuseppe D'Ambrosio, Davide De Vinco, Francesco Foglia, and Carmine Spagnuolo. 'Reliable and Efficient Agent-Based Modeling and Simulation'. *Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation* 27, no. 2 (2024), pp. 1–28.

Arp, Robert, Steven Barbone, and Michael Bruce, eds. *Bad Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Fallacies in Western Philosophy*. Hoboken, N.J.: John Wiley, 2018.

Asal, Victor, and David Malet. 'Nobody More Terrible than the Desperate: Conflict Conditions and Rebel Demand for Foreign Fighters'. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 47, no. 2 (2024), pp. 135–153.

Bao, Te, Brice Corgnet, Nobuyuki Hanaki, Yohanes E. Riyanto, and Jiahua Zhu. 'Predicting the Unpredictable: New Experimental Evidence on Forecasting Random Walks'. *Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control* 146 (January 2023), 104571.

Bao, Wuzhida, Yuting Cao, Yin Yang, Hangjun Che, Junjian Huang, and Shiping Wen. 'Data-Driven Stock Forecasting Models Based on Neural Networks: A Review'. *Information Fusion* (2024), 102616.

Bass, Frank M. 'A New Product Growth for Model Consumer Durables'. *Management Science* 15, no. 5 (1969), pp. 215–227.

Beard, Simon J., Martin Rees, Catherine Richards, and Clarissa Rios Rojas. *The Era of Global Risk: An Introduction to Existential Risk Studies.* Cambridge: Open Book, 2023.

Beaumais, Louise, and Frédéric Ramel. 'Diplomats, Soldiers, and Armed Conflict Databases: Another French Exception?' *Global Studies Quarterly* 3, no. 2 (2023), pp. 1–13.

Beccaro, Andrea. 'Non-State Actors and Modern Technology'. *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 34, no. 4 (2023), pp. 780–802.

Beerman, Jack T. 'To Err Is Human: The Effect of Mistakes in Social Simulations'. MSc Thesis, Miami University, 2023.

Bell, Daniel. 'Private Military Company'. *Encyclopedia Britannica*.

Beniwal, Himanshu, Kowsik D. Nandagopan, and Mayank Singh. 'Remember This Event That Year? Assessing Temporal Information and Reasoning in Large Language Models'. arXiv.2402.11997 (2024).

Biddle, Stephen. *Nonstate Warfare: The Military Methods of Guerillas, Warlords, and Militias*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2022.

Biswas, Som. 'Prospective Role of ChatGPT in the Military'. *Qeios*, 2023.

Bloomfield, Robert, and Jeffrey Hales. 'Predicting the Next Step of a Random Walk'. *Journal of Financial Economics* 65, no. 3 (2002), pp. 397–414.

Bowie, Neil G. '40 Terrorism Databases and Data Sets'. *Perspectives on Terrorism* 15, no. 2 (2021), pp. 147–161.

Bruininks, Bart M.H. 'On the Road to Simulating Life with Molecular Detail'. *Journal of Molecular Simulation*. PhD Diss., Groningen University (2021).

Chattoe-Brown, Edmund. 'Is Agent-Based Modelling the Future of Prediction?' *International Journal of Social Research Methodology* 26, no. 2 (2023), pp. 143–155.

Chen, Yang, Samuel N. Kirshner, Anton Ovchinnikov, Meena Andiappan, and Tracy Jenkin. 'Biases of Humans, of AI, and of Humans with AI'. 31 August 2024. SSRN: https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4943377.

Chung, Daewon, and Byeongseon Jeong. 'Analyzing Russia–Ukraine War Patterns Based on Lanchester Model Using SINDy Algorithm'. *Mathematics* 12, no. 6 (2024), p. 851.

Clausewitz, Carl von. *Vom Kriege*. Berlin: Dümmler, 1832–1834.

Cohen, Eliot A., and Phillips O'Brien. 'The Russia-Ukraine War: A Study in Analytic Failure'. Washington, D.C.: CSIS, 24 September 2024.

Cohen, Jaden, and Brandon Holland. 'Deep Learning and the Prisoner's Dilemma: A Strategic Evaluation'. *The National High School Journal of Science*, 2024.

Collins, Robert N., David R. Mandel, and David V. Budescu. 'Performance-Weighted Aggregation: Ferreting Out Wisdom Within the Crowd'. In Matthias Seifert, ed. *Judgment in Predictive Analytics*, edited by Matthias Seifert. Berlin: Springer, 2023, pp. 185–214.

Conrad, Justin, Kevin T. Greene, and Brian J. Phillips. 'Introducing ViNSAR: Dyadic Data on Violent Non-state Actor Rivalry'. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 68, no.9 (2023), pp. 1884–1908.

Cremers, Thijs, and Han Bouwmeester. 'Russian Commercial Warriors on the Battlefield'. In *Reflections on the Russia-Ukraine War*, edited by Maarten Rothman, Lonneke Peperkamp, and Sebastiaan Rietjens. Leiden: Leiden University Press, 2024, pp. 415–437.

Dacrema, Eugenio, and Stefano Benati. 'The Mechanics of Contentious Politics: An Agent-Based Modeling Approach'. *The Journal of Mathematical Sociology* 44, no. 3 (2020), pp. 163–198.

Dai, Hui, Ryan Teehan, and Mengye Ren. 'Are LLMs Prescient? A Continuous Evaluation Using Daily News as the Oracle'. arXiv:2411.08324 (2024).

Dal Forno, Ana J., Graziela Piccoli Richetti, and Vinícius H. Knaesel, `Fake News Detection Algorithms – A Systematic Literature Review'. *Data & Knowledge Engineering* (2025): 102441.

Davis, Jenny L. 'Elevating Humanism in High-Stakes Automation: Experts-in-the-Loop and Resort-to-Force Decision Making'. *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 78, no. 2 (2024), pp. 200–209.

De Amorim Silva, Rafael, and Rosana T. Vaccare Braga. 'Simulating Systems-of-Systems with Agent-Based Modeling: A Systematic Literature Review'. *IEEE Systems Journal* 14, no. 3 (September 2020), pp. 3609–3617.

De Mesquita, Bruce Bueno, and Alastair Smith. *The Dictator's Handbook: Why Bad Behavior Is Almost Always Good Politics*. New York: Public Affairs, 2012.

De Souza Barba, Lourenco. 'Controlling and Predicting Unpredictable Behavior'. *The Behavior Analyst* 38, no. 1 (2015), pp. 93–107.

Deng, Shixu, Maarten de Rijke, and Yunying Ning. 'Advances in Human Event Modeling: From Graph Neural Networks to Language Models'. In *Proceedings of the 30th ACM SIGKDD Conference on Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining*, August 2024, pp. 6459–6469.

Dorst, Kevin. 'Bayesians Commit the Gambler's Fallacy'. SSRN 4683064 (2024).

Drazin, Philip G., ed. *Collected Papers of Lewis Fry Richardson*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993.

Driedger, Jonas J., and Mikhail Polianskii. 'Utility-Based Predictions of Military Escalation: Why Experts Forecasted Russia Would Not Invade Ukraine'. *Contemporary Security Policy* 44, no. 4 (2023), pp. 544–560.

Elsenbroich, Corinna, and J. Garreth Polhill. 'Agent-Based Modelling as a Method for Prediction in Complex Social Systems'. *International Journal of Social Research Methodology* 26, no. 2 (2023), pp. 133–142.

Erskine, Toni, and Steven E. Miller. 'AI and the Decision to Go to War: Future Risks and Opportunities'. *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 78, no. 2 (2024), pp. 135–147.

Ferreira, Marcos. 'Conceptualizing Criminal Non-state Actors' in *Criminal Non-State Actors*. Springer, 2025, pp. 9–30.

Fokkink, Robbert J., and Roy Lindelauf. 'When Will It End? Assessing the Duration of Putin's War with Ukraine'. In *Reflections on the Russia-Ukraine War*, edited by Maarten Rothman, Lonneke Peperkamp and Sebastiaan Rietjens. Leiden University Press, 2024, pp. 537–550.

Galdorisi, George, and Sam J. Tangredi. *Algorithms of Armageddon: The Impact of Artificial Intelligence on Future Wars.* Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2024.

Gallegos, Isabel O., Ryan A. Rossi, Jace Barrow, Mehrab Tanjim, Sungchul Kim, Franck Dernoncourt, and Nesime K. Ahmed. 'Bias and Fairness in Large Language Models: A Survey'. *Computational Linguistics*, 50 no. 3 (2024), pp. 1–79.

Galtung, J. 'What Did the Experts Predict?' *Futures* 35, no. 2 (2003), pp. 123–145.

Gao, Chen, Xiaohong Lan, Nian Li, Yuan Yuan, Jingtao Ding, Zhilun Zhou, Fenglli Xu, and Yong Li. 'Large Language Models Empowered Agent-Based Modeling and Simulation: A Survey and Perspectives'. *Humanities and Social Sciences Communications* 11, no. 1 (2024), pp. 1–24.

Geiss, Robin, and Henning Lahmann (Eds.). *Research handbook on warfare and artificial intelligence*. Edward Elgar Publishing, 2024.

Gleditsch, Nils Petter. *Lewis Fry Richardson: His Intellectual Legacy and Influence in the Social Sciences.* Cham: Springer Nature, 2020.

Gómez, Yolanda M., Diego I. Gallardo, Carolina Marchant, Luis Sánchez, and Marcello Bourguignon. 'An In-Depth Review of the Weibull Model with a Focus on Various Parameterizations'. *Mathematics* 12 (2024), p. 56.

González, Roberto J. *War Virtually: The Quest to Automate Conflict, Militarize Data, and Predict the Future*. Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 2022.

Gould, Joe, Bryant Harris, Sebastian Sprenger, and Tom Kington. 'When Will the War in Ukraine End? Experts Offer Their Predictions'. *Defense News*, 13 January 2023.

Grossmann, Igor, Michael E.W. Varnum, Cendri A. Hutcherson, and David R. Mandel. 'When Expert Predictions Fail'. *Trends in Cognitive Sciences* 28, no. 2 (2024), pp. 113–123.

Guo, Weisi, Kristian Gleditsch, and Alan Wilson. 'Retool AI to Forecast and Limit Wars'. *Nature* 562 (2018), pp. 331–333.

Hadi, Muhammad U Qasem Al Tashi, Abbas Shah, Rizwan Qureshi, Amgad Muneer, Muhammad Irfan, Anas Zafar, Muhammad Bilal Shaikh, Naveed Akhtar, Jia Wu, Seyedali Mirjalili, and Mubarak Shah. 'Large Language Models: A Comprehensive Survey of Its Applications, Challenges, Limitations, and Future Prospects'. *Authorea* Preprints 2023.

Hadlington, Lee, Jens Binder, Sarah Gardner, Maria Karanika-Murray, and Sarah Knight. 'The Use of Artificial Intelligence in a Military Context: Development of the Attitudes Toward AI in Defense (AAID) Scale'. *Frontiers in Psychology* 14 (2023): 1164810.

Halawi, Danny, Fred Zhang, Yueh-Han Chen, and Jacob Steinhardt. 'Approaching Human-Level Forecasting with Language Models'. arXiv:2402.18563 (2024).

Helou, Mariana, Eric S. Weinstein, Joelle Kalaji, Toufic Chaaban, and Kaissar Yammine. 'Pager Explosion in Beirut: An Unprecedented Event'. *Disaster Medicine and Public Health Preparedness* 18 (2024): e215.

Heppell, Freddy, Mehmet E. Bakir, and Kalina Bontcheva. 'Lying Blindly: Bypassing ChatGPT's Safeguards to Generate Hard-to-Detect Disinformation Claims at Scale'. arXiv.2402.08467 (2024).

Heuser, Beatrice, Joachim Isacsson, and Olaf Theiler. 'Strategic Foresight and Future War: A Discussion of Methodologies'. In *Routledge Handbook of the Future of Warfare*, edited by Artur Gruszczak and Sebastian Kaempf. London: Routledge, 2023. Vol. 1, pp. 11–20.

Ho, Emily H., David V. Budescu, and Mark Himmelstein. 'Measuring Probabilistic Coherence to Identify Superior Forecasters'. *International Journal of Forecasting* 41, no. 2 (April–June 2025), pp. 596–612.

Holland Michel, Arthur. 'The Black Box, Unlocked: Predictability and Understandability in Military AI'. Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 2020.

Hsieh, Elvis, Preston Fu, and Jonathan Chen. 'Reasoning and Tools for Human-Level Forecasting'. arXiv:2408.12036 (2024).

Hua, Wenyue, Lizhou Fan, Lingyao Li, Kai Mei, Yianchao Ji, Yingqiang Ge, Laurel Hemphill, and Yongfeng Zhang. 'War and Peace (WarAgent): LLM-Based Multi-Agent Simulation of World Wars'. https://arxiv.org/abs/2311.17227v2 (2024).

Hunter, Cameron, and Bleddyn E. Bowen. 'We'll Never Have a Model of an AI Major-General: Artificial Intelligence, Command Decisions, and Kitsch Visions of War'. *Journal of Strategic Studies* 47, no. 1 (2024), pp. 116–146.

Hutson, James, and Daniel Plate. 'The Algorithm of Fear: Unpacking Prejudice Against AI and the Mistrust of Technology'. *Journal of Innovation and Technology*, no. 38 (2024).

Jensen, Benjamin M., Christopher Whyte, and Scott Cuomo. 'Algorithms at War: The Promise, Peril, and Limits of Artificial Intelligence'. *International Studies Review* 22, no. 3 (2020), pp. 526–550.

Kahneman, Daniel, and Amos Tversky. 'Intuitive Prediction: Biases and Corrective Procedures'. *Decision Research* 1977.

Kebir, Oussama, Issam Nouaouri, Lamia Rejeb, Lilia Rejab, and Lamjed Ben Said. 'Simulating Actors' Behaviors Within Terrorist Attack Scenarios Based on a Multi-Agent System'. In *Proceedings of the 12th International Defence and Homeland Security Simulation Workshop (DHSS 2022)*, Rome, Italy, 12–20 September 2022.

Klement, Joachim. *Geo-Economics: The Interplay Between Geopolitics, Economics, and Investments*. Charlottesville, Va.: CFA Institute, 2021.

Knoke, David. *Network Collective Action: Agent-Based Models of Pandemics, Riots, Social Movements, Insurrections and Insurgencies*. Springer, 2025.

Lanchester, Frederick W. *Aircraft in Warfare: The Dawn of the Fourth Arm*. London: Constable, 1916.

Li, Meilin. Understanding the effect of madman leaders on economic sanctions. *International Interactions*, *51*(2) (2025), pp. 320–343.

Logan, Sarah. 'Tell Me What You Don't Know: Large Language Models and the Pathologies of Intelligence Analysis'. *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 78, no. 2 (2024), pp. 220–228.

Loyle, Cyanne E. *Understanding Nonstate Actor Behavior.* Washington, D.C.: Simon-Skjodt Center for the Prevention of Genocide, 2018.

Maas, Matthijs M., Kayla Lucero-Matteucci, and Di Cooke. 'Military Artificial Intelligence as a Contributor to Global Catastrophic Risk'. In *AI and Global Catastrophic Risks,* edited by Max Tegmark and Allan Dafoe (2023), pp. 235–260.

Mauksch, Stefanie, Heiko A. von der Gracht and Theodore J. Gordon. 'Who Is an Expert for Foresight? A Review of Identification Methods'. *Technological Forecasting and Social Change* 154 (2020): 119982.

Mavrogiorgos, Konstantinos, Athanasios Kiourtis, Argyro Mavrogiorgou, Andreas Menychtas, and Dimosthenis Kyriazis. 'Bias in Machine Learning: A Literature Review'. *Applied Sciences* 14, no. 19 (2024): 8860.

McCullin, David E. 'Exploring Predictability in Armed Conflict'. *Journal of Advanced Military Studies* 11, no. 1 (2020), pp. 147–165.

Mehltretter, Andreas, Paul W. Thurner, Oliver Pamp and Paul Binder. *The Rebels' Armament Dataset (RAD) Codebook.* Munich: Ludwig Maximilian University, August 2023.

Mehrab, Zakaria, Logan Stundal, Samarth Swarup, Srinivasan Venaktramanan, Bryan Lewis, Henning Mortveit et al. 'Network Agency: An Agent-Based Model of Forced Migration from Ukraine'. In

Proceedings of the 23rd International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (May 2024), pp. 1372–1380.

Mesterton-Gibbons, Michael. *Models of War and Other Group Conflicts*. Lecture Notes. Florida State University, 2016.

Michaels, Eva. 'Caught off Guard? Evaluating How External Experts in Germany Warned About Russia's War on Ukraine'. *Intelligence and National Security* 39, no. 3 (2024), pp. 420–442.

Minaee, Shervin, Tomas Mikolov, Narjes Nikzad, Meysam Chenaghlu, Richard Socher, Xavier Amatriain, and Jianfeng Gao. 'Large Language Models: A Survey'. arXiv:2402.06196 (2025).

Mueller, Hannes, Christopher Rauh, and Ben Seimon. 'Introducing a Global Dataset on Conflict Forecasts and News Topics'. *Data & Policy* 6 (2024): e17.

Murphy, Max, Ezra Sharpe, and Kayla Huang. 'The Promise of Machine Learning in Violent Conflict Forecasting'. *Data & Policy* 6 (2024): e35.

Otto, Sabine, Adam Scharpf, and Anita R. Gohdes. 'The Diversity of Non-state Armed Actors: The History of Armed Actors Dataset'. Working Paper, March 2017.

Padur, Kärt, Hervé Borrion, and Stephen Hailes. 'Using Agent-Based Modelling and Reinforcement Learning to Study Hybrid Threats'. *Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation* 28, no. 1 (2025).

Park, Peter S., Simon Goldstein, Aidan O'Gara, Michael Chen, and Dan Hendrycks. 'AI Deception: A Survey of Examples, Risks, and Potential Solutions'. *Patterns* 5, no. 5 (2024).

Pasche, Olivier C., Jonathan Wider, Zhongwei Zhang, Jakob Zscheischler, and Sebastian Engelke. 'Validating Deep Learning Weather Forecast Models on Recent High-Impact Extreme Events'. *Artificial Intelligence for the Earth Systems* 4, no. 1 (2025): e240033.

Peterson, Andrew J. 'AI and the Problem of Knowledge Collapse'. *AI & Society* 40 (2025), pp. 3249–3269.

Petropoulos, Fotios, Daniele Apiletti, Vassilios Assimakopoulos, Mohamed Zied Babai, Devon K. Barrow, Souhaib Ben Taieb, and Florian Ziel. 'Forecasting: Theory and Practice'. *International Journal of Forecasting* 38, no. 3 (2022), pp. 705–771.

Pham Hoang Van and Scott Cunningham. 'Can Base ChatGPT be Used for Forecasting without Additional Optimization?' SSRN 4097279 (2024).

Pielke Sr, Roger A., Bo-Wen Shen, and Xubin Zeng. 'The Butterfly Effect: Can a Butterfly in Brazil Really Cause a Tornado in Texas?' *Weatherwise* 77, no. 3 (2024), pp. 14–18.

Powell, Stephen R., and Adrian Florea. 'Introducing the Armed Nonstate Actor Rivalry Dataset (ANARD)'. *Civil Wars* 23, no. 2 (2021), pp. 177–206.

Pratt, Sarah, Seth Blumberg, Pietro K. Carolino, and Meredith Ringel Morris. 'Can Language Models Use Forecasting Strategies?' arXiv:2406.04446 (2024).

Price, Ilan, Avaro Sanchez-Gonzalez, Ferran Alet, Tom R. Andersson, Andrew El-Kadi, Domenico Masters, Timo Ewalds, Jacklynn Stott, Shakir Mohamed, Peter Battaglia, Remi Lam, and Matthew Willson. 'Probabilistic Weather Forecasting with Machine Learning'. *Nature* 637, no. 8044 (2025), pp. 84–90.

Probasco, Emilia, Matthew Burtell, Helen Toner, and Tim G. Rudner. 'Not Oracles of the Battlefield: Safety Considerations for AI-Based Military Decision Support Systems'. In *Proceedings of the AAAI/ACM Conference on AI, Ethics, and Society*, 7 (2024), pp. 1157–1165.

Racek, Daniel, Paul W. Thurner, and Göran Kauermann. 'Integrating Spatio-Temporal Diffusion into Statistical Forecasting Models of Armed Conflict via Non-Parametric Smoothing'. Washington, D.C.: Center for Open Science, 2024.

Recchia, Giuseppe, Alexandra L. Freeman, and David Spiegelhalter. 'How Well Did Experts and Laypeople Forecast the Size of the COVID-19 Pandemic?' *PloS One* 16, no. 5 (2021): e0250935.

Richardson, Lewis Fry. 'Distribution of Wars in Time'. *Nature* 155, no. 3942 (1945), p. 610.

Rinne, Horst. *The Weibull Distribution: A Handbook*. Boca Raton, Fla.: Chapman and Hall/CRC, 2008.

Rivera, Juan-Pablo, Gabriel Mukobi, Anka Reuel, Max Lamparth, Chandler Smith, and Jacquelyn Schneider. 'Escalation Risks from Language Models in Military and Diplomatic Decision-Making'. In *FAccT '24: Proceedings of the 2024 ACM Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency* (2024), pp. 836–898.

Rød, Espen G., Tim Gåsste, and Håvard Hegre. 'A Review and Comparison of Conflict Early Warning Systems'. *International Journal of Forecasting* 40, no. 1 (2024), pp. 96–112.

Scriven, Michael. 'An Essential Unpredictability in Human Behavior'. *Voice of America*, 1961.

Shinde, Sagar, Suchitra Khoje, Ankit Raj, Lalitkumar Wadhwa, and Armaan Suhel C. Shaikh. 'Artificial Intelligence Approach for Terror Attacks Prediction through Machine Learning'. *Multidisciplinary Science Journal* 6, no. 1 (2024): 2024011.

Shrivastava, Aryan, Jessica Hullman, and Max Lamparth. 'Measuring Free-Form Decision-Making Inconsistency of Language Models in Military Crisis Simulations'. arXiv:2410.13204 (2024).

Shumallov, Ilia, Zakhar Shumaylov, Yiren Zhao, Yarin Gal, Nicolas Papernot, and Ross Anderson. 'The Curse of Recursion: Training on Generated Data Makes Models Forget'. arXiv:2305.17493v2 (2023).

Singh, Ishaansh. '20 Databases on (Violent and Armed) Conflicts'. *Perspectives on Terrorism* 15, no. 2 (2021), pp. 162–171.

Strickland, John. *Mathematical Modeling of Warfare and Combat Phenomenon.* Lulu.com, 2011.

Sumita, Yasuaki, Koh Takeuchi, and Hisashi Kashima. 'Cognitive Biases in Large Language Models: A Survey and Mitigation Experiments'. arXiv:2412.00323 (2024).

Syllaidopoulos, Ioannis, Klimis Ntalianis, and Ioannis Salmon, A Comprehensive Survey on AI in Counter-Terrorism and Cybersecurity: Challenges and Ethical Dimensions. *IEEE Access* 13, (2025), pp. 91740–91764.

Syrakos, Alexandros. 'Free Will and the Paradox of Predictability'. *Qeios* (2023).

Tetlock, Philip E., and Dan Gardner. *Superforecasting: The Art and Science of Prediction.* New York: Random House, 2016.

Veilleux-Lepage, Yannick, Tommy van Steen, and Maria-Elena Kisyova. 'Terrorism Experts' Predictions Regarding the Effects of the COVID-19 Pandemic on the Activities of Violent Non-State Actors'. *Perspectives on Terrorism* 16, no. 4 (2022), pp. 41–58.

Villota, Marina A. 'Intelligence analysis: Systems of Non-State Actors'. Educational Note, NATO Science & Technology Organization, 2024.

Vuchinich, Samuel, and Jay Teachman. 'Influences on the Duration of Wars, Strikes, Riots, and Family Arguments'. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 37, no. 3 (1993), pp. 544–568.

Wang, Lei, Chen Ma, Xueyang Feng, Zeyu Zhang, Hao Yang, Jingen Zhang et al. 'A Survey on Large Language Model Based Autonomous Agents'. *Frontiers of Computer Science* 18, no. 6 (2024), pp. 1–26.

Weinert, Friedel. *Demons of Science: What They Can and Cannot Tell Us About Our World.* Berlin: Springer, 2018.

Wikipedia. 'List of Cognitive Biases'. (Accessed September 2024).

Wiratsin, In-On, and Chaiyong Ragkhitwetsagul. `Effectiveness of Explainable Artificial Intelligence Techniques for Improving Human Trust in Machine Learning Models: A Systematic Literature Review'. *IEEE Access* (2025).

Wolfram, Stephen. 'What Is ChatGPT Doing… and Why Does It Work?', 14 February 2023. https://writings.stephenwolfram.com/2023/02/what-is-chatgpt-doing-and-why-does-it-work/.

Wood, Nathan G. 'Explainable AI in the Military Domain'. *Ethics and Information Technology* 26, no. 2 (2024), pp. 1–13.

Wrona, Zofia, Wojciech Buchwald, Maria Ganzha, Marcin Paprzycki, Florin Leon, Noman Noor, and Constantin-Valentin Pal. 'Overview of Software Agent Platforms Available in 2023'. *Information* 14, no. 6 (2023), p. 348.

Xu, Ruoxi, Yingfei Sun, Mengjie Ren, Shiguang Guo, Ruotong Pan, Hongyu Lin, Le Sun, and Xianpei Han. 'AI for Social Science and Social Science of AI: A Survey'. *Information Processing & Management* 61, no. 3 (2024): 103665.

Yeh, Min-Hsuan, Yuan Wan, and Ting-Hao Huang. 'CoCoLoFa: A Dataset of News Comments with Common Logical Fallacies Written by LLM-Assisted Crowds'. https://arxiv.org/abs/2410.03457v1 (2024).

Yelaiev, Yurii, Ihor Fedchak, Volodymyr Senyk, Dmytro Tymchyshyn, and Pavlo Nazarenko. 'Effectiveness of Forensic Computer Modeling for Predicting Wartime Crimes'. *Pakistan Journal of Criminology* 16, no. 2 (April–June 2024), pp. 601–618.

Zettl-Schabath, Kerstin. "Proxy Wars in Cyber-Space." *Routledge Handbook of Proxy Wars*. Routledge, (2023), pp. 412–424.

Zhang, Lan, Yuxuan Hu, Weihua Li, Quan Bai, and Parma Nand. 'LLM-AIDSim: LLM-Enhanced Agent-Based Influence Diffusion Simulation in Social Networks'. *Systems* 13, no. 1 (2025), p. 29.

PART II

Cases of Non-State (Armed) Actors in War

CHAPTER 11

Fighting or Writing? Dutch Volunteers in the Anglo-Boer War: Motivation, Loyalty, Effectiveness and Self-Representation

Henk de Jong

Abstract

This chapter aims to deepen our understanding of violent non-state actors, by way of analysing the self-representation of Dutch volunteers in the Second Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902). Torn between frenetic pro-Boer enthusiasm in the Netherlands and the strict neutral stance of the Dutch government, the foreign fighters had some explaining to do: to the national public, their relatives and ultimately to themselves. This translated into fascinating autobiographical publications in which they outlined and sought to justify their actions. These letters, diaries and memoirs reveal much about the mind-set and self-interpretation of violent non-state actors around 1900, as well as their way of fighting. Intriguing reflections can be identified on motivation, loyalty, effectiveness and life at the front. Obviously, these are key areas of interest, when studying the interplay between state and non-state actors in warfare, as is the case in this volume.[1]

Keywords: Anglo-Boer War, Dutch volunteers, Military autobiographies, Self-representation

11.1 Introduction

Semantically, we are on slippery terrain while studying violent non-state actors. Within the domain of War Studies the concept of violent non-state actors may refer to insurgents, rebels, freedom fighters, partisans, terrorists, guerrillas, bandits, condottieri, mercenaries, Private Military Companies (PMCs), foreign fighters, and so on and so forth.[2] The activities of this elusive category of fighters are described as variedly as guerrilla, insurgency, rebellion, uprising, *Kleinkrieg* or revolutionary war(fare).[3] Actions to suppress them are also characterised in a broad variety of ways, such as irregular warfare, asymmetrical warfare, small wars, counterinsurgency, counter-guerrilla, peace-enforcing, stabilisation operations and nation building.[4]

Notwithstanding this conceptual ambiguity, elaborated upon in the introduction and conclusion of this volume, it goes without saying that violent non-state actors emerge intermittently in military history. Stimulated by the rise of terrorist

groups such as ISIS, debate intensified on the key characteristics of volunteers and foreign fighters, as manifestations of violent non-state actors.[5] The jury is still out on the central questions in this regard. What for example are in general the main *motivations* for volunteers to participate in armed struggles abroad? What can be said about the nature of their *loyalty*? How *effective* are the military efforts of foreign fighters? What, more in general, can be said about the significance of non-state actor engagement in wars and the interplay between state and non-state actors in warfare? Since the answers to those questions are not yet forthcoming, studying violent non-state actors is a sound idea.

From a historical perspective, colonial wars and wars of decolonisation in particular provide interesting material in this respect. Implicitly or explicitly non-state actors were fought within this setting, whether it was labelled as *Mission Civilisatrice* (Bugeaud, Gallieni, Lyautey), *Imperial Policing* (Gwynn), *Pacification* (Van Heutsz), *Politionele Acties* (Spoor), *Small Wars* (Callwell) or *Hearts and Minds* (Templer).[6] In this regard South African military history proves to be especially informative. The conflicts in Southern Africa before 1900, between indigenous peoples and colonising powers, the fighting in Africa throughout the First World War, the Border War of the South African Defence Force (SADF) during the Cold War, the struggle of the armed branch of the African National Congress (ANC) against the Apartheid-regime, are all filled to the brim with insurgents, freedom fighters and 'terrorists'.[7]

The Second Anglo-Boer War of 1899–1902 (in recent literature categorised as *The South African War*) stands out particularly.[8] In this war the republics of the Oranje Vrijstaat and Transvaal fought the British Empire, that tried to subjugate them within a colonial context. To counter it, the Boers initially focussed on pre-emptive strikes, sieges and defending tactically important terrain. Subsequently, they opted for hit-and-run actions and other forms of irregular, asymmetric and guerrilla warfare. This was remarkably successful. The Boers fought in small, improvised units (commandos), without uniforms, and brought their own weapons and horses. The Boer commandos were composed of hardened local fighters (effective shots and experienced horse riders), who were as flexible as they were independent. Their commando units were led in principle by democratically elected local commanders. They blended effortlessly in the society whose independence they fought for, and in the unforgiving landscape they knew so well.

The Boer resistance was broken only slowly. The British had to revolutionise their way of fighting. Massive reinforcements were brought in from overseas. Large scale conventional operations were abandoned. British troops, under the command of general Roberts, started segmenting the terrain, using barbed wire and blockhouses, thus creating firebases and improving intelligence, and switched to search-and-destroy tactics and relentless sweeps by small fast units on horseback.

The British opted now for a scorched earth strategy, systematically destroying enemy crops and cattle. They tried to separate commandos and the Boer population by way of rounding up women, children and elderly in concentration camps. This proved successful. By 1901 the Boers were exhausted. They surrendered and the (traumatic) war ended on 31 May 1902, with the *Vrede van Vereeniging*.

Strictly speaking, the Boers cannot be categorised as violent non-state actors, since they fought for the independent 'states' of Transvaal and the Oranje Vrijstaat. However, the international volunteers in this conflict who joined the Boers most certainly can be regarded as violent non-state actors.[9] Many of them came from the Netherlands. Around 2,000-4,000 Dutch seem to have joined Boer forces in South Africa.[10] In 1899 British actions at the Cape produced an outcry in the Netherlands (and also in Germany, France, Scandinavia and Russia).[11] Hundreds chose to fight alongside the Boers, either within the *Hollanderkorps*, in units of international volunteers, or as free roaming individual Dutch soldiers.[12] Meanwhile, the government remained strictly neutral. Dutch citizens were forbidden from enlisting in the Oranje Vrijstaat or Transvaal, under penalty of de-naturalisation. This did not stop war enthusiasts going to South Africa and taking up arms.

Interestingly, quite a few of these Dutch volunteers felt the need to reflect on their thoughts and actions in South Africa in autobiographical writings. As early as 1901 Cornelis Plokhooy (1877–1964) came up with his *Met den Mauser. Persoonlijke ervaringen in den Zuid-Afrikaanschen Oorlog*.[13] In 1903 Hendrik verLoren van Themaat (1874–1966) published *Twee jaren in den boerenoorlog*.[14] The war experiences of Dutch lieutenant Gerrit Boldingh (1871–1901) were printed just after the war, as *Een Hollandsch officier in Zuid-Afrika. Nagelaten geschriften van luitenant Gerrit Boldingh*.[15] The story of Henri Slegtkamp (1873–1952) came out a few years later as *Slegtkamp van Spioenkop. Oorlogsherinneringe van Kapt. Slegtkamp*.[16] Letters from the front by the young Karel van den Berg (1873–1948) can be found in *Beste Ouders! Brieven uit de Transvaal van Karel van den Berg 1896–1900*.[17] The thoughts on the Anglo-Boer War of Ernest Douwes Dekker (1879–1950) were collected in *DD. Het leven van E.F.E. Douwes Dekker*.[18] This amounts to a fascinating corpus of texts that has much to say about Dutch violent non-state actors in South Africa around 1900.[19]

Obviously, their background and military involvement varied strongly. Distinction must be made between 'Hollanders' who were already living and working in South Africa when the conflict broke out, and the volunteers who came from the Netherlands to provide military support to the Boer nation. The first group included the young trainee Karel van den Berg, the typical frontier man Henri Slegtkamp and the teacher Cornelis Plokhooy. Although they had been living in South Africa for some time, they were by no means 'Afrikaanders' since they possessed Dutch nationality and spoke, wrote and thought in Dutch. Van den Berg was a young intern working at a bank in Pretoria. He may be characterised as an

indignant young 'uitlander' who threw himself into the war in a fit of enthusiasm. Slegtkamp, who had moved to South Africa in 1895, was more of the adventurous type. He became the 'hero of Spionkop' and was celebrated for it in South Africa and Holland. Plokhooy, a devoted teacher, started as a fervent supporter of the Boer case, but sobered up under the influence of fighting. The volunteers who joined the Boers from Holland comprised of H. verLoren van Themaat, Lieutenant Gerrit Boldingh and Ernest Douwes Dekker. The promising law student Hendrik verLoren van Themaat was a typical academic. He might be characterised as *freischwebende Intelligenz*. Themaat wanted to live according to 'higher ideals'. After the war he made a glorious career, first as mayor of Velsen and afterwards as professor of international law in Stellenbosch. Gerrit Boldingh, a lieutenant of the Dutch army, was of an altogether different type. He gave up his career as a gunnery officer to fight the British. In the war he showed himself the sober military analyst, in line with his background as a professional soldier and artillery officer. Ernest Douwes Dekker was completely different again. He was the (political) rebel within the group and remained a firebrand and agitator, also in the East Indies after the war.

So, the six Dutch foreign fighters who wrote about the Anglo-Boer War had very dissimilar backgrounds and characters. However, the striking similarities in thoughts and actions, their outspokenness and the sheer richness and quality of their texts, certainly allows for some generalising observations and remarks on the character of violent non-state actors around 1900. To give the chapter focus, and to align it with the themes explored by other authors, and to link it to more theoretical insights and contemporary issues, four aspects in particular will be highlighted: motivation, loyalty, effectiveness, and their representation of the war. Section 11.2 will concentrate on the reasons given by Dutch volunteers to go to war. Section 11.3 will discuss their trustworthiness and reliability. Section 11.4 will examine their military usefulness. Thereafter, the chapter will elaborate on some 'literary' characteristics of the autobiographies in section 11.5, since this proves to be of critical importance to building a sound understanding of this remarkable group of Dutch foreign fighters.

11.2 Motivation

The urge of many Dutch volunteers to stand side by side with the Boers and take up arms against the British can only be understood in the context of the outrage throughout Europe at British (military) interventions in South Africa that culminated in the Second Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902).[20] Two independent Boer republics of traditional deeply religious settlers, that many associated with (white) self-determination and freedom, seemed to have become victims of raw power politics and

blatant opportunism of an imperial superpower. This developed into a narrative of two small and young Boer nations (the Oranje Vrijstaat and Transvaal) being mangled by a great power-hungry imperialist hegemon that shamelessly wanted to secure gold, diamonds and (neo)colonial influence in Southern Africa.[21]

In the Netherlands, the sympathy for the Boer cause bordered on identification and verged on the hysterical.[22] This had much to do with the fact that the Afrikaans (old-Dutch) speaking Boers were perceived as members of 'the Dutch Tribe'. The Dutch term coined for it was *stamverwantschap* (kinship).[23] After decades of condescending remarks about the uncivilised Boers who seemed to close themselves off to the blessings of modern times, they now were presented as kinsmen, given their descent, language, religion and mentality. What is more, for many the 'Dutchmen at the Cape' embodied the imposing and strong Dutch culture of bygone times. The Boers may have been traditionalist and conservative, but precisely because of this they also represented the Dutch at their best.[24]

As a result of this, a flood of statements by pro-Boer committees and associations, numerous fundraising initiatives and other supportive activities swept through the Netherlands. The sheer number of petitions, pamphlets and publications in support of the Boers was staggering. It amounted to nothing less than a media storm, that Vincent Kuitenbrouwer characterised as a *War of Words*.[25] The outrage, anger and identification with the Boers was even carved in stone. Statues of heroes of 'The Boer War' were set up everywhere. To this day most municipalities in the Netherlands have Transvaal districts. The Dutch Defence Academy, place of work of the author of this chapter, is located on the De la Rey avenue. His family lives on Cronjé-Road. He himself shops on Kruger-square.

Nonetheless, the official stance of the Netherlands was strict neutrality. Neutrality had been the cornerstone of Dutch international diplomacy for decades. Although it was clear that many political leaders and even members of the Royal family were pro-Boer sympathisers, Dutch interference was out of the question, let alone military intervention.[26] The Netherlands could not afford a conflict with Great Britain. It resulted in outrage in the public sphere, but only symbolic actions were taken, such as raising money for ambulances, sending medical teams and the diplomatic gesture of granting President Kruger of Transvaal asylum at the end of the war and sending the warship Hr. Ms. Gelderland to help him leave South Africa. Of course, this was extremely frustrating for those who identified strongly with the Boer cause. Many wanted to contribute to the war in the most direct and practical terms possible. Despite the fact that it was forbidden to provide military support to the Boers, and under threat of losing Dutch citizenship, Dutch volunteers started leaving for South Africa. Many of those who were already there, also joined Boer forces.

We can find their motives explained and clarified in their autobiographical reflections on the war. Karel van den Berg is a case in point. He had lived in

Transvaal since 1896. Van den Berg came from a wealthy banker family. His father secured him a traineeship in a branch of the *Dutch Banking and Credit Association for South Africa* in Pretoria. The young and intelligent Karel wrote home almost every week. His (pre-war) sketches of Transvaal are very interesting, and remarkably critical. In it van den Berg shows himself to be anything but a Boer admirer. He could be cynical about the Afrikaners. Nevertheless, he was furious about the British military aggression. It made Karel van den Berg enter the war, devotedly and unreservedly. Having been a guest and a part of the South African 'nation' for years now, he felt obliged to fight for Transvaal. He even opted for Transvaal citizenship. Van den Berg's motivation to join the Boers therefore was clearly rooted in indignation about injustice done to the Boers, and the feeling that 'something had to be done'. In the face of this wrongdoing, one should not stand by idly.[27] Van den Berg reported for field service with the *Hollanderkorps*. But being militarily untrained he was transferred to their 'police service'. Within days he chose to go to a Boer commando and wanted to fight at the front.

The same sort of motives were also behind Cornelis Plokhooy's participation in the war. *Met den Mauser* (1901) illustrates that his main reason for taking up arms was again indignation, mixed with anger and idealism. *Met den Mauser* seems at first to be a rather descriptive and anecdotal book. The book is 'realistic' when it comes to descriptions of daily life in war and battle reports. *Met den Mauser* starts with the chilling events at Elandslaagte, after which the autobiography deals with the practicalities of being on a Boer commando. For Plokhooy, it boiled down to waiting, eating, taking care of the horses, standing guard, cooking, managing black 'agterryers', manoeuvring, and every now and then a bit of fighting. This seems to suggest that Plokhooy may have been in it for the excitement of 'the soldier's life'. But Plokhooy formulated his key ideals and motives for fighting at the end of the book. There it unmistakably turns out that his motives aligned with the anger and the idealism of van den Berg. Reflecting on his reasons for joining the Boers, Plokhooy came up with an almost Christian-nationalist moral underpinning of his motives. *Met den Mauser* ends with remarks on the depravity of the British, the moral high ground of the Boers, the assurance that 'God will take revenge' and 'set things right'.[28] It converges in a heartfelt outcry: 'Long live United South Africa!'[29] Again it was primarily outrage about injustice done that motivated him to fight.

Hendrik verLoren van Themaat reflected on his motivation from the outset of his *Twee jaren in den Boerenoorlog*. Disgust at the cynical British geopolitical policy in Southern Africa was for him the most important reason for leaving the Netherlands, he wrote. Secondly, he acknowledged great admiration for the courageous tough Boers, who obviously needed help fighting British armies. The third reason to go to the front proved to be a desire to live 'according to higher purposes in life'.[30] Themaat stressed that he wanted 'to do good' and 'to be good'.[31]

He objected to a traditional career and a normal job in dull and bourgeois Holland. He wanted to live 'a noble life', to the point where one had to fight or die for it.[32] Initially at least, outrage over the supposed geopolitical cynicism of the British stands out and within this framework the Boers were presented as 'noble' freedom fighters. But ultimately this amounted to 'moral idealism' as the important reason to legitimise taking up arms. This was accompanied by an aversion against petty bourgeois contemporary Dutch culture, that according to him was a shadow of its grand historical self. South Africa could fill an idealistic void, whilst people in the Netherlands fell back into materialism.

Henri Slegtkamp was more of an adventurer. His decision to join the fight in 1899 seems to have been at least partly inspired by a desire for action and an adventurous life, although his life writing suggests also that political commitment and morally inspired motives stimulated Slegtkamp to take up arms.[33]

We find this even more strongly in Ernest Douwes Dekker. He combined a strong desire for ideological and political 'alternatives' with a thirst for adventure and action. In many respects Ernest Douwes Dekker was the most colourful of all Dutch war volunteers. He was a firebrand and a political radical, of the tireless sort. An outspoken critic of their policies, Douwes Dekker left the Dutch East Indies for Transvaal after a series of conflicts with the Dutch colonial authorities with a view to joining the Boer struggle against the British Empire. Early in 1900 he signed up with a Boer commando, adopting Transvaal nationality in the process. Radical political commitment seems to have been his main driving force and the key motive for joining the fight in South Africa. But it is also perfectly clear that Douwes Dekker remained an adventurer, next to being the incorrigible political rebel.[34]

Unlike Douwes Dekker, Lieutenant Gerrit Boldingh most certainly was no professional political agitator nor adventurer. He hoped to help and support the Boer army as a military expert, whilst sharing the indignation and anger of van den Berg, Plokhooy and Themaat.[35]

This sums up the different motives for Dutch volunteers to take up arms in South Africa. The geopolitical 'injustice' done to the independent Boer republics led to anger and indignation. Fighting for 'freedom' therefore turns out to be the key argument. Secondly, it was also worth fighting since the Boers were defending the moral high ground and could be seen as a virtuous noble nation. The Boers embodied the ideals which seemed to be disappearing in the Netherlands. Discontent about lack of idealism and feebleness at home, in the Netherlands, certainly also resonates in the motives to go to the front in South Africa. More in the background, desire for adventure seems to have driven (some) volunteers.



Figure 11.1: 'n rustig uurtje. Hollanders op commando. 1900 / A calm moment. Dutch on commando. 1900 Collection Zuid-Afrikahuis, 19.3; www.geheugenvannederland.nl.

11.3 Loyalty

It is fascinating to note that all this could go hand in hand with a rather critical attitude towards the Boers. Despite his enthusiasm for the war, Karel van den Berg for example had reservations about the way the Boers were fighting at the front. He was particularly dismayed by the fact that the great majority of the Boers were not as disciplined as he thought.[36] Boldingh too judged that many Boers did not live up to what he regarded as necessary for effectively fighting the British. He was affected especially by the tensions he noticed among the Boers and saw many of their military decisions as manifestations of military incompetence. He met British-minded Boers and witnessed Boers engaging in contraband, which he found shocking.[37] VerLoren van Themaat was thrown off balance also when he encountered Boers in Pretoria dressing like British, who advised him not to waste his talents by fighting. According to Themaat, the Boers also far too often broke off fights light-heartedly and would not stand firm.[38] Much to his chagrin he saw a lack of discipline everywhere, and opportunism and 'material interests'. Themaat certainly also met Boers who were 'worthy' of their nation and what it stood for. But he also noticed indecision, fear, flight and a lack of discipline, time and time again.[39]

Despite this critical attitude towards the Boers, all volunteers remained unwaveringly loyal to the Boers.[40] No cases are known of Dutch volunteers distancing themselves from the ideal of independent Boer republics during the fighting, or later. The first observation on the subject of loyalty, therefore, must be that the Dutch volunteers remained devoted to the Boer cause, and certainly to their political and military aims.

The young Karel van den Berg again is a case in point. Van den Berg's parents followed his commitment to the Boers with great suspicion. They had placed their son in South Africa with a glittering career in mind, a career in Holland, that is. They did not want to see him end up as a radicalised foreign fighter. He was in danger of losing Dutch citizenship, as well as in great physical danger, since he lacked military experience. Karel van den Berg's father thereupon forced his son to return to the bank in Pretoria, after only a few weeks of fighting. Van den Berg obeyed his parents. His repatriation to the Netherlands followed. In his last letters from South Africa Karel apologised for his irresponsible behaviour. He attributed it to being overenthusiastic, impulsive and hot-tempered. Loyalty for him thus lay ultimately with parental authority. This did not mean that Karel van den Berg broke with the Boer cause. Back in the Netherlands, he became involved in all kinds of associations and movements supporting the Boer cause, until well after the Anglo-Boer War. In this sense, he still remained loyal to them.[41]

This can be said of all Dutch volunteers. Nevertheless, on a more practical level, and while in South Africa, loyalty to the Boers could become diffuse and fluid. To whom exactly were the volunteers supposed to be loyal during the fighting? After all, the Boer army was no conventional army.[42] It was made up of improvised regional commandos. The soldiers decided often for themselves who they joined and for how long. As a rule, they also decided for themselves when the battle was over and when it was time to go home. So the Dutch volunteers were not incorporated in a regular army, with a clear-cut organisation, hierarchy and loyalty. Consequently, they also decided for themselves with which commandos and commanders they went to the front, and where, and for how long. 'In the field' they also preferred to hang out with other Dutch volunteers. The foreign fighters clumped together in small groups of compatriots and friends, who joined commandos with which they had affinity. One could very well argue that therefore the basic (military) loyalty was not to the Boer army but to friends and other national volunteers who made up parts of Boer commandos.[43]

This is well illustrated by the way Cornelis Plokhooy fought. Plokhooy had been living in South Africa before the war. He moved to the Transvaal in 1897. Unlike many fellow emigrants, he got on very well with his new compatriots. He also maintained sympathy for the Boer cause throughout his life. In this sense he remained loyal, as most did. But his loyalty to the units and commanders in the field could

indeed change strongly and quickly. Initially, Plokhooy joined the *Hollanderkorps*. He fought at Elandslaagte. After the Boer defeat there, he switched regularly between commandos. He initially wanted to join the second *Hollanderkorps*, led by Maximov and De Villebois de Mareuil. But this did not materialise, upon which Plokhooy joined other commandos. This came to an abrupt end when Plokhooy was taken prisoner, just after the fall of Johannesburg. He refused to sign a 'declaration of neutrality', highlighting his loyalty to the Boer cause in general. Back in the Netherlands he supported the propaganda machine for the Boers, from which his book *Met den Mauser* emerged. However, on a more practical level, during the actual fighting in South Africa, his loyalty to Boer units and commanders clearly had been a rather flexible concept.

With Henri Slegtkamp we see the same thing. He illustrates unwavering loyalty to Boer ideals too, and to their political goals. At the same time his loyalty as a Dutch volunteer could be remarkably unsteady on campaign and during fighting. When war broke out in the spring of 1899, Slegtkamp and two friends on their own initiative joined the Middelburg Commando as independent Dutch volunteers. It was a commando from a district they were familiar with. They hoped to meet old acquaintances there. Slegtkamp left the Middelburg commando soon. He briefly joined a German unit, before switching to other commandos several times thereafter. Eventually Slegtkamp joined the Scotsman Jack Hindon and together they reported to a scout unit near Colenso/Tugela. This is how he got involved in the battles for Spionkop. In a daring action, Slegtkamp was one of the first to move up that hill. This made him 'the hero of Spionkop'. The pattern of changing loyalties continued thereafter. After the British breakthrough, Slegtkamp and Hindon engaged in sabotage duties. Then both joined Dannie Theron's scout corps, like so many other Dutchmen. He briefly took over command, after Theron's death. He remained in the field until 31 May 1902, and would be expelled from South Africa by the British, as *Bittereinder*.[44] Slegtkamp returned to the Netherlands. Here he received a true hero's welcome. This led to a new set of competing loyalties. Slegtkamp felt estranged in the Netherlands. He felt no longer 'at home'. For that reason, he returned to South Africa after the war. He enjoyed some fame there, but Slegtkamp had difficulties rooting in defeated South Africa, that had become part of the British Empire with the Boer community split to the bone. Fortunately, his work for the *Landbank* enabled Slegtkamp to be in the 'Veld' almost constantly, in the landscape that had become so dear to him. This sums up how complex 'loyalty' could become. Slegtkamp most certainly remained loyal to the Boers in general. They represented to him a noble and freedom loving nation. However, during fighting his loyalty to Boer commandos and commanders varied from day to day. Alienated from Holland ànd the new South Africa too, after 1901 Slegtkamp felt 'really at home' only on the African Veld.[45] The object of his loyalty was reduced to 'the bush'.

The loyalty problem manifested itself also in Gerrit Boldingh. The talented young officer Boldingh was a lieutenant of the Royal Artillery in the Dutch army. Being a professional officer, his loyalty by definition was to the Dutch state. But he gave it up to fight in South Africa. Boldingh must have concluded that a higher form of loyalty was at stake. At his own request Boldingh was given honourable discharge. He left for South Africa. Once he arrived, he had himself naturalised as a citizen of the Oranje Vrijstaat. In this way he would avoid serious problems in case he became a prisoner of war. By formally changing his national identity, he of course had not become an Afrikaander overnight. Boldingh thought, spoke and wrote Dutch. Nevertheless, as a 'foreigner' he was resolutely loyal to the Boer republics and their fight for freedom. However, during fighting we again come across remarkably flexible loyalties. Boldingh likewise regularly switched commandos, on his own initiative. Furthermore, as a professional soldier, Boldingh was an outsider. He could contribute to the fighting far more easily than others, given his military expertise and experience. But ironically, precisely because of his understanding of warfare, this increased his difficulty to remain loyal to Boer units and Boer tactics during military operations. His professionalism undermined loyalty to units and commanders. It amounted to analytical 'distance' and critical reflections. Boldingh wanted to provide reliable observations, instead of propaganda. Ultimately his loyalty was also to 'objective truth'.

Regarding the loyalty of the Dutch volunteers, we may therefore conclude that all of them remained faithful to the ideological, political and military aims of the Boer republics. They continued to be devoted to Kruger, Botha, Smuts and De Wet, and to the courageous noble freedom-loving Boer nation as a whole. It could be argued that Dutch volunteers stayed loyal on a strategic level. However, while fighting, this could be combined with wavering loyalties, to units and commanders, which were chosen almost entirely on their own initiative, and often temporarily. In day-to-day fighting we find loyalty centred on the small group of (Dutch) friends with whom one hung out and moved from commando to commando. On a tactical level loyalty could thus be flexible and fluid. This was reinforced by the fact that Dutch volunteers must have felt that they remained outside the Afrikaner community, despite their identification with the Boers and loyal support. Surprisingly, the realisation that they might lose Dutch citizenship because of fighting in 'foreign' military service does not seem to have troubled the Dutch volunteers too much. They must have felt that they were strongly supported by the Dutch public opinion (even the royal house) and could always return to Holland and reclaim their citizenship. Fascinatingly, Holland remained loyal to them, despite their disloyalty. Upon returning home, only Douwes Dekker experienced serious and long-term problems. In all likelihood this was not caused by having fought in South Africa, but due to the fact that he persisted in being a political radical. All in all, one could very well argue that it amounted to a mixed bag of different contending loyalties (plural).

11.4 Effectiveness

As for effectiveness, the picture is more clear-cut. The actual effectiveness of the military contributions of the Dutch volunteers to the Anglo-Boer War seems to have been close to zero. Their numbers were far too small to have any real effect. Military training and fighting power were negligible. The *Hollanderkorps* is a case in point. It was one of many international corps established to effectively manage the foreigners living in the Transvaal and Oranje Vrijstaat who wanted to enlist.[46] Dutch volunteers arriving from the Netherlands were allowed to enlist as well, but most of them arrived too late to do so, as the unit was short-lived.

On 22 September 1899 Herman Coster, a legal expert from Leiden who succeeded Willem Leyds as state procurator of Transvaal in 1895, brought together some 450 'Dutchmen' in Pretoria. Plokhooy and van den Berg seem to have been among them. After selection and some basic training, they were divided into sections of soldiers deemed suitable for the front, and those who would do better in support duties (such as van den Berg). Eventually, some one hundred and fifty men were included in the fighting element of the corps, led by J.P.L. Lombard. In October 1899, just after the invasion of Natal, fighting broke out around Talana Hill. Elandslaagte was a small station nearby, on the Ladysmith-Dundee railway line. It was of tactical importance. The Dutch ended up in a vulnerable forward position, and outnumbered. Ultimately, they found themselves in between British units. The British general John French (with Douglas Haig in his ranks) reacted with classic Aldershot tactics. After a barrage of his artillery, he let the infantry charge in closed order, and his cavalry eliminated the retreating enemy.[47] This attack, led by Ian Hamilton, on 21 October 1899, was successful. The Boers opted for retreat. The Dutch who had been positioned in their front lines, were driven from their positions. Eight Hollanders died, including their commander Coster. Fifty-four were captured or wounded, out of one hundred and fifty.[48] This effectively ended the unit's existence. Boer commander-in-chief Petrus Jacobus Joubert did not want to re-establish the *Hollanderkorps*, given its poor performance. The (inexperienced) *Hollanderkorps* had *not* been effective at Elandslaagte.[49]

As indicated, the great majority of Dutch volunteers who travelled to South Africa from the Netherlands, arrived too late for Elandslaagte.[50] As of then, they also saw the war change, from confrontations between conventional 'regular' units as in Elandslaagte, fighting in defensive lines or around sieges, into guerrilla warfare characterised by small unit tactics and constant movement of troops. Most of the Dutch volunteers now joined small local commandos.

The contribution of the Dutch foreign fighters to these commandos can be characterised as military amateurism, at best. This is illustrated by Hendrik ver-Loren van Themaat. One could very well argue that, from a military perspective, he

must have been more of a burden than an asset. Themaat came from a well-to-do background. He was a typical intellectual who took up arms. He was talented and highly intelligent. When war broke out, the student of international law from Leiden instantly decided to go. He wanted to contribute to the struggle. Themaat left for South Africa at the end of 1899. He had no military training or knowledge whatsoever. Nevertheless, he did not wish to contribute to the war as a legal expert and moved to the front. He seems to have instantly realised there that he was totally unfit for service. His marksmanship was poor and he lacked horsemanship. For this reason, Themaat joined the Dutch ambulances initially. Thereafter he tried several independent commandos, starting with the Middelburgers. Typically, this decision was prompted by the presence of acquaintances and friends in that commando, rather than military necessity. In a military sense VerLoren van Themaat contributed barely. Fascinatingly, he was the first to admit this. In *Twee Jaren in den Boerenoorlog* his bewilderment at his own military incompetence stands out. Themaat functioned mostly as a *'brandwacht'* (sentry). He hardly fired any shots. He was busy moving around to stay out of the hands of the British. Meanwhile, his military performance remained clumsy for a long time. It took him quite some time to obtain a horse. He had to hand over the animal again as it turned out to be someone else's. The first gun he fired jammed hopelessly. Deployed by the Boers in manual labour within defence lines, Themaat felt useless. He left his commando. Afterwards he fared only slightly better.[51] After Cronjé was defeated, Themaat followed the retreating Boers. His war amounted to driving around. Themaat found this increasingly difficult. He considered himself 'weak'.[52] He had acquired a Lee-Metford. But he could not handle the weapon properly. He did not fire a single shot for weeks. From June 1900 onwards things finally improved. Themaat joined Danie Theron's reconnaissance unit. A more effective Themaat came to the fore. He now often supported military actions by helping to spot the British and relaying positions. However, Themaat was never in the heat of battle, nor does he seem to have aspired to be in it. There was increasing enemy contact. But this can be best explained by the British closing in on the enemy, and not by Themaat's improved military quality or effectiveness.[53]

A disconcerting passage by Slegtkamp, the 'hero of Spionkop', complements this.[54] Slegtkamp had lived in South Africa since 1895. In 1895–96 he had fought with the Boers against the Jameson raid. Therefore, he could claim to be a veteran. Slegtkamp knew what Boer warfighting was about. However, in 1899 Slegtkamp had no weapon, no cartridges, no horse, no saddle and it was almost impossible for him to get those. Slegtkamp bought a pony from a field cornet. But Slegtkamp could not get the animal under control. He was thrown out of his saddle. Boers stood by, laughing. They decided to deploy Slegtkamp as *Agterrijer*, a supporting 'foot soldier'. Slegtkamp refused. He left for the front on his own initiative. Here

Slegtkamp would become an accomplished soldier. But fascinatingly Slegtkamp himself remained strongly in doubt of his military effectiveness. He stressed that in modern warfare individuals had become insignificant cogs in a 'machine' dominated by military technique. Soldiers involved in fighting had limited influence, and no overview at all.[55] An example was provided by the fighting on Spionkop (23–24 January 1900).[56] Slegtkamp describes it as a fight in which the participants were not aware of what was going on most of the time and lost contact with others involved. His description is one of chaos. Chance seemed to rule the battle. At Spionkop, the Boers improvised most of the time. The Dutch presence around there proved to be only marginally important. Not because of incompetence, but since no one oversaw and steered the whole thing.[57]

Having said this, it can also be observed that the Dutch volunteers became slowly but steadily more effective during the war. Horse riding skills, shooting proficiency and military contributions improved. After the fighting around Tugela River, British troops had broken Boer lines and forced them into guerrilla warfare. Boer commandos sought opportune targets thereafter, carrying out hit-and-run operations. It was within this context that (some) Dutch volunteers evolved into useful soldiers, as scouts in particular. Even Themaat, who had been militarily useless at the beginning of the war, was able to support De Wet's troops in this way as part of Theron's reconnaissance unit. Theron's corps attracted a remarkable number of Dutchmen.

Meanwhile, the war became tougher. Ironically, this resulted in a decrease of military effectiveness on the Boers' side. Plokhooy's autobiography is revealing in this respect, as he eloquently described the last year of the war as a downhill battle.[58] Small groups of Boers were hunted down now by British cavalry.[59] If British troops were shot at by guerrillas, they increasingly saw this as 'treason' and acted accordingly.[60] They also took increasingly harsh measures against the civilian population, especially if they helped the Boers in the field.[61] Crops and villages were laid to waste. This resulted in a sense of pessimism and fatalism on the part of Plokhooy (and other Dutch volunteers). It came with doubts about the effectiveness of the Boers. Despite endorsing the guerrilla-tactics and despite admiring De Wet, most Dutch volunteers considered the war virtually unwinnable. Authors such as Plokhooy spoke about impending defeat. Similar passages can also be found among the other authors. Themaats' battle descriptions regularly end with the observation that the Boer soldiers were worn-out.[62] Boldingh spoke about 'the final phase of the war'.[63] The fighting power and effectiveness of the Boers had been reduced to almost zero, he realised. As early as January 1901 Boldingh wrote 'it is done'.[64] The lack of effectiveness of the Boers was addressed now regularly.

With regard to military effectiveness, Boldingh himself was the odd one out. The former Dutch officer was an ammunition expert and engaged immediately

in 'blowing up bridges' to hinder the British advance.[65] Given his background in artillery, Boldingh had wanted to join the artillery of the Oranje Vrijstaat, as it was considered one of the best-trained standing professional units (and one of the few uniformed ones). To this end he was provided with equipment, horse, saddle, bridle and bought a uniform himself. But in the guerrilla phase of war this no longer made sense. The Oranje Vrijstaat was overrun and the front became dynamic and chaotic. Fire support by the artillery in the conventional way was no longer a possibility. Thereupon Boldingh joined different commandos and devoted himself to damaging railway bridges to support the Boers' withdrawal and hinder the British advance. He seems to have done this effectively.[66] Boldingh endorsed the strategy and tactics of the 'new' guerrilla.[67] At the same time, he soberly and critically described the military operations of the Boers this resulted in. It was not so much his own effectiveness he questioned. It was the effectiveness of the Boers.[68]

To sum up, the military effectiveness of the Dutch volunteers in general seems to have been rather low. A handful of overenthusiastic Dutch individuals came to South Africa, poorly trained and without weapons or horses, whereas this was a prerequisite for the Boers. They were unfamiliar with the terrain, went to the front almost unprepared and often had to learn to shoot and ride horses. Often, they decided for themselves where they would fight, how, with whom, and for how long. Their presence may certainly have had positive political and propagandistic effects. It underlined international solidarity. But from a military perspective, the Dutch were hardly effective, especially in the first part of the war. They lacked military skills and therefore found themselves deployed in auxiliary roles, such as guard duty, grooming of horses and logistics. It was in the second phase of the war that their contribution became somewhat more effective. In this phase, after the British had broken through at Colenso, individual Dutch volunteers contributed often as scouts. Even then, amateurism prevailed. Their support most of the time came down to firing a few shots and quickly departing thereafter. This was in line with guerrilla tactics. On the other hand, one cannot escape the impression that even within this guerrilla context Dutch volunteers acted more as military tourists than as effective combatants. Consequently, most Boers did not take them seriously. Conversely, the Dutch were debating the (low) effectiveness and lack of discipline of the Boers and could be remarkably harsh on them. Fascinatingly, they also turned that critical eye on themselves. They were absolutely aware of their own limited military capabilities. It is highly ironic that of all Dutch volunteers studied here, the only one to die in battle was Boldingh, who militarily was by far the most effective. He sustained fatal injuries at Nauwpoort on 16 December 1901.



Figure 11.2: Battlefield at Elandslaagte, 21 October 1899. Collection Zuid-Afrikahuis 23.2; www.geheugenvanNederland.nl; www.Zuidafrikahuis.nl.

11.5 Caught Between Idealism and Realism, Tradition and Modernity

Below the surface of the autobiographical publications of Dutch volunteers in the Anglo-Boer War and their remarks on motivation, loyalty and effectiveness shimmers something that may help to better understand the complex interrelationship of these aspects. The texts reveal an intriguing tension between idealism and realism, hope and pessimism, political commitment and a feeling of disillusionment. It could very well be argued that this tension in particular was typical for Dutch violent non-state actors on the Cape around 1900.

The frame of mind of all Dutch volunteers was most certainly first and foremost 'idealistic'. The foreign fighters wished to serve 'higher' values while fighting in South Africa. Plokhooy and many others saw the Boers as noble and virtuous. According to Plokhooy they possessed the moral high ground, whereas the British lacked honesty and humanity. It was illustrated best by the appalling way the British treated prisoners of war, wounded and fallen, while the Boers lovingly cared for them.[69] Themaat's and Boldingh's measuring sticks were also the ethical and normative.[70] Time and again they emphasised that the war was illegitimate and was waged by the British in an immoral manner. Sometimes this contrast could not be maintained. Themaat had met British officers in Delagoa Bay. Consequently, he had spoken to people who were going to serve on the other side of the front. A

sense of European kinship temporarily overcame the military enmity. Boldingh, a professional soldier, was used to analysing enemies rationally and objectively. He avoided stereotypes.[71] He reflected on the moral depravity of the British, but also on their acts of chivalry. However, in general a bipolar frame of mind dominated. Plokhooy and Douwes Dekker for example remained consequently and tirelessly anti-British.

This idealistic mind-set, and this is very interesting, was fundamentally undermined by the experience of war and warfighting. The nature of the fighting apparently could disrupt the 'idealistic' mindset of the Dutch volunteers. The shock of undergoing combat could lead to adjustment of one's own idealistic (pre)conceptions. It provoked forms of disillusionment and pessimism. This is well illustrated by the remarkably realistic, harsh and bleak sketches of war in the autobiographical texts, despite the initial war enthusiasm.

Plokhooy gives good examples. He received his baptism of fire at Elandslaagte. He was astonished by it and shaken.[72] He had gone to war optimistically and full of bravura. He was going to let the British 'slik Mauserpille' (swallow Mauser bullets).[73] But shortly before the battle he already realised he was terribly scared. During the British bombardment, and the infantry attack that followed, Plokhooy even almost stopped functioning. He threw himself behind a rock. He spoke to himself: 'You're a son of one brave nation – hold the honour of Holland high'.[74] But to no avail. It was only after he saw comrades fall, that distress changed into something that resembled fury. He picked up his rifle and started firing on the British. Nevertheless, heroism in the old sense never returned thereafter. He noted: 'We have become machines! Blast machines!'[75] Themes like fear, being panic-stricken, and the possibility of a painful and futile death, keep recurring in the autobiography of Plokhooy. The shock of real combat was also felt while observing the looting by the Boers, and their tendency to indulge in 'buit maken' (pillaging). Plokhooy was dumbfounded by it. He kept stressing that their fighting served 'a just cause' but never downplayed the gruesomeness and paradoxes of war.

The horrors of war also got to Themaat.[76] While travelling with the ambulances in the Oranje Vrijstaat he saw dead and wounded and was taken aback.[77] His reflex was to describe his experience in explicit detail. If someone was brought in with his brains out, Themaat outlined it graphically.[78] His autobiography is full of attention to wounded, killings, death and burials.[79] The funeral of Danie Theron, his hero, was sketched in striking detail.[80] Themaat understood very well that death and killing were part of warfare. But precisely because of this gruesomeness he felt the moral obligation to treat the enemy, the comrade, the dead, the wounded and the prisoners of war with honour.[81] Precisely this did not happen in this war, much to his indignation. Worse, both camps were guilty. That Brits and Boers both plundered civilian property was a shocking observation for Themaat. In the end,

Themaat characterised war as 'een onding' (a horror) and confessed that he 'had enough' of war.[82] Themaat also readily admitted to being scared, on a regular basis. He could not live up to the demands he made on himself in this respect. Neither could the other combatants.

