

DE GRUYTER

*Yury Arzhanov*

# DIVISIONS AND DEFINITIONS

SYRIAC SCHOOL MANUALS ON ARISTOTLE'S LOGIC  
(6TH-9TH C.)

PHILOSOPHY AND SCIENCES  
IN THE CHRISTIAN ORIENT

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Yury Arzhanov

**Divisions and Definitions**

# **Philosophy and Sciences in the Christian Orient**



Edited by  
Yury Arzhanov and Matthias Perkams

## **Volume 4**

Yury Arzhanov

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Syriac School Manuals  
on Aristotle's Logic (6th–9th C.)

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## Preface

The Syriac texts published in this volume are school manuals on logic composed between the 6th and the 9th centuries, i.e. in the period that saw the decline of the traditional Greek *paideia* and the rise of Christian education. Utilized within Syriac Christian schools, their primary aim was to explicate Aristotle's *Categories* and Porphyry's *Isagoge* and to adapt them for specific theological purposes. The earliest text among them (Text 1) is based primarily on Sergius of Reshaina's commentary on the *Categories* and on Proba's commentary on the *Isagoge*, and it presents the subject matters of these treatises in the form of tree diagrams. The collections of tree diagrams and short excerpts from the commentaries served as sources for the new schoolbooks containing philosophical divisions, examples of which are published in this volume as Texts 2–4. Materials from these schoolbooks were in turn recycled in later manuals on logic such as those published here as Texts 5–7.

Given the interrelationship between the dividing and defining methods of dialectic in late ancient philosophy, it is possible to discern a shared method of “division-and-definition” underlying the seven Syriac manuals published in the present volume. Together they chart late ancient logic's gradual transformation into a powerful tool for theological reasoning and polemics that was characteristic of both the early Byzantine world and the regions to the East of Byzantium. We can divide this process of transformation into three primary stages: first, the Alexandrian exegetical works; second, the visual representations of the divisions-and-definitions found in Aristotle's *Categories* and Porphyry's *Isagoge*; and finally, the manuals on logic based upon the collections of divisions-and-definitions.

The present volume could have been called “After Sergius”, since it was Sergius of Reshaina (d. 536), the Syriac disciple of Ammonius, who laid the foundation for the reception of Aristotle's logic among Syriac scholars. The fact that a number of the texts in this volume were ascribed to Sergius indicates the foundational role that he played in shaping the Syriac tradition of divisions-and-definitions. Thanks to Sergius' pioneering work, later authors such as the author of Text 5 published in the present volume could take it for granted that Aristotelian/Porphyrian logic provides insight into the ontological structure of the cosmos. As we read at one point in Text 5: “In all created beings you will discover, if you wish, these three things: genus, species, and particularity”. This author's situation was quite different from the one in which Sergius found himself. The latter had to justify the study of Aristotle by arguing that, without his *Organon*, “neither will one be capable of studying the books on medicine nor will the arguments of the philosophers be comprehensible”. Texts such as Text 5 testify to Sergius' success on this front.

The manuals published here enable us to understand better how Aristotle and Porphyry were studied within the Syriac Christian schools. Ultimately, these schools

attended more closely to the commentary tradition than to Aristotle or Porphyry themselves. The manuals also include excerpts from Gregory of Nazianzus, Evagrius Ponticus, and Severus of Antioch. In addition, they indicate the role played by Galenic writings in the study of logic. The Syriac manuals on logic therefore grant us rare insight into how the Christian schools evolved in the transition period from late antiquity to the early middle ages.

This book first took shape as part of a research project funded by the Austrian Science Fund (FWF) that has kindly supported my work at the University of Salzburg for many years. I completed the book's final revision as a member of the Institute for Advanced Study (IAS) in Princeton which gave me a unique opportunity not only to advance my study of the Syriac philosophical tradition but also to make the acquaintance of numerous new colleagues who enriched my knowledge of various historical disciplines through our conversations. I would like to express my deep gratitude to both the FWF and the IAS for their support of my research, which led to the publication of this book.

Additionally, I would like to thank those colleagues and friends who generously shared their knowledge with me during my work on this project, particularly to Michael Chase, Stephen Menn, Johannes Zachhuber, Jonathan Loopstra, Jonathan Greig, and Diego Viola. I am also grateful to Dylan Belton who carefully edited and proofread the final version of the text. The staff of the De Gruyter Brill publishing house have also been very helpful, especially with the layout of the book. Finally, and as always, I would like to thank my wife Olga and our son Theo who supported me most during the course of this project.

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Part I

## **Introduction**



# 1 Divisions and Definitions in Philosophy, Education, and Polemics

“Durch die ganze Philosophie der Syrer begegnet uns immer wieder die Vorliebe mittelmäßiger Köpfe für möglichst knappe und übersichtliche Kompendien wenn thunlich in der Form mehr oder minder systematisch geordneter ὅροι und διαπέσεις,”

Anton Baumstark<sup>1</sup>

First published in 1900, Baumstark’s “Aristoteles bei den Syrern vom 5. bis 8. Jahrhundert” was a pioneering study of the Syriac reception of Aristotle’s logic. Although some aspects of this book may now appear outdated, Baumstark’s remark quoted above about the preference of Syriac Aristotelians (not all of whom were mediocre minds) for compendia and collections of divisions-and-definitions<sup>2</sup> certainly still holds true. The tendency to compile isagogic treatises, commentaries, and short scholia mark the entire corpus of philosophical and scholarly literature preserved in Syriac,<sup>3</sup> from its onset with the study of Aristotle in the early 6th century<sup>4</sup> through to its last revival in the East Syriac monasteries in the 19th century.<sup>5</sup> While collections of divisions-and-definitions of the main philosophical terms are ubiquitous in this corpus, they have not attracted much scholarly attention since Baumstark’s study. This is most likely due to the reputation they received from him as works of “mittelmäßige Köpfe”.<sup>6</sup> However, given the popularity of these texts, they are important witnesses to the Syriac reception of Aristotle’s logic and, in turn, to the forms of the study of logic in Christian monastic schools between the 6th–9th centuries. Knowledge of Aristotle’s logic among educated Syriac Christians was based mainly on such collections rather than on Aristotle’s texts

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1 Baumstark 1900: 133.

2 Since these two nouns appear closely related to each other and together circumscribe a particular literary genre of collections published in the present book, they will often be taken as one term, combined by means of hyphens.

3 For general overviews of the Syriac philosophical literature, see particularly Endress 1987, Hugonnard-Roche & Watt 2018, and Daiber 2023.

4 Although the beginning of Aristotelian studies in Syriac was sometimes dated to the 4th/5th centuries, we have the first clear evidence for it in the writings of Sergius of Reshaina (d. 536). Cf. Arzhanov 2024a. On the period predating Sergius’ work, cf. the introductory part of 1.2, below.

5 For the revival of the study of Aristotle’s logic in the East Syriac monasteries, cf. Kessel 2023: 144–147.

6 Baumstark was not the first to characterize Syriac philosophy in these terms. Cf. the statement by E. Renan made in 1852: “Syriacae indolis proprium ac peculiare est quaedam mediocritas” (Renan 1852: 3). Several decades later, W. Wright supported Renan’s verdict: “As Renan said long ago, the characteristic of the Syrians is a certain mediocrity” (Wright 1894: 1–2). Similarly, in a recent study of one of the Syriac collections of divisions-and-definitions, H. Hugonnard-Roche gives as an excuse for the apparent simple form of these collections “l’inexpérience philosophique des érudits syriaques et ... la médiocrité de la réception qu’ils auraient procurée au savoir grec” (Hugonnard-Roche 1994a: 111). For this scholarly *topos*, cf. Weltecke 2001.

themselves or the commentaries on them; and this knowledge provided them with intellectual instruments in their polemic against other Christian groups and, later, against Islam.

## 1.1 The Greek Tradition

In his commentary on the *Categories* (*ad Gedalium*), Porphyry states that a definition reveals the essence of an existing thing.<sup>7</sup> In the *Isagoge*, he further specifies that a proper definition is based on the division of genera into species and particulars, the division that formed the so-called Porphyrian Tree and served as the foundation of education in logic both in late ancient Alexandria and in the Christian East.<sup>8</sup> The two notions, division and definition, are therefore closely connected and together they formed the core elements of late ancient philosophical education. Syriac collections of divisions-and-definitions, which might appear as mere products of early medieval scholastic culture, are in fact a small outer part of an immense iceberg whose main body is hidden in the classical Greek philosophical tradition.<sup>9</sup>

One of the earliest references to dividing and defining as philosophical methods appears in Plato's *Phaedrus*. Here, the Athenian philosopher suggests that dialectic can be understood from two perspectives, i.e. either as “distribution” (διαίρεσις) or as “collection” (συναγωγή).<sup>10</sup> The handbook of Platonic philosophy composed by a certain Alcinous (most likely in the 2nd century AD) under the title *Didaskalikos* interprets Plato's distribution and collection as the two ways of dialectical inquiry that proceed either from above or from below. Additionally, it explicates the former as a combination of two closely related methods, namely, dividing and defining:<sup>11</sup>

Dialectic has as its fundamental purpose first the examination of the substance (τὴν οὐσίαν) of every thing whatsoever, and then of its accidents. It enquires into the nature of each thing either from above, by means of division and definition (διαίρετικῶς καὶ ὀριστικῶς), or from below, by means of analysis.

<sup>7</sup> The quotation has been preserved in Simplicius, *In Cat.* 30.13 Kalbfleisch: ὁ μὲν ὄρος λόγος τῆς οὐσίας ἐστὶν ὡς τὴν οὐσίαν δηλῶν. For the English translation, see Chase 2003: 44.

<sup>8</sup> Cf. Porphyry, *Isag.* 6.13–23. For the prehistory of the so-called “Tree of Porphyry”, see particularly Barnes 2003: 128–141.

<sup>9</sup> For what follows, see in particular Chase 2015.

<sup>10</sup> Plato, *Phaedrus* 265d–266c. Cf. particularly 266c: τούτων δὴ ἐγωγε αὐτός τε ἐραστής, ὦ Φαῖδρε, τῶν διαίρεσεων καὶ συναγωγῶν ἵνα οἴος τε ὧ λέγειν τε καὶ φρονεῖν.

<sup>11</sup> Alcinous, *Didaskalikos* V.5: τῆς διαλεκτικῆς δὲ στοιχειωδέστατον ἡγείται πρῶτον μὲν τὸ τὴν οὐσίαν ἐπιβλέπειν παντός ὅτουοῦν, ἔπειτα περὶ τῶν συμβεβηκότων· ἐπισκοπεῖ δὲ αὐτὸ μὲν ὃ ἐστὶν ἕκαστον ἢ ἄνωθεν διαίρετικῶς καὶ ὀριστικῶς ἢ κάτωθεν ἀναλυτικῶς (8.9–13 Whittaker). The English translation is adapted, with some modifications, from Dillon 1993: 8.

As scholarship has already established, the origins of the analytical method — as well as of synthesis which is a reverse process — lie in ancient Greek geometry and mathematics. The Old Academy adopted the latter’s methods of proof for the purpose of dialectical inquiry.<sup>12</sup> Having further developed the same procedures himself, Aristotle summarizes Plato’s adaptation of the mathematical methods for the sake of philosophy as follows: “The way is either from the principles or to the principles”.<sup>13</sup> At the beginning of the *Physics*, Aristotle elaborates on this in his claim that, in seeking to understand existing things, we may either proceed from what is prior to us but posterior by nature or from what is prior by nature but posterior to us.<sup>14</sup> A collection of divisions-and-definitions that, in some manuscripts at least, is ascribed to Aristotle and that is traditionally referred to as *Divisiones Aristoteleae* most likely traces back to Aristotle’s school where the method of division (diaeresis) was used as an important educational tool.<sup>15</sup> In his own account of dialectic, the 2nd-century author of the *Didaskalikos* therefore had no difficulties in combining Plato’s views with the terminology that clearly derives from Aristotelian works.<sup>16</sup> After listing various examples of a dividing account (e.g. the division of the soul into rational and passionate parts), he reaches the following conclusion:<sup>17</sup>

It is primarily, however, the division of the genus into species that one must make use of for the purpose of discerning what each thing is in itself by virtue of its essence. This, however, could not be achieved without definition. Definition arises from division in the following manner: when one wants to subject a thing to definition, one must first of all grasp the genus, as for instance in the case of man, living being; then one must divide this according to its proximate differentiae until one arrives at the species, as for instance into rational and irrational, and mortal and immortal, with the result that if the proximate differentiae are added to the genus which is composed of them, the definition of man results.

12 On the origins of analysis in geometry, see Hinitikka & Remes 1974. For Plato’s notion of analysis and its relation to mathematics, cf. Menn 2002. S. Menn argues that, in light of its application in mathematics, Plato and his later followers were aware that their use of this term was metaphorical. See also Chase 2015.

13 Arist., *Nicom. Eth.* 1095a32–33: εὖ γὰρ καὶ ὁ Πλάτων ἠπόρει τοῦτο καὶ ἐζήτει, πότερον ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν ἢ ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχάς ἐστιν ἡ ὁδός.

14 Arist., *Phys.* 184a10–b14.

15 For the history and various recensions of this collection, which has been preserved as separate treatises and as part of Diogenes Laertius’ *Vitae*, cf. Rossitto 2005: 29–57; Dorandi 2016.

16 Cf. Mansfeld 1992: 78–80; Dillon 1993: 74–76.

17 Alcinous, *Didaskalikos* V.3: τῆ τοίνυν τοῦ γένους πρῶτον εἰς εἶδη τομῆ χρῆσθαι δεῖ ὑπὲρ τοῦ διαγινώσκειν αὐτὸ ἕκαστον ὃ ἐστὶ κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν· τοῦτο δὲ ἄνευ ὄρου οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο, ὃ δὲ ὄρος ἐκ διαίρεσεως γεννᾶται τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον· τοῦ μέλλοντος ὄρου ὑποπίπτειν πράγματος δεῖ τὸ γένος λαβεῖν, ὡς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τὸ ζῶον, ἔπειτα τοῦτο τέμνειν κατὰ τὰς προσεχεῖς διαφορὰς κατιόντας μέχρι τῶν εἰδῶν, οἷον εἰς λογικὸν καὶ ἄλογον καὶ θνητὸν καὶ ἀθάνατον, ὥστε εἰ συντεθεῖεν αἱ προσεχεῖς διαφοραὶ τῷ γένει τῷ ἐξ αὐτῶν, ὄρον ἀνθρώπου γίνεσθαι (9.3–10 Whittaker). The English translation is adapted, with some modifications, from Dillon 1993: 9.

Alcinous suggests in this passage that the proper understanding of the essence of an existing thing (ὁ ἔστι κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν) emerges through an assessment of it within Aristotle's system of genera and species. The division of a genus into underlying species by means of divisive differentiae has the aim of defining something as a separate entity. Division and definition therefore go hand in hand, forming two necessary parts of the proper way of understanding existing things. In so doing, they function as a sort of a bridge between Aristotle's logic and Plato's ontology.

Another example of the philosophical development of the notion of division as necessary for discovering the proper definition of things is found in Galen (c. 129–200). Highly interested not only in Platonic dialogues but also in Aristotelian logic, Galen proposes the following account of Plato's notion of definition in the treatise *On the Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato*:<sup>18</sup>

In the *Philebus* and *Phaedrus* he shows that the theory of division and synthesis is most necessary for the construction of the arts, and he prescribes a two-fold exercise in it: a descent from the first and most general class to the units that no longer admit of division, by way of the intervening differentiae, from which, as he had shown in the *Sophist* and *Statesman*, the definitions of the species are constructed; then a return, by synthesis, from the lowest species, which are many in number, up to the first genus. The path is the same for both, but the journey is two-fold, as it begins from one or the other of the two ends and passes to the remaining one.

Here Galen presents the same two ways of reasoning that we encounter in the *Didaskalikos*, i.e. the way of division from the highest genera all the way down to the entities that are no longer subject to division, and, in the reverse direction, from the lowest species “up to the first genus”, which he calls synthesis. He specifies that division (which we may identify with analysis) is the way to produce a definition. Just as with Alcinous, Galen suggests that the proper definition of something is constituted by assigning it a fitting position in the system of Aristotelian genera and species, thereby establishing its ontological status.

The 2nd century Christian author Clement of Alexandria offers a very similar account of the methods of dialectical division-and-definition. In the eighth book of his *Stromateis*, he provides an account of the various ways of reasoning (definition, demonstration, division) that, while Aristotelian in orientation, also includes some elements

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**18** Galen, *De Placitis Hippocratis et Platonis* IX.5.13: ἐν δὲ τῷ Φιλήβῳ καὶ τῷ Φαίδρῳ δείκνυσιν εἰς τεχνῶν σύστασιν ἀναγκαιοτάτην εἶναι τὴν διαιρετικὴν καὶ συνθετικὴν θεωρίαν γεγυμνάσθαι τε κελεύει διττῶς κατ' αὐτὴν ἀπὸ μὲν τοῦ πρώτου καὶ γενικωτάτου καταβαίνοντας ἐπὶ τὰ μηκέτι τομὴν δεχόμενα διὰ τῶν ἐν τῷ μεταξύ διαφορῶν, δι' ὧν καὶ τοὺς ὀρισμοὺς τῶν εἰδῶν ἐδεικτεῖν συνισταμένους ἐν Σοφιστῇ καὶ Πολιτικῷ, ἔμπαλιν δ' ἀπὸ τῶν εἰδικωτάτων πολλῶν ὄντων ἀναβαίνοντας ἐπὶ τὸ πρῶτον γένος κατὰ σύνθεσιν· ὁδὸν μὲν γὰρ εἶναι μίαν ἀμφοῖν, ὁδοιπορίαν δὲ διττὴν ἀπὸ θατέρου τῶν πρώτων ἐπὶ θάτερον ἐναλλάξ ἰόντι. (566.18–26 De Lacy). The English translation is adapted from the edition of De Lacy. For a detailed discussion of this passage, see Chase 2015: 118–120.

which indicate the influence of the Middle Platonic ideas that we find expressed in the *Didaskalikos*. He notes:<sup>19</sup>

Geometrical analysis and synthesis resemble dialectical division and definition, and we revert from division toward what is simpler and more principal. Indeed, we divided the genus of the thing being sought into the species inherent within it: for instance, in the case of man, we divide living being, which is the genus, into the species that appear, i.e. mortal and immortal, and thus always cutting the genera that seem to be compound into the simpler species, we come to what is sought, which no longer allows a cut. For once we have divided living being into mortal and immortal, then, however, mortal into terrestrial and aquatic, and again terrestrial into winged and footed, and dividing in this way the species proximate to what is being sought, which also contains what is being sought, we arrive, by cutting, at the simplest species, which contains nothing other than what is being sought. For once again, we divide footed into rational and irrational; then, selecting from the species taken from the division those that are proximate to man and putting them together into one logos, we have the definition of man, which is “a mortal, terrestrial, footed, rational living being”.

In this passage, Clement clearly draws a parallel between analysis and division, both of which entail a number of steps with the joint goal of establishing a certain item’s definition, i.e. the grasping of its essence. Clement describes the process in detail as a descent from the highest genera relating to an entity (“living being” in case of “man”) to the lower species, with each step adding a certain differentia to the genus from which it starts. The result is the clear definition of the entity in question. Clement’s description of the process not only combines the Aristotelian system of genera and species with the geometrical method of analysis (and synthesis as the reverse process); it also clearly reflects the Platonic idea of division as a “descent from the first and most general class to the units that no longer admit of division”, as the author of the *Didaskalikos* puts it (see above).

What the above examples of Alcinous and Clement make clear is that, by the second century AD, the interpretation of Aristotle’s logic included the notion of two dialectical methods, division and definition, that were seen as closely interrelated. This justifies

<sup>19</sup> Clement, *Strom.* VIII.6.18.4–7: ἡ γεωμετρικὴ ἀνάλυσις καὶ σύνθεσις τῆ διαλεκτικῆ διαιρέσει καὶ ὀρισμῷ ἔοικεν, καὶ ἀπὸ μὲν τῆς διαιρέσεως ἐπὶ τὰ ἀπλούστερα καὶ ἀρχικώτερα ανατρέχουμεν. τὸ γοῦν γένος τοῦ ζητούμενου πράγματος διαιρούμεν εἰς τὰ ἐνυπάρχοντα αὐτῷ εἶδη, οἷον ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τὸ ζῶν γένος ὃν εἰς τὰ ἐμφαινόμενα εἶδη διαιρούμεν, τὸ θνητὸν καὶ ἀθάνατον, καὶ οὕτως αἰεὶ τὰ σύνθετα δοκοῦντα εἶναι γένη εἰς τὰ ἀπλούστερα εἶδη τέμοντες ἐπὶ τὸ [μὴ] ζητούμενον καὶ μηκέτι τομὴν ἐπιδεχόμενον παραγινόμεθα. τὸ γὰρ ζῶν εἰς τὸ θνητὸν καὶ ἀθάνατον διελόντες, εἶτα μέντοι τὸ θνητὸν εἰς τὸ χερσαῖον καὶ ἔνυδρον, καὶ πάλιν τὸ χερσαῖον εἰς τὸ πτηνὸν καὶ πεζόν, καὶ οὕτως τὸ προσεχὲς τῶ ζητούμενῳ εἶδος, ὃ καὶ περιλαμβάνει τὸ ζητούμενον, διαιρούντες ἀφιζόμεθα τέμοντες ἐπὶ τὸ ἀπλούστατον εἶδος, ὅπερ ἄλλο μὲν οὐδέν, μόνον δὲ τὸ ζητούμενον περιλαμβάνει. πάλιν γὰρ τὸ πεζὸν εἰς λογικὸν καὶ ἄλογον διαιρούμεθα. κάπειτα τὰ προσεχῆ τῶν ἐκ τῆς διαιρέσεως λαμβανομένων εἰδῶν τῶ ἀνθρώπῳ ἐκλεγόμενοι καὶ ἐπισυνθέντες εἰς ἓνα λόγον τὸν ὅρον τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἀποδίδομεν, ὅς ἐστι ζῶν θνητὸν, χερσαῖον, πεζόν, λογικόν (91.10–26 Stählin). The English translation is adapted with slight modifications from Chase 115: 126; cf. Havrda 2016: 106–107.

their being combined into one concept, namely, division-and-definition. The ultimate goal of division is the construction of a definition that includes a genus and differentiae. A prerequisite for a proper definition is therefore the way of division, or analysis, which is characterized mostly in the Platonic terms of the descent from the first principles to the individual entities.

The clearest and by far the most influential account of the method of division-and-definition within Aristotle's logic is found in Chapter 2 ("On Species") of Porphyry's introduction (*Isagoge*) to Aristotle's *Categories*. In his discussion of the ten highest genera, the categories, Porphyry explicitly draws a parallel with the Platonic notion of the descent from the first principles:<sup>20</sup>

The most generic items, then, are ten; the most specific are of a certain number, but not an infinite one; the individuals — that is to say, the items after the most specific items — are infinite. That is why Plato advised those who descend from the most generic items to the most specific to stop there, and to descend through the intermediates, dividing them by the specific differentiae; and he tells us to leave the infinities alone, for there will be no knowledge of them. So, when we are descending to the most specific items, it is necessary to divide and to proceed through a plurality, and when we are ascending to the most generic items, it is necessary to bring the plurality together. For species — and still more, genera — gather the many items into a single nature; whereas the particulars or singulars, in contrary fashion, always divide the one into a plurality. For by sharing in the species the many men are one man, and by the particulars the one and common man is several — for the singular is always divisive whereas the common is collective and unificatory.

Here Porphyry focuses on the notion of division and Plato's interpretation of it as a descent from the most generic genera to the individuals. The dichotomy between division and collection in the last sentence is most likely an allusion to *Phaedrus* 266c (as quoted above). It is quite remarkable that, when articulating the way of division, Porphyry turns to the authority of Plato instead of Aristotle and that he considers this tradition as old as Plato's teaching itself. The examples from Alcinous, Galen, and Clement make clear that Porphyry drew on a long tradition of interpretation of the Platonic works and of Aristotle's *Categories* in light of Plato's ontology. Porphyry stresses that, in order for it to lead to the proper definition of things, the process of division should be comprehensive. That is, it should include all the intermediaries between the most generic

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<sup>20</sup> Porphyry, *Isag.*: διὸ ἄκρι τῶν εἰδικωτάτων ἀπὸ τῶν γενικωτάτων κατιόντας παρεκελεύετο ὁ Πλάτων παύεσθαι, κατιέναι δὲ διὰ τῶν διὰ μέσου διαιρουντας ταῖς εἰδοποιοῖς διαφοραῖς· τὰ δὲ ἀπειρά φησιν ἔαν, μὴ γὰρ ἂν γενέσθαι τούτων ἐπιστήμην. κατιόντων μὲν οὖν εἰς τὰ εἰδικώτατα ἀνάγκη διαιρουντας διὰ πλήθους ἰέναι, ἀνιόντων δὲ εἰς τὰ γενικώτατα ἀνάγκη συναρῆναι τὸ πλήθος εἰς ἓν· συναγωγὸν γὰρ τῶν πολλῶν εἰς μίαν φύσιν τὸ εἶδος καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον τὸ γένος, τὰ δὲ κατὰ μέρος καὶ καθ' ἕκαστα τούναντιον εἰς πλήθος αἰεὶ διαιρεῖ τὸ ἓν· τῇ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ εἶδους μετουσίᾳ οἱ πολλοὶ ἄνθρωποι εἷς, τοῖς δὲ κατὰ μέρος ὁ εἷς καὶ κοινὸς πλείους· διαιρετικὸν μὲν γὰρ αἰεὶ τὸ καθ' ἕκαστον, συλληπτικὸν δὲ καὶ ἔνοσιον τὸ κοινόν (6.18–23 Busse). The English translation is adapted from Barnes 2003: 7, with some modifications.

genera and the most specific species, starting from the primary one, substance, and going all the way down to the species of man, which is obviously the closest example for us.<sup>21</sup>

As J. Barnes notes in his commentary on *Isag.* 6, the notion of the division of genera “was a commonplace” by Porphyry’s time.<sup>22</sup> However, Porphyry’s *Introduction* played a crucial role in establishing the idea that at the core of Aristotle’s teaching in the *Categories* is the hierarchy of genera, species, and individuals. This idea had a significant influence upon the late ancient Greek schools and, even more so, on the Christian Oriental schools from the 6th century onwards. Its visual illustrations received the name “Tree of Porphyry”. It is noteworthy that the image of a tree appears in one of the Syriac texts (Text 5) published in the present volume. Furthermore, Text 1 bearing the title “Divisions of Porphyry” explicitly refers to Plotinus’ famous disciple as the source of the Syriac scholastic tradition. Transmitted under the title “On the Division of Substance”, Text 2 summarizes the main components of Aristotle’s logic using the idea of the division of the primary and most important genus, substance, into the proximate species and further down into the most specific species and individuals. The Syriac collections published here are therefore not just the products of an interpretation of the *Isagoge*’s main terms. Rather, they must be read as part of a long and venerable scholastic tradition of presenting division-and-definition (or definition resulting from division) as a central component of Platonic dialectic that, when combined with Aristotle’s *Categories*, received its most popular form in the “Tree of Porphyry”.

What made Porphyry’s *Isagoge* so important for the tradition of division-and-definition is its place in the educational model introduced in the late 5th century in Alexandria by Ammonius Hermeiou (435/445–517/526).<sup>23</sup> A student of Proclus (412–485), Ammonius began teaching philosophy in Alexandria around 470, and his tenure there endured a number of considerable changes in the Alexandrian academic life.<sup>24</sup> The conflict between, on the one hand, the monastic circles backed by the local bishop and, on the other hand, the traditional educational institutions led to a transformation of the higher educational system in a direction that proved more compatible with Christian views. As a result, a large number of teachers were expelled from the city, and Ammonius was granted a leading position in philosophical education.<sup>25</sup>

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21 The idea that in the proper division no intermediaries may be omitted was clearly expressed already by Aristotle in the *Posterior Analytics*. Here we read that the way from the top down shall be made “in order” (ἐφεξῆς), i.e. every genus shall be divided into its proximate species. Cf. Aristotle, *An. Post.* 91b27–32: ταῦτα μὲν οὖν παρίεται μὲν, ἐνδέχεται δὲ λύσαι τῷ λαμβάνειν ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι πάντα, καὶ τὸ ἐφεξῆς τῆ διαίρεσει ποιεῖν, αἰτούμενον τὸ πρῶτον, καὶ μηδὲν παραλείπειν. τοῦτο δ’ ἀναγκαῖον, εἰ ἅπαν εἰς τὴν διαίρεσιν ἐπίπτει καὶ μηδὲν ἐλλείπει.

22 Galen quoted an author of the 4th cent. BC, Mnesitheus, cf. Barnes 2003: 130–131.

23 For Ammonius, his school, and legacy, cf. Blank 2010 and Griffin 2016.

24 On the changes of educational forms in Alexandrian in late 5th to the early 6th cent., see Watts 2006.

25 Cf. Watts 2006: 216–225. For a critique of Watts’ arguments, cf. Segond *et al.* 2011: 461–462.

Ammonius' commentaries on Aristotle's works constitute his main literary heritage. The legacy of his teaching method and system of interpreting Aristotle is visible in the writings not only of his students but also of the next generations of Alexandrian philosophers. Among Ammonius' students were John Philoponus, Simplicius, and probably Olympiodorus. Elias and David, the last 6th-century Alexandrian philosophers whose names are known to us, also came under the influence of his teachings and writings. Ammonius' lectures have been preserved in the form of school notes made by his students<sup>26</sup> during classes "from the voice" (ἀπὸ φωνῆς) of their teacher.<sup>27</sup> In the commentary on Porphyry's *Isagoge* written "from the voice" of Ammonius, we find an excursus on various methods of reasoning. Commenting on *Isag.* 1.5, Ammonius outlines the four dialectical methods as he finds them in Plato — division, definition, demonstration, and analysis — and explicates the first and the second of these as follows:<sup>28</sup>

The function of the dividing (method) is to divide the proposed genus in good order into its proper differentiae: for instance, living being into rational and irrational, (or) into mortal and immortal, and not to say that of living being, one (part) is man, another horse, and another something else again. <...> It pertains to the definer to give the definition of each reality appropriately. He follows the divider, who is first, since the former requires the latter; for definitions derive from the genus and the constitutive differentiae. It is from the already-divided genus, then, that the definer selects what is useful for the definition. For instance, once living being has been divided into animal and plant, and animal into rational and irrational, (and the former) into mortal and immortal, the definer, wishing to define the human being, selects living being, rational, and mortal.