Boldingh for example was also troubled by what he saw. He too had to adjust his assumptions and presuppositions. Initially, the ex-army officer described the violence and horrors of war in a fairly sober way. When he was shot at, he found this 'interesting'.[83] He noted a certain nervousness, no fear. After he was wounded, Boldingh gave a rather down-to-earth description of what had happened.[84] He always remained focussed on making notes and giving proper military analyses.[85] Yet Boldingh was not blind to the misery produced by the Anglo-Boer war. He saw the destruction of the countryside by troops under Roberts and was utterly shocked by the way the British treated civilians, women, property, wounded and dead.[86] Boldingh also witnessed devastation caused by the Boers.[87] He elaborated on their shooting of prisoners of war. He wrote about the looting and destroying of British property and labelled this 'guerrilla degeneration'.[88]

So, the sobering reality of the war seems to have stripped the volunteers of some illusions. The war turned out not to be a gentleman's war after all. This makes the war experience of the Dutch volunteers in the Anglo-Boer rather 'modern'. It involved a demasqué of the idealistic metaphors in which they had believed when they left the Netherlands. At the same time however, they never went all-out in their disillusionment and gloomy picture of the war. Despite the harsh and realistic descriptions of the effects of war, the Dutch volunteers remained culturally and mentally within nineteenth-century boundaries. Their pessimistic view on the course of the war, and sobering observations on human nature during war, did not bring about a complete undermining of their devotion to an idealistic way of thinking.

How did they manage to do that? A number of literary 'tricks' could be deployed to safeguard the ideals for which they had come, despite their unsettling experiences. The first of these 'tricks' was to turn around the unpleasant realisation that the Boers were going to lose into a story of perseverance, sacrifice and victory in the long run. Despite his 'objective' analyses and sombre predictions, Boldingh for example expected victory in the end, even after defeat, because the Boers would 'resurrect'. This could happen because they were 'morally right'.[89] With Themaat, we find something similar. He too gave remarkably gloomy descriptions of the operations of the Boers, especially in the guerrilla phase. De Wet's march to the Cape Colony gave the impression of a plundering expedition, without a clear underlying military strategy. Large numbers of Boers gave up.[90] Themaat even suggested that in the end the Boers were no longer at war but were being hunted down by the British.[91] He saw the fighting power and discipline of the Boers dwindle.[92] It made

him doubt victory.[93] Nonetheless, Themaat's gloomy insights did *not* lead him to complete pessimism or defeatism. The situation on the battlefield most certainly was worrisome to the point of hopelessness, but 'the spiritual strength' of the Boers was beyond doubt. This would eventually lead to victory.[94] As 'a spiritual power' the Boer nation was unbroken. They would rise again.[95] Higher powers were at work, behind the struggle of the devout Boers against the immoral British. In the eyes of Themaat, this was 'a spiritual battle'.

This line of reasoning translated into multiple religious and quasi-religious metaphors. To many volunteers, the fact that the Boers were deeply religious proved the righteousness of their struggle. Boldingh in particular paid close attention to their religious beliefs. According to him, the land may have been temporarily coloured blood-red by the British, but the blood would soak into the ground and become the source of 'new harvest', because God recognised and sanctioned the war aims of the Boers.[96] Slegtkamp spoke explicitly about: '*die bewustsyn van 'n onsigbare maar gewisse Godsbestiering in alle dinge wat die mens versin*' (the notion that God's will would triumph).[97] In this regard, it is fascinating to note that certainly not all Dutch volunteers were deeply religious Christians themselves. The pro-Boer movement may have been strongly supported by members of the Reformed Church in the Netherlands, but the Dutch who took up arms in South Africa seem to have been relatively well-educated and fairly liberal-thinking modern and secularised gentlemen. Plokhooy was typical in this respect. His entire book illustrates that he was himself not a deeply religious person. Yet his book ends with reflections in which he spoke of 'a higher power', that would '*de zaak op orde brengen*' (set things right).[98] Themaat used similar words. Fascinatingly, he distanced himself from overly stern and pious Boers.[99] He realised he had little in common with them. He even stated that he did not believe in the stories of the Bible, nor in the existence of hell. Themaat nonetheless admired the religiosity of the Boers.[100] Religion gave the Boers comfort, strength and a moral compass, according to Themaat. It illustrated they too lived according to 'higher ideals', which in itself was praiseworthy. In his closing remarks Themaat stressed that for this very reason history would prove the Boers right. History, according to him, was not a meaningless process, in which the laws of the jungle prevailed. It was a meaningful process, in which in the long run vibrant cultural nations and noble ideals would overcome 'raw violence'.[101]

This way of reasoning resulted in fascinating secular-religious imagery in the texts of the Dutch volunteers. The first 'image' in this regard is the one of Boer-hero. Christiaan de Wet was the perfect example.[102] To the Dutch authors, he was far more than a normal soldier. He was the embodiment of 'the idea' of 'a true' Boer, 'the essence' of a Boer: simple, straightforward, approachable, democratic, strong, vigorous, determined, morally superior, never-giving-up and deeply religious. He became some sort of secular-religious saint and was contrasted with the British 'on

a spiritual level'.[103] De Wet taught the Boer nation what it was, what it was worth, and what it could be. Even in times of defeat. He 'mirrored' the Boers.[104] There were also hero-saints to be found without names. The autobiographical reflections on the war feature many anonymous lone Boers standing guard, silently looking out over the field, symbolising perseverance, mental and physical toughness, and the other values that could be admired in the Boers. The praying Boer on a Kopje, under a starry sky, with the endless Veld around him, in between two battles; this was a strong image that 'proved' the Boers were right.[105] The South African landscape in itself was also given significance in this sense. Themaat, Plokhooy, Boldingh, Slegtkamp and Douwes Dekker all came up with lengthy sketches of the landscape of South Africa. This unforgiving landscape under a burning sun had strong symbolic power. The suggestion was unmistakably that a devout lonely Boer belonged in this wild desolate landscape, since he was 'one with it'. The decadent power-hungry Briton obviously did *not* fit in here. The wild empty landscape of South Africa in this way demonstrated the illegitimacy of the British cause. The description of a small group of Boers with their arms slung over their shoulders in heartfelt prayer on a barren hillside, or paying respects to their dead at a grave, was much more than a description alone.[106] The river crossing was a powerful image too. It must have been something magical for the Dutch volunteers. The *Ossenwagen*, the Boers, the shouting, the action, the wild river, the initial failure, the second try, the impossible achieved, it illustrated the unwavering 'moral strength' of the Boers faced with the bleak situation of the war and also their 'moral right' to victory. Boldingh described river crossings often and in great detail, as if he was painting.[107] In Boldingh's own words, the river crossings in South Africa 'spoke' like paintings of Millet.[108] The most telling of all 'visual tropes' came from Plokhooy. After the battle of Spionkop, he writes he saw something reaching out of the stony ground: a clenched Boer fist.[109]

11.6 Conclusion

Despite striking individual differences, the Dutch autobiographical writings on the Anglo Boer War display characteristics and similarities that allow for interesting generalisations about the way violent non-state actors thought and fought around 1900. This unique historical case can concretise and provide historical context to the other approaches in this volume on violent non-state actors, that tend to be more theoretical and focussed on contemporary issues. Behind the vivid descriptions of the war in South Africa, we can discern much that is central to this volume's theme, in particular with regard to motivation, loyalty and effectiveness of foreign fighters.

On the topic of motivation, it turns out that most volunteers initially set off enthusiastically for South Africa, mainly out of indignation over the injustice done to the Boer nation by the British Empire. Freedom was trampled on and had to be fought for.[110] The outrage translated into presenting the Boers as deeply religious, hardworking and above all noble and the British as immoral and materialistic opportunists. The political stance came with an 'idealistic' dichotomy and stereotyping. Once the war progressed, most volunteers came to realise not all Boers were saints, without however ever losing faith in the Boer cause. Interestingly, all this could be combined, as it often was in the *fin-de siècle*, with critique of the materialistic, bourgeois and weak country they had left behind. All in all, the motivation for Dutch volunteers to take up arms seems first and foremost to have been a choice for 'virtuous ideals' and 'higher values'. Fighting 'the good cause' was the key motivation. A desire for adventure resonated in this modestly, but only for some. Clearly, this puts the Dutch foreign fighters around 1900 in another category than many of the contemporary violent non-state actors. For example, enlisting because of religious zealotism or social problems at home seems to have been absent here.

Regarding loyalty, it is remarkable that Dutch foreign fighters in general seem to have remained loyal to the cause of the Boers to the very end. There was a certain amount of disillusionment with the Boers, but the steadfast lone Boer who courageously stood his ground on his Kopje, continued to inspire the Dutch foreign fighters to keep fighting alongside him. However, on a more practical level and day-to-day basis, loyalty proved to be complex. Who was one supposed to be loyal to in the field? The unusual command structure of the armies of Transvaal and the Oranje Vrijstaat dictated that Dutch volunteers decided for themselves with whom they fought. This made loyalty in the field something that centred mostly on the small group one temporarily chose to fight with. Regarding loyalty to the Netherlands, it is clear that the volunteers could also rely on a hero's welcome upon return, despite participating in foreign military operations and being denaturalised, due to the fact that the Boers remained immensely popular in the Netherlands. Ties to the Netherlands were not completely broken off nor damaged beyond repair by going to fight in South Africa. All things considered, loyalty in the war proved to be rather multifaceted, and it is probably better to speak about contending loyalties (plural) instead of unchallenged loyalty (singular).

As far as the military effectiveness of the Dutch volunteers is concerned, this proved to be next to zero. Most volunteers were high-spirited idealists, who did not know the terrain well, nor the Boer army, did not bring weapons and horses, had yet to learn to shoot and to ride horses. The effectiveness of all involved seems to have improved somewhat during the war. Nonetheless, the military importance and effectiveness of the Dutch volunteers should not be exaggerated. Slegtkamp

and Boldingh were exceptions. Only they brought some proper military experience (Slegtkamp) and training (Boldingh).

Finally, it should be highlighted that the (literary) representation of the Boer War by the Dutch volunteers was at times remarkably 'modern'. The Dutch foreign fighters described their war experiences often in harsh 'realistic' terms. However, they combined this often with quasi-religious idiom and idealistic figures of speech. The disillusionment we encounter in the War Poets of the First World War announced itself, for example, in striking descriptions of the shock of combat.[111] Yet most Dutch volunteers also clung strongly to (secular-)religious imagery in order to make sense of the war. All things considered, the studied texts therefore seem to position themselves in a fascinating intermediate position, just like the war they were speaking of. One might expect heroism or trauma while reading military autobiographies.[112] This dichotomy does not apply to the Dutch volunteers. Their texts cannot be characterised as romantic reflections on war dominated by heroism and self-sacrifice. They were pessimistic about the chances of winning. They came up with explicit descriptions of the terror, confusion and chaos of war and the fear that came with it. On the other hand, their writing illustrates that the Dutch volunteers remained 'idealists'. This was made possible by putting faith not in the actual Boers they encountered, but in the 'ideals' behind the Boers, and in history. To most of them, history was the story about how in the long run 'brute force' would not survive, and virtuous ideals would triumph. Most Dutch volunteers seem to have trusted Clio. Thinking along these lines, horror could become sacrifice and defeat a prerequisite for resurrection.

Interestingly, this links them to many military volunteers from other times and places, since we encounter this reasoning and rationale for example also in foreign fighters in the interwar period in Spain and more recently in ISIS-fighters.[113] The same goes for the abovementioned aspects such as motivation, loyalty and military effectiveness.[114] The fact that the Dutch volunteers in the Anglo-Boer War were so immensely motivated, half-heartedly loyal and stunningly ineffective, probably points towards fascinating continuity, with regard to the 'significance' of non-state actor engagement in wars and the interplay between state and non-state actors in warfare. This is elaborated upon far more in depth in chapter 1 by Jan Willem Honig, and the introduction of this book. This chapter only tried to sketch how around 1900 this translated into a strikingly complex, layered and illuminating historical case.

Notes

[1] Floribert Baudet, Michiel de Jong and Jorn Buijnsters commented on the first draft of this chapter. This improved the text noticeably.

[2] An interesting reflection on this semantical quagmire can be found on the website of the Modern War Institute of Westpoint: Maher, 'Guerrillas, Revolutionaries, Insurgents and Militias and Mafiosi: The Grim Threat of Irregular Strategy'.

[3] On this: Black, *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: A Global History*; Rich and Duyvesteyn, eds., *The Routledge Handbook of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency*; Brocades Zaalberg, Hoffenaar and Lemmers, eds., *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: Irregular Warfare from 1800 to the Present*; Polack, *Guerrilla Warfare: Kings of Revolution*; Asprey, *War In the Shadows: The Guerrilla in History*; Boot, *Invisible Armies: An Epic History of Guerrilla Warfare*.

[4] See above, and also Rid and Keaney, eds., *Understanding Counterinsurgency Warfare: Doctrine, Operations, and Challenges*; Kilcullen, *Counterinsurgency*; Joes, *Resisting Rebellion: The History and Politics of Counterinsurgency*; Marston and Malkasian, *Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare*. Classics include Kitson, *Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency and Peacekeeping*; Callwell, *Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice*; Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*. Always interesting is http://www.smallwarsjournal.com/ref/counterinsurgency.htm.

[5] Flores, 'Foreign Fighters Involvement in National and International Wars: A Historical Survey'. Also: https://www.icct.nl/publication/foreign-fighters-foreign-volunteers-and-mercenaries-ukrainian-armed-conflict; https://www.icct.nl/project/foreign-fighters-workshops; https://www.europarl.europa.eu/EPRS/EPRS-Briefing-579080-Foreign-fighters-rev-FINAL.pdf.

[6] See Vandervort, *Wars of Imperial Conquest*; Porch, *Wars of Empire*; De Moor and Wesseling, eds., *Imperialism and War: Essays on Colonial Wars in Asia and Africa*; Kuss, *German Colonial Wars and the Context of Military Violence*; Horne, *A Savage War of Peace: Algeria, 1954–1962*; Grob-Fitzgibbon, *Imperial Endgame: Britain's Dirty Wars and the End of Empire*. Regarding Dutch colonial warfare, see Groen, Van Dissel, Loderichs, Limpach and Brocades Zaalberg, eds., *Krijgsgeweld en kolonie. Opkomst en ondergang van Nederland als koloniale mogendheid*; Hagen, *Koloniale oorlogen in Indonesië. Vijf eeuwen verzet tegen vreemde overheersing*; Brocades Zaalberg and Luttikhuis, eds., *Empire's Violent End. Comparing Dutch, British, and French Wars of Decolonization, 1945–1962*.

[7] Van der Waag, *A Military History of Modern South Africa*; Stapleton, *A Military History of South Africa*; Scholtz, *The SADF in the Border War, 1966–1989*; Douek, *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in South Africa*.

[8] Nason, *The War for South Africa: The Anglo-Boer War 1899–1902*; Bossenbroek, *De Boerenoorlog*; Pakenham, *The Boer War*.

[9] Pottinger, *The Foreign Volunteers: They Fought for the Boers, 1899–1902*.

[10] Exact numbers are hard to determine. The total of foreign volunteers fighting for the Boers seems to have been around 7–8,000 (including French, Scandinavians, Americans, Russians, Germans, etc.), of which approximately 2–4,000 were Dutch (including Belgians). The majority was already in South Africa in 1899, so certainly not all of them came directly from Holland in 1899. See 'Boer Foreign Volunteers, Vrijwilligers in de Tweede Boerenoorlog', accessed 10 March 2024, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boer_foreign_volunteers, and https://nl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vrijwilligers_in_de_Tweede_Boerenoorlog.

[11] See Kuitenbrouwer, 'A War of Words. Dutch Pro-Boer Propaganda and the South African War'; Wilson, ed., *The International Impact of the Boer War*.

[12] Schoeman, *Broers in die Stryd. Hollanders in die Anglo-Boereoorlog*. On the Hollanderkorps: Van Dalsen, 'Die Hollander Korps tydens die Tweede Vryheidsoorlog'; Schulten, 'Nederlandse vrijwilligers tijdens de Boerenoorlog in het Hollanderkorps'. See also: Pottinger, *Foreign Volunteers*.

[13] Plokhooy, *Met den Mauser. Persoonlijke herinneringen in den Zuid-Afrikaanschen Oorlog*.

[14] verLoren van Themaat, *Twee jaren in den Boerenoorlog*. Different ways of spelling are used. We find: Verloren van Themaat, ver Loren van Themaat, but mostly verLoren van Themaat.

[15] Priem, *Een Hollandsch officier in Zuid-Afrika. Nagelaten geschriften van luitenant Gerrit Boldingh*.

[16] Mostert, *Slegtkamp van Spioenkop. Oorlogsherinneringen van Kapt. Slegtkamp*.

[17] Schutte, ed., *Beste Ouders! Brieven uit de Transvaal van Karel van den Berg 1896–1900*.

[18] Glissenaar, *DD. Het leven van E.F.E. Douwes Dekker*.

[19] Recently I came across Vissering, 'Een Hollander in Zuid-Afrika'. This promising document is yet to be analysed. The same applies to Francken and Praamstra, eds., *Geen land voor dromen. Geschiedenis van de Zuid-Afrikaanse Nederlandse literatuur*, in which Dutch and Afrikaander autobiographical texts on the Boer War are discussed (chapter 4, pp. 473–553), among which are Plokhooy, VerLoren van Themaat and Douwes Dekker (also elaborated on here), but also C.G.S. Sandberg, Zuster Hellemans and L. Penning.

[20] Wilson, ed., *The International Impact of the Boer War*.

[21] Giliomee and Mbenga, *New History of South Africa*; Meredith, *Diamonds, Gold, and War: The British, the Boers, and the Making of South Africa*.

[22] Bossenbroek, 'The Netherlands and the Boer War'.

[23] Schutte, *Adhesie en aversie. Over stamverwantschap, Boerenvrienden, Hollanderhaat, Calvinisme en apartheid*.

[24] De Jong, 'The Past as Future? South Africa, The Boer War and Dutch (Military) Memory'; De Jong, 'On the Boer War and Dutch (Military) Memory: Aspects of the South-African Military History in Dutch Perspective'; De Jong, 'Past as Future: The South African War, Dutch Observers and Military Memory'.

[25] Kuitenbrouwer, *A War of Words*.

[26] Nonetheless, the war provoked a great interest among professional soldiers. This is illustrated for example by the analyses and debates on the war in military magazines such as the *Militaire Spectator* and the *Militaire Gids* (see, for example, 'Boerenoorlog' on https://militairespectator.nl). Serious professional military interest in the war translated also into sending official military observers to the conflict area by the Ministry of War, with the status of non-armed diplomats. Four young Dutch officers were sent to South Africa, tasked with describing and weighing the latest of military developments. The delegation of Dutch military observers was composed of C.J. Asselbergs (1869–1949), M.J. Nix (1874–1900), J.H. Ram (1861–1913) and L.W.J.K. Thomson (1869-1914). They were asked to make an in-depth analysis of the conflict and formulate lessons learned. They came up with a fascinating report. It 'disappeared' in the War Department, probably because of its unwelcome conclusions. On this: De Jong, 'Past as Future'; De Jong, 'Oog in oog met "eenen Afrikaanschen oorlog". Nederlandse militaire waarnemers in de Boerenoorlog (1899–1902)'. See also Boon, '"Wat viel er niet te leeren van de Boeren…" Lessen uit de Boerenoorlog. Nederlandse waarnemers aan het front in Zuid-Afrika', and Visser, 'David tegen Goliath in Zuid-Afrika. De Tweede Boerenoorlog door de ogen van het Nederlands militair attaché in Zuid-Afrika'. See also: "Dagboek van C.J. Asselbergs'.

[27] Schutte, *Beste Ouders!*

[28] Plokhooy, *Met den Mauser*, p. 151.

[29] Ibid.

[30] Themaat, *Twee Jaren in den Boerenoorlog*, pp. 1–20.

[31] Ibid.

[32] Ibid.

[33] Mostert, *Slegtkamp van Spioenkop*, introduction.

[34] D.D. reported on his experiences in the Anglo-Boer War in several newspapers, during and after the war. The articles were used by Frans Glissenaar in his analysis of D.D.'s African adventure in his biography. See Glissenaar, *DD*, and especially 'Naar Transvaal! (1900–1902)', pp. 23–47.

[35] Priem, *Nagelaten geschriften van luitenant Gerrit Boldingh*.

[36] Van den Berg, on multiple occasions in his letters.

[37] Priem, *Nagelaten geschriften van luitenant Gerrit Boldingh*, pp. 53–55.

[38] Themaat, *Twee Jaren in den Boerenoorlog*, pp. 12–13. Only later Themaat realised that the Boers were not fighting a conventional pitched battle and deliberately were not holding ground, but opted for manoeuvre and defence in depth, and went over to guerrilla tactics.

[39] Themaat, *Twee Jaren in den Boerenoorlog*, pp. 12–13.

[40] Interestingly, the criticism and mistrust were mutual. Many Boers considered the Dutch volunteers arrogant and haughty amateurs. Joubert, one of the Boer commanders, was an acknowledged Hollander-hater. He blamed them for not understanding South Africa, being pedantic, having their own agenda and being virtually useless as soldiers.

[41] Schutte, *Beste Ouders!* The letters covering the first months of the war are of exceptional quality (pp. 288–317). The young and impetuous Van den Berg shows himself a keen and critical observer.

[42] Wessels, 'Afrikaners at War'.

[43] There is ample research and literature on loyalty in small tactical military units. A much-debated classic in this field of research is Marshall, *Men Against Fire: The Problem of Battle Command*. See also, for more recent insights: https://usacac.army.mil/sites/default/files/documents/cace/DCL/DCL_SmallUnitCohesion.pdf

[44] Mostert, *Slegtkamp van Spioenkop*. Caveat: the 'autobiography' of Slegtkamp is written by ghost-writer Dirk Mostert who used letters and documents of Slegtkamp, and it should be pointed out here that Mostert made it into a heroic epic, whereas Slegtkamp himself seems to have been far more sober and sombre.

[45] See "En toe verder?", Mostert, *Slegtkamp van Spioenkop*, pp. 306–312.

[46] Van Dalsen, 'Die Hollander Korps tydens die Tweede Vryheidsoorlog'; Schulten, 'Nederlandse vrijwilligers tijdens de Boerenoorlog in het Hollanderkorps'. More in general: Schoeman, *Broers in die Stryd. Hollanders in die Anglo-Boereoorlog*; Pottinger, *Foreign Volunteers*.

[47] General French put in the field 1,600 infantry, 1,300 cavalry, and 550 gunners with 8 artillery pieces.

[48] The Battle of Elandslaagte cost 46 Boer lives, out of 800 deployed. 105 Boers were wounded and 189 surrendered, against 52 killed and 213 wounded on the British side: Pakenham, *Boer War*, pp. 133–141; Bossenbroek, *Boerenoorlog*, pp. 222–225.

[49] Pakenham, *The Boer War*, pp. 133–141; Bossenbroek, *De Boerenoorlog*, pp. 222–225.

[50] However, the memory of Elandslaagte seems to have been important to most of them. The defeat made a big impression on the volunteers. It played a major role as a paragon of heroic self-sacrifice, as proof of the depravity of the British and as an indication/myth that the Dutch fought harder than the Boers.

[51] Themaat, *Twee Jaren in den Boerenoorlog*, pp. 30ff.

[52] Ibid., pp. 36–49.

[53] Ibid., pp. 341–342, 350–352.

[54] Mostert, *Slegtkamp van Spioenkop*, pp. 5–6.

[55] Ibid., pp. 50–57.

[56] Ibid.

[57] Fascinatingly, this is in line with how Stendhal and Tolstoj described battles in *La Chartreuse de Parme* (Stendhal) and in *War and Peace* (Tolstoj).

[58] Plokhooy, *Met den Mauser*, pp. 97–98.

[59] Ibid., pp. 99–104. Chapter III ('In den Vrijstaat') is a description of Boers fleeing from the British. Plokhooy also recounts many Boers surrendering at this stage of the war. See for example: Ibid., p. 115.

[60] Priem, *Nagelaten geschriften van luitenant Gerrit Boldingh*, p. 76.

[61] Ibid., pp. 108–109.

[62] Themaat, *Twee Jaren in den Boerenoorlog*, pp. 255–256, 272, 280–282.

[63] Priem, *Nagelaten geschriften van luitenant Gerrit Boldingh*, pp. 88ff.

[64] Ibid., pp. 115, 116.

[65] Ibid., pp. 1–10.

[66] Ibid., pp. 155–156 is a good example of a description of a 'battle' in South Africa. See also p. 167.

[67] Ibid., chapter 5. Boldingh constantly indicated (e.g., at p. 129) that he understood and endorsed the underlying strategy. On pp. 179–181, he explicitly addressed De Wet's guerrilla tactics. Chapter IX also discusses the rationale behind guerrilla and pp. 186–187 discusses guerrilla again and how it is best conducted.

[68] Ibid., chapter 5.

[69] Plokhooy, *Met den Mauser*, chapter IV in general and in particular, pp. 134–138. Plokhooy himself had been a prisoner of war!

[70] Themaat, *Twee Jaren in de Boerenoorlog*, pp. 268, 188.

[71] Priem, *Nagelaten geschriften van luitenant Gerrit Boldingh*, p. 160.

[72] Plokhooy, *Met den Mauser*, pp. 1–32.

[73] Ibid.

[74] Ibid.

[75] Ibid.

[76] Themaat, *Twee Jaren in de Boerenoorlog*, pp. 187–188.

[77] Ibid., pp. 24–35.

[78] Ibid., pp. 24–25.

[79] Ibid., pp. 148–149, 299–300.

[80] Ibid., pp. 189–191.

[81] Ibid., pp. 299–300.

[82] Themaat, *Twee jaren in den Boerenoorlog*, p. 163.

[83] Priem, *Nagelaten geschriften van luitenant Gerrit Boldingh*, p. 60.

[84] Ibid., p. 147.

[85] Ibid., pp. 59–61.

[86] Ibid., pp. 42–52.

[87] Ibid., pp. 43ff.

[88] Ibid., p. 52.

[89] Ibid., p. 49.

[90] Themaat, *Twee jaren in den Boerenoorlog*, pp. 139–140.

[91] Ibid., p. 160.

[92] Ibid., pp. 191–211, 193–194, 215–216.

[93] Ibid., pp. 134, 136–138.

[94] Ibid., pp. 153, 323–329, 329–330.

[95] Ibid., pp. 153, 323–329, 329–330.

[96] Priem, *Nagelaten geschriften van luitenant Gerrit Boldingh*, p. 65.

97 Mostert, *Slegtkamp van Spioenkop*, p. 5.
98 Plokhooy, *Met den Mauser*, p. 51.
99 Themaat, *Twee jaren in den Boerenoorlog*, p. 59.
100 Ibid., pp. 278–279.
101 Ibid., pp. 353–354.
102 There was one alternative: Danie Theron. See: Ibid., pp. 101, 103, 142–172; Mostert, *Slegtkamp van Spioenkop*, pp. 134–135.
103 Themaat, *Twee jaren in den Boerenoorlog*, p. 326.
104 Ibid., pp. 315–319. For De Wet, see also: Ibid., pp. 244–247.
105 Ibid., p. 98.
106 Ibid., pp. 26–27.
107 Priem, *Nagelaten geschriften van luitenant Gerrit Boldingh*, pp. 93–95, 124–128, 169.
108 Ibid., chapters VI–XIII, esp. p. 167.
109 Plokhooy, *Met den Mauser*, pp. 75, 92–93.
110 The interesting question of whether 'freedom' meant the same to them as it does to us today, cannot be elaborated upon here, but obviously the meaning of the word 'freedom' has changed fundamentally.
111 Fussell, *The Great War and Modern Memory*.
112 https://www.naval-military-press.com/product-category/the-great-war/memoirs-biographies-and-diaries/.
113 Jorge, 'Transnational Soldiers and Guerrilla Warfare from the Spanish Civil War to the Second World War'; Tremlett, *The International Brigades: Fascism, Freedom and the Spanish Civil War*; Montgomery, *Foreign Fighters in the Middle East: Threat Issues, Terrorism Concerns, and Control Efforts*; Nance, *Defeating ISIS: Who They Are, How They Fight, What They Believe*; Levy, 'Soldiers of End-Times: Assessing the Military Effectiveness of the Islamic State'; Hashim, *The Caliphate at War: Operational Realities and Innovations of the Islamic State*; Weiss and Hassan, *ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror*. More in general: Malet, *Foreign Fighters: Transnational Identity in Civil Conflicts*.
114 See for example, the contribution of Tycho van der Hoog and Georg Frerks in Chapters 13 and 14.

Bibliography

Asprey, Robert B. *War in the Shadows: The Guerrilla in History.* New York: Doubleday, 1975.
Asselberg. 'Dagboek van C.J. Asselbergs' in *Christaan de Wet-Annale*, 5 (October 1978), pp. 2–64.
Black, Jeremy. *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: A Global History*. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2016.
Boon, M.E. '"Wat viel er niet te leeren van de Boeren…" Lessen uit de Boerenoorlog. Nederlandse waarnemers aan het front in Zuid-Afrika.' BA Thesis, University of Utrecht, 2012. https://studenttheses.uu.nl/handle/20.500.12932/11268.
Boot, Max. *Invisible Armies: An Epic History of Guerrilla Warfare from Ancient Times to the Present.* New York: Liveright, 2013.
Bossenbroek, Martin. 'The Netherlands and the Boer War'. In *The International Impact of the Boer War*, edited by Keith Wilson. Chesham: Acumen, 2001, pp. 123–140.
Bossenbroek, Martin. *De Boerenoorlog*. Amsterdam: Athenaeum, Polak & Van Gennep, 2012.
Brocades Zaalberg, Thijs, and Bart Luttikhuis, eds. *Empire's Violent End: Comparing Dutch, British, and French Wars of Decolonization, 1945–1962.* Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2022.

Brocades Zaalberg, Thijs, Jan Hoffenaar and Alan Lemmers, eds. *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: Irregular Warfare from 1800 to the Present*, CIMH Congress 2010 Amsterdam. The Hague: Netherlands Institute for Military History, 2011.

Callwell, C.E. *Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice*. Lincoln, Neb.: Bison Books, 1996.

Dalsen, Johannes van. 'Die Hollander Korps tydens die Tweede Vryheidsoorlog'. PhD Diss., University of Pretoria, 1942.

Douek, Daniel L. *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in South Africa*. London: Hurst, 2020.

Flores, Marcello. 'Foreign Fighters Involvement in National and International Wars: A Historical Survey'. In Andrea de Guttry, Francesca Capone and Christophe Paulussen, eds. *Foreign Fighters under International Law and Beyond.* Berlin: Springer, 2016, pp. 27–47.

Francken, Eep, and Olf Praamstra, eds. *Geen land voor dromen. Geschiedenis van de Zuid-Afrikaanse Nederlandse literatuur*. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2023.

Fussell, Paul. *The Great War and Modern Memory*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975.

Galula, David. *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*. New York: Praeger, 1964.

Giliomee, Herman, and Bernard Mbenga. *New History of South Africa*. Cape Town: Tafelberg, 2007.

Glissenaar, Frans. *DD. Het leven van E.F.E. Douwes Dekker*. Hilversum: Verloren, 1999.

Grob-Fitzgibbon, Benjamin. *Imperial Endgame: Britain's Dirty Wars and the End of Empire*. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011.

Groen, Petra, Anita van Dissel, Mark Loderichs, Rémy Limpach and Thijs Brocades Zaalberg, eds. *Krijgsgeweld en kolonie. Opkomst en ondergang van Nederland als koloniale mogendheid*. Meppel: Boom, 2021.

Hagen, Piet. *Koloniale oorlogen in Indonesië. Vijf eeuwen verzet tegen vreemde overheersing*. Amsterdam: Arbeiderspers, 2018.

Hashim, Ahmed S. *The Caliphate at War. Operational Realities and Innovations of the Islamic State.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018.

Horne, Alistair. *A Savage War of Peace: Algeria, 1954–1962*. New York: New York Review Book, 2006; orig. 1977.

Joes, James Anthony. *Resisting Rebellion: The History and Politics of Counterinsurgency*. Lexington, Ky.: University Press of Kentucky, 2004.

Jong, Henk de. 'On the Boer War and Dutch (Military) Memory: Aspects of the South-African Military History in Dutch perspective'. Lecture held at the 2010 Conference of *The Historical Association of South Africa* (HASA) in Potchefstroom (*Milestones / Mylpale. Commemorating Southern African History / Herdenking van Suider-Afrikaanse Geskiedenis*).

Jong, Henk de. 'Oog in oog met "eenen Afrikaanschen oorlog". Nederlandse militaire waarnemers in de Boerenoorlog (1899–1902)'. *Marineblad* 120, no. 5 (2010), pp. 22–28. Extended annotated digital version on: https://www.marineblad.nl/images/Marineblad/2010-2019/2010/Marineblad%205%20juli%202010.pdf.

Jong, Henk de. 'Past as Future: The South African War, Dutch Observers and Military Memory'. *Scientia Militaria. South African Journal of Military Studies* 41, no. 1 (2013), pp. 34–64.

Jong, Henk de. 'The Past as Future? South Africa, The Boer War and Dutch (Military) Memory'. Lecture held at the 2011 Conference of the *Southern African Historical Society* (SAHS) at the University of KwaZulu-Natal in Durban (*The Past and its Possibilities: Perspectives on Southern Africa*). www.SAHS.org.za/conference.

Jorge, Marco. 'Transnational Soldiers and Guerrilla Warfare from the Spanish Civil War to the Second World War'. *War in History* 27, no. 3 (2020), pp. 387–407.

Kilcullen, David. *Counterinsurgency*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.

Kitson, Frank. *Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency and Peacekeeping*. ShoeString Press, 1971.

Kuitenbrouwer, Vincent. 'A War of Words. Dutch Pro-Boer Propaganda and the South African War (1899–1902)'. PhD Diss., Universiteit van Amsterdam, 2010.

Kuss, Susanne. *German Colonial Wars and the Context of Military Violence*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2017.

Levy, Ido. 'Soldiers of End-Times: Assessing the Military Effectiveness of the Islamic State'. Washington, D.C.: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2021.

Maher, Andrew. 'Guerrillas, Revolutionaries, Insurgents and Militias and Mafiosi: The Grim Threat of Irregular Strategy'. https://mwi.westpoint.edu/guerrillas-revolutionaries-insurgents-and-militias-and-mafiosi-the-grim-threats-of-irregular-strategy/.

Malet, David. *Foreign Fighters: Transnational Identity in Civil Conflicts*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.

Marshall, S.L.A. *Men Against Fire: The Problem of Battle Command*. New York: Morrow, 1947.

Marston, Daniel, Carter Malkasian. *Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare*. Oxford: Osprey, 2010.

Meredith, Martin. *Diamonds, Gold, and War: The British, the Boers, and the Making of South Africa*. New York: PublicAffairs, 2007.

Montgomery, Alayna. *Foreign Fighters in the Middle East: Threat Issues, Terrorism Concerns, and Control Efforts*. Hauppage, N.Y.: Nova Science Publishers, 2015.

Moor, Jaap A. de, and H.L. Wesseling, eds. *Imperialism and War: Essays on Colonial Wars in Asia and Africa.* Comparative Studies in Overseas History, Vol. 8. Leiden: Brill, 1989.

Mostert, Dirk. *Slegtkamp van Spioenkop. Oorlogsherinneringen van Kapt. Slegtkamp*. Nasionale Pers Beperk, 1935.

Nance, Malcolm. *Defeating ISIS: Who They Are, How They Fight, What They Believe*. New York: Skyhorse, 2017.

Nason, Bill. *The War for South Africa. The Anglo-Boer War 1899–1902*. Cape Town: Tafelberg, 2010.

Pakenham, Thomas. *The Boer War*. London: Abacus, 1979.

Plokhooy, Cornelis. *Met den Mauser. Persoonlijke herinneringen in den Zuid-Afrikaanschen Oorlog*. F. Duym, 1901.

Polack, Peter. *Guerrilla Warfare: Kings of Revolution*. Oxford: Casemate, 2019.

Porch, Douglas. *Wars of Empire*. London: Cassell, 2000.

Pottinger, Brian. *The Foreign Volunteers: They Fought for the Boers, 1899–1902*. Scripta Africana Series, 1987.

Priem, S.H. *Een Hollandsch officier in Zuid-Afrika. Nagelaten geschriften van luitenant Gerrit Boldingh*. Rotterdam 1903; reprint Kessinger Publishing, 2010.

Rich, Paul B. and Isabelle Duyvesteyn, eds. *The Routledge Handbook of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency*. London: Routledge, 2012.

Rid, Thomas and Thomas Keaney, eds. *Understanding Counterinsurgency Warfare: Doctrine, Operations, and Challenges*. London: Routledge, 2010.

Schoeman, Chris. *Broers in die Stryd. Hollanders in die Anglo-Boereoorlog*. Cape Town: Zebra, 2011.

Scholtz, Leopold. *The SADF in the Border War 1966–1989*. Cape Town: Tafelberg, 2013.

Schulten, P. 'Nederlandse vrijwilligers tijdens de Boerenoorlog in het Hollanderkorps'. *Mars et Historia*, 20 March 2016. www.marsethistoria.nl.

Schutte, G.J. *Adhesie en aversie. Over stamverwantschap, Boerenvrienden, Hollanderhaat, Calvinisme en apartheid*. Franeker: T. Wever, 1986.

Schutte, G.J. ed. *Beste Ouders! Brieven uit de Transvaal van Karel van den Berg 1896-1900*. Amsterdam: Suid-Afrikaanse Instituut, 1999.

Stapleton, Timothy J. *A Military History of South Africa. From the Dutch-Khoi Wars to the End of Apartheid*. Westport, Conn.: Praeger 2010.

Tremlett, Giles. *The International Brigades: Fascism, Freedom and the Spanish Civil War*. London: Bloomsbury, 2021.

Vandervort, Bruce. *Wars of Imperial Conquest*. London: Taylor & Francis, 2016.

VerLoren van Themaat, H. *Twee jaren in den Boerenoorlog*. Haarlem: Tjeenk Willink, 1903.

Visser, Jelle. 'David tegen Goliath in Zuid-Afrika. De Tweede Boerenoorlog door de ogen van het Nederlands militair attaché in Zuid-Afrika'. Student Thesis. University of Amsterdam, 2024.

Vissering, Gerard. 'Een Hollander in Zuid-Afrika'. *De Gids*, no. 1 (1900), pp. 46–72.

Waag, Ian van der. *A Military History of Modern South Africa*. Oxford: Casemate, 2018.

Weiss, Michael, and Hassan Hassan. *ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2015.

Wessels, André. 'Afrikaners at War'. In *The Boer War: Direction, Experience and Image*, edited by John Gooch. London: Cass, 2000.

Wilson, Keith, ed. *The International Impact of the Boer War*. Chesham: Acumen, 2001.

https://www.icct.nl/publication/foreign-fighters-foreign-volunteers-and-mercenaries-ukrainian-armed-conflict.

https://www.icct.nl/project/foreign-fighters-workshops; https://www.europarl.europa.eu/EPRS/EPRS-Briefing-579080-Foreign-fighters-rev-FINAL.pdf.

http://www.smallwarsjournal.com/ref/counterinsurgency.htm.

https://usacac.army.mil/sites/default/files/documents/cace/DCL/DCL_SmallUnitCohesion.pdf

https://www.naval-military-press.com/product-category/the-great-war/memoirs-biographies-and-diaries/.

CHAPTER 12

The Pope's Divisions on the March: Soft Power and the Catholic Church[1]

Theo Brinkel

Abstract

The Roman Catholic Church has no troops at its disposal, nor does it exert economic pressure. The Church, however, and its supreme Pontiff the Pope, can be an influential actor in international relations. In that capacity the Church navigates the troubled waters of international security between armed state actors and armed non-state actors. This chapter will investigate the power of the Church. The central question will be: how can the Church, as an unarmed actor, exert power in conflicts with armed state and non-state actors? The chapter will first make a short excursion to the concept of soft power, as explained by Joseph Nye. Following the insight obtained by studying soft power, it will then discuss the ends, ways and means of Pope and Church in international relations: a huge and long-lasting organisation, a consistent philosophy and a network with a global outreach. As will be clarified, the Church may be considered as an actor without armed forces.

The chapter will take a closer look at two cases in which the Pope has played a notable role – the end of communist rule in Europe and the peace process in Northern Ireland – and at two cases in which this role is much harder to discern, such as the war in Ukraine or the war between Israel and Hamas. The ambition is not to appraise the concept of soft power, but to use insights from this concept to get a better picture of the power of the Pope: the objectives, the ways in which these objectives are pursued and the means available. The conclusion is that it would be too easy to dismiss the Church as irrelevant when it comes to studying conflict. War Studies deal with allies and enemies. Because the Church can be one of them it is well worth the trouble to learn how it operates.

Keywords: Roman Catholic Church, Pope, War, Peacebuilding, Soft power

There's nothing you can do that can't be done.
Nothing you can sing that can't be sung.
Nothing you can say but you can learn how to play the game.
It's easy.

All you need is love, © The Beatles 1967

12.1 Introduction

Close to the wall separating the Catholic Falls Road area from the Protestant Shankill Road neighbourhood in Belfast stands the Church of the Redeemer. This place of worship is a haven of tranquillity, colour, and meditation in otherwise violent, poor, and dreary surroundings. It is telling the visitor that these surroundings do not make up the final horizon. It represents an alternative, more humane, reality. The church is part of the Clonard Monastery of the Congregation of the Most Holy Redeemer who dedicate their work to bringing the Gospel to the poor. Father Alec Reid, one of the members of the congregation, played a crucial role in the peace process in Northern Ireland.[2]

Mediation between conflicting parties is one of many examples of the involvement of the Roman Catholic Church (hereafter the Church) in conflict and war around the world. Although it has neither troops at its disposal, nor does it exert economic pressure, the Church, and its supreme Pontiff the Pope, can be an influential actor in international relations. The Vatican is also a recognised state and as such has one of the largest diplomatic apparatuses in the world. In that capacity, the Church navigates the troubled waters of international security between armed state actors and armed non-state actors as it did in the above-mentioned example of Northern Ireland.[3]

This chapter will investigate the power of the Church. The central question will be: How can the Church, as an unarmed actor, exert power in conflicts with armed state and non-state actors? To answer, the next section will make a short excursion to the concept of soft power, as explained by Joseph Nye. This concept is apt in this case, as Joseph Stalin seems to have asked of Winston Churchill the rhetorical question: 'How many divisions did you say the Pope has?'.[4] Well, the Pope has no armed divisions. But he was instrumental in bringing an end to the regime that Stalin built. Following the insight obtained by studying soft power, section 12.2 will discuss the international ends, ways and means of Pope and Church: a huge and long-lasting organisation, a consistent philosophy and a network with a global outreach. As will be clarified in this section, the Church may be considered as an actor without armed forces.

Section 12.3 will then take a closer look at two cases in which the Pope has played a notable role – the end of communist rule in Europe and the peace process in Northern Ireland – and at two cases in which this role is much harder to discern, the war in Ukraine or the war between Israel and Hamas. The ambition of this chapter is not to appraise the concept of soft power, but to use insights from this concept to get a better picture of the power of the Pope: the objectives, the ways in which these objectives are pursued and the means available. It would be too easy to dismiss the Church as irrelevant when it comes to studying conflict. War Studies deal with allies and enemies. The Church can be one of them.

12.2 The Concept of Soft Power

This section will unpack the term soft power. This will help us find out how the Church uses power in international relations. According to Joseph Nye, '… power is the capacity to do things and in social situations to affect others to get the outcomes we want.'[5] He discusses soft power mainly as an instrument of government policy, specifically that of the United States. But the concept can very well be discussed in relation to non-state actors. The Church is one of those actors he specifically mentions: 'The Roman Catholic Church is organized on a global scale, and many Catholics around the world adhere to its teachings … because of its attraction, not coercion.'[6] In other words: it uses persuasion instead of force.

Power can be considered in terms of resources (military might, gross domestic product, size of a country), says Nye, but these are not enough to explain success. Even the most powerful nation does not always get its preferred outcomes. It is all about power conversion: the use of resources in such a way that the desired effects are obtained.[7] Nye distinguishes between three types of power conversion: (1) commanding change, which he defines as the ability to force others to change their behaviour, i.e., the force that can be applied by armed actors; (2) framing and agenda-setting in the sense of making the preferences of others seem unfeasible, irrelevant or out of order and making your agendas seem legitimate; and (3) the ability to influence the preferences of others in such a way that they desire the same things the actor wants.[8]

The first type is hard power, such as economic and military power. The second and third types are examples of soft power. During the Cold War, for instance, the US used soft power via Radio Free Europe, which broadcast the values that underpin the narrative of the free West towards the populations in communist countries. States that are smart in their exercise of power can combine hard and soft power resources into effective strategies.[9] They understand the full range of power resources and the problems of combining them effectively in various contexts. What is also needed is a good understanding of the context in which the actor operates. Exercising soft power is not easy because results may take a long time to come about.

Soft power was, for instance, an integral part of western counterinsurgency strategy in Iraq and Afghanistan. Apart from military operations, typical soft power resources such as persuasiveness, international reputation, and especially the values that inform moral authority, played a crucial role.[10] One of the weaknesses of western counterinsurgency was the lack of credibility. Nye argues that credibility disappears when governments show themselves to be manipulative and inconsistent.[11] In some instances, soft power is ineffective, such as in the dispute with North Korea over nuclear weapons. However, in promoting human rights and democracy, for instance, soft power will be more effective than hard power.[12]

Critics consider soft power a concept of limited value, because, as Kearn argues, the specific contribution of soft power to certain policy outcomes is difficult to assess. For instance, if a state uses both hard and soft power elements, how can the contribution to the results be attributed to soft power? Also, what role does soft power play in a complicated and interdependent international environment, where there is not just a mix of hard power and soft power policies present, but where there are also multiple state actors as well as non-state actors at work? Finally, Kearn argues, the concept was chiefly developed with an eye to the United States, and much less to small states, let alone non-state actors.[13]

Considering this last group, such as trade unions, advocacy groups, and other transnational organisations, soft power may be the only instrument available to them. Similarly, the recipients of soft power are not only state institutions of other countries but can also be NGOs or public opinion. These may indirectly influence the policies of their respective governments. Therefore, influencing public opinion through public diplomacy, television and social media, student exchanges, etc. is an important channel for soft power. Thanks to the information revolution, the costs of exchanging ideas internationally are negligible.

Non-state actors lacking hard power, face limitations when dealing with armed state and non-state actors. In a minimalist interpretation, they operate within a context that is determined by an already existing balance of power and all they can achieve is situated within that context. However, according to Luttwak, armed actors can be persuaded to achieve results that extend beyond their political horizons.[14] Faith and organised religion may help them to see events in the light of broader values, a moral frame of reference that transcends the differences of conflicting parties.[15] This way, religion or religious authorities may help by negotiating with armed actors on the possibility of concessions that the latter otherwise wouldn't have made. In short, the involvement of religion can broaden the potential of politically feasible agreements.[16]

The next section will investigate which elements of soft power theory relate to the international wheeling and dealing of the Roman Catholic Church and, more specifically, the Pope.

12.3 Power Conversion

As was observed in the previous section, power conversion is the use of resources in such a way that the desired effects are obtained. This section will deal with the question of how this applies to the Church in a general sense. This will be discussed alongside Arthur Lykke's traditional equation of strategy as ends (the desired effects) plus ways plus means (the use of resources).[17] The ends are the moral

objectives and the interests of the Church and its faithful. The ways are discussed as the institutions through which the Church operates. The means are the resources and instruments available.

In the view of the Church, separation of church and state does not mean that religion should be left out of public debate. It claims that faith includes more than merely praying at home or holding holy mass within the confines of a building. Catholic teaching is directed at the personal lives of the faithful, and to all people 'of good will' and to the spheres of politics and society as well. In the modern age, the Pope is aware of the need to leave the affairs of state in the hands of politicians and has disapproved of priests taking political responsibilities. That does not keep him from publicly speaking out.[18]

12.3.1 Ends

Catholicism boasts a philosophy that is both universal in ambition and applicable to various circumstances. This philosophy is summarised in the Catechism of the Roman Catholic Church and regularly developed further in Encyclicals and Pastoral Letters. Together, they may well be considered policy documents, containing overarching objectives of the Pope's divisions. The Church teaches that all human activity, international politics included, is subject to moral values that are fundamentally based on the dignity of the human person. This is best guaranteed under the conditions of democracy, the rule of law, and a socially and ecologically oriented market economy.[19]

According to the Catechism, the dignity of the human person is founded on the creation of man in the image of God.[20] In order to fulfil this vocation of dignity, the human person needs freedom, especially freedom of conscience and freedom of religion. The state must recognise and protect the exercise of freedom within the limits of the common good and public order.[21] Citizens should take an active part in public life, although the manner of this participation may vary from one country or culture to another.[22] It is the role of the state to defend and promote the common good of civil society, its citizens, and intermediate bodies. The common good needs peace, that is, the stability and security of a just order. It is the basis of the right to legitimate personal and collective defence.[23]

Discussion in the Catechism about war is founded on the fifth commandment: 'Thou shalt not kill'. The Church denounces war and insistently calls everyone to prayer and to action so that the world may be free from violence. However, the danger of war persists and there is no international authority with competence and power. Therefore, governments have the right of lawful self-defence.[24] This right is subject to the just war doctrine, which holds moral conditions that must be met before war is started as well as conditions that apply to the waging of war.[25]

Pope Francis has taken a more critical stance on this. Although taking up arms in defence of one's country may be justified, he argues, war itself can never be just. Only peace is just.[26] The Church teaches that peace is more than the absence of war. True peace entails safeguarding the goods of persons, free communication, respect for the dignity of persons and peoples and fraternity. 'Peace is the work of justice and the effect of charity.'[27]

Based on these notions, in its international statements and policies, the ends of the Church's involvement in international relations can be summarised as peace, justice, human rights, and democracy.

12.3.2 Ways

The ways in which the Church operates can be divided in matters spiritual and matters temporal. Byrnes typifies these two as communicating with the faithful and influencing their preferences and priorities on the one hand, and as using diplomatic channels and global media to contribute to the global conscience on the other.[28] The former primarily rests with the Pope in his capacity as head of the Apostolic See of Rome, founded by Saints Peter and Paul in the first century AD and with the community of bishops who are seen as the successors of Christ's apostles. The Pope appoints the bishops and cardinals, whereas he himself is elected by the College of cardinals.

Apart from these ecclesiastical connections, there is a huge variety of networks of Catholic believers. They work from the bottom upwards based on faith and they are relatively autonomous in their activities. Examples are religious orders and congregations such as the Order of Saint Francis or the Society of Jesus (Jesuit Order) and lay orders and communities. One of them is the Community of Sant'Egidio, dedicated to prayer, social care and peace mediation. Another is Caritas Internationalis, which is a global network of over 160 Catholic relief organisations, which are active in over 200 countries. These, and many other institutions all have their own international contacts and are also directly involved in charitable or peacebuilding projects. They are part of a global network of a Catholic civil society.

In the above sense, the Church operates as a non-state actor. However, the Church can also use its diplomatic channels and in this respect, it possesses elements of a state as well. The so-called Papal States in Central Italy that had existed since the eighth century came to an end when, in 1870, the Kingdom of Italy conquered Rome. The *Stato della Città del Vaticano* of today came into being on the basis of the Lateran Treaty of 1929. According to Article 3 of this Treaty, the Holy See enjoys 'full ownership, exclusive dominion and sovereign authority and jurisdiction' in Vatican City, a small piece of territory behind the church of Saint Peter in Rome.[29] Here, the Pope is head of state in a non-hereditary monarchy. According to the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, states have four

characteristics: a permanent population, a defined territory, a government and the capacity to enter relations with other states.[30] Vatican City possesses three. Most of its 700 to 750 inhabitants are not permanent residents.

Foreign relations are the responsibility of the Holy See. This is a non-territorial institution with its own internationally recognised legal personality.[31] It exists independently of other states and governments. Foreign policy is conducted by the Secretariat of State of the Holy See and its diplomatic service. Ambassadors are called nuncios or apostolic delegates. They make up the longest standing, and therefore highly experienced, diplomatic service in the world.

12.3.3 Means

As seen above, for an actor to exert soft power, its leadership needs to be qualified by authority, a good reputation, and credibility, with a communication strategy and a consistent narrative. Popes John Paul II (1978–2005) and Francis (2013–2025) in many ways behave like international celebrities and seem to be successful in this respect. Both popes have made full use of the possibilities of the information age. John Paul II started using modern means of communication such as travelling, public speeches and huge meetings with believers (often more than 100,000). Francis has his own X-profile called 'Pontifex', boasting millions of followers. The latter was the first Pope from the so-called Global South. More than his predecessors, in his public statements he took sides with the poor, the oppressed and the victims of war. According to De Volder, however, this is more a question of style than a fundamental change in Church policy.[32]

The Pope has many instruments of soft power at his disposal. There is the long-lasting global organisation of the Catholic Church under a single leader who stands for 1.3 billion Catholics world-wide. He can get his message across thanks to encyclicals, pastoral letters, through sermons that bishops and priests deliver in his name, as well as in meetings at the Vatican and international visits to countries of interest. These 1.3 billion Catholics are also voters in their respective countries. Among them are leaders and lobbyists who may influence political decision-making, both publicly and behind closed doors.

The soft power of the Church is heavily dependent on its moral credibility. The revelations of decades of child abuse by priests and sisters in the nineties that continued well into this century, as well as attempts to cover them up, have severely damaged the authority of the Church. Pope Benedict XVI (2005–2013) took most of the criticism, as he was seen to make too little effort in investigations, apologies and punishment of the perpetrators. Pope Francis has taken further steps in acknowledging and apologising for the sexual abuse scandals. As credibility is a precondition for soft power, the Church has lost much of its effectiveness in international relations.

Also, the Church is confronted with the same dilemmas as state governments. Campbell describes them as the tension between the diplomat and the prophet.[33] On the one hand the Church is championing peace and religious freedom in totalitarian states and on the other it needs the type of relations that allows it to function in these countries. Currently, the Holy See has diplomatic relations with 184 countries. The Holy See is recognised by the UN General Assembly as an 'observer non-member state'.[34] Thanks to a huge diplomatic network the Holy See boasts its own excellent information position and a broad international audience. Holy See diplomacy has, for instance, played a crucial role in restoring relations between the United States and Cuba in 2016 and the visit of President Barack Obama to Cuba. This process has shortly afterwards largely been undone by Obama's successor Donald Trump.

The Holy See has at its disposal the so-called Pontifical Swiss Guard, a military corps responsible for the safety of the Pope and the residents of Vatican City. Members of this corps – currently 135 in total – must all be Catholic males of Swiss nationality aged between 19 and 35 years. They have a ceremonial role but also serve as armed bodyguards of the Pope, equipped with firearms and assault rifles. The 300-men strong Gendarmerie Corps of Vatican City State provide police and security services within its territory. Because they are not deployed outside Vatican City they do not operate in the international relations of the Holy See. For this reason, the Church is effectively unarmed but has elements of a non-state actor and a state actor. The following section will explore how soft power works in the policies of the Pope. We will have a closer look at four examples. Four cases have been selected. The first one – Poland – is discussed because it was this case of Papal intervention that contributed to the fall of the empire of Stalin, the ruler who had cynically asked how many divisions the Pope could boast of. The second example regards the Northern Ireland Troubles. The interventions of the Church in this conflict were more bottom-up than centrally directed from Rome. The last two examples are the Russo-Ukrainian War and the war between Israel and Hamas, current wars that have caused thousands of casualties. The first two are taken from the pontificate of John Paul II in countries where the Church was present and dominant. The other examples are current wars under the pontificate of Popes Francis and Leo XIV, in countries in which the Roman Catholic Church does not have a strong presence.

12.4 Examples

12.4.1 The fall of communism

After the Second World War, Central and Eastern Europe were left to Soviet domination. Moscow dictated their destination, and it seemed as if Soviet communism

would rule forever. Western great powers had no alternative but to accept the situation. During the 1970s and 1980s, the communist regimes were slowly losing credibility. They seemed not to believe in their own ideology anymore. Poland was a case in point. In 1976 the country fell into an economic crisis, when harvests failed, shortages in consumer goods occurred, and foreign debts as well as state corruption skyrocketed. People started protesting and workers began to strike. In 1978 the Polish cardinal Karol Wojtyla, archbishop of Krakow, was elected Pope. He took the name of John Paul II.

Catholicism has been a determining factor in Polish identity for centuries. In 1978, 90% of its 35 million inhabitants were Catholic. John Paul II saw unique opportunities to liberate his country from oppression. Later, in a speech in Prague in 1990, he explained why communism was an untenable ideology: 'It denies essential aspects of being human: the irrepressible desire for freedom and truth and the incapacity to truly be happy if the transcendental relation with God is ruled out'.[35] In 1978, the Pope took the chance to set in motion a process that would free Poland and other countries of Central and Eastern Europe as well.

To achieve this goal, John Paul II overruled traditional Vatican diplomacy, such as voiced by the then Secretary of State Cardinal Agostino Casaroli. The latter preferred good relations with the communist regimes to safeguard the interests of the local churches in Central and Eastern Europe.[36] What resulted was a sort of division of labour. Casaroli would continue the Holy See's diplomatic work towards good relations with states, whereas the Pope would 'hammer away publicly on human rights issues'.[37] He found an ally in Ronald Reagan, President of the United States from 1980–1988. Both had survived a murder attempt in 1981, which motivated them even more. In an address to (Catholic) Notre Dame University in 1981, Reagan explained: 'The West won't contain communism, it will transcend communism. It won't bother to dismiss or denounce it; it will dismiss it as some bizarre chapter in human history whose last pages are even now being written.'[38]

In June 1982 the President and the Pope met in the Vatican. They needed each other. Weigel argues that the Pope's soft power could only work in combination with the hard power context in which it was deployed, such as western rearmament and the robust ideology of Reagan.[39] According to Bernstein, they even coordinated policies of, for instance, clandestine operations to support civil society organisations in Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia or to reach out to the peoples of those countries via channels such as Radio Free Europe.[40] Washington loudly supported the cause of democracy and human rights, exerted economic pressure, and promoted diplomatic isolation of Jaruzelski's regime. Reagan was surrounded by Catholic advisers like ambassador Vernon Walters, CIA chief William Casey, secretary of state Alexander Haig and William Wilson, Reagan's first ambassador to the Holy See.

The most striking means the Church used were the highly publicised visits of the Pope to Poland. His first visit occurred in 1979, shortly after his election, in a time of social unrest. During this visit, thirteen million Poles had been able to see and hear the Pope in person. In his speeches the Pope referred to values such as human dignity and justice and his audience easily made the connection with their plight.[41] Emboldened by the words of their Pope, in August 1980, workers at the Lenin Shipyard in Gdansk began to strike against rising food prices. The independent trade union movement Solidarity was founded, and Lech Walesa became its leader. Strikes spread all over the country. The regime gave in, and workers were formally granted the right to strike. Solidarity acquired ten million members – workers, intellectuals, students – and became a broad social movement.

In January 1981 representatives of Solidarity, including Walesa, met with the Pope at the Vatican. In the meeting Pope John Paul II expressed his support for their cause. To the delegation he said: 'I think, dear ladies and gentlemen, that you are fully aware of the duties that lie before you in "Solidarnosc" .... In this sense these duties have a fundamental meaning for the life of the whole society, of the whole nation: for its common good.'[42] The rise of Solidarity was observed anxiously by the Soviet leadership in the Kremlin. Fearing Soviet intervention, the Polish communist party installed general Wojciech Jaruzelski as the new leader. In December 1981 he imposed martial law and had about 5,000 activists of Solidarity arrested. Independent organisations were forbidden, strikes were banned, and protests were suppressed.

When in June 1983 the Pope visited Poland for a second time, he was more careful in his wordings.[43] Still, he publicly declared that martial law should be revoked and urged his audience not to despair. In cooperation with the Reagan administration, Solidarity, now an underground organisation, was supplied with fax machines, video cameras, xerox machines, computers, and money. They were secretly shipped to Poland through channels of the church, trade unions and US secret services. All this was intended to keep Solidarity alive until it would become legalised again. Information was gathered about Polish society through the extensive networks of the Church.

The Pope continued to be in contact with Walesa, giving him moral support as well as urging caution to prevent a military intervention by the Soviet Union. The Pope developed his own method: he would go along with initiatives from local civil society and the Catholic masses and support them. As he said to Polish leadership on his first visit to Poland: 'By establishing a religious relationship with people, the Church consolidates them in their natural social bonds.'[44] And he would push developments further through countless meetings, speeches, and religious services.

In June 1987, the Pope visited Poland for the third time. He praised Solidarity and insisted on respect for human rights. The atmosphere had changed. In the

Soviet Union Mikhail Gorbachev had come to power and planned to fundamentally reform communism. He fostered a climate in which Jaruzelski dared to introduce reforms, such as the release of political prisoners. In 1987 he promised to enter into dialogue with the Catholic Church in Poland. In January 1989 Solidarity was legalised again. Under the protection of the Church a Round Table Conference was held, which mandated semi-free elections that were held in June.

The elections were won by Solidarity and Lech Walesa was elected president in December 1990. Poland became the first country that peacefully ousted a communist regime. In the autumn of 1989 other countries of Central and Eastern Europe would follow. In 1991, the Soviet Union itself broke apart and communism was thrown on the dunghill of history. According to Weigel, Reagan's and the Pope's 'religious belief and moral conviction – supported by the judicious exercise of power – bent history's course in a more humane direction. The two true believers were right, after all.'[45]

12.4.2 Northern Ireland

In 1921 Ireland, which was overwhelmingly Catholic, became independent. Predominantly Protestant Northern Ireland remained within the United Kingdom. The Protestants wanted to stay British. Catholics and Irish nationalists sought unification with the Irish Republic. Compared to the Protestant majority, Catholics in Northern Ireland were disadvantaged politically, socially, and economically. In the 1960s people began protesting. Violence intensified during the Troubles, which lasted from 1968 to 1998. Over 3,500 people were killed in this period, in terrorist attacks by the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and Protestant self-defence forces, and in counterinsurgency operations of the British Army and the Royal Ulster Constabulary. The conflict could not leave the Church indifferent. An end to the violence, respect for the rights of Catholics and care for the victims and their relatives were its main objectives.

Most Catholics in Northern Ireland preferred peaceful change. Only the most radical among them considered the use of violence legitimate. Local priests generally were more radical than their bishops. In their daily work, the former were confronted with victims, they comforted mourning families, repaired churches and restored local communities after attacks. They visited prisoners and published about the circumstances in prison.

Bishops, higher up in the hierarchy, had to consider the impact of their words on public opinion and political actors. They often supported the nationalist course, but they condemned the violence. Because the Church is a world religion, it could bring the suffering to an international audience of Catholics in other countries and to the Pope in Rome. There was a close connection between the Irish bishops and

their colleagues in England. There also were contacts with the Irish diaspora in the United States. There, many supported reconciliation initiatives, others sent money to the IRA. US bishops lobbied in Washington for support for the peace process.

On a few occasions, the Pope got involved, for instance when the British government abolished the special political status that IRA-affiliated prisoners thus far had enjoyed and began treating them as ordinary criminals. In protest they first refused to wear any clothes and stopped washing themselves. In 1981 some of them stopped eating. Bobby Sands was their leader and the most famous among them. Priests visited the strikers, tried to convince prisoners to stop fasting and comforted their families. Bishop Edward Daly and Cardinal Tómas Ó Fiaich sought ways to end the hunger strikes. The cardinal visited Margaret Thatcher, prime minister from 1979–1990, in London and went to Rome to ask the Pope to intervene. Thatcher did not give an inch. For her the prisoners were just plain criminals.

Pope John Paul II personally appealed to Thatcher warning her that the death of the hunger strikers could have 'grave repercussions upon the whole situation in Northern Ireland.'[46] He sent his personal secretary, Fr. John Magee, to visit the hunger strikers in Maze Prison and speak with Bobby Sands several times. The Pope was critical of hunger striking and condemned violence, but he never excommunicated members of the IRA.[47] Bobby Sands died in May 1981 after 66 days of fasting. He was buried with a crucifix that Fr. Magee had given him as a personal gift from the Pope. Over 100,000 Catholics attended the funeral. Nine other hunger strikers died during that period. Persuaded by their priests and families, on 3 October 1981, the last hunger strikers ended their campaign. Three days later, the British government finally gave in and allowed the prisoners to wear their own clothes.

An important means of exercising soft power was speaking out in public. When in 1972 thousands of people were marching through the streets of Derry in defence of human rights, British soldiers shot and killed thirteen protesters. This disaster became known as Bloody Sunday. Priests tried to save people's lives and gave the last rites to the deadly wounded. They sharply condemned the conduct of the British military.

The main public event was the visit of Pope John Paul II to Ireland in 1979. Originally, the Pope was to visit Northern Ireland. A few weeks before his arrival, however, the IRA killed Lord Louis Mountbatten, cousin of Queen Elizabeth, and eighteen British soldiers. Visiting the North would have been too dangerous. So, the Pope held Mass in the town of Drogheda, situated within the Archdiocese of Armagh, which extends over Northern Ireland as well as the Republic. Drogheda is near the area where in 1690 the Battle of the Boyne took place and Catholic Ireland was brought under Protestant English rule.

Before an audience of over 250,000, the Pope voiced his support to Catholics in Northern Ireland, saying: 'As long as injustices exist in any of the areas that touch

upon the dignity of the human person, be it in the political, social or economic field, be it in the cultural or religious sphere, true peace will not exist.'[48] At the same time, he passionately condemned the violence: 'On my knees I beg you to turn away from the paths of violence and to return to the ways of peace.'[49] Finally, he addressed politicians: 'You must show that peace achieves the works of justice, and violence does not.'[50] Reactions in Catholic circles were positive. Only the IRA was critical and dismissed the speech as partisan and out of touch with reality.[51]

Another means was mediation. The Church regularly took part in meetings with the Anglican, Presbyterian, and Methodist Churches. Civil society initiatives, such as the Corrymeela Community and the Christian Renewal Centre, brought together Catholics and Protestants at a local level. Less public were the activities of the Clonard monastery in Belfast. Fr. Alec Reid had developed a confidential relationship with Gerry Adams, leader of Sinn Féin, the political branch of the IRA. Within the confines of the monastery, Fr. Reid brought about a dialogue between Adams and John Hume, leader of the non-violent nationalist SDLP (Social Democratic Labour Party) and the Irish prime minister. This clerical involvement came to an end, when the IRA declared a cessation of its military activities in 1994 and concrete steps towards peace could be taken. Then it was the politician's turn.

The Good Friday Agreement, signed on 10 April 1998, ended the Troubles. Northern Ireland would remain part of the UK until a majority of voters would decide otherwise. Many factors made peace possible, but the Church had certainly been instrumental. Scull argues that this was mostly due to 'passionate clerical individuals' and not to the Church as an institution.[52] The end of the hunger strikes may for an important part be attributed to the Church.[53] The Pope's speech in Drogheda did not convince the British government, nor the IRA. Doherty concludes that 'John Paul II shook communism to its foundations. In 1979, he wasted his breath on the IRA.'[54] Discussing the contribution of Fr. Reid, Scull concludes: 'Without the trust he [Reid] shared with Adams, dialogue between the SDLP and SF may have never occurred at this time.'[55]

12.4.3 Ukraine

To Russia's dictator Vladimir Putin, the emergence of an independent democratic Ukraine on Russia's border constitutes a threat. In 2014 Russia annexed Crimea and parts of Donetsk and Luhansk. In February 2022 Putin resorted to full-scale war in the hope of installing a puppet regime in Kyiv. Ukraine, however, did not surrender. At the time of writing, the war is still going on. Ukrainian cities have been bombarded, energy companies destroyed, and schools and hospitals damaged. 12,161 civilians were killed and 26,919 wounded in the period between February 2022 and 31 October 2024.[56]

The first act of Pope Francis was an unprecedented visit to the ambassador of the Russian Federation to the Holy See on the morning after the Russian invasion to express his concern. Generally, the Pope vented his concern for the victims and condemned the war as cruel and senseless.[57] During a video meeting with Russian Patriarch Kirill, who publicly supports Putin's war in Ukraine, Pope Francis said that the Church should not 'use the language of politics but the language of Jesus'.[58]

The diplomatic objectives of the Church were presented by Cardinal Pietro Parolin, the Secretary of State of the Holy See, at the Summit for Peace in Ukraine, held from 15 to 16 June 2024 in Switzerland. A durable peace for Ukraine and Russia can only be achieved through dialogue between all parties involved, he said. Parolin stressed the fundamental principles of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each country. He added that the Holy See is committed to facilitating the repatriation of children and encouraging the release of prisoners, especially seriously wounded soldiers and civilians. Despite all the challenges, the Holy See strives to maintain regular communication with both the Ukrainian and Russian authorities and remains prepared to assist in mediation initiatives.[59]

For the Church the way to pursue these objectives is, first, to take a position of diplomatic neutrality. The Pope regularly condemned the madness of war and conveyed his concern for the Ukrainian population and the innocent victims. The second way is maintaining working relations with both Ukraine and Russia. In public, Pope Francis did not want to simplify the war as a matter of good guys and bad guys. The causes of the conflict are too complex for that, he argued. He described NATO's Eastward expansion as 'barking at Russia's door', which was interpreted as Pontifical support for Putin's justification of the invasion in 2022.[60] For the Pope, religious unity and good relations with the Orthodox churches are important. In 2016 he was the first Pope to meet Patriarch Vladimir Kirill, primate of the Russian Orthodox Church, in the VIP-lounge of Havana Airport. He did not take sides in the quarrels between pro-Ukrainian and pro-Russian churches. It may be relevant to note here that about 8% of the pre-war Ukrainian population adhere to the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church (UGCC), which since 1596 has recognised the overall authority of the Pope.[61]

In working towards peace through negotiations the Church strives to keep diplomatic channels with Moscow open. In an interview with *Radio Télévision Suisse*, made public on 9 March 2024, the Pope urged Ukraine to start negotiations and end the war with Russia, saying:

> I believe that the 'stronger one' is the one who sees the situation, who thinks of the people, who has the courage of the white flag, to negotiate. And today, negotiations are possible with the help of international powers …. When you see that you are defeated, that things are not going well, it is necessary to have the courage to negotiate.[62]

Ukrainian Foreign Affairs minister Dmitri Kuleba reacted negatively and said: 'The strongest is the one who, in the battle between good and evil, stands on the side of good rather than attempting to put them on the same footing and call it "negotiations."'[63] Even Sviatoslav Shevchuk, the archbishop of Kyiv-Halych and the primate of the UGCC, distanced himself from his Pope by saying that surrender is not on the minds of Ukrainians.[64] It shows how a local church can differ in opinion from the centre in Rome: in public, the Pope stresses the importance of peace and negotiations, whereas the UGCC voices the Ukrainian perspective. Pope Francis, coming from Argentina and feeling closer to the so-called Global South than his predecessors, was criticised by most Western governments as well. The Kremlin, obviously, considered the remarks of the Pope 'quite understandable'.[65]

Diplomacy behind the scenes and continuing dialogue with Russian actors such as the Patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church is being carried out by the Papal nuncios, Secretary of State Parolin and the Pope's special envoy Cardinal Matteo Zuppi. The latter is concentrating his efforts on the repatriation of Ukrainian children that had been taken to Russia from the occupied territories. Zuppi is archbishop of Bologna and president of the Italian Bishops' Conference. Previously he participated in the movement of Sant'Egidio. He had, for instance, been part of its mediation team that led to the end of the civil war in Mozambique in 1992. As an observer the Holy See takes part in the International Coalition for the repatriation of Ukrainian children from Russia. Efforts are still underway, but these activities have not yet resulted in the return of the children.

In July 2024, Parolin visited the Ukrainian towns of Kyiv, Odessa and Lviv and met with President Volodymyr Zelensky. In his meeting with Zelensky, Parolin reaffirmed 'the Pope's solidarity and the commitment to finding a just and lasting peace for war-torn Ukraine.' During the same trip he also met archbishop Shevchuk. Parolin noted that his physical presence in the country, 'adds a "living" aspect to this papal presence', which 'shares in the pain', but, especially, 'desires to help open paths of peace'.[66] The war in Ukraine is still ongoing. There is little public support for Papal appeals to negotiate or any other attempts at mediation.

In June 2024, however, ten civilian prisoners were released, including a politician from the Crimea and two priests belonging to the UGCC. They had been taken prisoner by Russia in the annexed territories and by Belarus. Exchanges of prisoners of war have taken place in greater numbers, but the release of civilian prisoners is rare. Although the exact role of the Church is unknown, Pope Francis, cardinal Zuppi, and archbishop Visvaldas Kulbokas, the nuncio to Ukraine, were reportedly involved in the mediation.[67] Zelensky has recognised the role of the Church, saying: 'I would also like to note the Vatican's efforts to bring these people home.'[68]

12.4.4 Israel/Hamas

On 7 October 2023 Hamas invaded Southern Israel and, in an orgy of violence, killed more than 1,200 people and took 240 hostages. Israel reacted with full military force. To defeat Hamas, the Israeli army invaded and bombarded the Gaza strip. During and since the Hamas attacks, 1,200 Israeli's have died and 5,431 injured. As a result of Israeli operations against Hamas in Gaza, by early December 2024, 44,502 Palestinians were killed and 104,454 were injured.[69] The Pope takes a strong interest in the region. The Israel-Hamas war takes place in the land where Christianity originated and in what to the Church is the Holy Land. Important holy sites are situated in Jerusalem and the Galilee, as well as in Bethlehem, which is located in the Palestine Territories. Thousands of Christian pilgrims visit these places yearly.

Most Christians in the Holy Land are Palestinians. There are about 185,000 Christians in Israel proper and approximately 45,000 in the West Bank. In an interview of 29 June 2024 Father Gabriel Romanelli, parish priest of the Church of the Holy Family, the only Catholic church in Gaza, explained that there were about 1,000 Christians in the area before Hamas' attacks on Israel started. At the time of the interview, there were only 500 left according to Romanelli. People had been killed by the Israeli army, died of lack of access to health care, or left the Strip altogether. There has been a Christian community in Gaza for two thousand years.[70] It was hard for them to express their faith under the Hamas regime, but they have also become victims of the war as much as any other group in Gaza.

Due to radicalisation and increasing focus on religious issues on all sides, Christians increasingly feel the pressure of the Jews on the one hand and the Muslims on the other. They often fall victim to intimidation – such as verbal harassment, attacks on church properties, or spitting at clergy or pilgrims – by extremist Jewish groups under the exhortations of Itamar Ben Gvir, minister of National Security in the Israeli government. Although there is pressure from fundamentalist Muslim groups, Christians in the West Bank are relatively free to worship and celebrate religious holidays.

It is no wonder that the Catholic Church is committed to peace in the Holy Land. The first objective is an end to the war and peace based on the so-called two-state solution (Israel and Palestine as secure and independent states). But the other ends are maintaining religious ties with Judaism, protecting the important Christian holy sites as well as the Christians that live there. The Church therefore is not only guided by the abhorrence of war, but also by defending its religious interests and the interests of the faithful in the region.

There are several ways in which the involvement of the Pope with the war between Israel and Hamas is pursued: publicly condemning the cruelty of the war, using and balancing diplomatic and religious channels and defending the

connection with the Christians and the places in the Holy Land. On 2 February 2024 the Pope expressed this need to balance relations with Israel and the Palestinians: 'My heart is torn at the sight of what is happening in the Holy Land, by the power of so much division and so much hatred. The whole world looks on at what is happening in that land with apprehension and pain. These are feelings that express special closeness and affection for the peoples who inhabit the land which has witnessed the history of Revelation.'[71]

Diplomatic and religious channels have for instance been reinforced by the appointment of Pierbattista Pizzaballa as Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem in 2020. He is a Franciscan friar who had spent most of his career there. The Order of Saint Francis has been the Custodian of the Holy Places since the thirteenth century. In 2023, Pizzaballa was created cardinal, which can be seen as a symbol of the Pope's commitment to the region. There are also many contacts with and between local priests in Israel and the Palestine Territories.

An important means of maintaining the connection with Judaism are official declarations. In 1964 Pope Paul VI was the first Pope to visit Jerusalem. In 1965 the Church, that had its own history of denouncing Judaism, declared that it deplored antisemitism in any form. In 1993 the Holy See recognised the state of Israel supporting the so-called two-state solution. Israel, for its part, recognised the right of the Catholic Church to carry out its religious functions in Israel. In 2000 Pope John Paul II visited the West Bank, where he acknowledged the right of the Palestinians to a homeland. He also prayed at the West Wall and asked for forgiveness for the offenses of Christians against the Jews. In 2014 Pope Francis visited Jerusalem, the West Bank and Jordan.

In public statements Pope Francis stressed his indignation about the cruelty of the current war – for both sides. Pope Francis addressed the horrors in general terms, saying, 'Let the attacks and weapons cease, please, because it must be understood that terrorism and war do not lead to any resolutions, but only to the death and suffering of many innocent people.' The Pope confirmed 'the right of those who are attacked to defend themselves', and asked, 'that the hostages be released immediately.' At the same time called for a ceasefire.[72]

In February he sent a special letter to 'the ancient people of the Covenant'. He voiced his concern that the war between Hamas and Israel '… has also produced divisive attitudes, sometimes taking the form of anti-Semitism and anti-Judaism'. This is a sin against God. Pope Francis added that … 'together with you, we, Catholics, are very concerned about the terrible increase in attacks against Jews around the world. We had hoped that "never again" would be a refrain heard by the new generations, yet now we see that the path ahead requires ever closer collaboration to eradicate these phenomena.'[73]

Pope Francis tries to be even-handed in his solidarity with the victims. In November he met with a dozen relatives of Israeli hostages and then with ten relatives of Palestinians killed or jailed by Israel since 7 October 2023. In the conduct of diplomacy and in symbolic gestures the Church also expressed its support to the Palestinians. In 2015 the Holy See recognised the State of Palestine. On a Christmas Eve vespers service in Bethlehem, Pizzaballa wore a kaffiyeh over his cardinal's cassock. From the headquarters of the Latin Patriarchate, he coordinated relief efforts for the Church of the Holy Family in Gaza. Most Catholics in Gaza have sought shelter there.

On a daily basis, Pope Francis phoned father Gabriel Romanelli and his staff of the Church of the Holy Family to give moral support. There is only one other Christian Church in Gaza, which is the Greek-Orthodox Church of Saint Pyrophoros. According to Khalil Sayegh, on 18 October an Israeli airstrike hit a building within its compound, killing 18 people, including women and children. Also, the convent of the Sisters of Mother Teresa (the Missionaries of Charity), which stands in the compound of the Church of the Holy Family, was partially destroyed.[74]

Effects of the Church's involvement are hard to measure, as the war is still going on at the time of writing. According to Echols, the Pope's leverage on the Israeli government or Hamas is small, so he seeks to influence events by public statements. He 'has largely used his media megaphone to highlight the plight of civilians and call for an end to the war … A ceasefire remains elusive.'[75] Because there are so many important religious interests, Elie argues that there is no clear role for the Pope in mediation or the search for a peaceful solution.[76]

12.5 Conclusions

This chapter sought to investigate the power of the Pope in a world of armed state and non-state actors. The central question was: how can the Church, as an unarmed actor, exert power in conflicts with armed state and non-state actors? The previous sections will not enable us to draw general conclusions. The four cases are examples of the way a non-violent actor operates when applying soft power in international conflicts. A few concluding remarks can be made, however.

As far as the ends of Church involvement in world affairs are concerned, they are fairly consistent. They can be summarised as a commitment to peace, justice, democracy, and human rights. However, they need to be balanced with the protection of the interests of the Church and its believers. In Poland the Pope wanted to liberate the people from the yoke of communism. In Northern Ireland there was sympathy with the well-being of the Catholics, but at the same time a firm rejection of violence. In Ukraine, an end to the war and concern for its victims seems to be preferred above fighting for justice. In the Israel–Hamas war the Church struggles

to combine respect for the Jewish religion with concern for the Palestinian victims, for accessibility to the Holy sites, and for Christian communities in Israel and the Palestine Territories.

The ways of the Church are manifold. Catholic teaching may be universal, but the Church is not as hierarchical as it seems. There are autonomous peace initiatives from the bottom upwards, such as the Clonard community in Northern Ireland, or the priests who were among the protesters, the mourning families and in the jails. But the Pope himself can take the initiative and take the leading role, such as Pope John Paul's initiative towards Poland, or the regular phone calls by Pope Francis to the Church of the Holy Family in Gaza.

The international diplomatic and civil society networks of the Church are often deployed and most of the time they act behind the scenes. The Pope can send his personal envoy, like Fr. John Magee or Cardinal Zuppi, or use local bishops and lay organisations to lobby governments. The Pope is a head of state and has access to other political leaders that non-state actors do not. In his public speeches and statements, the Pope can frame issues as sinful or disastrous and then influence public opinion or parties in conflict. Armed actors can be persuaded to make concessions in negotiations that they originally were not prepared to, like in the Northern Ireland peace process. Symbolism is often used, like the choice of the town of Drogheda or the keffiyeh that cardinal Pizzaballa wore in Bethlehem. But even the Church is not free from the ambiguities and tensions that accompany all decision-makers. Even the Church must balance ideals with reality.[77]

Results may take a long time to come about. The credibility of the Church suffered dramatically by the many cases of sexual abuse of children and the inadequacy of the reactions of the Catholic hierarchy. It seems as if the authority of the Church will not be restored, if the victims are not addressed properly and if the perpetrators are not seriously confronted with their deeds. As the Belgian newspaper De Standaard suggested: 'The excruciating ambiguous feeling remains that in Rome they are not really outraged by sexual abuse.'[78] Apart from that, in hindsight, it is hard to prove to what extent certain results can be attributed to the soft power conversion of the Church. This chapter cannot solve this question. Cardinal Parolin, minister of foreign affairs of the Holy See, said: 'Despite not having the real power to stop conflicts, the Church can call on the universal human conscience to act so as to break down the walls of hatred and enmity, indicating fraternity as the true way to justice, solidarity, inclusion and care of the earth.'[79] One thing, though. When the Pope's divisions are on the march they are driven by ideals: peace, justice, love. Sometimes that is exactly what they get. It is never wise to fully trust realist instincts, because a wall may fall, a peace agreement may be signed, innocent people may be freed from prison, or a lone parish in Gaza may feel supported. In the words of the old Beatles song: There is nothing you can do that can't be done.

Notes

[1] The author wishes to thank his colleagues as well as Paul van Geest, professor of Theology at Tilburg and Rotterdam Universities, Stijn Fens, chief editor 'Faith and Worldview' at KRO/NCRV Broadcaster, and Simon Polinder, post-doctoral researcher in Religion, Conflict and Social Transformation at Utrecht University, for their comments on one of the draft versions of this chapter.

[2] Peter Crutchley, 'IRA Ceasefire 20 Years On: The Priest Who Brokered the Peace'.

[3] In fact, the Church is a *sui generis* actor in international relations as will be discussed in section 12.3.2.

[4] Excerpt from the 24 January 1946 diary entry of Assistant Press Secretary Eben Ayers. Provided by the Harry S. Truman Library and Museum, Independence Miss.: https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/1946-01-24.pdf.

[5] Nye, *The Future of Power*, p. 6.

[6] Nye, *Soft Power*, p. 94.

[7] Nye, *The Future of Power*, pp. 8, 10.

[8] Ibid., pp. 91–92.

[9] Nye, 'Get Smart, Combining Hard and Soft Power', p. 162.

[10] Nye, *The Future of Power*, pp. 37, 43.

[11] Ibid., p. 83.

[12] Ibid., pp. 11–16.

[13] See Kearn, 'The Hard Truths about Soft Power'.

[14] Luttwak, 'The Missing Dimension', p. 17.

[15] Said and Funk, 'The Role of Faith', pp. 37–38.

[16] Luttwak, 'The Missing Dimension', p. 17.

[17] Lykke, 'Defining Military Strategy', p. 4.

[18] Troy, 'Die Soft Power des Heiligen Stuhls', pp. 491–492.

[19] Weigel, *Roman Catholicism*, pp. 28, 31.

[20] *Catechism*, Paras 1702–1706.

[21] *Catechism*, Para 1738.

[22] *Catechism*, Paras 1920.

[23] *Catechism*, Paras 1917–1920.

[24] *Catechism*, Paras 2307–2308.

[25] *Catechism*, Paras 2309–2310.

[26] De Volder, 'Pope Francis's Contribution to Catholic Thinking', pp. 34–35.

[27] *Catechism*, Paras 2302–2305.

[28] Byrnes, 'Soft Power of the Catholic Papacy', pp. 233–234.

[29] 'Text of the Lateran Treaty of 1929'.

[30] 'Montevideo Convention of the Rights and Duties of States', Art. 1.

[31] Hernández, *International Law*, p. 106.

[32] De Volder, 'Pope Francis's Contribution to Catholic Thinking', p. 32.

[33] Sierra, 'The Power of the Pope'.

[34] UN General Assembly Resolution A/58/314, 'Participation of the Holy See in the Work of the United Nations'.

[35] Quoted in Bernstein en Politi, *Zijne Heiligheid,* p. 377.

[36] Ibid., p. 257.

37 Weigel, *Witness to Hope*, p. 300.
38 Reagan, 'Address at Commencement Exercises at the University of Notre Dame'.
39 Weigel, 'The President and the Pope'.
40 Bernstein, 'The Holy Alliance'.
41 Zagacki, 'Pope John Paul II and the Crusade against Communism', pp. 705–706.
42 John Paul II, 'Discorso del Santo Padre Giovanni Paolo II alla Delegazione del Sindicato "Solidarnosc"'.
43 Weigel, *Witness to Hope*, p. 461.
44 John Paul II, 'Meeting with Civil Authorities, Address of his Holiness John Paul II'.
45 Weigel, 'The President and the Pope'.
46 Scull, *The Catholic Church and the Northern Ireland Troubles*, p. 89.
47 Ibid., p. 89.
48 John Paul II, 'Holy Mass in Drogheda, Homily of His Holiness John Paul II'.
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid.
51 Scull, *The Catholic Church and the Northern Ireland Troubles*, p. 95.
52 Scull, 'The Churches, the Peace Process and Reconciliation'.
53 Scull, *The Catholic Church and the Northern Ireland Troubles*, p. 116.
54 Doherty, '"No Pope here"', p. 620.
55 Scull, *The Catholic Church and the Northern Ireland Troubles*, p. 175.
56 Statista Research Department, 'Number of Civilian Casualties in Ukraine during Russia's Invasion Verified by OHCHR from February 24, 2022 to October 31, 2024'.
57 Pope Francis, *Against War*, p. 7.
58 Vatican News, 'Pope to Russian Patriarch: "Church Uses Language of Jesus, Not of Politics"'.
59 Parolin, 'Why Did the Holy See Not Sign the Declaration in Favour of Ukraine at the Swiss Summit?'.
60 Faulconbridge and Gray, 'Kremlin, NATO at Odds Over Pope's Call for Ukraine to Show "White Flag"'.
61 Office of International Religious Freedom, '2021 Report on International Religious Freedom: Ukraine'.
62 Watkins, 'Pope on War in Ukraine: "Do Not Be Ashamed to Negotiate"'.
63 Cited in O'Connell, 'After Backlash, Vatican Clarifies Pope Francis' Call'.
64 Blann, 'Pope Francis' "White Flag" Comment'.
65 Faulconbridge and Gray, 'Kremlin, NATO at Odds Over Pope's Call for Ukraine to Show "White Flags".
66 Castellano Lubov, 'Cardinal Parolin to Ukraine: "Nothing Is Impossible for God"'.
67 MTK, 'Ukrainian Prisoners Freed in Russian Exchange Brokered by Vatican'.
68 Moscow Times, 'Moscow Releases Ten Ukrainian Civilian Prisoners – Zelensky'.
69 Statista Research Department, 'Number of Palestinian and Israeli Fatalities and Injuries Caused by the War between Hamas and Israel since October 7, 2023'.
70 Caldwell, 'Christian Community in Gaza under Risk of Disappearance'.
71 Francis, 'Letter of the Holy Father Francis to Jewish Brothers and Sisters in Israel'.
72 Elie, 'The Vatican and the War in Gaza'.
73 Francis, 'Letter of the Holy Father Francis to Jewish Brothers and Sisters in Israel'.
74 Sayegh, 'This Easter, Gaza's Christian Population Is on the Brink of Extinction'.
75 Echols, 'An Anti-War Pope Confronts a World in Turmoil'.
76 Elie, 'The Vatican and the War in Gaza'.

[77] On the way ethics and morality condition the use of power, see Polinder, *Towards a New Christian Political Realism*, pp. 196–197.

[78] Karel Verhoeven, 'Op wie zal de paus hier nog indruk maken?' *De Standaard*, 26 September 2024. Original text: 'Het tergende ambigue gevoel blijft dat ze in Rome niet écht verontwaardigd zijn over seksueel misbruik'.

[79] Palermo and Zengarini, 'Cardinal Parolin: "The Concept of Just War Needs to Be Reviewed"'.

Bibliography

AFP. 'Moscow Releases Ten Ukrainian Civilian Prisoners – Zelensky'. *Moscow Times*, 29 June 2024. https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2024/06/29/russia-releases-10-ukrainian-civilian-prisoners-zelensky-a85557. (Accessed 15 August 2024).

Bernstein, Carl. 'The Holy Alliance. Ronald Reagan and John Paul II', *Time Magazine*, 24 February 1992. https://time.com/archive/6719650/the-holy-alliance-ronald-reagan-and-john-paul-ii/. (Accessed 28 August 2024).

Bernstein, Carl, and Marco Politi. *Zijne Heiligheid. Johannes Paulus II en de verborgen geschiedenis van onze tijd*. Amsterdam: Jan Mets, 1996.

Blann, Susie. 'Pope Francis' "White Flag" Comment Is Met by Criticism from Ukraine and Its Allies *Associated Press*, 10 March 2024. https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-pope-francis-488ac1d4c5ae86cb34dcae2ab2dade12. (Accessed 31 May 2024).

Burleigh, Michael. *Sacred Causes: The Clash of Religion and Politics, From the Great War to the War on Terror*. New York: HarperCollins, 2007.

Byrnes, Timothy A. 'Soft Power of the Catholic Papacy'. In *The Geopolitics of Religious Soft Power*, edited by Peter Mandaville. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2023, pp. 232–247. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197605806.003.0013.

Caldwell, Simon. 'Christian Community in Gaza Now under "Real" Risk of Complete "Disappearance"'. *Catholic Herald*, 29 June 2024. https://catholicherald.co.uk/christian-community-in-gaza-under-real-risk-of-complete-disappearance/. (Accessed 17 December 2024).

Castellano Lubov, Deborah. 'Cardinal Parolin to Ukraine: "Nothing Is Impossible for God"'. *Vatican News*, 22 July 2024. https://www.vaticannews.va/en/vatican-city/news/2024-07/cardinal-parolin-to-ukraine-nothing-is-impossible-for-god.html. (Accessed 17 August 2024).

Catechism of the Roman Catholic Church, Vatican Ed. https://www.vatican.va/archive/ENG0015/_INDEX.HTM. (Accessed 4 April 2024).

Crutchley, Peter, 'IRA Ceasefire 20 Years On: The Priest Who Brokered the Peace, BBC News', 31 August 2014. https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-28812366. (Accessed 22 May 2024).

Doherty, Martin. '"No Pope Here". Britain, the Vatican, the IRA, and the Papal Visit to Ireland, September 1979'. *Church History*, no. 90 (2021), pp. 603–620. https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/church-history/article/no-pope-here-britain-the-vatican-the-ira-and-the-papal-visit-to-ireland-september-1979/6EFE8635B246DA0A7893EF492D3DAD34. (Accessed 23 August 2024).

Echols, Connor. 'An Anti-War Pope Confronts a World in Turmoil: Christmas Has Come Again, But Peace Remains Elusive, *Responsible Statecraft*, 25 December 2023. https://responsiblestatecraft.org/pope-francis-israel-gaza/. (Accessed 14 August 2023).

Elie, Paul. 'The Vatican and the War in Gaza: A Rhetorical Dispute between the Church and the Israeli Government Shows the Limits – and the Possibilities – of the Pope's Role in Times of Conflict. *New Yorker*, 26 February 2024. https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/the-vatican-and-the-war-in-gaza. (Accessed 13 August 2024).

Faulconbridge, Guy, and Andrew Gray. 'Kremlin, NATO at Odds Over Pope's Call for Ukraine to Show "White Flag" and Start Talks'. *US News and World Report*, 11 March 2024. https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2024-03-11/russia-says-popes-appeal-on-ukraine-war-is-to-the-west. (Accessed 4 June 2024).

Ferrara, Gerrardo. 'Israel; Ethnicity and Religion, a Complex Issue'. *Omnes*, 16 October 2023. https://omnesmag.com/en/newsroom/israel-and-palestine-ethnicity-and-religion/. (Accessed 15 August 2024).

Ferrara, Gerardo. 'The Religious Configuration in Palestine and Israel: A Puzzle of Confessions'. *Omnes*, 17 October 2023. https://omnesmag.com/en/newsroom/religious-configuration-in-palestine/. (Accessed 15 August 2024).

Fetko, Michael. 'Interreligious Dialogue as a Power of Ukrainian Civil Society'. In *Proactive Tolerance: The Key to Peace*, edited by Markus Vogt and Arnd Küppers. Baden Baden and Münster: Nomos/Aschendorf Verlag, 2021, pp. 227–247. https://www.nomos-elibrary.de/10.5771/9783748905431.pdf#page=227. (Accessed 4 July 2022).

Flatley, Tighe P. 'The Convenient Alliance: President Reagan and Pope John Paul II, Cold Warriors', University of Rhode Island Senior Honors Projects. Paper 48 (2007). https://digitalcommons.uri.edu/srhonorsprog/48. (Accessed 27 August 2024).

Francis. *Against War: Building a Culture of Peace*. Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 2024.

Francis. 'Letter of the Holy Father Francis to Jewish Brothers and Sisters in Israel'. Vatican City, 2 February 2024: https://www.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/letters/2024/documents/20240202-lettera-ebrei-in-israele.html. (Accessed 8 April 2024).

Francis with Fabio Marchese Ragona. *Life. My Story Through History*. Milan: HarperCollins Italia, 2024.

Gaetan, Victor. 'The Political Pope: How Francis Was Thrust into the World's Most Intractable Conflicts'. *Foreign Affairs*, 25 September 2015. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/world/political-pope. (Accessed 31 May 2024).

Gaetan, Victor. 'The Pope and the Politburo: The Vatican's Chinese Diplomacy'. *Foreign Affairs*, 24 March 2016. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2016-03-24/pope-and-politburo. (Accessed 31 May 2024).

Gaetan, Victor. 'Pope Francis' Holy Diplomacy in Ukraine: Why Washington and the Vatican Don't See Eye to Eye'. *Foreign Affairs*, 5 September 2019. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/pope-francis-holy-diplomacy-ukraine. (Accessed 1 June 2024).

Ganiel, Gladys, and Paul Dixon. 'Religion, Pragmatic Fundamentalism and the Transformation of the Northern Ireland Conflict', *Journal of Peace Research*, 45, no. 3, (2008), pp. 419–436. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343308088819.

Giarlarducci, Andrea. 'In Devastated Ukraine, the Work of the Holy See's Diplomacy'. *Omnes*, 16 July 2024. https://omnesmag.com/en/newsroom/ukraine-work-diplomacy-of-the-holy-see/. (Accessed 15 August 2024).

Gleider, Hernández. *International Law*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019.

John Paul II. 'Meeting with the Civil Authorities. Address of His Holiness John Paul II'. Warsaw, 2 June 1979. https://www.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/speeches/1979/june/documents/hf_jp-ii_spe_19790602_polonia-varsavia-autorita-civili.html. (Accessed 29 August 2024).

John Paul II. 'Holy Mass in Drogheda, Homily of His Holiness John Paul II'. 29 September 1979. https://www.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/homilies/1979/documents/hf_jp-ii_hom_19790929_irlanda-dublino-drogheda.html#:~:text=I%20came%20to%20Drogheda%20today,a%20danger%20or%20a%20threat. (Accessed 30 March 2024).

John Paul II. 'Discorso del Santo Padre Giovanni Paolo II alla Delegazione del Sindicato Indipendente ed Autonomo Polacco "Solidarnosc"'. Sala del Concistoro, 15 January 1981. https://www.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/it/speeches/1981/january/documents/hf_jp-ii_spe_19810115_solidarnosc.html. (Accessed 29 August 2024).

Kearn, David W. 'The Hard Truths about Soft Power'. *Journal of Political Power* 4, no. 1 (April 2011), pp. 65–85. https://www.researchgate.net/profile/David-Kearn/publication/254336694_The_Hard_Truths_about_Soft_Power/links/5cf6a7dd299bf1fb18596b28/The-Hard-Truths-about-Soft-Power.pdf. (Accessed 30 August 2024).

Luttwak, Edward. 'The Missing Dimension'. In *Religion: The Missing Dimension of Statecraft*, edited by Douglas Johnston and Cynthia Sampson. New York: Oxford University Press, 1994, pp. 8–19.

Lykke, Arthur F. 'Defining Military Strategy'. *Military Review* (May 1989), pp. 2–8.

'Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States', Signed at Montevideo, 26 December 1933. https://www.ilsa.org/Jessup/Jessup15/Montevideo%20Convention.pdf. (Accessed 30 August 2024).

Morss, John R. 'The International Legal Status of the Vatican/Holy See Complex'. *European Journal of International Law* 26, no. 4 (2015), pp. 927–946. https://doi:10.1093/ejil/chv062. (Accessed 26 July 2024).

MTK. 'Ukrainian Prisoners Freed in Russian Exchange Brokered by Vatican', *Essa News*, 29 June 2024. https://essanews.com/ukrainian-prisoners-freed-in-russian-exchange-brokered-by-vatican,70437757172389l3a. (Accessed 15 August 2024).

Nye, Joseph S. *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*. New York: Public Affairs, 2004.

Nye, Joseph S. 'Get Smart, Combining Hard and Soft Power'. *Foreign Affairs* 88, no. 4 (July/August 2009), pp. 160–163.

Nye, Joseph S. *The Future of Power*. New York: Public Affairs, 2011.

O'Connell, Gerard. 'After Backlash, Vatican Clarifies Pope Francis' Call for Ukraine to Have "Courage of the White Flag"'. *The Jesuit Review*, 10 March 2024. https://www.americamagazine.org/faith/2024/03/10/pope-francis-ukraine-white-flag-negotiate-247471. (Accessed 31 May 2024).

Ó Corráin, Daithi. 'Why Did Pope John Paul II Visit Ireland? The 1979 Papal Visit in Context'. *British Catholic History* 35, no. 4 (2021), pp. 462–485. https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/british-catholic-history/article/why-did-pope-john-paul-ii-visit-ireland-the-1979-papal-visit-in-context/AEA485B48916C4DFBFFF1890844DA83B. (Accessed 23 August 2024).

Office of International Religious Freedom. '2021 Report on International Religious Freedom: Ukraine'. US Department of State, Washington D.C., 2 June 2022. https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-re€port-on-international-religious-freedom/ukraine/. (Accessed 4 July 2022).

Palermo, Antonella, and Lisa Zengarini. 'Cardinal Parolin: "The Concept of Just War Needs to Be Reviewed"'. *Vatican News*, 2 July 2024. https://www.vaticannews.va/en/vatican-city/news/2024-07/cardinal-parolin-the-concept-of-just-war-needs-to-be-reviewed.html. (Accessed 17 August 2024).

Parolin, Pietro. 'Why Did the Holy See Not Sign the Declaration in Favour of Ukraine at the Swiss Summit? Statement of His Eminence Cardinal Pietro Parolin, Secretary of State, High-level Summit on Peace for Ukraine Switzerland'. 15–16 June 2024. https://zenit.org/2024/06/17/why-did-the-holy-see-not-sign-the-declaration-in-favor-of-ukraine-at-the-swiss-summit/?eti=15443. (Accessed 19 June 2024).

Polinder, Simon. *Towards a New Christian Political Realism. The Amsterdam School of Philosophy and the Role of Religion in International Relations*. London: Routledge, 2025.

Reagan, Ronald. 'Address at Commencement Exercises at the University of Notre Dame'. Notre Dame University, South Bend, Ind., 17 May 1981. https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/speech/address-commencement-exercises-university-notre-dame. (Accessed 15 July 2024).

Said, Abdul-Aziz, and Nathan Funk. 'The Role of Faith in Cross-Cultural Conflict Resolution'. *Peace and Conflict Studies* 9, no. 1 (2002) pp. 37–50. https://nsuworks.nova.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1022&context=pcs. (Accessed 19 August 2025).

Sayegh, Khalil. 'This Easter, Gaza's Christian Population Is on the Brink of Extinction'. *The New Arab*, 28 March 2024. https://www.newarab.com/opinion/easter-gazas-christian-community-faces-extinction. (Accessed 14 August 2024).

Scull, Maggie. 'The Churches, the Peace Process and Reconciliation', *Irish Times*, 6 April 2018. https://www.irishtimes.com/culture/books/the-churches-the-peace-process-and-reconciliation-1.3451470. (Accessed 23 August 2024).

Scull, Margaret M. *The Catholic Church and the Northern Ireland Troubles, 1968–1998*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022.

Sierra, Gabrielle. 'The Power of the Pope', Transcript of the podcast hosted by Gabrielle Sierra with episode guests Timothy Byrnes and Francis Campbell. New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 13 May 2022. https://www.cfr.org/podcasts/power-of-the-pope. (Accessed 30 May 2024).

Statista Research Department. 'Number of Civilian Casualties in Ukraine during Russia's Invasion Verified by OHCHR from February 24, 2022 to October 31, 2024', Statista Research Department, 2 December 2024. https://www.statista.com/statistics/1293492/ukraine-war-casualties/

Statista Research Department. 'Number of Palestinian and Israeli Fatalities and Injuries Caused by the War between Hamas and Israel since October 7, 2023', Statista Research Department, 5 December 2024. https://www.statista.com/statistics/1422308/palestinian-territories-israel-number-fatalities-and-injuries-caused-by-the-israel-and-hamas-war/. (Accessed 23 December 2024).

'Text of the Lateran Treaty of 1929'. https://spcp.prf.cuni.cz/dokument/lateran.htm.

Troy, Jodok. 'Die Soft Power des Heiligen Stuhls. Unsichtbare Legionen zwischen internationaler Gesellschaft und Weltgesellschaft'. *Zeitschrift für Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik*, no. 3 (2010), pp. 489–511.

UN General Assembly Resolution A/58/314, 'Participation of the Holy See in the Work of the United Nations', Fifty-eighth Session, Agenda Item 59, 16 July 2004. https://holyseemission.org/contents/mission/mission-55e373817eecc8.37288214.php. (Accessed 29 August 2024).

Vatican News. 'Pope to Russian Patriarch: "Church Uses Language of Jesus, Not of Politics"'. *Vatican News*, 16 March 2022. https://www.vaticannews.va/en/pope/news/2022-03/pope-francis-calls-patriarch-kirill-orthodox-patriarch-ukraine.html. (Accessed 30 May 2025).

Verhoeven, Karel. 'Op wie zal de paus hier nog indruk maken?' *De Standaard*, 26 September 2024. https://www.standaard.be/cnt/dmf20240925_96924165. (Accessed 27 September 2024).

Volder, Jan de. 'Francis's Idiosyncratic Approach to Vatican Geopolitics: An Introduction'. In *The Geopolitics of Pope Francis*, edited by Jan de Volder. Leuven: Peeters, 2019, pp. 1–23. https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv1q26mbx.4.

Volder, Jan de. 'Pope Francis's Contribution to Catholic Thinking and Acting on War and Peace'. *Theological Studies*, 84, no. 1 (2023), pp. 30–43. https://doi.org/10.1177/00405639231153574.

Watkins, Devin. 'Pope on War in Ukraine: "Do Not Be Ashamed to Negotiate"'. *Vatican News*, 9 March 2024. https://www.vaticannews.va/en/pope/news/2024-03/pope-francis-swiss-tv-interview-gaza-ukraine-wars.html. (Accessed 11 September 2024).

Weigel, George. 'Roman Catholicism in the Age of John Paul II'. In *The Desecularization of the World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics*, edited by Peter L. Berger. Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1999, pp. 19–35.

Weigel, George. 'The President and the Pope'. *National Review*, 2 April 2005. https://www.nationalreview.com/2005/04/president-and-pope-george-weigel/. (Accessed 27 August 2024).

Weigel, George. *Witness to Hope. The Biography of Pope John Paul II*. New York: HarperCollins, 2022.

Zagacki, Kenneth S. 'Pope John Paul II and the Crusade against Communism: A Case Study in Secular and Sacred Time'. *Rhetoric and Public Affairs* 4, no. 4 (Winter 2001), pp. 689–710.

CHAPTER 13

The Battle for Recognition: National Liberation Movements and Military Assistance During the Decolonisation of Southern Africa

Tycho van der Hoog[1]

Abstract

The decolonisation of Southern Africa was heavily influenced by national liberation movements, which were non-state actors who competed with each other for external support. Through a case study of Namibia, this chapter argues that international military assistance created incentives for national liberation movements to organise themselves as states-in-waiting. An important but generally overlooked actor is the Liberation Committee of the Organisation of African Unity, which preferred to recognise organisations that adopted bellicose instead of pacifist strategies in the campaigns for self-determination. Recognition from the Liberation Committee resulted in international diplomatic connections and funding, which were deployed by national liberation movements to develop their organisations to mirror those of traditional states. This chapter argues that progress on the battlefield was less important than usually assumed. For national liberation movements, war mattered more as a form of political statement.

Keywords: National Liberation Movements; African decolonisation; Non-State Actors; Military Assistance; Diplomacy

13.1 Introduction

The majority of citizens in the Southern African region are governed by retired national liberation movements, which operated as non-state actors during the twentieth century.[2] In the mythology of these organisations, the armed struggle for independence is widely celebrated as the foundation for their rule.[3] Meng and Paine argue that African 'rebel regimes', which consist of former combatants, are remarkably durable.[4] The experience of African national liberation movements is congruent with traditional state building theory, which conceptualises military might as the basis for state authority. In the case of Southern Africa, however, this chapter argues that the true metric of success for national liberation movements was not military effectiveness, but political skill. Anticolonial organisations

depended on external support for survival and competed with each other for international recognition.[5] This chapter shows that national liberation movements deployed the armed struggle as a tool to gain political support. This sheds light on an understudied dimension of violent decolonisation: the fact that sometimes strategic decisions of national liberation movements were driven by competition with other revolutionaries, rather than the strength or weakness of their colonial adversaries.

Tilly's famous argument that 'states make war and war makes the state' has inspired a field of study devoted to a bellicist theory of state formation, which is rooted in the study of (early modern) Europe. According to Tilly, war drives the formation of states through the mobilisation of resources against external threats.[6] Recent scholarship has applied bellicist theory on the Global South[7], although few studies are concerned with Sub-Saharan Africa.[8] It is often claimed, prominently by Herbst, that African states are weak because the threat of conflict is low.[9] However, the precise influence of bellicist pressure on post-colonial state formation remains disputed.[10] While much of the literature is concerned with inter-state rivalry[11], Jüde shifts our attention to armed movements by claiming that war has formative effects when 'violent non-state actors become highly institutionalized and develop a state-like organization'. This resonates with the scope of the present chapter, except for Jüde's emphasis on the need for armed groups to control and govern territory. He contends that armed groups 'institutionalize and develop into a state-like organization only when they rely on direct extraction', for example through taxation.[12] National liberation movements in Southern Africa, however, hardly managed to control territory during their wars for liberation. Even so, their participation in the war enhanced their development as state-like organisations because the performance of violence, as this chapter shows, led to international legitimacy. As such, the national liberation movements that won international recognition through armed struggle outperformed their rival liberation movements in the competition for resources.

The relative weight of violence as a political negotiation strategy is illustrated through a case study of the decolonisation of Namibia, using African primary sources from the National Archives of Namibia, the University of Namibia Archives, the Namibia Scientific Society, the SWAPO Archives, Basler Afrika Bibliographien, and the Nordic Africa Centre.[13] Central to this chapter is the competition for legitimacy between the South West Africa National Union (SWANU, established in 1959) and the South West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO, established in 1960).[14] SWANU, led by Fanuel Kozonguizi, initially spearheaded the Namibian campaign for self-determination and was recognised as such by the Liberation Committee of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU).[15] However, in 1966 SWAPO decided to wage an armed struggle against South Africa, while SWANU pursued a different

strategy. Kozonguizi described the declaration to fight as 'SWAPO's single asset in the battle for recognition'.[16] Even though they were not particularly successful on the battlefield, the decision to take up arms was a decisive measure for opening up new channels of aid. Soon, international recognition shifted towards SWAPO, and SWANU became marginalised in the international arena.

International recognition mattered a great deal to African revolutionaries. The OAU claimed that they had 'neither time nor money for movements that do not produce results'.[17] As the struggle for self-determination was long and difficult, external funding became essential. External support allowed liberation movements such as SWAPO to create a bureaucracy, establish diplomatic missions, and set up camps in exile where they could host their own schools and hospitals and exercise minimal governance. In contrast, rival liberation movements such as SWANU fell into obscurity when the OAU withdrew its recognition and funding. The sizeable investments in organisational development during the run-up to independence, combined with the legitimacy that came with external recognition, made a significant difference to the status of African revolutionaries. The organisations that gained legitimacy during the struggle for liberation were much better positioned to achieve political domination – and in some cases even state capture – in the era of postcolonial politics.[18]

SWAPO has won the majority of the popular vote in every election since Namibian independence in 1990, while SWANU currently struggles to hold onto a single seat in the National Assembly. SWAPO preserves its dominance over politics through the glorification of the Namibian war for independence. In 2002 the SWAPO government inaugurated the National Heroes' Acre, a cemetery where SWAPO comrades are buried as heroes of the nation, and which is regularly used for national commemorations.[19] In 2014, the SWAPO government inaugurated the Independence Memorial Museum, which is completely devoted to celebrating SWAPO's role in the liberation of Namibia.[20] This narrative emphasises the importance of violence, downplays the importance of diplomacy, and ignores the role of other (rival) organisations. Across Southern Africa, incumbent regimes use heritage, but also public history and political discourse in a similar way to marginalise their rivals.[21] To an important degree, these 'struggle credentials' originate from and build upon the recognition of the OAU Liberation Committee.

This first part of the chapter discusses the security environment in Southern Africa between 1960–1990. The refusal of white minority regimes to make way for democratic elections led to fierce resistance from the indigenous population, that organised itself through national liberation movements. Competition, exile, and external aid were important conditions that shaped the struggle for independence. The second part considers the important difference between bellicose and pacifist strategies for national liberation movements. The SWAPO-SWANU case study

illustrates that organisations that embraced the armed struggle earned more international recognition and thus stood a higher chance of receiving funding, while the movements that sought to negotiate and work with the colonial state often fell behind. The third part explores how liberation movements used external funding to develop their organisations as states-in-waiting. In a revealing example of state mimicry, African revolutionaries developed bureaucracies that mirrored those of the states they vowed to overthrow. The conclusion reflects upon the legacy of violence that influenced the development of modern Southern Africa. In a bid to remain in power, former liberation movements mythicise their own role in anticolonial warfare. As such, political culture in postcolonial Southern Africa is characterised by the glorification of war.

13.2 The Struggle for Freedom in Southern Africa

The liberation of Southern Africa from colonial rule arrived comparatively late. After the conclusion of the Second World War, calls for African self-determination grew louder and led to the emancipation of dozens of African states.[22] By the 1960s the majority of the continent had been liberated – except for major parts of Southern Africa, where a conservative coalition of white minority regimes withstood the desire for Black majority rule.[23] Angola and Mozambique were controlled by the Portuguese Empire, Rhodesia's (modern Zimbabwe) white settler regime had issued a unilateral declaration of independence from Great Britain, and South Africa and South West Africa (modern Namibia) were governed through the system of apartheid rule.[24] In all cases local opposition was vehemently repressed, and international pressure for democratic transitions was ignored.

Across Southern Africa, numerous indigenous actors emerged to challenge white minority rule, including petitioners, churches, trade unions, students, and political parties. National liberation movements, however, were the main drivers of decolonisation.[25] This particular type of organisation proved to be the most effective in rallying mass support for the cause of liberty. The oldest liberation movement was the African National Congress (ANC) of South Africa. Established in 1912, the ANC provided a blueprint for revolution that was eagerly adopted by comrades in neighbouring countries.[26] An eclectic assortment of dozens of national liberation movements was established across Southern Africa over the following few decades, varying in their ideological convictions, ethnic loyalties, and strategies to achieve victory.[27] African campaigns for self-determination resulted in a stark difference between 'winners' and 'losers'. SWAPO could be considered as the 'winner' of the Namibian struggle for liberation: an example of a successful nationalist movement that has dominated Namibian elections since independence, just as

their counterparts in Angola, Mozambique, South Africa, and Zimbabwe. SWANU can be considered as one of the 'losers' of the liberation struggle: an example of one of the many alternative nationalist movements that sank into oblivion and maintains hardly any significance for contemporary politics.

The historiography of the Southern African struggle is biased towards the 'winners' of the battle for recognition. Just as Namibian history is defined by SWAPO instead of SWANU[28], so is Angolan history defined by the People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) instead of the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA).[29] Mozambican history is defined by the Liberation Front of Mozambique (FRELIMO) instead of the Revolutionary Committee of Mozambique (COREMO).[30] South African history is defined by the ANC instead of the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC).[31] Zimbabwean history is defined by the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) instead of the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU).[32] While the group of 'losers' is much larger, they are generally overlooked in favour of the organisations that remain in power today.[33]

In the years leading up to independence, the conduct of national liberation movements was shaped by the conditions of the struggle, which for the purpose of this chapter can be divided into three dimensions: competition, exile, and assistance.

The first dimension is competition. Importantly, national liberation movements not only opposed the colonial state but also competed with each other for recognition as the true representative of their nation. Occasionally they even fought amongst themselves, as a result of factionalism.[34] In 1963, SWANU and SWAPO tried to join forces as the South West Africa National Liberation Front (SWANLIF) – an attempt to present a united front that was short-lived.[35] In 1978, a faction within SWAPO broke away from the main party and formed the rival SWAPO Democrats (SWAPO-D).[36] Similar patterns apply to the rest of Southern Africa, as liberation movements joined uneasy alliances or fractured into different groups.[37] In many African countries, the first liberation movement that was established did not end up winning the intra-national struggle for recognition.

The second dimension is exile. National liberation movements were routinely suppressed and occasionally banned from their home countries, which led many to find refuge in exile.[38] Of particular importance to Southern Africa were the so-called 'Frontline States', a coalition of independent states that opposed the South African apartheid regime by aiding liberation movements.[39] This group was established in the 1960s and contained Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.[40] Anticolonial groups operated from the Frontline States and beyond, in cities such as Dar es Salaam in Tanzania, Accra in Ghana, and Cairo in Egypt.[41] Such 'hubs of decolonisation' offered the prospects of relative safety to establish headquarters, training grounds, refugee camps, and most importantly, connections

to the outer world.[42] The struggle was often long and expensive. Survival was therefore immediately linked to international solidarity.[43] Like SWAPO, the most effective national liberation movements wielded a two-pronged approach that consisted of an internal wing, which rallied the domestic masses back home, and an external wing, which lobbied for international assistance from abroad.[44]

The third dimension is assistance. Recognition would often lead to resources, which made diplomacy a decisive factor in the success of any national liberation movement. The United Nations (UN) became a central platform for anticolonial aspirations, not only through the General Assembly but also through specialised institutions such as the Decolonisation Committee.[45] Popular campaigns such as the Anti-Apartheid Movement were effective in mobilising global audiences and influencing public discourse.[46] In terms of material aid, African revolutionaries were especially reliant on states from the Communist Bloc.[47] Major players such as the Soviet Union and China, but also smaller countries such as Cuba, Czechoslovakia, and North Korea were actively engaged in various African wars for liberation.[48] An overwhelming portion of the scholarship on African decolonisation focuses on the role of external players such as the UN or the Soviet Union. This chapter, in contrast, highlights the understudied role of African actors, in particular that of the OAU.

13.3 African Strategies for Decolonisation

African assistance to speed up the process of decolonisation was motivated by the ideal of 'African solutions to African problems', which was grounded in ideas of Pan-Africanism. The struggle for self-determination was spearheaded by towering figures such Kwame Nkrumah, Kenneth Kaunda, and Julius Nyerere, who emphasised that Africans must take ownership of peace and security on the continent.[49] Several African states made bilateral efforts to assist African revolutionaries, such as Ghana under Nkrumah's leadership.[50] Between 1959 and 1966, his Bureau of African Affairs invited liberation movements to Accra for training.[51] The Frontline States are an example of a regional security mechanism.[52] The most influential actor, however, was the continental body of the African continent, the OAU.[53] The OAU was established in 1963 and tasked with eradicating all forms of colonialism, as the liberation of Southern Africa was 'seen as a prelude to continental unity'.[54] Perhaps the most important component of the OAU was the Liberation Committee.

The Liberation Committee (also known as the 'Committee of Nine' or the 'Coordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa') was brought into existence to coordinate the final phase of African decolonisation. Its members consisted of Algeria, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Guinea, Nigeria, Senegal,

Tanzania, Uganda, and Egypt.[55] These members held a bi-annual meeting to make decisions and were supported by a secretariat and three Standing Committees (on information, finance, and defence). Its headquarters were established in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, for its proximity to Southern Africa.[56] The Liberation Committee aided liberation movements through the mobilisation of resources and international solidarity. Furthermore, it provided advice on how to execute the struggle and assessed their progress.[57]

Numerous anticolonial groups lobbied the OAU for support. The Liberation Committee administered a special fund with contributions from OAU member states, external countries, and international organisations. To simplify the road to victory, and considering the fact that the liberation fund was generally inadequate to meet all demands, the Liberation Committee preferred to support a single liberation movement per occupied territory. It therefore set out to 'identify the authentic movements' and designate them as 'true representatives' of their people.[58] This led to an intensive competition between rival organisations for recognition. Winning the 'African seal of approval' was essential for unlocking foreign support beyond the African continent. Mabitsela has for instance argued that the OAU 'played a colossal role' in the representation of national liberation movements at the UN, which gave them further legitimacy.[59] In practice, the Liberation Committee favoured liberation movements that adopted bellicose strategies instead of pacifist strategies – an important distinction that influenced the postcolonial trajectory of Southern Africa.

The preference for belligerent strategies was not obvious at the start of the struggle, in the early 1960s. In the words of Nyerere, African nationalists could win self-determination either through 'a conference or out on a battlefield'.[60] In Southern Africa most campaigns for freedom started with pacifist measures, a strategy that was confirmed in 1969 when OAU members adopted the Lusaka Manifesto, which declared that Africa 'would prefer to negotiate rather than destroy'. Yet, it gradually became clear that their adversaries would not give in. In 1971, several national liberation movements worked together with more radical African states to publish the Mogadishu Declaration, which argued that 'there is no way left for the liberation of Southern Africa except armed struggle'. The Liberation Committee finally adopted the Dar es Salaam Declaration in 1975, which reaffirmed this position and ruled out dialogue with South Africa.[61]

The quintessential choice between the conference and the battlefield had far-reaching consequences for the fate of national liberation movements, which can be illustrated through a case study of Namibian decolonisation. SWANU, formally the older movement, was initially seen as 'sophisticated' while SWAPO was deemed 'inexperienced'. At first, the OAU recognised SWANU as the primary liberation movement in Namibia, which provided SWANU officials with access to for

instance the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organisation (AAPSO).[62] When SWAPO officials tried to attend the opening ceremony of an AAPSO summit in 1965, they were barred from entering the conference venue because SWANU was recognised as the rightful representation of the Namibian struggle.[63]

However, SWAPO's decision to take up arms against South Africa changed everything. SWANU continued its non-violent approach, as it 'was not convinced of the wisdom and the practicability' of infiltrating a guerrilla army into Namibia.[64] Johan Alexander Müller attributed 'the effective SWAPO propaganda machinery' to the widespread belief that SWANU cowered from the struggle, while brave SWAPO fighters took up arms. Some SWANU fighters had indeed already received military training, but the movement had 'a different attitude' towards the right strategy to pursue liberation.[65] Vigne called SWAPO's decision to wage an armed struggle 'a clear line of demarcation', a fork in the road, as the Liberation Committee decided to put its weight behind SWAPO.[66] SWANU subsequently lost the recognition and funding of the OAU, and was soon expelled from the AAPSO.[67] SWAPO applied for membership to AAPSO and also became a full member of the Non-Aligned Movement.[68] In 1973, the UN General Assembly declared SWAPO to be 'the authentic representative of the Namibian people', a phrase that was altered in 1976 to 'the sole and authentic representative of the Namibian people'.[69]

The Namibian War for Independence commenced in 1966, when SWAPO soldiers clashed for the first time with the South African Defence Force (SADF) in the Battle of Ongulumbashe. SWAPO had established the People's Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN) as its armed wing and maintained military camps in Angola and Zambia. Pitted against the conventional army of South Africa, its rank and file were trained in guerrilla warfare.[70] PLAN was dependent on material aid and training from external actors. The protracted low-intensity war lasted until 1989 and was closely intertwined with other conflicts in Southern Africa. Angolan liberation movements were the drivers behind the Angolan War of Independence and the Angolan Civil War (1961–2002), Mozambican liberation movements were involved in the Mozambican war for Independence and the Mozambican Civil War (1964–1992), Zimbabwean liberation movements were involved in the Rhodesian Bush War (1966–1979) while the armed wing of the ANC was active until the end of apartheid (1961–1993).[71]

In its fight for independence, SWAPO was the recipient of various kinds of assistance from the Liberation Committee. Through the Standing Committees on Information, Finance, and Defence, the OAU provided SWAPO with land for military camps and educational centres; houses and security for leadership; financial and material assistance; and opportunities for publicity, for example through airtime on African radio services.[72] The amount of funding SWAPO received differed every year: in 1981 this was $700,000 but in 1984 the funds amounted to $250,000.[73]

SWAPO, like all liberation movements, complained that the OAU should supply more funds and material support. Unfortunately, the resources of the Liberation Committee were limited and 'the funds dispersed were normally far less than the budgets submitted'.[74]

In an annual budget that SWAPO submitted to the Liberation Committee in 1967, the liberation movement requested funds for 'military operations', 'administration', and 'propaganda'. The accompanying report stressed that SWAPO looked forward to receiving advice from the Military Committee of Experts of the Liberation Committee. Yet, the liberation movement argued that the 'most important is financial assistance … we would like to stress – while we very much appreciate the assistance rendered us in the past – that the financial assistance we receive from the Committee is always far below our needs'.[75] A shortage of funds notwithstanding, the Liberation Committee was able to give national liberation movements something that was perhaps even more valuable than money: recognition, which was of 'great significance' to improve their legitimacy abroad.[76] This, in turn, helped national liberation movements to transform themselves as states-in-waiting.

13.4 Warfare and States-in-Waiting

Not a single decolonial transition in Southern Africa was achieved through a military victory. African revolutionaries 'won' the struggle for self-determination through events that occurred outside the field of battle. Angola and Mozambique's autonomy was a by-product of the Carnation Revolution in Portugal. Zimbabwe held its first free elections through the Lancaster House Agreement. Namibia became independent via international deal-making, while South Africa transitioned to majority rule through negotiations between the National Party and the ANC.[77] The armed wing of the ANC, Umkhonto we Sizwe, 'never actually sent a regiment into South Africa' during the decades-long fight for independence.[78] Nevertheless, all national liberation movements that remain in power today in each these countries embraced the armed struggle. This allowed them to differentiate themselves from their competitors and develop their organisations as states-in-waiting.

While diplomacy was ultimately more important in the decolonisation of Southern Africa than war, the idea that war was used as a diplomatic strategy remains underdeveloped in scholarship. This chapter argues that recognition from the African Liberation Committee enhanced the development of national liberation movements as governments-in-waiting. They were not 'quasi-states', which Robert Jackson describes as countries that lack effective control.[79] Nor were they 'de facto states', which Scott Pegg describes as entities that control an area but

lack sovereign legitimacy.[80] National liberation movements were after all non-state actors that operated from exile. Michael Panzer used the term 'proto-state' to analyse FRELIMO during the liberation of Mozambique.[81] I prefer to borrow Walker's phrase 'states-in-waiting', to emphasise the aspect of waithood and expectation that characterised the plight of national liberation movements.[82]

Over the course of thirty years, SWAPO effectively positioned itself as a government in exile. In an effective attempt at 'state mimicry', the SWAPO organisation (which was a non-state actor) deliberately developed structures that mirrored those of a traditional state. State mimicry was only possible through the resources and legitimacy that came with the recognition of the Liberation Committee, and recognition was primarily granted to organisations that sufficiently engaged in war. In that sense, the display of violence became a driver of statehood. Publicly embracing the armed struggle was a ritual to which all successful national liberation movements in Southern Africa adhered to, as it helped them to overcome the 'crisis of legitimacy' that they experienced while waiting for independence.[83] This is illustrated in the presentation of Sam Nujoma, the leader of SWAPO, who regularly dressed in military uniform even though he was primarily a diplomat and never experienced action on the battlefield. To some extent, war became a performance that allowed certain national liberation movements to set themselves apart from their rivals.

In 1969, three years after the start of the Namibian war of independence, SWAPO decided to broaden its organisational structure to mirror that of a state. Nujoma was designated as the president and reigned over a central committee that served as his cabinet. The national liberation movement had an extensive bureaucracy with several ministry-like departments that were led by secretaries. The Department of Defence administered PLAN, which operated as SWAPO's army. Nevertheless, waging war was only a relatively small part of SWAPO activities abroad. The national liberation movement engaged in a wide range of activities, ranging from agriculture to health.[84] Jüde's claim that SWAPO was 'under institutionalised' is therefore incorrect.[85] Again, the experience of exile was an essential dimension. Williams argued that it was primarily in camps in the Frontline States where SWAPO 'governed Namibian nationals for the first time'.[86] Using novel archival material, the following sections will discuss how the Department of Education, the Department of Foreign Affairs, and the Department of Information laid the foundation for future rule.[87]

With the Department of Education, SWAPO was able to build centres where its cadres were taught in a wide range of subjects. The national liberation movement organised education from pre-elementary levels to adult levels and could in this way exert significant influence on the people under its command.[88] This ranged from informal 'bush schools' in zones of operation and university-like institutions such

as the United Nations Institute for Namibia (UNIN).[89] Located in Lusaka, Zambia, UNIN was established to train the 'future administrators and public servants in an independent Namibia'.[90] UNIN was administered by a senate that included the OAU, various UN members, representatives of the Zambian government, and SWAPO. UNIN graduated hundreds of students between 1976–1990 and formed the basis for the contemporary University of Namibia in Windhoek.[91] Although this institute was formally open to all Namibians, the CIA noted in 1986 that SWAPO's influence over the organisation became 'increasingly pervasive'. The student body appeared to be drawn 'exclusively from SWAPO ranks' (including a significant portion of PLAN soldiers) and both the faculty and administration include several high-ranking SWAPO members. Hage Geingob, the director of the institute and member of SWAPO's politburo, admitted that his organisation influenced UNIN (Geingob later became president of Namibia, between 2017–2024). He justified this with the fact that SWAPO was recognised by the UN.[92]

Most important, perhaps, was its Department of Foreign Affairs, which was established in 1970.[93] The department consisted of junior and senior officers, and SWAPO Representatives that operated as ambassadors.[94] SWAPO established diplomatic missions in Algeria, Angola, Botswana, the Republic of Congo, Cuba, Egypt, Ethiopia, Finland, France, the German Democratic Republic, Libya, Nigeria, Romania, Senegal, the Soviet Union, Sweden, Tanzania, the United Kingdom, the United States (an Observer Mission to the UN), Yugoslavia, Zambia, Zimbabwe, and India.[95] Although SWAPO was still a non-state actor, it utilised the rhetoric and ceremony of recognised states. Its diplomatic mission in India was described as a 'SWAPO Embassy' and inaugurated by Nujoma, who was received by Rajiv Ghandi with 'a ceremonial welcome accorded generally to heads of government'.[96] This approach laid a solid basis for the future: following independence, the former SWAPO diplomats were redeployed in the diplomatic service of the Namibian government. Peya Mushelenga (currently the Minister of International Relations and Cooperation in a SWAPO government) argued that SWAPO's 'pre-independence foreign policymaking has had a major impact on the foreign policy of independent Namibia'.[97]

Through its Department of Information, SWAPO established an elaborate propaganda operation.[98] SWAPO publications were banned in Namibia by the South African government, but the Liberation Committee provided funding for 'newspaper publications & party propaganda' for the Namibian nationalists in exile.[99] As SWAPO called itself 'the only genuine representative of the Namibian people', it founded the Namibia Press Agency (NAMPA) in their provisional headquarters in Angola. With 'Fighting for the Truth' as its official motto (and a logo that consisted of an AK-47 crossed with a pen), NAMPA facilitated 'the widest possible dissemination of news and information'.[100] The prominent display of armed struggle was an

effective propaganda tool that underlined the relevance of SWAPO as an effective organisation.

The liberation movement published *Namibia Today* from Dar es Salaam, *Namibia Review* from Lusaka, *Revue du SWAPO* from Algiers, *SWAPO Review* from Cairo, *Solidarity* from New York, and *Namibian News* from London.[101] Through the dissemination of such magazines (which also included titles as *SWAPO Information Bulletin*, *Namibia Youth*, *Ombuze YaNamibia*, *Information & Comments*, and *The Combatant*), SWAPO publicised the numerous foreign visits of Nujoma and other news updates pertaining to the revolution. Furthermore, the Voice of Namibia Radio Services was distributed via radio stations in Angola, Tanzania, Ethiopia, the Republic of Congo, Zambia, and from 1984 in Zimbabwe.[102] SWAPO described this as 'one of the most effective means … of reaching the world at large'.[103] SWAPO also began publishing its own history books, such as *To Be Born A Nation*, which were influential in revising the existing narrative of the colonisation of Namibia.[104]

Some members of the Liberation Committee believed that 'SWAPO was devoting too much attention to diplomatic activity in New York and not enough to the armed struggle'. Two military specialists were sent to SWAPO camps in Namibia on an investigative mission but reported that 'we had no way of proving the existence of the camps'. Another camp, in Zambia, 'did not look like a military camp' and even lacked basic facilities such as tents or huts. The Liberation Committee received numerous complaints from SWAPO critics who claimed that OAU funding was not used for the war, but was lavishly spent by Namibian nationalists on hotels, flights, and other non-military matters. The OAU, however, 'ignored these appeals, continued to fund SWAPO as before and instituted no more fact-finding missions to try to establish how SWAPO was conducting its struggle'.[105] This episode illustrates that once the OAU had made its decision, it was very difficult to change tactics.

SWANU attempted to challenge the special status of SWAPO within the Liberation Committee, but found itself outside the mainstream politics of liberation.[106] SWANU rejected the establishment of a SWAPO government in exile and argued that it was 'unfair and in-just for the rest of the Namibians who are not members of SWAPO' to be side-tracked from the campaign to decolonise Namibia.[107] It described itself as 'the only movement whose strength is not based on artificial external support' and called SWAPO's dependence on foreign aid a danger to the cause.[108] SWANU opposed the dominance of SWAPO at the United Nations, which followed the OAU in its choice to back Nujoma's organisation. In a statement to the UN Security Council in 1976, a SWANU representative stressed that 'it is very painful for us to listen to the UN Council for Namibia … which has chosen to state unequivocally its partisan position in regard to the national liberation movement of Namibia'. The isolated liberation movement said that 'there is perhaps still time' for the UN to 'extricate itself from its untenable position which is inconsistent with

the democratic practices and the aspirations of the Namibian people'.[109] A year later, the UN Conference on Namibia was convened without inviting representatives from SWANU. The movement complained in a letter to the Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim about this 'gross injustice', emphasising that SWANU was 'the first political party in Namibia'.[110] Nevertheless, SWANU's demand that SWAPO was to be removed from its privileged position fell on deaf ears.

13.5 Conclusion

The Liberation Committee was dissolved in 1994, when South Africa held its first democratic elections. The defeat of white minority rule in South Africa heralded the end of the liberation struggles in this part of the world. The legacy of liberation, however, remains an important factor in Southern African politics. Lieutenant-General Hashim Mbita, who was the Executive Secretary of the Liberation Committee from 1972–1994, inspired the writing of an official history of the decolonisation of Southern Africa. Known as the 'Hashim Mbita Project' and funded by the Southern African Development Community, the nine-volume results were finally published in 2014. This project reaffirmed SWAPO's all-powerful place in the historiography by firmly stipulating that 'Namibia had just one liberation movement, SWAPO'.[111] However, Saunders succinctly argued that SWAPO's dominant role was 'not a given'.[112] Indeed, a defining feature of its road to power was the competition with SWANU for credibility as Namibia's foremost liberation movement.