Here Ammonius not only paraphrases Porphyry's account of the method of division but also stresses the close relation between the division of genus into species by way of finding the proper differentiae and arriving at a definition of a certain entity. The latter is constituted by the genus and the differentiae that are collected during the division procedure. In his account of this, Ammonius also indicates the value of the division-and-

26 The only treatise that is now considered to have been composed by Ammonius himself is his commentary on Aristotle's *On Interpretation*. Commentaries on Porphyry's *Isagoge* and on Aristotle's *Categories* and *Prior Analytics* have been preserved under his name, but they were written by unknown students. Another commentary on the *Categories* has come down to us under the name of Philoponus, who notes that his text records Ammonius' lectures.

27 For the role of students' notes in shaping the written legacy of late ancient philosophers, see Cribiore 2024.

28 Ammonius, *In Isag.* 35.4–16 Busse: διαρετικῆς μὲν γὰρ ἔργον ἐστὶ τὸ διαρεῖν τὸ προτεθὲν γένος εὐτάκτως εἰς τὰς οἰκείας διαφοράς, οἷον τὸ ζῶον εἰς λογικὸν καὶ ἄλογον εἰς θνητὸν καὶ ἀθάνατον, καὶ μὴ λέγειν ὅτι τοῦ ζῶου τὸ μὲν ἐστὶν ἄνθρωπος τὸ δὲ ἵππος τὸ δὲ ἄλλο τι καὶ ἄλλο <...> ὀριστικῆς δὲ ἐστὶ τὸ τὸν ὀρισμὸν οἰκείως ἐκάστου τῶν πραγμάτων ἀποδιδόναι. οὗτος δὲ ἔπεται τῷ διαρετικῷ πρώτῳ ὄντι, ἐπειδὴ καὶ χρήζει αὐτοῦ· οἱ γὰρ ὀρισμοὶ ἐκ γένους εἰσὶ καὶ συστατικῶν διαφορῶν· ἐκ τοῦ οὖν διαρεθέντος ἤδη γένους ὁ ὀριστικὸς ἐκλέγεται τὰ χρήσιμα πρὸς τὸν ὀρισμὸν, οἷον διαρεθέντος τοῦ ἐμψύχου εἰς ζῶον καὶ φυτὸν καὶ τοῦ ζῶου εἰς λογικὸν καὶ ἄλογον εἰς θνητὸν καὶ ἀθάνατον, ὁ ὀριστικὸς βουλόμενος τὸν ἄνθρωπον ὀρίσασθαι ἐκλέγεται τὸ ζῶον τὸ λογικὸν καὶ τὸ θνητὸν. The English translation is adapted with minor changes from Chase 2020: 44.

definition for the educational process, something that the commentaries on Aristotle's works by later generations of the Alexandrian exegetes further elaborated upon. These commentaries attach much importance to the presentation of various introductory topics by means of division-and-definition, such as a general division of philosophy into parts and subparts, a list of the definitions of philosophy and their division according to the method of definition, and so on.

The curriculum established by Ammonius placed Aristotle's *Categories* at the beginning, making this treatise and Porphyry's introduction to it the first texts encountered by the students of philosophy in the course of their studies. Consequently, the lectures on these texts included introductory parts explaining general issues (*prolegomena*, i.e., questions that should be "studied before" getting to a certain text).<sup>29</sup> While it is likely that this tradition of *prolegomena* originated in Proclus' school,<sup>30</sup> it became a standard part of curriculum with Ammonius and his successors.<sup>31</sup> A commentary on an individual book of Aristotle's normally outlined at the outset the standard six *prolegomena* questions, including the goal of the book, the question of its authenticity, and the division into chapters. The commentaries on Porphyry's *Isagoge* and Aristotle's *Categories*, however, included more voluminous isagogic parts that functioned as full-scale introductions to philosophy in general and to Aristotle's logic in particular. In the school of Olympiodorus, the later successor of Ammonius, such isagogic texts became normative, and they were introduced into the Latin West through the works of Boethius (d. 524/526).<sup>32</sup>

One of the most extensive isagogic treatises handed down to us lists its author as David. Recorded "from his voice" and divided into 24 lectures (πράξεις), the *Prolegomena Philosophiae* (τὰ προλεγόμενα τῆς φιλοσοφίας)<sup>33</sup> opens with a general question about whether philosophy exists (lectures 1–4) and then proceeds to the question of how it should be defined. Before handling this latter question directly, David first asks what a definition is and how it differs from a simple term or a description (lectures 5–6). Having examined this issue, he arrives at the main point of his treatise, listing the standard six definitions of philosophy and addressing questions concerning the order that these definitions should be listed in, where they derive from, and what principles they are built upon (lectures 7–17). When discussing the six definitions of philosophy, David exhibits a particular interest in the final one, which defines philosophy etymologically as the love of wisdom and which he ascribes to Pythagoras. His discussion of Pythagoras' teachings on numbers creates a natural transition to the next major topic, namely, the division (διάρεσις) of philosophy into two main parts and the further division of

<sup>29</sup> Cf. Mansfeld 1994; Mansfeld & Runia 1996.

<sup>30</sup> According to Elias, *In Cat.* (see 107.24–26 Busse). Cf. Mansfeld 1994: 10–11.

<sup>31</sup> Cf. Hadot 1990 and Hadot 1991.

<sup>32</sup> In the early 6th century, Boethius composed the treatise *De divisione* (Magee 1998) that became one of his most influential works.

<sup>33</sup> David, *Prolegomena*. For the English translation, cf. Gertz 2018.

these parts into subparts (lectures 18–24). This section also includes an analysis of how many methods of division exist.

As this outline makes apparent, David’s *Prolegomena* deploy division-and-definition as the main instrument of logic. It is operative both on the theoretical level, since it constitutes the two main subject matters discussed in the treatise, and on the practical level, since the author structures his lectures as a series of definitions of central philosophical terms and their division into the main kinds.

David’s *Prolegomena Philosophiae* as well as other treatises composed under the influence of Ammonius’ teaching suggest that, by the mid-6th century, division-and-definition was not merely one of the dialectical methods whose origins could be traced to Plato. It had in fact become *the* method of teaching logic and an effective educational tool applied in the introductory courses of philosophical education. The application of this method also included tree diagrams. Composed “from the voice” of his teacher Ammonius, John Philoponus’ commentary on Aristotle’s *Categories* demonstrates that his use of the division method in his classes included drawings that were supposed to provide students with clear summaries of what was introduced orally in the lectures. Thus, speaking about the main kinds of the category of quality, Philoponus notes: “A drawing (καταγραφή) of the division will make the account (μέθοδος) of it easier for us to comprehend”.<sup>34</sup> What follows is a chart in the form of a tree that presents a detailed division of the category of quality. While discussing one kind of quality (i.e. affective quality) later on in the text, Philoponus makes a similar statement that is followed by another tree diagram: “Again, a drawing (καταγραφή) will make the division easy to comprehend”.<sup>35</sup> The term καταγραφή clearly refers to a graphical presentation in the form of a diagram and not to a narrative dividing account of the subject matter. It reflects the pedagogical practice of the Alexandrian lectures on Aristotle’s works that most likely traces back to Ammonius himself.<sup>36</sup>

Philoponus’ notes provide us insight into the context in which the earliest collections of divisions-and-definitions included in the present volume (particularly Texts 1–3) first appeared in Syriac in the 6th century. A further example of the use of the tree

<sup>34</sup> Philoponus, *In Cat.* 137.32–33 Busse: καὶ ἡ καταγραφή δὲ τῆς διαιρέσεως εὐληπτοτέραν αὐτῆς ἡμῖν ποιήσει τὴν μέθοδον. Cf. Share 2020: 78. A similar remark appears in Philoponus’ commentary on the *Prior Analytics* which is also based on Ammonius’ lectures: ἐκθησόμεθα δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς καταγραφῆς πρὸς τὸ εὐσύνοπτον τὴν εἰρημένην διαίρεσιν (*In An.Pr.* 69.28–29 Wallies). However, in this case, no graphic diagram follows in the extant manuscripts, and one of the manuscripts omits the whole sentence.

<sup>35</sup> Philoponus, *In Cat.* 148.6–7 Busse: πάλιν δὲ ἡ καταγραφή εὐσύνοπτον ποιήσει τὴν διαίρεσιν. Cf. Share 2020: 87.

<sup>36</sup> It would be logical to assume that the practice of presenting the key-notions of Aristotle’s logic in the form of diagrams had a much longer pre-history. Aristotle himself applies the term διάγραμμα in *An. Pr.* 41b14 in the context of presenting geometrical proofs. In his commentary on the *Prior Analytics*, Alexander of Aphrodisias (flourished at the beginning of the 3rd cent. AD) uses this term already in his discussion of the syllogisms, cf. Alexander, *In An. Pr.* 267.38 Wallies. On the use of diagrams in the Byzantine codices of the *Prior Analytics*, cf. Agiotis 2022.

diagrams mentioned by Philoponus and present in the extant manuscripts of his commentary comes from another student of Ammonius, Sergius of Reshaina (see 1.2.1 below). Having returned in the early 6th century from Alexandria where he had received a thorough philosophical and medical training, Sergius composed a commentary on Aristotle's *Categories* that is heavily dependent on the lectures of his Alexandrian master, Ammonius, and that also shows many parallels with Philoponus' treatise.<sup>37</sup> Each of the commentary's seven books concludes with various tree diagrams that explicate its main subjects. As the analysis below will demonstrate, it is very unlikely that Sergius himself was the author of these diagrams. However, the examples from Philoponus indicate that the tradition of graphic divisions has its roots in the Alexandrian pedagogical practice and had become well-known to Syriac students of philosophy through the works of scholars like Sergius.

In sum, we can view the tree diagrams found in the works of Philoponus and Sergius as a refined form of the tradition of division-and-definition that has its roots in Plato's account of the two methods of dialectical inquiry. As indicated above, this account is itself derived from the mathematical methods of analysis and synthesis. The later Platonist tradition interpreted division-and-definition as belonging to the way "from above", i.e. the method of analysis that proceeds from the highest principles. It distinguished this from the way "from below", i.e. the method of synthesis that proceeds from material objects. Although Aristotle had already done so, it was the Neoplatonists in particular — starting with Porphyry — who established a close connection between Plato's account of the descent from above and the division of genera into species by means of *differentiae*. This formed the core idea behind what became known as the Tree of Porphyry.

The descent from the highest genera to the lowest species by way of division was regarded as the first step on the way toward correctly defining things. This intimate connection between division and definition secured them a central place in education. Beginning with Ammonius' lectures, the commentary tradition placed the method of division-and-definition at the very heart of the educational model that was recorded in its scholastic form by the last generation of the Alexandrian commentators of Aristotle. It was in this form that the method was transmitted to Syriac students of philosophy in the late 5th — early 6th centuries. Against this backdrop, the Syriac collections of divisions-and-definitions published in the present volume give vivid expression to a long philosophical tradition and an established educational practice.

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<sup>37</sup> For the edition, see Arzhanov 2024.

## 1.2 The Syriac Tradition

As Baumstark correctly stated in his book on Aristotle quoted at the beginning of this introduction, Syriac Christians were particularly interested in the method of division-and-definition. An example that reflects this interest pertains to Plato. While Syriac scholars appear to have been aware of the exceptional importance of Plato's dialogues in the history of philosophy, we have no evidence that his works were translated into Syriac. Accordingly, knowledge of Plato among Syriac scholars was second-hand at best.<sup>38</sup> Among the texts that took the place of the Platonic dialogues themselves and that ultimately served to transmit Platonic ideas to Syriac readers were, for instance, the ascetic works of Evagrius Ponticus (d. 399).<sup>39</sup> The only treatise that we have in Syriac translation and that turns out to be in some way related to Plato is a collection of short explanations of philosophical terms that derive from his dialogues. It bears the title *Definitions* (Ὁποῖ).<sup>40</sup> Although late ancient tradition ascribed the composition of this collection to Plato's successor at the Academy, Speusippus, it seems to be a product of the study of Plato's dialogues in the Middle Platonic period.<sup>41</sup> This collection attracted the attention of Syriac scholars, and its translator(s) recast it in the form of questions-and-answers, as this was apparently best suited for educational purposes.<sup>42</sup>

Short excerpts from another pseudepigraphic collection in the division-and-definition form has been preserved. It is a Syriac version of the treatise *De Virtutibus et vitiis* attributed to Aristotle.<sup>43</sup> In one manuscript, this catalogue of virtues and vices is combined with another treatise ascribed to Aristotle and entitled "On the Soul". This latter text is in fact a Syriac version of the Λόγος κεφαλαιώδης περὶ ψυχῆς, a text that the Greek tradition ascribes to Gregory Thaumaturgus.<sup>44</sup> Like the collection of definitions attributed to Plato, these treatises ascribed to Aristotle in the Syriac tradition are composed in the form of divisions-and-definitions that was useful for educational purposes.

The texts published in the present volume highlight the central role played in the early period of the reception of Greek philosophy in Syriac by Evagrius Ponticus and by treatises such as *De Virtutibus et vitiis*. While Sergius of Reshaina's early 6th-century commentary on the *Categories* (see below) appears to be the earliest extant evidence of

38 On the knowledge of Plato in Syriac world, cf. Arzhanov 2019a: 76–81; Arzhanov 2019b.

39 On the Syriac reception of Evagrius' writings, see particularly Guillaumont 1982 and Casiday 2006. On the role of Evagrius' writings in Syriac schools, cf. Michelson 2022: 134–186. For the association between Evagrius and Plato in Syriac, cf. Arzhanov 2015.

40 For the modern critical edition of this text along with an extensive introduction, see Benati 2023.

41 Cf. Westerink 1962: 46–47. On the attribution of this collection to Speusippus, cf. Benati 2023: 17–68.

42 For the edition of one of the Syriac versions of Platonic *Definitions*, see Sachau 1870: 66–67. For other witnesses to the same collection, cf. Arzhanov 2019a: 77.

43 For the Greek text, see Susemihl 1884: 181–199. For the edition of the Syriac version preserved in one of the manuscripts (Sin. Syr. 14), see Brock 2014. Two Arabic versions of the *De Virt.* and *Divisiones* have been preserved both of which are dependent on the earlier Syriac translation, cf. Kellermann 1965.

44 On this treatise, cf. Lewis 1984: 19–26. German translation in Ryssel 1986. Cf. Furlani 1915, Zonta 1991.

the study of Aristotle's logic in Syriac, Sergius did not consider himself to be the first author writing in Syriac on philosophical issues. As indicated in the passage below in which he discusses the Aristotelian term ποιότης, "quality", Sergius was aware of an earlier tradition of philosophical education that attempted to interpret as well as translate Aristotle's works into Syriac:<sup>45</sup>

<...> you ought to know that concerning this genus there has been no established teaching and knowledge among those who spoke the Syriac tongue in the old days, since their notions of it are quite different everywhere. Also, those who earlier translated particular writings from the Greek language into the tongue of the Syrians interpreted the name of this genus in many different ways, sometimes calling it *hayla* ("capacity") and sometimes designating it as *zna* ("quality"), while some of them who as it seems to me were completely ignorant of the meaning of this name rendered it as *muzzaga* ("mixture"). For myself, I am sure that one term seems to be particularly suitable for rendering it, so that I will call it *zna* ("quality").

In his own work, Sergius tries systematically to use *zna* as the main Syriac term for "quality". However, insofar as they had already become part of the philosophical lexicon of his day, he occasionally uses the words *hayla* and *muzzaga* as alternatives. Although the Syriac scholar does not specify in the above passage what kind of philosophical texts he has in mind, T1 and T2 in the present volume provide us with some insight into the matter. In T1 §18, we find a division of the "powers (*hayle*) of the soul" that is derived from the treatise *De Virtutibus et vitiis* where we see a similar list of *hayle*, i.e. qualities (of the soul).<sup>46</sup> T2 §32 includes another list of qualities, this time pertaining to the body. The Syriac term used here is *muzzaga*. This whole passage in fact derives from Evagrius' *Letter to Melania*. These two examples show that, when the collections of divisions-and-definitions began emerging in the 6th century, the earlier school tradition based on school manuals such as *De Virtutibus et vitiis* and the writings of Evagrius was still alive and well. It was this tradition that Sergius' commentary challenged with its new approach to Aristotle's logic, an approach that proved highly influential in the subsequent centuries.

### 1.2.1 Sergius of Reshaina

Having received his philosophical and medical education in Alexandria,<sup>47</sup> Sergius (d. 536)<sup>48</sup> was interested not only in the works of Aristotle and Galen but also in the corpus of writings that probably appeared during his lifetime and was attributed to Dionysius

<sup>45</sup> Sergius, *In Cat.* §354 (362–363 Arzhanov).

<sup>46</sup> Cf. the commentary to the edition of T1 below.

<sup>47</sup> On the curriculum of the Alexandrian philosophical and medical schools, see Overwien 2018.

<sup>48</sup> On Sergius, his life, and his legacy, cf. Hugonnard-Roche 1997, Fiori 2014, Watt 2018, and Arzhanov 2024.

Areopagite.<sup>49</sup> Sergius translated this corpus into Syriac and, in an extensive preface attached to his translation, he presents his vision of philosophical education as primarily a matter of learning to control the passions. The vice of ignorance is described by Sergius both as immoral conduct and as the inability of the soul to adhere to “the divisions and definitions of virtue”.<sup>50</sup> It is unlikely that Sergius is referring here to the actual catalogue of virtues that he might have learnt from the Pseudo-Aristotelian treatise *De Virtutibus et vitiis* mentioned above. Rather, what the Syriac disciple of Ammonius is gesturing toward is the method of division-and-definition that he actively applies in his commentary on Aristotle’s *Categories* written on the basis of Ammonius’ lectures.<sup>51</sup> Sergius is therefore the earliest witness we have to the use of this method in Syriac schools.

In the prologue to his treatise, Sergius describes a (probably fictional) dialogue between himself and his disciple Theodore who has apparently just encountered Aristotle’s logic for the first time in Galen’s works. His description goes as follows:<sup>52</sup>

So, when we were translating certain writings of Galen the doctor from the Greek language into the tongue of the Syrians, I was the one who translated, while you wrote down after me and improved the Syriac text as the style of this tongue demands it. And when you saw the clear divisions of the terms that are in the writings of this man, the definitions and demonstrations that are frequently and excellently set in them, you asked me where precisely this man had received such a foundation and beginning in education and acquired such riches, i.e. from himself or from someone else among the authors before him.

This passage provides us with multiple insights into the philosophical life in early 6th-century Syria. In particular, it details the translation process as practiced in this period (including two stages, an initial literal rendering of the original followed by a further revision in the target language) and also indicates the role of Galenic treatises in the diffusion of Aristotle’s logic. In his attempt to explain Galen’s use of logical instruments, Sergius summarizes them as division, definition, and demonstration. This reflects the three major dialectical methods established by Plato, which, by the early 6th century, were widely deployed in Neoplatonic exegesis of Aristotle’s works (see above). Sergius’ Alexandrian teacher, Ammonius, characterizes these methods as common knowledge in his commentary on the *Isagoge*, and Sergius adopted this account in his own work.<sup>53</sup> Interestingly, however, he omits “analysis” in his treatment of logical methods. Treated together as a complex unit, division and definition apparently interested him most.

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<sup>49</sup> On the *Corpus Dionysiacum* in Syriac, cf. Sherwood 1952 and Hornus 1970. On Sergius as translator, cf. Perczel 2000 and Fiori 2023.

<sup>50</sup> Syriac: ܪܘܚܘܬܘܢ ܪܘܚܘܬܘܢ ܪܘܚܘܬܘܢ. For the Syriac text, see Sherwood 1960–1961: 454.17–18, cf. the translation on p. 457 (§33).

<sup>51</sup> Cf. Sergius, *In Cat.* §290 (304–306 Arzhanov).

<sup>52</sup> Sergius, *In Cat.* §2 (62.16–64.3 Arzhanov). The English translation is adapted from the same edition. On this passage, cf. Hugonnard-Roche 2004: 168.

<sup>53</sup> Cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 35.4–16 Busse, quoted above.



central role that the division-and-definition method played in it.<sup>63</sup> In all extant codices, each book is followed by tree diagrams presenting the key topics discussed in that book.<sup>64</sup> After Book I we encounter two diagrams: a division of philosophy into its main parts and a division of all of Aristotle's writings.<sup>65</sup> Seven diagrams are attached to Book II: a division of Aristotle's logical writings, a list of the types of speech, a classification of things from the point of view of homonymy, synonymy, and heteronymy, etc.<sup>66</sup> We find five diagrams at the end of Book III, including one focused on substance and one on property.<sup>67</sup> Attached to Book IV are two diagrams depicting quantity, while one graphical division of the category of relatives follows Book V.<sup>68</sup> Two graphical divisions of the category of quality are attached to Book VI.<sup>69</sup> Finally, Book VII concludes with five tree diagrams that present the main terms discussed in it (e.g. change, opposition, priority, and simultaneity).<sup>70</sup>

In each case, the divisions in the form of tree diagrams summarize the main contents of the respective books to which they are attached. They are clearly separated from the main body of the text. Each book of the treatise ends with a brief note, "End of Book N", after which, in most cases at least, an additional title follows, "Divisions of Book N". This arrangement gives us reason to assume that the tree diagrams were not composed simultaneously with the main body of the commentary but appeared at a later date. Several other considerations support this assumption, making it improbable that the tree diagrams derive from Sergius himself. Although division certainly is one of his main methodological techniques (see above), he never explicitly refers to the graphical appendixes in his work. Each time Sergius deploys the term "division" (Syr. *pullaga*) he means the explanatory account that either precedes this term or immediately follows it. Nowhere in his work do we find an example comparable to what we see in Philoponus' commentary on the *Categories* (see above), save for one instance where Sergius clearly refers to a graphical representation at the beginning of Book III. Here, Sergius comments on the four-fold division provided by Aristotle in *Cat.* 1a20–1b9 and summarizes his argument in the form of a diagram containing the main Aristotelian terms. Introducing the diagram are the words: "You learn them (*sc.* the key terms)

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63 For the main textual witnesses to Sergius' treatise, see Arzhanov 2024: 25–57.

64 The only exception to this rule is the oldest witness, ms. L (BL Add. 14658), which has no diagrams at the end of the final Book VII, cf. Arzhanov 2024: 27–28. For all the divisions which appear in the commentary, cf. the appendix in Arzhanov 2024: 445–463.

65 Cf. Arzhanov 2024: 104–105.

66 Cf. Arzhanov 2024: 160–165.

67 Cf. Arzhanov 2024: 257–261.

68 Cf. Arzhanov 2024: 326–327; 360–361.

69 Cf. Arzhanov 2024: 404–405.

70 Cf. Arzhanov 2024: 440–443.



Additional examples of this kind are present. What they demonstrate is that the tree diagrams attached to each book of the commentary derive not from Sergius himself but were instead added later by the readers and interpreters of his work. This conclusion contributes to our knowledge of the long and rich afterlife of Sergius' commentary between the 6th and 19th centuries. This afterlife took on multiple forms, including an epitome of it, periphrastic summaries of it in apologetic compendia, as well as short and long quotations from it by various authors dealing with Aristotle's logic.<sup>79</sup> Extensive quotations from Sergius' commentary appear as separate paragraphs in the collection of divisions-and-definitions edited in the present volume as Text 2.<sup>80</sup> This gives us good reason to suppose that Sergius' work became a rich source of information on Aristotle's logic for Syriac teachers and students of philosophy who mined it for short and handy quotations that were fitting for pedagogical purposes. The addition of the tree diagrams to the main text of Sergius' treatise further witnesses to its popularity and its rapid spread in the Syriac educational system in the decades after his death in 536.

Two Syriac manuscripts have preserved for us the tree diagrams from Sergius' commentary in the form of a separate collection. The mss. Berlin Sachau 116 and Birmingham Mingana Syriac 84 (see on them below) include two collections of tree diagrams. The first one bears the title "Divisions of Porphyry" (published in the present volume as Text 1) and is based on the *Isagoge*. The second collection bears the title "Divisions made by the Philosopher Aristotle",<sup>81</sup> and it consists of the tree diagrams attached to the end of each book of Sergius' commentary.<sup>82</sup> At the beginning of this collection, we find the two diagrams attached to Book I. Following them is a large excerpt from Book III of the commentary (§§124–126) in which Sergius explains the "first division" that Aristotle proposes in Chapter 2 of his *Categories*. As indicated above, a graphical presentation of this division is included in Sergius' treatise and is the only place where he himself refers to a graphical presentation of a division.<sup>83</sup> This probably made the compiler(s) of the collection include it. After the long quotation from the commentary, we find more tree diagrams. These not only follow (with some modifications)<sup>84</sup> the order of the divisions but also make precise references to the graphics as they appear in the preserved

79 On the afterlife and various forms of reception of Sergius' commentary in the Syriac literature, cf. Arzhanov 2024: 13–16.

80 See, e.g., T2 §§3, 4, 5, 8, 9, etc., which contain either verbatim (cf. the insertion of the phrase "to put it briefly" in §9!) or modified quotations from Sergius' commentary.

81 Syr.: ܩܘܠܘܢ ܕܩܘܠܘܢ ܕܩܘܠܘܢ ܕܩܘܠܘܢ.

82 This collection is not edited in the present book, since it appears to be nearly identical to the tree diagrams published as attachments to the individual books of Sergius' commentary in Arzhanov 2024.

83 Cf. Arzhanov 2024: 170–171.

84 The collection changes the order of the divisions attached to Book II, making Division 5 into no. 6, Division 6 into no. 7, and inserting the list of the ten categories (which has no number by Sergius) as no. 5.

manuscripts of Sergius' commentary.<sup>85</sup> Additionally, the collection includes one tree diagram (on the types of motion) that is not found in the extant witnesses to Sergius' commentary but which summarizes Sergius' §447.<sup>86</sup>

The Berlin and Birmingham codices are not the only witnesses to the tree diagrams associated with Sergius' treatise. This fact alone suggests that Syriac scholars considered these diagrams to be independent elements that did not belong to the core text of this treatise and that could therefore easily be separated from it. In addition to the same collection of the "Divisions of Porphyry" edited in the present volume, the codex Vatican Syriac 158 also includes a number of diagrams taken from Sergius' commentary that appear side by side with those pertaining to the *Isagoge*. The result is a mixed collection of divisions-and-definitions focused not only on Porphyry's text but also on Aristotle's *Categories*, *On Interpretation*, and *Prior Analytics* (see the detailed description of this collection below, under 2.1), i.e. covering the whole corpus of logical studies that in Syriac schools generally ended with *An. Pr. I.7*.<sup>87</sup> The Vatican collection includes nine tree diagrams based on Sergius' commentary and, in most cases, correctly assigns them to their proper source, including both the number of the book and the number of the diagram.

These precise references contribute to our knowledge of the afterlife of this treatise in Syriac schools. While the internal evidence from the commentary suggests that the diagrams do not derive from Sergius himself, the extant manuscripts indicate that they were attached to the main body of the text at a very early date, probably already in the mid-6th century. Despite its length, the commentary therefore quickly gained considerable popularity, serving as a useful manual for teachers and students of philosophy. Sergius deliberately conceived his commentary as a general introduction to philosophy and logic, not just as an exegetical work. He was eager to make his work as accessible as possible for beginners in philosophy, and the text constantly indicates his concern for this audience.<sup>88</sup> The method of division-and-definition undoubtedly served Sergius as an important pedagogical tool towards that end. It is therefore perhaps unsurprising that teachers of philosophy, to whom Sergius' treatise was mainly addressed, decided at a certain point to visualize the dividing accounts contained in it in the form of tree diagrams attached to the individual books. As the Berlin and Birmingham codices testify, the tree diagrams based on Sergius' treatise were also transmitted separately as a collection of divisions attributed to Aristotle himself. This suggests that the main

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<sup>85</sup> The Berlin and Birmingham mss. mostly omit the numbers of the books (only a reference to the last Book VII appears) but follow the numbering of divisions as they appear after individual books.

<sup>86</sup> It appears also in the narrative form in T2 §31.

<sup>87</sup> The existence of the full Syriac translation of the *Prior Analytics* (by George of the Arabs, late 7th cent.) makes it likely that a limited number of Syriac intellectuals were familiar with texts other than *An. Pr. I.1–7*, if not with the whole Organon.

<sup>88</sup> Cf. Arzhanov 2024: 8–12.

elements of Aristotle's logic were easy to present and easier to memorize when presented in the form of handy diagrams.

The tree diagrams were, however, not the only form in which these divisions were transmitted. As already indicated above, the collection published in the present volume as Text 2, "On the Division of Substance", contains extensive quotations taken directly from the text of Sergius' commentary. Additionally, it includes divisions that present in narrative form the tree diagrams which are attached to the individual books of Sergius' treatise (and which are transmitted separately in the Berlin and Birmingham codices).<sup>89</sup> While in some cases it is hard to discern whether or not a particular paragraph of T2 is based on the main text of Sergius' commentary or on a tree diagram attached to one of its books, in other cases we can be quite certain that the latter and not the former was the source. The most striking example of this is found in T2 §21, a text that offers a division of philosophy into subparts. After the division of the second practical part of philosophy into the rule over people, the rule over one's house, and the rule over oneself, the compiler of the collection adds a note that an additional division into law-givers and judges is "attached" to the previous one. In the context of the narrative account, this note is confusing. However, it makes perfect sense if we turn to the corresponding tree diagram (Division 1 after Book I) attached to Sergius' commentary where a subdivision into law-givers and judges is found right below the main diagram without any clear connection to it. It is quite literally just "attached" to it.<sup>90</sup>

This and other examples of this kind indicate that, while the text of Sergius' commentary long remained a source for short definitions, the tree diagrams attached to it took on a life of their own among the next generation of Syriac scholars, eventually becoming an independent source for later manuals in logic. As noted above, the various collections published in the present volume as Text 2, "On the Division of Substance", integrate both fragments from Sergius' commentary and a large number of the tree diagrams later attached to it. This text in turn became a source for other school texts. For instance, a number of paragraphs from T2 were integrated into T6. The popularity of T2 within educational contexts is evidenced by the fact that it served as one of the main sources for a collection of philosophical riddles which has come down to us.<sup>91</sup> In this collection, we discover some paragraphs from T2 either in the form of questions-and-answers containing a riddle or in the same form of the divisions contained in T2.<sup>92</sup> This provides us with a clear example of a living tradition of educational use of the materials that originally derive from Sergius' work.

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<sup>89</sup> See, e.g., T2 §§18, 19, 21, 22.

<sup>90</sup> Cf. Arzhanov 2024: 104–105 and particularly p. 447, where this division is represented in the tree diagram form.

<sup>91</sup> Published in Furlani 1918–1919.

<sup>92</sup> For instance, T2 §25 = 116.14–18 Furlani; §28 = 119.25–120.7 Furlani; §29 = 122.20–23 Furlani.

In sum, it is difficult to overestimate the role that Sergius of Reshaina's commentary on the *Categories* played in the history of Syriac schools in general and in establishing the division-and-definition genre in particular. The fact that the collection of "Divisions of Aristotle" preserved in two mss. attribute these tree diagrams to Aristotle and not to Sergius suggests that his commentary was often treated as a substitute for the study of the actual text of the *Categories*,<sup>93</sup> the earliest anonymous translation of which probably appeared in Syriac in the 6th century. However, this translation never played the same (or even a comparable) role that Sergius' commentary did.<sup>94</sup> Neither Syriac manuals on logic nor any other witnesses show familiarity with the anonymous Syriac translation, and it was not until the appearance of Jacob of Edessa's version that the actual text of the *Categories* became the object of study.<sup>95</sup>

Given Sergius' role in the history of Syriac philosophy, it is not surprising that several Syriac manuals on Aristotle's logic published in the present volume include Sergius' name in their title, even though it is very unlikely that they actually derive from him in the form in which they have been transmitted to us. Two treatises are explicitly attributed to Sergius — T3 ("Natural Demonstration") and T5 ("On Genus, Species, and Particularity") — while another one — T2 ("On the Division of Substance") — has sometimes been ascribed to him by modern scholars.<sup>96</sup> However, as will be shown below, there are good reasons to date all these texts to a period much later than the early 6th century. The appearance of Sergius' name in the title of these treatises is more likely due to the authority and esteem associated with this name and to the long-lasting popularity of his opus magnum, namely, his commentary on the *Categories*. The pseudepigraphic character is particularly evident in the case of T3, which is attributed to Sergius in the only codex that transmits it (on T3, see 2.3 below). The obvious explanation for this attribution is the text's inclusion of extensive quotations from Sergius' commentary that even contain correct references to their primary source (Book VI of the commentary).<sup>97</sup> In addition, this loose collection of fragments includes excerpts from various other works, some of which may be identified with more certainty than others. Two

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93 This conclusion is corroborated by ms. BL Add. 12155 (see on it further below, 2.2), which refers to the collection of quotations from Sergius' commentary as "selected fragments from Aristotle's *Categories*" (cf. Arzhanov 2024: 48).

94 The earliest anonymous Syriac translation of the *Categories* (King 2010) has come down to us in only one manuscript, BL Add. 14658. For more on this, see 2.2 below. Since both Jacob and his colleague George, bishop of the Arab tribes, were familiar with the 6th-century translation and made use of it in producing their own versions, it was not a marginal text in the history of the Syriac reception of the *Organon*. However, it never reached the popularity and the authority which Sergius of Reshaina's commentary gained in Syriac schools. On the relation of Jacob's and George's versions to the anonymous 6th-century translation, cf. King 2010: 35–38 and Arzhanov 2021b.

95 The school use of Jacob's version is attested to by the collection of scholia on the *Categories* preserved in ms. Vatican Syriac 586, cf. Aydin 2019.

96 Cf. Hugonnard-Roche 2004: 128–132 and Aydin 2016: 10–18.

97 See T3 §§10–11, corresponding to Sergius, *In Cat.* §§374–375 (380–381).



commentaries on Porphyry's *Isagoge*,<sup>103</sup> Aristotle's *On Interpretation*,<sup>104</sup> and *Prior Analytics* I.1–7,<sup>105</sup> i.e. on nearly the full corpus of writings which at the time constituted the truncated Organon. The only work that is missing in this list is the *Categories*. That no commentary on this work has come down under Proba's name may be explained by the fact that Sergius of Reshaina's treatise discussed in the previous section already existed at the time and that deference toward it prevented several subsequent generations of Syriac scholars from composing another one.<sup>106</sup> If this explanation is correct, it provides a strong argument for dating Proba's activity as a teacher of philosophy to the mid-6th century or later.

Insofar as the collections of divisions-and-definitions published in this volume contain fragments from his commentary on the *Isagoge* and his other works, Proba's contribution to these collections is no less significant than Sergius'. T3, "Natural Demonstration", which the manuscript tradition attributes to Sergius (see above), includes three fragments from the introductory part of Proba's commentary on Aristotle's *On Interpretation*.<sup>107</sup> Taken from the opening paragraph of Proba's treatise, the first fragment is, interestingly enough, ascribed to Alexander. It is likely that the philosopher in question is Alexander of Aphrodisias (late 2nd–early 3rd cent.).<sup>108</sup> Although the preserved Syriac text of Proba's commentary does not mention Alexander's name,<sup>109</sup> it is clearly dependent on the Alexandrian tradition, particularly on the texts deriving from Ammonius' school. Additionally, §13 of T3 presents a list of seven *prolegomena* questions that should be discussed before the study of any particularly philosophical work, which also derive from Proba's commentary. Further quotations from Proba's *In De Int.* are

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**103** The first part of this work (lacking introduction) preserved in three manuscripts now located in Erbil-Ankawa remains unpublished. For these three codices, which most likely go back to the same archetype, cf. Kessel 2023 and Arzhanov 2024: 32–35. In the present book, the first part of Proba's treatise will be quoted after the earliest witness, ms. Erbil 169 (dated 1821/1822). The second part of Proba's commentary on the *Isagoge* was published by A. Baumstark on the basis of ms. Sachau 226, see Baumstark 1900: 4–12 (Syriac pagination). Cf. Hugonnard-Roche 2012b.

**104** Published in Hoffmann 1869: 62–90.

**105** Edited with a French translation in Hugonnard-Roche 2017a.

**106** Chronologically speaking, the next Syriac commentary on the *Categories* known to us first appears in the early 8th century. George of the Arabs included it in the collection of his translations and commentaries on Aristotle's Organon, which has been preserved in ms. BL Add. 14659. The next extensive commentary on this treatise dates from the 13th century and, like that of George's, came down to us as part of a large collection of commentaries on the Organon composed by Dionysius Bar Šalibi and preserved in ms. Cambridge Gg 2.14.

**107** See T3 §§8–9 and 13.

**108** For the knowledge of Alexander's works among Syriac scholars, cf. Arzhanov & Arnzen 2014.

**109** See the Syriac text in Hoffmann 1869: 62–63; Latin translation on p. 90. Proba refers to Alexander in the second part of his commentary on Porphyry's *Isagoge*; see Baumstark 1900: 6.17 (Syriac text), 150 (German trans.). It remains unclear, however, why this name appears in T3 §8.

included in the version of T1 preserved in the Vatican codex.<sup>110</sup> More specifically, this version of T1 contains two diagrams (providing divisions of sentence and propositions) that are present in the transmitted text of Proba's work.<sup>111</sup>

Most of the quotations from Proba's *In De Int.* that are found in T3 derive from the introductory part of this work, which focuses on the *prolegomena* issues. The latter would be equally applicable to the study of the *Categories* and the *Isagoge*, and it is in fact these latter treatises that are the primary focus in the collections published in the present volume. The main source for the study of the *Categories* was Sergius' commentary, which apparently proved sufficient towards that end. On the other hand, the divisions-and-definitions in T1 pertaining to the *Isagoge* appear to derive both from Porphyry's text and from the commentary tradition. In fact, the sources for the *Isagoge* portion of these collections turn out to be limited to two main texts, as the remarks in the footnotes to the English translation will make clear. The first source is the anonymous 6th-century Syriac translation of Porphyry's text. Proba's commentary on the *Isagoge* is the second source.

Only in one case do we encounter a quotation from the *Isagoge* that corresponds to Athanasius of Balad's version of this text. This is the definition of accident provided in T3 §2. Interestingly enough, the same exact passage is found in the next paragraph already in the form in which it appears in the early anonymous version. Aside from this single exception, the 6th-century translation of the *Isagoge* is clearly the primary source for the collections of divisions-and-definitions published in this volume. This fact is particularly striking in the case of T1, which has been handed down to us in two versions that differ considerably from one another in their structure (on these two collections, see 2.1 below). In the Vatican codex, the collection of "Divisions of Porphyry the Philosopher" appears right after Athanasius' translation of the *Isagoge*. However, the quotations from Porphyry's text do not in fact come from Athanasius' translation but instead from the 6th-century translation. This suggests that the school tradition of divisions-and-definitions originated and developed in the 6th century. As noted above, Sergius of Reshaina's commentary was in all likelihood the first text to provide Syriac scholars with examples of divisions that could be easily extracted and translated into condensed explanations in the form of tree diagrams. The 6th-century translation of Porphyry's *Isagoge* made by (an) unknown Syriac author(s) and Proba's commentary on Porphyry's work therefore both provided further impetus to the tradition of divisions-and-definitions.

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**110** These divisions are not published in the present volume (divisions 17 and 18). On the structure of the Vatican collection, see below, 2.1.

**111** Cf. Hoffmann 1869: 67, 88.

The chronological relation between these two texts cannot be determined with certainty.<sup>112</sup> It is possible that Proba's commentary predates the anonymous Syriac translation, since the quotations from Porphyry that appear in it do not match the anonymous translation. This makes it likely that the latter did not yet exist when Proba wrote his commentary. However, this is not the only possible conclusion to draw. While we tend to refer to Proba's treatise as a commentary on the *Isagoge*, verbatim quotations from Porphyry are in fact rarely found in it. Assuming that Proba utilized some Greek sources for his work, it is quite possible that, based on the lemmata included in his source text, he made his own translations of the few passages from the *Isagoge* and therefore did not need to reference to the anonymous Syriac translation. This would be very similar to Sergius of Reshaina's *modus operandi*, whose commentary on the *Categories* includes nearly no quotations from Aristotle's actual text. Those that it does include most likely stem from the other Greek sources. In light of this example, we are unable to conclude with certainty whether or not the anonymous Syriac translation of the *Isagoge* predates Proba's commentary.<sup>113</sup>

Unfortunately, Proba's exegetical work has survived only in an incomplete form.<sup>114</sup> The extant text contains two parts. The first is dedicated to the "five words" discussed by Porphyry (genus, species, difference, property, accident), each of them forming a separate chapter. The second part covers the rest of the *Isagoge* in which Porphyry outlines what each of these categories has in common and what differentiates them. The same division is found in David's commentary on the *Isagoge*, which states that earlier exegetes preferred to divide Porphyry's work into three main parts.<sup>115</sup> Indeed, we find the three-fold division of the *Isagoge* in the commentaries of both Ammonius<sup>116</sup> and Elias.<sup>117</sup> It is therefore likely that the traditional point of view, which originated in the school of Ammonius, dominated until the mid-6th century after which it was replaced by a tendency to combine the second and the third parts of the *Isagoge* into a single section focused on the commonalities and differences between the five main items. Since Proba's work follows this latter tendency, we have an additional argument for dating it after the mid-6th century.

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112 Based on the analysis of the technical vocabulary of Proba's commentary, H. Hugonnard-Roche suggests that it should be dated to a time later than the anonymous Syriac translation of the *Isagoge*. Cf. Hugonnard-Roche 2004: 86–89. It seems, however, that the examples offered by Hugonnard-Roche give evidence instead for parallel traditions which developed independently from one another. They therefore cannot be analysed in terms of relative chronology.

113 Cf. Arzhanov 2024: 20–24.

114 Cf. Hugonnard-Roche 2012b. For the manuscript evidence, cf. Kessel 2019: 393.

115 Cf. David, *In Isag.* 93.6–24 Busse.

116 Cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 23.12–17 Busse.

117 Cf. Elias, *In Isag.* 39.20–26 Busse.



*Isagoge*.<sup>123</sup> To that end, Proba offers multiple divisions-and-definitions of the central issues in Porphyrian logic. Although he focuses primarily on the five main terms of the *Isagoge*, he also attends to other subjects that he apparently deems important for those beginning their philosophical education. This pedagogical attention to beginners is another characteristic that Proba shares with Sergius.

It was apparently this care for beginners that motivated Proba's use of division-and-definition as the main pedagogical technique in his commentary. Dealing with the first of the five terms discussed in the *Isagoge* (i.e. genus), the first chapter of the extant part of his work entitled "On Genus" opens with a discussion of the multiple meanings of the term. Following Porphyry's classification, Proba first lists those meanings based on certain relation and concludes with the meaning of the term as it is used in logic. Since the concept of relation emerges in this context, Proba finds it necessary to discuss this subject matter, explaining the primary meanings of the term. After subsequently clarifying Porphyry's definition of genus within logic as that which is predicated of multiple entities, Proba moves on to explain the idea of predication. Here he focuses on two notions, commonality and difference, which he uses to classify all things either as having something in common or as being different. The result is the taxonomy on which the division into homonyms, synonyms, polynoms, and heteronyms is based. The same idea of predication leads Proba to propose another classification, this time of words. Words either signify something or they do not, with the former admitting of further divisions that lead back to the five main terms of the *Isagoge* listed above.

This outline of Chapter 1 makes it clear that the method of division lies at the heart of Proba's argument. His explanations of the *Isagoge* are in fact a series of various divisions that serve as a tool for defining the main subjects of Porphyry's philosophy. While division-and-definition also serves as one of the pedagogical methods in Sergius' commentary on the *Categories*, it functions in Proba's treatise as the main, and at times only, instrument for presenting logical issues. The chapter "On differentia", for instance, starts with a division of differentia, proceeds to a second division that takes another perspective on it, and then immediately adds a third division. This strict adherence to the dividing method makes some parts of Proba's commentary read like a series of classifications that could be easily separated from the main text and studied independently. Apparently, this is what in fact happened soon after the composition of the treatise, since the preserved manuscripts of the first part of this work contain tree diagrams which are attached to each individual chapter. The first chapter, "On Genus", outlined above ends with four diagrams: a list of meanings of the term genus, a classification of the kinds of relations, a division of all things based on commonality and difference, and a taxonomy of words that could be either meaningful or meaningless.

These tree diagrams are without doubt based on Proba's text. However, as with the tree diagrams connected to Sergius' commentary, we have no evidence that Proba had

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123 Cf. Hugonnard-Roche 2012b: 233–234.



form. Ammonius also asserts that form gives order to matter and comes to be in it.<sup>128</sup> The commentaries of David, Elias, and Ps.-Elias point out that form is what “shapes” matter.<sup>129</sup> Like the latter authors, Proba draws a distinction between “things constituted of matter and shaping form” and those constituted of “what is analogous to matter and form”.<sup>130</sup> That the Syriac text speaks of the “shaping form”<sup>131</sup> indicates the influence of the tradition of interpretation which Proba shares with David, Elias, and Ps.-Elias, something that further supports the dating of Proba’s work to after the mid-6th century.

The same three manuscripts containing the tree diagrams extracted from Sergius of Reshaina’s treatise (see above, 1.2.1) also include the tree diagrams that we find in Proba’s commentary on the *Isagoge*. As already noted above, the collection bearing the title “Divisions of Porphyry the Philosopher” (T1 in the present edition, cf. 2.1 below), at least in the version which has been preserved in the Berlin and Birmingham codices (the Vatican manuscript has a more heterogeneous florilegium), opens with divisions based on the anonymous Syriac translation of the *Isagoge* and concludes with divisions found at the end of the individual chapters of Proba’s work. This combination makes it likely that the study of Porphyry’s *Isagoge* in Syriac schools was based not only on the actual text itself but also on Proba’s commentary, which was considered as authoritative as Sergius of Reshaina’s commentary on the *Categories*. T1 therefore gives us good reason to think that, by the late 6th century, these three texts formed the core of the introductory classes in logic in Syriac schools.

### 1.2.3 Development After the 6th Century

The collections of divisions-and-definitions published in the present volume have their roots in the school tradition of the study of Aristotle’s logic. Focused primarily on introductory courses, this tradition engaged mostly with isagogic materials rather than with more complex philosophical treatises. It remains an open question whether philosophy in general and Aristotle’s logical works in particular were an integral part of the curriculum in Syriac schools. The answer largely depends on the interpretation of the extant sources that derive from various historical periods. However, we are not always able to

<sup>128</sup> Cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 106.15–20 Busse. See also Elias, *In Isag.* 87.14–88.6 Busse; Ps.-Elias, *In Isag.* 115.2–116.4 Westerink.

<sup>129</sup> Cf. Ps.-Elias, *In Isag.*: τὸ δ’ εἶδος προσελθὸν ἐμόρφωσε τὴν ὕλην (115.11 Westerink). See also David, *In Isag.* 214.3–4 Busse.

<sup>130</sup> Cf. ms. Erbil 169, fol. 19v.

<sup>131</sup> Syr. *myaqnana*, a derivative from the noun *yūqna*, which is a loanword from the Gr. εἰκών. For the expression *adsha myaqnana*, cf. Timothy I, Letter 42: ܠܗܘܘܬܘܘܬܗ ܕܡܝܩܢܢܐ ܕܡܘܨܘܪܐ ܕܥܘܠܡܐ ܕܡܝܩܢܢܐ ܕܡܘܨܘܪܐ ܕܥܘܠܡܐ (Heimgartner 2012: 13.3). Here, the “productive nature” is a synonym for “shaping form”.

retrospectively project evidence from later time periods onto earlier ones.<sup>132</sup> The first explicit reference to Aristotle's logical treatises being used within the Syriac educational system is found in Gregory Bar 'Ebroyo's *Nomocanon*.<sup>133</sup> Bar 'Ebroyo (Bar Hebraeus, 1225/26–1286) lists the whole corpus of the Organon, starting with the *Categories* and ending with the *Sophistical Refutations*. This may reflect the state of the art in the 13th century.<sup>134</sup> It is likely that some of Aristotle's logical writings were reserved for advanced courses in philosophy<sup>135</sup> and for individual studies by members of the higher clergy<sup>136</sup> while the more general education of Syriac clerics was limited either to introductions to Aristotle's logic based on the *Categories* and the *Isagoge* or (in the more elaborated form) to the truncated Organon that included *Isag.*, *Cat.*, *De Int.*, and *An. Pr.* I.1–7. Such introductory courses apparently constituted the actual *Sitz im Leben* of the collections of philosophical divisions-and-definitions both in the East and the West Syriac educational traditions.

By means of their expositions of Aristotle's logic in the form of handy divisions, Sergius of Reshaina's and Proba's commentaries, as well as the first Syriac translation of the *Isagoge*, set the development of this tradition in motion. Sergius' treatise was apparently considered the primary source for the study of Aristotle's *Categories*. As for the *Isagoge*, we have both the Syriac translation of Porphyry's text and a commentary on it. This is understandable if we assume that Porphyry's treatise was viewed as an exegetical work that had the advantage of being not merely an introduction to Aristotle's *Categories* (as it was often considered to be) but also a short manual on logic. The collections of tree diagrams based on the aforementioned three sources — one of which is published as T1 in the present volume — represent the first stage in the development of this tradition whose origin we can date to the second half of the 6th century.

The presence of another 6th-century author, Paul the Persian, in the collections of divisions-and-definitions is marginal. This marginality is most likely explained by the fact that he originally composed his treatises in Persian. Severus Sebokht (d. 666/667) subsequently translated them into Syriac, after which they became accessible to Syriac

<sup>132</sup> For attempts at such a reconstruction, cf. Watt 2017 and Tannous 2018: 181–198.

<sup>133</sup> Bar 'Ebroyo, *Nomocanon* 7.9 (Bedjan 1898: 105–106). For the analysis of Bar 'Ebroyo's list of books in the *Nomocanon*, cf. Taylor 2008 and Tannous 2018: 187–192.

<sup>134</sup> The Arabic version of the Organon preserved in ms. Paris BnF arabe 2346 (dated ca. 1027) indicates the existence of Syriac translations of all treatises constituting the expanded Organon, including *Rhetoric* and *Poetics*. The Paris codex reflects the curriculum in the school of the Baghdad Aristotelians (established by the East Syriac scholar Abu Bishr Matta ibn Yunus) in the 9th–10th centuries. Cf. Endress 2012 and Endress 2016.

<sup>135</sup> It is possible that the collection of translations and exegetical works of George, bishop of the Arabs (d. 724), preserved in ms. BL Add. 14659 (cf. Wright 1872: 1163–1164) reflects such an advanced course in the early 8th century that would have been offered to a small group of intellectuals.

<sup>136</sup> Cf. the letters of Timothy I (East Syrian Catholicos-Patriarch from 780–823), in which he is seeking for a number of Aristotle's writings, including a rare reference to the *Poetics*, and which reflect his individual interest in Greek philosophy. Cf. Brock 1999 and Heimgartner 2012.



On the walls of the cell of the noble ‘Enanisho’ were written divisions and definitions, as well as other things. Now, when his brother, Mar Isho’yahb, had come to this monastery to pray and had seen the divisions of the science of philosophy by his brother ‘Enanisho’, he asked him to write an exposition of them for him and to send it to him. ‘Enanisho’ carried it out, having given a clear explanation of them in many verses.

According to Thomas of Marga, ‘Enanisho’ had received a solid education in the school of Nisibis before entering the monastery of Beth ‘Abe. In spite of the existence of numerous sources describing the educational process in this famous institution, the actual details of the monastery’s curriculum remain unknown to us.<sup>141</sup> The treatise *The Cause of the Foundation of the Schools*,<sup>142</sup> written around the year 600 by an alumnus, Barḥadbšabba, contains an exposition of “Aristotle’s school”, which is presented as one of the schools predating that of Nisibis. Barḥadbšabba’s treatise also contains multiple ideas deriving from the Neoplatonic commentaries on Aristotle’s writings, which suggests that these commentaries were known to at least some of the educated monks.<sup>143</sup> Additionally, Thomas of Marga’s description of ‘Enanisho’’s dwelling place makes it likely that, by the mid-7th century, the curriculum at Nisibis included introductory classes in philosophy based on collections of divisions-and-definitions similar to those published in the present volume as T1 (“Divisions of Porphyry”) or to the collection that, in two extant manuscripts, is attached to T1 and derives from Sergius’ commentary on the *Categories* (“Divisions of Aristotle”). Although it is possible that ‘Enanisho’ himself was familiar with the sources for T1 (i.e. Sergius’ and Proba’s commentaries),<sup>144</sup> it is apparently the tree diagrams containing the main philosophical categories that he made use of in his own pedagogical activity.<sup>145</sup> Following his brother’s request, ‘Enanisho’ was eager to provide an extensive exposition of the concise divisions-and-definitions inscribed (probably as tree diagrams) on the wall of his cell, thereby transforming the tree diagrams into a full-scale manual on logic.

This example illustrates very well the transformation of the literary forms of philosophical education in the period following the 6th century when the first collections of divisions-and-definitions were composed. While these early collections had been based mainly on the exegetical works of the 6th-century Syriac scholars, the later school manuals used these collections as their main sources. Regarding ‘Enanisho’’s exposition of

<sup>141</sup> For the history of the school of Nisibis and the extant sources pertaining to it, cf. Vööbus 1965, Becker 2006, and Becker 2008.

<sup>142</sup> Ed. Scher 1981. Cf. Becker 2008.

<sup>143</sup> Cf. Becker 2006: 126–154.

<sup>144</sup> It is likely that Barḥadbšabba, who studied at Nisibis half a century earlier than ‘Enanisho’, was familiar with Sergius’ commentary on the *Categories*, cf. Perkams 2019.

<sup>145</sup> Cf. the reference to ‘Enanisho’ in the catalogue of Syriac writers composed in the 13th century by ‘Abdisho’ bar Brikha (Assemanus 1725: 144, cf. Stadel 2024: 149). ‘Abdisho’ ascribes to him a treatise containing an “explanation of the readings”. This means that he was an author of an exegetical work explicating difficult terms (usually of Greek origins) that appear in the Bible and Church Fathers.

the divisions-and-definitions, Thomas writes that it was written “in many verses” (ܟܘܠܗܘܢ ܩܘܒܘܬܝܢ). This expression may simply indicate that the work was voluminous, but it could also mean that it was composed in the form of a metrical treatise (i.e. as a poem), since we encounter the same term in Bar Bahlul’s *Lexicon* in the phrase “in metrical verses” (ܟܘܠܗܘܢ ܩܘܒܘܬܝܢ).<sup>146</sup>

In fact, an exposition of the tree diagrams pertaining to the *Isagoge* (based on T1) and the *Categories* (i.e. deriving from Sergius’ commentary) has come down to us in the form of a metrical poem in multiple manuscripts.<sup>147</sup> In most of them, this work bears the title *Metrical Treatise on Philosophical Divisions* (ܟܘܠܗܘܢ ܩܘܒܘܬܝܢ ܕܩܘܒܘܬܝܢ ܕܩܘܒܘܬܝܢ ܕܩܘܒܘܬܝܢ). Although the manuscripts do not reference any author by name, scholars have sometimes ascribed it to the 12th/13th-century Syriac author, John (Yohānann) Bar Zo’bi,<sup>148</sup> the teacher of Severus Bar Shakko and the author of several grammatical and philosophical treatises, most of which were composed in metrical form. Since it differs in many respects from his other extant works,<sup>149</sup> it is only this formal characteristic that allows to associate the above-mentioned poem with Bar Zo’bi. A comparison of the poem with the tree diagrams in T1 and with those attached to Sergius’ commentary makes it clear that the poem is a late revision of these diagrams. Its differences from T1 may be explained by the author’s desire to give the poem a seven-meter form.

No extant manuscripts provide us with a clear connection between the *Metrical Treatise*<sup>150</sup> and ‘Enanisho’, although it is possible to identify this work as ‘Enanisho’’s letter to his brother (the work indeed opens with an address to someone’s brother) in which he purportedly provided “a clear explanation” of the divisions-and-definitions inscribed on the walls of his cell “in many verses”.<sup>151</sup> Either way, Thomas of Marga’s account offers us important insights into both the popularity of philosophical divisions-and-definitions (similar to those in T1) in the East Syriac schools of the early 7th century and their afterlife in the form of exegetical works. Isaac of Nineveh, one of the most influential East Syriac monastic authors of the late 7th century, apparently also included

146 Cf. Bar Bahlul’s exposition of the term “Homeric” (ܟܘܠܗܘܢ ܩܘܒܘܬܝܢ) as what is written in the form of “metrical verses of Homer” (ܟܘܠܗܘܢ ܩܘܒܘܬܝܢ ܕܩܘܒܘܬܝܢ ܕܩܘܒܘܬܝܢ) (I.616.4–6 Duval).

147 My knowledge of the *status quaestionis* on this collection is based on the materials that I received from Alexander Lamprakis who is preparing a critical edition of it and whom I would like to thank for sharing his work with me. In the draft version of his edition, Lamprakis lists ten manuscripts, the earliest among which are dated to the 15th century.

148 On Bar Zo’bi and his works, see Baumstark 1922: 310–311 and Daiber 1985. Baumstark considered Bar Zo’bi the likely author (“wenigstens mit großer Wahrscheinlichkeit”) of this collection. Daiber was sceptical about this attribution but kept Bar Zo’bi’s name in the reference to this work.

149 Cf. Daiber 1985: 76.

150 In what follows, this poem will be referred to as the anonymous *Metrical Treatise*. Since it serves as an additional witness to T1, it will also appear in the critical apparatus to the text (abbreviated as *Metr.*).

151 In fact, both A. Baumstark and G. Furlani considered ‘Enanisho’ to be the founder of the tradition of divisions-and-definitions in the East Syriac schools. Cf. Baumstark 1900: 218 and Furlani 1922.

some divisions-and-definitions in his writings. We know this from the author of the *Book of Definitions* (composed around the year 900, see on it below) who states that “Mar Ishaq, the sun of the saints” included two definitions of the term “accident” in his (no longer extant) *Book of Providence*.<sup>152</sup>

The dissemination of divisions-and-definitions among West Syriac intellectuals between the 6th<sup>153</sup> and the 9th centuries<sup>154</sup> is documented by the revision of T1 preserved in the 9th-century Syriac ms. Vat. Syr. 158 (ms. V in the present volume).<sup>155</sup> This codex appears to be connected with the curriculum of the monastery of Qenneshre that became a major centre for the study of the Greek language and Greek scholarly literature. Particularly during the period in which Severus Sebokht (d. in 666/667) was the bishop of this monastery, the interest in Aristotle began to increase there.<sup>156</sup> Although Severus did not leave behind any introductory treatises, letters in which he discusses a number of key issues in Aristotelian logic show him to be a masterful teacher.<sup>157</sup>

One of Severus’ pupils, Athanasius of Balad (d. 687), was more interested in writing isagogic materials. He left behind a manual on Aristotelian logic that covers the main topics of the truncated Organon (i.e. from Porphyry’s *Introduction* up to Aristotle’s *Prior Analytics* I.7).<sup>158</sup> This manual contains a few divisions-and-definitions of philosophical terms. However, no direct quotations of it can be identified in the collections published in this volume. Athanasius’ work bears the title ‘*swgwǵ*’, which is a transliteration of the term εἰσαγωγή, “introduction”, and which clearly establishes a connection to Porphyry’s introduction to Aristotle’s logic. Working with the new translation style practiced at Qenneshre, Athanasius carried out a new translation of Porphyry’s *Introduction*, which he most likely only intended to be a revision of the 6th-century Syriac version that brought the latter closer to the original Greek.<sup>159</sup> A collection of scholia to

152 Syriac text: ܩܘܠܘܢ ܕܩܘܪܕܢܐ ܕܩܘܪܕܢܐ ܕܩܘܪܕܢܐ ܕܩܘܪܕܢܐ ܕܩܘܪܕܢܐ ܕܩܘܪܕܢܐ ܕܩܘܪܕܢܐ ܕܩܘܪܕܢܐ ܕܩܘܪܕܢܐ ܕܩܘܪܕܢܐ ܕܩܘܪܕܢܐ ܕܩܘܪܕܢܐ ܕܩܘܪܕܢܐ (Furlani 1900: 28.11–12).

153 One of the earliest references to philosophical definitions relates to the West Syriac scholar and missionary Aḥudemmeḥ of Balad (575). Abdisho’ points out in his catalogue of Syriac authors that Aḥudemmeḥ composed “definitions of all things and a treatise on logic” (ܩܘܠܘܢ ܕܩܘܪܕܢܐ ܕܩܘܪܕܢܐ ܕܩܘܪܕܢܐ ܕܩܘܪܕܢܐ ܕܩܘܪܕܢܐ, cf. Assemanus 1725: 193).

154 In some cases, we are not able to date the Syriac school texts. For example, see a short scholion on Aristotle’s *Categories* preserved in various Syriac codices and published in Furlani 1914: 167–175.

155 On this manuscript, see section 2.1 below. On the Vatican codex as reflecting the curriculum of philosophical education in the monastery of Qenneshre, cf. Tannous 2013.

156 Cf. Reinink 2011 and Arzhanov 2021a: 26–37.

157 Cf. Reinink 1983, Hugonnard-Roche 2015, and Hugonnard-Roche 2017b.

158 Cf. Furlani 1916a and Furlani 1921–1922.

159 For a partial edition, cf. Freimann 1897. The full text of Athanasius’ version was critically edited by the present author in an online edition published in HUNAYNNET (<https://hunaynnet.oeaw.ac.at/isa-goge.html>). For the relation of Athanasius’ text to the earlier 6th-century translation, cf. Brock 1989 and Hugonnard-Roche 1994b.

Porphyry's *Introduction* preserved in ms. Vat. Syr. 158<sup>160</sup> demonstrates that, at least in the school of Qenneshre, Athanasius' version replaced the early anonymous translation. The latter nonetheless remained important for the collections of divisions-and-definitions. The revision of T1 preserved in the same Vatican codex is based on the early translation, even though Athanasius' translation is quoted in the folios just before the "Divisions of Porphyry the Philosopher".