SWAPO won the battle for recognition 'because of the way it was able to present itself as a national movement' and thus monopolised the campaign for Namibian self-determination.[113] The formal support of the Liberation Committee was essential in this regard, as OAU approval unlocked a range of possibilities to participate in international diplomacy and obtain resources. The Liberation Committee primarily supported non-state actors that declared support for violent strategies for liberation. Kozonguizi, the leader of SWANU, sharply remarked that 'SWAPO's single asset in the battle for recognition was their declaration of an armed struggle in 1966'. In the case of Namibian decolonisation, recognition was a zero-sum game – and SWANU lost.[114] Publicly embracing the armed struggle was an essential step in the competition for legitimacy among nationalist movements. The fact that in truth SWAPO made little progress on the battlefield hardly mattered: a convincing display of violence could be parleyed into political negotiation. Armed struggle was an essential step towards liberation, but not determinate.

SWAPO capitalised upon OAU recognition in order to build its organisation and gain experience in governance. War requires a 'huge organisational challenge' and Jüde argues that this argument has 'partially been lost' in the application of bellicist

theory in the Global South.[115] For SWAPO, the transition from anticolonial struggle to postcolonial rule was marked by a significant degree of continuity. PLAN, its guerrilla army, was integrated into the Namibian Defence Force. UNIN, the educational institute in exile, was the model for the University of Namibia. SWAPO's network of diplomatic missions became the backbone of Namibia's foreign office. NAMPA is now the national news agency. SWAPO would not have been able to maintain these institutions without the support of the Liberation Committee, which was indispensable for its development as a state-in-waiting.[116] This is not only the case in Namibia but also applies in general terms to other victorious national liberation movements in Southern Africa.

The largest political parties in Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, and Zimbabwe are rooted in armed groups that fought for independence during the Cold War.[117] In each country, the prevailing national liberation movement has dominated politics since independence through the legacy of the armed struggle.[118] The electoral success of retired revolutionaries has a profound impact on contemporary political culture in Southern Africa, which is marked by military mindsets, patriotic history, and the legacy of the armed struggle. Contemporary politicians use the heroic exploits of the wars for liberation to justify their claims for enduring rule. Although African liberation movements boasted about their military achievements and claimed to govern 'liberated zones', these organisations were in practice not terribly effective in the theatre of war.

The armies of their adversaries – primarily the South African apartheid regime, but also the Portuguese colonial empire and the settler-government of Rhodesia – were better equipped, had superior training, and were generally much larger in size.[119] In the best case scenario, African liberation movements were able to work themselves into an expensive stalemate – but winning the war on military grounds was an entirely different thing. Nevertheless, the success of the armed struggle in Southern Africa should not be evaluated on military metrics. Rather, the armed struggle mattered as a form of political statement that allowed national liberation movements to claim legitimacy and develop their organisations.

Notes

[1] I am grateful to the participants of the Military-Civil Writing Group and the Southern Africa Writing Group for commenting on previous drafts of this paper. In particular, I wish to acknowledge the helpful feedback of Bernard C. Moore, Brooks Marmon, and Jan Willem Honig.

[2] Mlambo and Parsons, *A History of Southern Africa*.

[3] Melber, '"Namibia, Land of the Brave": Selective Memories on War and Violence within Nation Building', pp. 305–327.

4 Meng and Paine, 'Power Sharing and Authoritarian Stability: How Rebel Regimes Solve the Guardianship Dilemma'.
5 Sapire, 'Liberation Movements, Exile, and International Solidarity: An Introduction'.
6 Tilly, ed., *The Formation of National States in Western Europe*.
7 Thies, 'War, Rivalry, and State Building in Latin America'; Taylor and Botea, 'Tilly Tally: War-Making and State-Making in the Contemporary Third World'; Thies, 'Public Violence and State Building in Central America'; Lu and Thies, 'War, Rivalry, and State Building in the Middle East'; Han and Thies, 'External Threats, Internal Challenges, and State Building in East Asia'.
8 Thies, 'The Political Economy of State Building in Sub-Saharan Africa'.
9 Herbst, 'War and the State in Africa'.
10 Kisangani and Pickering, 'Rebels, Rivals, and Post-Colonial State-Building: Identifying Bellicist Influences on State Extractive Capability'.
11 Suhas and Israelsen, 'Interstate Rivalries and Expansions in Military Capacity'.
12 Jüde, 'Making or Un-Making States: When Does War Have Formative Effects?'.
13 Van der Hoog, 'A New Chapter in Namibian History: Reflections on Archival Research'; Van der Hoog and Moore, 'Paper, Pixels, or Plane Tickets? Multi-Archival Perspectives on the Decolonisation of Namibia'; Van der Hoog, 'Research Note: The Nordic Africa Institute (NAI) Pamphlet Collection'.
14 Leys, Saul and Brown, *Namibia's Liberation Struggle: The Two-Edged Sword*.
15 Müller, *The Inevitable Pipeline into Exile: Botswana's Role in the Namibian Liberation Struggle*, p. 39.
16 Basler Afrika Bibliographien (BAB), PA.48 Tony Emmett, Kozonguizi Documents, No 4: Kozonguizi, J.: The Namibian Political Situation. Undated (circa 1975).
17 Ibid., No 5: Kozonguizi, J.: Brief Outline of the History and International Action by Namibians. January 1976.
18 Blaauw and Zaire, eds., *Dominant Parties as Governments in Southern Africa: Their Changing Nature and Its Implications for Democracy and Democratic Consolidation*.
19 NSS, Heroes Acre Committee, *The Unknown Soldier: Inauguration of Heroes' Acre 26 August 2002*.
20 Williams and Mazarire, 'The Namibian Independence Memorial Museum, Windhoek, Namibia', pp. 1809–1811.
21 Werbner, 'Smoke from the Barrel of a Gun: Post-Wars of the Dead, Memory and Reinscription in Zimbabwe'; Ranger, 'Nationalist Historiography, Patriotic History and the History of the Nation: The Struggle over the Past in Zimbabwe'; Kriger, 'From Patriotic Memories to 'Patriotic History' in Zimbabwe, 1990–2005'; Welz and Kromrey, 'Legacies of the Past: The Influence of Former Freedom Fighters and Their Rhetoric in Southern Africa'; Jopela, 'The Politics of Liberation Heritage in Postcolonial Southern Africa, With Special Reference to Mozambique'.
22 Walker, 'Decolonization in the 1960s: On Legitimate and Illegitimate Nationalist Claims-Making'.
23 Temu and Das Neves Tembe, eds., *Southern African Liberation Struggles: Contemporaneous Documents, 1960–1994*.
24 Telepneva, *Cold War Liberation: The Soviet Union and the Collapse of the Portuguese Empire in Africa, 1961–1975*; White, *Unpopular Sovereignty: Rhodesian Independence and African Decolonization*; Baines and Vale, eds., *Beyond the Border War: New Perspectives on Southern Africa's Late-Cold War Conflicts*.
25 Southall, *Liberation Movements in Power: Party and State in Southern Africa*.
26 Odendaal, *The Founders: The Origins of the ANC and the Struggle for Democracy in South Africa*.
27 Alexander et al., 'Liberation Beyond the Nation: An Introduction'.
28 SWAPO, *To Be Born a Nation: The Liberation Struggle for Namibia*.
29 Pearce, 'Contesting the Past in Angolan Politics'.
30 De Souto, 'Memory and Identity in the History of Frelimo: Some Research Themes'.

[31] Saunders, 'The ANC in the Historiography of the National Liberation Struggle in South Africa'.

[32] Ranger, 'Nationalist Historiography, Patriotic History and the History of the Nation: The Struggle over the Past in Zimbabwe'.

[33] There are a handful of exceptions, including Lodge, 'Insurrectionism in South Africa : The Pan-Africanist Congress and the Poqo Movement, 1959–1965'; Macola, *Liberal Nationalism in Central Africa: A Biography of Harry Mwaanga Nkumbula*; Marmon, '"Division to Save the Country Is Wisdom": The Short Life of the Zimbabwe National Party and Its Lasting Impact on Zimbabwe's Liberation Struggle, 1961–1963'; Marmon, 'Early Factionalism in Zimbabwe's Liberation Struggle'; Passemiers, 'Mozambique's Neglected Nationalists in Exile: Retracing Coremo's Relations with the Congolese Government and the FNLA'; Sá and Kilumbo, 'UNITA's Post-War Parliamentary Elite: From a Wartime Defeat to a Nationwide Party in Angola'.

[34] Gibson, *African Liberation Movements: Contemporary Struggles Against White Minority Rule*, pp. 1–16.

[35] University of Namibia (UNAM) Archives, PA3/1/2/34: Supporting material collected by Tjitendero (for research?): Education/Training: Bundle 3: 1976–1981?; Saunders, 'SWAPO, Namibia's Liberation Struggle and the Organisation of African Unity's Liberation Committee'; Miškařík, 'SWAPO's Version of History in Namibia', p. 152.

[36] Leys and Saul, 'Liberation Without Democracy? The SWAPO Crisis of 1976'.

[37] White and Larmer, 'Introduction: Mobile Soldiers and the Un-National Liberation of Southern Africa'.

[38] Alexander, McGregor, and Tendi, 'The Transnational Histories of Southern African Liberation Movements: An Introduction'.

[39] University of Western Cape-Robben Island Mayibuye Archives (MA), African National Congress Papers (Lusaka and London, 1960–1991), Box 62, Department of International Affairs + Relations with African Countries (1986–1991): Final Communique of Frontline States Summit Meeting Held in Arusha, Tanzania, 29 April 1984.

[40] Evans, 'The Front-Line States, South Africa and Southern African Security: Military Prospects and Perspectives'.

[41] Burton, 'Hubs of Decolonization. African Liberation Movements and "Eastern" Connections in Cairo, Accra, and Dar Es Salaam', pp. 25–56.

[42] Vigne, 'SWAPO of Namibia: A Movement in Exile'; Scarnecchia, 'Front Line Diplomats: African Diplomatic Representations of the Zimbabwean Patriotic Front, 1976–1978'; Munguambe, 'Nationalism and Exile in an Age of Solidarity: Frelimo–ZANU Relations in Mozambique (1975–1980)'; Williams, 'Education in Exile: International Scholarships, Cold War Politics, and Conflicts among SWAPO Members in Tanzania, 1961–1968'; Sapire, 'Liberation Movements, Exile, and International Solidarity: An Introduction'.

[43] Ibid.

[44] Dobell, *Swapo's Struggle for Namibia, 1960–1991: War by Other Means*.

[45] Santos, 'The Role of the Decolonization Committee of the United Nations Organization in the Struggle against Portuguese Colonialism in Africa: 1961–1974'; Turner, '"Finishing the Job": The UN Special Committee on Decolonization and the Politics of Self-Governance'.

[46] Thörn, 'Solidarity Across Borders: The Transnational Anti-Apartheid Movement'.

[47] Dallywater, Saunders and Helder Adegar, *Southern African Liberation Movements and the Global Cold War 'East'*.

[48] Greig, *The Communist Challenge to Africa: An Analysis of Contemporary Soviet, Chinese and Cuban Policies*; Henriksen, *Communist Powers and Sub-Saharan Africa*; Shubin, *The Hot 'Cold War': The USSR in Southern Africa*; Muehlenbeck, *Czechoslovakia in Africa, 1945–1968*; Yordanov, *The Soviet*

Union and the Horn of Africa during the Cold War: Between Ideology and Pragmatism; Telepneva, *Cold War Liberation: The Soviet Union and the Collapse of the Portuguese Empire in Africa, 1961–1975*; Argyriadis, Bonacci, and Delmas, eds., *Cuba and Africa, 1959–1994: Writing an Alternative Atlantic History*; Van der Hoog, 'Comrades Beyond the Cold War: North Korea and the Liberation of Southern Africa'.

49 Dersso, 'The Quest for Pax Africana: The Case of the African Union's Peace and Security Regime'.

50 Grilli, 'Nkrumah's Ghana and the Armed Struggle in Southern Africa (1961–1966)'.

51 Grilli, 'Nkrumah, Nationalism, and Pan-Africanism: The Bureau of African Affairs Collection'.

52 Khadiagala, *Allies in Adversity: The Frontline States in Southern African Security, 1975–1993*.

53 Nash, 'Embracing State Security: The Peace and Security Norms and Structures of the Organisation of African Unity, 1963–1993'.

54 Tarimo and Reuben, 'The Role of the OAU Liberation Committee in the South African Liberation Struggle', pp. 55–56.

55 Ibid.

56 Roberts, *Revolutionary State-Making in Dar Es Salaam: African Liberation and the Global Cold War*.

57 El-Khawas, 'Southern Africa: A Challenge to the OAU'.

58 Tarimo and Reuben, 'The Role of the OAU Liberation Committee in the South African Liberation Struggle'.

59 Mabitsela, 'The Role of OAU on Representation of National Liberation Movements at the UN, 1963–1974'.

60 National Archives of Namibia (NAN), CCO, 39/12/1/3/2, Vredesoffensief in Afrika/Tanzania/Koerant uitknipsels, 1975–1976.

61 Nordic Africa Institute (NAI) Library, Pamphlet Collection, Southern Africa: National Liberation Movements: documents and speeches compiled by Shamuyarira and Leonard.

62 Emmett, *Popular Resistance and the Roots of Nationalism in Namibia, 1915–1966*.

63 Armstrong, *In Search of Freedom: Andreas Shipanga Story as Told to Sue Armstrong*, pp. 84–85.

64 Saunders, 'SWAPO, Namibia's Liberation Struggle and the Organisation of African Unity's Liberation Committee'.

65 Müller, *The Inevitable Pipeline into Exile. Botswana's Role in the Namibian Liberation Struggle*, p. 142.

66 Vigne, 'SWAPO of Namibia', p. 88.

67 BAB, PA.48 Tony Emmett, Kozonguizi Documents, No 5: Kozonguizi, J.: Brief Outline of the History and International Action by Namibians, January 1976.

68 NAI Library, Pamphlet Collection, Regional cooperation: AAPSO; UNAM Archives, PA1/16/2/1, The Leading Facts in the Struggle of South West Africa Today. SWAPO Memorandum Circulated at the Fourth Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Conference to be Held at the Kwame Nkrumah Ideological Institute, Winneba, Ghana. 1965. 2 pp; UNAM Archives, PA1/16/5/69, Memorandum of the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) of Namibia to the Preparatory meeting of the Non-Alignment Conference, Dar es Salaam, April 13, 1970 to April 17, 1970.

69 Saunders, 'SWAPO, Namibia's Liberation Struggle and the Organisation of African Unity's Liberation Committee'.

70 Dale, *The Namibian War of Independence, 1966–1989: Diplomatic, Economic and Military Campaigns*.

71 Cherry, *Umkhonto We Sizwe*; White, *Unpopular Sovereignty: Rhodesian Independence and African Decolonization*; Guimaraes, *The Origins of the Angolan Civil War: Foreign Intervention and Domestic Political Conflict, 1961–76*; Jentzsch, *Violent Resistance: Militia Formation and Civil War in Mozambique*.

72 Tarimo and Reuben, 'The Role of the OAU Liberation Committee in the South African Liberation Struggle'.

[73] Saunders, 'SWAPO, Namibia's Liberation Struggle and the Organisation of African Unity's Liberation Committee'.

[74] Tarimo and Reuben, 'The Role of the OAU Liberation Committee in the South African Liberation Struggle', p. 59.

[75] UNAM Archives, PA1/20/13 SWAPO, internal documents: 1965–1969.

[76] Müller, *The Inevitable Pipeline into Exile. Botswana's Role in the Namibian Liberation Struggle*, p. 73.

[77] Mlambo and Parsons, *A History of Southern Africa*.

[78] White and Larmer, 'Introduction: Mobile Soldiers and the Un-National Liberation of Southern Africa', p. 1271.

[79] Jackson, *Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World*.

[80] Pegg, *International Society and the De Facto State*.

[81] Panzer, 'A Nation in Name, a "State" in Exile: The FRELIMO Proto-State, Youth, Gender, and the Liberation of Mozambique 1962–1975'.

[82] Walker, *States-in-Waiting: A Counternarrative of Global Decolonization*.

[83] Voller, *The Kurdish Liberation Movement in Iraq: From Insurgency to Statehood*, pp. 7–8.

[84] NAN, GOVN, OB7/1/2, Politieke Organisasies/SWAPO, 1978-1979. [nine volumes]

[85] Jüde, 'Making or Un-Making States', p. 219.

[86] Williams, *National Liberation in Postcolonial Southern Africa: A Historical Ethnography of SWAPO's Exile Camps*, p. 65.

[87] Namibia Scientific Society (NSS), 'Political program of the South West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO) of Namibia, 1976'.

[88] Mbamba, *The Namibia Education and Health Centres: A Study of SWAPO Schools Among Namibian Refugees in Zambia and Angola*.

[89] UNAM Archives, PA1/1/4, SWAPO and Bishop Winter: 1972–1982.

[90] NSS, The Combatant, July 1983; South West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO) Archives, 02000006, Seminar: Training in Diplomacy. I would like to thank Saima Ashipala for sharing this file with me.

[91] UNAM Archives, PA3/2/18/1, UN Information Centre: United Nations in Zambia: A Profile. Lusaka: United Nations Information Centre, 1988.

[92] CIA Reading Room, CIA-RDP86T01017R000707170001-8, SWAPO Influence of the United Nations Institute for Namibia, 29 April 1986.

[93] Ashipala, 'Diplomacy in Armed Struggle: A Case of the South West Africa People's Organisation', pp. 47–58.

[94] SWAPO Archives, 02000009-9A/9C, Participants: Seminar on Training in Diplomacy for SWAPO Representative and Officials 1988. I would like to thank Saima Ashipala for sharing this file with me.

[95] NSS, SWAPO Information Bulletin, October 1986.

[96] UNAM Archives, PA4/1/4/113, (i) First SWAPO's Embassy Abroad Inaugurated.

[97] Mushelenga, 'Foreign Policy-Making for a Pre-Independent Namibia and the Subsequent Results', pp. 60–66. See also Dobell, *Swapo's Struggle for Namibia, 1960–1991*.

[98] UNAM Archives, PA1/20/12, SWAPO Internal Documents: n.d.; NAN, PB/1529, Session on Problems of Dissemination of Information by Liberation Movements.

[99] UNAM Archives, PA1/16/2/8, Memorandum Submitted by SWAPO to the OAU Coordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa, January 1967. 3 pp.

[100] NSS, SWAPO Information Bulletin, September 1984; UNAM Archives, PA3/8/9, Namibia Press Agency (NAMPA): Inaugural Seminar, 28 Nov–6 Dec. 1987, Luanda – P.R. of Angola. Luanda: SWAPO Department of Information and Publicity, 1987 28 November–6 December.

[101] UNAM Archives, PA1/12/3, Various: 1969–1986.

[102] Heinze, '"It Recharged Our Batteries": Writing the History of the Voice of Namibia'.
[103] NSS, SWAPO Information Bulletin, September 1984; UNAM Archives, PA1/14/2, SWAPO of Namibia: Information & Comments: 1979–1984; UNAM Archives, PA1/14/1/1, Namibia Today, Lusaka, Zambia (Official Organ of SWAPO); UNAM Archives, PA1/14/8, Namibia Youth (Official Bulletin of the SWAPO Youth League): 1982-1983; UNAM Archives, PA1/14/10, Ombuze YaNamibia: 1976–1978.
[104] SWAPO, *To Be Born a Nation: The Liberation Struggle for Namibia*; Saunders, 'Some Roots of Anti-Colonial Historical Writing About Namibia'.
[105] Ibid.
[106] Ibid.
[107] NAN, CCO, 39/10/1/9, SWANU/Koerant uitknipsels, 1975–1976; NAN, CCO, 39/10/1/9, SWANU, 1975–1976.
[108] SWANU, 'The Position of SWANU and the Namibia National Front on the Negotiations between the Five Western Powers and South Africa on Namibia', SWANU International Organ, September 1977.
[109] NAN, CCO, 39/10/1/9, SWANU, 1975–1976.
[110] UN Archives, S-0902-0007-07-00001 – Question of Namibia – organizations and individuals – South West Africa National Union (SWANU).
[111] Maundi, 'The Role of the Organization of Africa Unity in the Liberation Struggle of Southern Africa'.
[112] Saunders, 'SWAPO, Namibia's Liberation Struggle and the Organisation of African Unity's Liberation Committee'.
[113] Ibid.
[114] BAB, PA.48 Tony Emmett, Kozonguizi Documents, No 4: Kozonguizi, J.: The Namibian political situation. Undated (circa 1975).
[115] Jüde, 'Making or Un-Making States', p. 215.
[116] As mentioned before, this contradicts Jüde's assertion that 'warfare did not induce a transformation into a state-like organization' in the case of SWAPO. Jüde, 'Making or Un-Making States', p. 221.
[117] Southall, *Liberation Movements in Power: Party and State in Southern Africa*.
[118] Melber, 'Southern African Liberation Movements as Governments and the Limits to Liberation'.
[119] Baines and Vale, *Beyond the Border War: New Perspectives on Southern Africa's Late-Cold War Conflicts*.

Primary Sources

Basler Afrika Bibliographien (BAB)

PA.48 Tony Emmett, Kozonguizi Documents, No 4: Kozonguizi, J.: The Namibian political situation. Undated (circa 1975).

PA.48 Tony Emmett, Kozonguizi Documents, No 5: Kozonguizi, J.: Brief outline of the history and international action by Namibians. January 1976.

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Reading Room

CIA-RDP86T01017R000707170001-8, SWAPO Influence of the United Nations Institute for Namibia, 29 April 1986.

Namibia Scientific Society (NSS)

Political program of the South West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO) of Namibia, 1976.

Heroes Acre Committee, *The Unknown Soldier: Inauguration of Heroes' Acre 26 August 2002 (*Windhoek, 2002).

The Combatant, July 1983.

SWAPO Information Bulletin, September 1984.

SWAPO Information Bulletin, October 1986.

National Archives of Namibia (NAN)

CCO, 39/12/1/3/2, Vredesoffensief in Afrika/Tanzania/Koerant uitknipsels, 1975–1976.

GOVN, OB7/1/2, Politieke Organisasies/SWAPO, 1978–1979.

CCO, 39/10/1/9, SWANU/Koerant uitknipsels, 1975–1976.

CCO, 39/10/1/9, SWANU, 1975–1976.

Nordic Africa Institute (NAI) Library

Pamphlet Collection, Regional cooperation: AAPSO.

Pamphlet Collection, Southern Africa: National Liberation Movements.

South West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO) Archives

02000006, Seminar: Training in Diplomacy.

02000009-9A/9C, Participants: Seminar on Training in Diplomacy for SWAPO Representative and Officials 1988.

United Nations (UN) Archives

S-0902-0007-07-00001 – Question of Namibia – organizations and individuals – South West Africa National Union (SWANU).

University of Namibia (UNAM) Archives

PA4/1/4/113, (i) First SWAPO's Embassy abroad Inaugurated.

PA3/1/2/34: Supporting material collected by Tjitendero (for research?): Education/Training: Bundle 3: [Education]: 1976-1981?

PA1/16/5/69, Memorandum of the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) of Namibia to the preparatory meeting of the Non-Alignment Conference, Dar es Salaam, April 13, 1970 to April 17, 1970.

PA1/14/1/1, Namibia Today, Lusaka, Zambia (official organ of SWAPO).

PA1/16/2/1, The Leading Facts in the Struggle of South West Africa Today. SWAPO memorandum circulated at the Fourth Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Conference to be held at the Kwame Nkrumah Ideological Institute, Winneba, Ghana. 1965. 2 pp.

PA3/2/18/1, UN Information Centre: United Nations in Zambia: a profile. – Lusaka: United Nations Information Centre, 1988.

PA1/14/2, SWAPO of Namibia: Information & Comments: 1979–1984.

PA1/12/3, Various: 1969–1986.

PA1/1/4, SWAPO and Bishop Winter: 1972–1982.

PA1/14/8, Namibia Youth (Official Bulletin of the SWAPO Youth League): 1982–1983.

PA1/16/2/8, Memorandum submitted by SWAPO to the OAU coordinating committee for the liberation of Africa. January 1967. 3 pp.

PA3/8/9, Namibia press agency (NAMPA): Inaugural seminar, 28 Nov–6 Dec. 1987, Luanda – P.R. of Angola. – Luanda: SWAPO Department of Information and Publicity, 1987 28 November–6 December.

PA1/14/10, Ombuze YaNamibia: 1976–1978.

PA1/20/12, SWAPO Internal documents: n.d.; NAN, PB/1529, Session on problems of dissemination of information by liberation movements.

PA1/20/13 SWAPO, internal documents: 1965–1969.

University of Western Cape-Robben Island Mayibuye Archives (MA)

African National Congress Papers (Lusaka and London, 1960–1991), Box 62, Department of international affairs + relations with African countries (1986–1991).

Bibliography

Alexander, Jocelyn, JoAnn McGregor and Blessing-Miles Tendi. 'The Transnational Histories of Southern African Liberation Movements: An Introduction'. *Journal of Southern African Studies* 43, no. 1 (2017), pp. 1–12.

Alexander, Jocelyn, Paolo Israel, Miles Larmer and Ricardo Soares de Oliveira. 'Liberation Beyond the Nation: An Introduction'. *Journal of Southern African Studies* 46, no. 5 (2020), pp. 821–828.

Argyriadis, Kali, Giulia Bonacci and Adrien Delmas, eds. *Cuba and Africa, 1959–1994: Writing an Alternative Atlantic History*. Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 2020.

Armstrong, Sue. *In Search of Freedom: Andreas Shipanga Story as Told to Sue Armstrong*. Gibraltar: Ashanti Publishing, 1989.

Ashipala, Saima N. 'Diplomacy in Armed Struggle: A Case of the South West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO)'. MA thesis, University of Namibia, 2015.

Baines, Gary, and Peter Vale, eds. *Beyond the Border War: New Perspectives on Southern Africa's Late-Cold War Conflicts*. Unisa: Unisa Press, 2008.

Blaauw, Leslie, and Dennis Zaire, eds. *Dominant Parties as Governments in Southern Africa: Their Changing Nature and Its Implications for Democracy and Democratic Consolidation*. Windhoek: Konrad Adenauer Foundation, 2023.

Burton, Eric. 'Hubs of Decolonization. African Liberation Movements and 'Eastern' Connections in Cairo, Accra, and Dar Es Salaam'. In *Southern African Liberation Movements and the Global Cold War 'East': Transnational Activism 1960–1990*, edited by Lena Dallywater, Chris Saunders and Helder Adegar Fonseca. Berlin: De Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2019, pp. 25–56.

Cherry, Janet. *Umkhonto We Sizwe*. Johannesburg: Jacana Media, 2011.

Dale, Richard. *The Namibian War of Independence, 1966–1989: Diplomatic, Economic and Military Campaigns*. Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland, 2014.

Dallywater, Lena, Chris Saunders, and Fonseca Helder Adegar. *Southern African Liberation Movements and the Global Cold War 'East', Transnational Activism 1960–1990*. Berlin: De Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2019.

Dersso, Solomon A. 'The Quest for Pax Africana: The Case of the African Union's Peace and Security Regime'. *African Journal on Conflict Resolution* 12, no. 2 (2012), pp. 11–48.

De Souto, Amélia Neves. 'Memory and Identity in the History of Frelimo: Some Research Themes'. *Kronos* 39, no. 1 (January 2013), pp. 280–296.

Dobell, Lauren. *Swapo's Struggle for Namibia, 1960–1991: War by Other Means*. Basel: P. Schlettwein, 1998.

El-Khawas, Mohamed A. 'Southern Africa: A Challenge to the OAU'. *Africa Today* 24, no. 3 (1977), pp. 25–41.

Emmett, Tony. *Popular Resistance and the Roots of Nationalism in Namibia, 1915–1966*. Basel: P. Schlettwein, 1999.

Evans, Michael. 'The Front-Line States, South Africa and Southern African Security: Military Prospects and Perspectives'. *Zambezia* 12 (1984), pp. 1–19.

Gibson, Richard. *African Liberation Movements: Contemporary Struggles against White Minority Rule*. London: Oxford University Press, 1972.

Greig, Ian. *The Communist Challenge to Africa: An Analysis of Contemporary Soviet, Chinese and Cuban Policies*. London: Foreign Affairs, 1977.

Grilli, Matteo. 'Nkrumah, Nationalism, and Pan-Africanism: The Bureau of African Affairs Collection'. *History in Africa* 44 (June 2017), pp. 295–307. https://doi.org/10.1017/hia.2016.15.

Grilli, Matteo. 'Nkrumah's Ghana and the Armed Struggle in Southern Africa (1961–1966)'. *South African Historical Journal* 70, no. 1 (2018), pp. 56–81.

Guimaraes, Fernando Andresen. *The Origins of the Angolan Civil War: Foreign Intervention and Domestic Political Conflict, 1961–76*. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016.

Han, Enze, and Cameron Thies. 'External Threats, Internal Challenges, and State Building in East Asia'. *Journal of East Asian Studies* 19, no. 3 (November 2019), pp. 339–360. https://doi.org/10.1017/jea.2019.24.

Heinze, Robert. '"It Recharged Our Batteries": Writing the History of the Voice of Namibia'. *Journal of Namibian Studies: History Politics Culture* 15 (2014), pp. 25–62. https://doi.org/10.59670/jns.v15i.89.

Henriksen, Thomas H. *Communist Powers and Sub-Saharan Africa*. Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1981.

Herbst, Jeffrey. 'War and the State in Africa'. *International Security* 14, no. 4 (1990), pp. 117–139.

Hoog, Tycho van der, and Bernard C. Moore. 'Paper, Pixels, or Plane Tickets? Multi-Archival Perspectives on the Decolonisation of Namibia'. *Journal of Namibian Studies* 32 (2022), pp. 77–106.

Hoog, Tycho van der. 'A New Chapter in Namibian History: Reflections on Archival Research'. *History in Africa*, January 2022, pp. 1–26.

Hoog, Tycho van der. *Comrades Beyond the Cold War: North Korea and the Liberation of Southern Africa*. London: Hurst, 2025.

Hoog, Tycho van der. 'Research Note: The Nordic Africa Institute (NAI) Pamphlet Collection'. *Cold War History* 22, no. 3 (2022), pp. 363–368.

Jackson, Robert H. *Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511559020.

Jentzsch, Corinna. *Violent Resistance: Militia Formation and Civil War in Mozambique*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2022.

Jopela, Albino Pereira de Jesus. 'The Politics of Liberation Heritage in Postcolonial Southern Africa, With Special Reference to Mozambique'. PhD Diss., University of the Witwatersrand, 2017.

Jüde, Johannes. 'Making or Un-Making States: When Does War Have Formative Effects?' *European Journal of International Relations* 28, no. 1 (March 2022), pp. 209–234. https://doi.org/10.1177/13540661211053628.

Khadiagala, Gilbert M. *Allies in Adversity: The Frontline States in Southern African Security, 1975–1993*. Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1994.

Kisangani, Emizet F., and Jeffrey Pickering. 'Rebels, Rivals, and Post-Colonial State-Building: Identifying Bellicist Influences on State Extractive Capability'. *International Studies Quarterly* 58, no. 1 (March 2014), pp. 187–198. https://doi.org/10.1111/isqu.12042.

Kriger, Norma. 'From Patriotic Memories to 'Patriotic History' in Zimbabwe, 1990–2005'. *Third World Quarterly* 27, no. 6 (2006), pp. 1151–1169.

Leys, Colin, and John S. Saul. 'Liberation Without Democracy? The SWAPO Crisis of 1976'. *Journal of Southern African Studies* 20, no. 1 (1994), pp. 123–147.

Leys, Colin, John S. Saul, and Susan Brown. *Namibia's Liberation Struggle: The Two-Edged Sword*. Edinburgh: James Curry, 1995.

Lodge, Tom Geoffrey. 'Insurrectionism in South Africa: The Pan-Africanist Congress and the Poqo Movement, 1959–1965'. PhD Diss., University of York, 1984. https://etheses.whiterose.ac.uk/14182/.

Lu, Lingyu, and Cameron G. Thies. 'War, Rivalry, and State Building in the Middle East'. *Political Research Quarterly* 66, no. 2 (June 2013), pp. 239–253. https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912912448538.

Mabitsela, Seane. 'The Role of OAU on Representation of National Liberation Movements at the UN, 1963–1974'. *Journal of African Union Studies* 12, no. 1 (April 2023), pp. 71–87. https://doi.org/10.31920/2050-4306/2022/12n1a4.

Macola, Giacomo. *Liberal Nationalism in Central Africa: A Biography of Harry Mwaanga Nkumbula*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010.

Marmon, Brooks. '"Division to Save the Country Is Wisdom": The Short Life of the Zimbabwe National Party and Its Lasting Impact on Zimbabwe's Liberation Struggle, 1961–1963'. *International Journal of African Historical Studies* 53, no. 3 (2020), pp. 361–387.

Marmon, Brooks. 'Early Factionalism in Zimbabwe's Liberation Struggle'. In *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of African History*, 2023. https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190277734.013.1460.

Maundi, Mohammed Omar. 'The Role of the Organization of Africa Unity in the Liberation Struggle of Southern Africa'. In *Southern African Liberation Struggles*, edited by Arnold J. Temu and Joel das Neves Tembe. Dar es Salaam: Mkuki na Nyota, 2019, pp. 381–430

Mbamba, A. Mauno. *The Namibia Education and Health Centres: A Study of SWAPO Schools Among Namibian Refugees in Zambia and Angola*. Stockholm: University of Stockholm, 1979.

Melber, Henning. '"Namibia, Land of the Brave": Selective Memories on War and Violence within Nation Building'. In *Rethinking Resistance: Revolt and Violence in African History*, edited by Jon Abbink, Klaas van Walraven and Mirjam de Bruijn. Leiden: Brill, 2003, pp. 305–327. https://doi.org/10.1163/9789047401629_015.

Melber, Henning. 'Southern African Liberation Movements as Governments and the Limits to Liberation'. *Review of African Political Economy* 36, no. 121 (2009), pp. 451–459.

Meng, Anne, and Jack Paine. 'Power Sharing and Authoritarian Stability: How Rebel Regimes Solve the Guardianship Dilemma'. *American Political Science Review* 116, no. 4 (November 2022), pp. 1208–1225. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055422000296.

Miškařík, Pavel. 'SWAPO's Version of History in Namibia'. *Asian and African Studies* 28, no. 2 (2019), pp. 149–167.

Mlambo, Alois S., and Neil Parsons. *A History of Southern Africa*. London: Bloomsbury, 2018.

Muehlenbeck, Philip. *Czechoslovakia in Africa, 1945–1968*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-137-56666-9.

Müller, Johann Alexander. *The Inevitable Pipeline into Exile. Botswana's Role in the Namibian Liberation Struggle*. Basel: Basler Afrika Bibliographien, 2012.

Munguambe, Clinarete Victoria Luis. 'Nationalism and Exile in an Age of Solidarity: Frelimo–ZANU Relations in Mozambique (1975–1980)'. *Journal of Southern African Studies* 43, no. 1 (2017), pp. 161–178.

Mushelenga, Peya. 'Foreign Policy-Making for a Pre-Independent Namibia and the Subsequent Results'. *Journal of Namibian Studies: History Politics Culture* 19 (June 2016), pp. 43–68.

Nash, Kathryn. 'Embracing State Security: The Peace and Security Norms and Structures of the Organisation of African Unity, 1963–1993'. In *Visions of African Unity: New Perspectives on the History of Pan-Africanism and African Unification Projects*, edited by Matteo Grilli and Frank Gerits. Cham: Springer International, 2020, pp. 263–287. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-52911-6_11.

Odendaal, André. *The Founders: The Origins of the ANC and the Struggle for Democracy in South Africa*. Johannesburg: Jacana Media, 2012.

Panzer, Michael G. 'A Nation in Name, a "state" in Exile: The FRELIMO Proto-State, Youth, Gender, and the Liberation of Mozambique 1962–1975'. PhD Diss., University at Albany, State University of New York, 2013.

Passemiers, Lazlo. 'Mozambique's Neglected Nationalists in Exile: Retracing Coremo's Relations with the Congolese Government and the FNLA'. *Journal of Southern African Studies* 49, no. 5–6 (November 2023), pp. 861–887. https://doi.org/10.1080/03057070.2023.2322873.

Pearce, Justin. 'Contesting the Past in Angolan Politics'. *Journal of Southern African Studies* 41, no. 1 (2015), pp. 103–119.

Pegg, Scott. *International Society and the De Facto State*. London: Routledge, 2019. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429354847.

Ranger, Terence. 'Nationalist Historiography, Patriotic History and the History of the Nation: The Struggle over the Past in Zimbabwe'. *Journal of Southern African Studies* 30, no. 2 (2004), pp. 215–234.

Roberts, George. *Revolutionary State-Making in Dar Es Salaam: African Liberation and the Global Cold War, 1961–1974*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021.

Sá, Ana Lúcia, and Olivio Kilumbo. 'UNITA's Post-War Parliamentary Elite: From a Wartime Defeat to a Nationwide Party in Angola'. *Journal of Southern African Studies* (2024), pp. 1–20. https://doi.org/10.1080/03057070.2024.2403256.

Santos, A. 'The Role of the Decolonization Committee of the United Nations Organization in the Struggle against Portuguese Colonialism in Africa: 1961–1974'. *Journal of Pan African Studies* 4, no. 10 (2012), pp. 248–260.

Sapire, Hilary. 'Liberation Movements, Exile, and International Solidarity: An Introduction'. *Journal of Southern African Studies* 35, no. 2 (2009), pp. 271–286.

Saunders, Chris. 'Some Roots of Anti-Colonial Historical Writing About Namibia'. *Journal of Namibian Studies* 3 (2008), pp. 83–93.

Saunders, Chris. 'The ANC in the Historiography of the National Liberation Struggle in South Africa'. In *Treading the Waters of History and Perspectives of the ANC*, edited by Kwandiwe Kondlo, Chris Saunders and Siphamandla Zondi, 11–22. Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa, 2014.

Saunders, Chris. 'SWAPO, Namibia's Liberation Struggle and the Organisation of African Unity's Liberation Committee'. *South African Historical Journal* 70, no. 1 (2018), pp. 152–167.

Scarnecchia, Timothy. 'Front Line Diplomats: African Diplomatic Representations of the Zimbabwean Patriotic Front, 1976–1978'. *Journal of Southern African Studies* 43, no. 1 (January 2017), pp. 107–124. https://doi.org/10.1080/03057070.2017.1273555.

Shubin, Vladimir. *The Hot 'Cold War': The USSR in Southern Africa*. London: Pluto Press, 2008.

Southall, Roger. *Liberation Movements in Power: Party and State in Southern Africa*. Woodbridge: Boydell & Brewer, 2013.

Suhas, Prashant Hosur, and Shelli Israelsen. 'Interstate Rivalries and Expansions in Military Capacity'. *International Area Studies Review* 25, no. 1 (March 2022), pp. 50–72. https://doi.org/10.1177/22338659211040289.

SWANU. 'The Position of SWANU and the Namibia National Front on the Negotiations between the Five Western Powers and South Africa on Namibia'. *SWANU International Organ*, September 1977.

SWAPO. *To Be Born a Nation: The Liberation Struggle for Namibia*. London: Zed Press, 1981.

Tarimo, Elias, and Neville Reuben. 'The Role of the OAU Liberation Committee in the South African Liberation Struggle'. *The Tinker*, 2013.

Taylor, Brian D., and Roxana Botea. 'Tilly Tally: War-Making and State-Making in the Contemporary Third World'. *International Studies Review* 10, no. 1 (March 2008), pp. 27–56. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2486.2008.00746.x.

Telepneva, Natalia. *Cold War Liberation: The Soviet Union and the Collapse of the Portuguese Empire in Africa, 1961–1975*. Chapel Hill, N.C.: The University of North Carolina Press, 2022.

Temu, Arnold J., and Joel das Neves Tembe, eds. *Southern African Liberation Struggles: Contemporaneous Documents, 1960–1994*. Dar es Salaam: Mkuki na Nyota, 2014.

Thies, Cameron G. 'Public Violence and State Building in Central America'. *Comparative Political Studies* 39, no. 10 (December 2006), pp. 1263–1282. https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414005284380.

Thies, Cameron G. 'War, Rivalry, and State Building in Latin America'. *American Journal of Political Science* 49, no. 3 (2005), pp. 451–465. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2005.00134.x.

Thies, Cameron G. 'The Political Economy of State Building in Sub-Saharan Africa'. *The Journal of Politics* 69, no. 3 (August 2007), pp. 716–731. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2508.2007.00570.x.

Thörn, Håkan. 'Solidarity Across Borders: The Transnational Anti-Apartheid Movement'. *Voluntas: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations* 17, no. 4 (2006), pp. 285–301.

Tilly, Charles, ed. *The Formation of National States in Western Europe*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1975.

Turner, Oliver. '"Finishing the Job": The UN Special Committee on Decolonization and the Politics of Self-Governance'. *Third World Quarterly* 34, no. 7 (August 2013), pp. 1193–1208. https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2013.825078.

Vigne, Randolph. 'SWAPO of Namibia: A Movement in Exile'. *Third World Quarterly* 9, no. 1 (January 1987), pp. 85–107. https://doi.org/10.1080/01436598708419963.

Voller, Yaniv. *The Kurdish Liberation Movement in Iraq: From Insurgency to Statehood*. New York: Routledge, 2014.

Walker, Lydia. 'Decolonization in the 1960s: On Legitimate and Illegitimate Nationalist Claims-Making'. *Past & Present* 242, no. 1 (2019), pp. 227–264.

Walker, Lydia. *States-in-Waiting: A Counternarrative of Global Decolonization*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2024. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009305815.

Welz, Martin, and Daniela Kromrey. 'Legacies of the Past: The Influence of Former Freedom Fighters and Their Rhetoric in Southern Africa'. *Politikon* 42, no. 2 (May 4, 2015), pp. 255–273. https://doi.org/10.1080/02589346.2015.1041673.

Werbner, Richard. 'Smoke from the Barrel of a Gun: Post-Wars of the Dead, Memory and Reinscription in Zimbabwe'. In *Memory and the Postcolony: African Anthropology and the Critique of Power*, edited by Richard Werbner. London: Zed Books, 1998, pp. 71–102.

White, Luise, and Miles Larmer. 'Introduction: Mobile Soldiers and the Un-National Liberation of Southern Africa'. *Journal of Southern African Studies* 40, no. 6 (2014), pp. 1271–1274.

White, Luise. *Unpopular Sovereignty: Rhodesian Independence and African Decolonization*. Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 2015.

Williams, Christian. *National Liberation in Postcolonial Southern Africa: A Historical Ethnography of SWAPO's Exile Camps*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015.

Williams, Christian. 'Education in Exile: International Scholarships, Cold War Politics, and Conflicts among SWAPO Members in Tanzania, 1961–1968'. *Journal of Southern African Studies* 43, no. 1 (January 2017), pp. 125–141. https://doi.org/10.1080/03057070.2017.1272227.

Williams, Christian, and Tichaona Mazarire. 'The Namibian Independence Memorial Museum, Windhoek, Namibia'. *American Historical Review* 124, no. 5 (2019), pp. 1809–1811.

Yordanov, Radoslav A. *The Soviet Union and the Horn of Africa during the Cold War: Between Ideology and Pragmatism*. Reprint edition. Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books, 2017.

CHAPTER 14

Fighting the State: The Comparative Advantages and Disadvantages of the Tamil Tigers in Their Separatist Struggle against the Sri Lankan Government

Georg Frerks

Abstract

Until their defeat in 2009, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) seriously challenged the Government of Sri Lanka (GoSL) for over 25 years, controlling significant parts of Sri Lankan territory and establishing their own governance structures. This chapter provides a structured comparison along seven abductively derived dimensions. It shows that success and failure do not solely depend on military effectiveness and armaments, but also on territorial control, opportunities for mobilisation and rebel governance. Less tangible factors as loyalty and legitimacy, ideology and symbolism, and international backing are important contributing factors.

Keywords: Tamil Tigers, LTTE, Sri Lanka, Rebel governance, Military

14.1 Introduction

The contemporary 'warscape' has revived the interest in armed non-state actors seen operating not only in the Ukraine-Russian war and Gaza, but in countless other conflicts around the globe. According to Beckett in 1989, a survey counted 569 guerrilla or terrorist groups in the world and this number has arguably grown with the implosion of the Soviet Union and the quagmires in the Middle East and Afghanistan.[1] This raises the question of why and how these armed non-state actors persist and what explains their relative successes and failures compared to their statist adversaries. To help answer this question, I argue that much can be learned from the separatist fight of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) or Tamil Tigers against the Government of Sri Lanka (GoSL).[2] The LTTE has been labelled a liberation, separatist/secessionist, insurgent, guerrilla and militant movement, but also a terrorist organisation. In fact, it has been considered among the most effective, disciplined, sophisticated and ruthless non-state actors known.[3] The GoSL

has been described as a legitimate and democratic sovereign power with the right to defend itself against terrorism, but also as a perpetrator of international crimes and human rights violations. In short, the conflict between the GoSL and the LTTE has been subject to political, ethical and moral controversy and contestation, both in Sri Lanka and abroad. It ran from 1983 till 2009 when the LTTE was militarily defeated by the government forces. Despite its final defeat, for long periods the LTTE was able not only to successfully challenge the Sri Lankan Armed Forces, but also to control significant parts of Sri Lankan territory and establish its own governance structures, from where it launched its military efforts, raised taxes and recruits, and built support and legitimacy among the population. In many respects the Tamil Tigers matched the government and this makes it interesting to collate them.

Hence, in this chapter I will make a structured comparison between the two protagonists along several dimensions of interest including: (rebel) governance and territorial control; mobilisation strategies; loyalty and legitimacy; ideology and symbolism; military innovation and effectiveness; unity versus division; and international support and backing.[4] Before delving into these issues, I will present an account of the emergence of Tamil militancy, a description of the two conflict protagonists, and a brief section on the aftermath of the conflict.

The chapter is based on original empirical research by the author spanning several decades and a perusal of relevant secondary sources. I also used some abridged or revised parts of texts that I wrote and co-authored earlier on the subject.[5]

14.2 The Rise of Tamil Militancy and the LTTE

Immediately after independence in 1948 the Sri Lankan government, dominated by the majority Sinhalese, disenfranchised one million Indian Tamils who had been brought from South India as plantation labourers by the British in the late 19th and early 20th century. This created anxiety among other minority groups such as the Muslims, Burghers, and the Ceylon or Jaffna Tamils who had lived on the island for over two thousand years. In 1956, the Sri Lanka Freedom Party came to power with a Sinhalese ethno-nationalist agenda. The government declared Sinhalese the only official national language ('Sinhala-only') to the detriment of Tamil and English, effectively excluding Tamils from government jobs.[6]

In response, the (Tamil) Federal Party (FP) demanded a federal state comprising a separate Tamil-speaking Northern and Eastern part and a Southern Sinhalese part, and wanted both Sinhala and Tamil to be recognised as official languages. It further demanded a stop to state-aided colonisation by Sinhalese farmers in Tamil areas. Non-violent demonstrations and protests by the FP against government policies in 1956 were attacked by Sinhalese mobs and anti-Tamil violence spread across the

country. An estimated 150 Tamils died in the riots, including women and children.[7] In May 1958 there were again riots that left three hundred (mainly Tamils) dead and over one thousand injured. Clarance observes that: 'From this critical moment, the Tamils realized that they could no longer rely on the state to protect them'.[8]

In the 1960s and 1970s controversial colonisation schemes to settle Sinhalese farmers in Tamil areas were implemented, while the so-called educational standardisation hampered Tamil students' access to university. Finally, the new 1972 constitution awarded special protection to Buddhism (adhered to nearly exclusively by Sinhalese), and removed the earlier clause protecting ethnic and religious minorities. Violence against Tamils occurred in several parts of the country, often with the connivance or complicity of the state and the police, and with impunity to the instigators.

In the meantime, the FP proved unable to achieve any results in negotiations with the government. In 1972 the various Tamil political parties united to become the Tamil United Liberation Front that sought to establish a free sovereign state of Tamil Eelam based on the right of self-determination. However, a younger generation of Tamils had become disappointed with the ineffective elderly Tamil political leaders and took matters into their own hands. From the late 1960s and early 1970s onwards, young Tamils started to organise themselves in a variety of radical political and militant groups.

In 1969 the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organisation was set up with the young Velupillai Prabhakaran, the later LTTE leader, as one of its members. On 5 May 1976 Prabhakaran founded the LTTE. In those early days of Tamil militancy, there were more than 30 groups which differed by caste, region, or ideological position (nationalist, revolutionary, Marxist etc.). Several had acquired arms, with some receiving guerrilla training with the help of India, but one of them was also supported and trained by the PLO in Lebanon. Over time, these groups would not only attack the Sri Lankan state but also target each other in a search for exclusive leadership and ideological hegemony.[9]

In the second half of the 1970s, the situation in the north of Sri Lanka grew increasingly violent. Tamil protests, attacks, bomb explosions, and assassination attempts led to widespread arrests, imprisonment of suspects without charge or conviction, torture, and 'a reign of police terror in the North' by the government.[10]

In the years following 1976, Prabhakaran further developed the LTTE, which started training new recruits, and gave itself a logo, a central committee, and a constitution. The LTTE engaged in armed skirmishes with the Sri Lankan army on a significant scale from the late seventies onwards. It staged a series of (bank) robberies and killings of policemen, for which the organisation claimed responsibility in letters to the press. In addition, it blew up an aircraft at the Ratmalana airport close to Colombo. The LTTE also undertook a propaganda campaign justifying their struggle.[11]

Anton Balasingham, a journalist and academic, joined the LTTE giving ideological classes to LTTE members and further developing its political and ideological stance.

The conflict between the government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE gained international prominence as an overt, violent conflict in July 1983, when 13 Sinhalese soldiers were ambushed in Tirunelveli in North Sri Lanka by the LTTE. Riots broke out in Colombo killing thousands of Tamils (estimates range up to 3,000 casualties) and damaging the livelihoods and homes of probably 30,000. An estimated 100,000 Tamils were displaced in Colombo and 175,000 fled abroad. These events, also known as *Black July*, and their aftermath started a full-blown war that was to last 26 years.

In a few years' time the LTTE eradicated competing Tamil rebel groups and gained hegemony as the proclaimed 'sole representative of the Tamil people'. The LTTE proved to be better disciplined and organised than its competitors due to the discipline, central control and leadership qualities of Prabhakaran and its cohesion originating from the closely knit Kadalodiekal *karaiyar*-subcaste[12] in and around Velvethithurai on the Jaffna Peninsula from where Prabhakaran and most of his commanders hailed.[13]

14.3 The Conflict Protagonists

14.3.1 The LTTE

After the LTTE was founded, it went through a process of institutionalisation that especially received an impetus when the movement started to control territory and was able to establish committees, offices and departments. Despite all its organisational appurtenances, Prabhakaran remained the LTTE's supreme leader allegedly with near-total control, though some authors assert that the LTTE had a more horizontal and inclusive leadership structure.[14] Whatever the truth, Prabhakaran, who was called *Thalaivar* or Leader, appeared to be a god-like person for many of his followers. The LTTE's main structures were the political, military and intelligence wings. Its armed wing expanded rapidly from its beginnings as a hit-and-run guerrilla force and became increasingly professionalised resembling more and more a conventional army. There were eleven divisions, including the Sea Tigers, Air Tigers and Black Tigers (the suicide commandos), and specialist artillery, mining, underwater demolition teams and mortar units as well as a hit-and-run pistol gang. Prabhakaran had his own security unit. There was also a women's wing and the infamous 'baby brigade' comprising child soldiers. The LTTE had the dubious reputation of being the first militant movement to pioneer suicide vests and belts, deploy suicide commandos, to have aircraft, and to have invented the cyanide capsule that cadres had to swallow when captured by the enemy so

they could not divulge sensitive information. The use of women and children was also an innovative tactic. Clarke provides a long list of technological innovations by the LTTE.[15] Many of these innovations were copied by other militant movements in the world.

Apart from developments in the military domain, the LTTE also established an effective propaganda machinery, engaged in diplomatic efforts and raised funds through taxation and a variety of legal and illegal means, including drug trafficking, human smuggling, credit card fraud, money laundering, bank robberies and extortion.[16] Its operations among the over one million diaspora Tamils worldwide contributed to its diplomatic, military and financial posture.

Already during the early 1980s, the Indian external intelligence agency, the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), had started training and arming the different Tamil rebel groups on a large scale. In total an estimated 1,200 young Tamils received training in Dehra Dun, close to Delhi, between 1983 and 1987.[17] Those who finished their training in turn trained thousands of new recruits in dozens of camps set up in Tamil Nadu, helped by retired Indian army officers. Swamy estimates that the numbers trained by 1985 would have equalled or surpassed the strength of the Sri Lankan army.[18] Gunaratne claims that some 20,000 people received training and weapons in India.[19] Though it is difficult to verify such numbers, it is generally accepted that the maximum strength of the LTTE fighters was close to 20,000 and between 15,000 and 18,000 throughout during the conflict.[20]

The LTTE procured weapons in a dozen countries in regions varying from Southeastern and Southwestern Asia, Southeast Europe and the Balkans, Africa, former Soviet republics and the Middle East. This was also helped by maintaining contacts with other insurgent groups like the ANC, SWAPO, EPLF, TPLF, HIG and JRA in respectively South Africa, Namibia, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Afghanistan and Japan.[21] It also raided bases of the Sri Lankan army and acquired caches of weaponry and ammunition left behind by the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) in 1990. Clarke describes a whole catalogue of weapons the LTTE possessed including rapid-fire pistols, assault rifles, rocket-propelled grenades, surface-to-air missiles, multi-barrel rocket launchers, artillery batteries and mortars of different sizes, and an array of anti-mortar and anti-aircraft systems and all types of explosives. It also developed 'world class maritime capabilities', including frogman kits, underwater scooters and a fleet of over 500 to a 1,000 fibreglass boats.[22]

The LTTE's defeat in 2009 was facilitated by an internal rift in 2004 when the eastern commander, Karuna, and his men defected and joined the government whom he then provided with crucial military and strategic information.[23] Further, the LTTE's operations and fundraising abroad were hampered by its listing internationally as a proscribed terrorist organisation. After the cease-fire agreement (see below) was abrogated by the Sri Lankan government and it chose to pursue a

military solution to the conflict, the LTTE became outnumbered by the growing Sri Lankan forces and their increased firepower.

14.3.2 The government of Sri Lanka

The Sri Lankan government was initially overwhelmed by the violence that engulfed the country. Its army was originally a ceremonial parade ground force, a colonial remnant used for state visits and Independence Day commemorations. The low priority accorded to the military was caused by the absence of any strategic threats and mutual security arrangements with Britain. Military spending in the 1960s and 1970s was on average well below 1% of GDP. In 1981/82 it was only 0.63 and 0.54% respectively.[24] In 1971 the GoSL had to deal with an insurrection by the Maoist JVP youth movement in the South of the country that took it by surprise. It could only quell the insurrection with the international military support of India, the UK, the US, the Soviet Union, Egypt, Yugoslavia and Pakistan.[25] As a consequence, the police and army became better experienced, trained and equipped to face similar threats in the future. Yet development remained slow also because of political changes in the government and economic recessions. All in all, the forces remained understrength and ill-equipped to deal with the challenges they had to face from the early 1980s. For example, the air force had no combat aircraft at all and as observed by Chandraprema 'the LTTE was far more advanced in their use of light aircraft for combat operations'.[26] However, with the rising threat of Tamil militancy and the armed attacks by the LTTE mounting, defence budgets started to grow well above 3% of GDP and even to nearly 6% in 1995, equalling 15% of the government budget. Also the size of the uniformed forces, including police, the paramilitary police Special Task Force deployed in the east, and the so-called Home Guards, was to grow rapidly and all these forces became more professional and better armed, supported by an array of foreign countries, ranging from Israel to China.[27] Though it had to deal with increasing numbers of desertions in the more violent and bloody episodes of the war, the Sri Lankan uniformed forces ultimately grew to around 360,000 towards the end of the war.

14.4 The Aftermath of the Conflict

All attempts to resolve the conflict, among others through an Indian Peace Keeping Force, direct and indirect (international) negotiations, including facilitation by the government of Norway, failed. The conflict has been described and explained in many ways. Political grievances, competing ethno-nationalisms, ethnic politics and discrimination, failed nation-building, religious intolerance, and human rights

violations and impunity are among the major factors mentioned as contributing to the genesis and escalation of the conflict.

The war caused over 80,000 casualties of which an estimated 27,000 were soldiers from the Sri Lankan Armed Forces, while one million people fled the country, and some 800,000 people were internally displaced, often multiple times.[28] The conflict badly affected the human rights, economic stability and development of the country as a whole and led to a militarisation of society.[29] It also led to increased ethnic and social divisions and mutual distrust between the different identity groups as well as economic disparities between the war zones and the rest of the country. Different transitional justice initiatives in the aftermath of the conflict failed to offer redress to survivors and victims of the war due to the lack of political will on the part of the government.

For this chapter, this brief summary must suffice, as the conflict has been documented extensively by a large variety of Sri Lankan and international scholars and experts.[30] In the remainder of this chapter, I shall discuss the seven different dimensions along which I have structured the comparative discussion of the conflict protagonists.

14.5 Structured Comparison of the Conflict Protagonists

14.5.1 (Rebel) governance and territorial control

The 'warscape' shifted over the 26 years of war. There were periods of intense fighting, the so-called Eelam Wars I–IV, interspersed with episodes of lower-level violence and a cease-fire agreement (CFA) between 2002 and 2008. Similarly, the areas under control of the LTTE also waxed and waned. A distinction was made between 'uncleared areas' that were firmly under the control of the LTTE, cleared areas under control of the GoSL and grey areas where control was divided and frequently shifted, sometimes between day and night, leading to what Spencer et al. called a 'patchwork sovereignty'.[31]

In areas under its control the LTTE set up its own administrative structures, with police, judiciary and tax collection. In other sectors, such as general administration and social services, the LTTE operated pragmatically in conjunction with the state, whereby it nearly completely controlled these state services. The LTTE tried to generate and sustain public authority and legitimacy through a variety of violent and non-violent practices and symbols. It 'mimicked' statehood by introducing, among others, such symbols as policing, uniforms, ceremonies, nationalist songs, commemorations of martyrs, and a media apparatus. This not only consolidated its grip on the Northeast of the island but also engineered a level of support and

compliance among the population of the areas under its control. Obviously, this territorial control and institutional machinery brought significant advantages from a military perspective as a base for launching attacks against government forces and assets, to raise taxes and to recruit fighters. The LTTE also exercised control in the uncleared and grey areas in the north and east, even though they were less visibly present. This was achieved by their capability of undercover and hit-and-run operations, infiltration, surveillance and intelligence. They had the reputation of 'knowing everything' and being able to punish instantly in case of non-compliance.

On 23 February 2002 a CFA was brokered by the Norwegian government. During the CFA period, the boundaries between the areas controlled by the government and those by the LTTE were delineated and supervised by the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission. In its de facto statelet of Eelam the LTTE had now a free hand to build its institutions and its military strength for a negotiated end to the conflict or arguably its final military push to an independent homeland.

As indicated above the LTTE was able to build a militarily successful and effective force that employed a variety of conventional and non-conventional guerilla-type and terrorist means. It took the GoSL a fairly long time before it could equal, let alone surpass the LTTE's strength and its knowledge of the terrain. A problem was that the government forces were stationary and vulnerable to attack from a force that could run from its jungle camps and hide again. When the LTTE increasingly started to become sedentary after the CFA froze the existing boundaries and areas of control, it arguably lost its edge as a highly mobile and flexible force and instead became subject to the same vulnerabilities as conventional forces. Next to other factors such as the defection by Karuna and the forces under his command, the numerical growth of the Sri Lankan forces, and the LTTE's proscription internationally, it has been argued that this process of turning conventional was partly responsible for its downfall. Clarke states: 'A purely kinetic analysis of Karuna's defection reveals that once his force of 500–600 fighters switched sides, the LTTE began to operate as more of a conventional military, rather than as an insurgent force. This strategic miscalculation played directly in the hands of the Sri Lankan COIN forces, which had spent much of the past decade upgrading its conventional forces with the help of China.'[32]

The GoSL was only partly in control of its territory and had to deal with parallel governance structures and fragmented authority. Its own civilian personnel in the north and east were influenced, if not fully controlled by the LTTE. This made it difficult for the government to operate. As the armed forces nearly totally comprised Sinhalese, it had also a problem in its communication with the local population. Though territorial control changed hands a few times during the 26-year-long war, the GoSL could only retake full control of the island at the very end of the war in 2009 and defeat the LTTE and its leadership.

14.5.2 Mobilisation strategies

There are two types of mobilisation relevant for my analysis. First, mobilising general support among the public for the fight against the opponent and, second, the mobilisation of recruits to take part in that fight.

The LTTE developed a whole repertoire of narratives, media campaigns and symbols to garner support for its fight among the general population. Many of the Tamils and to a lesser degree the Muslims in the north and east of Sri Lanka were sympathetic to the goals of the movement, also due to the perceived discrimination by the Sinhalese-dominated governments that increasingly adopted an ethno-nationalist Sinhalese-Buddhist stance in the post-independence period. Most families had members in the movement and they generally felt a sense of loyalty, as also described in section 14.5.3 below. Recent research by the author showed that this level of support remained high also in retrospect and that the ideals of the LTTE and especially the aspiration to establish an independent state of Eelam are still surprisingly alive.[33] It must, however, simultaneously be highlighted that dissent or public disapproval of the LTTE's objectives, policies and actions was heavily sanctioned by the movement, and that there was always an element of coercion present in the background.

However, the LTTE made a strategic blunder when it expelled the Muslims from the Jaffna Peninsula in 1990 and started to attack mosques in the East. This alienated the Muslim minority that initially, at least to a certain degree, was supportive of the movement.

Regarding the mobilisation of fighters (cadres), the movement could rely on those who were motivated to join them voluntarily. As noted by Staniland, there was a surge in young Tamils that wanted to join the LTTE in the aftermath of Black July, but the LTTE took care to maintain high standards and recruit selectively by screening and socialising new recruits.[34] However, in other periods of battlefield losses and when they ran out of manpower, the LTTE also resorted to forced recruitment, including child recruitment. To facilitate this recruitment, they had established the 'one-person-per-family rule' that stipulated that each family had to contribute one member to the struggle. The LTTE subsequently used tactics of motivation, persuasion and ultimately coercion to enforce compliance with this rule.

The Sri Lankan government also tried to motivate young men and women to join them in the fight against the LTTE by referring to such issues as national duty, defence of the 'motherland', territorial integrity, and counterterrorism. It did not use compulsory conscription to raise recruits, but offered an attractive package in terms of salary, pension and, if applicable, payments to survivors of those who were killed in the fighting. Though several recruits may have joined out of idealism,

for poorer and less educated sections of the Sinhalese population, this package offered an attractive opportunity, especially in times of high unemployment. In fact, the salaries offered to soldiers were significantly higher than those available to highly educated personnel in civilian society, such as teachers etc. Yet, for quite a few of these recruits the realities of warfare turned out to be less pleasant and the Sri Lankan armed forces had to deal with a significant number of deserters, so many in fact that deserters were granted amnesty if they returned to their units.

In addition to the importance attached to recruitment, both parties realised the need for getting their messages across to the different national and international audiences. They extensively used the media, videos, internet, propaganda and diplomacy to achieve this. The LTTE had a radio station in Sri Lanka, and also one in Norway for international use. Clarke mentions there were over 40 Sri Lankan Tamil newspapers in North America alone, more than three-quarters of which were managed by the LTTE or associated front groups. Clarke further observes that 'the LTTE's public relations machine became so effective that attempts by the government in Colombo to counteract its propaganda activities fell short.'[35] Only after the proscription of the LTTE in a number of western countries did it become less easy for them to continue and fund their propaganda efforts (see also 5.7 below).

14.5.3 Loyalty and legitimacy

The relationship between the LTTE and the population in the areas under its control was complex. To achieve compliance with their policies, the movement relied on genuine support, loyalty, legitimacy, symbolism and sometimes even admiration; but it also used a mix of persuasion, coercion and violence. It depended on both fear and sympathy. Many Tamils supported the LTTE in its struggle against the Sri Lankan state and most had children or relatives taking active part in its struggle. But there was also forced (child) recruitment and the expulsion of the entire Muslim population from the northern province in 1990. In addition, there was a strong element of repression of those civilians who acted against the interests or policies of the LTTE. Although many Tamils felt a deep sense of loyalty to the LTTE, the people would often talk about the Tigers with fear. The LTTE communicated its demands to the civilian population through letters, house-to-house visits, radio announcements and community meetings and 'no' was not taken for an answer.[36]

Thiranagama's book *In My Mother's House* (2011) provides an ethnographic account of how political violence of both the LTTE and the Sri Lankan state impacted ordinary lives. She shows how the penetration of the LTTE in daily life and its control and possibility to sanction gave the LTTE a form of 'intimate' power. This ambiguity of LTTE rule between sympathy and fear worked out differently for different ethnic groups and regions and varied with the fortunes on the battlefield.

In any case, any room for dissent was limited, if not fully absent. The LTTE was known for its harsh punishments and as reported by Human Rights Watch 'the LTTE prefers to openly execute opponents, perhaps to ensure a deterrent effect on the population. LTTE abductions may also be underreported because the family members of the victims and eyewitnesses are often reluctant to report the abuses, fearing LTTE retribution'.[37]

The GoSL was in a slightly more difficult situation regarding this dimension. Partly this was because subsequent governments had divergent agendas, for example concerning the question of whether to pursue a negotiated solution or a military one. Its constituency in Sri Lanka was also more diverse with different ethnic groups, NGOs, a critical press etc. that had different views on the issue. Its activities were also closely and critically scrutinised by international organisations and the donor community. This left them with less leeway compared to the LTTE who faced fewer limitations, at least until after 9/11 when they were listed as a terrorist organisation and proscribed in a number of countries. This seriously affected their room for manoeuvre abroad and their possibilities for fundraising. The government on the other hand faced the problem of desertion. Though the country had no mandatory conscription and recruits joined of their own free will on the basis of a contract, many were forced to join due to poverty and unemployment. Once faced with the realities of combat, many deserted.