Two of Athanasius' younger contemporaries provide us with further insight into the study of philosophy at Qenneshre. Jacob of Edessa (d. 708) spent several years in Alexandria where he completed his studies of Greek.<sup>161</sup> Although he studied there in the second half of the 7th century (a considerable length of time after the last Alexandrian teachers of philosophy known to us), it is likely that he received some philosophical education. Jacob's large literary heritage includes a new translation of Aristotle's *Categories*, which proved very influential in Syriac schools and has been preserved in multiple manuscripts<sup>162</sup> as well as in the form of lemmata of a short question-and-answer commentary.<sup>163</sup>

Insofar as he also left behind a short treatise that explains various Syriac terms for "nature", Jacob of Edessa turns out to be significant for the history of the divisions-and-definitions genre. The treatise<sup>164</sup> is entitled: "*ḥkyrydyn* (ἐγχειρίδιον) on various necessary subjects concerning *pwsys* (φύσις), i.e. nature, composed by Jacob, the reverend bishop of Edessa".<sup>165</sup> The title by itself discloses Jacob's interest in the philological analysis of the Syriac terms for "nature" in relation to Greek philosophical terminology. His *Encheiridion* ("Handbook") focuses on six terms: nature (*kyana*, corresponding to φύσις), substance (*'usiya* < οὐσία), individual being (*qnoma*, corresponding to ὑπόστασις), essence (*yata*), person (*parṣopa* < πρόσωπον), and species (*'adša* < εἶδος).<sup>166</sup> As is clear from this list, most of these terms either derive from the Greek or may be understood from it. Jacob's explanations of these terms include detailed comparisons between the Greek words and their Syriac equivalents, while also offering numerous philological observations and paying attention to linguistic as well as theological dimensions.

<sup>160</sup> Published under the title *Anonymus Vaticanus* in Baumstark 1900: 36–65 (Syriac pages); 227–257 (German translation).

<sup>161</sup> On Jacob, cf. Hugonnard-Roche 2008.

<sup>162</sup> A partial edition is in Schüler 1897. The full text was published in Georr 1948 on the basis of two Paris mss. For an online critical edition, see HUNAYNNET (<https://hunaynnet.oew.ac.at/categories.html>). On Jacob's version, cf. Hugonnard-Roche 1987.

<sup>163</sup> Ed. Aydin 2019.

<sup>164</sup> Published with an Italian translation on the basis of the only extant ms. in Furlani 1928. Cf. also the translation and analysis of this work in Furlani 1921 and Furlani 1925a.

<sup>165</sup> Syriac: ܡܘܠܝܩܬܐ ܕܡܫܝܚܐ ܕܩܝܢܝܘܨܐ ܕܩܝܢܝܘܨܐ ܕܩܝܢܝܘܨܐ ܕܩܝܢܝܘܨܐ ܕܩܝܢܝܘܨܐ ܕܩܝܢܝܘܨܐ (Furlani 1928: 224.1–3).

<sup>166</sup> For an analysis of Jacob's treatise, see particularly Furlani 1925a, Hugonnard-Roche 2006, and Hainthaler 2010.

The influence of Jacob's *Encheiridion* is particularly apparent in the case of T4, a text which focuses on the same six terms. However, while the collections of definitions published below were likely used for those beginning their philosophical education, Jacob's treatise appears to have been addressed to more advanced students of philosophy, particularly those seeking to apply philosophical vocabulary in polemics. Accordingly, it is more sophisticated than T4. Instead of including elementary explanations and standard formulas, it delves directly into the differences between various interpretations of the listed terms, focusing not just on their philosophical meanings but also on their theological implications. Deriving them in large part from Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, Jacob lists twelve meanings of the term "nature" in his first section, one of which made its way into the school manuals published below (see T3 §2).<sup>167</sup>

Another Qenneshre scholar, George, bishop of the Arabs (d. 724),<sup>168</sup> was even more interested in Aristotle's logical texts than his colleague and friend Jacob.<sup>169</sup> One Syriac manuscript has preserved for us a whole corpus of George's exegetical works. Dated to the 8th/9th centuries, ms. BL Add. 14659 contains actual texts of the *Categories*, *On Interpretation*, and *Prior Analytics* as well as commentaries on them.<sup>170</sup> Interestingly enough, George did not limit his studies of Aristotle's Organon to *An. Pr.* I.7 (as was the case with Proba) but in fact made a translation of the entire *Prior Analytics*. Instead of immediately opening with the text of the *Categories*, the volume begins with a short introduction that outlines the main *prolegomena* issues pertaining to Aristotle's philosophy in general and the study of the *Categories* in particular.<sup>171</sup> George's commentary on the *Categories* mirrors John Philoponus' commentary very closely, a work he probably based his own on.<sup>172</sup> This makes it likely that George was involved in more advanced philosophical education that went beyond the traditional truncated Organon. However, the extant corpus of his letters shows that he also took part in the elementary education

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167 Cf. Furlani 1925a.

168 On George, cf. Furlani 1923 and Tannous 2008.

169 Ms. Birmingham, Mingana Syriac 4 (copied in 1895) has preserved for us a collection of questions and answers that is ascribed to Jacob of Edessa at the beginning but contains one exposition attributed to George, bishop of the Arabs. George's answer (to question 2 of the collection) presents a division of beings that is similar to the Tree of Porphyry, different versions of which we encounter in the collections of divisions-and-definitions published below. On the codex containing the collection, see Mingana 1933: 6–19 and Arzhanov 2019a: 19–20.

170 For a description of the codex, see Wright 1872: 1163–1164. George's versions of the *Categories* and *On Interpretation* were published in Gottheil 1892–1893 and Furlani 1933. The Syriac text of the *Prior Analytics* was published in Furlani 1935 and Furlani 1937. Cf. also Furlani 1939–1940.

171 Edited with an English translation in Watt 2015.

172 Cf. Furlani 1923 and Watt 2015: 149–152.

of the clergy,<sup>173</sup> which must have included introductory classes in philosophy and discussions of the basic logical categories.<sup>174</sup>

The further development of philosophical studies in Syriac schools and the use of divisions-and-definitions in them is reflected in the writings of several 8th-century authors. Ishoʿbokht, the East Syrian metropolitan bishop of Rev Ardashir, left behind a short treatise on Aristotle’s logic.<sup>175</sup> At the beginning, Ishoʿbokht notes that this text addresses many people who kept asking him about various topics in “books of philosophy”. In response to these requests, he first explains the meaning of the term “philosophy”, then outlines a division of philosophy into parts and subparts, and then lists six classical definitions of the term. Following this, Ishoʿbokht presents an exposition of the numbers one through nine and explains Aristotle’s ten categories. He then gives his version of the Tree of Porphyry, discusses the fourfold division (into substance, accident, universal, and particular), and explains what synonyms, homonyms, and paronyms are. The last portion of his treatise pertains more to Christian doctrine, namely the ways of speaking about Mary and Jesus. Ishoʿbokht’s treatise has no clear narrative structure. Rather it is organized as a series of short expositions most of which clearly derive from the divisions-and-definitions found in the collections published in the present volume.

Another 8th-century manual on theology that integrated elements of logical divisions-and-definitions was composed by Theodore Bar Koni under the title *Book of Scholia*.<sup>176</sup> Parts (*memre*) 1–5 of this work focus on the Old Testament, while parts 6–9 consider subjects related to the New Testament. The first sections of part 6 deal with logical issues and are introduced with a question about how many “orders” (*ṭakse* = τάξεις) everything that exists is generally divided into. In his answer to this question, the author turns to the fourfold division presented in Chapter 2 of the *Categories*. The sections that follow deal with other subjects pertaining to the *Categories* and are based to a large extent on Sergius of Reshaina’s commentary on this treatise.<sup>177</sup> Using it as a helpful pedagogical strategy, Bar Koni’s method of presenting particular subjects is close to that of division-and-definition. In many cases, he seems to derive his materials not directly from Sergius’ text but from manuals containing divisions-and-definitions, some of

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173 George describes the elementary literary education in one of his letters. Cf. Arzhanov 2019: 85. It is interesting to note that the same Syriac codex that contains George’s letters (ms. BL Add. 12154) also includes several collections of questions-and-answers and divisions-and-definitions (the latter being a later revision of T1). Cf. Furlani 1918–1919.

174 In his letter to John the Stylite concerning some difficult passages in Jacob of Edessa’s works, George discusses the term “definition” (Gr. ὁροϋ). Cf. Ryssel 1891: 64–67. For the Syriac text, see ms. BL Add. 12154, fols. 273v–274r.

175 This treatise, sometimes referred to as a commentary or scholia on the *Categories*, has been preserved in multiple manuscripts, some of which may now be lost (see Kessel 2019: 399). The extant witnesses include mss. Cambridge, Add. 2812 and Birmingham, Mingana Syriac 547.

176 Ed. Scher 1910–1912, French trans. in Hespel & Draguet 1982 (recension of Seert); Hespel 1983 (recension of Urmia). Cf. Griffith 1982.

177 Cf. Arzhanov 2024: 14.

which are published in the present volume. For instance, when answering the question of how universal substance is divided, Bar Koni presents a taxonomy that corresponds nearly verbatim to the division of substance that appears several times in the texts below.<sup>178</sup> After discussing the properties of accident, he also lists, like Sergius before him, the various ways of saying that one thing is “in” something else and, while doing so, presents the same division that appears in the manuals.<sup>179</sup> The logical portion in Bar Koni’s treatise ends with questions about the meaning of the term *qnoma*, “individual person” or “hypostasis”, in relation to God. Here we see the theological dimension of the Syriac logical compendia, which is particularly evident in Texts 6–7 published below.

The philosophical parts of Bar Koni’s treatise served as one of the main sources for Silwanos of Qardu, who probably belonged to the next generation of East Syriac scholars.<sup>180</sup> Silwanos compiled two collections with excerpts taken from various theological and philosophical texts. Heavily dependent on Part 6 of Bar Koni’s *Book of Scholia*, the second collection also includes materials deriving from other sources that must have belonged to the same tradition of divisions-and-definitions as the texts edited in the present volume did. Accordingly, Silwanos’ explanation in Fragment 1 of the origins of the various philosophical schools’ names is very similar to what we find in T1 §22. Fragment 3 corresponds nearly verbatim to T2 §§2–6 and in all likelihood derives from it. Finally, the first part of Fragment 5 corresponds verbatim to T1 §18, while the rest of the fragment seems to be related to the *Divisiones Aristoteleae* found in T1 §19.

Just as with ‘Enanisho’ in the mid-7th century, it is therefore likely that both Theodore and Silwanos made use of collections of divisions-and-definitions circulating in the East Syriac schools while composing their compendia. The most voluminous collection of this kind has come down to us under the title *Book of Definitions*.<sup>181</sup> In some Syriac manuscripts, this work is ascribed to Michael Badoqa (i.e. “Michael the Scholar”),<sup>182</sup> but this is probably incorrect. Its formation possibly began at the time when the tradition of divisions-and-definitions first started (i.e. late 6th cent.), but it took on its final form around the year 900.<sup>183</sup> Dating to the 10th century, the earliest textual witness to it, ms. BL Add. 14538,<sup>184</sup> introduces this work as “The book of definitions of all things, including

**178** Cf. Scher 1910–1912/II: 8.1–25 and T2 §3.

**179** Cf. Scher 1910–1912/II: 14.7–12 and T2 §23, which in turn derives from Division 1 attached to Book III of Sergius’ commentary on the *Categories* (cf. Arzhanov 2024: 160.17–20).

**180** Ed. in Hespel 1983. Silwanos’ work has been preserved in two rather late manuscripts. See Baumstark 1922: 197; Daiber 2023: 84–85.

**181** Edited, with an Italian translation and a commentary, in Furlani 1926.

**182** Michael Badoqa was a teacher in the famous school of Nisibis whose tenure is dated to the 6th or 7th century. He is credited with a number of exegetical works. Cf. on him Vööbus 1965: 278–279; Hein 1985: 36; Fiano 2011. G. Furlani (1926) referred to him as “Michael the Interpreter”.

**183** Baumstark (1922: 129 n. 2) suggested that the author bearing the same name Michael Badoqa should be dated to around the year 900. Furlani, who published the text in 1926, followed this proposal. Cf. Abramowski 1999.

**184** Cf. Wright 1871: 1004. Furlani (1926: 13) suggests 9th or early 10th centuries.

explanations of them and their divisions that are collected from philosophical books for any lover of learning”.<sup>185</sup> The title makes explicit that the treatise is a collection of excerpts deriving from various philosophical works. Its compiler, who prefaced the treatise with an extensive introduction praising learning, did not see the need to specify his individual sources. However, it is likely that collections of divisions-and-definitions like those published in this volume played a significant role in the formation of this work.

The *Book of Definitions* opens with five definitions of philosophy and its division into two main parts, namely, theory and practice. These first sections have clear parallels with the *prolegomena* to the commentaries on the *Isagoge* and the *Categories*, although — as the collections included in this volume demonstrate — such divisions and definitions could also be transmitted in the form of excerpts in school manuals (see, for instance, T3 §13, containing an excursus into the main *prolegomena* issues).<sup>186</sup> The sections of the *Book of Definitions* that follow make it clear that school manuals containing divisions-and-definitions were one of its main sources. The first term that the author explicates right after the list of definitions of philosophy is “nature” (*kyana*), which he defines as that which “should be separated from accidents”. He therefore understands it to be a synonym for “substance” (the term *'usiya* appears in the following sentences). The background for the author’s understanding of these terms soon becomes apparent, since the subjects that he discusses next are accident, genus, species, property, and differentia — i.e. the “five words” analysed in the *Isagoge* — and each of Aristotle’s ten categories. Most of these terms are presented in the form of divisions that find close parallels in the texts published below. This is particularly the case with T2, which explicates in narrative form the divisions that are found in T1 in the form of tree diagrams.<sup>187</sup>

Coming down to us in multiple manuscripts and in various forms, T2 was apparently known to a 10th-century Syriac scholar, Garshun the Stranger.<sup>188</sup> A collection of philosophical definitions under the title, “The teaching of Garshun the Stranger against the heresies”,<sup>189</sup> has been preserved in the relatively late codex, Jerusalem, Saint Mark’s

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185 Syriac: ܟܬܒܐ ܕܥܘܢܝܢ ܕܩܘܠܘܒܐ ܕܩܘܠܘܒܐ ܕܩܘܠܘܒܐ ܕܩܘܠܘܒܐ ܕܩܘܠܘܒܐ ܕܩܘܠܘܒܐ (ms. BL Add. 14538, fol. 1v).

186 That the *Book of Definitions* is based not on commentaries but on some manuals on logic becomes clear from the fact that it analyzes five definitions of philosophy, while the Alexandrian commentaries traditionally list six. Cf., e.g., David, *Prolegomena* 20.27–31 Busse.

187 This tradition had its afterlife in the Arabic schools. One of the earliest explications of Porphyry’s *Isagoge* in Arabic, composed by Ibn al-Muqaffa’ (d. ca. 756), opens with an excursus on the meaning of the terms “division” and “definition” and suggests a series of divisions that resemble those found in T1 and T2, cf. Ighbariah 2020. Some divisions found in T1 (in the form of tree diagrams) and T2 (in the narrative form) appear in the “History” of the 9th-century Muslim scholar Abu al-’Abbas al-Ya’qubi, cf. Klamroth 1887.

188 Cf. Barsoum 2003: 397 (no. 170). Based on the evidence of Syriac chronicles, Barsoum suggests that Garshun the Stranger was a teacher of philosophy in the monastery in Melitene who died in Constantinople in 1005. For the edition of one of Garshun’s works, see Minov 2024.

189 Syriac: ܟܬܒܐ ܕܩܘܠܘܒܐ ܕܩܘܠܘܒܐ ܕܩܘܠܘܒܐ (ms. SMMJ 321, page 213).

Monastery Syr. 321, copied in 1861.<sup>190</sup> This treatise is structured as a collection of questions-and-answers, a large part of which is focused on logical subjects. A considerable portion of the divisions-and-definitions that he presents in his answers to these questions derives from T2, a testimony to the broad dissemination of this collection in the 10th century. It is also notable that the title of Garshun's treatise contains no reference to philosophy or logic. The text is a polemic against heresies, and this was the primary reason for the study of Aristotelian logic in the author's context.

The reception history of the collections of divisions-and-definitions published below has much to do with their form. Most of them, particularly Texts 1–4, were compiled as a series of short notes on various logical subjects. It is therefore unsurprising that some of these notes found their way into Syriac lexica, which had a special interest in Greek philosophical and scholarly terminology. Ḥunayn b. Ishaq (d. 873) is credited with one such lexicon, which has most likely been lost. Fortunately, we possess the work compiled by Ḥunayn's disciple, Išo' Bar 'Ali.<sup>191</sup> Bar 'Ali's work was used by Ḥasan Bar Bahlul, the 10th-century East Syriac scholar who spent most of his life in Baghdad, while it was one of the vibrant centres of Aristotelian studies. His main scholarly work is the voluminous *Lexicon*,<sup>192</sup> which contains explanations in Syriac and Arabic of Greek philosophical and scientific terms. The entries on the main logical terms ("substance", "accident", "genus", etc.) in most cases find parallels in the collections of divisions-and-definitions. They derive from the works of his predecessors Ḥenanisho' Bar Seroshway and Bar 'Ali who themselves must have made use of earlier sources. Bar Bahlul's monumental work accordingly belongs within the long tradition of the use of logical manuals in Syriac schools that made an impact on the Baghdad Aristotelians.

Other examples of the afterlife of the collections of divisions-and-definitions are found in the exegetical works of the 12th-century West Syriac Maphrian, Dionysius Bar Ṣalibi (d. 1171).<sup>193</sup> These have been preserved in the codex Cambridge Gg. 2.14, which includes Bar Ṣalibi's commentaries on Porphyry's *Isagoge* and on Aristotle's *Categories*, *On Interpretation*, and *Prior Analytics*.<sup>194</sup> Bar Ṣalibi indicates that his primary aim was not to compose an original exegetical work but only to present the earlier Syriac commentaries in the form of a summary. His commentary on the *Isagoge* ends with a large collection of tree diagrams. This collection differs from T1 insofar as it starts with an overview of the main *prolegomena* issues and the division of philosophy. His commentary on Aristotle's *Categories* begins with a collection of divisions-and-definitions focused on the main logical terms, but here they are presented in narrative form instead

<sup>190</sup> The digital copy of this codex is available online: <https://w3id.org/vhmmml/reading-Room/view/135928>.

<sup>191</sup> On Išo' Bar 'Ali, cf. Butts 2009. His lexicon was published in Hoffmann 1874 and Gottheil 1908.

<sup>192</sup> Ed. Duval 1888–1901.

<sup>193</sup> On Bar Ṣalibi and his extant works, see Rabo 2019.

<sup>194</sup> Cf. Wright 1901/2: 1008–1023. The manuscript is dated to the 15th/16th centuries. Bar Ṣalibi's commentaries remain unpublished.

of as tree diagrams. The two collections assembled by Bar Šalibi therefore reflect the two stages in the development of the divisions-and-definitions genre represented by T1 and T2 in the present volume. Accordingly, the 12th-century Syriac scholar offers us insight into an established tradition of the study of Aristotle's logic in the West Syriac schools in which collections of divisions-and-definitions served as integral parts of the introductory courses focused on the *Isagoge* and the *Categories*.

Another late West Syriac author, Jacob (Severus) Bar Shakko (d. 1241), who together with Gregory Bar 'Ebroyo (Bar Hebraeus) belongs to the period of the so-called "Syriac Renaissance", further contributes to our knowledge of the Syriac school tradition.<sup>195</sup> Bar Shakko's extant works consist of two large compendia, the *Book of Treasures* and the *Book of the Dialogues*. The former pertains to theology, while the latter covers non-theological disciplines, including logic.<sup>196</sup> Just like Bar Šalibi, Bar Shakko was interested in copying earlier texts, thereby offering us a rich source of information on the Syriac school system prior to the 13th century. The *Book of the Dialogues* is structured as a series of questions-and-answers (hence the title) and is derived from multiple works which were available to him in the rich library of the Mar Mattai monastery. Bar Shakko apparently was interested in philosophical divisions-and-definitions, as his compendium contains a quotation from Aristotle's *Poetics* that provides a definition of tragedy.<sup>197</sup> This section of the text is, however, not directly based on Aristotle but clearly derives from another, Christian, source. It therefore includes definitions of tragedy apart from Aristotle's (Bar Shakko also quotes the Bible and Church Fathers) as well as a division of tragedy into various types.<sup>198</sup> Following the standard set of *prolegomena* issues, the part on logic opens with a series of general questions about the goal of philosophy, the nature of division, the division of philosophy and the sciences, and so on. Bar Shakko presents them in the form of divisions-and-definitions largely resembling those found in T2 (which is, in turn, based on T1).

In conclusion, the texts published in the present volume witness to a living and evolving school tradition. T2 in particular shows the development of this tradition from its use of diagrams to its use of short manuals outlining the main terms of logic. It also includes a number of paragraphs that derive from an author who is not traditionally associated with Aristotle's logic, namely, Evagrius of Pontus. It seems that these paragraphs were attached at the end of one of the collections of divisions-and-definitions because they contain short and handy divisions, similar to the logical ones. But the appearance of quotations from one of the Church Fathers in a philosophical manual

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<sup>195</sup> On Bar Shakko, cf. Baumstark 1922: 311–312, Teule 2007, and Rassi 2019.

<sup>196</sup> The *Book of the Dialogues* remains largely unpublished, but parts of it have been edited. Partial edition and translation of the logical sections of this treatise are found in Baumstark 1900 (Italian trans. in Furlani 1926–1927). See also Ruska 1896.

<sup>197</sup> Edited with an English translation and a commentary in Arzhanov 2021c.

<sup>198</sup> A similar treatment of the term "comedy", including its division in the form of a tree diagram, is found in the so-called *Tractatus Coislianus*. Cf. Janko 1984.

allows us to see these manuals in a new light, namely, as part of the theological debates of the 6th century in which Aristotle's logic played a significant role.

### 1.3 The Impact of the Christological Debates

The dogmatic formulas of the Council of Chalcedon (451) resulted in the split of the Christian Church into various factions that sought to present themselves not as something new but as the true followers of the earlier generations of Christian teachers. The desire of these factions to demonstrate that they were the main heirs of the Fathers involved them in extensive exegetical work on the texts of certain Church authorities (primarily Cyril of Alexandria and the Cappadocians). This in turn gave birth to florilegia containing quotations of various length from these authorities that were arranged in a particular order and that provided the proofs for a specific theological position.<sup>199</sup>

Syriac Christians, and those belonging to the West Syriac (Syriac Orthodox) Church in particular, were also eager to compose such florilegia.<sup>200</sup> Some appeared already in the 5th century, but they became more common around the beginning of the 6th century. Even though theological topics are the main focus of the patristic florilegia, the Church Fathers' application of philosophical terms such as "substance", "nature", and "hypostasis" to both the Godhead and to Jesus Christ yielded a discussion of philosophical issues.<sup>201</sup> Since most of the terms applied in the theological polemics came from Aristotle's logic, the need for an explanation of the basic logical terminology eventually resulted in the appearance of short manuals that were similar to, and in most cases originally derived from, the manuals in elementary logic known to Syriac intellectuals from the late ancient Greek schools.

One of the earliest examples of the integration of Aristotle's logic into a theological compendium appeared in the first half of the 6th century.<sup>202</sup> Attributed to Theodore of Raithu<sup>203</sup> and traditionally referred to as *Preparatio* (Προπαρασκευή), the text consists of two main parts.<sup>204</sup> In the first part, Theodore offers a catalogue of heretical teachings and then moves on to offer an extensive account of the theology of Severus of Antioch and the place of Aristotle's *Categories* in it. The latter subject sets up the second part of the text in which Theodore, echoing the structure of Porphyry's *Isagoge*, provides a survey of the foundational logical terms ("substance", "accident", "differentia", and

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199 On the florilegia containing quotations from the Church Fathers after Chalcedon, see particularly Schermann 1941 and Grillmeier 1991: 58–89.

200 Cf. Richard 2011.

201 Cf. Roueché 1974, Uthemann 1981, and Hainthaler 2010.

202 Cf. Grillmeier 1991: 94–100. Uthemann 1980: 310 n. 10 lists the examples of Christian collections of philosophical definitions prior to the 6th century.

203 For the problems in dating the *Preparatio*, cf. Klein 2002.

204 Ed. Diekamp 1938.

“hypostasis”).<sup>205</sup> Some of Theodore’s definitions have clear parallels with the Syriac school manuals on logic, for instance, the characteristic of substance as what is “self-subsistent” (αὐθυπόστατον)<sup>206</sup> and the equating of this term with “nature”.<sup>207</sup> The appearance of the name of Severus of Antioch in Theodore’s work is significant, since it provides a clear link between the West Syriac interest in Aristotle’s logic and the Alexandrian philosophical school.

Other collections of definitions of logical terms emerged in the 6th century. Among them is one composed by Ephrem, the patriarch of Antioch (in 527–545), in the form of a letter to the Aramean philosopher Acacius<sup>208</sup> as well as a more lengthy collection entitled *Philosophical Chapters* that is attributed to Anastasius of Antioch (559–598).<sup>209</sup> The latter work enjoyed widespread popularity among Christian authors in the 7th century and became one of the sources for the voluminous compendium, *Doctrina Patrum de Incarnatione Verbi*.<sup>210</sup> Composed in the late 7th to early 8th centuries, the treatises of John of Damascus (655–745) testify to the by then already established tradition of using the main elements of Porphyry’s *Isagoge* and Aristotle’s *Categories* in theological works.<sup>211</sup>

This tradition runs parallel to, and mostly derives from, the practice in the schools of recasting Aristotle’s logic in the form of school manuals and collections of divisions-and-definitions based on the *Isagoge* and the *Categories*, i.e. the two texts that opened the standard philosophical curriculum. The principles of education set out by Ammonius in the late 5th century were further developed by his disciples and successors in Alexandria who produced voluminous isagogic works. The treatises of Olympiodorus, David, and Elias reinforced this tendency in the philosophical education to focus on the introductory issues (*prolegomena philosophiae*). The extant schoolbooks deriving from the last Alexandrian teachers of philosophy known to us, Ps.-Elias and Stephanus, concentrate on the introductory issues and apply diaeresis as their main pedagogical tool.<sup>212</sup> For the next generations of scholars, these introductory treatises became rich sources

205 Cf. Chase 2009–2010.

206 Cf. Theodore of Raithu, *Praeparatio*: οὐκοῦν πᾶν ὅτιπερ αὐθυπόστατόν τε ὑπάρχει καὶ ἐν ἑαυτῷ καὶ μὴ ἐν ἑτέρῳ ἔχει τὸ εἶναι, οὐσία ἐστίν (202.3–5 Diekamp, cf. 201.13–15). For this definition of substance, cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 70.8 Busse.

207 Cf. Theodore of Raithu, *Praeparatio*: ὥστε τὸ αὐτὸ σημαίνει τὸ ὄνομα τῆς οὐσίας καὶ τῆς φύσεως, τὸ μὲν παρὰ τὸ εἶναι, τὸ δὲ παρὰ τὸ πεφυκέναι (202.19–20 Diekamp).

208 Ed. Helmer 1962: 271–272.

209 Ed. Uthemann 1980.

210 Ed. Diekamp 1907. On this work, cf. Grillmeier 1991: 86.

211 John was the author of a manual on Aristotle’s logic entitled *Capita Philosophica*, or *Dialectica*, see Kotter 1969. On this work, cf. Erismann 2011.

212 Cf. Wildberg 1990. On Stephanus who was sometimes identified as Ps.-Elias, cf. Roueché 2012 and Roueché 2016.

of knowledge for fundamental philosophical terms and for later abridgements in the form of collections of philosophical definitions.<sup>213</sup>

Starting with the Syriac disciple of Ammonius, Sergius of Reshaina, Syriac intellectuals established strong ties with the Alexandrian philosophical school.<sup>214</sup> Alexandrian exegetical works, introductory treatises, and collections of definitions based on them became an integral part of Syriac libraries. The need to clarify the main terms of Aristotle's logic, which became particularly urgent in the context of the polemical theological debates, contributed to the popularity of such collections. John Philoponus, another Christian disciple of Ammonius and publisher of the latter's lectures on the *Categories*, also played an important role in the Syriac reception of Aristotelian and Porphyrian logic, which he was eager to apply in his interpretation of central theological ideas.<sup>215</sup> By doing just this, his apologetic treatises provided the Miaphysite community of Alexandria with a systematic critical analysis of Chalcedonian theology from a philosophical perspective. He developed a sophisticated evaluation of the terms that were at the centre of the theological debates at the time, terms such as "substance", "nature", "hypostasis", and "property". A large number of Philoponus' theological works have been preserved in Syriac translation,<sup>216</sup> which testifies to their popularity in Syriac schools.

In the second half of the 6th century, Philoponus became involved in the so-called Tritheistic controversy among the Miaphysite Christians, a controversy which turned out to be particularly effective in bringing about the further integration of Aristotelian logic into Christian polemics.<sup>217</sup> The Patriarch of Antioch, Peter of Callinicum (d. 591), offered one of the most vocal reactions against Tritheism in his polemic against Damian of Alexandria (d. 609). Their controversy resulted in multiple works, one of which was Peter's treatise *Contra Damianum*.<sup>218</sup> A considerable part of this treatise clarifies the same foundational logical terms mentioned above, and the quotations from it formed the core of several West Syriac collections of testimonies composed for polemical purposes.

One such collection, ms. BL Add. 12155,<sup>219</sup> includes a number of excerpts from Sergius of Reshaina's commentary on the *Categories* as well as T4, an anthology of

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213 For an overview, cf. Roueché 1974 and Roueché 1980.

214 Cf. Arzhanov 2024: 3–16.

215 On Philoponus' Christian interpretation of Aristotle's logic, see particularly Lang 2001. Cf. also Edwards 2019: 149–170 and Zachhuber 2020: 145–169.

216 The Syriac texts of most these treatises, including the most systematic work, *Arbiter*, were published in Sanda 1930. For the English translation of the *Arbiter*, see Lang 2001. A Syriac epitome (or a collection of excerpts) of Philoponus' other polemical work, *Tmemata*, has been preserved in the *Chronicle* of Michael the Syrian.

217 On florilegia connected with this controversy, see Grillmeier 1991: 77–79. Cf. Zachhuber 2020: 155–167 and Ebeid 2021.