14.5.4 Ideology and symbolism

Both protagonists used ideology, symbols and rituals to legitimise their war efforts. As observed by Staniland, as early as the 1980s, the LTTE had begun to engage in rituals as a form of legitimation.[38] McDowell states that the 'funeral processions for fallen martyrs, cyanide sacrifices, and rousing public speeches contributed towards the mythologizing of Prabhakaran and the Tigers' senior commanders who advanced the invincibility of the LTTE'.[39] Terpstra and Frerks note that

> Symbols of the LTTE as a rebel movement, and of the struggle for an independent state with a distinct national identity, continued to evolve over time. This effort was projected towards internal audiences such as the Tamil population living in the Vanni, but also to international audiences and the diaspora, as part of the LTTE's pursuit of international recognition for its proposed Tamil Eelam.[40]

The LTTE also projected its power by running its parallel state project. It 'mimicked' statehood by setting up all types of public offices, providing security, rule and order by its armed wing and the LTTE police with its own uniforms, by running social services and NGOs, by organising ceremonies and holding commemorations of

martyrs. It designed a Tiger logo, had a national tree, a national flower and a national bird, flew a flag and put posters in the public space. Such symbols functioned to validate rebel rule. In a study on Maoist insurgents in central India, Sundar posits the existence of 'mimetic sovereignties', where both state and rebels start to imitate and resemble one another in their performance of sovereignty.[41] In his recent book, Klem awards this type of performativity a central place in analysing the LTTE's sovereign aspirations, arguing that understanding performances and their effects may better help to explain the movement than all types of structural phenomena.[42]

Rebels usually also try and produce a more-or-less coherent narrative legitimating their struggle and outlining their political goals. The LTTE propagated a strong narrative of a traditional Tamil homeland with its own political and social characteristics referring back to the old Jaffna Kingdoms and Portuguese and Dutch maps that depicted the Northeast as a separate area distinguished from the Kandyan and Kotte Kingdoms in the centre and south of the island. On a more contemporary note, they adopted language of the UN Charter about the right to self-determination, political independence and liberation, and, in contrast to all that, the oppression, state terrorism and genocide perpetrated by the Sri Lankan government. In addition, they wanted to effect 'a socialist transformation' and aimed at 'the creation of a radical new society free from all structures of oppression and exploitation'.[43] These latter changes were directed against 'the tyranny' of the conservative caste-based Jaffna society, suppression of women and inequality.

The government resorted to a nationalistic discourse imbued with a strong Sinhalese-Buddhist flavour. As observed by de Silva, the Sinhalese thought of themselves as a chosen people with a providential mission, entitled to cultural, linguistic, and political supremacy in Sri Lanka. He explains that

> in Sinhalese the words for nation, race and people are practically synonymous and a multi-racial or multi-communal nation or state is incomprehensible to the popular mind. The emphasis on the sense of uniqueness of the Sinhalese past, and the focus on Sri Lanka as the land of the Sinhalese and the country in which Buddhism stood forth in its purest form, carried an emotional appeal compared with which a multi-racial polity was a meaningless abstraction.[44]

In addition, there is a strong discourse elevating the history of Sri Lankan Buddhism. The mythical chronicle of the Mahavamsa states that the foremost task of Kings is the protection and conservation of Buddhism against invasions from the Indian peninsula: 'When King Dutthagamini had defeated 32 Tamil kings, he ruled over Lanka in single sovereignty'.[45] This 'heroic' resistance and victory of King Dutthagamini in the face of these Indian invasions is archetypical for Sri Lankan Buddhism and is applied to the contemporary setting with Tamils and

other minorities presented as a contemporary threat, aiming to harm the original Sinhalese owners of the land, the Bhumi Putras ('Sons of the Soil').

At the international level, the Sri Lankan government stressed its right to defend its territorial integrity and to wipe out a terrorist organisation. Though these arguments were initially not seen as convincing against its own controversial treatment of the Tamil minority, they found more resonance after 9/11 when the LTTE became internationally isolated due to its listing as a terrorist organisation and its proscription in a series of western countries.

14.5.5 Military innovation and effectiveness

I have already described the relative strengths and weaknesses of the two protagonists in section 14.3 above. Both had in common that they had to start from scratch: the LTTE from its origin as a fairly small-scale outfit of young militants amidst many other competing groups and the Sri Lankan army from its origins as a post-colonial parade ground force. After the LTTE proclaimed itself to be the sole representative of the Tamil people in Sri Lanka and took control of the Jaffna Peninsula, it was able to consolidate and expand its military strength. From its beginnings as a hit-and-run guerrilla force using terrorist means, it became a well-trained, equipped, disciplined and ruthless force that also gradually started to build more conventional capabilities. The Sri Lankan government was not well prepared for such an opponent and for a long time it was not able to seriously weaken the LTTE, let alone defeat it. As a consequence, it often resorted to repressive and authoritarian means that were critically scrutinised internationally, if not rejected. Also, India kept a close watch on the developments of its southern neighbour. As stated earlier, the GoSL also had to deal with divergent political views of varying political dispensations, and with prime ministers and presidents of different political convictions that shifted between a preference for a negotiated deal and a more military approach. The government was also hampered by a JVP insurrection in the South in 1988 that had to be dealt with militarily. Further it faced a critical international donor community that was keen to see a negotiated political end to the conflict.

Though the CFA enabled the LTTE to consolidate and, probably, strengthen its military foundation, it also served as a wake-up call to the GoSL. As the Norwegian brokered negotiations did not lead anywhere and the LTTE's demands became ever more radical, among others by wanting to establish an Interim Self-Governing Authority, the newly elected president Mahinda Rajapakse preferred a more hardline approach and ultimately officially abrogated the CFA in January 2008 to pursue a military end to the conflict. As observed by Staniland, the Sri Lankan army was refitted, reformed and expanded during the ceasefire and assisted by

the intelligence provided by Karuna (see below). After the Eastern Province fell to the government, the LTTE were driven back in the Vanni 'massively outnumbered and increasingly outgunned', until they faced their final defeat in Mullivaikal.[46]

14,5.6 Unity versus division

As already discussed above, the LTTE made serious efforts to become a strong, centralised and disciplined organisation. This was not only achieved by intensive cadre training, a concerted ideological narrative and effective propaganda, but also by the physical elimination of adversaries and competitors and the killing of 'traitors'. Any form of open dissent was punished instantaneously. The close control and surveillance of the population led to nearly total compliance with the LTTE's policies and rules. As a consequence, there are very few known examples of dissent or opposition within the LTTE. In 1990 Prabhakaran ordered the execution of his earlier confidant and high-ranking LTTE-member Mahattaya who was accused of plotting with the Indian army's RAW to kill the LTTE's leadership. Burns wrote in the *New York Times* about Prabhakaran that 'many of his own lieutenants have been murdered; Tamils who have criticized him, even mildly or in jest, have been picked up, tortured, and executed; others have been held in dungeons, half-starved, hauled out periodically for a battering by their guards.'[47] Even if this journalistic rendering might only be partly true, it shows that one better toed the line set out by the Leader.

The most consequential threat to the LTTE's unity was the Karuna split in 2004 that arguably set in motion the process leading towards the LTTE's final defeat.

As mentioned already in this chapter, the GoSL position shifted with the change of the political parties and presidents in power. The hardline military solution pursued by President Rajapakse received at least in retrospect significant support among his Sinhalese constituency, though there remained critical voices in the press, the NGO-sector and internationally as elaborated upon in the next section.

14,5.7 International support and backing

At the international level the LTTE has been at the centre of a number of paradoxes in prevailing international norms. On the one hand, there existed hostile international attitudes towards armed struggles against internationally recognised states. Insurgencies like the LTTE might thus become incorporated within a terrorist framing. As such, the LTTE was banned under anti-terrorism legislation by the USA (in 1997), the UK (in 2001), and India (in 1991, after the murder of prime minister Rajiv Gandhi by an LTTE suicide bomber). Countries like Australia and

Canada prohibited the LTTE's fundraising activities in 2002. The EU only decided to proscribe the LTTE in 2006.

At the same time, however, countries like the USA and the UK and many European countries also actively promoted negotiations between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan government. By doing so they implicitly recognised the LTTE as a legitimate political actor with which to negotiate. As part of this effort, several LTTE delegations visited Western countries, including the Netherlands, France, Spain, Switzerland, and South Africa, to examine constitutional models and governance arrangements. Particularly after the CFA in 2002 several Western countries established varying forms of contact with the LTTE's leadership. This, taken together with the various terrorist listings, made relations between the LTTE and these countries both ambiguous and paradoxical.

Also, the Sri Lankan government was scrutinised by the international community, especially with regard to its record on human rights, and whether it engaged in war crimes or crimes against humanity. But the atmosphere turned more positive during the CFA period, when the Wickramesinghe government was in power and adhered to a more neo-liberal and pro-peace agenda.

The donor community in Sri Lanka has embraced positive and negative aid conditionalities as well as non-conditional incentives to promote peace, addressing both the government and the LTTE. It is however questionable whether this has created a lot of impact due to weaknesses and arbitrariness in the application and enforcement, and the lack of clear performance criteria and a compliance regime.[48]

14.6 Conclusion

The structured comparison along the seven dimensions discussed above shows that in the late 1970s and 1980s the LTTE was positioned better along the dimensions of mobilisation, ideology and symbolism, military innovation and unity. The government was initially overwhelmed and did not know how to react to the growing violence, militancy and the aftermath of Black July. It was under pressure from India and had to face a JVP insurrection in the south of Sri Lanka, while its defence was ill-equipped and underfunded.

In the 1990s both sides further consolidated and professionalised, while the LTTE could profit from its territorial control and expanding institutionalisation. Also, the government became better prepared in most dimensions but could not yet match the LTTE.

In the CFA-period from 2002–2008 both parties tried to consolidate their strengths. The LTTE was helped by the internationally supervised boundaries of their prospective Eelam state but also faced a serious drawback by the defection

of Karuna and the dwindling international support, and the proscription of its organisation in a number of western countries. The GoSL, in contrast, seemed to benefit from the post 9/11 situation and was able to muster more international support and sympathy, despite continuing concerns about its human rights record and discrimination vis-à-vis the Tamil population.

In the final stages of the fight and at the end of the war the LTTE lost out on most of the dimensions and the GoSL could reach the upper hand and defeat its opponent.

The main conclusion of this chapter is that for a relatively long period the LTTE was able to exploit its relative strengths in several of the dimensions discussed, but that in the long term the government succeeded in improving its military strength, while the LTTE started to lose its edge, especially when, after 9/11, it was listed as a terrorist organisation and lost international support and fundraising capabilities abroad. It probably made a miscalculation to rely more and more on a conventional style of warfighting instead of a guerrilla-type of struggle where it arguably had an edge over the GoSL. The loss of territory and its governance structures crucially affected its possibilities for recruitment, material provisions and organisation, and led ultimately to its military defeat in 2009.

On a more general level, it can be concluded that the relative success or failure of an armed non-state actor depends on a variety of factors. This case has shown that apart from pure military strength, armament and territorial control, more intangible factors like mobilisation strategies, the use of symbols and ideological or nationalist narratives, loyalty and legitimacy among the population, and keeping unity by the carrot or the stick are of the essence for initial insurgent success. Also, international backing and support play an important role whether from governments, other insurgent groups, NGOs or the population at large.

Notes

1 Beckett, 'The Future of Insurgency', p. 23.

2 Sri Lanka was officially called Ceylon until 1972, but for simplicity's sake I shall refer to the country as Sri Lanka also when I discuss pre-1972 events or developments.

3 Staniland, *Networks of Rebellion: Explaining Insurgent Cohesion and Collapse*, p. 141.

4 These issues were selected as they regularly occur as relevant factors in the literature on the Sri Lankan conflict or have been identified by myself in my (ongoing) work on the subject.

5 For this chapter I used parts of Frerks, 'Female Tigers'; Frerks and Klem, *Dealing with Diversity*; Terpstra and Frerks, 'Rebel Governance' and Terpstra and Frerks, 'Governance Practices'.

6 De Silva, *Sri Lanka's Troubled Inheritance*.

7 Swamy, *Tigers of Lanka. From Boys to Guerrillas*, p. 11; Wickramasinghe, *Sri Lanka in the Modern Age: A History of Contested Identities*, p. 272.

[8] Clarance, *Ethnic Warfare in Sri Lanka and the UN Crisis*, p. 37.
[9] Wilson, *Sri Lankan Tamil Nationalism: Its Origins and Development in the 19th and 20th Centuries*, pp. 126–127.
[10] Bandarage, *The Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka. Terrorism, Ethnicity*, p. 69.
[11] Swamy, *Tigers of Lanka*, pp. 64–65.
[12] *Karayar* refers to the fishermen's caste.
[13] Staniland, *Networks*, pp. 150–151.
[14] Ibid., p. 172.
[15] Clarke, *Terrorism, Inc. The Financing of Terrorism, Insurgency and Irregular Warfare*, p. 58.
[16] Ibid., pp. 50–54.
[17] Swamy, *Tigers of Lanka,* pp. 102, 110.
[18] Ibid., p. 112.
[19] Bandarage, *The Separatist Conflict*, p. 114.
[20] Clarke, *Terrorism*, p. 65.
[21] Ibid., p. 55.
[22] Ibid., pp. 54–57.
[23] See for details: Sánchez Meertens, 'Letters from Batticaloa. TMVP's Emergence and the Transition of Conflict in Eastern Sri Lanka'.
[24] MacroTrends, Sri Lanka Military Spending/Defense Budget, 1960–2024.
[25] De Silva, *A History of Sri Lanka*, p. 543.
[26] Chandrapema, *Gōta's War. The Crushing of Tamil Tiger Terrorism in Sri Lanka*, p. 109.
[27] De Silva, *Sri Lanka and the Defeat of the LTTE*, pp. 223–224.
[28] Figures of casualties vary widely; higher estimates mention figures well over one hundred to one hundred and twenty thousand. This is partly due to the violent end of the war in which many people were killed and disappeared. This episode is subject to political controversy and currently subject to an international investigation into alleged war crimes and violations of human rights by the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva.
[29] Mel, *Militarizing Sri Lanka: Popular Culture, Memory and Narrative in the Armed Conflict*.
[30] For example, Frerks and Klem, *Dealing with Diversity*; McGilvray, *Crucible of Conflict;* Peiris, *Twilight of the Tigers*; Silva, *Sri Lanka and the Defeat of the LTTE;* Solnes, *Powderkeg;* Spencer et al., *Checkpoint*; Swamy, *Tiger Vanquished*; Wickramasinghe, *Sri Lanka in the Modern Age* and Weiss, *The Cage*.
[31] Spencer et al., *Checkpoint*, p. 54.
[32] Clarke, *Terrorism*, p. 67.
[33] Frerks, '"Life After Death", Remembering the "Tamil Tigers" in North-East Sri Lanka', pp. 7–9.
[34] Staniland, *Networks*, p. 157.
[35] Clarke, *Terrorism*, p. 66.
[36] Terpstra and Frerks, 'Rebel Governance and Legitimacy', p. 288.
[37] Quoted in Somasundaram, 'Parallel Governments: Living between Terror and Counter Terror in Northern Lanka (1982–2009)', p. 574.
[38] Staniland, *Networks*, p. 170.
[39] McDowell, *Tamil Asylum Diaspora: Sri Lankan Migration, Settlement and Politics in Switzerland*, p. 89.
[40] Terpstra and Frerks, 'Governance Practices', p. 1032.
[41] Sundar, 'Mimetic Sovereignties, Precarious Citizenship: State Effects in a Looking-glass World', p. 476.
[42] Klem, *Performing Sovereign Aspirations: Tamil Insurgency and Postwar Transition in Sri Lanka*.

[43] LTTE, 'Socialist Tamil Eelam. Political programme of the LTTE', p. 300.
[44] Silva, *A History*, p. 512.
[45] Mahavamsa, Chapter XXV: www.vipassana.com/resources/mahavamsa.
[46] Staniland, *Networks*, p. 175.
[47] Burns, 'A Sri Lankan Evoked Pol Pot: Asia's Latest Master of Terror'.
[48] Frerks and Klem, *Conditioning Peace among Protagonists. A study into the Use of Peace Conditionalities in the Sri Lankan Peace Process*.

Bibliography

Bandarage, A. *The Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka: Terrorism, Ethnicity, Political Economy.* Kohuwala: Vijitha Yapa Publications, 2009.

Beckett, I.F.W. 'The Future of Insurgency'. *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 16, no. 1 (2005), pp. 22–36. https://doi.org/10.1080/0959231042000322549.

Burns, J.F. 'A Sri Lankan Evoked Pol Pot: Asia's Latest Master of Terror'. *New York Times*, 2 May 1995.

Chandrapema, C.A. *Gōta's War: The Crushing of Tamil Tiger Terrorism in Sri Lanka*. Ranjan Wijeratne Foundation, 2012.

Clarance, W. *Ethnic Warfare in Sri Lanka and the UN Crisis.* Kohuwala: Vijitha Yapa Publications, 2007.

Clarke, C.P. *Terrorism, Inc. The Financing of Terrorism, Insurgency and Irregular Warfare.* Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2015.

Frerks, G. '"Life After Death": Remembering the "Tamil Tigers" in North-East Sri Lanka', *Civil Wars* (2023), pp. 1–24. doi: 10.1080/13698249.2023.2167041.

Frerks, G. 'The Female Tigers of Sri Lanka: The Legitimation of Recruitment and Fight'. In *Perpetrators of International Crimes. Theories, Methods, and Evidence*, edited by A. Smeulers, M. Weerdesteijn and B. Holá. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019.

Frerks, G., and B. Klem, eds. *Dealing with Diversity: Sri Lankan Discourses on Conflict and Peace.* The Hague: Clingendael Institute, 2005.

Frerks, G., and B. Klem. *Conditioning Peace among Protagonists. A Study into the Use of Peace Conditionalities in the Sri Lankan Peace Process.* The Hague: Clingendael Institute, 2006.

Klem, B. *Performing Sovereign Aspirations: Tamil Insurgency and Postwar Transition in Sri Lanka*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2024.

LTTE. 'Socialist Tamil Eelam. Political Programme of the LTTE'. In *Dealing with Diversity: Sri Lankan Discourses on Peace and Conflict*, edited by G. Frerks and B. Klem. The Hague: Clingendael Institute, 2005.

McDowell, C. *A Tamil Asylum Diaspora: Sri Lankan Migration, Settlement and Politics in Switzerland*. Oxford: Berghahn, 1996.

McGilvray, D.B. *Crucible of Conflict: Tamil and Muslim Society on the East Coast of Sri Lanka.* Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2008.

Mel, N. *Militarizing Sri Lanka. Popular Culture, Memory and Narrative in the Armed Conflict.* New York: Sage, 2007.

Peiris, G.H. *Twilight of the Tigers. Peace Efforts and Power Struggles in Sri Lanka.* Kohuwala: Vijitha Yapa Publications, 2009.

Sánchez Meertens, A. 'Letters from Batticaloa. TMVP's Emergence and the Transition of Conflict in Eastern Sri Lanka'. PhD Diss., University of Utrecht, 2013.

Silva, K.M. de. *A History of Sri Lanka.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981.

Silva, K.M. de. *Sri Lanka and the Defeat of the LTTE.* Kohuwala: Vijitha Yapa Publications, 2012.

Silva, K.M. de. *Sri Lanka's Troubled Inheritance.* Colombo: International Centre for Ethnic Studies, 2007.

Solnes, J.O. *A Powderkeg in Paradise: Lost Opportunity for Peace in Sri Lanka.* Delhi: Konark Publishers, 2010.

Somasundaram, D. 'Parallel Governments: Living Between Terror and Counter Terror in Northern Lanka (1982–2009)'. *Journal of Asian and African Studies* 45, no. 5 (2010), pp. 568–583.

Spencer, J., J. Goodhand, S. Hasbullah, B. Klem, B. Korf and K.T. Silva. *Checkpoint, Temple, Church and Mosque: A Collaborative Ethnography of War and Peace.* London: Pluto Press, 2015.

Staniland, P. *Networks of Rebellion. Explaining Insurgent Cohesion and Collapse.* Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2014.

Sundar, N. 'Mimetic Sovereignties, Precarious Citizenship: State Effects in a Looking-glass World'. *Journal of Peasant Studies* vol. 41, no. 4 (2014), pp. 469–490.

Swamy, M.R.N. *The Tiger Vanquished. LTTE's Story.* Delhi: Sage Publications India, 2010.

Swamy, M.R.N. *Tigers of Lanka. From Boys to Guerrillas,* 3rd ed. Kohuwala: Vijitha Yapa Publications, 2002.

Terpstra, N., and Frerks, G. 'Governance Practices and Symbolism: De Facto Sovereignty and Public Authority in "Tigerland"'. *Modern Asian Studies* 52, no. 3 (2018), pp. 1001–1042. doi:10.1017/S0026749X16000822.

Terpstra, N., and Frerks, G. 'Rebel Governance and Legitimacy: Understanding the Impact of Rebel Legitimation on Civilian Compliance with LTTE Rule'. *Civil Wars* 19, no. 3 (2017), pp. 279–307. doi: 10.1080/13698249.2017.1393265.

Thiranagama, S. *In My Mother's House: Civil War in Sri Lanka*. Philadelphia, Penn.: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011.

Weiss, G. *The Cage. The Fight for Sri Lanka and the Last Days of the Tamil Tigers.* New York: Vintage, 2012.

Wickramasinghe, N. *Sri Lanka in the Modern Age: A History of Contested Identities.* Kohuwala: Vijitha Yapa Publications, 2006.

Wilson, A. L. *Sri Lankan Tamil Nationalism: Its Origins and Development in the 19th and 20th Centuries.* London: Hurst, 2000.

CHAPTER 15

Cohesion and Conflict Outcomes in Nagorno-Karabakh

Feike Fliervoet

Abstract

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the independence of its constituent republics in 1991, the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast – an enclave with a majority Armenian population within Azerbaijan – declared itself an independent state. A full-scale war erupted between ethnic Armenians and Azerbaijanis, in which the Armenians slowly gained the upper hand and eventually captured the enclave as well as its surrounding regions. How did the irregular forces that fought for the Karabakh Armenians manage to defeat the better-equipped state army of newly independent Azerbaijan? This chapter will argue that political cooperation by the Karabakh Armenians was crucial to achieving military cohesion and, subsequently, battlefield success – and vice versa, that political and military infighting in Azerbaijan contributed to battlefield failure.

Keywords: Cohesion, State formation, Armed forces, Nagorno-Karabakh, Azerbaijan

15.1 Introduction

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the independence of its constituent republics in 1991, the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO) – an enclave with a majority Armenian population within Azerbaijan – declared itself an independent state. A full-scale war erupted between ethnic Armenians and Azerbaijanis, in which the Armenians slowly gained the upper hand. A Russian-brokered ceasefire was signed in 1994, and for the next 25 years, the Nagorno-Karabakh region functioned as a *de facto* state outside of Azerbaijan's influence.[1] Although the two sides did repeatedly exchange fire during these decades, it took until the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War in September–November 2020 for Azerbaijan to regain a steady foothold in the enclave, as it reclaimed most of the territory it had lost in the 1990s.[2] Only recently, in September 2023, did Azerbaijan win back full control over Nagorno-Karabakh through a large-scale military offensive that lasted only twenty-four hours. It resulted in the near-complete exodus of the enclave's Armenian population.[3]

How did the irregular forces that fought for the Karabakh Armenians – non-state armed actors who were greatly outnumbered and had limited military means – manage to defeat the better-equipped state army of newly independent Azerbaijan between 1991 and 1994? This chapter will argue that political cooperation by the Karabakh Armenians was crucial to achieving military cohesion and, subsequently, battlefield success – and vice versa, that political and military infighting in Azerbaijan contributed to battlefield failure. This causal mechanism linking cohesion to conflict outcomes is key to explaining when and how state armies are at risk of losing wars to non-state armed actors, and as such to our understanding of war, peace and security.

In the following sections, this chapter will demonstrate that the Karabakh Armenians simultaneously engaged in war-making and state-making efforts after their declaration of independence in 1991. Over time, the activists of the Karabakh movement created a full-fledged state apparatus to govern the territory of the unrecognised Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (NKR), also known as the Republic of Artsakh. The creation of this governing structure was not without problems, however, as different military and political forces vied for control during the Republic's formative years. On the military side, self-defence forces emerged in a bottom-up fashion, lacking political affiliation or coordination. In August 1992, however, they were brought under a single command in the form of a State Defence Committee.[4] Since then no infighting has occurred within the Karabakh movement, contributing to battlefield successes that ultimately allowed the Karabakh Armenians to gain full control over Nagorno-Karabakh.

The Republic of Azerbaijan meanwhile struggled to create a unified military force, and therefore also struggled on the battlefield. Prior to the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Azeri leadership had deliberately held off on the establishment of a national army, and it failed to catch up to the more organised Armenian forces after gaining independence. In part, this military disorganisation was a reflection of the lack of political unity in Azerbaijan, where distrust between regime and opposition prevented effective political as well as military cooperation.[5] As a result, the better-equipped Azerbaijani army suffered a painful defeat at the hands of the irregular forces of the NKR. This chapter thus shows that statehood is not a necessary nor a sufficient condition for the creation of an effective army, and in doing so, problematises the distinction between the state and the non-state.

15.2 Creating a Non-State Army: The Karabakh Armenians

The Karabakh Armenians have a long history of political activism with regard to the status of the NKAO. Notwithstanding the fact that it had a majority Armenian

population, the mountainous Karabakh region was incorporated into the Azerbaijani Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR) in 1923 – an arrangement that left the Armenians continuously dissatisfied. Despite a decades-long political campaign advocating the transfer of the NKAO to the Armenian SSR, the Soviet leadership refused to heed to the Armenians' demands.[6] At the state as well as the local level, the Azerbaijani SSR and its Azeri citizens also continually resisted Armenian attempts to withdraw the NKAO from Azerbaijan's authority, leading to increasing tensions between Armenians and Azerbaijanis in both their titular SSRs.

The Armenian SSR played a particular role in the conflict, simultaneously maintaining strong involvement in and a certain distance to Nagorno-Karabakh. Although the Armenian Supreme Soviet repeatedly passed resolutions in favour of incorporating Nagorno-Karabakh into Soviet Armenia, it sought to work through the Soviet system to accomplish unification and refrained from taking more confrontational steps. After the Soviet Union collapsed, newly independent Armenia did not lay claim to Nagorno-Karabakh or even recognise its independence: it was careful to avoid the Karabakh conflict from being portrayed as a war of annexation rather than a quest for self-determination, for this would have harmed Armenian interests considerably. This is also why Armenia's military involvement was of a clandestine nature and comprised paramilitary forces rather than army detachments, as it sought to retain plausible deniability when it came to its involvement in the Karabakh war.

From 1988 onwards, the tensions between Armenians and Azerbaijanis turned increasingly violent. A growing wave of interethnic clashes resulted in the expulsion of thousands of Azeris from Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh, and thousands of Armenians from other regions in Azerbaijan. Anticipating the outbreak of a conflict in which the Karabakh Armenians would not be able to rely on Soviet forces coming to their aid, the Armenians started to organise themselves into self-defence units of twenty to forty men.[7] These units, which called themselves *fedayeen* – an Arabic term used to refer to 'sacrificial fighters willing to risk their lives for the cause'[8] – were organised in a bottom-up manner and served local protection needs, thus engaging in armed activities with little coordination or cooperation with other forces.[9] As Bolukbasi writes, the *fedayeen* initially were 'undisciplined, unorganised, and under-trained',[10] but as time went on, they benefitted from an influx of diaspora Armenians from Lebanon and elsewhere who had gained battle experience in the Lebanese civil war or in the activities of the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA), a terrorist organisation operating from Beirut that primarily targeted Turkish diplomats.[11] These experienced fighters not only provided the self-defence forces with military know-how, but also helped in their organisation and the procurement of weaponry.

More specifically, it was the diaspora organisation Armenian Revolutionary Federation–Dashnaktsutyun (ARFD) that took up the pivotal role of commanding

the activities of the Karabakh movement.[12] The organisation has a long history in Armenia, ruling the First Republic of Armenia during its brief period of independence from 1918 to 1920. The ARFD was subsequently banned by the communist regime and moved its base of operations to the Armenian diaspora, most notably in Lebanon and the United States, from where it exercised considerable influence during Soviet times. From 1988 onwards, it secretly became active in Nagorno-Karabakh by providing tacit support to the Karabakh movement.[13] This support soon became crucial for the defence of the Armenian enclave, as by 1990, the ARFD had set up several self-defence units in Nagorno-Karabakh and provided weapons, food and financial aid to the movement.[14] The delivery of small arms, in particular, served as leverage to bind the self-defence units to the Federation both politically and militarily: the *fedayeen* were in desperate need of weaponry, often having only hunting rifles or self-made weapons at their disposal.[15] By making membership of the ARFD a condition for the provision of its aid, the fighters of the Karabakh movement were brought into the ranks of the Federation, allowing the latter to serve as a first platform for coordination and cooperation between the disparate forces in Nagorno-Karabakh.

At first glance, this development may seem wholly positive for the defence of Nagorno-Karabakh and the pursuit of Armenian interests in the enclave, but it also had negative consequences. To understand why, it is important to know that for historical reasons, the ARFD was perceived as an opposition party that challenged the authority of the Armenian National Movement (ANM), the party that dominated the political landscape in Armenia and that officially came to power in August 1990. While Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia had their own political systems, the key players in these systems were not fully independent of one another; as such, the emergence of the ARFD as a strong political force in Nagorno-Karabakh was considered a vital challenge to the authority of the ANM in an already fragmented political landscape in Yerevan.[16] To some observers, the friction between the ARFD and the ANM was even considered a potential source of internecine war, as exemplified by the following statement of the leader of the Communist Party of Armenia, Vladimir Movsisyan, on 17 April 1990: 'We are facing a new disaster – there are dangerous trends of internal national discord that could lead to civil war.'[17]

Although an internecine war never materialised, the tensions between the ARFD and the ANM did start to pose an operational risk as Armenian self-defence units with competing political affiliations became active in Nagorno-Karabakh. While the ARFD initially was the only organisation that actively provided support to the self-defence units in Nagorno-Karabakh and therefore was able to exert a large degree of control over them, this changed as a consequence of Operation *Koltso* (also known as Operation Ring) on 30 April 1991. This operation, a large-scale military campaign launched by Soviet and Azerbaijani security forces intended to

quash Armenian disobedience, 'resulted in the arrest and detention of hundreds of Armenian men, the temporary deportation of thousands of Armenians, and the emptying of between twenty-two and twenty-four Armenian villages.'[18] Rather than deterring the Armenians, however, the operation served as a further confirmation that they would not be safe in Azerbaijan or receive protection from the Soviet Union, thus strengthening their conviction that Nagorno-Karabakh should be transferred to the Armenian SSR. In addition, the operation bolstered rather than weakened the ranks of the Armenian irregulars.

The main cause of the surge in Armenian forces, who merely numbered a few hundred men, was the fact that the ANM now became directly involved in the armed activities in Nagorno-Karabakh. The party flew in Armenian volunteer fighters by helicopter who were equipped with weapons bought illegally from Georgian military units, including hand-held weapons, automatic weapons and grenade launchers.[19] These forces did not follow the orders of the ARFD, but instead heeded their own lines of command. In other words, the direct involvement of ANM forces in Nagorno-Karabakh meant that different factions emerged in the Karabakh movement: local self-defence units that had emerged in a bottom-up fashion, which accounted for an estimated eighty percent of all detachments operating in Nagorno-Karabakh and were often 'excessively politicised and rigidly tied to their area'[20]; and detachments arriving from Armenia, making up the remaining 20 percent of forces. Both of these strands contained factions controlled by the ARFD (the majority of self-defence units), others controlled by the ANM, and yet others who operated independently. The ANM and ARFD detachments, in particular, did not trust one another and therefore did not engage in joint operations or coordinate their military actions. The self-defence units instead operated at their own behest, failing to see the need for military discipline or subordination to a single command.[21]

The Karabakh Armenians soon realised how unsustainable this situation was. Not only did the fragmentation of the self-defence units hinder their military effectiveness, it also put their survival at risk. For the Karabakh Armenians to withstand the Azerbaijani forces, the support of Armenia was indispensable: Armenia provided Nagorno-Karabakh with its only connection to the outside world. They thus could not afford alienating the ANM. Therefore, the ARFD was willing to make far-reaching concessions to placate the ANM. The first of these concessions was the establishment of an operational headquarters for Nagorno-Karabakh in both Yerevan and Stepanakert. In the latter capital, these headquarters took the shape of a Defence Committee headed by Serzh Sargsyan, a local ally of Armenian President Levon Ter-Petrosyan.[22] Secondly, in July 1991, the ARFD accepted that the command of the self-defence units was transferred from Arkady Karapetyan, an active member of the ARFD, to General Arkady Ter-Tadevosyan, a neutral political figure and military professional who effectively followed Sargsyan's command.[23]

General Ter-Tadevosyan was tasked with uniting the disparate forces in Nagorno-Karabakh under a single command – a tough challenge, given the extreme fragmentation of Nagorno-Karabakh's military landscape at the time.[24] Gradually, however, he managed to realise a closer collaboration between the various self-defence units with different political orientations, and by October 1991, the military command under General Ter-Tadevosyan's lead was able to coordinate the actions of all self-defence units. A key factor in the General's success was the strategy of the government of Armenia to send its supplies of arms and ammunition to the Defence Committee, which, as the ARFD had done previously, could now use these supplies as leverage to ensure the loyalty of the different forces, regardless of their prior political affinity.[25]

From November 1991 onwards, a next stage of military integration took place as the different self-defence units were transformed into regular military detachments, marking the onset of the formal establishment of the NKR Defence Army. First, the volunteer detachments were transformed into nine companies, followed by the creation of the first regiment in February 1992.[26] In March, the volunteer units were granted the official status of Self-Defence Forces. Meanwhile, the NKR's authorities decided that the presence of any paramilitary formations in the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh was illegal, taking an important step towards the establishment of a monopoly on violence in the enclave.[27]

The improved coordination of the Self-Defence Forces allowed for a string of important military victories over the Azerbaijani army, despite the fact that the latter had more than ten times the number of forces and was much better armed and equipped.[28] The most important of these victories occurred in May 1992 when the Armenians captured Shusha, a majority-Azeri town of great strategic importance due to its location uphill from Stepanakert, the capital of Nagorno-Karabakh. The capital was constantly besieged from Shusha, and capturing this town therefore greatly enhanced the safety of Stepanakert's residents. The Armenians subsequently broke the blockade between Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia by capturing the town of Lachin and creating the crucially important Lachin corridor, which allowed for goods and people to be transported into the enclave over land instead of by air.

The capture of Shusha and creation of the Lachin corridor led some to believe that the war over Nagorno-Karabakh had been won, decreasing their focus on the battlefield and re-initiating the political confrontation between the ANM and the ARFD.[29] Yet while almost all of Nagorno-Karabakh was in Armenian hands by the end of May 1992, making the prospects of a reversal of battlefield fortunes seem unlikely,[30] the Armenians subsequently suffered a series of losses in June and July of 1992,[31] underlining the crucial importance of political cohesion for military success – and the detrimental consequences of political fragmentation as a precursor to military failure.

In response to the military setbacks on the battlefield, Armenia enforced a process of political unification to finally quash the tensions between the ANM and ARFD. Key in this process was the establishment of the State Defence Committee (SDC) on 15 August 1992, which assumed all executive power in Nagorno-Karabakh.[32] As Hakobyan writes, 'This step was explained by the necessity of confronting Azerbaijan's extensive military operations with a united front.'[33] Robert Kocharyan, a close ally of Armenian president Ter-Petrosyan, was elected as the SDC's president and authorised to head the government. In parallel, the NKR Defence Army was formally created, into which the entire Karabakh Armenian male population between eighteen and forty-five years of age – around fifteen thousand men – were conscripted.[34] Taking charge of political as well as military affairs, the SDC effectively brought forces in both spheres under a single command, crucially improving relations with the Armenian authorities in Yerevan – and the battlefield performance of the NKR Defence Army in the process. As such, the struggle for power in the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic was effectively ended, and the republic now possessed a 'non-state army'.

In sum, after tensions between Armenians and Azerbaijanis increased, the Karabakh Armenians were quickly imbued with the fact that the creation of a united armed force was necessary. Initially, it was the diaspora organisation ARFD that took charge of this process, using its provision of support as leverage to tie the Karabakh Armenians to the organisation both politically and militarily. While this development initially did serve to create a united front in Nagorno-Karabakh, it also created tensions with the ANM in Armenia, which saw the influence of the ARFD in Nagorno-Karabakh as a challenge to its rule in Armenia. A political confrontation between the two organisations ensued, in which the ARFD ultimately made far-reaching concessions to the ANM in order to resolve the political crisis in the region and ensure the survival of Nagorno-Karabakh. The creation of the State Defence Committee and NKR Defence Army were the final steps in this process, by which the ARFD effectively relinquished its power. A key factor in the creation of the 'non-state army' of Nagorno-Karabakh was thus the ability of several key ARFD members to put the greater good before their own, as they realised that movement cohesion as well as the maintenance of good relations with Armenia were of existential importance to the NKR.[35]

15.3 Internal Strife and Military Setbacks: The Fragmented Army of Azerbaijan

While the process of uniting the disparate Karabakh Armenian forces progressed relatively quickly – it started in 1990 and was effectively complete in August 1992 – the Azerbaijanis meanwhile struggled greatly to establish a cohesive national army. Part of the explanation for this struggle is the fact that the Azerbaijanis did

not possess the same sense of urgency as the Armenians when it came to the establishment of effective military structures, nor was the Karabakh issue perceived as a matter of survival like it was by Armenians. For the Armenians, a long history of repression and persecution had translated into a collective trauma and sustained perception of existential threat; the Azerbaijanis simply lacked such a laden history. As Koehler and Zurcher write, 'The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict grew to be dominant in Azerbaijan not as a nationalist cause of great urgency unifying the political forces as in Armenia; on the contrary, it was simply the most important tool of political infighting in the capital.'[36]

While the long history of political activism by the Karabakh Armenians described in the previous section was indicative of a strong nationalist fervour in relation to the Karabakh issue, such zeal only emerged in Azerbaijan by the fall of 1988.[37] By that time, the Armenians had been organising mass rallies to gain control over Nagorno-Karabakh for nearly a year and collecting signatures among the population for a 'referendum' on unification with Armenia for nearly two, yet the Azerbaijani people only now mobilised in defence of their republic's territorial integrity.[38] They had not previously taken an interest in the Karabakh issue because they did not realise it held such significance to the Armenians, and had therefore 'simply taken for granted that Karabakh would always be theirs.'[39] In Baku, daily mass demonstrations began to take place from mid-November, involving as many as forty different informal organisations.[40] They eventually coalesced into the Azerbaijan Popular Front (APF) in March 1989, giving direction to the popular discontent among the Azerbaijani population.[41]

According to Bolukbasi, the APF 'was never as organized or as disciplined as the ANM.'[42] Instead, it was a loose umbrella organisation containing many different subgroups who pursued a range of different goals and advocated the use of different means. On one end, there was a moderate wing that primarily sought to win the next parliamentary elections in Azerbaijan; on the other, there was a radical wing that strove for Azerbaijan's independence and did not shy away from harsher methods – including armed action.[43] The status of Nagorno-Karabakh was the Front's most pressing issue, however, and the various factions did seem to agree on the need to actively defend Azerbaijani sovereignty over the enclave.[44]

The Popular Front elected Abulfaz Elchibey as its leader at its official founding congress in July 1989, and gained legal status as a political organisation in October of that same year.[45] The APF initially claimed to form a united front with the Azerbaijani Communist Party (AzCP),[46] but in practice, the two organisations clashed on key issues – the most important being the need for Azerbaijan to have its own defence forces. From August onwards, the APF had started to form volunteer units to confront the Armenian self-defence forces active in Nagorno-Karabakh;[47] indeed, Azerbaijani militants who were either 'tightly or loosely linked to the APF'

had been clashing with Armenian irregulars in several locations.[48] The Popular Front began to organise its volunteers into 100-men strong military units,[49] starting the process of military structuring that was necessary to counter the threat of Armenian irredentism. Yet despite these efforts, the AzCP in November rejected an appeal by the APF to establish a national army.[50] The AzCP argued that having such an army was not necessary, because Soviet troops would defend Azerbaijani interests whenever needed. To lend credence to this argument, around 15,000 troops from the Soviet Interior Ministry were stationed in Nagorno-Karabakh soon after.[51]

Frustrated with the AzCP's lack of action, the APF became dominated by its radical wing, who were 'fully in charge of the Popular Front' by December 1989.[52] The APF's influence only grew while the AzCP's authority dwindled, leading to a deepening political crisis in Azerbaijan. By early January, military units of the APF had taken power into their own hands in different regions of the country, even serving as an informal government in many of them.[53] In coordination with the AzCP, the APF subsequently formed a National Defence Council (NDC) on 12 January 1990, tasked with overseeing the defence efforts of the Azerbaijanis and with protecting the republic against Armenian incursions.[54] The NDC was thus intended to take up the role the ARFD had played in Nagorno-Karabakh, coordinating the efforts of the different volunteer units that had started to emerge previously.

The efforts of the NDC were thwarted within days, however, due to events in Baku that became known as 'Black January'. On 13 January, the day after the National Defence Council had been formed, an anti-Armenian pogrom commenced in Baku that took the lives of over ninety Armenians and injured dozens more.[55] The role of the APF in the violence is strongly debated, with some claiming that Popular Front activists were responsible for the atrocities while others claim they helped save Armenian lives. As De Waal aptly notes, both claims are probably true, given the highly diverse nature of the Front's membership.[56] Regardless of its role, however, Moscow cracked down hard on the APF in the days after the pogrom, detaining dozens of Popular Front activists – including many members of the NDC.[57] In the crackdown, Soviet troops killed at least 130 civilians, and wounded hundreds more.[58]

In the aftermath of the events that transpired in Baku, Soviet troops took control of Nagorno-Karabakh (as well as other contentious regions in Azerbaijan), declared a state of emergency, and started disarming the population. Left without weaponry, some of the military units that had been formed by the APF disbanded themselves, while others continued illegally. This led to a decline in the APF's power, but its popularity only grew: while Black January had the effect of restoring the Communist Party's power throughout the country, it destroyed its legitimacy.[59]

One of the factors that facilitated the restoration of the AzCP's control over Azerbaijan was a piece of new Soviet legislation allowing Union Republics to form

their own special police forces, known as OMON, an opportunity of which the AzCP eagerly made use. The forces, effectively legalised paramilitaries, were deployed almost exclusively in and around Nagorno-Karabakh and tightened the AzCP's grip on the region.[60] While the OMON's establishment had the short-term advantage of suppressing the rebellious activities of the Karabakh Armenians – the OMON played a key role in Operation *Koltso*, mentioned in the previous section, in the spring of 1991 – it had disastrous consequences in the longer term as it further delayed the creation of a national army.[61]

Indeed, even after the August 1991 coup that heralded the end of the Soviet Union, the Communist Party in Baku remained loyal to the Soviet system and was reluctant to become independent from Moscow militarily. While it seemed on paper like important steps were being taken in that direction – after Azerbaijan had declared itself independent on 30 August 1991, a Ministry of Defence was created on 5 September and a Defence Council on 29 September, and the decision to create the National Army of Azerbaijan (NAA) was taken on 9 October –Yunusov asserts that these were merely token gestures:

> The Azerbaijani leadership opposed the creation of genuine armed forces, fearing that they might later turn their weapons against the Communist authorities. For similar reasons everything possible was done to prevent weapons falling into the hands of the population. Following secret orders from the republican leadership, officials in the MOD openly sabotaged the decision to create the NAA.[62]

This sabotage included the dissuasion of those arriving at NAA recruitment stations to enrol in the army, as a result of which the NAA was only composed of 150 servicemen by February 1992 – five months after the decision to create an army had been taken.[63] Efforts to form effective armed forces were further compounded by the fact that few Azerbaijanis had served in combat battalions or officer roles in the Soviet army, instead being assigned to 'notoriously undisciplined' construction battalions.[64] A final complicating factor was that Azerbaijan's independence had given a new impetus to the confrontation between the APF and the leadership of the former AzCP: 'for many politicians, the war effort was [simply] less important than the domestic power struggle.'[65]

Meanwhile, the APF made considerable efforts to compensate for the lack of action on the part of Azerbaijan's leadership by forming new volunteer units. The first two self-defence battalions were formed in Shusha and Lachin in November 1991, and additional volunteer units were established by other political organisations. Until genuine efforts were made to form a national army, these forces took the responsibility of defending Nagorno-Karabakh.[66] Meanwhile, the Defence Council that had been created in September 1991 and which was composed

of representatives from various political parties (including the APF) was dissolved on 27 January 1992, allegedly because Azerbaijan's first president, Ayaz Mutalibov, was afraid that the volunteer units under the control of the different political parties 'could be used to topple him.'[67]

The dissolution of the Defence Council did not lead to the disbandment of the different volunteer detachments, however; it just hindered their coordination. In effect, numerous private armies emerged that were under the command of influential, wealthy, or criminal individuals, and that were kept together by kinship, regional loyalties, party affiliation, or money. In front-line Agdam, for example, no fewer than six private armies were active, while four rival paramilitary groups fought in Shusha. Despite the strategic importance of these towns, there was no cooperation or coordination between the forces defending them, and they frequently fought each other instead.[68]

This chaos on the Azerbaijani side of the frontline in Nagorno-Karabakh coincided with the institutionalisation of the Karabakh Armenian self-defence units under General Ter-Tadevosyan's leadership, allowing the Armenians to realise important military victories in the first months of 1992 – including the capture of Khojaly, a town of great symbolic and strategic significance due to its proximity to Stepanakert and the presence of an airfield.[69] To the Azerbaijani side, these were such painful losses that they forced Mutalibov to step down from the presidency on 5 March 1992. Military reverses continued in his absence, however, culminating in the fall of Shusha in May. Through a manipulation of parliamentary procedures that constituted a 'constitutional coup d'état', Mutalibov tried to use the tragic loss of Shusha as an excuse to return to power.[70] This was essentially a declaration of civil war with the APF,[71] which overthrew Mutalibov in a swift and 'nearly bloodless' counter-coup on 8 May.[72] A pro-APF government was formed the next day, but by then, the damage was already done: Azerbaijani positions on the front, including Lachin, were left exposed because APF military units were rushed to the capital to challenge Mutalibov's rule.[73] As described in the previous section, the Karabakh Armenian forces subsequently captured Lachin and established a land bridge with Armenia on 18 May. Some of the most important military defeats for Azerbaijan thus coincided with political unrest and internal strife in Baku.

It was after Abulfaz Elchibey, the leader of the APF, was elected President on 7 June 1992 that efforts to create a cohesive national army started in earnest. Indeed, Elchibey directly enacted emergency measures to jumpstart the process. These included the issuance of a decree calling for the disbandment and disarmament of all the different private armies, which he held collectively responsible for Azerbaijan's battlefield failures.[74] This decree seems not to have been enacted immediately, however, as paramilitary forces played a significant role in future operations. Elchibey also mobilised almost 40,000 men for the NAA, of which about

21,000 recruits were deployed to the battlefield by the summer of 1992. Together with about 4,000 OMON troops and up to 7,000 fighters from the volunteer battalions of the APF and other parties, the NAA launched several successful attacks that heralded a temporary shifting of fortunes in Nagorno-Karabakh.[75] The first of these offensives took place on 12 June, merely five days after Elchibey's election. It is unlikely that Elchibey's reforms yielded results this quickly; a more likely explanation for the Azerbaijani successes is the fact that Azerbaijan benefited from the influx of large amounts of military hardware left behind by the departing Russian army,[76] coupled with the confrontation between the ANM and ARFD (described in the previous section) that weakened the Armenian front.

Azerbaijan was unable to consolidate its military successes, however. The fall and winter of 1992 were marked by only Armenian victories, undoing much of the progress the Azerbaijani army had made during the summer.[77] The lack of battlefield success led to a substantial decline in the popularity of Elchibey and the APF, brought many of the warlords on Azerbaijan's frontline to act on their own accord, and negatively affected the government's recruitment efforts for the NAA.[78] As Bolukbasi writes,

> battlefield defeats, together with the growing popular perceptions that the command staff was largely incompetent and corrupt contracted recruitment figures within a year. Faced with the dwindling of men under arms, the government introduced conscription, but many tried to elude it …. All these took place while on the war front Azeri units suffered from low morale, higher desertion rates, and lack of discipline.[79]

In an effort to turn the tide, the Elchibey government dismissed its Defence Minister, Rahim Gaziyev, as well as the commander of the Northern front, Surat Huseinov, in early February 1993.[80] Rather than reversing battlefield fortunes, however, this decision triggered a mutiny on the part of Huseinov and the forces under his command that was illustrative of the lack of control the government exercised over its own armed forces. After his dismissal, Huseinov withdrew his forces from the frontline to Ganja, where a clash with NAA forces ensued in early June 1993.[81] Huseinov subsequently demanded that Elchibey and two other high officials would step down from power immediately; when they proposed negotiations instead, he and his private army started to march on the capital. By mid-June, Huseinov and his forces were outside Baku demanding the resignation of the entire government, eventually leading Elchibey to flee 'after being informed that the military would not intervene to stop them.'[82] It was former Communist strongman Heidar Aliyev who stepped into the power vacuum and took Elchibey's place, coopting Huseinov by appointing him as prime minister, minister of defence, and minister of interior.[83]

The coup d'état and its resulting disarray in Baku had direct negative effects on the battlefield, demoralising the troops of the NAA and enabling the NKR Defence Army to make large advances.[84] Rather than prioritising the war effort, Aliyev focused on consolidating his power by organising presidential elections in October 1993 (which he won by a landslide) and purging opponents from the government and armed forces. As Yunusov writes:

> He disbanded all 33 volunteer battalions that were under the control of the APF and various other parties. This led to disaster for the Azerbaijanis on the front, for it was the most able units, numbering some 7,000 men, that were disbanded. Amid an Azerbaijani internal crisis, Azerbaijan lost seven regions in and around Nagorno Karabakh in Armenian attacks at the end of the year.[85]

With internal politics being the main focus of the Azerbaijani government, it is perhaps no surprise that the Karabakh Armenians gained control over the entire Nagorno-Karabakh region, as well as a 'buffer zone' around it, by the end of 1993.[86] While Aliyev managed to win back a limited part of the buffer zone in a winter offensive in early 1994, he eventually signed a ceasefire agreement on 12 May 1994 that left an estimated 20 percent of Azerbaijan's territory outside of his control – a situation that would last for almost thirty years.[87]

To summarise, creating a cohesive national army was never a priority of the Azerbaijani government. The Azerbaijani Communist Party was long convinced that it was better off putting its faith in the hands of Moscow, therefore rejecting calls by the Azerbaijani Popular Front to establish its own armed forces. The APF tried to counter this inaction by establishing its own volunteer units, but they lacked coordination. A National Defence Council was created to resolve this issue, but the Council was short-lived as many of its members were jailed after a Moscow crackdown on the APF following Black January. On paper, the situation changed when Azerbaijan gained independence in August 1991 and established a ministry of defence as well as the National Army of Azerbaijan, but in practice, efforts to establish the NAA were sabotaged by former AzCP officials. The APF and other political parties established new volunteer units that effectively took on the fighting in and around Nagorno-Karabakh, but over time, these developed into private armies that fought each other as much as they fought the enemy. They therefore suffered one military defeat after another, particularly during times of internal strife in Baku, and were unable to prevent the Karabakh Armenians gaining control of twenty percent of Azerbaijan's territory.

15.4 State and Non-State Armies

When asking how the irregular forces that fought for the Karabakh Armenians managed to defeat the better-equipped state army of newly independent Azerbaijan, the answer is largely a story of army formation. The irregular forces of the Karabakh Armenians were only a *non-state* army because Nagorno-Karabakh was never recognised as an independent state; in all other respects, they created effective army structures through which they were able to realise battlefield success. The Azerbaijanis, on the other hand, were hesitant to create such structures even after gaining independence. Part of the explanation for this discrepancy was the fact that the Azerbaijani authorities long believed that they could rely on the Soviet centre to fight its battles for them, whereas the Karabakh Armenians had quickly given up that hope. Although the APF made extensive efforts to compensate for the lack of urgency felt on the part of the AzCP, the volunteer units it created never reached the level of coordination necessary to counter the Karabakh Armenian self-defence forces effectively. Internal political strife further distracted the Azerbaijanis from their predicament on the battlefield, reflected by the simultaneous occurrence of political upheaval in Baku and crucial losses on the frontline. The Karabakh Armenians, on the other hand, benefited from the political cohesion that was achieved when the ARFD conceded power to the ANM, stringing together military victories that the Azerbaijanis were unable to reverse. This chapter thus demonstrates that it is not the state or non-state designation of an army that determines its military prowess, but rather the extent to which political cooperation can be translated into military cohesion and, subsequently, battlefield success.

Notes

1 Crisis Group, 'Nagorno-Karabakh: Seeking a Path to Peace in the Ukraine War's Shadow'.
2 Center for Preventive Action, 'Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict'.
3 Wright, 'Nagorno-Karabakh: Armenia Says 100,000 Refugees Flee Region'.
4 Hakobyan, *Karabakh Diary: Green and Black – Neither War nor Peace*, p. 159.
5 Bolukbasi, *Azerbaijan: A Political History*, pp. 187–190.
6 Panossian, 'The Irony of Nagorno-Karabakh: Formal Institutions versus Informal Politics'.
7 Croissant, *The Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict: Causes and Implications*, p. 38.
8 De Waal, *Black Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan Through Peace and War*, p. 112.
9 Sargsyan, *Нагорный Карабах: Война и Политика (1990–93гг.). Война в Нагорном Карабахе и Внутренний Конфликт в Армянском Обществе* [Nagorno-Karabakh: War and Politics (1990–93)], p. 35.
10 Bolukbasi, *Azerbaijan: A Political History*, p. 161.

[11] The main goals of ASALA were a public acknowledgment of the 1915 Armenian genocide, the payment of reparations by Turkey, and the 'liberation' of traditional Armenian lands in Turkey and beyond. Central Intelligence Agency, 'The Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia'.
[12] Sargsyan, *War in Nagorno-Karabakh*.
[13] Fliervoet, 'Friends or Foes: Explaining Cohesion in Secessionist Movements', p. 112.
[14] Ibid.
[15] De Waal, *Black Garden*, p. 163.
[16] See Fliervoet, 'Friends or Foes', pp. 110–115.
[17] Quoted in Sargsyan, *War in Nagorno-Karabakh*, p. 30.
[18] Human Rights Watch, 'Azerbaijan: Seven Years of Conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh', p. 5.
[19] De Waal, *Black Garden,* p. 115.
[20] Ter-Tadevosyan, 'Анализ Боевых Действий в Арцахе (Июль 1991-Июль 1992 Гг.) [The Analysis of Combat Operations in Artsakh (July 1991–July 1992)]', p. 553.
[21] Ibid., pp. 552–554.
[22] Sargsyan, *War in Nagorno-Karabakh*, pp. 75–76.
[23] Ter-Tadevosyan, 'Analysis of Combat Operations', p. 552.
[24] Ibid.
[25] Ibid., pp. 557–558.
[26] Ibid., p. 560.
[27] Sargsyan, *War in Nagorno-Karabakh*, p. 54.
[28] Ter-Tadevosyan, 'Analysis of Combat Operations', pp. 561–562; De Waal, *Black Garden*, pp. 198–199.
[29] Ter-Tadevosyan, 'Analysis of Combat Operations', p. 572.
[30] Croissant, *Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict*, p. 80.
[31] Ter-Tadevosyan, 'Analysis of Combat Operations', pp. 572–575.
[32] De Waal, *Black Garden*, p. 196.
[33] Hakobyan, *Karabakh Diary*, p. 159.
[34] De Waal, *Black Garden*, pp. 196–197.
[35] Fliervoet, 'Friends or Foes', p. 128.
[36] Koehler and Zürcher, 'The Art of Losing the State: Weak Empire to Weak Nation-State Around Nagorno-Karabakh', p. 159.
[37] Croissant, *Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict*, p. 31.
[38] Ibid. See also Bolukbasi, *Azerbaijan: A Political History*, p. 107.
[39] De Waal, *Black Garden*, p. 29.
[40] Bolukbasi, *Azerbaijan: A Political History*, p. 105.
[41] Croissant, *Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict*, p. 34.
[42] Bolukbasi, *Azerbaijan: A Political History*, p. 107.
[43] Ibid.; De Waal, *Black Garden*, p. 86.
[44] Bolukbasi, *Azerbaijan: A Political History*, p. 108; also see O'Ballance, *Wars in the Caucasus, 1990–95*, p. 22.
[45] Bolukbasi, *Azerbaijan: A Political History*, p. 108.
[46] Ibid., pp. 108–109.
[47] Yunusov, 'Azerbaijan: The Burden of History', p. 4.
[48] Bolukbasi, *Azerbaijan: A Political History*, p. 26.
[49] Ibid., p. 129.
[50] Altstadt, 'Azerbaijan's Struggle toward Democracy', pp. 121–122.
[51] Yunusov, 'Azerbaijan: The Burden of History', p. 3.

[52] De Waal, *Black Garden*, p. 88.
[53] Ibid., p. 145; Yunusov, 'Azerbaijan: The Burden of History', p. 5.
[54] Bolukbasi, *Azerbaijan: A Political History*, p. 131.
[55] De Waal, *Black Garden*, p. 90.
[56] Ibid., p. 91.
[57] Ibid., p. 94.
[58] Yunusov, 'Azerbaijan: The Burden of History', p. 5.
[59] Ibid., pp. 5–6.
[60] De Waal, *Black Garden*, p. 110.
[61] Ibid., p. 114.
[62] Yunusov, 'Azerbaijan: The Burden of History', p. 7.
[63] Ibid.
[64] Koehler and Zürcher, 'The Art of Losing the State', pp. 162–163; Altstadt, 'Azerbaijan's Struggle toward Democracy', p. 127.
[65] De Waal, *Black Garden*, p. 163.
[66] Yunusov, 'Azerbaijan: The Burden of History', pp. 7–8.
[67] Bolukbasi, *Azerbaijan: A Political History*, p. 187.
[68] Ibid., pp. 188–190; De Waal, *Black Garden*, pp. 164–165.
[69] Croissant, *Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict*, p. 78.
[70] Bolukbasi, *Azerbaijan: A Political History*, p. 191; De Waal, *Black Garden*, p. 182.
[71] De Waal, *Black Garden*, p. 182.
[72] Koehler and Zürcher, 'The Art of Losing the State', p. 159.
[73] Bolukbasi, *Azerbaijan: A Political History*, pp. 192–193; De Waal, *Black Garden*, p. 182.
[74] Croissant, *Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict*, p. 83.
[75] Yunusov, 'Azerbaijan: The Burden of History', p. 12.
[76] Koehler and Zürcher, 'The Art of Losing the State', p. 160.
[77] Altstadt, 'Azerbaijan's Struggle toward Democracy', p. 128.
[78] Bolukbasi, *Azerbaijan: A Political History*, p. 197.
[79] Ibid.
[80] Altstadt, 'Azerbaijan's Struggle toward Democracy', p. 128.
[81] Croissant, *Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict*, pp. 89–90.
[82] Ibid., p. 90.
[83] Bolukbasi, *Azerbaijan: A Political History*, p. 206.
[84] Ibid., pp. 204–205.
[85] Yunusov, 'Azerbaijan: The Burden of History', p. 14.
[86] Croissant, *Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict*, p. 95.
[87] Ibid., pp. 95–97; Kamrava, 'State-Building in Azerbaijan: The Search for Consolidation', p. 222.

Bibliography

Altstadt, Audrey L. 'Azerbaijan's Struggle toward Democracy'. In *Conflict, Cleavage, and Change in Central Asia and the Caucasus,* edited by Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.

Bolukbasi, Suha. *Azerbaijan: A Political History.* London: I.B. Tauris, 2011.

Center for Preventive Action. 'Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict'. Global Conflict Tracker. Updated 20 March 2024. https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/nagorno-karabakh-conflict.

Central Intelligence Agency. 'The Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia: A Continuing International Threat'. Central Intelligence Agency, January 1984. https://www.cia.gov/reading-room/docs/CIA-RDP85T00283R000400030009-2.pdf.

Crisis Group. 'Nagorno-Karabakh: Seeking a Path to Peace in the Ukraine War's Shadow'. 22 April 2022. https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/caucasus/nagorno-karabakh-conflict/nagorno-karabakh-seeking-path-peace-ukraine.

Croissant, Michael P. *The Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict: Causes and Implications.* Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1998.

De Waal, Thomas. *Black Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan Through Peace and War*. New York: New York University Press, 2003.

Fliervoet, Feike E.M. 'Friends or Foes: Explaining Cohesion in Secessionist Movements'. PhD diss., European University Institute, 2022.

Hakobyan, Tatul. *Karabakh Diary: Green and Black – Neither War nor Peace*. Antelias Publishing, 2010.

Human Rights Watch. 'Azerbaijan: Seven Years of Conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh'. Human Rights Watch, 1 December 1994, https://www.hrw.org/report/1994/12/01/seven-years-conflict-nagorno-karabakh.

Kamrava, Mehran. 'State-Building in Azerbaijan: The Search for Consolidation'. *Middle East Journal* 55, no. 2 (2001), pp. 216–236, https://www.jstor.org/stable/4329615.

Koehler, Jan, and Christoph Zürcher. 'The Art of Losing the State: Weak Empire to Weak Nation-State Around Nagorno-Karabakh'. In *Potentials of Disorder: Explaining Conflict and Stability in the Caucasus and in the Former Yugoslavia*, edited by Jan Koehler and Christoph Zürcher. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003.

O'Ballance, Edgar. *Wars in the Caucasus, 1990–95.* London: MacMillan, 1997.

Panossian, Razmik. 'The Irony of Nagorno-Karabakh: Formal Institutions versus Informal Politics'. *Regional & Federal Studies* 11, no. 3 (2001), pp. 143–164, https://doi.org/10.1080/714004708.

Sargsyan, Manvel. *Нагорный Карабах: Война и Политика (1990–93гг.). Война в Нагорном Карабахе и Внутренний Конфликт в Армянском Обществе* [Nagorno-Karabakh: War and Politics (1990–93). War in Nagorno-Karabakh and Internal Conflict in Armenian Society]. Armenian Centre for National and International Studies, 2010.

Ter-Tadevosyan, Arkadi. 'Анализ Боевых Действий в Арцахе (Июль 1991–Июль 1992 Гг.) [The Analysis of Combat Operations in Artsakh (July 1991–July 1992)]'. In *Studies on Strategy and Security*, edited by Armen Ayvazyan. Lusakn, 2007.

Wright, George. 'Nagorno-Karabakh: Armenia Says 100,000 Refugees Flee Region'. *BBC News,* 30 September 2023. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-66969845.

Yunusov, Arif. 'Azerbaijan: The Burden of History – Waiting for Change'. In *The Caucasus: Armed and Divided*, edited by Anna Matveeva and Duncan Hiscock. London: Saferworld, 2003.

General Bibliography

Case law

International Court of Justice, 'Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in the Gaza Strip (South Africa v. Israel)', Order on Provisional Measures, 26 January 2024.

US District Court, Eastern District of Virginia, Suhail Najim Abdullah Al Shimari, et al. v. CACI Premier Technology, Inc., 12 November 2024.

Supreme Court of the Netherlands, The Prosecutor v. Guus Kouwenhoven, ECLI:NL:HR:2018:2336.

District Court for the Eastern District of Illinois, Jovic and ors v L-3 Services Incorporated and Engility Holdings Incorporated, 69 F. Supp. 3d 750, September 24, 2014.

Supreme Court of the Netherlands, The Prosecutor v. Frans van Anraat, ECLI:NL:HR:2009:BG4822.

Inter-American Court of Human Rights. *Case of the 'Mapiripán Massacre' v. Colombia*, (Judgement of 15 September 2005).

ICTR, Alfred Musema v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-96-13-A, Appeals Chamber Judgement, 16 November 2001.

ICTR, The Prosecutor v. Alfred Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-T, Trial Chamber Judgement, 27 January 2000.

Colombia Constitutional Court. *Case No. C-225/95, Re: File No. L.A.T.-040* (Judgement of 18 May 1995).

The Flick Trial, Trial of Friedrich Flick and five others, [1947] US Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, Case No. 48 found in Law reports of the trials of war criminals by the UN (Vol. IX) (1949).

The I.G. Farben Trial, Trial of Carl Krauch and twenty-two others [1948] US Military Tribunal, Nuremberg Case No. 57 found in Law reports of the trials of war criminals by the UN (Vol. X) (1949).

The Krupp Trial of Alfried Felix Alwyn Krupp and eleven others [1948] US Military Tribunal, Case No. 58 found in Law Reports of trials of war criminals, UN war crimes Commission: The I.G. Farben and Krupp Trials (Vol.10).

Trial of Bruno Tesch & Others (the Zyklon B case), UNWCC, Vol. I.

Treaties

'Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States', Signed at Montevideo, 26 December 1933. https://www.ilsa.org/Jessup/Jessup15/Montevideo%20Convention.pdf. (Accessed 30 August 2024).

'Text of the Lateran Treaty of 1929'. https://spcp.prf.cuni.cz/dokument/lateran.htm.

Literature

Abraham, Yuval. '"Lavender": The AI Machine Directing Israel's Bombing Spree in Gaza'. *+927 Magazine*, 3 April 2024. https://www.972mag.com/lavender-ai-israeli-army-gaza/.

Acosta, Luis Jaime. 'Colombia Accuses Drummond Executives of Funding Paramilitary Group'. *Reuters*, 31 May 2023. https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/drummond-colombia-executives-be-tried-financing-paramilitary-group-2023-05-31/.

Adamo, Antonino. 'The Terrorist and the Mercenary: Private Warriors against Nigeria's Boko Haram'. *African Studies* 79, no. 3 (2020), pp. 339–359. https://doi.org/10.1080/00020184.2020.1788920.

AFP. 'Moscow Releases Ten Ukrainian Civilian Prisoners – Zelensky'. *Moscow Time*s, 29 June 2024. https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2024/06/29/russia-releases-10-ukrainian-civilian-prisoners-zelensky-a85557. (Accessed 15 August 2024).

Agrawal, Renuka, and Kanhaiya Sharma. 'An Extensive Review on Significance of Explainable Artificial Intelligence Models in Discrete Domains for Informed Decisions Making'. *Revue d'Intelligence Artificielle* 38, no. 3 (2024), pp. 957–968.

Ahmed, N., and M. Shamsan. 'Analysis: Origins of Houthi Supremist Ideology'. Commonspace.eu, 23 August 2022. https://www.commonspace.eu/analysis/analysis-origins-houthi-supremacist-ideology.

Akcinaroglu, S., and E. Radziszewski. 'Private Military Companies, Opportunities, and Termination of Civil Wars in Africa'. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 57, no. 5 (October 2013), pp. 795–821. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002712449325.

Aksamitowska, Karolina. 'Digital Evidence in Domestic Core International Crimes: Lessons Learned from Germany, Sweden, Finland and The Netherlands'. *Journal of International Criminal Justice* 19, no. 1 (March 2021), pp. 189–211. https://doi.org/10.1093/jicj/mqab035.

Al Jazeera. 'Iran Shows Missile, Launches Satellite Which Fails to Reach Orbit'. 9 February 2020. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/2/9/iran-shows-missile-launches-satellite-which-fails-to-reach-orbit.

Al Jazeera. 'Yemen's Houthis Say They Launched Ballistic Missile, Drones at Israel'. 31 October 2023. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/10/31/israel-says-it-shot-down-aerial-target-near-red-sea-city-of-eilat.

Alexander, Jocelyn, JoAnn McGregor and Blessing-Miles Tendi. 'The Transnational Histories of Southern African Liberation Movements: An Introduction'. *Journal of Southern African Studies* 43, no. 1 (2017), pp. 1–12.

Alexander, Jocelyn, Paolo Israel, Miles Larmer and Ricardo Soares de Oliveira. 'Liberation Beyond the Nation: An Introduction'. *Journal of Southern African Studies* 46, no. 5 (2020), pp. 821–828.

Altstadt, Audrey L. 'Azerbaijan's Struggle toward Democracy'. In *Conflict, Cleavage, and Change in Central Asia and the Caucasus,* edited by Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.

Amnesty International. 'Amnesty International Position on the Proposals for a Digital Services Act and a Digital Markets Act', March 2021. https://www.amnesty.eu/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Amnesty-International-Position-Paper-Digital-Services-Act-Package_March2021_Updated.pdf.

Anderton, Charles H., and John R. Carter. *Principles of Conflict Economics.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.

Andreopoulos, George J., and John Kleinig. *Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) and the Quest for Accountability.* London: Routledge, 2015.

Andres, Richard B, Craig Wills and Thomas Griffith. 'Winning with Allies: The Strategic Value of the Afghan Model'. *International Security* 30, no. 3 (Winter 2005/2006), pp. 124–160.

Anon. 'About Anonymous' from https:/anonymoushackers.net/anonymous-history/. (Accessed 7 August 2024).

Antelmi, Alessia, Pasquale Caramante, Gennaro Cordasco, Giuseppe D'Ambrosio, Davide De Vinco, Francesco Foglia, and Carmine Spagnuolo. 'Reliable and Efficient Agent-Based Modeling and Simulation'. *Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation* 27, no. 2 (2024), pp. 1–28.

Apuzzo, Matt. 'Blackwater Guards Found Guilty in 2007 Iraq Killings', *New York Times*, 22 October 2014.

Arduino, Alessandro. *China's Private Army: Protecting the New Silk Road*. Singapore: Springer, 2018. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-7215-4.

Arel, Dominique, and Jesse Driscoll. *Ukraine's Unnamed War: Before the Russian Invasion of 2022*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2022.

Argyriadis, Kali, Giulia Bonacci and Adrien Delmas, eds. *Cuba and Africa, 1959–1994: Writing an Alternative Atlantic History*. Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 2020.

Armstrong, Sue. *In Search of Freedom: Andreas Shipanga Story as Told to Sue Armstrong*. Gibraltar: Ashanti Publishing, 1989.

Arnold, K.L., and S. van Dorst. 'Wiperware: Een nieuw cyberwapen voor de militaire toolbox?' *Militaire Spectator* 192, no. 11 (2023), pp. 512–525.

Arnold, Kraesten, Peter Pijpers, Paul Ducheine and Peter Schrijver. 'Assessing the Dogs of Cyberwar: Reflections on the Dynamics of Operations in Cyberspace during the Russo-Ukrainian War'. In *Reflections on the Russian-Ukrainian War*, edited by Maarten Rothman, Lonneke Peperkamp and Sebastiaan Rietjens. Leiden: Leiden University Press, 2024, pp. 231–256.

Arnold, Thomas D. 'Geoeconomic Dimensions of Russian Private Military and Security Companies'. *Military Review* 99, no. 6 (November–December 2019), pp. 6–18.

Arp, Robert, Steven Barbone, and Michael Bruce, eds. *Bad Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Fallacies in Western Philosophy*. Hoboken, N.J.: John Wiley, 2018.

Arquilla, John and David Ronfeldt. 'Cyberwar Is Coming!' *Comparative Strategy* 12, no. 2 (Spring 1993), pp. 141–165.

Asal, Victor, and David Malet. 'Nobody More Terrible than the Desperate: Conflict Conditions and Rebel Demand for Foreign Fighters'. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 47, no. 2 (2024), pp. 135–153.

Ashipala, Saima N. 'Diplomacy in Armed Struggle: A Case of the South West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO)'. MA thesis, University of Namibia, 2015.

Asprey, Robert B. *War in the Shadows: The Guerrilla in History.* New York: Doubleday, 1975.

Asselberg. 'Dagboek van C.J. Asselbergs' in *Christaan de Wet-Annale*, 5 (October 1978), pp. 2–64.

Associated Press in Dubai. 'Rubymar Ship Attacked by Houthi Rebels Finally Sinks in Red Sea'. 3 March 2024. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/mar/02/stricken-ship-attacked-by-houthi-rebels-sinks-in-red-sea.

Avant, Deborah D. 'Pragmatic Networks and Transnational Governance of Private Military and Security Services'. *International Studies Quarterly* 60, no. 2 (June 2016), pp. 330–342. https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqv018.

Axelrod, Alan, and Michael Dubowe. *Mercenaries: A Guide to Private Armies and Private Military Companies*. Thousand Oaks, Calif.: CQ Press, 2014.

Baines, Gary, and Peter Vale, eds. *Beyond the Border War: New Perspectives on Southern Africa's Late-Cold War Conflicts*. Unisa: Unisa Press, 2008.

Bamigboye, Oluwaseyi Mike. 'Does Outsourcing Security to Private Security Companies Impact International Security and Counterterrorism?' *African Journal of Terrorism and Insurgency Research* 3, no. 2 (2022).

Bandarage, A. *The Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka: Terrorism, Ethnicity, Political Economy.* Kohuwala: Vijitha Yapa Publications, 2009.

Bank, Max, and Bram Vanken. 'How Big Tech's Revolving Doors Erode EU Antitrust Laws. EU Observer'. 28 October 2024. https://euobserver.com/news/ar1234f8b4.

Bao, Te, Brice Corgnet, Nobuyuki Hanaki, Yohanes E. Riyanto and Jiahua Zhu. 'Predicting the Unpredictable: New Experimental Evidence on Forecasting Random Walks'. *Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control* 146 (January 2023), 104571.

Bao, Wuzhida, Yuting Cao, Yin Yang, Hangjun Che, Junjian Huang, and Shiping Wen. 'Data-Driven Stock Forecasting Models Based on Neural Networks: A Review'. *Information Fusion* (2024), 102616.

Bara, C., and J. Kreutz. 'To Buy a War but Sell the Peace? Mercenaries and Post-Civil War Stability'. *Security Studies* 31, no. 3 (May 2022), pp. 417–445. https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2022.2097890.

Barakat, Matthew. 'Retired General's Testimony Links Contractor to Abu Graib Abuses'. *Military Times*, 16 April 2024.

Barnett, Michael, and Raymond Duvall. 'Power in International Politics'. *International Organisation* 59, no.1 (2005), pp. 39–75.

Bass, Frank M. 'A New Product Growth for Model Consumer Durables'. *Management Science* 15, no. 5 (1969), pp. 215–227.

Batchu, Swati. 'Chinese Private Security Companies along the BRI: An Emerging Threat?' *Modern Diplomacy*, 25 September 2020. https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2020/09/25/chinese-private-security-companies-along-the-bri-an-emerging-threat/.

Bateman, Jon. 'Russia's Wartime Cyber Operations in Ukraine: Military Impacts, Influences, and Implications'. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, December 2022. https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2022/12/russias-wartime-cyber-operations-in-ukraine-military-impacts-influences-and-implications?lang=en.

Beard, Simon J., Martin Rees, Catherine Richards and Clarissa Rios Rojas. *The Era of Global Risk: An Introduction to Existential Risk Studies.* Cambridge: Open Book, 2023.

Beaumais, Louise, and Frédéric Ramel. 'Diplomats, Soldiers, and Armed Conflict Databases: Another French Exception?' *Global Studies Quarterly* 3, no. 2 (2023), pp. 1–13.

Beccaro, Andrea. 'Non-State Actors and Modern Technology'. *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 34, no. 4 (2023), pp. 780–802.

Beckett, I.FW. 'The Future of Insurgency'. *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 16, no. 1 (2005), pp. 22–36. https://doi.org/10.1080/0959231042000322549.

Beerman, Jack T. 'To Err Is Human: The Effect of Mistakes in Social Simulations'. MSc Thesis, Miami University, 2023.

Bell, Daniel. 'Private Military Company'. *Encyclopedia Britannica*.

Bellinger III, John. 'Suing China over the Coronavirus Won't Help: Here's What Can Work'. *Washington Post*, 23 April 2020. https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/04/23/suing-china-over-coronavirus-wont-help-heres-what-can-work/.

Bély, Lucien, Jean Bérenger and André Corvisier. *Guerre et paix dans l'Europe du XVIIe siècle*, 2nd ed. Paris: Sedes, 1991, Vol. I.

Bender, Bryan. 'Satellite Companies Join the Hunt for Russian War Crimes'. *Politico*, 6 April 2022. https://www.politico.com/news/2022/04/06/satellite-russian-war-crimes-00023386.

Beniwal, Himanshu, Kowsik D. Nadagopan, and Mayank Singh. 'Remember This Event That Year? Assessing Temporal Information and Reasoning in Large Language Models'. arXiv.2402.11997 (2024).

Berdal, Mats, and David M. Malone, eds. *Greed & Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars.* Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 2000.

Berkovich, Ilya. *Motivation in War: The Experience of Common Soldiers in Old-Regime Europe.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017.

Berndtsson, J. 'Exploring PSC-Military Relations: Swedish Officers and the Private Security Sector in Peace Operations'. *Cooperation and Conflict* 48, no. 4 (December 2013), pp. 484–501. https://doi.org/10.1177/0010836713482554.

Bernstein, Carl. 'The Holy Alliance. Ronald Reagan and John Paul II', *Time Magazine*, 24 February 1992. https://time.com/archive/6719650/the-holy-alliance-ronald-reagan-and-john-paul-ii/. (Accessed 28 August 2024).

Bernstein, Carl, and Marco Politi. *Zijne Heiligheid. Johannes Paulus II en de verborgen geschiedenis van onze tijd*. Amsterdam: Jan Mets, 1996.

Best, Geoffrey. *Humanity in Warfare*. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1980.

Betz, David, and Tim Stevens. 'Chapter One: Power and Cyberspace'. *Adelphi Series* 51, no. 424 (2011), pp. 35–54. doi: 10.1080/19445571.2011.636954

Biaumet, G. 'The Sentinel and the Rebel. Multi-Choice Policing in Burundi and the State-Centered Approach of Security Sector Reform'. *Crime Law and Social Change* 67, no. 3 (April 2017), pp. 333–351. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10611-016-9654-2.

Biddle, Stephen D. 'Allies, Airpower, and Modern Warfare: The Afghan Model in Afghanistan and Iraq'. *International Security* 30, no. 3 (Winter 2005/2006), pp. 161–176.

Biddle, Stephen. *Nonstate Warfare: The Military Methods of Guerillas, Warlords, and Militias*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2022.

Binnendijk, Anika, and Marta Kepe. 'Civilian-Based Resistance in the Baltic States: Historical Precedents and Current Capabilities'. Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, 2021.

Bismuth, Regis. 'Mapping a Responsibility of Corporations for Violations of International Humanitarian Law Sailing between International and Domestic Legal Orders'. *Denver Journal of International Law & Policy* 38, no. 2 (2010), pp. 203–226.

Biswas, Som. 'Prospective Role of ChatGPT in the Military'. *Qeios*, 2023.

Blaauw, Leslie, and Dennis Zaire, eds. *Dominant Parties as Governments in Southern Africa: Their Changing Nature and Its Implications for Democracy and Democratic Consolidation.* Windhoek: Konrad Adenauer Foundation, 2023.

Black, Jeremy. *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: A Global History*. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2016.

Blann, Susie. 'Pope Francis' "White Flag" Comment Is Met by Criticism from Ukraine and Its Allies *Associated Press*, 10 March 2024. https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-pope-francis-488ac1d4c5ae86cb34dcae2ab2dade12. (Accessed 31 May 2024).

Blessing, Jason. 'Revisiting the Russian Viasat Hack: Four Lessons About Cyber on the Battlefield', American Enterprise Institute, 2 September 2022.

Bloch, Jonathan, and Patrick Fitzgerald. *British Intelligence and Covert Action*. London: Brandon & Junction Books, 1983.

Bloch, Marc. *La société féodale.* Paris: Albin Michel, 1978; orig. 1939–1940.

Bloomfield, Robert, and Jeffrey Hales. 'Predicting the Next Step of a Random Walk'. *Journal of Financial Economics* 65, no. 3 (2002), pp. 397–414.

Bolukbasi, Suha. *Azerbaijan: A Political History.* London: I.B. Tauris, 2011.

Bond, Shannon, and Bobby Allyn. 'Russia is Restricting Social Media: Here's What we Know'. *NPR*, 21 March 2022. https://www.npr.org/2022/03/07/1085025672/russia-social-media-ban.

Bonner, Raymond. 'War Crimes Panel Finds Croat Troops 'Cleansed' the Serbs'. *New York Times*, 31 March 1999.

Boogaard, Jeroen van den. 'Reimagining IHL Principles Part I: The Wrong Principles'. *Articles of War* (blog), 8 December, 2020. https://lieber.westpoint.edu/reimagining-ihl-principles-part-i-wrong-principles/.

Boon, M.E. '"Wat viel er niet te leeren van de Boeren…" Lessen uit de Boerenoorlog. Nederlandse waarnemers aan het front in Zuid-Afrika.' BA Thesis, University of Utrecht, 2012. https://studenttheses.uu.nl/handle/20.500.12932/11268.

Boot, Max. *Invisible Armies: An Epic History of Guerrilla Warfare from Ancient Times to the Present*. New York: Liveright, 2013.

Borghard, Erica D., and Shawn W. Lonergan. 'Cyber Operations as Imperfect Tools of Escalation'. *Strategic Studies Quarterly* 13, no. 3 (2019), pp. 125–131.

Bossenbroek, Martin. 'The Netherlands and the Boer War'. In *The International Impact of the Boer War*, edited by Keith Wilson Chesham: Acumen, 2001, pp. 123–140.

Bossenbroek, Martin. *De Boerenoorlog*. Amsterdam: Athenaeum, Polak & Van Gennep, 2012.

Bothe, Michael, Karl Josef Partsch and Waldemar A. Solf. *New Rules for Victims of Armed Conflicts: Commentary on the Two 1977 Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 2013.

Boulanin, V., and M. Verbruggen. 'Mapping the Development of Autonomy in Weapon Systems'. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, November 2017.

Bourhous, Amal, Emelie Poignant Khafagi and Alaa Tartir. 'Strengthening Social Cohesion in the Nineveh Plains of Iraq: Issues of Common Concern and Local Cooperative Solutions', Stockholm: SIPRI Research Policy Paper (August 2024).

Bowie, Neil G. '40 Terrorism Databases and Data Sets'. *Perspectives on Terrorism* 15, no. 2 (2021), pp. 147–161.

Braak, W. van. 'Vliegprestaties van de Qasef', BSc Thesis, Netherlands Defence Academy, 2021.

Brandom, Russell. 'Google Launches New Anti-DDoS Service Called 'Project Shield'. *The Verge*, 21 October 2013. https://www.theverge.com/2013/10/21/4862724/google-launches-new-anti-ddos-service-called-project-shield

Brands, Hal, and Tim Nichols. 'Cost Imposition in the Contact Layer: Special Operations Forces and Great-Power Rivalry'. Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 2021.

Brocades Zaalberg, Thijs, and Bart Luttikhuis, eds. *Empire's Violent End: Comparing Dutch, British, and French Wars of Decolonization, 1945–1962*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2022.

Brocades Zaalberg, Thijs, Jan Hoffenaar and Alan Lemmers, eds. *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: Irregular Warfare from 1800 to the Present*, CIMH Congress 2010 Amsterdam. The Hague: Netherlands Institute for Military History, 2011.

Broeders, Dennis, Els de Busser and Patryk Pawlak. 'Three Tales of Attribution in Cyberspace: Criminal Law, International Law and Policy Debates'. The Hague Program for Cyber Norms Policy Brief (2020).

Brölmann, Catherina, and Janne Nijman. 'Legal Personality as a Fundamental Concept of International Law'. In *Concepts for International Law: Contributions to Disciplinary Thought*, edited by Jean d'Aspremont and Sahib Singh. London: Edward Elgar, 2017.

Bruininks, Bart M.H. 'On the Road to Simulating Life with Molecular Detail'. *Journal of Molecular Simulation*. PhD Diss., Groningen University (2021).

Bruneau, T. C. 'Contracting Out Security'. *Journal of Strategic Studies* 36, no. 5 (October 2013), pp. 638–665. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2012.663254.

Bueno, Nicolas, and Claire Bright. 'Implementing Human Rights Due Diligence through Corporate Civil Liability'. *International & Comparative Law Quarterly* 69 (2020), pp. 789–818.

Buga, Irina. *Modification of Treaties by Subsequent Practice*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018.

Burleigh, Michael. *Sacred Causes: The Clash of Religion and Politics, From the Great War to the War on Terror*. New York: HarperCollins, 2007.

Burns, J.F. 'A Sri Lankan Evoked Pol Pot: Asia's Latest Master of Terror'. *New York Times*, 2 May 1995.

Burt, Tom. 'Disrupting Cyberattacks Targeting Ukraine'. *Microsoft* (blog), 7 April 2022. https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2022/04/07/cyberattacks-ukraine-strontium-russia/.

Burt, Tom. 'Malware Attacks Targeting Ukraine Government'. *Microsoft* (blog), 15 January 2022. https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2022/01/15/mstic-malware-cyberattacks-ukraine-government/.

Burton, Eric. 'Hubs of Decolonization. African Liberation Movements and 'Eastern' Connections in Cairo, Accra, and Dar Es Salaam'. In *Southern African Liberation Movements and the Global Cold War 'East': Transnational Activism 1960–1990*, edited by Lena Dallywater, Chris Saunders and Helder Adegar Fonseca. Berlin: De Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2019, pp. 25–56.

Byrnes, Timothy A. 'Soft Power of the Catholic Papacy'. In *The Geopolitics of Religious Soft Power*, edited by Peter Mandaville. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2023, pp. 232–247. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197605806.003.0013.

Çaglar, M.T. 'Privatization of Security in Iraq with US Intervention: The Role and Effects of Contracted Personnel and Private Military and Security Companies'. *Siyasal-Journal of Political Sciences* 29, no. 1 (March 2020), pp. 143–163. https://doi.org/10.26650/siyasal.2020.29.1.0027.

Caldwell, Simon. 'Christian Community in Gaza Now under "Real" Risk of Complete "Disappearance"'. *Catholic Herald*, 29 June 2024. https://catholicherald.co.uk/christian-community-in-gaza-under-real-risk-of-complete-disappearance/. (Accessed 17 December 2024).

Caliskan, Murat. 'Hybrid Warfare through the Lens of Strategic Theory'. *Defense & Security Analysis* 35, no. 1 (2019), pp. 40–58.

Callwell, C.E. *Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice*. Lincoln, Neb.: Bison Books, 1996; orig. 1896.

Cameron, Lindsey, and Vincent Chetail. *Privatizing War: Private Military and Security Companies under Public International Law.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013.

Campa, K., A. Braverman, K. Tyson, J. Moore and B. Carter. 'Iran Update, July 22, 2024'. Washington, D.C.: Institute for the Study of War.

Castellano Lubov, Deborah. 'Cardinal Parolin to Ukraine: "Nothing Is Impossible for God"'. *Vatican News*, 22 July 2024. https://www.vaticannews.va/en/vatican-city/news/2024-07/cardinal-parolin-to-ukraine-nothing-is-impossible-for-god.html. (Accessed 17 August 2024).

Catechism of the Roman Catholic Church, Vatican Ed. https://www.vatican.va/archive/ENG0015/_INDEX.HTM. (Accessed 4 April 2024).

Center for Preventive Action. 'Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict'. Global Conflict Tracker. Updated 20 March 2024. https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/nagorno-karabakh-conflict.

Central Intelligence Agency. 'The Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia: A Continuing International Threat'. Central Intelligence Agency, January 1984. https://www.cia.gov/reading-room/docs/CIA-RDP85T00283R000400030009-2.pdf.

Challener, Richard D. *The French Theory of the Nation in Arms, 1866–1939*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1955.

Chandrapema, C.A. *Gōta's War: The Crushing of Tamil Tiger Terrorism in Sri Lanka*. Ranjan Wijeratne Foundation, 2012.

Chattoe-Brown, Edmund. 'Is Agent-Based Modelling the Future of Prediction?' *International Journal of Social Research Methodology* 26, no. 2 (2023), pp. 143–155.

Chen, Yang, Samuel N. Kirshner, Anton Ovchinnikov, Meena Andiappan, and Tracy Jenkin. 'Biases of Humans, of AI, and of Humans with AI'. 31 August 2024. SSRN: https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4943377.

Cheng, Christine. *Extra-legal Groups in Post-Conflict Liberia: How Trade Makes the State*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018.

Cherry, Janet. *Umkhonto We Sizwe*. Johannesburg: Jacana Media, 2011.

Chizzoni, Emanuele. 'Understanding the Chinese Private Security Contracting Industry'. *The Security Distillery*, 15 March 2024. https://thesecuritydistillery.org/all-articles/understanding-the-chinese-private-security-contracting-industry.

Chung, Daewon, and Byeongseon Jeong. 'Analyzing Russia–Ukraine War Patterns Based on Lanchester Model Using SINDy Algorithm'. *Mathematics* 12, no. 6 (2024), p. 851.

Clarance, W. *Ethnic Warfare in Sri Lanka and the UN Crisis*. Kohuwala: Vijitha Yapa Publications, 2007.

Clarke, C.P. *Terrorism, Inc. The Financing of Terrorism, Insurgency and Irregular Warfare*. Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2015.

Clarke, Richard A., and Robert K. Knake. *Cyber War: The Next Threat to National Security and What to Do about It?* London: Routledge, 2010.

Clausewitz, Carl von. *Vom Kriege*. Berlin: Dümmler, 1832–1834.

Clausewitz, Carl von. *Historical and Political Writings*, ed. and tr. Peter Paret and Daniel Moran. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2014.

Clausewitz, Carl von. *On War*, ed. and tr. Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984.

Clausewitz, Carl von. *On War*, tr. J. J. Graham, introd. Jan Willem Honig. New York: Barnes & Noble, 2004.

Cohen, Eliot A., and Phillips O'Brien. 'The Russia-Ukraine War: A Study in Analytic Failure'. Washington, D.C.: CSIS, 24 September 2024.

Cohen, Jaden, and Brandon Holland. 'Deep Learning and the Prisoner's Dilemma: A Strategic Evaluation'. *The National High School Journal of Science*, 2024.

Coleman, K.P., and B. Nyblade. 'Peacekeeping for Profit? The Scope and Limits of 'Mercenary' UN Peacekeeping'. *Journal of Peace Research* 55, no. 6 (November 2018), pp. 726–741. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343318775784.

Collins, Robert N., David R. Mandel, and David V. Budescu. 'Performance-Weighted Aggregation: Ferreting Out Wisdom Within the Crowd'. In *Judgment in Predictive Analytics*, edited by Matthias Seifert. Berlin: Springer, 2023, pp. 185–214.

Conflict Armaments Research. 'Dissecting Iranian Drones Employed by Russia in Ukraine'. November 2022. https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/7a394153c87947d8a602c3927609f572.

Conrad, Justin, Kevin T. Greene, and Brian J. Phillips. 'Introducing ViNSAR: Dyadic Data on Violent Non-state Actor Rivalry'. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 68, no.9 (2023), pp. 1884–1908.

Contamine, Philippe. *La guerre au Moyen Age*, 6th ed. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2003.

Copp, T., and L.C. Baldor. 'US Military Shoots Down Missiles and Drones as It Faces Growing Threats in Volatile Middle East'. *Associated Press*, 20 October 2023. https://apnews.com/article/yemen-navy-warship-missiles-intercepted-2f5fc9c8a3737f762b29d5c53ec08a5b.

Corn, Geoffrey. 'Precautions to Minimize Civilian Harm Are a Fundamental Principle of the Law of War'. *Just Security* (blog). 8 July 2015. https://www.justsecurity.org/24493/obligation-precautions-fundamental-principle-law-war/

Corn, Geoffrey. 'Targeting, Distinction and the Long War: Guarding Against Conflation of Cause and Responsibility'. *Israel Yearbook of Human Rights* 46 (2016), pp. 135–170.

Corvisier, André. *Armées et sociétés en Europe de 1494 à 1789*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1976.

Craig, Gordon A. 'Delbrück: The Military Historian', in Peter Paret, ed. *Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986, pp. 326–353.

Crawford, Emily. 'Tracing the Historical and Legal Development of the Levée en masse in the Law of Armed Conflict'. *Journal of the History of International Law* 19, no. 3 (2017), pp. 329–361.

Crawford, Emily. *Identifying the Enemy: Civilian Participation in Armed Conflict.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015.

Crawford, James. *Brownlie's Principles of Public International Law*, 9th ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019.

Cremers, Thijs, and Han Bouwmeester. 'Russian Commercial Warriors on the Battlefield'. In *Reflections on the Russia-Ukraine War*, edited by Maarten Rothman, Lonneke Peperkamp and Sebastiaan Rietjens. Leiden: Leiden University Press, 2024, pp. 415–437.

Crisis Group. 'Nagorno-Karabakh: Seeking a Path to Peace in the Ukraine War's Shadow'. 22 April 2022. https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/caucasus/nagorno-karabakh-conflict/nagorno-karabakh-seeking-path-peace-ukraine.

Croissant, Michael P. *The Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict: Causes and Implications.* Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1998.

Croot, Edward C. 'There is an Identity Crisis in Special Forces: Who Are the Green Berets Supposed to Be?' Fellows Strategy Research Project Monograph. Carlisle, Penn.: US Army War College, 2020.

Crutchley, Peter, 'IRA Ceasefire 20 Years On: The Priest Who Brokered the Peace', BBC News, 31 August 2014. https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-28812366. (Accessed 22 May 2024).

Cullen, Anthony. *The Concept of Non-international Armed Conflict in International Humanitarian Law*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.

Curtis, Mark. 'Britain's Covert War in Yemen'. *Declassified UK*, 5 October 2022. https://www.declassifiedfieduk.org/britains-covert-war-in-yemen/.

Cusumano, E. 'The Scope of Military Privatisation: Military Role Conceptions and Contractor Support in the United States and the United Kingdom'. *International Relations* 29, no. 2 (June 2015), pp. 219–241. https://doi.org/10.1177/0047117814552142.

Cyber Peace Institute #Ukraine. https://cyberconflicts.cyberpeaceinstitute.org/threats. (Accessed: March 2024).

Cyberknow. Cybertracker. https://cyberknow.medium.com. (Accessed March 2024).

Daase, Christopher, and James W. Davis, eds. *Clausewitz on Small War*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015.

Dach, Hans von. *Der totale Widerstand. Eine Kleinkriegsanleitung für Jedermann*. Rorbas: Schweizer Unteroffiziersverband, 1957.

Dacrema, Eugenio, and Stefano Benati. 'The Mechanics of Contentious Politics: An Agent-Based Modeling Approach'. *The Journal of Mathematical Sociology* 44, no. 3 (2020), pp. 163–198.

Dai, Hui, Ryan Teehan, and Mengye Ren. 'Are LLMs Prescient? A Continuous Evaluation Using Daily News as the Oracle'. arXiv:2411.08324 (2024).

Dal Forno, Ana J., Graziela Piccoli Richetti, and Vinícius H. Knaesel, `Fake News Detection Algorithms – A Systematic Literature Review'. *Data & Knowledge Engineering* (2025): 102441

Dale, Richard. *The Namibian War of Independence, 1966–1989: Diplomatic, Economic and Military Campaigns*. Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland, 2014.

Dallywater, Lena, Chris Saunders, and Fonseca Helder Adegar. *Southern African Liberation Movements and the Global Cold War 'East', Transnational Activism 1960–1990*. Berlin: De Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2019.

Dalsen, Johannes van. 'Die Hollander Korps tydens die Tweede Vryheidsoorlog'. PhD Diss., University of Pretoria, 1942.

Danylyuk, Oleksandr V. 'Against the Odds: Lessons from the Ukrainian Resistance Movement'. *RUSI Commentary*, 4 July 2023. https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/against-odds-lessons-ukrainian-resistance-movement. (Accessed 20 May 2024).

Daumann, Frank. 'The Client's Struggle to Control Private Military Companies Effectively'. *Defence and Security Analysis* 39, no. 4 (2023), pp. 432–451. https://doi.org/10.1080/14751798.2023.2240654.

Daumann, Frank. 'Potential Negative Externalities of Private Military Entrepreneurs from an Economic Perspective'. *Defence and Peace Economics* 35, no. 2 (2024), pp. 206–226.

Davis, Diane E., and Anthony W. Pereira, eds. *Irregular Armed Forces and Their Role in Politics and State Formation*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003.

Davis, Jenny L. 'Elevating Humanism in High-Stakes Automation: Experts-in-the-Loop and Resort-to-Force Decision Making'. *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 78, no. 2 (2024), pp. 200–209.

De Amorim Silva, Rafael, and Rosana T. Vaccare Braga. 'Simulating Systems-of-Systems with Agent-Based Modeling: A Systematic Literature Review'. *IEEE Systems Journal* 14, no. 3 (September 2020), pp. 3609–3617.

De Graaf, Ronald. *Oorlog om Holland, 1000–1375*. Hilversum: Verloren, 1996.

De Groot, Tom, and Salvador Santino F Regilme Jr. 'Private Military and Security Companies and the Militarization of Humanitarianism'. *Journal of Developing Societies* 38, no. 1 (2022), pp. 50–80.

De Mesquita, Bruce Bueno, and Alastair Smith. *The Dictator's Handbook: Why Bad Behavior Is Almost Always Good Politics*. New York: Public Affairs, 2012.

De Nevers, Renée. 'Private Security Companies and the Laws of War'. *Security Dialogue* 40, no. 2 (2009), pp. 169–190.

De Nevers, Renée. 'The Effectiveness of Self-Regulation by the Private Military and Security Industry'. *Journal of Public Policy* 30, no. 2 (2010), pp. 219–240.

De Souto, Amélia Neves. 'Memory and Identity in the History of Frelimo: Some Research Themes'. *Kronos* 39, no. 1 (January 2013), pp. 280–296.

De Souza Barba, Lourenco. 'Controlling and Predicting Unpredictable Behavior'. *The Behavior Analyst* 38, no. 1 (2015), pp. 93–107.

De Waal, Thomas. *Black Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan Through Peace and War*. New York: New York University Press, 2003.

Debre, I., and J. Gambrell. 'Yemen's Houthi Rebels Hijack an Israeli-linked Ship in the Red Sea and Take 25 Crew Members Hostage'. *Associated Press*, 20 November 2023. https://apnews.com/article/israel-houthi-rebels-hijacked-ship-red-sea-dc9b6448690bcf5c70a0baf7c7c34b09.

Defense Update. 'Harpy Air Defense Suppression System'. 3 April 2006. https://defense-update.com/20060403_harpy.html.

Delbrück, Hans. *Geschichte der Kriegskunst im Rahmen der politischen Geschichte,* Vol. IV: *Neuzeit.* Berlin: De Gruyter, 1920.

Delbrück, Hans. *Geschichte der Kriegskunst im Rahmen der politischen Geschichte,* Vol. II: *Die Germanen*, 3rd ed. Berlin: De Gruyter, 1921.

Deng, Shixu, Maarten de Rijke, and Yunying Ning. 'Advances in Human Event Modeling: From Graph Neural Networks to Language Models'. In *Proceedings of the 30th ACM SIGKDD Conference on Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining*, August 2024, pp. 6459–6469.

Deni, John R. 'The New NATO Force Model: Ready for Launch?' *NATO Defence College Outlook*, no. 4 (2024), pp. 1–7.

Dersso, Solomon A. 'The Quest for Pax Africana: The Case of the African Union's Peace and Security Regime'. *African Journal on Conflict Resolution* 12, no. 2 (2012), pp. 11–48.

Deruelle, Benjamin. 'The Sixteenth-Century Antecedents of Special Operations "Small War"'. *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 25, no. 4 (2014), pp. 754–766.

Digital Forensic Research Lab. 'Russian Hybrid Threats Report: A Push to Recognize Ukrainian Regions as Independent States'. *Atlantic Council,* January 2022.

Dijck, José van, David Nieborg and Thomas Poell. 'Reframing Platform Power'. *Internet Policy Review* 8, no. 2 (2019). doi: 10.14763/2019.2.1414.

Dobell, Lauren. *Swapo's Struggle for Namibia, 1960–1991: War by Other Means*. Basel: P. Schlettwein, 1998.

Doherty, Martin. '"No Pope Here". Britain, the Vatican, the IRA, and the Papal Visit to Ireland, September 1979'. *Church History*, no. 90 (2021), pp. 603–620. https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/church-history/article/no-pope-here-britain-the-vatican-the-ira-and-the-papal-visit-to-ireland-september-1979/6EFE8635B246DA0A7893EF492D3DAD34. (Accessed 23 August 2024).

Donkersgoed, R. van. 'A Performance Assessment of the Anti-ship Ballistic Missile "Khalij Fars"', MSc Thesis, Netherlands Defence Academy, 2022.

Dörmann, Knut. 'The Legal Situation of "Unlawful/Unprivileged" Combatants'. *International Review of the Red Cross* 85 (2003), pp. 45–74.

Dorn, Nicholas, and Michael Levi. 'European Private Security, Corporate Investigation and Military Services: Collective Security, Market Regulation and Structuring the Public Sphere'. *Policing & Society* 17, no. 3 (2007), pp. 213–238.

Dorst, Kevin. 'Bayesians Commit the Gambler's Fallacy'. SSRN 4683064 (2024).

Douek, Daniel L. *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in South Africa*. London: Hurst, 2020.

Dov Bachmann, Sascha. 'Hamas–Israel: TikTok and the Relevance of the Cognitive Warfare Domain'. *The Defence Horizon Journal,* 11 March 2024. https://tdhj.org/blog/post/hamas-israel-tiktok-war/.

Downing, Brian M. *The Military Revolution and Political Change: Origins of Democracy and Autocracy in Early Modern Europe.* Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992.

Drazin, Philip G., ed. *Collected Papers of Lewis Fry Richardson*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993.

Driedger, Jonas J., and Mikhail Polianskii. 'Utility-Based Predictions of Military Escalation: Why Experts Forecasted Russia Would Not Invade Ukraine'. *Contemporary Security Policy* 44, no. 4 (2023), pp. 544–560.

Drummond, Catherine. 'Ensuring Respect for IHL by, and in Relation to the Conduct of Private Actors'. In *Ensuring Respect for International Humanitarian Law*, edited by Eve Massingham and Annabel McConnachie. London: Routledge, 2020, pp. 63–82.

Ducheine, Paul. 'Non-Kinetic Capabilities: Complementing the Kinetic Prevalence to Targeting'. In *Targeting: Challenges of Modern Warfare*, edited by Paul Ducheine, Michael Schmitt, and Frans Osinga. The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2015.

Ducheine, Paul, Jelle van Haaster and Richard van Harskamp. 'Manoeuvring and Generating Effects in the Information Environment'. In *Winning without Killing: The Strategic and Operational Utility of Non-Kinetic Capabilities in Crisis*. NL ARMS Netherlands Annual Review of Military Studies 2017, edited by Paul Ducheine and Frans Osinga. The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2017, pp. 155–179.

Ducheine, Paul, and Peter Pijpers. 'The Missing Component in Deterrence Theory: The Legal Framework'. In *Deterrence in the 21st Century: Insights from Theory and Practice*, edited by Frans Osinga and Tim Sweijs. NL ARMS Netherlands Annual Review of Military Studies 2017. The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2021.

Ducheine, Paul, Peter Pijpers and Kraesten Arnold. 'The "Next" War Should Have Been Fought in Cyberspace, Right?' In *Beyond Ukraine: Debating the Future of War,* edited by Tim Sweijs and Jeff Michaels. London: Hurst, 2024.

Duffield, Mark R., and Antonio Donini. *Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging of Development and Security*. London: Zed Books, 2014.

Duguin, Stéphane, and Pavlina Pavlova. 'The Role of Cyber in the Russian War against Ukraine: Its Impact and the Consequences for the Future of Armed Conflict'. *EU Policy Department for External Relations*, September 2023. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2023/702594/EXPO_BRI(2023)702594_EN.pdf.

Dunigan, M. 'The Future of US Military Contracting: Current Trends and Future Implications'. *International Journal* 69, no. 4 (December 2014), pp. 510–524. https://doi.org/10.1177/0020702014549677.

Dwoskin, Elizabeth. 'A Flood of Misinformation Shapes Views of Israel-Gaza Conflict'. *Washington Post*, 14 October 2023. https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2023/10/14/propaganda-misinformation-israel-hamas-war-social-media/.

Echols, Connor. 'An Anti-War Pope Confronts a World in Turmoil: Christmas Has Come Again, But Peace Remains Elusive, *Responsible Statecraft*, 25 December 2023. https://responsiblestatecraft.org/pope-francis-israel-gaza/. (Accessed 14 August 2023).

El-Khawas, Mohamed A. 'Southern Africa: A Challenge to the OAU'. *Africa Today* 24, no. 3 (1977), pp. 25–41.

Elie, Paul. 'The Vatican and the War in Gaza: A Rhetorical Dispute between the Church and the Israeli Government Shows the Limits – and the Possibilities – of the Pope's Role in Times of Conflict. *New Yorker*, 26 February 2024. https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/the-vatican-and-the-war-in-gaza. (Accessed 13 August 2024).

Elsenbroich, Corinna, and J. Garreth Polhill. 'Agent-Based Modelling as a Method for Prediction in Complex Social Systems'. *International Journal of Social Research Methodology* 26, no. 2 (2023), pp. 133–142.

Emmett, Tony. *Popular Resistance and the Roots of Nationalism in Namibia, 1915–1966*. Basel: P. Schlettwein, 1999.

Emtseva, Julia. 'Philanthrocapitalism, Transitional Justice and the Need for Accountability'. *Justieinfo.net*, 12 October 2020. https://www.justiceinfo.net/en/45639-philanthrocapitalism-transitional-justice-need-accountability.html.

Erskine, Toni, and Steven E. Miller. 'AI and the Decision to Go to War: Future Risks and Opportunities'. *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 78, no. 2 (2024), pp. 135–147.

European Council. 'EU Sanctions against Russia Explained'. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions-against-russia-explained/

Evans, Michael. 'The Front-Line States, South Africa and Southern African Security: Military Prospects and Perspectives'. *Zambezia* 12 (1984), pp. 1–19.

Export Centre of the Ministry of Defence of the Islamic Republic of Iran. 'BM-250 Surface to Surface Ballistic Missile Weapon System'. 2023. https://mindexcenter.ir/node/1435.

Ezrow, Natasha. *Global Politics and Violent Non-State Actors*. Los Angeles: Sage, 2017.

Fabian, E. 'Israel's Arrow 3 Has Made Its 1st-ever Interception, Downing Likely Yemen-fired Missile'. *Times of Israel*, 9 November 2023. https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/israels-arrow-3-has-made-its-1st-ever-interception-downing-likely-yemen-fired-missile/.

Fabian, E., and T. Staff. 'Ballistic Missile Fired from Yemen Triggers Sirens across Central Israel'. *Times of Israel*, 15 September 2024. https://www.timesofisrael.com/ballistic-missile-fired-from-yemen-triggers-sirens-across-central-israel/.

Fabian, Sandor. 'Are the Baltics Really Undefendable?' *RUSI Newsbrief* 40, no. 9 (2020), pp. 1–3.

Fabian, Sandor. 'Professional Resistance Forces as a Defence Framework for Small Countries'. *Security: Theory and Practice* 48, no. 3 (2022), pp. 187–196.

Fahn, M., and T. Hadjer. 'Optimal Contracting with Private Military and Security Companies'. *European Journal of Political Economy* 37 (March 2015), pp. 220–240. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2014.10.004.

Farrell, Francis. 'Inside Occupied Ukraine's Most Effective Resistance Movements'. *Kyiv Independent*, 9 January 2024. https://kyivindependent.com/image-draft-there-is-no-doubt-in-victory-inside-occupied-ukraines-most-effective-resistance-movements/. (Accessed 20 May 2024).

Farrow, Ronan. 'Elon Musk's Shadow Rule'. *New Yorker*, 21 August 2023. https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2023/08/28/elon-musks-shadow-rule.

Faucon, B.D. Lieber, and G. Lubold. 'Iranian Spy Ship Helps Houthis Direct Attacks on Red Sea Vessels'. *Wall Street Journal,* 22 December 2023.

Faulconbridge, Guy, and Andrew Gray. 'Kremlin, NATO at Odds Over Pope's Call for Ukraine to Show "White Flag" and Start Talks'. *US News and World Report*, 11 March 2024. https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2024-03-11/russia-says-popes-appeal-on-ukraine-war-is-to-the-west. (Accessed 4 June 2024).

Faulkner, C.M. 'Buying Peace? Civil War Peace Duration and Private Military & Security Companies'. *Civil Wars* 21, no. 1 (2019), pp. 83–103. https://doi.org/10.1080/13698249.2017.1406037.

Fedorov, Myhailo. Tweet ('while you try to colonize Mars …'), Twitter (now X), 26 February 2022. https://x.com/FedorovMykhailo/status/1497543633293266944.

Fendorf, Kyle. 'The Dynamics of the Ukrainian IT Army's Campaign in Russia'. *Lawfare*, 15 June 2023. https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/the-dynamics-of-the-ukrainian-it-army-s-campaign-in-russia.

Ferreira, Marcos. 'Conceptualizing Criminal Non-state Actors' in *Criminal Non-State Actors*. Springer, 2025, pp. 9–30.

Ferrara, Gerrardo. 'Israel; Ethnicity and Religion, a Complex Issue'. *Omnes*, 16 October 2023. https://omnesmag.com/en/newsroom/israel-and-palestine-ethnicity-and-religion/. (Accessed 15 August 2024).

Ferrara, Gerardo. 'The Religious Configuration in Palestine and Israel: A Puzzle of Confessions'. *Omnes*, 17 October 2023. https://omnesmag.com/en/newsroom/religious-configuration-in-palestine/. (Accessed 15 August 2024).

Fetko, Michael. 'Interreligious Dialogue as a Power of Ukrainian Civil Society'. In *Proactive Tolerance: The Key to Peace*, edited by Markus Vogt and Arnd Küppers. Baden Baden and Münster: Nomos/Aschendorf Verlag, 2021, pp. 227–247. https://www.nomos-elibrary.de/10.5771/9783748905431.pdf#page=227. (Accessed 4 July 2022).

Fiala, Otto. 'Special Operations Command Europe: Resistance Operating Concept'. Unclassified PowerPoint Briefing, May 2019. https://nsiteam.com/social/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/U-SMA-Brief-SOCEUR-Resistance-Operating-Concept.pdf. (Accessed 15 April 2024).

Fiala, Otto. *Resistance Operating Concept*. MacDill Air Force Base, Fla. Joint Special Operations University Press, 2020.

Fiala, Otto. 'Resistance Resurgent: Resurrecting a Method of Irregular Warfare in Great Power Competition'. *Special Operations Journal* 7, no. 2 (2021), pp. 109–135.

Fiala, Otto. 'Legitimizing the Resistance'. *Journal on Baltic Security* 8, no. 1 (2022), pp. 151–170.

Fiala, Otto, and Ulrica Pettersson. 'ROC(K) Solid Preparedness: Resistance Operations Concept in the Shadow of Russia'. *PRISM* 8, no. 4 (2020), pp. 17–28.

Fisher, Jonathan, and David M Anderson. 'Authoritarianism and the Securitization of Development in Africa'. *International Affairs* 91, no. 1 (2015), pp. 131–151.

Fitzsimmons, Scott. 'Wheeled Warriors: Explaining Variations in the Use of Violence by Private Security Companies in Iraq'. *Security Studies* 22, no. 4 (October 2013), pp. 707–739. https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2013.844521.

Fitzsimmons, Scott. *Private Security Companies during the Iraq War: Military Performance and the Use of Deadly Force*. London: Routledge, 2016.

Fitzsimmons, Scott. 'Contracting Blowback? The Use of Violence by Private Security Companies and Insurgents during the Iraq War'. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 47, no. 1 (2024), pp. 78–97.

Flatley, Tighe P. 'The Convenient Alliance: President Reagan and Pope John Paul II, Cold Warriors', University of Rhode Island Senior Honors Projects. Paper 48 (2007). https://digitalcommons.uri.edu/srhonorsprog/48. (Accessed 27 August 2024).

Fliervoet, Feike E.M. 'Friends or Foes: Explaining Cohesion in Secessionist Movements'. PhD Diss., European University Institute, 2022.

FlightGlobal. 'USA and Israel in Crisis over China Harpy Deal'. *FlightGlobal*, 4 January 2005. https://www.flightglobal.com/usa-and-israel-in-crisis-over-china-harpy-deal-/58275.article.

Flores, Marcello. 'Foreign Fighters Involvement in National and International Wars: A Historical Survey'. In Andrea de Guttry, Francesca Capone and Christophe Paulussen, eds. *Foreign Fighters under International Law and Beyond.* Berlin: Springer, 2016, pp. 27–47.

Fokkink, Robbert J., and Roy Lindelauf. 'When Will It End? Assessing the Duration of Putin's War with Ukraine'. In *Reflections on the Russia-Ukraine War*, edited by Maarten Rothman, Lonneke Peperkamp and Sebastiaan Rietjens. Leiden University Press, 2024, pp. 537–550.

Fonck, Bertrand, and George Satterfield. 'The Essence of War: French Armies and Small War in the Low Countries (1672–1697)'. *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 25, no. 4 (2014), pp. 767–783.

Francioni, Francesco, and Natalino Ronzitti, eds. *War by Contract: Human Rights, Humanitarian Law, and Private Contractors*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.

Francis, with Fabio Marchese Ragona. *Life. My Story Through History*. Milan: HarperCollins Italia, 2024.

Francis. 'Letter of the Holy Father Francis to Jewish Brothers and Sisters in Israel'. Vatican City, 2 February 2024: https://www.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/letters/2024/documents/20240202-lettera-ebrei-in-israele.html. (Accessed 8 April 2024).

Francis. *Against War: Building a Culture of Peace.* Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 2024.

Franck, Thomas. *Fairness in International Law and Institutions*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998.

Francken, Eep, and Olf Praamstra, eds. *Geen land voor dromen. Geschiedenis van de Zuid-Afrikaanse Nederlandse literatuur*. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2023.

Freedman, Lawrence. 'Ukraine and the Art of Limited War'. *Survival* 56, no. 6 (2014), pp. 7–38.

Frerks, Georg. 'The Female Tigers of Sri Lanka: The Legitimation of Recruitment and Fight'. In *Perpetrators of International Crimes. Theories, Methods, and Evidence,* edited by A. Smeulers, M. Weerdesteijn and B. Holá. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019.

Frerks, Georg. '"Life after Death": Remembering the "Tamil Tigers" in North-East Sri Lanka', *Civil Wars* (2023), pp. 1–24. doi: 10.1080/13698249.2023.2167041.

Frerks, G., and B. Klem, eds. *Dealing with Diversity: Sri Lankan Discourses on Conflict and Peace.* The Hague: Clingendael Institute, 2005.

Frerks, G., and B. Klem. *Conditioning Peace among Protagonists. A Study into the Use of Peace Conditionalities in the Sri Lankan Peace Process.* The Hague: Clingendael Institute, 2006.

Fussell, Paul. *The Great War and Modern Memory*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975.

Gaetan, Victor. 'Pope Francis' Holy Diplomacy in Ukraine: Why Washington and the Vatican Don't See Eye to Eye'. *Foreign Affairs*, 5 September 2019. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/pope-francis-holy-diplomacy-ukraine. (Accessed 1 June 2024).

Gaetan, Victor. 'The Political Pope: How Francis Was Thrust into the World's Most Intractable Conflicts'. *Foreign Affairs*, 25 September 2015. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/world/political-pope. (Accessed 31 May 2024).

Gaetan, Victor. 'The Pope and the Politburo: The Vatican's Chinese Diplomacy'. *Foreign Affairs*, 24 March 2016. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2016-03-24/pope-and-politburo. (Accessed 31 May 2024).

Galdorisi, George, and Sam J. Tangredi. *Algorithms of Armageddon: The Impact of Artificial Intelligence on Future Wars.* Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2024.

Galeotti, Mark. 'Hybrid, Ambiguous, and Non-Linear? How New Is Russia's "New Way of War"?' *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 27, no. 2 (2016), pp. 282–301. https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2015.1129170.

Gallegos, Isabel O., Ryan A. Rossi, Jace Barrow, Mehrab Tanjim, Sungchul Kim, Franck Dernoncourt, and Nesime K. Ahmed. 'Bias and Fairness in Large Language Models: A Survey'. *Computational Linguistics* 50 no. 3 (2024), pp. 1–79.

Galtung, J. 'What Did the Experts Predict?' *Futures* 35, no. 2 (2003), pp. 123–145.

Galula, David. *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*. New York: Praeger, 1964.

Ganiel, Gladys, and Paul Dixon. 'Religion, Pragmatic Fundamentalism and the Transformation of the Northern Ireland Conflict', *Journal of Peace Research* 45, no. 3, (2008), pp. 419–436. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343308088819. (Accessed 5 June 2024).

Gao, Chen, Xiaohong Lan, Nian Li, Yuan Yuan, Jingtao Ding, Zhilun Zhou, Fenglli Xu, and Yong Li. 'Large Language Models Empowered Agent-Based Modeling and Simulation: A Survey and Perspectives'. *Humanities and Social Sciences Communications* 11, no. 1 (2024), pp. 1–24.

Gartzke, Erik. 'The Myth of Cyberwar: Bringing War in Cyberspace Back Down to Earth The Myth of Cyberwar'. *International Security* 38, no. 2 (2013), pp. 41–73.

Gartzke, Erik, and Jon R. Lindsay. 'Weaving Tangled Webs: Offense, Defense, and Deception in Cyberspace'. *Security Studies* 24, no. 2 (2015), pp. 316–348.

Gartzke, Erik, and Jon R. Lindsay. 'The Cyber Commitment Problem and the Destabilization of Nuclear Deterrence'. In *Bytes, Bombs and Spies: The Strategic Dimensions of Offensive Cyber Operations*, edited by Herbert S. Lin and Amy Zegart. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2019, pp. 195–234.

Geiss, Robin, & Henning Lahmann (Eds.). *Research handbook on warfare and artificial intelligence*. Edward Elgar Publishing, 2024.

Ghafar, Adel Abdel, and Anna L. Jacobs, 'Beijing Calling: Assessing China's Growing Footprint in North Africa'. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2019. https://policycommons.net/artifacts/4140875/beijing-calling/.

Ghanem, Yehia. 'Eeben Barlow: Inside the World of Private Military Contractors'. *Talk to Al Jazeera*. 5 January 2020. https://www.aljazeera.com/program/talk-to-al-jazeera/2020/1/5/eeben-barlow-inside-the-world-of-private-military-contractors.

Ghesquiere, Stefaan. 'The Implementation of International Humanitarian Law and the International Committee of the Red Cross'. In *Armed Conflicts and the Law*, edited by Jan Wouters, Philip de Man and Nele Verlinden. Cambridge, Antwerp, Portland: Intersentia, 2016, pp. 445–483.

Ghiselli, Andrea. 'Interpreting China's Rise in a Decentered World through the Lens of Peacekeeping and Antipiracy Missions'. *Chinese Political Science Review* 3, no. 3 (2018), pp. 252–269. https://doi.org/10.1007/s41111-018-0093-3.

Giarlarducci, Andrea. 'In Devastated Ukraine, the Work of the Holy See's Diplomacy'. *Omnes*, 16 July 2024. https://omnesmag.com/en/newsroom/ukraine-work-diplomacy-of-the-holy-see/. (Accessed 15 August 2024).

Gibson, Richard. *African Liberation Movements: Contemporary Struggles against White Minority Rule*. London: Oxford University Press, 1972.

Giliomee, Herman, and Bernard Mbenga. *New History of South Africa.* Cape Town: Tafelberg, 2007.

Gillard, Emanuela-Chiara. 'Business Goes to War: Private Military/Security Companies and International Humanitarian Law'. *International Review of the Red Cross* 88 (2006), pp. 525–572.

Giumelli, Francesco, and Eugenio Cusumano. 'Normative Power under Contract? Commercial Support to European Crisis Management Operations'. *International Peacekeeping* 21, no. 1 (2014), pp. 37–55.

Giumelli, Francesco. 'Winning without Killing: The Case for Targeted Sanctions'. In *Winning without Killing: The Strategic and Operational Utility of Non-Kinetic Capabilities in Crises*, Netherlands Annual Review of Military Studies 2017, edited by Paul Ducheine and Frans Osinga. The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2017.

Giustozzi, Antonio. *Empires of Mud: Wars and Warlords in Afghanistan*. London: Hurst, 2009.

Gleditsch, Nils Petter. *Lewis Fry Richardson: His Intellectual Legacy and Influence in the Social Sciences*. Cham: Springer Nature, 2020.

Gleider, Hernández. *International Law*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019.

Glissenaar, Frans. *DD. Het leven van E.F.E. Douwes Dekker*. Hilversum: Verloren, 1999.

Gómez, Yolanda M., Diego I. Gallardo, Carolina Marchant, Luis Sánchez, and Marcello Bourguignon. 'An In-Depth Review of the Weibull Model with a Focus on Various Parameterizations'. *Mathematics* 12 (2024), p. 56.

González, Roberto J. *War Virtually: The Quest to Automate Conflict, Militarize Data, and Predict the Future*. Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 2022.

Google Threat Analysis Group and Mandiant. 'Fog of War: How the Ukraine Conflict Transformed the Cyber Threat Landscape'. February 2023. https://services.google.com/fh/files/blogs/google_fog_of_war_research_report.pdf.

Gould, Joe, Bryant Harris, Sebastian Sprenger, and Tom Kington. 'When Will the War in Ukraine End? Experts Offer Their Predictions'. *Defense News*, 13 January 2023.

Grassiani, Erella, and Tessa Diphoorn. 'Introduction: Ethnographies of Private Security'. *Conflict and Society* 3, no. 1 (2017), pp. 1–7. https://doi.org/10.3167/arcs.2017.030101.

Greenberg, Andy. 'The Untold Story of NotPetya, the Most Devastating Cyberattack in History'. *Wired*, 22 August 2018.

Greenberg, Andy. 'The WIRED Guide to Cyberwar'. *Wired*, 23 August 2019.

Greig, Ian. *The Communist Challenge to Africa: An Analysis of Contemporary Soviet, Chinese and Cuban Policies*. London: Foreign Affairs, 1977.

Grilli, Matteo. 'Nkrumah, Nationalism, and Pan-Africanism: The Bureau of African Affairs Collection'. *History in Africa* 44 (June 2017), pp. 295–307. https://doi.org/10.1017/hia.2016.15.

Grilli, Matteo. 'Nkrumah's Ghana and the Armed Struggle in Southern Africa (1961–1966)'. *South African Historical Journal* 70, no. 1 (2018), pp. 56–81.

Grob-Fitzgibbon, Benjamin. *Imperial Endgame: Britain's Dirty Wars and the End of Empire*. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011.

Groen, Petra, Anita van Dissel, Mark Loderichs, Rémy Limpach and Thijs Brocades Zaalberg, eds. *Krijgsgeweld en kolonie. Opkomst en ondergang van Nederland als koloniale mogendheid*. Meppel: Boom, 2021.

Grossman, Taylor, Monica Kello, James Shires and Max Smeets. 'Public-Private Collaboration in Ukraine and Beyond'. *Binding Hook*, 2024. https://bindinghook.com/articles-binding-edge/public-private-collaboration-in-ukraine-and-beyond/

Grossmann, Igor, Michael E.W. Varnum, Cendri A. Hutcherson, and David R. Mandel. 'When Expert Predictions Fail'. *Trends in Cognitive Sciences* 28, no. 2 (2024), pp. 113–123.

Grotius, *De Jure Belli ac Pacis* (1625). Tr. Francis W. Kelsey (1925). Clark, N.J.: The Lawbook Exchange, 2021.

Guerrero-Saade, Juan Andres and Max van Amerongen. 'AcidRain: A Modem Wiper Rains Down on Europe'. *Sentinel Labs*, March 2022.

Guimaraes, Fernando Andresen. *The Origins of the Angolan Civil War: Foreign Intervention and Domestic Political Conflict, 1961–76*. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016.

Gunn, Stephen, David Grummitt and Hans Cools. *War, State, and Society in England and the Netherlands, 1477–1559*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.

Guo, Weisi, Kristian Gleditsch, and Alan Wilson. 'Retool AI to Forecast and Limit Wars'. *Nature* 562 (2018), pp. 331–333.

Gwatiwa, Tshepo T. 'Private Military and Security Companies Policy in Africa: Regional Policy Stasis as Agency in International Politics'. *Scientia Militaria: South African Journal of Military Studies* 44, no. 2 (2016), pp. 68–86.

Haaster, Jelle van. 'On Cyber: The Utility of Military Cyber Operations during Armed Conflict'. PhD Diss., University of Amsterdam, 2019.

Hadi, Muhammad U Qasem Al Tashi, Abbas Shah, Rizwan Qureshi, Amgad Muneer, Muhammad Irfan, Anas Zafar, Muhammad Bilal Shaikh, Naveed Akhtar, Jia Wu, Seyedali Mirjalili, and Mubarak Shah. 'Large Language Models: A Comprehensive Survey of Its Applications, Challenges, Limitations, and Future Prospects'. *Authorea* Preprints 2023.

Hadlington, Lee, Jens Binder, Sarah Gardner, Maria Karanika-Murray, and Sarah Knight. 'The Use of Artificial Intelligence in a Military Context: Development of the Attitudes Toward AI in Defense (AAID) Scale'. *Frontiers in Psychology* 14 (2023): 1164810.

Hagen, Piet. *Koloniale oorlogen in Indonesië. Vijf eeuwen verzet tegen vreemde overheersing*. Amsterdam: Arbeiderspers, 2018.

Haidt, Jonathan. *The Anxious Generation: How the Great Rewiring of Childhood Is Causing an Epidemic of Mental Illness.* New York: Penguin, 2024.

Hajdin, Nikola R. 'Neutral Business Assistance and the Limits of Complicity Under International Criminal Law'. *Michigan Journal of International Law* 45, no. 3 (2024), pp. 381–440. https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4560065.

Hakobyan, Tatul. *Karabakh Diary: Green and Black – Neither War nor Peace*. Antelias Publishing, 2010.

Halawi, Danny, Fred Zhang, Yueh-Han Chen, and Jacob Steinhardt. 'Approaching Human-Level Forecasting with Language Models'. arXiv:2402.18563 (2024).

Hamilton, Rebecca J. 'Social Media Platforms in International Criminal Investigations'. *Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law* 52, no. 1 (2020), pp. 213–223.

Han, Enze, and Cameron Thies. 'External Threats, Internal Challenges, and State Building in East Asia'. *Journal of East Asian Studies* 19, no. 3 (November 2019), pp. 339–360. https://doi.org/10.1017/jea.2019.24.

Harknett, Richard J., and Max Smeets. 'Cyber Campaigns and Strategic Outcomes'. *Journal of Strategic Studies* 45, no. 4 (2022), pp. 534–567.

Hashim, Ahmed S. *The Caliphate at War. Operational Realities and Innovations of the Islamic State.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018.

Hayashi, Nobuo. 'Requirements of Military Necessity in International Humanitarian Law and International Criminal Law'. *Boston University International Law Journal* 28, no. 1 (2010), pp. 39–140.

Heers, Jacques. *Le clan familial au Moyen Age: Étude sur les structures politiques et sociales des milieux urbains*. Paris: Quadrige, 1993.

Heinecken, Lindy. 'Outsourcing Public Security: The Unforeseen Consequences for the Military Profession'. *Armed Forces & Society* 40, no. 4 (2014), pp. 625–646. https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327x13489974.

Heinze, Robert. '"It Recharged Our Batteries": Writing the History of the Voice of Namibia'. *Journal of Namibian Studies: History Politics Culture* 15 (2014), pp. 25–62. https://doi.org/10.59670/jns.v15i.89.

Helou, Mariana, Eric S. Weinstein, Joelle Kalaji, Toufic Chaaban, and Kaissar Yammine. 'Pager Explosion in Beirut: An Unprecedented Event'. *Disaster Medicine and Public Health Preparedness* 18 (2024): e215.

Henriksen, Thomas H. *Communist Powers and Sub-Saharan Africa*. Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1981.

Heppell, Freddy, Mehmet E. Bakir, and Kalina Bontcheva. 'Lying Blindly: Bypassing ChatGPT's Safeguards to Generate Hard-to-Detect Disinformation Claims at Scale'. arXiv.2402.08467 (2024).

Herbst, Jeffrey. 'War and the State in Africa'. *International Security* 14, no. 4 (1990), pp. 117–139.

Heuser, Beatrice. 'Small Wars in the Age of Clausewitz: The Watershed between Partisan War and People's War'. *Journal of Strategic Studies* 33, no. 1 (2010), pp. 139–162.

Heuser, Beatrice. 'Introduction: Exploring the Jungle of Terminology'. *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 25, no. 4 (2014), pp. 741–753.

Heuser, Beatrice, Joachim Isacsson, and Olaf Theiler. 'Strategic Foresight and Future War: A Discussion of Methodologies'. In *Routledge Handbook of the Future of Warfare*, edited by Artur Gruszczak and Sebastian Kaempf, London: Routledge, 2023. Vol. 1, pp. 11–20.

Hintze, Otto. *Staatsverfassung und Heeresverfassung*. Dresden: Zahn & Jaensch, 1906; tr. as 'Military Organization and the Organization of the State'. In *The Historical Essays of Otto Hintze*, edited by Felix Gilbert. New York: Oxford University Press, 1975.

Hippler, Thomas. *Citizens, Soldiers and National Armies: Military Service in France and Germany, 1789–1830*. Abingdon: Routledge, 2008.

Hitz, Benjamin. *Kämpfen um Sold: Eine Alltags- und Sozialgeschichte schweizerischer Söldner in der Frühen Neuzeit*. Cologne: Böhlau, 2015.

Ho, Emily H., David V. Budescu, and Mark Himmelstein. 'Measuring Probabilistic Coherence to Identify Superior Forecasters'. *International Journal of Forecasting* 41, no. 2 (April–June 2025), pp. 596–612.

Holland Michel, Arthur. 'The Black Box, Unlocked: Predictability and Understandability in Military AI'. Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 2020.

Honig, Jan Willem. Review of *Söldner aus Böhmen, Im Dienst deutscher Fürsten: Kriegsgeschäft und Heeresorganisation im 15. Jahrhundert*, by Uwe Tresp. *German History* 24, no. 2 (2006), pp. 295–296. https://doi.org/10.1177/026635540602400208.

Honig, Jan Willem, and Ilmari Käihkö. 'An Exemplary Defeat: The West in Afghanistan, 2001–2021', *Armed Forces & Society* 49, no. 4 (October 2023), pp. 989–1000. https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X221101364.

Honig, Jan Willem. 'People's War vs Professional War: Which Has the Future in Europe?' In *Beyond Ukraine: Debating the Future of War*, edited by Tim Sweijs and Jeffrey H. Michaels. London: Hurst, 2024, pp. 125–145.

Hoog, Tycho van der. 'A New Chapter in Namibian History: Reflections on Archival Research'. *History in Africa*, January 2022, pp. 1–26.

Hoog, Tycho van der. 'Research Note: The Nordic Africa Institute (NAI) Pamphlet Collection'. *Cold War History* 22, no. 3 (2022), pp. 363–368.

Hoog, Tycho van der. 'North Korea and the Liberation of Southern Africa, 1960–2020'. PhD Diss., Leiden University, 2024.

Hoog, Tycho van der, and Bernard C. Moore. 'Paper, Pixels, or Plane Tickets? Multi-Archival Perspectives on the Decolonisation of Namibia'. *Journal of Namibian Studies* 32 (2022), pp. 77–106.

Horncastle, James R., and Jack Adam Maclennan. 'Where Eagles Err: Contemporary Geopolitics and the Future of Western Special Operations'. *Special Operations Journal* 7, no. 1 (2021), pp. 43–54.

Horne, Alistair. *A Savage War of Peace: Algeria, 1954–1962*. New York: New York Review Book, 2006; orig. 1977.

Horowitz, Jason. 'Italy Orders Seizure of Migrant Rescue Ship'. *New York Times*, 20 November 2018. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/20/world/europe/italy-aquarius-seizure-order.html.

Howard, Michael, George J. Andreopolous and Mark R. Shulman, eds. *The Laws of War: Constraints on Warfare in the Western* World. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1994.

Howell O'Neill, Patrick. 'Russia Hacked an American Satellite Company One Hour before the Ukraine Invasion'. *MIT Technology Review*, 10 May 2022. https://www.technologyreview.com/2022/05/10/1051973/russia-hack-viasat-satellite-ukraine-invasion/.

Hsieh, Elvis, Preston Fu, and Jonathan Chen. 'Reasoning and Tools for Human-Level Forecasting'. arXiv:2408.12036 (2024).

Hua, Wenyue, Lizhou Fan, Lingyao Li, Kai Mei, Yianchao Ji, Yingqiang Ge, Laurel Hemphill, and Yongfeng Zhang. 'War and Peace (WarAgent): LLM-Based Multi-Agent Simulation of World Wars'. https://arxiv.org/abs/2311.17227v2 (2024).

Hudson, J., and J. Gould. 'THAAD, in First Operational Use, Destroys Midrange Ballistic Missile in Houthi Attack'. *Defense News*, 21 January 2022, https://www.defensenews.com/land/2022/01/21/thaad-in-first-operational-use-destroys-midrange-ballistic-missile-in-houthi-attack/.