218 Published in Ebied *et al.* 1994–2003.

219 Cf. Wright 1871: 921–955.

heterogeneous texts entitled *Natural Demonstration*.<sup>220</sup> The term “natural” in this title most likely refers to philosophy in general, indicating for the reader that the arguments will derive from profane wisdom rather than from Church authorities. That the term carries this connotation is suggested by an anecdote included in the same manuscript. The London codex contains several short fragments attributed to famous Greek persons (e.g., Crates the Cynic), one of which is presented as an answer given by the Alexandrian philosopher Olympiodorus to the question of what he thinks of Cyril and Nestorius. Olympiodorus replies that “Cyril (is speaking) in the most Christian and pious way while Nestorius (is speaking) naturally”.<sup>221</sup> The Alexandrian philosopher seems to mean that, while Cyril’s words are divinely inspired, Nestorius’ arguments are products of the limited human mind alone. The point being made here is clear: philosophical categories are welcome in the Christian Church so long as they are subordinated to the “Christian and pious way” of life.

Another Syriac polemical florilegium addressed specifically against the ideas of Trinitheism is found in mss. BL Add. 14532 and 14538.<sup>222</sup> Seeking to respond to false teachers who base their heretical ideas on logic, the compilers of the florilegium stress that the Fathers of the Church were eager to apply Aristotelian philosophy only when the Holy Spirit spoke through them.<sup>223</sup> In contrast, the heretics use Aristotle “in the most natural way”,<sup>224</sup> a claim which echoes the description of Nestorius given by the non-Christian (and hence impartial) philosopher Olympiodorus.

By way of summary, two closely intertwined historical and cultural processes in the 6th century led to the emergence of the Syriac school manuals in which we find divisions-and-definitions of the main terms of Aristotle’s logic. On the one hand, these manuals are products of the developing Alexandrian educational model that, between the late 5th and mid-6th centuries, shifted more and more towards a formalization of introductory education in philosophy. This formalization involved an initial transition from using commentaries to using *prolegomena* treatises and a subsequent transition to the use of collections of divisions-and-definitions. Having himself witnessed the beginning of this shift in Ammonius’ school in the late 5th century, Sergius of Reshaina planted this educational model on Syrian soil with his monumental commentary on the *Categories*. The work deeply shaped Syriac Aristotelian studies in the following centuries and became one of the main sources for later school manuals on logic. Proba’s commentary on the *Isagoge* was another important school text that was also directly dependent upon the Alexandrian commentary tradition. However, it makes use of the

220 Cf. Arzhanov 2024: 46–50.

221 The text of this piece was published in Arzhanov 2019: 188.

222 For a detailed description of this florilegium, see Furlani 1924, cf. Ebeid 2021.

223 Syriac: ܘܡܫܘܚܐ ܕܘܫܘܚܐ ܕܘܫܘܚܐ ܕܘܫܘܚܐ ܕܘܫܘܚܐ ܕܘܫܘܚܐ — “When the Holy Spirit spoke through the Holy Fathers, they adhered it to Aristotle”. Cf. Furlani 1924: 662.

224 Syriac: ܘܫܘܚܐ ܕܘܫܘܚܐ ܕܘܫܘܚܐ ܕܘܫܘܚܐ ܕܘܫܘܚܐ.

method of diaeresis to a much greater extent than does Sergius' commentary and because of this became a fruitful source for later manuals.

The second major cultural process was the Christianization of philosophical education and the adaptation of Aristotle's logic for the purposes of intra-Christian polemics. By the 6th century, the main dogmatic formulas coined at the Ecumenical Councils all deployed philosophical terms associated with the *Categories* and the *Isagoge*. The study of the latter texts therefore became an integral part of theological education. As indicated above, the Tritheistic controversy within the Miaphysite Christian community was particularly effective in stimulating further interest in logic. The controversy focused primarily on the clarification of philosophical terminology already being used by theologians, and the eventual result was the appearance of collections of definitions.

The school manuals are a result of the convergence of these processes in the late 6th century. From this period on, the study of philosophy in the Christian schools of Byzantium and in the territories to the East of Byzantium was based mainly upon manuals. The texts published in the present volume and outlined in more detail below are therefore important witnesses to the transformation of philosophical education from the late ancient models to medieval scholasticism.

## 2 The Texts

### 2.1 “Divisions of Porphyry” (T1)

Text 1 is a collection of tree diagrams that has come down to us in two different versions in three manuscripts:

Version 1:    B   Berlin, Sachau Syriac 116<sup>1</sup>  
                  M   Birmingham, Mingana Syriac 84<sup>2</sup>  
Version 2:    V   Vatican, Syriac 158<sup>3</sup>

In ms. V, T1 appears as part of a heterogeneous anthology of tree diagrams in which materials pertaining to the *Isagoge* are combined with other logical divisions. Mss. B and M, in contrast, contain the more original form of this collection that is limited to the subject matters of the *Isagoge* and derives from two sources: the anonymous 6th-century Syriac translation of Porphyry’s text and Proba’s commentary on it. Following the “Divisions of Porphyry”, mss. B and M both include another collection that derives from Sergius’ commentary on the *Categories* and contains all tree diagrams that we find in the extant witnesses to Sergius’ treatise in the form of attachments to its individual books.<sup>4</sup> Ms. B also contains a fragment of a didactic poem on man as microcosm.<sup>5</sup> The folios are in disorder, and it is likely that the Berlin codex in its present form does not represent the original collection of philosophical texts, which must have been much more voluminous. In addition to the two collections of tree diagrams, ms. M. contains several treatises of John Bar Zo’bi.<sup>6</sup>

Overall, the contents of mss. B and M are rather different, but the two collections of diagrams at the beginning of both codices clearly trace back to the same source. In spite

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1 Cf. Sachau 1899/1: 338–339 [catalogue no. 90]. Sachau tentatively dated it to the 17th century, probably based on the assessment of Gottheil 1888. The latter was the first to describe the contents of this codex and noted that “the ms. is written in a good bold Nestorian hand of about the seventeenth century”.

2 Cf. Mingana 1933: 208–210. The manuscript is dated to the year 1790.

3 Cf. Assemanus & Assemanus 1759: 304–307. The colour images supplemented by a description of this codex are accessible online: [https://digi.vatlib.it/view/MSS\\_Vat.sir.158](https://digi.vatlib.it/view/MSS_Vat.sir.158). The manuscript is dated to the 9th century.

4 This collection is not included in this book, since all its diagrams are present as attachments to the individual books of Sergius’ treatise in Arzhanov 2024. For the diagrams in the tree form, see also the appendix to the latter book.

5 The fragment was published in Gottheil 1888. The full text of this poem was edited in Gignoux 1999 as a work of the 13th-century East Syriac author Giwargis Warda (Gottheil’s fragment starts at line 361 of Gignoux’s edition). This attribution has been put into question, cf. Reinink 2007. Reinink demonstrated that the poem is dependent on the 6th-century work of Michael Badoqa.

6 Bar Zo’bi was sometimes credited with a composition of the *Metrical Treatise on the Parts of Philosophy*, which turns out to be a revised version of T1. See above (1.2.3) on the possible role of ‘Enanisho’ in the emergence of this text. For the *Metrical Treatise*, see below.

of the minor differences between the two manuscripts that indicate their independent origin, they represent the same version of the collection, containing similarities both in content and in form of T1 which in both codices is reproduced nearly identically in terms of layout.

The main errors shared by B and M are the following:

- 82.1 ܠܥܠܘܫ scr.: ܠܥܠܘܫ BM
- 82.14 ܥܡܘܘܩ V: ܥܡܘܩ BM
- 84.11 ܠܥܦܘܩ V: ܠܥܦܘܩ BM
- 84.18 ܠܥܦܘܩ V: ܠܥܦܘܩ BM
- 88.4 ܝܫܘܥܝܩ V: ܝܫܘܥܝܩ BM
- 90.7 + ܠܥܦܘܩ BM
- 92.13 ܠܥܦܘܩ V: ܠܥܦܘܩ BM
- 96.12 ܠܥܦܘܩ V: ܠܥܦܘܩ BM
- 104.5 ܠܥܦܘܩ V: ܠܥܦܘܩ ܐܪ BM

Specific errors in B which are not shared by M include:

- 82.6 ܡܠܘܫܘܩ MV: ܡܠܘܫܘܩ B
- 82.13 ܡܠܘܫܘܩ MV: ܡܠܘܫܘܩ B
- 86.1 ܫܠܠܘܫܘܩ MV: ܫܠܠܘܫܘܩ B
- 86.12 ܡܠܘܫܘܩ MV: ܡܠܘܫܘܩ B
- 88.8 ܠܥܦܘܩܩ MV: ܠܥܦܘܩܩ B
- 94.3 ܠܥܦܘܩܩܩ V: ܠܥܦܘܩܩܩ M: ܠܥܦܘܩܩܩ B
- 98.2 ܝܫܘܥܝܩ MV: ܝܫܘܥܝܩ B
- 102.13 ܠܥܦܘܩ MV: ܠܥܦܘܩ B
- 106.2 ܠܥܦܘܩ MV: ܠܥܦܘܩ B

Specific errors in M not shared by B include:

- 86.3 ܠܥܦܘܩ BV: ܠܥܦܘܩ M
- 86.10 ܠܥܦܘܩܩ BV: ܠܥܦܘܩܩ M
- 86.11 ܠܥܦܘܩ BV: ܠܥܦܘܩ M
- 90.13 ܠܥܦܘܩܩܩ V: + ܠܥܦܘܩܩܩܩ ܠܥܦܘܩܩܩ M (cf. *Metr.*)
- 102.1 ܠܥܦܘܩ BV: ܠܥܦܘܩ M

The lists above indicate that, although deriving from the same prototype, M and B were produced independently from one another. The title of the collection in B and M makes explicit where the tree diagrams originate from: “Divisions of the Book *Isagoge* of Porphyry, Philosopher and Teacher, and Various Definitions that are Found at the End of the Chapters of the Book *Isagoge*”.<sup>7</sup> The “chapters” mentioned here refer both to Porphyry’s text and to Proba’s commentary on it. While no Syriac codices have been preserved that contain the *Isagoge* with the tree diagrams attached to the individual

<sup>7</sup> Cf. the edition below.

sections, this practice of including the diagrams is well-documented in the extant manuscripts of Proba's commentary. Both the sequence of the divisions and, in most cases, their titles correspond to what we find in Proba's commentary. There also remains no doubt that the tree diagrams were originally attached to the individual chapters of Porphyry's and Proba's texts and later separated from them in the form of the collection preserved in mss. B and M. As noted above, another collection immediately following the "Divisions of Porphyry" in both codices pertains to the *Categories* and is based on Sergius' commentary on this treatise. *Isag.*, Proba's *In Isag.*, and Sergius' *In Cat.* therefore turn out to be the three main sources of the two collections of the tree diagrams in mss. B and M.

The third textual witness for T1 is ms. V. This 9th-century codex is a remarkable anthology of philosophical texts, including Athanasius of Balad's version of the *Isagoge* and Jacob's translation of the *Categories*.<sup>8</sup> Originally belonging to the library of the famous Egyptian monastery Dayr al-Suryan, in the 17th century this codex made its way to the Vatican library. Here it was copied several times.<sup>9</sup> The extant copies include: Florence, Bibliotheca Medicea Laurenziana, Or. 209 (1585) and Or. 174 (1592); Vatican, Syriac 36 (late 16th cent.); Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, Syriac 248 (1637); and Madrid, Escorial, ar. 655 (17th cent.). Despite being direct copies (*apographa*) of ms. Vat. Syr. 158, these manuscripts nonetheless remain valuable for modern scholars insofar as they were produced (sometimes by highly qualified scribes, one of whom was Moses of Mardin<sup>10</sup>) before the Vatican codex was rebound and lost some of its folios.<sup>11</sup>

The collection preserved in the Vatican manuscript and its direct copies differs in many respects from the one in mss. B and M.<sup>12</sup> Although it shares a similar title, "The Divisions of the *Isagoge* of Porphyry the Philosopher",<sup>13</sup> it includes divisions pertaining not only to Porphyry's work but also to Aristotle's treatises *Categories*, *On Interpretation*, and *Prior Analytics*. In addition, a large number of diagrams in the Vatican ms. originate from Sergius' commentary on the *Categories*. The two collections which appear separately in B and M are therefore combined in V. Similar to the version preserved in B and M, the titles of most of the tree diagrams in V deriving from Sergius'

<sup>8</sup> For the connection between this codex and the Qenneshre school, cf. above, 1.2.3.

<sup>9</sup> Cf. Kessel 2019: 390–391.

<sup>10</sup> Cf. Borbone 2017: 91.

<sup>11</sup> For instance, the folio that now appears as no. 17 in the Vatican manuscript but which was incorrectly inserted there (as the extant Syriac numbers of the divisions make clear), corresponding to fol. 11 in the Escorial ms. This gives us reason to assume that it was originally bound between fols. 25 and 26 in the Vatican codex.

<sup>12</sup> The collection was described in Hugonnard-Roche 1994a who used one of the apographa of the Vatican codex, ms. Escorial ar. 655, as the basis for his study.

<sup>13</sup> Cf. the title of T1 below.

commentary provide clear references to the book and diagram number that they originally had in the latter, thereby indicating their original source.<sup>14</sup>

Other sources of the Vatican collection — not all of which can be determined with certainty<sup>15</sup> — include Proba's commentary on the *On Interpretation*<sup>16</sup> and Paul the Persian's commentary on the same treatise.<sup>17</sup> The Vatican manuscript thereby testifies to the expansion of T1 to include materials comprising the Organon in the truncated form that was characteristic of the Syriac educational system in the 7th–8th centuries. Mss. B and M, on the contrary, have preserved for us the original version of T1. Limited to the texts of the 6th century when this tradition first emerged, T1 originally appeared as a separate collection of tree diagrams pertaining to the *Isagoge* (based on *Isag.* and Proba's commentary) and was followed by another collection pertaining to the *Categories* (based on Sergius' commentary).

That mss. B and M have preserved for us a more original version of these two collections is confirmed by a later source, which appears to be a revision of both the “Divisions of Porphyry” and the collections deriving from Sergius' *In Cat.* The anonymous *Metrical Treatise of Philosophical Divisions* mentioned above corresponds in general to the structure of the collection preserved in mss. B and M. However, it does not include Divisions 1–10 of T1, which are based on Porphyry's text proper. It starts with Division 11, after which point it mostly follows the order of elements in T1. We may assume that the compiler of the *Metrical Treatise* found the first divisions redundant, since most of

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**14** Div. 19 in the Vatican ms. = Division 3 of Book II in Sergius' commentary (162.1–3 Arzhanov). Div. 20 in V is related to Division 4 of Book II in Sergius (162.4–8), although there are minor differences between the two versions. For Div. 31 in V, cf. the graphics in Book III in Sergius (170.1–4). Div. 40 in V = Div. 1 attached to Book VI in Sergius (404.3–7). Div. 41 in V corresponds nearly verbatim (with some minor differences) to Div. 2 attached to Book VI of Sergius' commentary (404.8–13). Div. 42 in V is based on Book VI of Sergius, omitting, however, one kind of motion (alteration), cf. Sergius, *In Cat.* §409 (408.11–17). Div. 43 in V = Div. 2 attached to Book III in Sergius (258.1–9). For Div. 44 in V, cf. Sergius, *In Cat.* §§447–448 (436–439). A separate diagram is not transmitted in the extant manuscripts containing Sergius' commentary, but it appears as part of the division of motion in mss. B (f. 19r) and M (f. 18v). Div. 50 in V = Division 1 attached to Book III in Sergius (256.9–21).

**15** Division 46 in the Vatican codex treats the category of having. Cf. chapter 15 of the *Categories* (15b17–32). Like Ammonius' commentary, Sergius of Reshaina skipped this chapter in his treatise, but a short explication of it is found in the last part of the commentary by Dionysios Bar Šalibi preserved in ms. Cambridge Gg 2.14. The terminology characteristic of Bar Šalibi's treatise is nearly identical with that found in the division preserved in ms. V, and it is likely that the latter was based on Bar Šalibi's source. Cf. Division 21 in the *Metrical Treatise*, which differs from the version in ms. V but which also specifies that the types of “having” are seven.

**16** For Division 17 in the Vatican collection, cf. Hoffmann 1869: 66–67, particularly the graphics on p. 67. For Division 18, cf. the diagram in Hoffmann 1869: 88.

**17** Division 49 in the Vatican collection is based on this source (cf. Hugonnard-Roche 2013: 60.1–17). The version in ms. V differs in many aspects from the one preserved in Paul's commentary. The table is ordered differently, and in general it contains multiple errors, which suggests that the scribe did not completely understand the context of these graphics.

them appear later in the text again. The order of T1 is maintained in the *Metrical Treatise* until Division 27, which focuses on substance. This apparently served as an impetus for the compiler of the *Metrical Treatise* to turn to the ten Aristotelian categories, of which substance is considered the primary one. The rest of the *Metrical Treatise* follows the second collection, “Divisions of Aristotle”, derived from Sergius’ commentary on the *Categories*.

In light of this evidence, the edition of T1 below generally follows the structure of the collection of “Divisions of Porphyry” in mss. B and M. The Vatican codex is used as an additional textual witness for those divisions found in both collections (i.e. in B and M on the one hand and V on the other). All other tree diagrams present only in the Vatican codex are excluded.

Based upon the structure of the collection in B and M (corroborated by the *Metrical Treatise*), T1 may be divided into three main parts:

- (1) diagrams 1–10 deriving from the *Isagoge*;
- (2) diagrams 11–22 presenting *prolegomena* issues;
- (3) diagrams 23–39 deriving from Proba’s commentary on the *Isagoge*.

The diagrams in the first group are based on the early anonymous Syriac translation of the *Isagoge* and were most likely originally attached to it. Although no extant Syriac manuscripts include the early Syriac version of the *Isagoge* with the attached tree diagrams, ms. V witnesses to this tradition. This codex contains Athanasius of Balad’s version of Porphyry’s work. In the margins of this text we also find multiple notes that refer to the central terms of the *Isagoge* and that offer divisions and definitions of them.<sup>18</sup> The presence of Athanasius’ version in the Vatican codex makes the link between T1 and the anonymous 6th-century translation particularly striking, since one would expect the compilers of this codex to use Athanasius’ text as the main source of the *Isagoge* for T1. However, the influence of the latter in T1 is minimal. In Divisions 5 and 6 of T1, where two definitions of the term “differentia” are presented, the Vatican codex systematically applies the Syriac word *šuhlapa*. This reflects Athanasius’ rendering of the Greek διαφορά. In the version preserved in B and M, the latter term is translated as *puršana*. This corresponds to the 6th-century translation and was apparently in the original version of T1 that was slightly adapted in the Vatican codex to Athanasius’ version. This adaptation is, however, the only example of the influence of Athanasius’ text on T1, whose primary source otherwise remains the anonymous translation.

While diagrams 23–39 in T1 clearly derive from Proba’s commentary, the same may not be stated with certainty for the second group of diagrams, comprising nos. 11–22. Since the introductory part of Proba’s work has not survived, we are unable to compare the tree diagrams preserved in T1 with those attached to Proba’s text. There are,

<sup>18</sup> Cf. e.g., the marginal note on fol. 2v connected with the subtitle “On Species”. It suggests a division of this term that is nearly identical with T1 §3.

however, a number of witnesses that support the assumption that the source of group (2) in T1 was the same as that of group (3). No. 11 of T1 starts a new block of diagrams that present the traditional division of philosophy into theory and practice, the subject which opens the first introductory part of Sergius' commentary on the *Categories*.<sup>19</sup> The diagrams that follow also pertain to the traditional subject matters discussed in the Alexandrian *prolegomena* treatises and clearly derive from an introductory part of some Syriac commentary. Since it is precisely this part of Proba's *In Isag.* that is now missing and since Proba's other exegetical works are clearly based on the Alexandrian commentary tradition and start with the *prolegomena* part, we have good reason to assume that it opened his *In Isag.* too and that the preserved diagrams in T1 were originally attached to it. The evidence for this assumption comes from two sources: the *Metrical Treatise* and Bar Shakko's *Book of the Dialogues*.<sup>20</sup>

As noted above, the *Metrical Treatise* starts with Division 11 of T1 and follows the latter text very closely in some portions, although there is a clear tendency to reshape the text in order to make it fit the meter. While one has always to keep in mind the literary form of this treatise, it still testifies to the original text on whose basis it was created. The *Metrical Treatise* has been preserved in multiple manuscripts whose relations to each other have not yet been established. In one of the oldest manuscripts, Mardin Chaldean Cathedral 20 (CCM 20), dated to the 15th century,<sup>21</sup> the treatise is divided into small portions that in general correspond to the divisions found in T1. For the sake of simplicity, the references to the *Metrical Treatise* in my commentary on the edition of T1 will be based on the numbering in the Mardin codex.<sup>22</sup> The *Metrical Treatise* starts with a unit corresponding to §11 in T1<sup>23</sup> and tracks the structure of T1 until diagram 28, after which follows a block of definitions of Aristotle's ten categories. The author of the *Metrical Treatise* (who might have been 'Enanisho', cf. above, 1.2.3) therefore saw in T1 a clear connection between group (2) of the diagrams and the substantial part of group (3) that undoubtedly derives from Proba's commentary. He treats both groups as if they had one source.

Finally, a considerable number of diagrams in group (2) of T1 find close parallels in Bar Shakko's *Book of the Dialogues*. The exact nature of the relation between the two

19 Cf. Sergius, *In Cat.* §§8–20 (70–81 Arzhanov).

20 Cf. on these two texts above, 1.2.3.

21 Images of this codex are available online (<https://w3id.org/vhmdl/readingRoom/view/132222>), containing also its detailed description.

22 The numbers which appear in the Mardin codex in the form of letters are not always consistent. No. 11 (↪) has been moved one sentence earlier than where it should be. One number is skipped, and no. 16 in reality includes two different divisions, which I refer to as nos. 16a and 16b. Nos. 27 and 30 also include several divisions.

23 It is interesting to note that the explicative additions in Division 11 that are found in ms. M are integrated into the corresponding portion of the *Metrical Treatise*, which suggests that the latter is based on the version of T1 preserved in mss. B and M rather than on the version of V.

texts cannot be determined with certainty, since only a small portion of Book II of Bar Shakko's treatise dealing with logic (*memra* 1) and philosophy (*memra* 2) has been published thus far.<sup>24</sup> Still, even the published portions show multiple parallels with the diagrams included in T1. Divisions 11, 12, 14, 15, and 22 of T1 appear in nearly the same form in Bar Shakko's treatise, with some of them found in both narrative form and the shape of tree diagrams.<sup>25</sup> Given that the corresponding parts of Bar Shakko's treatise have not been published, we cannot establish further parallels between the two texts. Nonetheless, the data collected thus far support the provisional assumption that Bar Shakko was familiar with a no longer extant Syriac commentary and that the latter served as the source for the tree diagrams which form the central group of items of T1 (nos. 11–22). Since T1 first appears in the 6th century and since the remaining part of the divisions included in it derive from Proba's commentary on the *Isagoge*, it is likely that nos. 11–22 also derive from the lost introductory part of the same commentary. The possibility that these divisions trace back to another unknown 6th-century source can, however, not be ruled out categorically.

## 2.2 “On the Division of Substance” (T2)

As with Text 1, Text 2 has come down to us in numerous manuscripts, all of which contain different versions of it. On the one hand, this testifies to the popularity of this collection whose original title was probably the one found in ms. L, i.e. “On the Division of Substance”. On the other hand, the preserved witnesses indicate that, even though it retained its authority as a practical introduction to logic for a long period of time, T2 was never considered a fixed text. Its loose structure meant that parts of T2 could be transmitted separately and included in other works. For instance, several of its paragraphs appear in the collection of excerpts attributed to Silwanos of Qardu and attached to Theodore Bar Koni's *Book of Scholia*.<sup>26</sup>

The direct textual witnesses for T2 include one author and four manuscripts, which in the edition below have the following sigla:

C            Dayr al-Suryan 28, Part B (8th cent.);<sup>27</sup>

<sup>24</sup> Cf. Baumstark 1900 and Furlani 1926–1927.

<sup>25</sup> For a comparison between T1 §22 and Bar Shakko's text, cf. Furlani 1916b: 147. Furlani quotes Bar Shakko's text on pp. 148–150, including a tree diagram on p. 150 which bears a striking similarity to that of T1.

<sup>26</sup> Furthermore, longer or shorter excerpts from T2 appear in the anonymous Syriac collection of philosophical riddles (ed. Furlani 1918–1919) and in the work attributed to Garshun the Stranger. Cf. above, 1.2.1 and 1.2.3.

<sup>27</sup> For a description of this codex, which contains remains of different manuscripts, cf. Brock & Van Rompay 2014: 178–211.

D	Dayr al-Suryan 27, Part B (9th/10th cent.); <sup>28</sup>
E	London, British Library, Additional 12155 (8th cent.); <sup>29</sup>
L	London, British Library, Additional 14658 (7th cent.); <sup>30</sup>
Silw.	Silwanos of Qardu, collection of philosophical fragments. <sup>31</sup>

The treatise appears in most mss. as a part of larger collections. In ms. L, it belongs to the corpus of writings that reflect the idea of late ancient general education (*enkyklios paideia*), which started with the introductory treatises in logic.<sup>32</sup> In ms. E, several fragments from T2 serve as part of an overview of the main logical notions used for training in polemic.<sup>33</sup> T2 appears in manuscripts C and D as one of the chapters of the theological and logical compendia, which is also the case with Silwanos who included several paragraphs from T2 in his manual on logic. The textual witnesses to this text therefore provide us insight into its use in the schools as well as explain the fluid form of its transmission. It is clear that T2 had a basic open-ended structure (what might be called in German “Schachtelprinzip”) that could be freely adjusted in terms of both the form of the whole collection and the form of particular paragraphs. Characteristic of school manuals and handbooks in general,<sup>34</sup> the fluid form of T2’s transmission is mostly a function of its loose structure. It combined short textual units, each of which could be either ordered differently, omitted, or supplemented with new elements.

Although occasionally omitting or adding certain elements, the textual witnesses for T2 generally maintain the same sequence of paragraphs. It is therefore possible to combine them with relative ease. The largest collections are those preserved in mss. L and C, and we can insert the paragraphs in C that are missing in L between the paragraphs of L or add them afterwards. Containing only four pieces, the shortest collection is found in ms. E. Two of its four pieces correspond to the two first paragraphs of L. Accordingly, the additional elements of E may be placed at the beginning of the collection. This ordering is further supported by Silwanos’s collection, which quotes five pieces as a continuous text that form Fragment 3 of his appendix to Bar Koni’s work. In order to maintain the references to the edition of Silwanos’s work, while differentiating the individual paragraphs, I introduce the additional divisions by means of small Latin letters in the parenthesis. The order of the pieces that is thereby reconstructed from

<sup>28</sup> Like ms. DS 28, this codex includes parts with heterogeneous origins. Cf. Brock & Van Rompay 2014: 159–177. For Part B, cf. Arzhanov 2021a: 5–10.

<sup>29</sup> For a description of this codex, cf. Wright 1871: 921–955.

<sup>30</sup> Cf. Wright 1872: 1154–1160. Cf. Hugonnard-Roche 2007.

<sup>31</sup> Ed. in Hespel 1983.

<sup>32</sup> Cf. Arzhanov 2019: 190–193.

<sup>33</sup> Cf. Arzhanov 2024: 46–50.

<sup>34</sup> On the textual transmission of lexica, collections of technical terms, and other school texts, cf. West 1973: 16–17; Reynolds & Wilson 2013: 235–236.

mss. L, C, E, and from Silw., is, however, not fully supported by ms. D. Some paragraphs are misplaced in the latter, while the rest follows the sequence of other mss.

Based on this evidence, the edition of T2 in the present volume reflects primarily the structure that it has in ms. L, the oldest witness to the collection. It also expands it by adding the additional elements from the three other manuscripts and from Silwanos. The final structure of the present edition is therefore the following:

ED.	L	C	E	D	Silw.
1			1		
2			2		3 (a)
3	1		3	5	3 (b)
4	2		4	6	3 (c)
5	3			7	3 (d)
6	4			8	3 (e)
7	5			1	
8	6			2	
9	7			9	
10	8			10	
11	9			11	
12	10				
13	11				
14	12				
15	13				
16		1			
17		2			
18	14	3			
19	15	4			
20	16	5		3	
21	17	6			
22		7			
23	18	8			
24	19	9			
25		10			

ED.	L	C	E	D	Silw.
26	20	11			
27	21	12			
28		13			
29		14			
30		15			
31		16			
32	22	17		4	
33	23				
34	24				
35	25				
36	26				
37	27				
38	28				
39		18			
40		19			
41		20			
42		21			

T2 is connected with T1 in many ways and represents a further development of the same scholastic tradition. It integrates elements of T1 as well as its three main source texts, namely, Porphyry's *Isagoge*, Sergius' *In Cat.*, and Proba's *In Isag.* Like T1, T2 primarily concentrates on questions pertaining to the study of the *Isagoge* and the *Categories* as well as on *prolegomena* issues discussed in the commentaries on these texts. T2's opening paragraphs (§§1–6) focus on the idea of division and its relation to the process of defining the essence of particular entities, topics discussed extensively in Elias' and David's *Prolegomena* to the study of philosophy and logic by.<sup>35</sup> In ms. L, §7 bears the subtitle that lists the five main terms of the *Isagoge*: "Genus, species, differentia, accident, and property".<sup>36</sup> This points clearly to Porphyry's work as one of T2's central sources, and the various divisions of substance found in the paragraphs that follow §7 are based

<sup>35</sup> Cf. Elias, *Prolegomena*, lectures 2–3 and 10 (3.1–4.32; 25.24–26.5 Busse); David, *Prolegomena*, lectures 5–6 and 18 (11.16–20.23; 55.6–16 Busse).

<sup>36</sup> This subtitle has a strange form in ms. D: "Substance is divided into genus, species, differentia, accident, and property". It seems to be a result of some transmission error.

mainly on the “Porphyrian Tree”. The actual text of the *Isagoge* is quoted only a few times (cf. §17), and, as with T1, the quotations correspond to the anonymous 6th-century version and not to Athanasius’ translation.

Sergius’ commentary on the *Categories*, which is not in the version of T1 published in the present volume but which is the source of the second collection of tree diagrams in mss. B and M, plays a significant role in T2. Here we encounter not only tree diagrams based on Sergius’ text but also excerpts from it that appear either in the form of verbatim quotations (cf., e.g., §§8, 9, 16, 17) or as summaries of it (cf. §§3, 5, 13, 14). These examples highlight the role that Sergius’ treatise continued to play in Syriac schools in the centuries following its composition. The primary reason for this is the nature of the text itself. As briefly outlined above, Sergius’ commentary was particularly suitable for being divided into small fragments containing definitions of logical terms, and these fragments constitute a considerable portion of T2. Apart from them, we encounter passages that trace back not to Sergius’ text itself but to the tree diagrams that were later attached to it and that constitute the second collection of divisions in mss. B and M (i.e. those attached to the “Divisions of Porphyry” and that are mixed with the latter in ms. V). For instance, we see that the main part of T2 §19 presents a narrative account of Division 5 of Book III in Sergius, that §21 is based on Division 1 of Book I, and that §23 is a nearly verbatim quotation of Division 1 of Book III. These examples and more show that both the main text and the tree diagrams attached to it served as sources for the type of school manuals in logic represented (in varying form) by T2. In addition, they also witness to the evolving tradition of the use of exegetical works pertaining to Aristotle’s logic in the schools, i.e. to the gradual transition from commentaries (such as Sergius’ and Proba’s works) to collections of divisions-and-definitions in the form of tree diagrams (T1) and short fragments (T2).