Human Rights Watch. 'Azerbaijan: Seven Years of Conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh'. Human Rights Watch, 1 December 1994, https://www.hrw.org/report/1994/12/01/seven-years-conflict-nagorno-karabakh.

Hunter, Cameron, and Bleddyn E. Bowen. 'We'll Never Have a Model of an AI Major-General: Artificial Intelligence, Command Decisions, and Kitsch Visions of War'. *Journal of Strategic Studies* 47, no. 1 (2024), pp. 116–146.

Human Rights Watch, 'Mali: New Atrocities by Malian Army, Apparent Wagner Fighters', 24 July 2023.

Hutson, James, and Daniel Plate. 'The Algorithm of Fear: Unpacking Prejudice Against AI and the Mistrust of Technology'. *Journal of Innovation and Technology*, no. 38 (2024).

Hyunjoo Jin. 'Musk Says Starlink Active in Ukraine as Russian Invasion Disrupts Internet'. *Reuters*, 27 February 2022.

ICANN. 'Letter from Göran Marby to Mykhailo Fedorov'. 2 March 2022. https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/correspondence/marby-to-fedorov-02mar22-en.pdf.

ICoCA. 'The Nisour Square Massacre'. Undated. https://icoca.ch/case-studies/the-nisour-square-massacre. (Accessed 29 May 2025).

ICRC. 'Conference of Government Experts on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, Geneva, 3 May-3 June 1972 (Second Session)'. Geneva: ICRC, 1972. https://library.icrc.org/library/docs/CD/CEG_1972_DOCUMENTS_ENG_3.pdf.

ICRC. *Commentary on the First Geneva Convention*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016.

ICRC. *Commentary on the Second Geneva Convention*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017.

ICRC. 'Global Advisory Board on Digital Threats during Conflict, Final Report, Protecting Civilians against Digital Threats during Armed Conflict: Recommendations to States, Belligerents, Tech Companies, and Humanitarian Organizations'. Geneva: ICRC, 2024. https://shop.icrc.org/protecting-civilians-against-digital-threats-during-armed-conflict-recommendations-to-states-belligerents-tech-companies-and-humanitarian-organizations-pdf-en.html.

ICRC. *Statutes of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement.* (Accessed 4 May 2024).

International Bar Association (IBA). 'IBA Practical Guide on Business and Human Rights for Business Lawyers' (2016).

International Court of Justice. *Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons*. Advisory Opinion of 8 July 1996.

Irving, Emma. 'And So It Begins… Social Media Evidence in an ICC Arrest Warrant'. *Opinio Juris*, 17 August 2017. https://opiniojuris.org/2017/08/17/and-so-it-begins-social-media-evidence-in-an-icc-arrest-warrant/.

Isidore, Chris. 'Why Many Businesses Are Getting Tougher on Russia Than Sanctions Require'. *CNN*, 3 March 2022. https://edition.cnn.com/2022/03/03/business/business-go-beyond-russian-sanctions/index.html.

Jackson, Kristi, Pat Bazeley and Patricia Bazeley. *Qualitative Data Analysis with NVivo.* London: Sage, 2019.

Jackson, Robert H. *Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511559020.

Jaklin, David Christopher. 'Sadat: Proxy Force – Informal Security Structure – Turkey's Group Wagner?' In *Agents of Violence: Non-Governmental Armed Forces in Southwest Asia, North Africa and Beyond*, edited by Rüdiger Lohlker and Katharina Ivanyi. Leiden: Brill/Schöningh, 2024, pp. 1–24. https://doi.org/10.30965/9783657794478_002.

Jakobsen, Peter Viggo. 'Causal Theories of Threat and Success: Simple Analytical Tools Making It Easier to Assess, Formulate, and Validate Military Strategy'. *Scandinavian Journal of Military Studies* 5, no. 1 (2022), pp. 177–191.

James, Luke. 'Military Information Sharing by Ukrainian Citizens in the Digital Environment: DPH? – Blurring of Lines Between Civilian and Military Actors in Ukraine'. *Opinio Juris* (blog), 12 September 2022. http://opiniojuris.org/2022/09/12/military-information-sharing-by-ukrainian-citizens-in-the-digital-environment-dph-blurring-of-lines-between-civilian-and-military-actors-in-ukraine/.

Jane's International Defence Review. 'Harpy Heralds New Customers'. *Jane's International Defence Review* (1997).

Jefferies, Ian D. 'Private Military Companies: A Positive Role to Play in Today's International System'. *Connections* 1, no. 4 (2002), pp. 103–125.

Jensen, Benjamin M., Christopher Whyte, and Scott Cuomo. 'Algorithms at War: The Promise, Peril, and Limits of Artificial Intelligence'. *International Studies Review* 22, no. 3 (2020), pp. 526–550.

Jentzsch, Corinna. *Violent Resistance: Militia Formation and Civil War in Mozambique.* New York: Cambridge University Press, 2022.

Jervis, Robert. 'Why Nuclear Superiority Doesn't Matter'. *Political Science Quarterly* 94, no. 4 (1979), pp. 617–633.

Jesson, Jill, Fiona M. Lacey and Lydia Matheson. *Doing Your Literature Review: Traditional and Systematic Techniques.* London: Sage, 2011.

Jie, Yu, and Lucy Ridout. 'Who Decides China's Foreign Policy? The Role of Central Government, Provincial-Level Authorities and State-Owned Enterprises'. London: Chatham House, 19 November 2021. https://www.chathamhouse.org/2021/11/who-decides-chinas-foreign-policy.

Jie, Yu, and Jon Wallace. 'What Is China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)?' London: Chatham House, 19 December 2022. https://www.chathamhouse.org/2021/09/what-chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-bri.

Joachim, Jutta, and Andrea Schneiker. 'New Humanitarians? Frame Appropriation through Private Military and Security Companies'. *Millennium* 40, no. 2 (2012), pp. 365–388.

Joachim, Jutta, and Andrea Schneiker. 'All for One and One in All: Private Military Security Companies as Soldiers, Business Managers and Humanitarians'. *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 27, no. 2 (June 2014), pp. 246–267. https://doi.org/10.1080/09557571.2013.867300.

Joes, James Anthony. *Resisting Rebellion: The History and Politics of Counterinsurgency*. Lexington, Ky.: University Press of Kentucky, 2004.

John Paul II. 'Discorso del Santo Padre Giovanni Paolo II alla Delegazione del Sindicato Indipendente ed Autonomo Polacco "Solidarnosc"'. Sala del Concistoro, 15 January 1981. https://www.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/it/speeches/1981/january/documents/hf_jp-ii_spe_19810115_solidarnosc.html. (Accessed 29 August 2024).

John Paul II. 'Holy Mass in Drogheda, Homily of His Holiness John Paul II'. 29 September 1979. https://www.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/homilies/1979/documents/hf_jp-ii_hom_19790929_irlan-

da-dublino-drogheda.html#:~:text=I%20came%20to%20Drogheda%20today,a%20danger%20or%20a%20threat. (Accessed 30 March 2024).

John Paul II. 'Meeting with the Civil Authorities. Address of His Holiness John Paul II'. Warsaw, 2 June 1979. https://www.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/speeches/1979/june/documents/hf_jp-ii_spe_19790602_polonia-varsavia-autorita-civili.html. (Accessed 29 August 2024).

Johnson, Rob. 'The First Phase of the Russian Invasion of Ukraine 2022'. Oxford Changing Character of War Centre, 16 March 2022. https://www.ccw.ox.ac.uk/news/rob-johnson-writes-essay-on-ukraine.

Jones, Andrew. 'U.S. Sanctions Chinese Satellite Firm for Allegedly Supplying SAR Imagery to Russia's Wagner Group'. *SpaceNews*, 27 January 2023. https://spacenews.com/u-s-sanctions-chinese-satellite-firm-for-allegedly-supplying-sar-imagery-to-russias-wagner-group/.

Jones, Archer. *The Art of War in the Western World*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1989.

Jones, Connor. 'Leader of Pro-Russia DDoS Crew Killnet "Unmasked" by Russian State Media'. *The Register*, 27 November 2023. https://www.theregister.com/2023/11/27/leader_of_prorussia_ddos_crew/. (Accessed 23 May 2025).

Jones, Derek, and Brian Mehan. 'Stronger Together: The Integration of a Nation's Special Operations Forces and Voluntary-Based Formation in Comprehensive and Total Defence'. *Security: Theory and Practice* 48, no. 3 (2022), pp. 141–155.

Jones, Derek, and J. Bryant Love. 'Resilience and Resistance 2.0: Initial Lessons of Ukraine and the Implications of Resilience and Resistance Efforts to Deter and Respond to Invasion and Occupation by Revisionist Powers'. *Security: Theory and Practice* 48, no. 3 (2022), pp. 21–40.

Jones, Seth G., Catrina Doxsee, Brian Katz, Eric McQueen and Joe Moye. *Russia's Corporate Soldiers: The Global Expansion of Russia's Private Military Companies.* Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2021.

Jong, Henk de. 'On the Boer War and Dutch (Military) Memory: Aspects of the South-African Military History in Dutch perspective'. Lecture held at the 2010 Conference of *The Historical Association of South Africa* (HASA) in Potchefstroom (*Milestones / Mylpale. Commemorating Southern African History / Herdenking van Suider-Afrikaanse Geskiedenis*).

Jong, Henk de. 'Oog in oog met "eenen Afrikaanschen oorlog". Nederlandse militaire waarnemers in de Boerenoorlog (1899–1902)'. *Marineblad* 120, no. 5 (2010), pp. 22–28. Extended annotated digital version on: https://www.marineblad.nl/images/Marineblad/2010-2019/2010/Marineblad%205%20juli%202010.pdf.

Jong, Henk de. 'The Past as Future? South Africa, The Boer War and Dutch (Military) Memory'. Lecture held at the 2011 Conference of the *Southern African Historical Society* (SAHS) at the University of KwaZulu-Natal in Durban (*The Past and its Possibilities: Perspectives on Southern Africa*). www.SAHS.org.za/conference.

Jong, Henk de. 'Past as Future: The South African War, Dutch Observers and Military Memory'. *Scientia Militaria. South African Journal of Military Studies* 41, no. 1 (2013), pp. 34–64.

Jopela, Albino Pereira de Jesus. 'The Politics of Liberation Heritage in Postcolonial Southern Africa, With Special Reference to Mozambique'. PhD Diss., University of the Witwatersrand, 2017.

Jorge, Marco. 'Transnational Soldiers and Guerrilla Warfare from the Spanish Civil War to the Second World War'. *War in History* 27, no. 3 (2020), pp. 387–407.

Jüde, Johannes. 'Making or Un-Making States: When Does War Have Formative Effects?' *European Journal of International Relations* 28, no. 1 (March 2022), pp. 209–234. https://doi.org/10.1177/13540661211053628.

Kahneman, Daniel, and Amos Tversky. 'Intuitive Prediction: Biases and Corrective Procedures'. *Decision Research* 1977.

Käihkö, Ilmari, and Jan Willem Honig. 'Ukraine's Not-So-Whole-of-Society at War: Force Generation in Modern Developed Societies'. *Parameters: The US Army War College Quarterly* 55, no. 1 (Spring 2025), pp. 25–38. doi: 10.55540/0031-1723.3329.

Kaldor, Mary. *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era*, 3rd ed. Cambridge: Polity, 2012; orig. 1999.

Kaleck, Wolfgang, and Saage-Maaβ, Miriam. 'Corporate Accountability for Human Rights Violations Amounting to International Crimes: The Status Quo and its Challenges'. *Journal of International Criminal Justice* 8 (2010), pp. 699–724.

Kalshoven, Frits. 'The Conference of Government Experts on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts (Second Session), 3 May–2 June 1972'. *Netherlands Yearbook of International Law* 3 (1972), pp. 18–61.

Kalshoven, Frits. 'Civilian Immunity and the Principle of Distinction'. *American University Law Review* 31 (1982), pp. 855–896.

Kamrava, Mehran. 'State-Building in Azerbaijan: The Search for Consolidation'. *Middle East Journal* 55, no. 2 (2001), pp. 216–236, https://www.jstor.org/stable/4329615.

Kaplan, Robert D. 'The Coming Anarchy'. *The Atlantic* (February 1994).

Katz, Brian, Seth G. Jones, Catrina Doxsee and Nicholas Harrington, 'Moscow's Mercenary Wars: The Expansion of Russian Private Military Companies'. Washington, D.C.: CSIS, September 2020. https://russianpmcs.csis.org/. (Accessed 29 May 2025).

Kearn, David W. 'The Hard Truths about Soft Power'. *Journal of Political Power* 4, no. 1 (April 2011), pp. 65–85. https://www.researchgate.net/profile/David-Kearn/publication/254336694_The_Hard_Truths_about_Soft_Power/links/5cf6a7dd299bf1fb18596b28/The-Hard-Truths-about-Soft-Power.pdf. (Accessed 30 August 2024).

Kebir, Oussama, Issam Nouaouri, Lamia Rejeb, Lilia Rejab, and Lamjed Ben Said. 'Simulating Actors' Behaviors Within Terrorist Attack Scenarios Based on a Multi-Agent System'. In *Proceedings of the 12th International Defence and Homeland Security Simulation Workshop (DHSS 2022)*, Rome, Italy, 12–20 September 2022.

Kellett, Anthony. *Combat Motivation: The Behavior of Soldiers in Battle*. Boston: Kluwer-Nijhoff, 1982.

Kelly, Francis J. *Vietnam Studies: U.S. Army Special Forces 1961–1971*. Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1973. https://history.army.mil/Publications/Publications-Catalog/US-Army-Special-Forces-1961-1971/.

Kelly, Michael J. *Prosecuting Corporations for Genocide*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016.

Keulen, Roy van. 'Digital Force: Disrupting Life, Liberty and Livelihood in the Information Age'. PhD Diss., Leiden University, 2018.

Khadiagala, Gilbert M. *Allies in Adversity: The Frontline States in Southern African Security, 1975–1993*. Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1994.

Khan, Fahad A., Gang Li, Anam N. Khan, Qazi W. Khan, Myriam Hadjouni and Hela Elmannai. 'AI-Driven Counter-Terrorism: Enhancing Global Security Through Advanced Predictive Analytics'. *IEEE Access* 11 (2023), pp. 135864–135879.

Khanal, Shaleen, Hongzhou Zhang and Araz Taeihagh. 'Why and How Is the Power of Big Tech Increasing in the Policy Process? The Case of Generative AI'. *Policy and Society*, 44, no. 1 (2025), pp. 52–69. https://doi.org/10.1093/polsoc/puae012.

Kharief, Akram. 'China's Discreet Game in North Africa: Private Military Companies'. Tunis: Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung, March 2022. https://rosaluxna.org/publications/chinas-discreet-game-in-north-africa-private-military-companies/. (Accessed 27 May 2025).

Kilcullen, David. *Counterinsurgency*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.

Kilcullen, David. *The Dragons and the Snakes: How the Rest Learned to Fight the West*. London: Hurst, 2020.

King, Anthony. *The Combat Soldier: Infantry Tactics and Cohesion in the Twentieth and Twenty-First Centuries*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.

King, Anthony. 'On Cohesion'. In *Frontline: Combat and Cohesion in the Twenty-First Century*, edited by Anthony King. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015, pp. 3–23.

Kinsey, C., and M.H. Patterson. *Contractors and War: The Transformation of United States' Expeditionary Operations.* Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2012.

Kinsey, Christopher. *Corporate Soldiers and International Security: The Rise of Private Military Companies.* Abingdon: Routledge, 2006.

Kinsey, Christopher, and Andreas Krieg. 'Assembling a Force to Defeat Boko Haram: How Nigeria Integrated the Market into Its Counterinsurgency Strategy'. *Defence and Security Analysis* 37, no. 2 (April 2021), pp. 232–249. https://doi.org/10.1080/14751798.2021.1919356.

Kinsey, Christopher. *Private Contractors and the Reconstruction of Iraq: Transforming Military Logistics*. London: Routledge, 2009.

Kirichenko, David. 'Ukraine's Volunteer IT Army Confronts Tech, Legal Challenges'. CEPA, 27 November 2023. https://cepa.org/article/ukraine-volunteer-it-army-confronts-tech-legal-challenges/.

Kisangani, Emizet F., and Jeffrey Pickering. 'Rebels, Rivals, and Post-Colonial State-Building: Identifying Bellicist Influences on State Extractive Capability'. *International Studies Quarterly* 58, no. 1 (March 2014), pp. 187–198. https://doi.org/10.1111/isqu.12042.

Kitson, Frank. *Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency and Peacekeeping*. ShoeString Press, 1971.

Klamberg, Mark. 'Prosecuting Corporate Executives for War Crimes in Sudan'. *New York University Journal of International Law & Politic*s 54 (2022), pp. 887–939.

Kleffner, Jann. 'From "Belligerents" to "Fighters" and Civilians Directly Participating in Hostilities: On the Principle of Distinction in Non-International Armed Conflicts One Hundred Years after the Second Hague Peace Conference'. *Netherlands International Law Review* 54, no. 2 (2007), pp. 315–336.

Kleffner, Jann K. 'The Applicability of International Humanitarian Law to Organized Armed Groups' *International Review of the Red Cross* 93, no. 882 (June 2011), pp. 443–461. doi: 10.1017/S181638311200001X.

Kleffner, Jann. 'Scope of Application of International Humanitarian Law'. In *The Handbook of International Humanitarian Law*, edited by Dieter Fleck. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021.

Kleisner, Theodore W., and Trevor T. Garmey. 'Tactical TikTok for Great Power Competition: Applying the Lessons of Ukraine's IO Campaign to Future Large-Scale Conventional Operations'. *Military Review* (July–August 2022), pp. 23–43.

Klem, Bart. *Performing Sovereign Aspirations: Tamil Insurgency and Postwar Transition in Sri Lanka*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2024.

Klement, Joachim. *Geo-Economics: The Interplay Between Geopolitics, Economics, and Investments*. Charlottesville, Va.: CFA Institute, 2021.

Knoke, David. *Network Collective Action: Agent-Based Models of Pandemics, Riots, Social Movements, Insurrections and Insurgencies*. Springer, 2025.

Koehler, Jan, and Christoph Zürcher. 'The Art of Losing the State: Weak Empire to Weak Nation-State Around Nagorno-Karabakh'. In *Potentials of Disorder: Explaining Conflict and Stability in the Caucasus and in the Former Yugoslavia*, edited by Jan Koehler and Christoph Zürcher. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003.

Koenig, Alexa. 'Meta's Oversight Board Recommends Major Advance in International Accountability'. *Just Security*, 22 June 2023. https://www.justsecurity.org/87015/metas-oversight-board-recommends-major-advance-in-international-accountability/.

Kofman, Michael. 'Fixing NATO Deterrence in the East or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love NATO's Crushing Defeat by Russia'. *War on the Rocks*, 12 May 2016. https://warontherocks.com/2016/05/fixing-nato-deterrence-in-the-east-or-how-i-learned-to-stop-worrying-and-love-natos-crushing-defeat-by-russia/. (Accessed 15 April 2024).

Kolb, Robert. 'Of Hague Law and Geneva Law'. *Articles of War* (blog), 29 November 2023. https://lieber.westpoint.edu/of-hague-law-geneva-law/.

Koskenniemi, Martti. *The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law, 1870–1960*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.

Koven, Barnett S. 'Competing with Great Powers through Competitive Strategy and Unconventional Warfare'. *Special Operations Journal* 7, no. 1 (2021), pp. 68–86.

Krahmann, E. 'From Performance to Performativity: The Legitimization of US Security Contracting and Its Consequences'. *Security Dialogue* 48, no. 6 (December 2017), pp. 541–559. https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010617722650.

Krahmann, E. 'Nato Contracting in Afghanistan: The Problem of Principal-Agent Networks'. *International Affairs* 92, no. 6 (November 2016), pp. 1401–1426. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2346.12753.

Krahmann, E., and A. Leander. 'Contracting Security: Markets in the Making of MONUSCO Peacekeeping'. *International Peacekeeping* 26, no. 2 (March 2019) pp. 165–189. https://doi.org/10.1080/13533312.2018.1557051.

Kraska, James. 'China's Maritime Militia Upends Rules on Naval Warfare'. *The Diplomat*, 10 August 2015. https://thediplomat.com/2015/08/chinas-maritime-militia-upends-rules-on-naval-warfare/.

Kriger, Norma. 'From Patriotic Memories to 'Patriotic History' in Zimbabwe, 1990–2005'. *Third World Quarterly* 27, no. 6 (2006), pp. 1151–1169.

Krohley, Nicholas. 'Ukrainian Civilians Are Pioneering the Art of Resistance: Nonviolent Tools are Undercutting the Russian Occupation'. *Foreign Policy*, 28 February 2024. https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/02/28/ukrainian-civilian-resistance-movements-women-war-mavkas/. (Accessed 20 May 2024).

Kruck, A. 'Theorising the Use of Private Military and Security Companies: A Synthetic Perspective'. *Journal of International Relations and Development* 17, no. 1 (January 2014), pp. 112–141. https://doi.org/10.1057/jird.2013.4.

Kuitenbrouwer, Vincent. 'A War of Words. Dutch Pro-Boer Propaganda and the South African War (1899–1902)'. PhD Diss., Universiteit van Amsterdam, 2010.

Kuss, Susanne. *German Colonial Wars and the Context of Military Violence*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2017.

La Noue, François de. *Discours politiques et militaires*, ed. F. E. Sutcliffe. Geneva: Droz, 1967.

Lanchester, Frederick W. *Aircraft in Warfare: The Dawn of the Fourth Arm*. London: Constable, 1916.

Lawson, Sean, and Michael K. Middleton. 'Cyber Pearl Harbor: Analogy, Fear, and the Framing of Cyber Security Threats in the United States, 1991–2016'. *First Monday* 24, no. 3 (March 2019). https://doi.org/10.5210/fm.v24i3.9623.

Leander, Anna. 'The Market for Force and Public Security: The Destabilizing Consequences of Private Military Companies'. *Journal of Peace Research* 42, no. 5 (2005), pp. 605–622. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343305056237.

Lee, J.S., M. Kelly and A. Mirza. 'Saudi-led Airstrikes in Yemen Have Been Called War Crimes, Many Relied on U.S. Support'. *Washington Post*, 4 June 2022.

Lee, Jong Min, and Samuel Wittman. 'Will China's Private Security Companies Follow the Wagner Group's Footsteps in Africa?' *The Diplomat*, 24 June 2023. https://thediplomat.com/2023/06/will-chinas-private-security-companies-follow-the-wagner-groups-footsteps-in-africa/.

Lee, Robert, Michael Assante and Tim Conway. 'Analysis of the Cyber Attack on the Ukrainian Power Grid'. *SANS Industrial Control Systems Security Blog*, 2016.

Legarda, Helena, and Meia Nouwens. 'Guardians of the Belt and Road'. Berlin: MERICS, Mercator Institute for China Studies, 2018. https://www.merics.org/en/report/guardians-belt-and-road.

Lehnart, Chia. 'Individual Liability of Private Military Personnel under International Criminal Law'. *European Journal of International Law* 19, no. 5 (2008), pp. 1015–1034.

Levy, Ido. 'Soldiers of End-Times: Assessing the Military Effectiveness of the Islamic State'. Washington, D.C.: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2021.

Lewis, Steve. 'Special Operations Forces' Role in Political Warfare'. *Special Operations Journal* 5, no. 2 (2019), pp. 179–187.

Leys, Colin, and John S. Saul. 'Liberation Without Democracy? The SWAPO Crisis of 1976'. *Journal of Southern African Studies* 20, no. 1 (1994), pp. 123–147.

Leys, Colin, John S. Saul, and Susan Brown. *Namibia's Liberation Struggle: The Two-Edged Sword*. Edinburgh: James Curry, 1995.

Li, N. 'Major Security Challenges to China's Belt and Road Initiative'. *East Asian Policy* 11, no. 2 (April–June 2019), pp. 95–103. https://doi.org/10.1142/s1793930519000205.

Li, Meilin. Understanding the effect of madman leaders on economic sanctions. *International Interactions*, *51*(2) (2025): 320-343.

Libiseller, Chiara. '"Hybrid Warfare" as an Academic Fashion'. *Journal of Strategic Studies* 46, no. 4 (2023), pp. 858–880.

Lichtenstein, Denis, et al. 'Framing the Ukraine Crisis: A Comparison between Talk Show Debates in Russian and German Television'. *International Communication Gazette* 81, no. 1 (2019), pp. 66–88. https://doi.org/10.1177/1748048518755209.

Lieber, Robert J. Review of *The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy* by Robert Jervis. *Science* 227, no. 4698 (22 February 1985), p. 935. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.227.4689.935.a.

Lindsay, Jon R., and Erik Gartzke, 'Coercion through Cyberspace: The Stability-Instability Paradox Revisited'. In *The Power to Hurt: Coercion in Theory and in Practice*, edited by Kelly M. Greenhill and Peter J.P. Krause. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016, pp. 179–203.

Lishchuck, Ruslana. 'How Large Would Tech Companies Be if They Were Countries?' *MacKeeper Blog*, 13 August 2021. https://mackeeper.com/blog/tech-giants-as-countries/.

Lithuanian National Radio and Television (LRT), 'Lithuania Sets Up Wartime Civilian Force: Explainer'. 5 May 2024. https://www.lrt.lt/en/news-in-english/19/2264481/lithuania-sets-up-wartime-civilian-force-explainer. (Accessed 15 May 2024).

Liu, Lianlian, and Jessica Gammon. 'The Unique Role of the Chinese Government in the Protection of Overseas Citizens'. *International Review of Administrative Sciences* 88, no. 3 (2022), pp. 793–808. https://doi.org/10.1177/0020852320954278.

Lodge, Tom Geoffrey. 'Insurrectionism in South Africa: The Pan-Africanist Congress and the Poqo Movement, 1959–1965'. PhD Diss., University of York, 1984. https://etheses.whiterose.ac.uk/14182/.

Logan, Sarah. 'Tell Me What You Don't Know: Large Language Models and the Pathologies of Intelligence Analysis'. *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 78, no. 2 (2024), pp. 220–228.

Łoś, R. 'U.S. and China: Hard and Soft Power Potential'. *International Studies: Interdisciplinary Political and Cultural Journal* 22, no. 1 (2018), pp. 39–50. https://doi.org/1018778/1641-4233.22.03.

Lovewine, George C. *Outsourcing the Global War on Terrorism: Private Military Companies and American Intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan.* New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014.

Loyle, Cyanne E. *Understanding Nonstate Actor Behavior.* Washington, D.C.: Simon-Skjodt Center for the Prevention of Genocide, 2018.

LTTE. 'Socialist Tamil Eelam. Political Programme of the LTTE'. In *Dealing with Diversity: Sri Lankan Discourses on Peace and Conflict*, edited by G. Frerks and B. Klem. The Hague: Clingendael Institute, 2005.

Lu, Lingyu, and Cameron G. Thies. 'War, Rivalry, and State Building in the Middle East'. *Political Research Quarterly* 66, no. 2 (June 2013), pp. 239–253. https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912912448538.

Lupion, Miranda. 'The Gray War of Our Time: Information Warfare and the Kremlin's Weaponization of Russian-Language Digital News'. *Journal of Slavic Military Studies* 31, no. 3 (2018), pp. 329–353.

Luttwak, Edward. 'The Missing Dimension'. In *Religion: The Missing Dimension of Statecraft*, edited by Douglas Johnston and Cynthia Sampson. New York: Oxford University Press, 1994, pp. 8–19.

Lykke, Arthur F. 'Defining Military Strategy'. *Military Review* (May 1989), pp. 2–8.

Lyons, Joshua. 'Documenting Violations of International Humanitarian Law from Space: A Critical Review of Geospatial Analysis of Satellite Imagery during Armed Conflicts in Gaza (2009), Georgia (2008), and Sri Lanka (2009)'. *International Review of the Red Cross* 94 (2012), pp. 739–763.

Maas, Matthijs M., Kayla Lucero-Matteucci, and Di Cooke. 'Military Artificial Intelligence as a Contributor to Global Catastrophic Risk'. In *AI and Global Catastrophic Risks,* edited by Max Tegmark and Allan Dafoe (2023), pp. 235–260.

Mabitsela, Seane. 'The Role of OAU on Representation of National Liberation Movements at the UN, 1963–1974'. *Journal of African Union Studies* 12, no. 1 (April 2023), pp. 71–87. https://doi.org/10.31920/2050-4306/2022/12n1a4.

Mačák, Kubo. 'On the Shelf, But Close at Hand: The Contribution of Non-State Initiatives to International Cyber Law'. *AJIL Unbound* 113 (2019), pp. 81–86.

Mačák, Kubo, and Mauro Vignati. 'Civilianization of Digital Operations: A Risky Trend'. *Lawfare*, 5 April 2023. https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/civilianization-digital-operations-risky-trend.

Macleod, S., and R. Dewinter-Schmitt. 'Certifying Private Security Companies: Effectively Ensuring the Corporate Responsibility to Respect Human Rights?'. *Business and Human Rights Journal* 4, no. 1 (January 2019) pp. 55–77. https://doi.org/10.1017/bhj.2018.25.

Macola, Giacomo. *Liberal Nationalism in Central Africa: A Biography of Harry Mwaanga Nkumbula*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010.

Madory, Doug. 'Updated: Cogent and Lumen Curtail Operations in Russia'. *Kentik*, 7 March 2022, https://www.kentik.com/blog/cogent-disconnects-from-russia/.

Maher, Andrew. 'Guerrillas, Revolutionaries, Insurgents and Militias and Mafiosi: The Grim Threat of Irregular Strategy'. https://mwi.westpoint.edu/guerrillas-revolutionaries-insurgents-and-militias-and-mafiosi-the-grim-threats-of-irregular-strategy/.

Mahoney, C.W. 'Buyer Beware: How Market Structure Affects Contracting and Company Performance in the Private Military Industry'. *Security Studies* 26, no. 1 (January-March 2017), pp. 30–59. https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2017.1243912.

Malet, David. *Foreign Fighters: Transnational Identity in Civil Conflicts*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.

Malik, Aisha. 'Google Adds Air Raids Alerts to Android Phones in Ukraine'. *TechCrunch*, 10 March 2022. https://techcrunch.com/2022/03/10/google-adds-air-raid-alerts-to-android-phones-in-ukraine/?guccounter=2.

Man, Joseph. 'Covert TikTok Campaign Blamed in Pro-Russian Romanian Candidate's Surge'. *Washington Post*, 5 December 2024. https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2024/12/05/tiktok-romania-president-russia-infulence/.

Mandiant. 'APT 1: Exposing One of China's Cyber Espionage Units'. 2013.

Mann, Michael. *The Sources of Social Power*, 4 vols. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986–2012.

Mann, Michael. 'The Sources of My Sources'. *Contemporary Sociology* 42 no. 4 (2013), pp. 499–502. https://doi.org/10.1177/0094306113491546c.

Mann, Michael. *On Wars*. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2023.

Marco, Anthony. 'Forces of Destabilization: Countering Wagner Group in the Sahel'. Washington, D.C.: Irregular Warfare Initiative, 4 April 2023. https://irregularwarfare.org/articles/forces-of-destabilization-countering-wagner-group-in-the-sahel/.

Marks, Thomas A., and Paul B. Rich. 'Back to the Future: People's War in the 21st Century'. *Small Wars and Insurgencies* 28, no. 3 (2017), pp. 409–425.

Marmon, Brooks. '"Division to Save the Country Is Wisdom": The Short Life of the Zimbabwe National Party and Its Lasting Impact on Zimbabwe's Liberation Struggle, 1961–1963'. *International Journal of African Historical Studies* 53, no. 3 (2020), pp. 361–387.

Marmon, Brooks. 'Early Factionalism in Zimbabwe's Liberation Struggle'. In *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of African History*, 2023. https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190277734.013.1460.

Marquardt, Alex. 'Exclusive: Musk's SpaceX Says It Can No Longer Pay for Critical Satellite Services in Ukraine, Asks Pentagon to Pick Up the Tab'. *CNN*, 14 October 2022. https://edition.cnn.com/2022/10/13/politics/elon-musk-spacex-starlink-ukraine/index.html.

Marshall, S.L.A. *Men Against Fire: The Problem of Battle Command*. New York: Morrow, 1947.

Marston, Daniel, and Carter Malkasian. *Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare*. Oxford: Osprey, 2010.

Marten, Kimberley. *Warlords: Strong-Arm Brokers in Weak States*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2012.

Martin, Alexander. 'US Military Hackers Conducting Offensive Operations in Support of Ukraine, Says Head of Cyber Command'. *Sky News*, 1 June 2022. https://news.sky.com/story/us-military-hackers-conducting-offensive-operations-in-support-of-ukraine-says-head-of-cyber-command-12625139.

Maschmeyer, Lennart. 'Cyber Conflict and Subversion in the Russia-Ukraine War'. *Lawfare*, 11 June 2024.

Maschmeyer, Lennart. 'The Subversive Trilemma: Why Cyber Operations Fall Short of Expectations'. *International Security* 46, no. 2 (2021), pp. 51–90.

Masson, J. 'Les missiles des Houthis: prolifération balistique et groupes armés non-étatiques'. Paris: Fondation pour la recherche stratégique, December 2018. https://www.nonproliferation.eu/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/201811.pdf.

Mauksch, Stefanie, Heiko A. von der Gracht and Theodore J. Gordon. 'Who Is an Expert for Foresight? A Review of Identification Methods'. *Technological Forecasting and Social Change* 154 (2020): 119982.

Maundi, Mohammed Omar. 'The Role of the Organization of Africa Unity in the Liberation Struggle of Southern Africa'. In *Southern African Liberation Struggles*, edited by Arnold J. Temu and Joel das Neves Tembe. Dar es Salaam: Mkuki na Nyota, 2019, pp. 381–430.

Mavrogiorgos, Konstantinos, Athanasios Kiourtis, Argyro Mavrogiorgou, Andreas Menychtas, and Dimosthenis Kyriazis. 'Bias in Machine Learning: A Literature Review'. *Applied Sciences* 14, no. 19 (2024): 8860.

Mbamba, A. Mauno. *The Namibia Education and Health Centres: A Study of SWAPO Schools Among Namibian Refugees in Zambia and Angola*. Stockholm: University of Stockholm, 1979.

McCord, Edward A. *The Power of the Gun: The Emergence of Modern Chinese Warlordism*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1993.

McCreadie, Maureen, and Ronald Rice. 'Trends in Analyzing Access to Information. Part I: Cross-Disciplinary Conceptualizations of Access'. *Information Processing and Management* 35 (1999), pp. 45–76.

McCullin, David E. 'Exploring Predictability in Armed Conflict'. *Journal of Advanced Military Studies* 11, no. 1 (2020), pp. 147–165.

McDaid, Cathal, and Rowland Corr. 'The Mobile Network Battlefield in Ukraine: Part 3'. *Adaptive Mobile Security*, 2022.

McDowell, C. *A Tamil Asylum Diaspora: Sri Lankan Migration, Settlement and Politics in Switzerland*. Oxford: Berghahn, 1996.

McFarlane, K. B. *The Nobility of Later Medieval England*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973.

McFarlane, K. B. *England in the Fifteenth Century: Collected Essays*. London: Hambledon, 1981.

McFate, Sean. 'The Mercenaries behind the Bucha Massacre'. *Wall Street Journal*, 12 April 2022. https://www.wsj.com/articles/mercenaries-behind-bucha-massacre-russia-ukraine-putin-attack-terror-brutality-wagner-group-moscow-geneva-convention-war-crimes-atrocities-11649797041.

McGilvray, D.B. *Crucible of Conflict: Tamil and Muslim Society on the East Coast of Sri Lanka*. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2008.

McGregor, Andrew. 'Wagner's Influence in Central African Republic Wanes as American PMC Enters the Scene'. *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 21, no. 19 (2024). https://jamestown.org/program/wagners-influence-in-central-african-republic-wanes-as-american-pmc-enters-the-scene/.

McNeill, William H. *The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force, and Society since A.D. 1000*, 2nd ed. Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1984.

Mehltretter, Andreas, Paul W. Thurner, Oliver Pamp and Paul Binder. *The Rebels' Armament Dataset (RAD) Codebook*. Munich: Ludwig Maximilian University, August 2023.

Mehrab, Zakaria, Logan Stundal, Samarth Swarup, Srinivasan Venaktramanan, Bryan Lewis, Henning Mortveit et al. 'Network Agency: An Agent-Based Model of Forced Migration from Ukraine'. In *Proceedings of the 23rd International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems* (May 2024), pp. 1372–1380.

Mel, N. *Militarizing Sri Lanka. Popular Culture, Memory and Narrative in the Armed Conflict*. New York: Sage, 2007.

Melber, Henning. '"Namibia, Land of the Brave": Selective Memories on War and Violence within Nation Building'. In *Rethinking Resistance: Revolt and Violence in African History*, edited by Jon Abbink, Klaas van Walraven and Mirjam de Bruijn. Leiden: Brill, 2003, pp. 305–327. https://doi.org/10.1163/9789047401629_015.

Melber, Henning. 'Southern African Liberation Movements as Governments and the Limits to Liberation'. *Review of African Political Economy* 36, no. 121 (2009), pp. 451–459.

Melzer, Nils. *International Humanitarian Law: A Comprehensive Introduction*. Geneva: ICRC, 2016.

Meng, Anne, and Jack Paine. 'Power Sharing and Authoritarian Stability: How Rebel Regimes Solve the Guardianship Dilemma'. *American Political Science Review* 116, no. 4 (November 2022), pp. 1208–1225. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055422000296.

Meredith, Martin. *Diamonds, Gold, and War: The British, the Boers, and the Making of South Africa*. New York: PublicAffairs, 2007.

Mertens, F. 'The Dangers and Limitations of the Russian Missile Campaign'. The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, January 2024. https://hcss.nl/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/Dangers-and-Limitations-of-the-Russian-Missile-Campaign-HCSS-2024-V1.pdf.

Mesterton-Gibbons, Michael. *Models of War and Other Group Conflicts*. Lecture Notes. Florida State University, 2016.

Meta Oversight Board. 'Armenian Prisoners of War Video'. 13 June 2023. https://www.oversightboard.com/decision/FB-YLRV35WD.

Meta, 'Update: Israel and Palestine Due Diligence', 1 September 2023. https://humanrights.fb.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/September-2023-Israel-and-Palestine-HRDD-Meta-Update.pdf.

Meta. 'Meta's Ongoing Efforts Regarding Russia's Invasion of Ukraine'. 26 February 2022. https://about.fb.com/news/2022/02/metas-ongoing-efforts-regarding-russias-invasion-of-ukraine/.

Michaels, Eva. 'Caught off Guard? Evaluating How External Experts in Germany Warned About Russia's War on Ukraine'. *Intelligence and National Security* 39, no. 3 (2024), pp. 420–442.

Michaelson, R. 'Israel Says It Intercepted Missile Fired by Houthis at Port City of Eilat'. *Guardian*, 21 July 2024. https://www.theguardian.com/world/article/2024/jul/21/israel-says-intercepted-missile-fired-houthis-port-city-eilat.

Michaelson, R., Q. Kierszenbaum and E. Graham-Harrison. 'Israel Strikes Yemen Port after Houthi Rebels Attack Tel Aviv'. *Guardian*, 20 July 2024. https://www.theguardian.com/world/article/2024/jul/20/airstrikes-hit-yemens-hodeidah-port-after-israel-vows-revenge-for-houthi-attack.

Michalowski, Sabine. 'Doing Business with a Bad Actor: How to Draw the Line Between Legitimate Commercial Activities and Those that Trigger Corporate Complicity Liability'. *Texas International Law Journal* 50 (2015), pp. 403–464.

Microsoft Threat Intelligence Centre. 'A Year of Russian Hybrid Warfare in Ukraine'. 15 March 2023. https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/sites/default/files/documents/s9zfme-rssdn/2023-03-15-Microsoft-A-year-of-Russian-hybrid-warfare-in-Ukraine-MS-Threat-Intelligence.pdf.

Microsoft Threat Intelligence Centre. 'Destructive Malware Targeting Ukrainian Organizations'. 15 January 2022.

Microsoft. 'Microsoft Suspends New Sales in Russia'. *Microsoft Official Blog*, 4 March 2022. https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2022/03/04/microsoft-suspends-russia-sales-ukraine-conflict/.

Mikler, John. *The Political Power of Global Corporations*. Cambridge: Polity, 2018.

Military Africa, 'China's Mercenaries in Africa: A Growing Threat or a Strategic Partner?' *Military Africa*, 1 December 2023. https://www.military.africa/2023/12/chinas-mercenaries-in-africa-a-groweing-threat-or-a-strategic-partner/. (Accessed 29 May 2025).

MilitaryNewsUA. Tweet ('Ukrainian Saker Scout drone with artificial intelligence'), 25 January 2024. https://twitter.com/i/status/1750444954298577263.

Miller, Phil, 'British Security Firm Saladin Tries to Distance Itself from Police War Crimes Investigation'. *Declassified UK*, 18 September 2020, https://www.declassifieduk.org/british-security-firm-saladin-tries-to-distance-itself-from-police-war-crimes-investigation/.

Minaee, Shervin, Tomas Mikolov, Narjes Nikzad, Meysam Chenaghlu, Richard Socher, Xavier Amatriain, and Jianfeng Gao. 'Large Language Models: A Survey'. arXiv:2402.06196 (2025).

Ministry of Defence of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. 'Netherlands Defence Doctrine'. June 2019.

Ministry of National Defence, Republic of Lithuania. 'Cooperation between the Lithuanian and the U.S Special Operations Forces Improves Our National Security'. *Ministry of National Defence News*. 30 March 2023. https://kam.lt/en/cooperation-between-the-lithuanian-and-the-u-s-special-operations-forces-improves-our-national-security/. (Accessed 10 May 2024).

Ministry of National Defence, Republic of Lithuania. 'National Defence Minister Met with Commander of U.S. Special Operations Command Gen. Bryan Fenton visiting Lithuania'. *Ministry of National Defence News*. 15 September 2023. https://kam.lt/en/national-defence-minister-met-with-commander-of-u-s-special-operations-command-gen-bryan-fenton-visiting-lithuania/. (Accessed 10 May 2024).

Minkin, Amelia and Michael Beckel. 'Big Tech Ramps Up Lobbying as Industry Seeks to Thwart Legislation to Protect Kids Online'. *IssueOne*, 22 October 2024. https://issueone.org/articles/big-tech-ramps-up-lobbying-as-industry-seeks-to-thwart-legislation-to-protect-kids-online/.

Mironova, Vera. 'Russia's Invasion of Ukraine Is Also Being Fought in Cyberspace'. *Atlantic Council*, 2023.

Miškařík, Pavel. 'SWAPO's Version of History in Namibia'. *Asian and African Studies* 28, no. 2 (2019), pp. 149–167.

Missile Defense Project. 'Shahab-3'. Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 31 July 2021. https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/shahab-3/.

Mlambo, Alois S., and Neil Parsons. *A History of Southern Africa*. London: Bloomsbury, 2018.

Moench, Mallory. 'Abu Graib Military Contractor Trial Set to Start 20 Years After Shocking Images of Abuse'. *Time*, 14 April 2024.

Moir, Lindsay. *The Law of Internal Armed Conflict*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.

Molendijk, Tine. 'Morale and Moral Injury among Russian and Ukrainian Combatants'. In *Reflections on the Russian-Ukrainian War*, edited by Maarten Rothman, Lonneke Peperkamp and Sebastiaan Rietjens. Leiden: Leiden University Press, 2024, pp. 99–106.

Mongelard, Eric. 'Corporate Civil Liability for Violations of International Humanitarian Law'. *International Review of the Red Cross* 88 (2006), pp. 665–691.

Mongilio, H. 'Destroyer USS Carney Returns Home After Seven-Month Deployment, 51 Houthi Engagements'. *US Naval Institute News*, 20 May 2024. https://news.usni.org/2024/05/20/destroyer-uss-carney-returns-home-after-seven-month-deployment-51-houthi-engagements.

Montgomery, Alayna. *Foreign Fighters in the Middle East: Threat Issues, Terrorism Concerns, and Control Efforts*. Hauppage, N.Y.: Nova Science Publishers, 2015.

Moor, Jaap A. de, and H.L. Wesseling, eds. *Imperialism and War: Essays on Colonial Wars in Asia and Africa.* Comparative Studies in Overseas History, Vol. 8. Leiden: Brill, 1989.

Morgenthau, Hans J. *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, 4th ed. New York: Knopf, 1967; orig. 1948.

Morris, Ian. *War, What Is It Good For? The Role of Conflict in Civilisation, From Primates to Robots*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2014.

Morss, John R. 'The International Legal Status of the Vatican/Holy See Complex'. *European Journal of International Law* 26, no. 4 (2015), pp. 927–946. https://doi:10.1093/ejil/chv062.

Moskos, Charles. *The American Enlisted Man: The Rank and File in Today's Military*. New York: Sage, 1970.

Mostert, Dirk. *Slegtkamp van Spioenkop. Oorlogsherinneringen van Kapt. Slegtkamp*. Nasionale Pers Beperk, 1935.

Moussa, E. 'Privatizing Security and Authoritarian Adaptation in the Arab Region since the 2010–2011 Uprisings'. *Contemporary Security Policy* 44, no. 3 (July 2023), pp. 462–490. https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2023.2214757.

MTK. 'Ukrainian Prisoners Freed in Russian Exchange Brokered by Vatican', *Essa News*, 29 June 2024. https://essanews.com/ukrainian-prisoners-freed-in-russian-exchange-brokered-by-vatican,7043775717238913a. (Accessed 15 August 2024).

Muehlenbeck, Philip. *Czechoslovakia in Africa, 1945–1968*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-137-56666-9.

Mueller, Hannes, Christopher Rauh, and Ben Seimon. 'Introducing a Global Dataset on Conflict Forecasts and News Topics'. *Data & Policy* 6 (2024): e17.

Mueller, Karl, David A. Schlapak, Michael W. Johnson and David Ochmanek. 'In Defense of a Wargame: Bolstering Deterrence on NATO's Eastern Flank'. *War on the Rocks*, 14 June 2016. https://warontherocks.com/2016/06/in-defense-of-a-wargame-bolstering-deterrence-on-natos-eastern-flank/. (Accessed 15 April 2024).

Müller, Johann Alexander. *The Inevitable Pipeline into Exile. Botswana's Role in the Namibian Liberation Struggle*. Basel: Basler Afrika Bibliographien, 2012.

Munguambe, Clinarete Victoria Luis. 'Nationalism and Exile in an Age of Solidarity: Frelimo–ZANU Relations in Mozambique (1975–1980)'. *Journal of Southern African Studies* 43, no. 1 (2017), pp. 161–178.

Münkler, Herfried. *Die neuen Kriege*. Berlin: Rowohlt, 2004.

Münkler, Herfried. *The New Wars*, tr. Patrick Camiller. Cambridge: Polity, 2004.

Murphy, Max, Ezra Sharpe and Kayla Huang. 'The Promise of Machine Learning in Violent Conflict Forecasting'. *Data & Policy* 6 (2024): e35.

Murphy, Orville T. 'The American Revolutionary Army and the Concept of Levee en masse'. *Military Affairs* 23, no. 1 (1959), pp. 13–20.

Mushelenga, Peya. 'Foreign Policy-Making for a Pre-Independent Namibia and the Subsequent Results'. *Journal of Namibian Studies: History Politics Culture* 19 (June 2016), pp. 43–68.

Musk, Elon (@elonmusk), Twitter (now X), 26 February 2022. https://x.com/elonmusk/status/1497701484003213317.

Nagi, A. 'Catching Up on the Back-channel Peace Talks in Yemen'. International Crisis Group, 10 October 2023. https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/yemen/catching-back-channel-peace-talks-yemen.

Namidi, F. 'Iran's Ballistic Missile Arsenal Is Still Growing in Size, Reach, and Accuracy'. Washington Institute for Near-East Policy, 13 December 2021. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/irans-ballistic-missile-arsenal-still-growing-size-reach-and-accuracy.

Nance, Malcolm. *Defeating ISIS: Who They Are, How They Fight, What They Believe*. New York: Skyhorse, 2017.

Nash, Kathryn. 'Embracing State Security: The Peace and Security Norms and Structures of the Organisation of African Unity, 1963–1993'. In *Visions of African Unity: New Perspectives on the History of Pan-Africanism and African Unification Projects*, edited by Matteo Grilli and Frank Gerits. Cham: Springer International, 2020, pp. 263–287. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-52911-6_11.

Nason, Bill. *The War for South Africa. The Anglo-Boer War 1899–1902*. Cape Town: Tafelberg, 2010.

NATO, 'AJP-3.10 Allied Joint Doctrine for Information Operations'. November 2009.

NATO, 'AJP-3.20 Allied Joint Publication for Cyber Operations', Edition A Version 1. January 2020.

NATO Special Operations Headquarters (NSHQ). *Comprehensive Defence Handbook*, Vol I. Edition A, Version 1, December 2020. https://www.nshq.nato.int/Library/DownloadFile/e8a86ab2-cbf4-900e-3fcc-c3daa451c067.

NATO. 'MDO Conference Video: Contemporary Perspectives', 12 July 2022. https://arrc.nato.int/newsroom/archive/2022/mdo-conference-video-contemporary-perspectives.aspx.

NATO. 'AJP-01 Allied Joint Doctrine', Edition F, Version 1. December 2022.

NATO. 'MC 422/3, NATO Military Policy for Information Operations'.

NATO. 'NATO's Military Presence in the East of the Alliance'. *North Atlantic Treaty Organization*, 8 December 2023. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_136388.htm. (Accessed 15 May 2024).

Nawaz, Amna. 'Kimberly Marten: A Look at the Wagner Group's Presence and Activities in Africa'. *PBS Newshour*, 2023. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9S9TANZAdbU.

Nevola, L. 'Beyond Riyadh, Houthi Cross-border Warfare 2015–2022'. Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED) Project, 17 January 2023. https://acleddata.com/2023/01/17/beyond-riyadh-houthi-cross-border-aerial-warfare-2015-2022/.

Nevola, L. 'Yemen and the Red Sea: Rising Tensions Threaten Peace Process and International Security'. ACLED Conflict Watchlist 2024, 17 January 2024. https://acleddata.com/conflict-watchlist-2024/yemen/.

Nix, Naomi, Will Oremus and Aaron Gregg. 'Meta Ends Fact-Checking, Drawing Praise from Trump'. *Washington Post*, 7 January 2025. https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2025/01/07/meta-factchecking-zuckerberg/.

Nolan, Cathal J. *The Allure of Battle: A History of How Wars Have Been Won and Lost*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2017.

Nowrot, Karsten. 'Transnational Corporations as Steering Subjects in International Economic Law: Two Competing Visions of the Future?' *Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies* 18, no. 2 (2011), pp. 803–842.

Nye, Joseph S. *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*. New York: Public Affairs, 2004.

Nye, Joseph S. 'Get Smart, Combining Hard and Soft Power'. *Foreign Affairs* 88, no. 4 (July/August 2009), pp. 160–163.

Nye, Joseph S. *The Future of Power*. New York: Public Affairs, 2011.

Nye, Joseph S. 'Hard, Soft, and Smart Power'. In *The Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy*, edited by Andrew Cooper, Jorge Heine, and Ramesh Thakur. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.

Ó Corráin, Daithi. 'Why Did Pope John Paul II Visit Ireland? The 1979 Papal Visit in Context'. *British Catholic History* 35, no. 4 (2021), pp. 462–485. https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/british-catholic-history/article/why-did-pope-john-paul-ii-visit-ireland-the-1979-papal-visit-in-context/AEA485B48916C4DFBFFF1890844DA83B. (Accessed 23 August 2024).

O'Ballance, Edgar. *Wars in the Caucasus, 1990–95*. London: MacMillan, 1997.

O'Brien, Kevin A. 'PMCs, Myths and Mercenaries: The Debate on Private Military Companies'. *RUSI Journal* 145, no. 1 (2000), pp. 59–64. https://doi.org/10.1080/03071840008446490..

O'Connell, Gerard. 'After Backlash, Vatican Clarifies Pope Francis' Call for Ukraine to Have "Courage of the White Flag"'. *The Jesuit Review*, 10 March 2024. https://www.americamagazine.org/faith/2024/03/10/pope-francis-ukraine-white-flag-negotiate-247471. (Accessed 31 May 2024).

O'Neill, Patrick Howell. 'Russia Hacked an American Satellite Company One Hour Before the Ukraine Invasion'. *MIT Technology Review*, 10 May 2022. https://www.technologyreview.com/2022/05/10/1051973/russia-hack-viasat-satellite-ukraine-invasion/.

Odendaal, André. *The Founders: The Origins of the ANC and the Struggle for Democracy in South Africa*. Johannesburg: Jacana Media, 2012.

Office of International Religious Freedom. '2021 Report on International Religious Freedom: Ukraine'. US Department of State, Washington D.C., 2 June 2022. https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-report-on-international-religious-freedom/ukraine/. (Accessed 4 July 2022).

Official Records of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, Vol. VII (1978).

Oman, Charles. *A History of the Art of War in the Sixteenth Century*. London: Methuen, 1937.

Ostensen, Å.G. 'In the Business of Peace: The Political Influence of Private Military and Security Companies on UN Peacekeeping'. *International Peacekeeping* 20, no. 1 (February 2013), pp. 33–47. https://doi.org/10.1080/13533312.2012.761872.

Otto, Sabine, Adam Scharpf, and Anita R. Gohdes. 'The Diversity of Non-state Armed Actors: The History of Armed Actors Dataset'. Working Paper, March 2017.

Paalo, S.A., D.D. Arthur, A. Dramani, and S. Adu-Gyamfi. 'Exploring Hybrid Security Strategies in Ghana: State and Private Sector Partnerships'. *African Security Review* 33, no. 1 (December 2023), pp. 81–97. https://doi.org/10.1080/10246029.2023.2286225.

Padur, Kärt, Hervé Borrion, and Stephen Hailes. 'Using Agent-Based Modelling and Reinforcement Learning to Study Hybrid Threats'. *Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation* 28, no. 1 (2025).

Pakenham, Thomas. *The Boer War*. London: Abacus, 1979.

Palermo, Antonella, and Lisa Zengarini. 'Cardinal Parolin: "The Concept of Just War Needs to Be Reviewed'. *Vatican News*, 2 July 2024. https://www.vaticannews.va/en/vatican-city/news/2024-07/cardinal-parolin-the-concept-of-just-war-needs-to-be-reviewed.html. (Accessed 17 August 2024).

Panossian, Razmik. 'The Irony of Nagorno-Karabakh: Formal Institutions versus Informal Politics'. *Regional & Federal Studies* 11, no. 3 (2001), pp. 143–164, https://doi.org/10.1080/714004708.

Panzer, Michael G. 'A Nation in Name, a "state" in Exile: The FRELIMO Proto-State, Youth, Gender, and the Liberation of Mozambique 1962–1975'. PhD Diss., University at Albany, State University of New York, 2013.

Paresh, Dave, and Jeffrey Dastin. 'Ukraine Has Started Using Clearview AI's Facial Recognition During War'. *Reuters*, 14 March 2022. https://www.reuters.com/technology/exclusive-ukraine-has-started-using-clearview-ais-facial-recognition-during-war-2022-03-13/.

Paret, Peter. *Yorck and the Era of Prussian Reform, 1807–1815*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1966.

Park, Peter S., Simon Goldstein, Aidan O'Gara, Michael Chen, and Dan Hendrycks. 'AI Deception: A Survey of Examples, Risks, and Potential Solutions'. *Patterns* 5, no. 5 (2024).

Parker, Geoffrey. *The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road, 1567–1659: The Logistics of Spanish Victory and Defeat*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972.

Parolin, Pietro. 'Why Did the Holy See Not Sign the Declaration in Favour of Ukraine at the Swiss Summit? Statement of His Eminence Cardinal Pietro Parolin, Secretary of State, High-level Summit on Peace for Ukraine Switzerland'. 15–16 June 2024. https://zenit.org/2024/06/17/why-did-the-holy-see-not-sign-the-declaration-in-favor-of-ukraine-at-the-swiss-summit/?eti=15443. (Accessed 19 June 2024).

Pasche, Olivier C., Jonathan Wider, Zhongwei Zhang, Jakob Zscheischler, and Sebastian Engelke. 'Validating Deep Learning Weather Forecast Models on Recent High-Impact Extreme Events'. *Artificial Intelligence for the Earth Systems* 4, no. 1 (2025): e240033.

Passchier, Reijer. *De vloek van Big Tech: De juridisch-technologische wortels van constitutioneel verval en digitaal feodalisme.* Meppel: Boom Juridisch, 2024.

Passemiers, Lazlo. 'Mozambique's Neglected Nationalists in Exile: Retracing Coremo's Relations with the Congolese Government and the FNLA'. *Journal of Southern African Studies* 49, no. 5–6 (November 2023), pp. 861–887. https://doi.org/10.1080/03057070.2023.2322873.

Paton Walsh, Nick, Alex Marquardt, Florence Davey-Attlee and Kosta Gak. 'Ukraine Relies on Starlink for Its Drone War. Russia Appears to Be Bypassing Sanctions to Use the Devices Too'. *CNN*, 26 March 2024. https://www.cnn.com/2024/03/25/europe/ukraine-starlink-drones-russia-intl-cmd/index.html.

Pattison, James. *The Morality of Private War: The Challenge of Private Military and Security Companies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014.

Pearce, Justin. 'Contesting the Past in Angolan Politics'. *Journal of Southern African Studies* 41, no. 1 (2015), pp. 103–119.

Pegg, Scott. *International Society and the De Facto State*. London: Routledge, 2019. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429354847.

Peiris, G.H. *Twilight of the Tigers. Peace Efforts and Power Struggles in Sri Lanka.* Kohuwala: Vijitha Yapa Publications, 2009.

Pell, Stephanie. 'Contextualizing Last Week's Malicious Cyber Activities against Ukrainian Government Websites and Systems'. *Lawfare*, 21 January 2022.

Penel, Charlotte, and Ulrich Petersohn. 'Commercial Military Actors and Civilian Victimization in Africa, Middle East, Latin America, and Asia, 1980–2011'. *Journal of Global Security Studies* 7, no. 1 (March 2022): ogab029. https://doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogab029.

Pereira, R., A. Luquett, R. Forte, and M. Eslami. 'Chinese Private Security Companies and the Limit of Coercion'. *Small Wars and Insurgencies* 34, no. 8 (November 2023), pp. 1532–1557. https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2023.2256645.

Pereira, Ricardo, Ana Luquett, Rui Forte and Mohammad Eslami. 'Chinese Private Security Companies and the Limit of Coercion'. *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 34, no. 8 (2023), pp. 1532–1557.

Petersohn, Ulrich. 'The Effectiveness of Contracted Coalitions: Private Security Contractors in Iraq'. *Armed Forces & Society* 39, no. 3 (July 2013), pp. 467–488. https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X12459712.

Petersohn, Ulrich. 'Reframing the Anti-Mercenary Norm: Private Military and Security Companies and Mercenarism'. *International Journal: Quarterly of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs*, 69, no. 4 (2014), pp. 475–493. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0020702014544915.

Peterson, Andrew J. 'AI and the Problem of Knowledge Collapse'. *AI & Society* 40 (2025), pp. 3249–3269.

Petropoulos, Fotios, Daniele Apiletti, Vassilios Assimakopoulos, Mohamed Zied Babai, Devon K. Barrow, Souhaib Ben Taieb, and Florian Ziel. 'Forecasting: Theory and Practice'. *International Journal of Forecasting* 38, no. 3 (2022), pp. 705–771.

Pham Hoang Van, and Scott Cunningham. 'Can Base ChatGPT be Used for Forecasting without Additional Optimization?' SSRN 4097279 (2024).

Piasecki, Eugene G. and Luke C. Guerin. 'Civilian Irregular Defense Group in Vietnam'. In *The Competitive Advantage: Special Operations Forces in Large-Scale Combat Operations*, edited by Robert M. Toguchi and Michael E. Krivdo. Fort Leavenworth, Ks.: Army University Press 2019, pp. 177–193.

Pickrell, Ryan. 'Ukraine Urges Kyiv Residents to "Make Molotov Cocktails" as Russia Advances and Even Shows People How to Make Them'. *Business Insider*, 25 February 2022. https://www.businessinsider.com/ukraine-kyiv-residents-molotov-cocktails-russia-advances-2022-2.

Pielke Sr, Roger A., Bo-Wen Shen, and Xubin Zeng. 'The Butterfly Effect: Can a Butterfly in Brazil Really Cause a Tornado in Texas?' *Weatherwise* 77, no. 3 (2024), pp. 14–18.

Pijpers, Peter, and Kraesten Arnold. 'Conquering the Invisible Battleground'. *Atlantisch Perspectief* 44, no. 4 (2020), pp. 10–14.

Pijpers, Peter, and Paul Ducheine. '"If You Have a Hammer": Shaping the Armed Forces' Discourse on Information Maneuver'. *International Journal of Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence* 36, no. 3 (2023), pp. 1164–1183. https://doi.org/10.1080/08850607.2023.2197560.

Pijpers, Peter, and Paul Ducheine. 'Influence Operations in Cyberspace: How They Really Work'. In *Hybridity, Conflict, and the Global Politics of Cybersecurity*, edited by Fabio Cristiano and Bibi van den Berg. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2023.

Plokhooy, Cornelis. *Met den Mauser. Persoonlijke herinneringen in den Zuid-Afrikaanschen Oorlog*. F. Duym, 1901.

Polack, Peter. *Guerrilla Warfare: Kings of Revolution*. Oxford: Casemate, 2019.

Polinder, Simon. *Towards a New Christian Political Realism. The Amsterdam School of Philosophy and the Role of Religion in International Relations*. London: Routledge, 2025.

Porch, Douglas. *Wars of Empire*. London: Cassell, 2000.

Porter, Bruce D. *War and the Rise of the State: The Military Foundation of Modern Politics*. New York: Free Press, 1994.

Portmann, Roland. *Legal Personality in International Law*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.

Pottinger, Brian. *The Foreign Volunteers: They Fought for the Boers, 1899–1902*. Scripta Africana Series, 1987.

Powell, Stephen R., and Adrian Florea. 'Introducing the Armed Nonstate Actor Rivalry Dataset (ANARD)'. *Civil Wars* 23, no. 2 (2021), pp. 177–206.

Pratt, Sarah, Seth Blumberg, Pietro K. Carolino, and Meredith Ringel Morris. 'Can Language Models Use Forecasting Strategies?' arXiv:2406.04446 (2024).

Price Waterhouse Coopers. 'Global Ranking of the Top 100 Public Companies by Market Capitalisation', April 2024. https://www.pwc.co.uk/services/audit/insights/global-top-100-companies.html?WT.mc_id=CT1-PL50-DM2-TR3-LS3-ND30-TTA9-CN_Captial-Markets-Assurance-Global-Top-100-Companies-Annual-Report-.

Price, Ilan, Avaro Sanchez-Gonzalez, Ferran Alet, Tom R. Andersson, Andrew El-Kadi, Domenico Masters, Timo Ewalds, Jacklynn Stott, Shakir Mohamed, Peter Battaglia, Remi Lam, and Matthew Willson. 'Probabilistic Weather Forecasting with Machine Learning'. *Nature* 637, no. 8044 (2025), pp. 84–90.

Priem, S.H. *Een Hollandsch officier in Zuid-Afrika. Nagelaten geschriften van luitenant Gerrit Boldingh*. Rotterdam 1903; reprint Kessinger Publishing, 2010.

Probasco, Emilia, Matthew Burtell, Helen Toner, and Tim G. Rudner. 'Not Oracles of the Battlefield: Safety Considerations for AI-Based Military Decision Support Systems'. In *Proceedings of the AAAI/ACM Conference on AI, Ethics, and Society*, 7 (2024), pp. 1157–1165.

Racek, Daniel, Paul W. Thurner, and Göran Kauermann. 'Integrating Spatio-Temporal Diffusion into Statistical Forecasting Models of Armed Conflict via Non-Parametric Smoothing'. Washington, D.C.: Center for Open Science, 2024.

Radio Free Europe. 'Ukraine Tells UN's Top Court Russia Using "False" Genocide Allegations as Pretext for War', 19 September 2023. https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-tells-un-russia-false-genocide-war-pretext/32599619.html.

Radziszewski, E., and S. Akcinaroglu. 'Private Military & Security Companies, Conflict Complexity, and Peace Duration: An Empirical Analysis'. *Small Wars and Insurgencies* 31, no. 7–8 (November 2020), pp. 1415–1440. https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2020.1784500.

Ramasastry, Anita, and Robert C. Thompson. 'Commerce, Crime and Conflict: Legal Remedies for Private Sector Liability for Grave Breaches of International Law', *FAFO* (2006).

Ramirez, M.D., and R.M. Wood. 'Public Attitudes toward Private Military Companies: Insights from Principal-Agent Theory'. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 63, no. 6 (July 2019), pp. 1433–1459. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002718797166.

Ranger, Terence. 'Nationalist Historiography, Patriotic History and the History of the Nation: The Struggle over the Past in Zimbabwe'. *Journal of Southern African Studies* 30, no. 2 (2004), pp. 215–234.

Ranito, J.J., and C.T. Mayer. 'Normalization of Mercenary-Like Private Military and Security Companies: The Need for Re-Securitization of Regulation'. *International Politics* 58, no. 5 (October 2021), pp. 772–791. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41311-020-00271-3.

Ray, Jody. 'Alessandro Arduino: The Rise of China's Private Military & Security Companies'. Podcast audio. *Exit Strategy Podcast* 45:162021. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1BMwWcKZaQU.

Reagan, Ronald. 'Address at Commencement Exercises at the University of Notre Dame'. Notre Dame University, South Bend, Ind., 17 May 1981. https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/speech/address-commencement-exercises-university-notre-dame. (Accessed 15 July 2024).

Recchia, Giuseppe, Alexandra L. Freeman, and David Spiegelhalter. 'How Well Did Experts and Laypeople Forecast the Size of the COVID-19 Pandemic?' *PloS One* 16, no. 5 (2021): e0250935.

Redlich, Fritz. *The German Military Enterpriser and His Work Force*. Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1964, Vol. I.

Redpacket Security. 'APT Trends Report Q2 2020: The Most Remarkable Findings, Southeast Asia and Korean Peninsula'. 30 July 2020. https://www.redpacketsecurity.com/apt-trends-report-q2-2020/.

Reiter, Dan, and Paul Poast. 'The Truth About Tripwires: Why Small Force Deployments Do Not Deter Aggression'. *Texas National Security Review* 4, no. 3 (2021), pp. 33–53.

Reuters. 'NGOs File Suit Alleging BNP Paribas Complicity in Rwandan Genocide', 29 June 2017. https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSKBN19K1HR/.

Reuters. 'Yemen's Houthis Warn Ships in Red Sea to Avoid Travel to Israel', 13 December 2023. https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/yemens-houthis-warn-ships-red-sea-avoid-travel-palestinian-territories-2023-12-12/.

Reuters. 'Japan's Itochu to End Cooperation with Israel's Elbit amid Gaza War', 5 February 2024. https://www.reuters.com/business/japans-itochu-end-cooperation-with-israels-elbit-over-gaza-war-2024-02-05/.

Rich, Paul B., and Isabelle Duyvesteyn, eds. *The Routledge Handbook of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency*. London: Routledge, 2012.

Richardson, Lewis Fry. 'Distribution of Wars in Time'. *Nature* 155, no. 3942 (1945), p. 610.

Rid, Thomas, and Thomas Keaney, eds. *Understanding Counterinsurgency Warfare: Doctrine, Operations, and Challenges*. London: Routledge, 2010.

Ringstrom, Anna. 'Former Oil Firm Executives Go on Trial in Sweden over Sudan War Crimes'. *Reuters*, 5 September 2023. https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/sudan-war-crime-trial-ex-oil-firm-executives-starts-sweden-2023-09-05/.

Rinne, Horst. *The Weibull Distribution: A Handbook*. Boca Raton, Fla.: Chapman and Hall/CRC, 2008.

Rivera, Juan-Pablo, Gabriel Mukobi, Anka Reuel, Max Lamparth, Chandler Smith, and Jacquelyn Schneider. 'Escalation Risks from Language Models in Military and Diplomatic Decision-Making'. In *FAccT '24: Proceedings of the 2024 ACM Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency* (2024), pp. 836–898.

Robbins, T., H.S. Shah and M. Dalton. 'U.S. Support for Saudi Military Operations in Yemen'. Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 23 March 2018. https://www.csis.org/analysis/us-support-saudi-military-operations-yemen.

Roberts, George. *Revolutionary State-Making in Dar Es Salaam: African Liberation and the Global Cold War, 1961–1974*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021.

Robinson, K. 'Yemen's Tragedy: War, Stalemate and Suffering'. New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1 May 2023. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/yemen-crisis.

Rød, Espen G., Tim Gåsste, and Håvard Hegre. 'A Review and Comparison of Conflict Early Warning Systems'. *International Journal of Forecasting* 40, no. 1 (2024), pp. 96–112.

Rodenhäuser, Tilman, and Mauro Vignati. '8 Rules for "Civilian Hackers" during War, and 4 Obligations for States to Restrain Them'. *EJIL:Talk*! 4 October 2023. https://www.ejiltalk.org/8-rules-for-civilian-hackers-during-war-and-4-obligations-for-states-to-restrain-them/.

Rodriguez, C.A., T.C. Walton and C. Hyong. 'Putting the "FIL" into "DIME": Growing Joint Understanding of the Instruments of Power'. *Joint Force Quarterly* 97, no.2 (2020).

Rosén, Frederik. 'Commercial Security: Conditions of Growth'. *Security Dialogue* 39, no. 1 (2008), pp. 77–97.

Rothman, Maarten. 'This Has Triggered a Civil War: Russian Deterrence of Democratic Revolts'. In *Deterrence in the 21st Century: Insights from Theory and Practice,* NL ARMS Netherlands Annual Review of Military Studies 2020, edited by Frans Osinga and Tim Sweijs. The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2020, pp. 311–325.

Roulette, Joey. 'SpaceX Curbed Ukraine's Use of Starlink Internet for Drones – Company President', *Reuters*, 9 February 2023. https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/spacex-curbed-ukraines-use-starlink-internet-drones-company-president-2023-02-09/.

Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. *The Social Contract* (1762). Tr. Jonathan Bennett (2017).

Ruehl, John P. 'Private Military Companies Continue to Expand in Africa'. *NE Global*, 31 August 2023. https://www.neglobal.eu/private-military-companies-continue-to-expand-in-africa/.

Runts, Mareks. 'The Backbone: The Role of the Armed Forces in the Resistance Movement'. *Journal on Baltic Security* 8, no. 1 (2022), pp. 120–130.

Sá, Ana Lúcia, and Olivio Kilumbo. 'UNITA's Post-War Parliamentary Elite: From a Wartime Defeat to a Nationwide Party in Angola'. *Journal of Southern African Studies* (2024), pp. 1–20. https://doi.org/10.1080/03057070.2024.2403256.

Said, Abdul-Aziz, and Nathan C. Funk. 'The Role of Faith in Cross-Cultural Conflict Resolution'. *Peace and Conflict Studies* 9, no. 1 (2002) pp. 37–50. https://nsuworks.nova.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1022&context=pcs. (Accessed 19 August 2025).

Sánchez Meertens, A. 'Letters from Batticaloa. TMVP's Emergence and the Transition of Conflict in Eastern Sri Lanka'. PhD Diss., University of Utrecht, 2013.

Sandoz, Yves, Christophe Swinarski and Bruno Zimmermann. *Commentary of Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977*. Geneva: ICRC, 1987.

Saner, R., A. Uchegbu, and L. Yiu. 'Private Military and Security Companies: Legal and Political Ambiguities Impacting the Global Governance of Warfare in Public Arenas'. *Asia Pacific Journal of Public Administration* 41, no. 2 (2019), pp. 63–71. https://doi.org/10.1080/23276665.2019.1622325.

Sanger, Andrew. 'Piercing the State's Corporate Veil: Using Private Actors to Enforce International Norms'. *EJIL: Talk!* 17 March 2022. https://www.ejiltalk.org/piercing-the-states-corporate-veil-using-private-actors-to-enforce-international-norms/.

Sanson, Jerry P., 'General Claire Chennault and the Flying Tigers'. *64 Parishes*, 2023. https://64parishes.org/entry/general-claire-chennault-and-the-flying-tigers. (Accessed 29 May 2025).

Santos, A. 'The Role of the Decolonization Committee of the United Nations Organization in the Struggle against Portuguese Colonialism in Africa: 1961–1974'. *Journal of Pan African Studies* 4, no. 10 (2012), pp. 248–260.

Sapire, Hilary. 'Liberation Movements, Exile, and International Solidarity: An Introduction'. *Journal of Southern African Studies* 35, no. 2 (2009), pp. 271–286.

Sargsyan, Manvel. *Нагорный Карабах: Война и Политика (1990–93гг.). Война в Нагорном Карабахе и Внутренний Конфликт в Армянском Обществе* [Nagorno-Karabakh: War and Politics (1990–93). War in Nagorno-Karabakh and Internal Conflict in Armenian Society]. Armenian Centre for National and International Studies, 2010.

Sari, Aurel. 'Hybrid Threats and the Law: Concepts, Trends and Implications'. *Hybrid Centre of Excellence Trend Report* 3 April 2020. https://www.hybridcoe.fi/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/Hybrid-CoE-Trend-Report-3.pdf.

Sarkesian, Sam C., ed. *Combat Effectiveness: Cohesion, Stress, and the Volunteer Military*. Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1980.

Sassòli, Marco. 'New Challenges and Old Problems for International Humanitarian Law', *Articles of War* (blog), 3 April 2024. https://lieber.westpoint.edu/new-challenges-old-problems-international-humanitarian-law/.

Sassòli, Marco. *International Humanitarian Law: Rules, Controversies, and Solutions to Problems Arising in Warfare*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2019.

Satariano, Adam. 'Facebook's Oversight Board Faults Its Policy on Preferential Treatment'. *New York Times*, 21 October 2021. https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/21/business/facebook-oversight-board-members-criticism.html.

Satterfield, George. *Princes, Posts and Partisans: The Army of Louis XIV and Partisan Warfare in the Netherlands (1673–1678)*. Leiden: Brill, 2003.

Sauer, Pjotr. 'Wagner Mercenary Admits "Tossing Grenades" at Injured Ukrainian PoWs'. *Guardian*, 18 April 2023. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/apr/18/wagner-mercenary-admits-tossaing-grenades-at-injured-ukrainian-pows.

Saunders, Chris. 'Some Roots of Anti-Colonial Historical Writing About Namibia'. *Journal of Namibian Studies* 3 (2008), pp. 83–93.

Saunders, Chris. 'The ANC in the Historiography of the National Liberation Struggle in South Africa'. In *Treading the Waters of History and Perspectives of the ANC*, edited by Kwandiwe Kondlo, Chris Saunders and Siphamandla Zondi. Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa, 2014, pp. 11–22.

Saunders, Chris. 'SWAPO, Namibia's Liberation Struggle and the Organisation of African Unity's Liberation Committee'. *South African Historical Journal* 70, no. 1 (2018), pp. 152–167.

Savelsberg, Ralph. 'Burkan-1 and 2, Open-source Analysis of Yemeni Scuds'. Paper Presented at 2019 3AF Integrated Air and Missile Defence Conference, Rome, May 2019.

Savelsberg, Ralph. 'Houthi 'Terror' Scuds Now Threaten Most of Saudi Arabia'. *Breaking Defense*, 15 June 2021. https://breakingdefense.com/2021/06/houthi-terror-scuds-now-threaten-most-of-saudi-arabia/.

Savelsberg, Ralph. 'Beyond the 2000 km Range Limit, Iranian IRBMs'. Paper Presented at 2021 3AF Integrated Air and Missile Defence Conference, Nice, December 2021.

Savelsberg, Ralph. 'Analysis: Houthi Targeting of Israel Suggests New, Longer-range Missile in Play'. *Breaking Defense*, 13 December 2023. https://breakingdefense.com/2023/12/analysis-houthi-targetaing-of-israel-suggests-new-longer-range-missile-in-play/.

Savelsberg, Ralph. 'Open-source Analysis of Houthi MRBMs'. Paper Presented at 2025 3AF Integrated Air and Missile Defence Conference, Thessaloniki, May 2025.

Sayegh, Khalil. 'This Easter, Gaza's Christian Population Is on the Brink of Extinction'. *The New Arab*, 28 March 2024. https://www.newarab.com/opinion/easter-gazas-christian-community-faces-extinction. (Accessed 14 August 2024).

Scarnecchia, Timothy. 'Front Line Diplomats: African Diplomatic Representations of the Zimbabwean Patriotic Front, 1976–1978'. *Journal of Southern African Studies* 43, no. 1 (January 2017), pp. 107–124. https://doi.org/10.1080/03057070.2017.1273555.

Scheipers, Sibylle. '"The Most Beautiful of Wars": Carl von Clausewitz and Small Wars'. *European Journal of International Security* 2, no. 1 (2016), pp. 47–63.

Schelling, Thomas C. *Arms and Influence*. Yale University Press, 1966.

Schlapak, David A., and Michael W. Johnson, 'Reinforcing Deterrence on NATO's Eastern Flank: Wargaming the Defense of the Baltics'. Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, 2016.

Schlapak, David A., and Michael W. Johnson. 'Outnumbered, Outranged, and Outgunned: How Russia Defeats NATO'. *War on the Rocks*, 21 April 2016. https://warontherocks.com/2016/04/outnumbered-outranged-and-outgunned-how-russia-defeats-nato/. (Accessed 15 April 2024).

Schmitt, Michael N. 'Military Necessity and Humanity in International Humanitarian Law: Preserving the Delicate Balance'. *Virginia Journal of International Law* 50 (2010), pp. 795–839.

Schmitt, Michael N. 'Discriminate Warfare: The Military Necessity-Humanity Dialectic of International Humanitarian Law'. In *Protecting Civilians During Violent Conflict: Theoretical and Practical Issues for the 21st Century*, edited by David W. Lovell and Igor Primoratz. London: Routledge, 2012.

Schmitt, Michael N. 'Ukraine Symposium: Attacking Power Infrastructure Under International Humanitarian Law'. *Articles of War* (blog), 20 October 2022. https://lieber.westpoint.edu/attacking-power-infrastructure-under-international-humanitarian-law/.

Schoeman, Chris. *Broers in die Stryd. Hollanders in die Anglo-Boereoorlog*. Cape Town: Zebra, 2011.

Scholtz, Leopold. *The SADF in the Border War 1966–1989*. Cape Town: Tafelberg, 2013.

Schouten, Peer, and Jason Miklian. 'The Business–Peace Nexus: "Business for Peace" and the Reconfiguration of the Public/Private Divide in Global Governance'. *Journal of International Relations and Development* 23 (2020), pp. 414–435.

Schrijver, Peter, and Paul Ducheine. 'Cyber-enabled Influence Operations: The Case of the Belarusian Cyber-Partisans'. *Militaire Spectator* 192, no.11 (2023), pp. 284–295.

Schrijver, Peter. '"The Wise Man Will Be Master of the Stars": The Use of Twitter by a Military Intelligence Service in Wartime: The Case of the GUR 77. In *Reflections on the Russia-Ukraine War*, edited by Maarten Rothman, Lonneke Peperkamp, and Bas Rietjens. Leiden University Press, 2024, pp. 77–95.

Schrijver, Peter, and Paul Ducheine. 'Cyber-Enabled Influence Operations'. *Militaire Spectator* 192, no. 6 (2023), pp. 285–295.

Schroeder, Ralph. 'Introduction: The IEMP Model and Its Critics'. In *An Anatomy of Power: The Social Theory of Michael Mann*, edited by J.A. Hall and Ralph Schroeder. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015.

Schulten, P. 'Nederlandse vrijwilligers tijdens de Boerenoorlog in het Hollanderkorps'. *Mars et Historia*, 20 March 2016.

Schultz, Jason W. 'Enabling Operational Reach and Endurance: The Use of Contractors during World War II'. Fort Leavenworth, Kan.: US Army Command and General Staff College, 2016. https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1022250.pdf.

Schutte, G.J. *Adhesie en aversie. Over stamverwantschap, Boerenvrienden, Hollanderhaat, Calvinisme en apartheid*. Franeker: T. Wever, 1986.

Schutte, G.J. ed. *Beste Ouders! Brieven uit de Transvaal van Karel van den Berg 1896–1900*. Amsterdam: Suid-Afrikaanse Instituut, 1999.

Scriven, Michael. 'An Essential Unpredictability in Human Behavior'. *Voice of America*, 1961.

Scull, Maggie. 'The Churches, the Peace Process and Reconciliation', *Irish Times*, 6 April 2018. https://www.irishtimes.com/culture/books/the-churches-the-peace-process-and-reconciliation-1.3451470. (Accessed 23 August 2024).

Scull, Margaret M. *The Catholic Church and the Northern Ireland Troubles, 1968–1998*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022.

Seabury, Paul, and Angelo Codevilla. *War: Ends and Means*. New York: Basic Books, 1989.

Shapira, B. 'Houthis Claim to Launch a New Ballistic Missile Toward Israel'. Alma Research and Education Center, Israel, 6 June 2024. https://israel-alma.org/2024/06/06/houthis-claim-to-launch-a-new-ballistic-missile-toward-israel.

Shift, Oxfam and Global Compact Network Netherlands. 'Doing Business with Respect for Human Rights: A Guidance Tool for Companies' (2016).

Shinde, Sagar, Suchitra Khoje, Ankit Raj, Lalitkumar Wadhwa, and Armaan Suhel C. Shaikh. 'Artificial Intelligence Approach for Terror Attacks Prediction through Machine Learning'. *Multidisciplinary Science Journal* 6, no. 1 (2024): 2024011.

Shrivastava, Aryan, Jessica Hullman, and Max Lamparth. 'Measuring Free-Form Decision-Making Inconsistency of Language Models in Military Crisis Simulations'. arXiv:2410.13204 (2024).

Shubin, Vladimir. *The Hot 'Cold War': The USSR in Southern Africa*. London: Pluto Press, 2008.

Shumallov, Ilia, Zakhar Shumaylov, Yiren Zhao, Yarin Gal, Nicolas Papernot, and Ross Anderson. 'The Curse of Recursion: Training on Generated Data Makes Models Forget'. arXiv:2305.17493v2 (2023).

Shumpenthung, Ezung, and Kekhronei O Koza. 'The Influence of Social Media on Public Discourse: Examining How Social Media Shape Popular Opinion'. *International Journal of Contemporary Research in Multidisciplinary* 3 no. 6 (2024). doi: https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.14252454.

Siddiqui, Zeba. 'FBI Working with US Companies to Collect War Crime Evidence in Ukraine'. *Reuters*, 26 April 2023. https://www.reuters.com/world/fbi-working-with-us-companies-collect-war-crime-evidence-ukraine-2023-04-26/.

Siebold, Guy L. 'The Essence of Military Group Cohesion'. *Armed Forces & Society* 33, no. 2 (2007), pp. 286–295.

Sierra, Gabrielle. 'The Power of the Pope', Transcript of the podcast hosted by Gabrielle Sierra with episode guests Timothy Byrnes and Francis Campbell. New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 13 May 2022. https://www.cfr.org/podcasts/power-of-the-pope. (Accessed 30 May 2024).

Silva, K.M. de. *A History of Sri Lanka.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981.

Silva, K.M. de. *Sri Lanka and the Defeat of the LTTE.* Kohuwala: Vijitha Yapa Publications, 2012.

Silva, K.M. de. *Sri Lanka's Troubled Inheritance.* Colombo: International Centre for Ethnic Studies, 2007.

Sinai, Tamir. 'Eyes on Target: 'Stay-Behind' Forces During the Cold War'. *War in History* 28, no. 3 (2021), pp. 681–700.

Singer, Peter W. *Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry.* Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2008.

Singh, Ishaansh. '20 Databases on (Violent and Armed) Conflicts'. *Perspectives on Terrorism* 15, no. 2 (2021), pp. 162–171.

Skėrytė, Jūratė. 'Lithuanian Parliament Expands Activities of Riflemen's Union'. *Lithuanian National Radio and Television (LRT)*, 8 November 2022. https://www.lrt.lt/en/news-in-english/19/1816497/lithuanian-parliament-expands-activities-of-riflemen-s-union. (Accessed 10 May 2024).

Sluiter, Göran, and Sean Yau. 'Aiding and Abetting and Causation in the Commission of International Crimes: The Cases of Dutch Businessmen van Anraat and Kouwenhoven'. In *The International Criminal Responsibility of War's Funders and Profiteers*, edited by Nina Jørgenson. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020, pp. 204–328.

Smeets, Max. 'The Strategic Promise of Offensive Cyber Operations'. *Strategic Studies Quarterly* (Fall 2018), pp. 90–113.

Smeets, Max. *No Shortcuts: Why States Struggle to Develop a Military Cyber-Force.* London: Hurst, 2022.

Smeets, Max, and J.D. Work. 'Operational Decision-Making for Cyber Operations: In Search of a Model'. *Cyber Defence Review* (Spring 2020), pp. 95–96.

Smith, Brad. 'Defending Ukraine: Early Lessons from the Cyber War'. *Microsoft* (blog), 22 June 2022. https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2022/06/22/defending-ukraine-early-lessons-from-the-cyber-war/.

Smith, Brad. 'Extending Our Vital Technology Support for Ukraine'. *Microsoft* (blog), 3 November 2022. https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2022/11/03/our-tech-support-ukraine/.

Snyder, Glenn H. 'Deterrence and Power', *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 4, no. 2 (1960), pp. 163–178.

Snyder, Glenn H. 'The Balance of Power and the Balance of Terror'. In *The Balance of Power*, edited by Paul Seabury (San Francisco: Chandler, 1965).

Snyder, Hannah. 'Literature Review as a Research Methodology: An Overview and Guidelines'. *Journal of Business Research* 104 (2019), pp. 333–339. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbusres.2019.07.039.

Soesanto, Stefan. 'The IT Army of Ukraine: Structure, Tasking, and Ecosystem'. *CSS Cyberdefense Report*, June 2022. https://css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/Cyber-Reports-2022-06-IT-Army-of-Ukraine.pdf.

Soesanto, Stefan. 'Ukraine's IT Army'. *Survival* 65, no. 3 (2023), pp. 93–106.

Soldatov, Andrei, and Irina Borogan. 'Russian Cyberwarfare: Unpacking the Kremlin's Capabilities'. *Centre for European Policy Analysis (CEPA)*, 2022.

Solnes, J.O. *A Powderkeg in Paradise: Lost Opportunity for Peace in Sri Lanka.* Delhi: Konark Publishers, 2010.

Somasundaram, D. 'Parallel Governments: Living Between Terror and Counter Terror in Northern Lanka (1982–2009)'. *Journal of Asian and African Studies* 45, no. 5 (2010), pp. 568–583.

Sommer, Udi, Eviatar Matania and Nir Hassid. 'The Rise of Companies in the Cyber Era and the Pursuant Shift in National Security'. *Political Science* 75, no. 2 (2023), pp. 140–164. doi: 10.1080/00323187.2023.2278499.

Sonne, Paul, Missy Ryan and John Hudson. 'Russia Planning Potential Sabotage Operations in Ukraine, U.S. Says'. *Washington Post*, 14 January 2022. https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/russia-ukraine-invasion-sabotage-operations/2022/01/14/769314a2-754f-11ec-8ec6-9d61f7afbe17_story.html.

Southall, Roger. *Liberation Movements in Power: Party and State in Southern Africa*. Woodbridge: Boydell & Brewer, 2013.

Spearin, Christopher. 'Canada and Contracted War: Afghanistan and Beyond'. *International Journal* 69, no. 4 (December 2014), pp. 525–541. https://doi.org/10.1177/0020702014546703.

Spearin, Christopher. *Private Military and Security Companies and States: Force Divided.* London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017.

Spearin, Christopher. 'Since You Left: United Nations Peace Support, Private Military and Security Companies, and Canada'. *International Journal* 73, no. 1 (March 2018), pp. 68–84. https://doi.org/10.1177/0020702017740158.

Spearin, Christopher. 'UN Peacekeeping and Chinese Private Security Companies: Assessing Demand Factors for China'. *Defense & Security Analysis* 38, no. 1 (2022), pp. 91–105. https://doi.org/10.1080/14751798.2022.2030917.

Special Operations Command Europe. 'SOCEUR Resistance Operational Guidance (Draft)'. 10 June 2022. Unclassified.

Spencer, J., J. Goodhand, S. Hasbullah, B. Klem, B. Korf and K.T. Silva. *Checkpoint, Temple, Church and Mosque: A Collaborative Ethnography of War and Peace.* London: Pluto Press, 2015.

Spender, T., J. Cheetham and F. Gardner. 'Three Killed in Houthi Missile Attack on Cargo Ship in Gulf of Aden'. *BBC News*, 7 March 2024. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-68490695.

Staff, T. '"Luckily There Were No Children": School Near Tel Aviv Ravaged by Houthi Missile Warhead'. *Times of Israel*, 19 December 2024. https://www.timesofisrael.com/lucky-there-were-no-children-school-near-tel-aviv-ravaged-by-houthi-missile-attack/.

Staff, T. 'Missile Fired from Yemen Explodes in South Tel Aviv, Lightly Injuring 16'. *Times of Israel*, 21 December 2024. https://www.timesofisrael.com/missile-from-yemen-explodes-in-south-tel-aviv-park-lightly-injuring-16/.

Staniland, P. *Networks of Rebellion. Explaining Insurgent Cohesion and Collapse.* Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2014.

Stapleton, Timothy J. *A Military History of South Africa. From the Dutch-Khoi Wars to the End of Apartheid*. Westport, Conn.: Praeger 2010.

Statista Research Department. 'Number of Civilian Casualties in Ukraine during Russia's Invasion Verified by OHCHR from February 24, 2022 to October 31, 2024', Statista Research Department, 2 December 2024. https://www.statista.com/statistics/1293492/ukraine-war-casualties/.

Statista Research Department. 'Number of Palestinian and Israeli Fatalities and Injuries Caused by the War between Hamas and Israel since October 7, 2023', Statista Research Department, 5 December 2024. https://www.statista.com/statistics/1422308/palestinian-territories-israel-number-fatalities-and-injuries-caused-by-the-israel-and-hamas-war/. (Accessed 23 December 2024).

Stichting Onderzoek Multinationale Ondernemingen. 'Handel met Israëlische nederzettingen'. 13 December 2023. https://www.somo.nl/nl/handel-met-israelische-nederzettingen-ministerie-negeert-interne-waarschuwingen/.

Stieglitz, Stefan, and Björn Ross. 'The Impact of Social Media on Social Cohesion: A Double-Edged Sword'. *Media and Communication* 10, no. 2 (2022). https://doi.org/10.17645/mac.v10i2.5792.

Stouffer, Samuel A., *The American Soldier*, Vol. 2: *Combat and Its Aftermath*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1949.

Stouffer, Samuel A. et al., *Studies in Social Psychology in World War II: Measurement and Prediction*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1950.

Strachan, Hew. *European Armies and the Conduct of War*. London: Allen & Unwin, 1983.

Strickland, John. *Mathematical Modeling of Warfare and Combat Phenomenon*. Lulu.com, 2011.

Stringer, Kevin D. 'Special Operations Forces (SOF): The Integrators for Total Defense and Resistance'. *Journal on Baltic Security* 8, no. 1 (2022), pp. 65–75.

Suhas, Prashant Hosur, and Shelli Israelsen. 'Interstate Rivalries and Expansions in Military Capacity'. *International Area Studies Review* 25, no. 1 (March 2022), pp. 50–72. https://doi.org/10.1177/22338659211040289.

Sukhankin, Sergey. 'Chinese Private Security Contractors: New Trends and Future Prospects'. Washington, D.C.: Jamestown Foundation, 20 May 2020. https://jamestown.org/program/chinese-private-security-contractors-new-trends-and-future-prospects/.

Sullivan, Eilleen, and Benjamin Weiser. 'U.S. Seizes North Korean Ship for Violating Sanctions'. *New York Times*, 9 May 2019. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/09/us/politics/wise-honest-north-korea-ship-seized.html.

Sumita, Yasuaki, Koh Takeuchi, and Hisashi Kashima. 'Cognitive Biases in Large Language Models: A Survey and Mitigation Experiments'. arXiv:2412.00323 (2024).

Sundar, N. 'Mimetic Sovereignties, Precarious Citizenship: State Effects in a Looking-glass World'. *Journal of Peasant Studies* vol. 41, no. 4 (2014), pp. 469–490.

Sutton, Rebecca. 'Enacting the "Civilian plus": International Humanitarian Actors and the Conceptualization of Distinction'. *Leiden Journal of International Law* 33, no. 2 (2020), pp. 429–449.

Swamy, M.R.N. *Tigers of Lanka: From Boys to Guerrillas,* 3rd ed. Kohuwala: Vijitha Yapa Publications, 2002.

Swamy, M.R.N. *The Tiger Vanquished: LTTE's Story.* Delhi: Sage Publications India, 2010.

SWANU. 'The Position of SWANU and the Namibia National Front on the Negotiations between the Five Western Powers and South Africa on Namibia'. *SWANU International Organ*, September 1977.

SWAPO. *To Be Born a Nation: The Liberation Struggle for Namibia*. London: Zed Press, 1981.

Swed, O. 'The Afghanistan War's Legacy: The Reimagining of the Outsourcing of War and Security'. *Armed Forces & Society* 49, no. 4 (October 2023), pp. 1027–1034. https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327x221101340.

Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs and ICRC, *Montreux Document on Pertinent International Obligations and Good Practice for States Related to Operations of Private and Military Security Companies during Armed Conflict.* Geneva, 2008.

Syllaidopoulos, Ioannis, Klimis Ntalianis, and Ioannis Salmon, A Comprehensive Survey on AI in Counter-Terrorism and Cybersecurity: Challenges and Ethical Dimensions. *IEEE Access* 13, (2025), pp. 91740–91764

Syrakos, Alexandros. 'Free Will and the Paradox of Predictability'. *Qeios* (2023).

Taillat, Stéphane, and Frédérick Douzet. 'Collective Security and Strategic Instability in the Digital Domain'. *Contemporary Security Policy* 40, no. 3 (2019), pp. 362–367.

Tarimo, Elias, and Neville Reuben. 'The Role of the OAU Liberation Committee in the South African Liberation Struggle'. *The Tinker*, 2013.

Taylor, Brian D., and Roxana Botea. 'Tilly Tally: War-Making and State-Making in the Contemporary Third World'. *International Studies Review* 10, no. 1 (March 2008), pp. 27–56. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2486.2008.00746.x.

Tehran Times. 'Iran Discloses Surface-to-Surface Ballistic Missile with 1,400-km Range'. 23 September 2022. https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/476984/Iran-discloses-surface-to-surface-ballistic-missile-with-1400-km.

Telepneva, Natalia. *Cold War Liberation: The Soviet Union and the Collapse of the Portuguese Empire in Africa, 1961–1975*. Chapel Hill, N.C.: The University of North Carolina Press, 2022.

Temu, Arnold J., and Joel das Neves Tembe, eds. *Southern African Liberation Struggles: Contemporaneous Documents, 1960–1994*. Dar es Salaam: Mkuki na Nyota, 2014.

Ter-Tadevosyan, Arkadi. 'Анализ Боевых Действий в Арцахе (Июль 1991-Июль 1992 Гг.) [The Analysis of Combat Operations in Artsakh (July 1991–July 1992)]'. In, ed. *Studies on Strategy and Security*, edited by Armen Ayvazyan. Lusakn, 2007.

Terpstra, N., and Frerks, G. 'Rebel Governance and Legitimacy: Understanding the Impact of Rebel Legitimation on Civilian Compliance with LTTE Rule'. *Civil Wars* 19, no. 3 (2017), pp. 279–307. doi: 10.1080/13698249.2017.1393265.

Terpstra, N., and Frerks, G. 'Governance Practices and Symbolism: De Facto Sovereignty and Public Authority in "Tigerland"'. *Modern Asian Studies* 52, no. 3 (2018), pp. 1001–1042. doi:10.1017/S0026749X16000822.

Tetlock, Philip E., and Dan Gardner. *Superforecasting: The Art and Science of Prediction.* New York: Random House, 2016.

The Maritime Executive. 'Trafigura Tanker on Fire After Being Hit by Houthi Missile in Gulf of Aden'. 26 January 2024. https://maritime-executive.com/article/breaking-report-trafigura-tanker-hit-by-houthi-missile-in-gulf-of-aden.

The White House. 'Executive Order: Restoring Freedom of Speech and Ending Federal Censorship'. 25 January 2025. https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/01/restoring-freedom-of-speech-and-ending-federal-censorship/.

Thies, Cameron G. 'War, Rivalry, and State Building in Latin America'. *American Journal of Political Science* 49, no. 3 (2005), pp. 451–465. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2005.00134.x.

Thies, Cameron G. 'Public Violence and State Building in Central America'. *Comparative Political Studies* 39, no. 10 (December 2006), pp. 1263–1282. https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414005284380.

Thies, Cameron G. 'The Political Economy of State Building in Sub-Saharan Africa'. *The Journal of Politics* 69, no. 3 (August 2007), pp. 716–731. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2508.2007.00570.x.

Thiranagama, S. *In My Mother's House: Civil War in Sri Lanka*. Philadelphia, Penn.: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011.

Thörn, Håkan. 'Solidarity Across Borders: The Transnational Anti-Apartheid Movement'. *Voluntas: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations* 17, no. 4 (2006), pp. 285–301.

Tilly, Charles, ed. *The Formation of National States in Western Europe*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1975.

Tilly, Charles. 'War Making and State Making as Organized Crime'. In *Bringing the State Back In*, edited by Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Theda Skocpol. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985, pp. 169–191.

Tilly, Charles. *Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990–1990*. Oxford: Blackwell, 1990.

Timmer, Marije, and Paul Ducheine. 'Conceptual Manoeuvring: The Interpretation of Information Manoeuvre within the Netherlands Ministry of Defence'. *Militaire Spectator* 192, no. 11 (2023), pp. 542–555.

Trabulsi, Andrew, and Noah Raford, eds. *Warlords Inc.: Black Markets, Broken States, and the Rise of the Warlord Entrepreneur*. Berkeley, Calif.: North Atlantic Books, 2015.

Tracy, Jared M. 'Another Type of Warfare: U.S. President John F. Kennedy's Address to the West Point Class of 1962'. *Veritas* 19, no. 1 (2023), pp. 14–22.

Trainin, I.P. 'Questions of Guerrilla Warfare in the Law of War'. *American Journal of International Law* 40, no. 3 (1946), pp. 534–562.

Tremlett, Giles. *The International Brigades: Fascism, Freedom and the Spanish Civil War*. London: Bloomsbury, 2021.

Tresp, Uwe. *Söldner aus Böhmen, Im Dienst deutscher Fürsten: Kriegsgeschäft und Heeresorganisation im 15. Jahrhundert*. Paderborn: Schöningh, 2004.

Trevithick, Joseph. 'U.S. Special Ops and Lithuanian Reservists Practiced Waging Guerrilla War Against Russia'. *The Warzone*, 30 June 2019. https://www.twz.com/19186/u-s-special-ops-and-lithuanian-reservists-practiced-waging-guerrilla-war-against-russia. (Accessed 10 May 2024).

Trim, David J.B. 'Ideology, Greed and Social Discontent in Early Modern Europe: Mercenaries and Mutinies in the Rebellious Netherlands, 1568–1609'. In *Rebellion, Repression, Reinvention: Mutiny in Comparative Contexts*, edited by Jane Hathaway. Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2001, pp. 47–61.

Trim, David J.B. 'Fighting "Jacob's Wars": The Employment of English and Welsh Mercenaries in the European Wars of Religion: France and the Netherlands, 1562–1610'. PhD Diss., King's College London, 2002.

Trim, David J.B. 'Army, Society and Military Professionalism in the Netherlands during the Eighty Years' War'. In *The Chivalric Ethos and the Development of Military Professionalism*, edited by David J.B. Trim. Leiden: Brill, 2003, pp. 268–289.

Troy, Jodok. 'Die Soft Power des Heiligen Stuhls. Unsichtbare Legionen zwischen internationaler Gesellschaft und Weltgesellschaft'. *Zeitschrift für Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik*, no. 3 (2010), pp. 489–511.

Tucker, Katherine, and Maria Robson-Morrow. 'Intelligence Outsourcing for Non-Traditional Clients: The Rise of Private Sector Intelligence Providers. *Intelligence and National Security* (2025), pp. 1–20. https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2024.2437958.

Turner, Oliver. '"Finishing the Job": The UN Special Committee on Decolonization and the Politics of Self-Governance'. *Third World Quarterly* 34, no. 7 (August 2013), pp. 1193–1208. https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2013.825078.

Tychchenko, Kateryna. 'Russian Hackers Infiltrated Kyivstar System in May 2023 or Earlier – Security Service of Ukraine'. *Ukrainska Pravda*, 4 January 2024. https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2024/01/4/7435792/. (Accessed 4 August 2024).

Tyson, T., A. Soltani, A. Jhaveri, P. Mills, A. Braverman, K. Campa, J. Moore, A. Parry and B. Carter. 'Iran Update, April 18, 2024'. Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project, 2024.

Tzifakis, Nikolaos, and Asteris Huliaras. 'The Perils of Outsourcing Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Donor Countries, International NGOs and Private Military and Security Companies'. *Conflict, Security & Development* 15, no. 1 (2015), pp. 51–73.

UK Ministry of Defence. 'Joint Doctrine Publication 0-01: British Defence Doctrine' (2011).

UN. 'Principles for Responsible Contracts: Integrating the Management of Human Rights Risks into State-Investor Contract Negotiations: Guidance for Negotiators' (2015).

UN General Assembly Resolution A/58/314, 'Participation of the Holy See in the Work of the United Nations', Fifty-eighth Session, Agenda Item 59, 16 July 2004. https://holyseemission.org/contents/mission/mission-55e373817eecc8.37288214.php. (Accessed 29 August 2024).

UN Human Rights Council. 'Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises', John Ruggie, 'Principles for Responsible Contracts: Integrating the Management of Human Rights Risks into State-Investor Contract Negotiations: Guidance for Negotiators'. UN Doc. A/HRC/17/31/Add.3, 25 May 2011.

UN Meetings Coverage and Press Releases. 'Security Council Demands End to Yemen Violence, Adopting Resolution 2216 (2015), with Russian Federation Abstaining'. 14 April 2015. https://press.un.org/en/2015/sc11859.doc.htm.

UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. 'The Corporate Responsibility to Protect Human Rights: An Interpretive Guide' (2012).

UN Security Council. 'Final report of the Panel of Experts on Yemen'. 26 January 2018 https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/letter-dated-26-january-2018-panel-experts-yemen-mandated-security-council-resolution.

UN Security Council. 'Final report of the Panel of Experts on Yemen'. 27 January 2020. https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/letter-dated-27-january-2020-panel-experts-yemen-addressed-president-security-council.

UN Security Council. 'Letter dated 2 November 2023 from the Panel of Experts on Yemen addressed to the President of the Security Council'. 2 November 2023. https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/S_2023_833.pdf.

UN Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries as a Means of Violating Human Rights and Impeding the Exercise of the Right of Peoples to Self-determination. 'Relationship between Private Military and Security Companies and the Extractive Industry from a Human Rights Perspective'. UN Doc. A/HRC/42/42, 29 July 2019.

US Central Command. 'Operational Brief USS Forrest Sherman/Normandy Dhow Interdiction November 2019/February 2020'. 9 February 2020. https://www.centcom.mil/Portals/6/Documents/Reports/20FEBslides.pdf.

US Department of Defense. 'Remarks by Secretary Panetta on Cybersecurity to the Business Executives for National Security'. 11 October 2012. https://content.govdelivery.com/accounts/USDOD/bulletins/571813.

US Department of Defense. 'Irregular Warfare: Countering Irregular Threats Joint Operating Concept'. Joint Chiefs of Staff Doctrine Publication, 17 May 2010. https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/concepts/joc_iw_v2.pdf?ver=2017-12-28-162021-510. (Accessed 20 April 2024).

US Department of Defense. 'Joint Publication 3-05 Special Operations'. Joint Chiefs of Staff Doctrine Publication, 16 July 2014. https://irp.fas.org/doddir/dod/jp3_05.pdf. (Accessed 20 April 2024).

US Department of Defense. 'Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America'. Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2018.

US Department of Defense, 'Lithuanian KASP and US SOF Train Irregular Warfare at Saber Junction 18'. *Defense Visual Information Distribution Service.* 27 September 2018. https://www.dvidshub.net/news/294586/lithuanian-kasp-and-us-sof-train-irregular-warfare-saber-junction-18#:~:text=The%20KASP%20is%20part%20of,aggression%2C%E2%80%9D%20said%20Major%20M. (Accessed 10 May 2024).

US Department of Defense. 'Green Berets Mentor U.S., Albanian and Lithuanian Forces During Allied Spirit VIII'. *Utah National Guard.* 2 March 2019. https://ut.ng.mil/Site-Management/News-Article-View/Article/2007935/green-berets-mentor-us-albanian-and-lithuanian-forces-during-allied-spirit-viii/. (Accessed 10 May 2024).

US Department of Defense. 'Summary of the Irregular Warfare Annex to the National Defense Strategy'. Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2 October 2020. https://media.defense.gov/2020/Oct/02/2002510472/-1/-1/0/Irregular-Warfare-Annex-to-the-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.PDF. (Accessed 20 April 2024).

US Department of Defense, 'U.S. SOF Train With Lithuanian Forces'. *Defense Visual Information Distribution Service*. 12 March 2022. https://ut.ng.mil/Site-Management/News-Article-View/

Article/2007935/green-berets-mentor-us-albanian-and-lithuanian-forces-during-allied-spirit-viii/. (Accessed 10 May 2024).

US Department of Justice. 'Six Russian GRU Officers Charged in Connection with Worldwide Deployment of Destructive Malware and Other Disruptive Actions in Cyberspace, 19 October 2020. https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/six-russian-gru-officers-charged-connection-worldwide-deployment-destructive-malware-and.

US Department of Justice. 'Five Russian GRU Officers and One Civilian Charged for Conspiring to Hack Ukrainian Government'. 6 September 2024. https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/five-russian-gru-officers-and-one-civilian-charged-conspiring-hack-ukrainian-government.

US Joint Chiefs of Staff. 'Joint Publication 1: Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States' (2013).

US Special Operations Command Europe. '10th Special Forces Group & KASP'. *Twitter*, 20 June 2019. https://x.com/us_soceur/status/1141645372042948608. (Accessed 10 May 2024).

US Special Operations Command Europe. 'Saber Junction 20'. *Facebook*, 10 September 2020. https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=10157749706823196&set=a.440825833195. (Accessed 10 May 2024).

Valovic, Tom. 'Big Tech Companies Are Becoming More Powerful Than Nation-States'. *Metapsychosis: Journal of Consciousness, Literature and Art*, 13 May 2024. https://metapsychosis.com/big-tech-companies-are-becoming-more-powerful-than-nation-states/.

Van Creveld, Martin. *On Future War*. London: Brassey's, 1991 (published in the US under the title *The Transformation of War*).

Van Creveld, Martin. *The Culture of War*. Stroud: Spellmount, 2008.

Van Creveld, Martin. *The Rise and Decline of the State.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.

Van der Essen, L. 'Kritisch onderzoek betreffende de oorlogvoering van het Spaanse leger in de Nederlanden in de XVIe eeuw'. *Mededelingen van de Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie voor Wetenschappen, Letteren en Schone Kunsten van België* XII, 1 (1950), and XV, 4 (1953).

Van Meegdenburg, Hilde. 'What the Research on PMSCs Discovered and Neglected: An Appraisal of the Literature'. *Contemporary Security Policy* 36, no. 2 (2015), pp. 321–345.

Van Nierop, Henk. *Treason in the Northern Quarter: War, Terror, and the Rule of Law in the Dutch Revolt*, tr. J. C. Grayson. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2009.

Vandervort, Bruce. *Wars of Imperial Conquest*. London: Taylor & Francis, 2016.

Varin, Caroline. 'Turning the Tides of War: The Impact of Private Military and Security Companies on Nigeria's Counterinsurgency against Boko Haram'. *African Security Review* 27, no. 2 (2018), pp. 144–157.

Vatican News. 'Pope to Russian Patriarch: "Church Uses Language of Jesus, Not of Politics"'. *Vatican News*, 16 March 2022. https://www.vaticannews.va/en/pope/news/2022-03/pope-francis-calls-patriarch-kirill-orthodox-patriarch-ukraine.html. (Accessed 30 May 2025).

Vavasseur, X. 'Several New Major Incidents in the Red Sea'. *Naval News*, 16 December 2023, https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2023/12/several-new-major-incidents-in-the-red-sea/.

Veebel, Viljar, and Illimar Ploom. 'Are the Baltic States and NATO on the Right Path in Deterring Russia in the Baltic?' *Defense & Security Analysis* 35, no. 4 (2019), pp. 406–422.

Veilleux-Lepage, Yannick, Tommy van Steen, and Maria-Elena Kisyova. 'Terrorism Experts' Predictions Regarding the Effects of the COVID-19 Pandemic on the Activities of Violent Non-State Actors'. *Perspectives on Terrorism* 16, no. 4 (2022), pp. 41–58.

Ventura, Manuel J. 'Ordering'. In *Modes of Liability in International Criminal Law*, edited by Jérôme de Hemptinne, Robert Roth, Elies van Sliedregt, Marjolein Cupido, Manuel J. Ventura and Lachezar Yanev. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2019, pp. 284–306.

Verbruggen, J.F. 'De militaire dienst in het Graafschap Vlaanderen'. *Tijdschrift voor Rechtsgeschiedenis* 26 (1958), pp. 437–465.

Verhoeven, Karel. 'Op wie zal de paus hier nog indruk maken?' *De Standaard*, 26 September 2024. https://www.standaard.be/cnt/dmf20240925_96924165. (Accessed 27 September 2024).

VerLoren van Themaat, H. *Twee jaren in den Boerenoorlog*. Haarlem: Tjeenk Willink, 1903.

Verwer, Willem Janszoon. *Memoriaelbouck, Dagboek van gebeurtenissen te Haarlem van 1572–1581*, ed. J. J. Temminck. Haarlem: Schuyt, 1973.

Vićić, Jelena, and Rupal N. Mehta, 'Why Russian Cyber Dogs Have Mostly Failed to Bark'. *War on the Rocks*, 14 March 2022.

Vigne, Randolph. 'SWAPO of Namibia: A Movement in Exile'. *Third World Quarterly* 9, no. 1 (January 1987), pp. 85–107. https://doi.org/10.1080/01436598708419963.

Villota, Marina A. 'Intelligence analysis: Systems of Non-State Actors'. Educational Note, NATO Science & Technology Organization, 2024.

Visser, Jelle. 'David tegen Goliath in Zuid-Afrika. De Tweede Boerenoorlog door de ogen van het Nederlands militair attaché in Zuid-Afrika'. Student Thesis. University of Amsterdam, 2024.

Vissering, Gerard. 'Een Hollander in Zuid-Afrika'. *De Gids*, no. 1 (1900), pp. 46–72.

Volder, Jan de. 'Francis's Idiosyncratic Approach to Vatican Geopolitics: An Introduction'. In *The Geopolitics of Pope Francis*, edited by Jan de Volder. Leuven: Peeters, 2019, pp. 1–23. https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv1q26mbx.4.

Volder, Jan de. 'Pope Francis's Contribution to Catholic Thinking and Acting on War and Peace'. *Theological Studies*, 84, no. 1 (2023), pp. 30–43. https://doi.org/10.1177/00405639231153574.

Voller, Yaniv. *The Kurdish Liberation Movement in Iraq: From Insurgency to Statehood*. New York: Routledge, 2014.

Voß, Klaas. 'Plausibly Deniable: Mercenaries in US Covert Interventions during the Cold War, 1964–1987'. *Cold War History* 16, no. 1 (2016), pp. 37–60. https://doi.org/10.1080/14682745.2015.1078312.

Voskuijl, M., T. Dekkers and R. Savelsberg. 'Flight Performance Analysis of the Samad Attack Drones Operated by Houthi Armed Forces'. *Journal of Science & Global Security* 28, no. 3 (2020), pp. 113–134.

Voskuijl, M. 'Performance Analysis and Design of Loitering Munitions: A Comprehensive Technical Survey of Recent Developments', *Defense Technology* 18, no. 3 (2022), pp. 325–343.

Vuchinich, Samuel, and Jay Teachman. 'Influences on the Duration of Wars, Strikes, Riots, and Family Arguments'. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 37, no. 3 (1993), pp. 544–568.

Waag, Ian van der. *A Military History of Modern South Africa*. Oxford: Casemate, 2018.

Walker, Lydia. 'Decolonization in the 1960s: On Legitimate and Illegitimate Nationalist Claims-Making'. *Past & Present* 242, no. 1 (2019), pp. 227–264.

Walker, Lydia. *States-in-Waiting: A Counternarrative of Global Decolonization*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2024. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009305815.

Walsh, Declan. 'Russian Mercenaries Are Driving War Crimes in Africa, U.N. Says'. *New York Times*, 27 June 2021. https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/27/world/asia/russia-mercenaries-central-african-republic.html.

Walter, Dierk. *Preußische Heeresreformen, 1807–1870, Militärische Innovation und der Mythos der 'Roonschen Reform'*. Paderborn: Schöningh, 2003.

Walton, Calder. 'What's Old Is New Again: Cold War Lessons for Countering Disinformation'. *Texas National Security Review* (Fall 2022), pp. 49–72.

Wang, Lei, Chen Ma, Xueyang Feng, Zeyu Zhang, Hao Yang, Jingen Zhang et al. 'A Survey on Large Language Model Based Autonomous Agents'. *Frontiers of Computer Science* 18, no. 6 (2024), pp. 1–26.

Watkins, Devin. 'Pope on War in Ukraine: "Do Not Be Ashamed to Negotiate"'. *Vatican News*, 9 March 2024. https://www.vaticannews.va/en/pope/news/2024-03/pope-francis-swiss-tv-interview-gaza-ukraine-wars.html. (Accessed 11 September 2024).

Watson, Alexander. 'Culture and Combat in the Western World, 1900–1945'. *Historical Journal* 51, no. 2 (2008), pp. 529–546. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0018246X0800681X.

Weber, Max, 'Zweiter Vortrag: Politik als Beruf'. In *Geistige Arbeit als Beruf: Vier Vorträge vor dem Freistudentischen Bund*, by Max Weber. Munich & Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1919.

Weber, Max. 'Politics as a Vocation'. In *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, edited by Hans H. Gerth and Charles W. Mills. New York: Oxford University Press, 1948, pp. 77–128.

Weigel, George. 'Roman Catholicism in the Age of John Paul II'. In *The Desecularization of the World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics*, edited by Peter L. Berger. Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1999, pp. 19–35.

Weigel, George. *Witness to Hope. The Biography of Pope John Paul II*. New York: HarperCollins, 2022.

Weigel, George. 'The President and the Pope'. *National Review*, 2 April 2005. https://www.nationalreview.com/2005/04/president-and-pope-george-weigel/. (Accessed 27 August 2024).

Weinbaum, Cortney, Melissa Shostak, Chandler Sachs and John V., Parachini. 'Mapping Chinese and Russian Military and Security Exports to Africa'. Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, 13 December 2022. https://www.rand.org/pubs/tools/TLA2045-3.html.

Weinert, Friedel. *Demons of Science: What They Can and Cannot Tell Us About Our World*. Berlin: Springer, 2018.

Weiss, G. *The Cage. The Fight for Sri Lanka and the Last Days of the Tamil Tigers.* New York: Vintage, 2012.

Weiss, Michael, and Hassan Hassan. *ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2015.

Welz, Martin, and Daniela Kromrey. 'Legacies of the Past: The Influence of Former Freedom Fighters and Their Rhetoric in Southern Africa'. *Politikon* 42, no. 2 (May 4, 2015), pp. 255–273. https://doi.org/10.1080/02589346.2015.1041673.

Werbner, Richard. 'Smoke from the Barrel of a Gun: Post-Wars of the Dead, Memory and Reinscription in Zimbabwe'. In *Memory and the Postcolony: African Anthropology and the Critique of Power*, edited by Richard Werbner. London: Zed Books, 1998, pp. 71–102.

Wesche, Philipp. 'Business Actors, Paramilitaries and Transitional Criminal Justice in Colombia'. *International Journal of Transitional Justice* 13 (2019), pp. 478–503.

Wessels, André. 'Afrikaners at War'. In *The Boer War: Direction, Experience and Image*, edited by John Gooch. London: Cass, 2000.

Weymouth, Lally. 'Volodymyr Zelensky: "Everyone Will Lose" If Russia Invades Ukraine'. *Washington Post*, 20 January 2022. https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2022/01/20/ukraine-russia-zelenskyinterview/.

White, Luise, and Miles Larmer. 'Introduction: Mobile Soldiers and the Un-National Liberation of Southern Africa'. *Journal of Southern African Studies* 40, no. 6 (2014), pp. 1271–1274.

White, Luise. *Unpopular Sovereignty: Rhodesian Independence and African Decolonization*. Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 2015.

Whitman, James Q. *The Verdict of Battle: The Law of Victory and the Making of Modern War*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2012.

Wickramasinghe, N. *Sri Lanka in the Modern Age: A History of Contested Identities.* Kohuwala: Vijitha Yapa Publications, 2006.

Wikipedia. 'List of Cognitive Biases'. (Accessed September 2024).

Wilde, Gavin. 'Cyber Operations in Ukraine: Russia's Unmet Expectations'. *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, December 2022.

Williams, Christian. *National Liberation in Postcolonial Southern Africa: A Historical Ethnography of SWAPO's Exile Camps*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015.

Williams, Christian. 'Education in Exile: International Scholarships, Cold War Politics, and Conflicts among SWAPO Members in Tanzania, 1961–1968'. *Journal of Southern African Studies* 43, no. 1 (January 2017), pp. 125–141. https://doi.org/10.1080/03057070.2017.1272227.

Williams, Christian, and Tichaona Mazarire. 'The Namibian Independence Memorial Museum, Windhoek, Namibia'. *American Historical Review* 124, no. 5 (2019), pp. 1809–1811.

Wilson, A. L. *Sri Lankan Tamil Nationalism: Its Origins and Development in the 19th and 20th Centuries.* London: Hurst, 2000.

Wilson, Keith, ed. *The International Impact of the Boer War*. Chesham: Acumen, 2001.

Wilson, Owen. *The Wagner Group: Yevgeny Prigozhin's Mercenaries and Their Ties to Vladimir Putin.* London: Gibson Square, 2023.

Wiltenburg, Ivor. 'Security Force Assistance: Practised but not Substantiated'. *Militaire Spectator* 188, no. 2 (2019), pp. 88–99.

Wiratsin, In-On, and Chaiyong Ragkhitwetsagul. `Effectiveness of Explainable Artificial Intelligence Techniques for Improving Human Trust in Machine Learning Models: A Systematic Literature Review'. *IEEE Access* (2025).

Wither, James Kenneth. 'Back to the Future? Nordic Total Defence Concepts'. *Defence Studies* 20, no. 1 (2020), pp. 61–81.

Wolf, Klaus Dieter, Nicole Deitelhoff, and Stefan Engert. 'Corporate Security Responsibility: Towards a Conceptual Framework for a Comparative Research Agenda'. *Cooperation and Conflict* 42, no. 3 (2007), pp. 294–320.

Wolfram, Stephen. 'What Is ChatGPT Doing… and Why Does It Work?', 14 February 2023. https://writings.stephenwolfram.com/2023/02/what-is-chatgpt-doing-and-why-does-it-work/.

Wood, Graeme. 'A Suspicious Pattern Alarming the Ukrainian Military'. *The Atlantic*, 18 March 2024. https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2024/03/american-satellites-russia-ukraine-war/677775/.

Wood, James B. *The King's Army: Warfare, Soldiers, and Society during the Wars of Religion in France, 1562–1576*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

Wood, Nathan G. 'Explainable AI in the Military Domain'. *Ethics and Information Technology* 26, no. 2 (2024), pp. 1–13.

Wright, George. 'Nagorno-Karabakh: Armenia Says 100,000 Refugees Flee Region'. *BBC News*, 30 September 2023. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-66969845.

Wrona, Zofia, Wojciech Buchwald, Maria Ganzha, Marcin Paprzycki, Florin Leon, Noman Noor, and Constantin-Valentin Pal. 'Overview of Software Agent Platforms Available in 2023'. *Information* 14, no. 6 (2023), p. 348.

Xu, Ruoxi, Yingfei Sun, Mengjie Ren, Shiguang Guo, Ruotong Pan, Hongyu Lin, Le Sun, and Xianpei Han. 'AI for Social Science and Social Science of AI: A Survey'. *Information Processing & Management* 61, no. 3 (2024): 103665.

Yau, Niva, and Dirk van der Kley. 'The Growth, Adaptation and Limitations of Chinese Private Security Companies in Central Asia'. Washington, D.C.: Oxus Society for Central Asian Affairs, 7 October 2020. https://oxussociety.org/the-growth-adaptation-and-limitations-of-chinese-private-security-companies-in-central-asia/.

Yeh, Min-Hsuan, Yuan Wan, and Ting-Hao Huang. 'CoCoLoFa: A Dataset of News Comments with Common Logical Fallacies Written by LLM-Assisted Crowds'. https://arxiv.org/abs/2410.03457v1 (2024).

Yelaiev, Yurii, Ihor Fedchak, Volodymyr Senyk, Dmytro Tymchyshyn, and Pavlo Nazarenko. 'Effectiveness of Forensic Computer Modeling for Predicting Wartime Crimes'. *Pakistan Journal of Criminology* 16, no. 2 (April–June 2024), pp. 601–618.

Yordanov, Radoslav A. *The Soviet Union and the Horn of Africa during the Cold War: Between Ideology and Pragmatism*. Reprint edition. Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books, 2017.

Yuan, Jingdong. 'China's Private Security Companies and the Protection of Chinese Economic Interests Abroad'. *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 33, no. 1–2 (2022), pp. 173–195. https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2021.1940646.

Yuan, Jingdong. 'China's Private Security Companies and the Protection of Chinese Economic Interests Abroad'. *Small Wars and Insurgencies* 33, no. 1–2 (February 2022), pp. 173–195. https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2021.1940646.

Yunusov, Arif. 'Azerbaijan: The Burden of History – Waiting for Change'. In *The Caucasus: Armed and Divided*, edited by Anna Matveeva and Duncan Hiscock. London: Saferworld, 2003.

Zagacki, Kenneth S. 'Pope John Paul II and the Crusade against Communism: A Case Study in Secular and Sacred Time'. *Rhetoric and Public Affairs* 4, no. 4 (Winter 2001), pp. 689–710.

Zakrzewski Cat. 'Elon Musk Goes Global with His Playbook for Political Influence'. *Washington Post*, 5 January 2025. https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2025/01/04/elon-musk-uk-germany-canada-far-right/.

Zelensky, Volodymyr. 'We Are Here to Defend Our Independence'. 25 February 2022, https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=WkNiYYzHeDs.

Zetter, Kim. *Countdown to Zero Day: Stuxnet and the Launch of the World's First Digital Weapon*. New York: Crown, 2014.

Zettl-Schabath, Kerstin. "Proxy Wars in Cyber-Space." *Routledge Handbook of Proxy Wars*. Routledge, (2023), pp. 412–424.

Zhang, Lan, Yuxuan Hu, Weihua Li, Quan Bai, and Parma Nand. 'LLM-AIDSim: LLM-Enhanced Agent-Based Influence Diffusion Simulation in Social Networks'. *Systems* 13, no. 1 (2025), p. 29.

Zwanenburg, Marten. 'The United Nations and International Humanitarian Law'. *Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law*.

About the Editors

Joep Aarts LLM is a captain in the Royal Netherlands Army Legal Service. He has been working as a lecturer in military law at the Netherlands Defence Academy since 2023. He previously held a position at the Netherlands Ministry of Defence as legal representative in administrative objection and appeal cases. Captain Aarts is the secretary of the editorial board of the *Netherlands Military Law Review*. He has published on (military) administrative law and constitutional law.

Monica den Boer has held the Chair on Military Policing Operations at the Netherlands Defence Academy in Breda since June 2020, as well as a Chair by special appointment in Policing Studies at the Faculty of Governance and Global Affairs at Leiden University since January 2024. Prior to these appointments, she was a member of Parliament for the social-liberal party D66 from 2017 to 2020. After completing her PhD at the European University Institute in Florence in 1990, she consecutively held positions in Edinburgh, Leiden, Maastricht, Tilburg, Brussels, Apeldoorn and Amsterdam. She has published widely on European internal security, home affairs and police co-operation. Among other publications, she edited *Comparative Policing from a Legal Perspective*, published by Edward Elgar in 2018. Together with other editors, she is currently working on a volume on European Border Control (Routledge) as well as a volume on European Gendarmerie Organisations (Palgrave MacMillan).

Jan Willem Honig is Professor of International Security Studies at the Netherlands Defence Academy. Before taking up this position in 2021, he taught for many years in the Department of War Studies at King's College London, where he remains a visiting professor. Between 2007 and 2011, he was the first holder of the Chair in Military Strategy at the Swedish National Defence University in Stockholm. He also had long-standing associations with the Royal College for Defence Studies in London and the Maxwell School for Citizenship and Public Affairs at Syracuse University, and held fellowships at the Remarque Institute, New York University, and the Center of International Studies, Princeton University. He publishes on Clausewitz, strategy and conflict, medieval and modern.

Marten Zwanenburg is Professor of Military Law in the Faculty of Military Sciences of the Netherlands Defence Academy (since 2019) and at the University of Amsterdam (since 2021). He previously held positions as legal counsel at the

Directorate of Legal Affairs of the Ministry of Defence and the Directorate of Legal Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands. Professsor Zwanenburg is an editor of the *Military Law and the Law of War Review* and of the *Netherlands Military Law Review*. He has published extensively on issues of international law relating to security.

About the Authors

Lieutenant-Colonel (ret.) **Kraesten Arnold**, MSc, EMSD, served as an Assistant Professor and Researcher of Cyber Operations at the Faculty of Military Sciences of the Netherlands Defence Academy.

Theo Brinkel is Professor by special appointment of Civil-military Studies at Leiden University and Associate Professor of Security Policy Development at the Netherlands Defence Academy. Previously he was Member of Parliament, general secretary of Pax Christi Netherlands, and researcher at the Political Academy of the Christian Democratic Party of the Netherlands. In his current research he focuses on resilience in international security.

Lieutenant-Colonel **Chiel Conijn**, EMSD, is an Assistant Professor of Military Policing Operations. After a career in operations in the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee, he is now a lecturer and programme coordinator at the Netherlands Defence Academy.

Lieutenant-Colonel **Thijs J.J. Cremers**, MA, after graduating from the Military Academy in 1997, has worked in the field of Planning & Control and has seen operations in the former Yugoslavia and Mali. After receiving his master's degree in military strategic studies, he has been working as an Assistant Professor in the field of land operations.

Brigadier-General professor dr. **Paul Ducheine**, MSc, LLM is the Professor for Cyber Operations and Chair of the War Studies Department at the Faculty of Military Sciences of the Netherlands Defence Academy. Starting in the Engineer Regiment, he joined the Army Legal Service. At the University of Amsterdam, he was endowed Professor of Law of Military Cyber Operations (2014–2024).

Dr. **Feike E. M. Fliervoet** is Assistant Professor in International Security Studies at the Netherlands Defence Academy. She obtained her doctorate from the European University Institute. Her research centres on the dynamics of civil wars, with a particular focus on rebel group cohesion, rebel governance, and civilian agency in conflict.

Georg Frerks is research fellow at the Netherlands Defence Academy and Professor emeritus of International Security Studies at the Netherlands Defence Academy and Professor emeritus of Conflict Prevention and Conflict Management at Utrecht University.

Tycho van der Hoog is an Assistant Professor of International Security Studies at the Netherlands Defence Academy. He is the author of 'Comrades Beyond the Cold War: North Korea and the Liberation of Southern Africa' (Hurst and Oxford University Press, 2025).

Dr. **H. (Henk) de Jong** holds a PhD in History from the University of Amsterdam. He is an Assistant Professor of Military History at the Faculty of Military Sciences, Netherlands Defence Academy. His research focuses on cultural aspects of war and warfare.

Hans Melissen studied Mathematics and Theoretical Physics and holds a PhD from Utrecht University. He worked as researcher, Assistant/Associate Professor at Philips Research, Eindhoven, Delft University of Technology, and currently serves at the Netherlands Defence Academy. His research interests include packing and covering problems and general applications of Mathematics, Statistics, and Optimisation with a focus on the military domain.

Frederik Mertens is a military historian who works at TNO Defence, Safety and Security where he is part of the Strategic Defence and Security Analysis Research Department. With a focus on trying to understand large scale war between great powers, he has produced both scientific articles on military history under his own name and studies as a strategic analyst.

Lotte Nietzman, MSc is researcher in Cyber Operations at the Netherlands Defence Academy.

Colonel Dr. **Peter B.M.J. Pijpers** is Vice-Dean of Education at the Faculty of Military Sciences and an Associate Professor of Cyber Operations at the Faculty of Military Sciences of the Netherlands Defence Academy, a researcher at the Amsterdam Centre of International Law, University of Amsterdam and a non-resident fellow at the University of South Florida.

Lieutenant-Colonel Dr. **Eric Pouw** is a military legal advisor of the Army Legal Service and currently serves as an Assistant Professor and Researcher of Cyber Operations at the Faculty of Military Sciences of the Netherlands Defence Academy.

Major **Steven van de Put** is a legal advisor in the Dutch Air Force. He has worked at several levels of command and taught at the Netherlands Defence Academy. He holds a PhD from Maastricht University and an LLM from Queen's University Belfast. His research mainly focuses on military accountability.

Dr. **Maarten Rothman** is Associate Professor in International Security Studies at the Netherlands Defence Academy. His research focuses on theories of international politics, globalisation, democratic revolutions, ideologies and the justification of violence. Recent publications include a textbook (*Internationale Veiligheidsstudies: Het vak, de theorie en de praktijk*, co-edited with Sabine Mengelberg and Georg Frerks, Leiden University Press, 2024) and the edited volume *Reflections on the Russia-Ukraine War* (co-edited with Lonneke Peperkamp and Sebastiaan Rietjens, Leiden University Press, 2024).

Martijn Rouvroije is senior academic advisor at the Netherlands Special Operations Command's Warfare Centre where he focuses on joint concept and doctrine development. As part of his position at NLD SOCOM, he is also lecturer and researcher at the Netherlands Defence Academy's Department of Irregular Warfare and Special Operations where he develops professional education for the special forces community. His research interests lie in special operations, irregular warfare, and the balance of power paradigm within international relations theory.

Lieutenant-Colonel **Michael Rustenhoven**, MA, EMSD, is an Assistant Professor of Military Policing Operations. He holds a master's degree in strategic border management and has over twenty-two years of experience as an officer in the Royal Marechaussee, including several expeditionary deployments.

Ralph Savelsberg holds a PhD in Applied Physics from Eindhoven University of Technology. Currently, he is an Associate Professor for missile defence at the Faculty of Military Sciences, Netherlands Defence Academy. His research is focused on modelling and simulation of ballistic missile threats, based on open sources.

Peter C. Schuur earned his PhD in Mathematical Physics from Utrecht University. His theoretical research focuses on packing and covering problems, game theory, and the fundamentals of simulated annealing. Applied interests include (closed-loop) supply chain management, with topics such as vehicle routing, distributed planning, multimodal networks, dynamic pricing, reverse logistics, renewable energy, layout optimisation, and warehouse modelling.

Arjen Vermeer is Assistant Professor of Military Law at the Military Law Section of the Netherlands Defence Academy. He is also conducting his PhD research at the University of Amsterdam. Arjen holds master's degrees from Leiden University and the Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights.

Mark Voskuijl has been Professor of Weapon- and Aviation Systems at the Faculty of Military Sciences of the Netherlands Defence Academy since 2018. He is a specialist in the field of flight performance, stability and control of both (unmanned) fixed wing aircraft and rotorcraft. His research is focused on the following three topics: Loitering munitions, Counter-UAS systems, Effective (future) military helicopter operations and the development and integration of unmanned aircraft systems for naval operations. He is the (co-)author of more than 80 publications in the field of (unmanned) aircraft and rotorcraft flight simulation. Currently Mark is the chairman of the Educational Board of the Bachelor of Science programme Military Systems and Technology of the Netherlands Defence Academy.

Dr. **Erik J. de Waard** is an Associate Professor of Military Policing Operations. After starting his career as an infantry officer in 1994, he shifted his professional focus to academia in 2002. His research focuses on the intersection between management and security studies.

Bart Wielders is a PhD researcher at the Netherlands Defence Academy. He started his PhD research in 2022 after working as a law enforcement and intelligence officer for fourteen years. His study focuses on intelligence, border management and migrant instrumentalisation.