Some paragraphs of T2 show us the theological context of the study of logic in Syriac schools in the 6th–7th centuries. In §§10–11, for instance, the exposition of the Porphyrian Tree engages the question of how certain logical terms may be applied to the Trinity and Jesus Christ. In §10, we read:

There is the unity of a generic name which signifies the unity of a nature of different individuals — for instance, the names “God”, “man”, “animal”, and so on. And there is the unity of a specific name which signifies the unity of an individual (combining) different natures — for instance, “man” (refers) to soul and body, and “Christ” to divinity and humanity.

This comparison between the union of soul and body in human beings and the union of the divine and human natures in Jesus Christ is used in arguments characteristic of the Christological debates of the 6th century. While its origins may be traced to the third century, it becomes particularly important in the context of the Miaphysite critique of the formula of Chalcedon.<sup>37</sup> We find it in the treatises of Severus of Antioch, and John

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<sup>37</sup> Cf. Lang 2001: 101–157.

Philoponus applies it systematically in a key argument that he uses to explain the Miaphysite account of the two natures combined in the one individual/hypostasis of Jesus Christ.<sup>38</sup> While this analogy served clear polemical purposes in the Christological debates of the 6th century, it is presented in a neutral manner in the text quoted above. The compiler of T2 apparently takes it to be common knowledge rather than a polemical thesis. T2 therefore demonstrates how the application of logical terminology in theology that was pioneered by Severus and Philoponus eventually became a standard school practice. It is interesting to note that, in the version found in the 8th-century ms. C (and in the edition below), T2 ends with a short excerpt from one of Severus' letters treating the characteristics of the human soul. This indicates that Severus' letters were indeed one of the sources of inspiration for the collections of divisions-and-definitions.

Another author who turns out to be an important source for these collections is Evagrius of Pontus.<sup>39</sup> Evagrius composed his ascetic writings mostly in the form of collections of short admonitions that were easy to memorize, a characteristic that made them a particularly convenient source for the short definitions which made their way into manuals in logic such as T2. The first set of quotations from Evagrius' writings appears in T2 §32. This set is present in three manuscripts, suggesting that the integration of Evagrius' materials was not occasional. These quotations derive from Evagrius' *Letter to Melania*, which presents a particularly informative summary of his philosophical views.<sup>40</sup> The fragments that follow (preserved in ms. L only) are excerpted from his *Kephalaia Gnostica* (the unabridged version).<sup>41</sup> This is made explicit by the Syriac letters that reference the book and paragraph numbers in the *Kephalaia*.

Just as the analysis of T2's sources and its comparison with T1 paint for us a complex picture of the development of the school manuals (including their reuse of earlier materials), so too does T2's afterlife help us see the main trajectories of this tradition's further development. Some parts of T6 appear to be a later revision of T2, including both verbatim quotations from it and periphrastic accounts. For instance, T6 §16 is a revision of T2 §35, containing a clarification of the terms "sensation", "sensible", "sensitive", and so forth. §35 in T2, in turn, derives from one of Evagrius' texts. Taken together, the school manuals published in the present volume therefore represent a chain of revision and reuse of earlier materials.

Another example of the afterlife of T2 (as distinct from its direct transmission) is the revision of this text that is preserved in ms. London, British Library, Additional 12154

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<sup>38</sup> On Severus' and Philoponus' comparison of the soul-body relationship to the divine-human unity in Christ, cf. particularly Lang 2001; see also Grillmeier & Hainthaler 1990: 129–132.

<sup>39</sup> On Evagrius, cf. particularly Guillaumont 1982 and Casiday 2006.

<sup>40</sup> The first part of Evagrius' *Letter to Melania* was published in Frankenberg 1912: 612–619. For the edition of the second part, see Vitestam 1964.

<sup>41</sup> On *Kephalaia Gnostica*, cf. Guillaumont 1962. For the edition of the two Syriac versions of it, see Guillaumont 1958. For the English translation (supplied with a detailed commentary), see Ramelli 2015.

(8th/9th cent.), fols. 191r–199v.<sup>42</sup> The text bears the title, “A Treatise of the Philosophers on the Division of Substance”,<sup>43</sup> which clearly points to the source from which this collection derives. Although having a somewhat different form, a large number of paragraphs originating from T2 are found in the British Library codex. What we see in the latter is therefore either a paraphrase of T2 or a completely new revision of it. Like other witnesses to T2, the collection in BL Add. 12154 consists of largely independent sections that we can compare with the edition of T2 in the present book.<sup>44</sup> For instance, sections 9 and 10 in the former are revised and considerably expanded versions of §17 and §16 of T2 respectfully. However, a large number of sections in ms. BL Add. 12154 do not find parallels in T2. These sections show how further materials could be incorporated into this collection which generally maintained an open structure.

### 2.3 “Natural Demonstration” (T3)

Ms. E (BL Add. 12155), which is one of the witnesses to T2, has also preserved for us another school text, which, as with T2, is a loose collection of fragments deriving from various sources.<sup>45</sup> Given that the collection does not deal with physics, the term “nature” as it appears in its title most likely does not carry the meaning that it does in natural philosophy. In fact, the title admits of various interpretations:

- (1) In the collections published in the present volume, the term *kyana*, “nature”, often means “substance” (cf. particularly T5). The title of T3 therefore may refer to this central category within Aristotelian logic (i.e. meaning “a demonstration pertaining to substance”, cf. the title of T2) rather than to the meaning it carries in natural philosophy.
- (2) The adjective *kyanaya*, “natural”, is sometimes used in Syriac texts to indicate non-theological subject matters (cf. the characteristic of Nestorius which appears in the same codex and is quoted above in section 1.3). Accordingly, the title may be interpreted as a “discourse on natural subjects” (i.e. non-theological subjects).

“Natural Demonstration” is, in fact, the title for the first portion of fragments included in it (§§1–7). Here we find a series of definitions mainly based on the text of Porphyry’s *Isagoge*. §8 has the subtitle, “Alexander on Natural Things”. Despite this reference to

<sup>42</sup> For a description of this codex, cf. Wright 1871: 976–989.

<sup>43</sup> Syriac: ܩܘܪܢܐ ܕܩܘܪܢܐ ܕܩܘܪܢܐ ܕܩܘܪܢܐ ܕܩܘܪܢܐ (ms. BL Add. 12154, fol. 191r).

<sup>44</sup> E.g., sections 1–4 in BL Add. 12154 correspond to §§3–6 of T2, sections 5–6 to §§8–9, section 7 to §15, and section 8 to §18.

<sup>45</sup> It starts on fol. 178r and ends on fol. 178v being followed by a selection from Sergius’ commentary. Cf. Arzhanov 2024: 46–50.

Alexander (of Aphrodisias),<sup>46</sup> the whole paragraph in reality derives from the introductory part of Proba's commentary on *On Interpretation*. An extensive quotation from the same source appears in the final part of the collection (§13). The central part comprises two large portions (§§10–11) taken from Sergius' commentary on the *Categories*. Three main sources therefore contributed to the formation of T3, namely, Porphyry's *Isagoge*, Sergius' commentary on the *Categories*, and one of Proba's exegetical works. This renders it similar to both T1 and T2.

As is the case with T1 and T2, the quotations from the *Isagoge* are in most cases drawn from the anonymous 6th-century translation. This again highlights the constitutive role that the latter played in the tradition of divisions-and-definitions. The only exception is §2, where we find a definition of accident based upon Athanasius' version. This exception does not break the rule, however, since the same passage from the *Isagoge* is quoted later on, in §4, and the source in this case is the anonymous translation. Nevertheless, the presence of the quotation from Athanasius, together with two passages in §2 most likely deriving from Jacob of Edessa's *Encheiridion*, witnesses to the creative adaptation of the 6th-century school manuals among the Hellenophiles of Qenneshre and later in the West Syriac schools, i.e. to the growth and transformation of this tradition, examples of which we have seen already in the comparison between T2 and T1.

Apart from the elements that appear only in §2, the sources for T3 are mainly restricted to the 6th-century texts. The early anonymous translation of the *Isagoge* is cited several times, and several extensive quotations from it are found in §§3, 4, and 7. §§5–6 present a series of short definitions that were most likely taken from other collections of either tree diagrams (similar to T1) or short divisions-and-definitions (similar to T2). While the sources for §5 cannot be identified with certainty, we can discern that §6 derives from a list that ultimately goes back to Porphyry's text and that appears in two tree diagrams in T1 and in a separate fragment in T2. Proba's commentary on Aristotle's *On Interpretation* is the source for §§8–9 and §13.<sup>47</sup> The quotations from this text do not, however, shift the focus of the collection to the issues discussed in *On Interpretation*. They derive only from the introductory part of Proba's treatise, which deals with the *prolegomena* issues that could equally be discussed in an introduction to the *Isagoge* or the *Categories*. The last paragraph 13 in fact focuses on the number of *prolegomena* and the meaning of each one of these issues.

Sergius of Reshaina is the third main source for the collection, and the presence of the materials deriving from his commentary on the *Categories* was most likely the primary reason why this whole collection was attributed to him. §10 makes this connection

<sup>46</sup> The name of Alexander of Aphrodisias occurs in its full form later in ms. BL Add. 12155, i.e. in fol. 259v, in two pieces dealing with psychology. Cf. Wright 1971: 953. There remains little doubt that in fol. 178r the same philosopher is meant.

<sup>47</sup> Ed. in Hoffmann 1869.

explicit, for its subtitle states that the following paragraphs (i.e. §§10–11) derive from Book VI of Sergius' commentary. While the fragments contain some errors, the quotations track the transmitted text of the commentary closely and are probably based directly on it. It is possible, however, that the compiler(s) used a collection of fragments taken from the text.

What further links T3 to Sergius is the reference to the works of Galen in its discussion of issues in logic. The name of the Greek physician appears twice in ms. E. The first reference to Galen in ms. E is located at the beginning of the fragments that derive from T2 (cf. above) and that bear the general title: "A chapter explaining the distinctions of substance extracted from one of the books of Galen".<sup>48</sup> It remains unclear whether the paragraphs that follow in fact derive from one of the Galenic writings or from other sources.<sup>49</sup> What is certain is that a number of paragraphs in T2 (starting with §5) are extracted from Sergius' commentary, while the first paragraphs in T2 (as preserved in ms. E) originate from another source that contained either Galen's ideas or his texts.

In the prologue to his commentary, Sergius describes a peculiar dialogue (quoted in 1.2.1, above) with his disciple Theodore who is impressed by the logical divisions and definitions in the Galenic writings that he and Sergius were translating into Syriac. That Galen was used for the study of logic, as this story indicates, is corroborated by T3. In §1 the compiler finds it necessary to refer to the authority of Galen when making a general statement that "man" is one in species but multiple in its individual instantiations. The compiler here credits Galen with the statement that man is at the same time one and not one, a position that Galen articulates in a passage in the treatise *On Elements According to Hippocrates*, in which he discusses a logical problem that he finds in one of Hippocrates' writings.<sup>50</sup> While commenting on Hippocrates' words, Galen analyses their logical form (τοῦ σχήματος τοῦ συλλογιστικοῦ), showing how they lead to contradictory positions. This example indicates that, in the early 6th century (when Sergius composed his commentary) but also at a later date (when T3 appeared), the works of the Greek physician were used in Syriac schools not only as source texts for medical education but also for training in logic.<sup>51</sup>

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<sup>48</sup> Cf. the Syriac text in the critical apparatus to the title of T2.

<sup>49</sup> It is possible that they go back to Galen's lost treatise *On Demonstration*, which most likely served as the source for the 8th Book of Clement of Alexandria's *Stromata* and which could have been known to Syriac readers. For the edition of the extant fragments of Galen's work, see Havrda & Koetschet 2025.

<sup>50</sup> Cf. De Lacy 1996: 76–79.

<sup>51</sup> The same practice was characteristic of the schools of the Alexandrian *iatrosophists* with which Sergius became acquainted during his stay in Alexandria in the late 5th century. Cf. Overwien 2018.

## 2.4 “Natural Treatise” (T4)

Text 4 is a small treatise that is less fragmentary than the texts discussed above. Insofar as it has been preserved in its entirety, we can be certain that it originally was a short sketch of Aristotelian logic containing explanations of its main terms. The latter are for the most part introduced with the formula: “If you hear the term so-and-so, you shall understand it as follows...” Because of this literary device, T4 reads more like a unified treatise than a loose collection of philosophical divisions-and-definitions. This work has come down to us in two manuscripts:

C Dayr al-Suryan 28, Part B, fols. 163r–164v,<sup>52</sup>

F London, British Library, Additional 17215, fol. 5.<sup>53</sup>

In its complete form found in ms. C, T4 immediately follows T2 (“On the Division of Substance”) and is very similar to the latter. Additionally, a fragment from T4, including §1 and part of §2, has been preserved in ms. F, which combines individual leaves originating from different manuscripts (one bifolio has preserved a fragment of Proba’s commentary on the *Isagoge*, cf. 1.2.2 above). The preserved portion of T4 in ms. F has the same title as the complete version found in ms. C, namely, “Natural Treatise”. This supports the assumption that the text was considered a unified treatise and not just a loose collection of fragments whose order and form could be rearranged, as was the case with T1–T3.

Similar to T3, the title of T4 incorporates various aspects of the term “nature”. On the one hand, several paragraphs (particularly the last §6) are focused on natural philosophy, i.e. on the four elements and their combinations (this paragraph is further elaborated on in T6). On the other hand, the title clearly refers to the central concept of Aristotelian logic, i.e. “substance”, which in Syriac is a synonym for “nature” (in T5, as discussed below, the term “substance”, *’usiyā*, does not appear at all but is completely replaced by “nature”). The first paragraphs explicate the term “substance”, including a remark that it is also applicable to the Holy Trinity. This remark again highlights the close association in the period following the 6th century between logical studies and both theology and polemics. Already apparent in T2 (§§10–11), this close association becomes even clearer in T7.

Although T4 is a short treatise that combines issues in theology, logic, and natural philosophy, it has been preserved in two copies. We may therefore assume that it enjoyed popularity in Syriac schools. Since some of its paragraphs appear in revised form in T6, we can also conclude that it became a source for the later tradition of divisions-and-definitions.

<sup>52</sup> Cf. on it above, 2.2.

<sup>53</sup> Cf. Wright 1872: 1164–1165.

## 2.5 “On Genus, Species, and Particularity” (T5)

As discussed above, T4 has a formal structure, even though it still exhibits something of the fragmentary character of Texts 1–3. In comparison with the texts outlined thus far, Texts 5–7 are homogeneous treatises. They have an isagogic character that, as with Texts 1–4, deal with the basic logical categories. They show multiple points of connection with the texts discussed in the previous sections, and, in many cases, they present a revision of those paragraphs which constitute Texts 1–4. Texts 5–7 therefore represent a later development of the tradition of divisions-and-definitions that originally was formed on the basis of fragments extracted from the large treatises (Porphyry’s *Isagoge*, Sergius’ and Proba’s commentaries). However, Texts 5–7 turn out to be much more dependent on Texts 1–4 themselves than on the latter’s original sources.

While the dependence of Texts 1–4 on the 6th-century sources provides grounds for dating the core materials belonging to them to the 6th century, we also see in these texts certain elements that disclose their development and growth in the course of the following centuries. The same may be said of T5 that has come down to us with the title “On Genus, Species, and Particularity”.<sup>54</sup> It is possible that the core of this text goes back to the 6th century and that it was later revised. In the only manuscript in which it has been preserved, BL Add. 14658 (L), the treatise is attributed to Sergius of Reshaina,<sup>55</sup> although there are good reasons to question this.

One of the characteristics of T5 is its systematic use of the term “nature” with the technical meaning of “substance”. This terminology does not align with Sergius’ commentary on the *Categories* in which he nearly exclusively uses the loanword *’usiya* (deriving from Gr. οὐσία).<sup>56</sup> While the association of the term *kyana*, “nature”, with “substance” begins already in the 6th century (particularly in context of Christian polemics), it is characteristic primarily of the Syriac philosophical tradition from the 7th century onwards. In his *Encheiridion*, Jacob of Edessa makes a clear distinction between *’usiya* and *kyana*. He restricts the former to discussions of logical issues and the latter to more general discussions of existence.<sup>57</sup> However, in the *Book of Definitions*, dated to the year 900 (see above), *kyana* is defined as that which has self-subsistence and which thereby differs from accidents (*gedše* = συμβεβηκότα). It is a definition fully applicable to οὐσία, but it is not characteristic of Sergius’ writings.

The same applies to the technical use of the term *šuhlapa* in T5 to refer to differentia (Gr. διαφορά). This use is characteristic of Athanasius of Balad’s version of Porphyry’s

<sup>54</sup> An Italian translation of this text was published in Furlani 1925b.

<sup>55</sup> This attribution was accepted as genuine in Furlani 1925b, Hugonnard-Roche 1997, and Aydin 2016.

<sup>56</sup> On Sergius’ understanding of *kyana*, see particularly Sergius, *In Cat.* §12 (72–75 Arzhanov).

<sup>57</sup> For the text, see Furlani 1928: 224–233. Cf. Hainthaler 2010: 38–39. While a number of definitions of “substance” offered by Jacob derive from the *Categories*, those of “nature” are largely based on the *Metaphysics*, cf. Furlani 1925a.

*Isagoge* produced in the late 7th century.<sup>58</sup> The 6th-century anonymous translation of the *Isagoge* and both Sergius of Reshaina and Proba (who also belong to the 6th century) use instead the term *puršana*. The prevalence of *šuḥlapa* in T5 brings it closer to the works of the Qenneshre scholars than to Sergius.

The disparity between T5 and Sergius' logical terminology is even more apparent in the use of the Syriac term *zna*. The term generally means "type" or "kind", and it is used with this meaning in T5 §15 in the context of a discussion of the term "species". Deriving them from ethics rather than logic, the compiler of T5 offers a series of examples in which the species of entities are explained as its kinds. The term *zna*, however, had a specific meaning for Sergius that he was eager to stress. He presented it several times in his commentary as the only correct rendering of the Greek term ποιότης, rejecting other variants.<sup>59</sup> It is not in this technical sense, however, that T5's compiler deploys the term *zna*.

While there are several phrases in the text where the author speaks of himself in the first person addressing someone else, it seems that such phrases are being used as a literary device rather than as an actual address to a concrete person. The expression "I would like your intelligence to know" in §15 finds a direct parallel in the *Book of Definitions*,<sup>60</sup> where it is clearly not functioning as a personal message. The book is instead addressed to a broad public and was authored not by a single individual but by multiple authors who were all part of an evolving tradition of philosophical divisions-and-definitions. The same applies to T5 insofar as the latter is not a product of one particular author (Sergius) but is an anonymous school manual on logic. Addressed to a broad circle of "the lovers of learning" (§13), it presents logical categories in simple terms and on the basis of everyday life examples.

Although all of these characteristics point to the pseudepigraphic character of T5, the text is clearly influenced by Sergius of Reshaina as were most of the texts described above. There is little doubt that Sergius made a profound impact on the whole history of the Syriac reception of Aristotle's logic, and the inclusion of his name in the title of T5 was no doubt a *homage* to this impact. It is also possible that, just as with Texts 1–4, T5 integrates elements of Sergius' writings that are no longer extant. However, the characteristics listed above make it improbable that the 6th-century Syriac writer himself composed this treatise in the current form that has been transmitted to us.

As the title makes explicit and as the main body of the text also makes clear, the main subjects of this treatise are the three terms that pertain to the Porphyrian Tree: genera, species, and particulars.<sup>61</sup> What differentiates T5 from Texts 1–4 is that it explains and illustrates these central terms of logic not by referencing Porphyry and

58 Cf. the analysis in Brock 1989: 48.

59 Cf. Sergius, *In Cat.* §§ 99, 354–355, and 365.

60 Cf. Furlani 1926: 17.5.

61 Cf. also T5 §13.

Aristotle but instead by using examples taken from the natural world: animals, plants, stones, and so forth. §2 lists various kinds of animals, birds, plants, and seeds. §3 draws examples from colours, forms, and tastes. In §4, the author turns to “things that are grasped intellectually”, for instance, human crafts. After listing these examples, the treatise concludes in §13 with the claim that “in all created beings you will discover, if you wish, these three things: genus, species, and particularity”. Here the author emphasizes the ontological status of the logical categories, which thereby grant us a better understanding of the hierarchical structure of the cosmos. It is in this context that the text presents the system of genera and species using the image that underlies the well-known expression “Porphyrian Tree”: the logical system is like a tree with one main trunk that is further divided into boughs and branches (§5).

T5 also makes use of specific terminology that differentiates it from T1–4. Only in T5 do we encounter the term *metmanyana*, “numerable”, in the technical sense of “individual”. While it appears in some Syriac texts in connection with the term *qnoma*,<sup>62</sup> we find it neither in Sergius’ and Proba’s commentaries nor in the other texts published in this volume. In addition, the expressions *gens gense*, “the most generic genus”, and *adš adše*, “the most specific species”, differ slightly from the expressions, *gens gensin* and *adš adšin*, which appear as *termini technici* both in Sergius of Reshaina’s commentary and in the later philosophical texts.<sup>63</sup> The terms T5 lack this technical character. Instead, the compiler of T5 decided to use more descriptive expressions, thereby shifting the focus at the formal level from the system of logical categories to examples of everyday life. He even presents the abstract theory of what is traditionally called the Porphyrian Tree using the image of a real tree with all its characteristics.

Consequently, the expression *gens gense* (“the most generic genus”) as T5 uses it does not refer to the ten highest genera of Aristotle’s categories (and, most of all, to the main category of substance). In §11, “wood” is the most generic genus for wooden things, and “fruit” is the most generic genus for all kind of fruits. Each generic genus is further divided into species and individual entities. All of the examples presented in T5 support the claim made in §13, namely, that this principle (genus-species-individuality) structures the whole created cosmos. On the one hand, this conclusion renders the Porphyrian/Aristotelian system of the categories a universal principle that structures the created world. On the other hand and somewhat paradoxically, it detaches the terms genera, species, and particularity from their original sources, namely, Aristotle’s *Categories* and Porphyry’s *Isagoge*. The latter are no longer necessary for gaining an understanding of the main logical terms.

T5 addresses those readers who considered logic a part of Christian education but who had never read (and didn’t have to) either Aristotle’s or Porphyry’s works. It is

<sup>62</sup> Cf., for instance, Theodore Bar Koni, *Book of Scholia*, part 6 (Scher 1910–1912/II: 57).

<sup>63</sup> Cf. Sergius, *In Cat.* §94 (142 Arzhanov); Jacob of Edessa, *Encheiridion* (231.17 Furlani); Ps.-Michael Badoqa, *Book of Definitions* 11–12 (31–32 Furlani).

therefore unsurprising that the examples deployed in the text are based mainly on Biblical characters. In §1, the names Paul, Peter, and Jacob appear as examples of individual men where one traditionally encounters the names Socrates and Plato. In §4, the author presents Hiram as an example of a smith, Aquila as a model of a tentmaker, and Joseph as the exemplary carpenter. While the first case derives from the Old Testament, the latter two are drawn from the New Testament. These figures were presumably already well-known by the audience to which T5 was originally addressed. T5 therefore reflects the process of the “Christianization” of logical manuals that took place during this period, something that is also characteristic of the Greek school texts that derive from the Byzantine period.<sup>64</sup> Its terminology brings it closer to the 7th–8th centuries than to the earlier period to which Texts 1–3 most likely belong. We may view it as part of the afterlife and further development of the tradition that was originally based on large treatises (such as commentaries) but that later became part of the Christian educational system, after which the connection with the original sources of Texts 1–3 was gradually lost.

## 2.6 Logical Treatise in Ms. DS 27 (T6)

This treatise has been preserved in ms. D, i.e. Dayr al-Suryan 27, Part B, fols. 110r–113v. However, it is possible that it originally belonged to another codex which has not survived but whose parts were bound with the other folios that now constitute this codex.<sup>65</sup> Since this text came down to us without a beginning or an ending, we know neither its title nor its original length. Nonetheless, even the preserved portion of the treatise makes clear that it is focused on the same subject matters as Texts 1–5 and is in many respects connected with them.

The first extant paragraphs of T6 deal with the terms “genus”, “species”, “differentia”, “property”, and “accident”, i.e. with the *quinque voces* of the *Isagoge*. As is the case with T5, no quotations from Porphyry are found in T6, and only in the last paragraph do we find an explicit reference to his treatise. §22 contains a number of Greek terms that “are found in the treatise *Isagoge*”. However, the listed words derive not from Porphyry’s text but from the commentary tradition. §22 mentions terms such as “theoretical” and “practical”, “mathematics” and “geometry”, etc., none of which are found in the *Isagoge*. They do, however, play an important role in the introductory sections of the commentaries on this treatise that deal with the *prolegomena* issues such as the division of philosophy.

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<sup>64</sup> For the Byzantine manuals in logic which largely demonstrate the same tendencies that are apparent in T5, cf. Roueché 1974: 68, 72, 76.

<sup>65</sup> For the description of DS 27 and the problems related to the identification of its parts deriving from various manuscripts, cf. Brock & Van Rompay 2014: 159–177; Arzhanov 2021a: 5–10.

Yet a comparison between T6 and other texts published in the present volume gives us good reasons to assume that it derives not from complete commentaries on the *Isagoge* but from collections of divisions-and-definitions and school manuals such as T2 and T4. The definitions in T6 of the Greek terms that “are found in the treatise *Isagoge*” are more extensive than the explanations we find in T1, which contains only short tree diagrams. The definitions in T6 trace back to manuals such as T2, which took the tree diagrams and transformed them into short narratives. Some paragraphs of T6 find direct parallels in T2. For instance, §§16, 19, and 20 repeat parts of T2 nearly verbatim, while §14 appears to be a revised version of the sections in T2 dealing with synthesis as a method of reasoning. Furthermore, §§11–12 explicate the four elements and their relation to one another, indicating a clear parallel to T4 on which it is probably based. These examples grant us insight into the process through which the Syriac school manuals in logic developed from collections of tree diagrams based on large commentaries to anthologies of divisions-and-definitions and finally to full-scale manuals in logic that no longer maintain a connection to Porphyry and Aristotle.

Accordingly, it is not surprising to find in T6 no direct references to Porphyry or Aristotle whose authority is replaced by that of “the wise”. As in T5, T6 uses examples derived from the Bible rather than from philosophical treatises. Even more so than T5, T6 turns out to be only loosely connected to the *Isagoge* and the *Categories*. In T6 §2, we encounter the definition of genus as that which embraces multiple things “being different in nature” (ܡܚܬܠܦܘܢ ܚܝܬܘܢ). This definition clearly departs from what we find both in the *Isagoge* (cf. 2.14–3.20) and in treatises based on it (cf., e.g., T2 §17), where genus is explained as that which embraces multiple things that are different *in species*. Even more striking is the explanation in §2 of the term “most specific species” as “something that does not possess the ability to be divided”, i.e. an individual. While both the *Isagoge* (cf. 4.15–5.1) and the explications of Porphyry’s text (T2 §§15 and 18) define the most specific species as that which may not be further divided *into species* (for instance, universal man) but only into particulars, T6 clearly conflates the two terms, making specific species equivalent to individuals, such as Simon or Sergius (cf. §2). As is already the case with T5, the author of T6 uses the terms genus, species, and individual in a rather loose way, indicating an unfamiliarity with their original meaning in the system of Porphyrian logic.

In §4 we also find a conflation of two topics that are traditionally differentiated in the commentary tradition: priority by nature and the interpretation of property as something that defines a certain nature. The former topic appears in T2 §28, which derives from Sergius’ commentary on the *Categories*. It is therefore probable that the author of T6 used a collection of definitions similar to T2 as a source, where the two topics (property and priority by nature) either were discussed in close proximity to one another or were not clearly differentiated. This would explain the confusion that we encounter in T6 §4. A similar confusion probably lies behind the definition of accident found in §5.

All of this suggests that T6 was primarily based on neither the *Isagoge* nor a commentary on it but on collections of divisions-and-definitions similar to Texts 1–3 published in the present volume. As such, T6 represents the final developmental stage of the Syriac school manuals in logic. While T1 is directly based both on the *Isagoge* and on the commentary tradition, T2 integrates elements of T1’s source texts and T1 itself, while later manuals (e.g., T4) recycle some elements of T2. T6 exemplifies the next round of recycling of the materials transmitted in earlier manuals. It has nearly no direct connection to the source texts of T1 and T2. As a result, it exhibits confusion regarding crucial terms such as “the most specific species” and “individuals”.

The recycling of the earlier materials in T6 resulted in a full-scale manual on logic whose fragmentary character nonetheless remains visible, particularly when viewed in light of its presumed sources. In §6, the author applies the same rhetorical device that we find in T5 (a potential source). Every new term in T6 is introduced by the phrase, “When you hear the name so-and-so...” The explanation that follows appears as a part of the teaching process of explicating basic philosophical terms, including logical categories as well as issues such as weight, transparency, softness, and so forth. In §10, the author delves into the topic of the human senses, and here his dependence on the previous collections of divisions-and-definitions is particularly apparent. It appears to be an elaboration of T5 §5, which itself is a revision of T2 §32, a paragraph that ultimately derives from one of Evagrius’ writings. Another example of this kind is found in T6 §16. The latter is a slightly revised version of T2 §35, which is also a fragment taken from Evagrius. The revision in T6 is primarily stylistic, and it aims at reshaping the list of definitions found in T2 into a more coherent text to be used for pedagogical purposes.

This “chain of recycling” reveals a living and evolving school tradition in which earlier materials were constantly adapted for the needs of Syriac schools. As outlined below, T7 makes it particularly clear that, in the period following the 6th century, these needs were mostly related to polemics against other Christian denominations and later against Islam. In both cases, Aristotelian logic, on the one hand, provided common ground and, on the other hand, functioned as a useful instrument.

## 2.7 Logico-Theological Treatise in Ms. DS 28 (T7)

Like T6, T7 has been preserved without a title and in a single manuscript, Dayr al-Suryan 28, part B (ms. C). Ms. C serves as a witness to multiple Syriac collections of divisions-and-definitions, including T7 (fols. 154r–160r), T2 (fols. 160v–163r), and T4 (fols. 163r–164v). After T4, we find a short excerpt from Cyril of Alexandria’s commentary on Isaiah that, among other things, explains how both Adam and Jesus may be considered the founders of the genus of humanity. It was this reference to genus that probably led the compiler to attach this fragment to other texts that deal with issues in logic.

This philosophical anthology opens with T7, but the first folios have been lost. As a result, we know neither the title of this treatise nor its original length. Since it ends with



the Tritheists could be directed equally against Muslim opponents.<sup>69</sup> We are unable to determine in many cases whether the compiler of T7 used the actual works of Basil, Gregory, and Severus or instead made use of theological treatises loaded with quotations from the Church Fathers such as *Contra Damianum*. It is, however, more likely that the original source of the quotations from the Church Fathers was neither of them but rather the kind of theological florilegium that we find in the 8th-century ms. BL Add. 12155.<sup>70</sup> This florilegium contains both logical expositions and quotations from the Church authorities, and T7 is most likely summing up the main arguments presented in a florilegium like it.

The main theological focus in T7 is on how the Christian idea of one Godhead existing in three Persons (or Hypostases) can be explained using the Aristotelian logical categories (i.e. genus, substance, and individuals). Similar to Peter of Callinicum, the compiler of T7 argues that the three Persons of the Trinity share the same substance (the Godhead) but are differentiated through their characteristic properties just as individual men are distinguished through their properties while still belonging to one and the same species of man (§18). T7 tends to articulate a dichotomous relation between the one (genus, species) and the many (individuals). In §2, the compiler speaks of the Godhead as “one genus and one species” embracing three individuals/hypostases. The same scheme is applied later on in the text to other subject matters. For instance, all rational creatures are characterized as being of “one genus and one species” (§3), and so are the angelic powers (§4) and men (§5).

If we consider them from the point of view of the Porphyrian Tree (an outline of which is found in §11), such claims appear rather surprising. According to the Porphyrian Tree, a genus comprises species, which in turn may be genera of other species that are beneath them and that are usually characterized either as being generic or specific. In T7, these logical nuances disappear, giving way to a straightforward dichotomy between something general (“one genus and one species”) and its individual instantiations whose characteristic properties differentiate them from one another. The text moves away from the Christological discussions of the post-Chalcedonian period in which the conflicts revolved around the core question of the relation between the divine and human natures in Jesus Christ. In T7, these Christological debates do not play any significant role, and the focus lies instead on the question of the relation between the one and the many in the Trinity.

All these aspects situate T7 in the 8th–9th century polemic with Islam. This brings it close to the West Syriac florilegia that appear in this period and that integrate the 6th-century treatises addressed against the Tritheists. As demonstrated by the texts published in this volume, T7 (together with T6) therefore forms the final stage of the development of the Christian adaptation of Aristotelian and Porphyrian logic. The earliest

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<sup>69</sup> On the afterlife of the anti-Tritheistic polemical treatises in the early Islamic period, cf. Ebeid 2021.

<sup>70</sup> On this codex, cf. 2.2 and 2.3, above.

texts among them are connected with the commentaries on the *Categories* and the *Isagoge*, presenting the central logical terms in collections of divisions-and-definitions. The later school manuals are, however, based on such collections only. They also narrow the focus to a few logical notions that played a crucial role, initially, in the controversies between Christians and, subsequently, in Christian polemics against the Muslims.

### 3 Concluding Remarks

In light of the above overview, we may draw some general conclusions regarding the historical setting and the main lines of development of the Syriac school manuals on logic that played a significant role in Syriac scholastic culture. The history of these manuals stretches from the 6th to the 9th centuries, covering the period of transition from the traditional late antique paideia to the Christian pedagogical system. Aristotelian and Porphyrian logic gained a firm footing within the Christian Syriac schools during this transition period, ultimately laying the foundation for the development of medieval scholasticism.

While the method of defining the essence of an entity by means of division has a long history and is found in both Platonic dialogues and Porphyry's treatises in logic, the origins of the Syriac collections of divisions-and-definitions trace back to a practice found in the Alexandrian school in the late 5th–early 6th centuries that resulted from the transformation of philosophical education brought about by Ammonius Hermeiou. The model of education developed in Ammonius' school placed Aristotle's *Categories* and Porphyry's introduction to it at the beginning of the curriculum. Lectures on these texts thereby became introductory courses in philosophy in general. The preserved 6th-century Alexandrian commentaries on the *Categories* and the *Isagoge* contain extensive introductory parts focusing on the *prolegomena* issues. They are also structured largely in the form of divisions-and-definitions, something that was adopted by the Syrian heirs of this Alexandrian pedagogical practice.

In the Syriac tradition, the earliest witness to the use of divisions-and-definitions in philosophical education was Sergius of Reshaina's commentary on Aristotle's *Categories*, written in the early 6th century on the basis of the oral lectures of Ammonius. Sergius' treatise seldom quotes Aristotle's text verbatim but mainly presents a general overview of central logical terms in the form of basic explanations. This provided a pattern for the next generations of Syriac scholars who based their knowledge of the *Categories* on such isagogic materials rather than on Aristotle's text itself. Characteristic of this next generation, neither the school manuals on logic nor the Syriac authors who integrated elements of these manuals in their writings turned to the anonymous Syriac translation of the *Categories* that appeared in the 6th century. They preferred to rely on Sergius' treatise. Sergius frequently made use of the method of diaeresis, emphasizing its role in providing definitions of logical terms. This made his commentary a rich source for tree diagrams which were attached to it at a later stage.

The 6th-century anonymous Syriac translation of Porphyry's *Isagoge* and Proba's commentary on it functioned as two additional primary sources for the later collections of divisions-and-definitions. It is likely that neither of these texts originally included the tree diagrams. However, even more so than Sergius' commentary, Proba's exegetical work was structured as a school manual based on the method of diaeresis with the primary aim of explaining the main categories of Porphyrian logic by means of division-

and-definition. This formal characteristic rendered Proba's work a likely source for the composition of the tree diagrams that were eventually attached to it and that could be used in introductory courses in logic. As the preserved Syriac scholia on the *Isagoge* and the compilations of later Syriac scholars (e.g., the *Book of the Dialogues* of Severus Bar Shakko) demonstrate, more exegetical works related to Porphyry's treatise appeared after the 6th century. However, in the tradition of the school manuals, Proba's commentary played the decisive role.

It is likely that the tree diagrams based on the *Isagoge* and on the exegetical works of Sergius and Proba were attached to these texts in the second half of the 6th century. As the title of T1 (in the version preserved in mss. B and M) makes apparent, these diagrams were originally used as supplements to the study of the above-mentioned three texts. However, they were later separated from this initial setting and transmitted in the form of handy collections, an example of which we find in one version of T1. It is likely that, while initially maintaining their connection to their sources, they gradually became stand-alone texts whose original tree diagrams were reshaped into short narrative explications of central logical categories by way of division-and-definition.

In this revised narrative form, collections of tree diagrams became sources for later manuals in logic. An example of such a manual, which recycles the elements of T1, is published here as T2. This loose collection of philosophical definitions has been preserved in at least four recensions, which speaks to its popularity in Syriac schools in the early Islamic period (7th–9th centuries). Besides the fragments that derive from logical treatises (including the collections of tree diagrams), the oldest revision of T2 includes fragments originating from Evagrius and Severus of Antioch, thereby shedding light on the theological context in which these collections later developed and expanded.

The last developmental stage of this tradition, which began with anthologies of tree diagrams (such as T1), is marked by logical treatises that were formed primarily on the basis of manuals such as T2 and T3. As T5 and T6 show, these treatises are full-scale expansions of the loose collections of definitions that we find in texts such as T2 and T3. It is likely that these treatises were the basis for introductory courses in logic that were offered to clergy in order to prepare them for various kinds of polemics.

Particularly in the form of the Tritheistic controversy, which was associated primarily with the Miaphysite Church and which included prominent Alexandrian philosophers such as John Philoponus, the theological debates of the 6th century provided additional impetus for the development of further collections of philosophical divisions-and-definitions. These collections focused mainly on theologically significant terms such as substance, person, nature, and hypostasis. Syriac texts treating these terms find multiple parallels in the Byzantine manuals in logic (for instance, in Theodore of Raithu's *Preparation*). From the 7th century onward, the collections of philosophical definitions become tools deployed in both intra-Christian disputes and Christian polemics against Islam, as the example of T7 published below makes clear.

The school manuals based on philosophical divisions-and-definitions had enduring influence in Syriac educational institutions. Their impact extended from brief citations

by individual Syriac authors, who deemed logical argumentation necessary, to comprehensive anthological collections during the period of Syriac Renaissance (e.g., by such authors as Bar Shakko and Bar 'Ebroyo). The school manuals published below therefore played a significant role in Christian education in the transitional period between the decline of the Alexandrian philosophical school in the 6th–7th centuries and the rise of Christian scholasticism in the middle ages.

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Part II

**Syriac Texts and English Translation**



# Sigla, Abbreviations, and Signs Used in the Edition

## Sigla

B	Berlin, Staatsbibliothek, Preußischer Kulturbesitz, Sachau 166
C	Dayr al-Suryan, Syriac 28
D	Dayr al-Suryan, Syriac 27
E	London, British Library, Additional 12155
F	London, British Library, Additional 17215
L	London, British Library, Additional 14658
M	Birmingham, Mingana Collection, Syriac 84
V	Vatican, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, sir. 158

<i>Metr.</i>	<i>Metrical Treatise</i> , quoted on the basis of ms. Mardin, Chaldean Cathedral 20 (CCM 20)
Silw.	Silwanos of Qardu, quoted on the basis of Hespel 1983

## Abbreviations and Signs

add.	<i>addidit</i> (a scribe “added”): applies to material added by a scribe
cod(d).	<i>codex</i> ( <i>codices</i> )
corr.	<i>correxit</i> (a scribe “corrected”): applies to scribal corrections in the mss.
ditt.	<i>dittographia</i> (“dittography”): applies to the accidental repetition of one or more words or phrases by a scribe
et passim	“and throughout”: indicates that material can be found in other locations in the codex
f(ol).	<i>folio</i>
fort.	<i>fortasse</i> (“perhaps”): denotes that the editor is guessing the correctness of a reading
in marg.	<i>in margine</i> (“in the margin”): indicates that material is written in the margin of a manuscript as opposed to the main text block
inv.	<i>invertit</i> (a scribe “inverted”): applies to simple inversions of word order
om.	<i>omisit</i> (a scribe “omitted”): applies to words that are omitted in a manuscript
om. hom.	<i>omisit per homoioteleuton</i> (a scribe “omitted due to homoioteleuton”): applies to omissions in manuscripts due to identical endings in two words
scr.	<i>scripsi</i> (“I have written”): applies to editorial corrections/alleged corrections expressly marked as such in the edition as opposed to corrections by scribes, denoted as “corr.”
sim.	<i>similia</i> (“similar words”)
+	introduces an addition in the manuscript following the lemma to which this addition is attached
§	paragraph numbers introduced by the editor
(...)	additions in the English translation



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## T1: Divisions of Porphyry

קָלָהּ וְהָיָה לְכָל הָעָם וְלְכָל הָאָדָם וְלְכָל הָאָרֶץ וְלְכָל הָאֲדָמָה וְלְכָל הָאֲרָצוֹת וְלְכָל הָאֲרָצוֹת וְלְכָל הָאֲרָצוֹת וְלְכָל הָאֲרָצוֹת

פְּלִיגָה וְהָיָה

§1

5

וְהָיָה לְכָל הָעָם

וְהָיָה לְכָל הָעָם וְלְכָל הָאָדָם וְלְכָל הָאֲדָמָה וְלְכָל הָאֲרָצוֹת וְלְכָל הָאֲרָצוֹת וְלְכָל הָאֲרָצוֹת וְלְכָל הָאֲרָצוֹת וְלְכָל הָאֲרָצוֹת וְלְכָל הָאֲרָצוֹת וְלְכָל הָאֲרָצוֹת וְלְכָל הָאֲרָצוֹת

10

וְהָיָה לְכָל הָעָם

§2

וְהָיָה לְכָל הָעָם

וְהָיָה לְכָל הָעָם וְלְכָל הָאָדָם וְלְכָל הָאֲדָמָה וְלְכָל הָאֲרָצוֹת וְלְכָל הָאֲרָצוֹת וְלְכָל הָאֲרָצוֹת וְלְכָל הָאֲרָצוֹת וְלְכָל הָאֲרָצוֹת וְלְכָל הָאֲרָצוֹת וְלְכָל הָאֲרָצוֹת וְלְכָל הָאֲרָצוֹת

15

§1 B 1, M 1, V 1 §2 B 2, M 2, V 2

1 [om. V] | BM: V | BM: V | BM: V | scr: BM | 4 [om. V] | 6 [om. V] | BM: V | MV: B 7 | BM: V 8 | MV: B | 9 BM | 11 [om. V] | 13 BM | + BM | B: B | 14 V | 15 BM | 16 BM | 17 BM | 18 BM

*Divisions of the Book “Isagoge” of Porphyry, Philosopher and Teacher, and  
Various Definitions That are Found at the End of the Chapters of the Book  
“Isagoge”<sup>1</sup>*

§1

*Division of genus<sup>2</sup>*

Genus is said of

- an assembly of many coming from a single origin, as the Heraclids from Heracles;
- someone’s place of birth, as Plato the Athenian, and someone’s derivation from the progenitor, as Hyllos from Heracles;<sup>3</sup>
- and below what a species is said of, for instance “living being” below which “man” is said of.

§2

*Second division<sup>4</sup>*

What is said of something

- is said either of one thing, (namely) an individual, (for instance) “Socrates” and this and that (person),
- or of many:
  - genus, as “living being”,
  - species, as “man”,
  - differentia, as “rational”,

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<sup>1</sup> This is the title found in mss. B and M. The title in ms. V is: “Divisions of the *Isagoge* of Porphyry the Philosopher”. The title mentioned at the end of the collection is: “Divisions of Porphyry the Philosopher”.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. *Isag.* 1.18–2.13. See also the anonymous scholia on the *Isagoge* preserved in ms. V (Baumstark 1900: 41.6–11). Another version of this list based not on Porphyry’s text but on Proba’s commentary on it appears below in §23.

<sup>3</sup> In the Vatican codex, this second point is divided into two separate points (i.e. generation from one’s own progenitor and place of birth), thus suggesting a four-fold division. However, mss. B and M correctly reflect Porphyry’s division of the meanings of “genus” into three as stressed in *Isag.* 2.14 and are likely to have preserved the original recension of this diagram.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. *Isag.* 2.17–22. See also §26 below, which is based on Proba’s commentary on the *Isagoge*. For the second half of the list, cf. T2 §17 and T3 §6.

כסאך וְאֵת כְּסֵאֲךָ  
וְאֵת כְּסֵאֲךָ וְאֵת כְּסֵאֲךָ

כְּסֵאֲךָ וְאֵת כְּסֵאֲךָ

§3

יְהוָה וְאֵת

5

כְּסֵאֲךָ וְאֵת כְּסֵאֲךָ — וְאֵת כְּסֵאֲךָ  
וְאֵת כְּסֵאֲךָ וְאֵת כְּסֵאֲךָ — וְאֵת כְּסֵאֲךָ  
וְאֵת כְּסֵאֲךָ וְאֵת כְּסֵאֲךָ

כְּסֵאֲךָ

§4

10

כְּסֵאֲךָ וְאֵת כְּסֵאֲךָ  
כְּסֵאֲךָ וְאֵת כְּסֵאֲךָ  
כְּסֵאֲךָ וְאֵת כְּסֵאֲךָ  
כְּסֵאֲךָ וְאֵת כְּסֵאֲךָ  
כְּסֵאֲךָ וְאֵת כְּסֵאֲךָ  
כְּסֵאֲךָ וְאֵת כְּסֵאֲךָ  
כְּסֵאֲךָ וְאֵת כְּסֵאֲךָ

15

כְּסֵאֲךָ

§5

יְהוָה וְאֵת

כְּסֵאֲךָ וְאֵת כְּסֵאֲךָ — וְאֵת כְּסֵאֲךָ  
כְּסֵאֲךָ וְאֵת כְּסֵאֲךָ — וְאֵת כְּסֵאֲךָ

§3 B 3, M 3, V 3 §4 B 4, M 4, V 4 §5 B 5, M 5, V 5

1 כְּסֵאֲךָ V: כְּסֵאֲךָ BM | כְּסֵאֲךָ V: כְּסֵאֲךָ וְאֵת כְּסֵאֲךָ BM 3 כְּסֵאֲךָ V: כְּסֵאֲךָ  
om. V 5 ,כּ B: אֵת V: om. M 8 כְּסֵאֲךָ BM: כְּסֵאֲךָ V 11 כְּסֵאֲךָ V: כְּסֵאֲךָ BM 13 כְּסֵאֲךָ V:  
כְּסֵאֲךָ BM | כְּסֵאֲךָ VB: כְּסֵאֲךָ M 16 כְּסֵאֲךָ BM: כְּסֵאֲךָ V 17 כְּסֵאֲךָ BM:  
כְּסֵאֲךָ V 18 כְּסֵאֲךָ V: כְּסֵאֲךָ וְאֵת כְּסֵאֲךָ BM

- property, as “laughing”,
- accident, as “universal blackness”.

§3

*First division: Division of species*<sup>5</sup>

Species is said

- of the shape of every person, as someone’s species that is worthy of a ruler;<sup>6</sup>
- and of what is beneath a genus, as “man” is beneath “living being” and “white” is beneath “colour”.

§4

*Second division*<sup>7</sup>

Substance is called a most generic genus.

Body is a species and a genus.

Animate body is a species and a genus.

Living being is a species and a genus.

Rational living being is a species and a genus.

Man is a most specific species.

Socrates is a particular individual.

§5

*Division of differentia*<sup>8</sup>

Differentia is said

- in the common sense, as Socrates (differs) from Plato and also from himself in young and old age; they are called of other sort and accidental;

5 This is the subtitle in mss. B and M. It is likely that this division originally appeared as the first diagram attached to the chapter on species in the Syriac version of the *Isagoge*. Cf. *Isag.* 3.22–4.4.

6 The text is based on the early anonymous Syriac translation of *Isag.* 3.22–4.1 (Brock 1988: 7.15–17) which interpreted ἐπὶ τῆς ἐκάστου μορφῆς as referring to persons and hence rendered the Greek τυραννίς as “ruler, governor”.

7 Cf. *Isag.* 4.22–32. See also T2 §8 and T2 §18. A similar list (which does not include the last item and differs in some details) appears as Division 5 attached to Book II of Sergius, *In Cat.* (162.10–14 Arzhanov).

8 The diagram summarizes *Isag.* 8.8–21, reflecting the early anonymous Syriac translation (cf. Brock 1988: 18–20). See also §29, below.



- in the proper sense, as being hook-nosed, having blue eyes, and having a wound; they are also called of other sort and accidental;
- and in the most proper sense, as man (differs) from horse and dog; they are called other and specific.

§6

*Second division*<sup>9</sup>

Further, (on) differentiae:

- some of them are separable, as being in motion and staying still, or being healthy and being ill;
- some of them are inseparable:
  - some of them are accidental, as being hook-nosed and having blue eyes;
  - and some of them are natural:
    - some of them are divisive of genera; for instance, animate and inanimate and sensitive and insensitive which divide substance, or rational and irrational and mortal and immortal which divide living being;
    - some of them are constitutive of species; for instance, animate and sensitive which constitute living being, and rational and mortal which constitute man.

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<sup>9</sup> The diagram summarizes *Isag.* 9.7–10.21, following the early anonymous Syriac translation (Brock 1988: 20–24).



§7

*Division of property*<sup>10</sup>

Property is divided into four:

- what occurs to one species alone but not to all of it, as healing or doing geometry;
- what (occurs) to the entire (species) and always but not to it alone, as being biped;
- what (occurs) to (a species) alone and to all of it but not always, as turning grey in old age;
- what (occurs) to (a species) alone, to all of it, and always, as being capable of laughing (belongs) to man and being capable of neighing to horse.

§8

*Division of accident*<sup>11</sup>

Accident is divided

- into separable, as sleeping and being in motion;
- and inseparable, as blackness in a raven and whiteness in a swan.

§9

*Twenty differences*:<sup>12</sup>

Genus (differs) from differentia, from species, from property, from accident.  
 Differentia (differs) from genus, from species, from property, from accident.  
 Species (differs) from genus, from differentia, from property, from accident.

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**10** The diagram summarizes *Isag.* 12.13–19, following the early anonymous Syriac translation (Brock 1988: 28). Another variant of it (based on Proba's commentary) appears as §36 below. Cf. Division 4 attached to Book III in Sergius, *In Cat.* (260.2–9 Arzhanov).

**11** The division sums up *Isag.* 12.24–13.5 based on the early anonymous Syriac translation (Brock 1988: 29).

**12** §§ 9 and 10 summarize the second part of the *Isagoge* where Porphyry demonstrates what the five terms outlined in part one have in common and how they differ from one another. A similar list appears at the end of T1, see §39.

תַּלְמוּדֵי אֱלֹהִים — חַם לְמַעַן . חַם אֶתְּנֶה . חַם אֶתְּנֶה . חַם אֶתְּנֶה .  
אֶתְּנֶה — חַם לְמַעַן . חַם אֶתְּנֶה . חַם אֶתְּנֶה . חַם אֶתְּנֶה .

חַסְדֵי אֱלֹהִים

§10

לְמַעַן — חַם אֶתְּנֶה . חַם אֶתְּנֶה . חַם אֶתְּנֶה . חַם אֶתְּנֶה .  
אֶתְּנֶה — חַם אֶתְּנֶה . חַם אֶתְּנֶה . חַם אֶתְּנֶה .  
אֶתְּנֶה — חַם אֶתְּנֶה . חַם אֶתְּנֶה .  
אֶתְּנֶה — חַם אֶתְּנֶה .

5

אֱלֹהֵי מִצְרָיִם

§11

אֱלֹהֵי מִצְרָיִם אֱלֹהֵי מִצְרָיִם

אֱלֹהֵי מִצְרָיִם

אֱלֹהֵי מִצְרָיִם אֱלֹהֵי מִצְרָיִם

אֱלֹהֵי מִצְרָיִם אֱלֹהֵי מִצְרָיִם

אֱלֹהֵי מִצְרָיִם

אֱלֹהֵי מִצְרָיִם

אֱלֹהֵי מִצְרָיִם אֱלֹהֵי מִצְרָיִם

אֱלֹהֵי מִצְרָיִם אֱלֹהֵי מִצְרָיִם

אֱלֹהֵי מִצְרָיִם אֱלֹהֵי מִצְרָיִם

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15

§10 B 10, M 10, V 10 §11 B 11, M 11, V 21; Metr. 1

1 אֱלֹהֵי מִצְרָיִם V: אֱלֹהֵי מִצְרָיִם BM | אֱלֹהֵי מִצְרָיִם BM: אֱלֹהֵי מִצְרָיִם V 2 אֱלֹהֵי מִצְרָיִם BM: אֱלֹהֵי מִצְרָיִם V | אֱלֹהֵי מִצְרָיִם V:  
אֱלֹהֵי מִצְרָיִם BM 4 אֱלֹהֵי מִצְרָיִם BM: אֱלֹהֵי מִצְרָיִם V | אֱלֹהֵי מִצְרָיִם V: אֱלֹהֵי מִצְרָיִם BM 5 אֱלֹהֵי מִצְרָיִם BM: אֱלֹהֵי מִצְרָיִם  
V | אֱלֹהֵי מִצְרָיִם V: אֱלֹהֵי מִצְרָיִם BM 7 אֱלֹהֵי מִצְרָיִם V: אֱלֹהֵי מִצְרָיִם BM | אֱלֹהֵי מִצְרָיִם + אֱלֹהֵי מִצְרָיִם BM 8 אֱלֹהֵי מִצְרָיִם  
אֱלֹהֵי מִצְרָיִם om. V 9 אֱלֹהֵי מִצְרָיִם אֱלֹהֵי מִצְרָיִם] inv. M, ditt. in B | אֱלֹהֵי מִצְרָיִם BM, Metr.:  
אֱלֹהֵי מִצְרָיִם V 10 אֱלֹהֵי מִצְרָיִם V: אֱלֹהֵי מִצְרָיִם BM; + אֱלֹהֵי מִצְרָיִם M, sim. Metr.  
13 אֱלֹהֵי מִצְרָיִם V: אֱלֹהֵי מִצְרָיִם BM; + אֱלֹהֵי מִצְרָיִם M, sim. Metr.  
14 אֱלֹהֵי מִצְרָיִם + אֱלֹהֵי מִצְרָיִם M, sim. Metr. 15 אֱלֹהֵי מִצְרָיִם V:  
אֱלֹהֵי מִצְרָיִם BM 16 אֱלֹהֵי מִצְרָיִם V: אֱלֹהֵי מִצְרָיִם BM

Property (differs) from genus, from differentia, from species, from accident.  
 Accident (differs) from genus, from differentia, from species, from property.

§10

*Ten differences*

Genus (differs) from differentia, from species, from property, from accident.  
 Differentia (differs) from species, from property, from accident.  
 Species (differs) from property and from accident.  
 Property (differs) from accident.

§11

*First division*<sup>13</sup>

Philosophy is divided:

- into theoretical (θεωρητικόν) (part, which is subdivided into):
  - theology,
  - natural philosophy,
  - and mathematical (μαθηματικόν) (part);
- and practice (which is subdivided into):
  - political (πολιτικόν) (part), which means “care of cities”,
  - economical (οικονομικόν) (part), which means “care of houses”,
  - and ethical (ἠθικόν) (part), which means “care of morals”.<sup>14</sup>

<sup>13</sup> This division was probably the first one in the introductory part of a commentary on Porphyry's *Isagoge*. Almost the same division of philosophy has been preserved in Bar Shakko's *Book of the Dialogues* (Baumstark 1900: 22.4–5), and it is likely that §§11–19 derive from Bar Shakko's source. This source was either the lost introductory part of Proba's commentary or an unknown Syriac work that has not come down to us as a separate text. Additionally, most of §§11–39 were integrated into the *Metrical Treatise on Philosophical Divisions* (*Metr.*), references to which are given under the Syriac text and are attached to the manuscripts in which individual divisions are preserved.

<sup>14</sup> Similar divisions are found in Sergius, *In Cat.* (104.1–10 Arzhanov), and Ps.-Michael Badoqa, *Book of Definitions* (25.3–9 Furlani; nearly identical with Sergius' version). For the Greek parallel, cf. Ps.-Elias (Ps.-David), *In Isag.*: διαφεῖ ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης τὴν φιλοσοφίαν εἰς θεωρητικὸν καὶ πρακτικὸν, καὶ τὸ θεωρητικὸν εἰς φυσιολογικὸν μαθηματικὸν θεολογικὸν, καὶ τὸ μαθηματικὸν εἰς δ' ἐπιστήμας, ἀριθμητικὴν μουσικὴν γεωμετρίαν καὶ ἀστρονομίαν, καὶ πάλιν τὸ πρακτικὸν εἰς ἠθικὸν οἰκονομικὸν πολιτικὸν (46.17–21 Westerink).

92 — Text 1

§12

כאשר יבוא

כחומר חלל כחומר נשמה — כחומר של אר  
מאבות כחומר אר

5 וכן — ארץ כחומר של ארץ ארץ ארץ ארץ  
אמורה — ארץ ארץ ארץ ארץ ארץ ארץ  
אמורה ארץ ארץ ארץ ארץ ארץ ארץ

— ארץ ארץ ארץ ארץ ארץ ארץ ארץ ארץ  
10 אמורה — אמורה ארץ ארץ ארץ ארץ ארץ ארץ  
אמורה חלל כחומר נשמה

כחומר נשמה

§13

אמורה ארץ ארץ ארץ

כחומר נשמה ארץ ארץ ארץ ארץ ארץ ארץ  
15 ארץ ארץ ארץ ארץ ארץ ארץ ארץ ארץ  
אמורה ארץ ארץ ארץ ארץ ארץ ארץ ארץ ארץ  
אמורה ארץ ארץ ארץ ארץ ארץ ארץ ארץ ארץ

אמורה ארץ ארץ ארץ

§14

אמורה ארץ ארץ ארץ

אמורה ארץ ארץ ארץ

20 אמורה ארץ ארץ ארץ ארץ ארץ ארץ ארץ ארץ

§12 B 12, M 12; Metr. 2 §13 B 13, M 13, V 22; Metr. 3 §14 B 14, M 14, V 38; Metr. 4

11 כחומר נשמה] om. V 12 אמורה] om. V 13 אמורה ארץ MV: אמורה ארץ B  
אמורה ארץ V: אמורה ארץ BM | אמורה V: אמורה ארץ BM 14 אמורה ארץ ארץ BM:  
אמורה ארץ ארץ V | אמורה ארץ BM: אמורה ארץ V 15 אמורה ארץ ארץ V: אמורה ארץ ארץ BM  
16 אמורה ארץ V: אמורה ארץ ארץ BM 17 אמורה ארץ ארץ] om. V 18 אמורה ארץ] om. V  
19 אמורה ארץ B: אמורה ארץ MV 20 אמורה ארץ BV: אמורה ארץ M | אמורה ארץ MV:  
אמורה ארץ B

§12

*Second division*<sup>15</sup>

All things

- are either immaterial, and the knowledge of them is called divine science,
- or material:
  - they are either separable from matter only in thought, as circle or the form of the triangle, (and) the knowledge of them is called mathematical (μαθηματικόν);
  - or they are inseparable from matter even in thought, as the elements (στοιχεῖα) and what (is constituted) from them, and the knowledge of them is called natural science.

§13

*Third division*

The mathematical (μαθηματικόν) (part of philosophy is divided) into:

- geometry (γεωμετρία), which means “measurement of land”,
- astronomy (ἀστρονομία), which means “law of the stars”,
- arithmetic (ἀριθμητική), which means “numbering”,
- and music (μουσική), which means “playing on a cithern”.<sup>16</sup>

§14

*Fourth division*<sup>17</sup>

Quantity is divided:

- into continuous,
  - (which is) either unmovable and pertaining to geometry (γεωμετρία),

<sup>15</sup> Just as the previous division, this one most likely derives from the commentary on the *Isagoge* that served as the source for Bar Shakko's *Book of the Dialogues*. In Bar Shakko (Baumstark 1900: 23.1–9), we find a diagram which in general corresponds to the division above. For the explanation of the tripartite division of the theoretical part of philosophy into theology, physics, and mathematics, cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 11.25–12.20 Busse; Sergius, *In Cat.* §12 (72–74 Arzhanov).

<sup>16</sup> For the division of mathematical sciences in the Alexandrian *prolegomena*-treatises, cf., e.g., David, *Prolegomena* 60.10–65.9 Busse.

<sup>17</sup> The same division appears in Bar Shakko's *Book of the Dialogues* (Baumstark 1900: 23.16–27) as an answer to the question of why there are four mathematical sciences. Cf. David, *Prolegomena* 60.22–62.3 Busse.

רַב־אֱלֹהִים לְרַב־אֱלֹהִים אֵל  
 רַב־אֱלֹהִים  
 מִלְּפָנֶיךָ לְרַב־אֱלֹהִים רַב־אֱלֹהִים לְךָ אֵל  
 מִלְּפָנֶיךָ לְרַב־אֱלֹהִים אֵל

5

רַב־אֱלֹהִים

§15

לְךָ אֵל רַב־אֱלֹהִים  
 רַב־אֱלֹהִים אֵל  
 רַב־אֱלֹהִים אֵל  
 מִלְּפָנֶיךָ אֵל

10

רַב־אֱלֹהִים

§16

רַב־אֱלֹהִים רַב־אֱלֹהִים רַב־אֱלֹהִים  
 רַב־אֱלֹהִים רַב־אֱלֹהִים  
 רַב־אֱלֹהִים רַב־אֱלֹהִים רַב־אֱלֹהִים

§15 B 15, M 15, V 23; Metr. 5 §16 B 16, M 16; Metr. 6

1 רַב־אֱלֹהִים BM: רַב־אֱלֹהִים V 2 רַב־אֱלֹהִים B, Metr.: רַב־אֱלֹהִים M: רַב־אֱלֹהִים V 3 מִלְּפָנֶיךָ V: מִלְּפָנֶיךָ M: מִלְּפָנֶיךָ B 4 לְרַב־אֱלֹהִים V: לְרַב־אֱלֹהִים BM | מִלְּפָנֶיךָ V: מִלְּפָנֶיךָ BM 5 רַב־אֱלֹהִים] om. V 6 לְךָ אֵל BM: לְךָ V 9 אֵל  
 מִלְּפָנֶיךָ codd.: מִלְּפָנֶיךָ Metr.

- or movable and pertaining to astronomy (ἄστρονομία);
- and discrete,
  - (which) appears to be either without affinity and pertaining to arithmetic (ἀριθμητική),
  - or having affinity and pertaining to music (μουσική).

§15

*Fifth division*<sup>18</sup>

Everything that (one) does or performs, (he does)

- either in a city,
- or in a house,
- or in himself.<sup>19</sup>

§16

*Sixth division*<sup>20</sup>

The care of cities, of one's house, and of one's morals (is divided into):

- legislation and jurisdiction,
- foresight and strategy.<sup>21</sup>

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**18** This list serves as an additional explanation to the fact that the practical part of philosophy (“everything one does”) is divided into three parts. The division above is nearly identical with the version found in Bar Shakko’s *Book of the Dialogues* (Baumstark 1900: 25.18–19, cf. the following diagram).

**19** Cf. Sergius, *In Cat.* 104.8–9 Arzhanov. In Sergius’ and Bar Shakko’s treatises, as well as in the *Metr.*, we find the term *qnoma* as standing for the third type (“for himself”), so that the form in the present version (*hu beh*) appears quite unique and is most likely a product of textual corruption.

**20** This diagram presents an additional division of the practical part of philosophy, which includes politics, economics, and ethics, cf. §11 above.

**21** The division of the practical part into legislation and jurisdiction, according to David (*Prolegomena* 75.33–76.17 Busse), derives from Plato, cf. also Ammonius, *In Isag.* 15.10–16.4 Busse; Sergius, *In Cat.* §19 (78 Arzhanov).



§17

*Seventh division*<sup>22</sup>

The life<sup>23</sup> of the soul is:

- cognitive — it is set in order by theory;
- and practical — it is set in order by practice.<sup>24</sup>

§18

*Eighth division*

The powers of the soul are:

- reason: if it is completed, it becomes wisdom;
- wrath: if it (is directed) against evil, it becomes courage;
- and desire: if it (is directed) towards what is proper, it becomes modesty.<sup>25</sup>

§19

*Ninth division*

Virtues are four:

- wisdom: when it is excessive it turns into cunning and when it is deficient it turns into madness;
- fortitude: when it overflows it turns into boldness and when it diminishes it becomes fear;
- temperance:<sup>26</sup> when it is excessive it turns into ardour and when it is deficient it becomes immovability;
- justice: when it is excessive it acquires what does not belong to it and when it is deficient it becomes oppression.<sup>27</sup>

22 This division finds its parallel in Bar Shakko's *Book of the Dialogues* (Baumstark 1900: 22.6–21).

23 Thus mss. B and M, and *Metr.*, cf. also Bar Shakko (Baumstark 1900: 22.8). Ms. V: “the powers of the soul”, cf. Proba, *In De Int.* (65.19 Hoffmann). Sergius in *In Cat.* speaks of two “parts” of the soul, encompassing some of its powers, which seems to be more fitting terminology, cf. the next division.

24 For a comparison between the two powers of the soul and the two parts of philosophy (theoretical and practical), cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 11.16–22 Busse; Sergius, *In Cat.* 70.14–72.5 Arzhanov.

25 The Alexandrian *prolegomena* treatises discuss this subject in the context of Plato's definition of philosophy, cf. Elias, *Prolegomena* 18.26–31 Busse. A similar division appears in Ps.-Michael Badoqa, *Book of Definitions* 69.1–3 Furlani. Cf. also the Syriac version of Ps.-Aristotle's *De Virt.* I.3 (Brock 2014: 94).

26 One would expect to find the term *nakputa* here instead of *knikuta* (cf. *De Virt.* IV.5 and *Div. Arist.* §13 in Brock 2014: 96, 98).

27 Cf. Elias, *Prolegomena* 19.5–29 Busse; David, *Prolegomena* 38.1–39.13 Busse. Cf. also the Syriac version of *Div. Arist.* §13 (Brock 2014: 98).



§20

*Another division, which appears as the first one*<sup>28</sup>

Everything that is said to exist

- subsists either in pure thought, as one speaks of a centaur;<sup>29</sup>
- or in actuality:
  - it is either body or incorporeal;
  - it subsists either by itself
  - or in something else:
    - it is either separable from what it is in
    - or it is inseparable.<sup>30</sup>

§21

*Second division*

Genera and species:

- some of them are prior to the many — they are an object of investigation for theology;
- some of them are in the many — they are an object of investigation for physics;
- and some of them are after the many — their investigation belongs to logic.<sup>31</sup>

<sup>28</sup> I.e. the following division appears as the first one in the next block of divisions (attached to a different book or book chapter).

<sup>29</sup> Syriac *susay barnaša* is an explicative translation of the Gr. κένταυρος.

<sup>30</sup> Cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 39.14–41.2 Busse. See also T2 §20.

<sup>31</sup> Cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 41.20–42.21 Busse. While discussing the Platonic notion of the Demiurge containing the models of all things, Ammonius (*In Isag.* 42.6–13 Busse) speaks of the universals that are “prior to the many” (πρὸ τῶν πολλῶν), those that are “in the many” (ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς), and those that are “after the many” (μετὰ τοὺς πολλοὺς), cf. Elias, *In Isag.* 48.15–30 Busse; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 58.13–21 Busse. Sergius of Reshaina presents a similar division in *In Cat.* §§72–79 (126–133 Arzhanov), coming to the conclusion that it is only the genera and species which are “after the many” that are the object of investigation in the “books of logic” (132.11–14). Cf. also the anonymous Syriac scholia on the *Isagoge* preserved in ms. V (Baumstark 1900: 39.16–26).

העלית: קל

עלמיתא קל

אך חן חלמית — חן חלמית חן חלמית חן חלמית  
חלמית

5 אר חן חלמית — חן חלמית חן חלמית חן חלמית חן חלמית  
אר חן חלמית — חן חלמית חן חלמית חן חלמית חן חלמית  
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אר חן חלמית — חן חלמית חן חלמית חן חלמית חן חלמית  
אר חן חלמית — חן חלמית חן חלמית חן חלמית חן חלמית  
10 חן חלמית חן חלמית חן חלמית חן חלמית חן חלמית

אר חן חלמית — חן חלמית חן חלמית חן חלמית חן חלמית  
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§22 B 22, M 22, V 16; Metr. 12

1 אר חלמית קל] om. V 3 אר] om. V | חלמית BM: חלמית V | חלמית BM:  
חלמית V | חן חלמית חן חלמית] om. BM | חן חלמית scr.: חלמית V 5 אר]  
om. V | חן חלמית B: חלמית V | חן חלמית חן חלמית חן חלמית חן חלמית  
חן חלמית BM 6 אר] om. V | חן חלמית BM: חלמית V | חן חלמית] om. V | חן חלמית  
חן חלמית חן חלמית חן חלמית חן חלמית חן חלמית] om. BM 8 אר] om. V | חן חלמית +  
Metr. | חן חלמית MV: חלמית B | חן חלמית BM: חן חלמית V | חן חלמית] om. BM | חן חלמית V:  
חן חלמית B: חלמית M 9 אר] om. V | חן חלמית BM: חלמית V | חן חלמית BM: חלמית  
V | חן חלמית] om. V | חן חלמית חן חלמית חן חלמית חן חלמית חן חלמית] om. BM 10 חן חלמית V:  
חן חלמית BM 11 אר] om. V | חן חלמית חן חלמית חן חלמית חן חלמית חן חלמית  
חן חלמית חן חלמית חן חלמית חן חלמית חן חלמית V: חן חלמית M: חן חלמית B

Philosophers derive their names

- either from their teacher, as the Pythagoreans are called after (their) teacher Pythagoras;
- or from a country, as the Cyrenaics are called after the country of Cyrene;<sup>33</sup>
- or from a place, as the Stoics are called after the Stoa *Pyltws*<sup>34</sup> and the Academics after the Academy, i.e. the school of Plato;
- or from the kind (of life), as the Cynics, which means “the dog-like”, are called;<sup>35</sup>
- or from the form (of judgement), as the Sceptics (Ἐφεκτικοί) who are called “masters of bringing themselves to silence”, “ready for death”, or “masters of argument”;<sup>36</sup>
- or from the goal (of their philosophy), as those who are called Hedonists and who stated that the goal of philosophy is pleasure, which is the comprehension of (existing) things;<sup>37</sup>

32 This list derives from one of the *prolegomena* questions, i.e. where the names of philosophical schools come from. Ammonius discusses it as the first introductory question at the beginning of his commentary on the *Categories* (*In Cat.* 1.13–3.19 Busse). Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 1.19–3.24 Busse; Simplicius, *In Cat.* 3.30–4.9 Kalbfleisch; Olympiodorus, *Prolegomena* 3.8–5.30 Busse; Elias, *In Cat.* 108.15–113.16 Busse. The same issue is discussed in the treatise ascribed to Olympiodorus (and preserved in fragmentary form in Syriac) as well as in Bar Shakkō’s *Book of the Dialogues* (cf. Furlani 1916b). Cf. also Silwanos of Qardu, 2nd collection, §1 (Hespel 1983: 34–35).

33 Cf. Olympiodorus, *Prolegomena* 3.15–16 Busse: ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς πατρίδος τῶν προκαταρξαμένων ὡς ἡ Κυρηναϊκὴ λέγεται φιλοσοφία ἀπὸ Ἀριστίππου τοῦ Κυρηναϊκοῦ — “(some schools are called) after the birthplace of their founders, as the Cyrenaic philosophy (has received its name) from Aristippus of Cyrene”.

34 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 1.17–18 Busse: ἀπὸ τοῦ τόπου ἔνθα ἐπαίδευσον, ὡσπερ οἱ Στωϊκοί, ἐπειδὴ ἐν τῇ στοᾷ ἐπαίδευσον τῇ ποικίλῃ — “(some are named) after the place where they studied, as, for example, the Stoics because they studied in the Painted Stoa”. See also Olympiodorus, *Prolegomena* 3.15–16 Busse. The Syriac word *Pyltws* most likely originated from an attempt at transliterating the Greek ποικίλος, which later was modified.

35 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 2.2 Busse: ἡ ἀπὸ τοῦ εἴδους τῆς ζωῆς ὡσπερ οἱ Κυνικοὶ φιλόσοφοι — “(some are named) after their way of life, as the Cynic philosophers”. Cf. Olympiodorus, *Prolegomena* 3.20–21 Busse.

36 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 2.8–9 Busse: ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ τρόπου τῆς γνώσεως (...) ὡσπερ φαμέν τοὺς Ἐφεκτικούς. For the designations of this group presented in the Syriac text, cf. Olympiodorus, *Prolegomena* 3.38–4.3 Busse. See also Silwanos of Qardu, 2nd coll., §1 (Hespel 1983: 34.22–35.3).

37 Cf. Elias, *In Cat.* 111.33–34 Busse: τέλος γὰρ τῶν ὄντων τὴν ἡδονὴν ἔλεγον. See also Philoponus, *In Cat.* 2.29–3.3 Busse and Olympiodorus, *Prolegomena* 5.8–18 Busse, both of whom stress that, while speaking about pleasure as the goal of philosophy, the Hedonists meant not the bodily pleasure but that of the soul.

הַחַיִּים וְהַמְּתוּקִים — אֵלֶּיךָ יָבוֹאוּ  
וְיִשְׂמְרוּ לְךָ אֶת-בְּרִיתִי

פְּסוּלֵי מִזְבֵּחַ

§23

וְהַחֲבִיבִים

5 אֶת-בְּרִיתִי וְהַחֲבִיבִים — אֵלֶּיךָ יָבוֹאוּ וְיִשְׂמְרוּ לְךָ אֶת-בְּרִיתִי  
וְהַחֲבִיבִים — אֵלֶּיךָ יָבוֹאוּ וְיִשְׂמְרוּ לְךָ אֶת-בְּרִיתִי  
וְהַחֲבִיבִים — אֵלֶּיךָ יָבוֹאוּ וְיִשְׂמְרוּ לְךָ אֶת-בְּרִיתִי  
10 וְהַחֲבִיבִים — אֵלֶּיךָ יָבוֹאוּ וְיִשְׂמְרוּ לְךָ אֶת-בְּרִיתִי

פְּסוּלֵי מִזְבֵּחַ

§24

וְהַחֲבִיבִים וְהַחֲבִיבִים — אֵלֶּיךָ יָבוֹאוּ וְיִשְׂמְרוּ לְךָ אֶת-בְּרִיתִי  
וְהַחֲבִיבִים — אֵלֶּיךָ יָבוֹאוּ וְיִשְׂמְרוּ לְךָ אֶת-בְּרִיתִי  
15 וְהַחֲבִיבִים — אֵלֶּיךָ יָבוֹאוּ וְיִשְׂמְרוּ לְךָ אֶת-בְּרִיתִי  
וְהַחֲבִיבִים — אֵלֶּיךָ יָבוֹאוּ וְיִשְׂמְרוּ לְךָ אֶת-בְּרִיתִי

§23 B 23, M 23, V 36; Metr. 13 §24 B 24, M 24, V 13; Metr. 14

1 אֵלֶּיךָ] om. V | אֵלֶּיךָ BV: אֵלֶּיךָ M | אֵלֶּיךָ V: אֵלֶּיךָ BM | הַחַיִּים וְהַמְּתוּקִים  
וְהַחֲבִיבִים] om. BM 2 אֵלֶּיךָ וְהַחֲבִיבִים V: אֵלֶּיךָ וְהַחֲבִיבִים אֵלֶּיךָ וְהַחֲבִיבִים  
וְהַחֲבִיבִים] om. V 6 אֵלֶּיךָ V: אֵלֶּיךָ BM 7 אֵלֶּיךָ V: אֵלֶּיךָ BM | אֵלֶּיךָ B: אֵלֶּיךָ M: אֵלֶּיךָ V 8 אֵלֶּיךָ V: אֵלֶּיךָ BM 9 אֵלֶּיךָ] inv.  
B | אֵלֶּיךָ V: אֵלֶּיךָ BM 10 אֵלֶּיךָ] + אֵלֶּיךָ BM 11 אֵלֶּיךָ] om. V  
12 אֵלֶּיךָ וְהַחֲבִיבִים] om. BM 13 אֵלֶּיךָ] + אֵלֶּיךָ BM | אֵלֶּיךָ MV: אֵלֶּיךָ B  
14 אֵלֶּיךָ] + אֵלֶּיךָ M 15 אֵלֶּיךָ] + אֵלֶּיךָ M 16 אֵלֶּיךָ] + אֵלֶּיךָ M | אֵלֶּיךָ V:  
אֵלֶּיךָ BM

- or from an external accidental feature, as the Peripatetics, i.e. the school of Aristotle, are called, (which means) “walking”.

§23

*First division*<sup>38</sup>

“Genus” signifies

- relation of many to one and to one another, as the Heraclids are from Heracles,
- relation of one to one, as a certain person derives from Heracles or from Athens,<sup>39</sup>
- the fact that there is a species beneath something, as “living being” beneath which there is “man”.

§24

*Second division*<sup>40</sup>

Relation is said in four ways:

- either by accident, as a servant (is related) to his master;
- or by craft, as a disciple (is related) to his teacher;
- or by will, as a friend (is related) to his friend;
- or by nature, as a son (is related) to his father.

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<sup>38</sup> This diagram appears as Division 1 attached to the chapter “On Genus” in the extant part of Proba’s commentary on the *Isagoge* (ms. Erbil 169, fol. 5r) and is based on the text of the commentary. Cf. Porphyry, *Isag.* 1.18–2.13.

<sup>39</sup> In Porphyry’s text, the second point (relation of one to one) is subdivided into two types, generation from some person (e.g. Heracles) and from some place (e.g. Athens). In the diagram attached to the chapter “On Genus” in Proba’s treatise, this subdivision is not apparent. However, in the actual text of the commentary on which this division is based, it is made explicit.

<sup>40</sup> This list is based on the chapter “On Genus” in Proba’s commentary on the *Isagoge* (ms. Erbil 169, fol. 2r), to which it was attached in the form of a tree diagram as Division 2 (fol. 5r).

כחלדה קלא

§25

כיחאמא חכ

כחלדה קלא — כיחאמא קלאמא קלאמא קלאמא

כיחאמא קלאמא — כיחאמא קלאמא

5 קלאמא קלאמא — כיחאמא קלאמאמא קלאמא קלאמא

כיחאמא קלאמא — כיחאמא

קלאמא קלאמא — כיחאמא קלאמא קלאמא קלאמא

כיחאמא קלאמא חכמא — קלאמא

קלאמא קלאמא — כיחאמא קלאמאמא קלאמא קלאמאמא

כיחאמא קלאמא — קלאמא קלאמא

10

כחלדה קלא

§26

חכמא קלא חכמא

קלאמא קלאמא קלאמא קלאמא קלאמא

קלאמא קלאמא קלאמא קלאמא

15

קלאמא קלאמא — קלאמא קלאמא

קלאמא קלאמא קלאמא קלאמא

קלאמא קלאמא — קלאמא קלאמא

קלאמא קלאמא — קלאמא קלאמא

קלאמא קלאמא — קלאמא קלאמא

20

קלאמא קלאמא — קלאמא קלאמא

קלאמא קלאמא — קלאמא קלאמא

§25 B 25, M 25, V 24; Metr. 16a §26 B 26, M 26; Metr. 16b

1 כחלדה קלא] om. V 3 קלאמא BM, Metr.: קלאמא V 4 קלאמא V: קלאמא B: קלאמא M | קלאמא V: קלאמא קלאמא BM | כיחאמא V: כיחאמא BM 5 קלאמא Metr.: קלאמא V: קלאמאמא BM 6 קלאמא B: קלאמא M: קלאמא V | קלאמא BM, Metr.: קלאמא V | כיחאמא V, Metr.: קלאמא BM 7 קלאמא BM, Metr.: קלאמא V | קלאמא V: קלאמאמא BM 8 כיחאמא BM: כיחאמא V 10 כיחאמא V: כיחאמא BM 13 קלאמאמא M, Metr.: קלאמאמא B

§25

*Third division*<sup>41</sup>

Among things, (there is)

- commonality of name but difference of thing, as a land-dog and the dog of Orion, which are called homonyms;
- difference of name but commonality of thing, as “sword” and “blade”, which are called polyonymes;
- difference of name and difference of thing, as “animal” and “whiteness”, which are called heteronymes;
- commonality of name and commonality of thing, as (the species) “bull” and “horse” in (the genus) “animal”, and they are called synonyms.

§26

*Fourth division*<sup>42</sup>

Every word that exists,

- either does not signify anything known at all,
- or signifies something:
  - it is either predicated of a particular thing, for instance of Socrates,
  - or of many:
    - it is either a genus, as “living being”,
    - or a species, as “man”,
    - or a differentia, as “rational”,
    - or a property, as “laughing”,
    - or an accident, as “black”.<sup>43</sup>

41 Cf. Division 3 attached to the chapter “On Genus” in Proba’s commentary on the *Isagoge* (see ms. Erbil 169, fol. 5v). Although there are minor differences between the two versions, both of them are clearly based on Proba’s text (cf. fol. 3r). Cf. Sergius, *In Cat.* §§117–120 (156–159 Arzhanov) and Division 6 of Book II (164.2–10), where we find rather different terminology. See also T2 §27, which is closer to Sergius’ version than to Proba’s.

42 Cf. Division 4 attached to the chapter “On Genus” in Proba’s commentary on the *Isagoge* (ms. Erbil 169, fol. 5v) and based on the text of the commentary (see fol. 3r). Cf. §2 above based on Porphyry’s text, as well as T2 §17 and T3 §6 where the second half of the list appears in narrative form.

43 Cf. Porphyry, *Isag.* 2.17–19. For this division, cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 58.19–59.8 Busse: τῶν φωνῶν αἱ μὲν εἰσιν ἄσημοι οἷον κνάξ βλίτυρι σκινδαψός, αἱ δὲ σημαντικαί, αἴτινες ἢ καθ’ ἑνὸς λέγονται, ὡς ὅταν εἴπωμεν Πλάτωνα ἢ Σωκράτην ἢ τινα τῶν καθ’ ἕκαστα, ἢ κατὰ πλειόνων, αἴτινες ἢ καθ’ οὐσιωδῶν κατηγοροῦνται ἢ καθ’ ἐπουσιωδῶν· ἢ κατὰ διαφορόντων τῶ εἶδει ὡς τὰ γένη καὶ αἱ διαφοραὶ (ταῦτα δὲ ἐν τῶ τί ἐστι κατηγορεῖται ὡς τὸ γένος ἢ ἐν τῶ ὁποῖόν τί ἐστι ὡς ἡ διαφορὰ), ἢ κατὰ διαφορόντων τῶ ἀριθμῶ ὡς τὸ εἶδος· ἢ καθ’ ἑνὸς εἶδους κατηγορεῖται ὡς τὸ ἴδιον ἢ κατὰ πλειόνων ὡς τὸ συμβεβηκός.

ḥalāqat mānā

§27

ḥalāqat mānā

lā mānā

ḥalāqat

5

ḥalāqat

ḥalāqat

ḥalāqat

ḥalāqat mānā — ḥalāqat mānā

ḥalāqat mānā — ḥalāqat mānā

10

ḥalāqat mānā — ḥalāqat mānā

ḥalāqat mānā — ḥalāqat mānā

ḥalāqat mānā

§28

ḥalāqat mānā

ḥalāqat mānā — ḥalāqat mānā

15

ḥalāqat

ḥalāqat mānā — ḥalāqat mānā

ḥalāqat

ḥalāqat mānā — ḥalāqat mānā

ḥalāqat mānā

§27 B 27, M 27, V 37; Metr. 17 §28 B 28, M 28

1 ḥalāqat mānā] om. V 2 ḥalāqat MV: ḥalāqat B 3 lā MV: lā B 5 ḥalāqat] +  
ḥalāqat BM 7 ḥalāqat BV: ḥalāqat M 8 ḥalāqat BM: ḥalāqat V | ḥalāqat V: ḥalāqat  
BM | ḥalāqat BM: ḥalāqat V | ḥalāqat BM: ḥalāqat V; +, ḥalāqat mānā ḥalāqat  
ḥalāqat BM 9 ḥalāqat BM: ḥalāqat V 10 ḥalāqat BM: ḥalāqat V 11 ḥalāqat M:  
ḥalāqat BV | ḥalāqat V: ḥalāqat M: ḥalāqat B

§27

*First division*<sup>44</sup>

Substance is divided

- into incorporeal:
  - into angels
  - and into souls;
- into body:
  - into animate:
    - into animals — into man, bull, and horse;
    - into animal-plants — into sponges and into shellfishes;
    - and into plants — into grass, seeds, and trees;
  - and into inanimate — into stones, iron, and the rest.

§28

*Second division*<sup>45</sup>

“Individual” is called

- what has no parts at all, as the point in a circle’s centre;
- what is difficult to divide, either because of its hardness or because of its small size;
- and what, when it is divided, does not maintain the account of its nature, as Plato, or Socrates, or any other person.

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44 Cf. Division 1 attached to the chapter “On Species” in Proba’s commentary (ms. Erbil 169, fol. 11v). For this division known as the “Tree of Porphyry”, cf. T2 §§3, 7, 8, 20; T3 §8.

45 Cf. Division 2 attached to the chapter “On Species” in Proba’s commentary (see ms. Erbil 169, f. 12r). The division is extracted from Proba’s text as a summary of it (see fol. 10r-v).

קטנת קלא

§29

יזנתו קלא

קתאמא קתאלא קאמא אהא קא — אהא  
 קתאמא קתאלא קאמא קתאלא קא — אהא  
 קתאמא קתאלא קאמא קתאלא קא — אהא

5

קתנת קלא

§30

קלא אהא

יזנתו קלא אהא — אהא קתאמא  
 אהא קתאלא אהא קתאלא אהא — אהא

10

קתנת קלא

§31

קלא אהא

יזנתו קתאלא אהא — אהא קתאלא  
 קתאלא אהא  
 קתאלא קתאלא — קתאלא אהא  
 קתאלא קתאלא — אהא אהא

15

§29 B 29, M 29, V 32 §30 B 30, M 30, V 33; Metr. 25 §31 B 31, M 31, V 34

1 קטנת קלא] om. V 3 קא] + ,א B 4 קא MV: קא B | קתאמא BM: קתא  
 5 קתאלא V: אהא BM | קא MV: קא B 6 קתנת קלא] om. V 8 אהא BM:  
 ,אהא V | קתאלא scr.: אהא BM: אהא יזנתו V 10 קתנת קלא] om. V  
 12 קתאלא V: אהא אהא אהא אהא BM 14 קתאלא] om. BM | קתאלא<sup>2</sup> V: יזנתו BM  
 15 אהא MV: ,א B | אהא] om. BM | קתאלא scr.: אהא BM: אהא יזנתו  
 אהא V: אהא BM

§29

*First division*<sup>46</sup>

Differentia is said

- commonly, as sitting, standing-up, youth, and old age;
- properly, as being snub-nosed or as blackness of a raven;
- and most properly, as rational and irrational.<sup>47</sup>

§30

*Second division*<sup>48</sup>

Further, a differentia

- either makes (a substrate) other, i.e. the one that is said most properly,
- or (makes it) different, i.e. the one that is (said) commonly and the one that is (said) properly.<sup>49</sup>

§31

*Third division*<sup>50</sup>

Further, a differentia

- is either separable, i.e. the one said commonly,
- or inseparable:
  - the one said properly, (which) is called accidental,
  - and also the one (said) most properly, (which) is called substantial.<sup>51</sup>

<sup>46</sup> Cf. Division 1 attached to the chapter “On Differentia” in Proba’s commentary (ms. Erbil 169, fol. 21r).

<sup>47</sup> Cf. Porphyry, *Isag.* 8.8: διαφορὰ δὲ κοινῶς τε καὶ ἰδίως καὶ ἰδιαιτάτα λεγέσθω.

<sup>48</sup> Cf. Division 2 attached to the chapter “On Differentia” in Proba’s commentary (ms. Erbil 169, fol. 21r).

<sup>49</sup> Cf. Porphyry, *Isag.* 8.19–21: τῶν γὰρ διαφορῶν αἱ μὲν ἄλλοῖον ποιοῦσιν, αἱ δὲ ἄλλο. αἱ μὲν οὖν ποιοῦσαι ἄλλο εἰδοποιοὶ κέκληνται, αἱ δὲ ἄλλοῖον ἀπλῶς διαφοραί.

<sup>50</sup> Cf. Division 3 attached to the chapter “On Differentia” in Proba’s commentary (ms. Erbil 169, fol. 21v).

<sup>51</sup> Cf. Porphyry, *Isag.* 9.24–10.1: τριῶν οὖν εἰδῶν τῆς διαφορᾶς θεωρουμένων καὶ τῶν μὲν οὐσῶν χωριστῶν τῶν δὲ ἀχωρίστων καὶ πάλιν τῶν ἀχωρίστων τῶν μὲν οὐσῶν καθ’ αὐτὰς τῶν δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκός.

ḥḥḥḥ ḥḥḥḥ

§32

ḥḥḥḥ ḥḥḥḥ

ḥḥḥḥ ḥḥḥḥ ḥḥḥḥ ḥḥḥḥ ḥḥḥḥ — ḥḥḥḥ ḥḥḥḥ

ḥḥḥḥ ḥḥḥḥ

5 ḥḥḥḥ ḥḥḥḥ — ḥḥḥḥ ḥḥḥḥ ḥḥḥḥ — ḥḥḥḥ ḥḥḥḥ

ḥḥḥḥ


ḥḥḥḥ ḥḥḥḥ

§33

ḥḥḥḥḥḥ ḥḥḥḥḥḥ

10

ḥḥḥḥḥḥḥḥ



ḥḥḥḥḥḥḥḥ

ḥḥḥḥḥḥḥḥ

ḥḥḥḥḥḥḥḥ

15

ḥḥḥḥḥḥḥḥ

ḥḥḥḥḥḥḥḥ ḥḥḥḥḥḥḥḥ

ḥḥḥḥḥḥḥḥ

§32 B 32, M 32, V 35 §33 B 33, M 33, V 26; Metr. 27c

1 ḥḥḥḥḥ ḥḥḥḥḥ] om. V 3 ḥḥḥḥḥ B: ḥḥḥḥḥḥḥḥ VM | ḥḥḥḥḥ] om. BM  
ḥḥḥḥḥḥḥ MV: ḥḥḥḥḥḥḥḥ B 5 ḥḥḥḥḥḥ V: ḥḥḥḥḥḥ ḥḥḥḥḥḥ BM 6 ḥḥḥḥḥ V:  
ḥḥḥḥḥḥ BM 7 ḥḥḥḥḥ ḥḥḥḥḥ] om. V


§32

*Fourth division*<sup>52</sup>

The most proper differentiae

- are either constitutive, as being animate and being perceptive, which constitute living being,
- or divisive, as rational and irrational, which divide living being.<sup>53</sup>

§33


*Fifth division*<sup>54</sup>

<sup>52</sup> Cf. Division 4 attached to the chapter “On Differentia” in Proba’s commentary (ms. Erbil 169, fol. 21v).

<sup>53</sup> Cf. Porphyry, *Isag.* 10.2–8.

<sup>54</sup> Cf. Division 5 attached to the chapter “On Differentia” in Proba’s commentary (ms. Erbil 169, fol. 21v). It appears in the narrative form in *Metr.*

§34



§35

הַלְלֵךְ דָּוִד  
 וְכָל־לַיְלָה כָּל־לַיְלָה  
 אֲשֶׁר עָשָׂה לְדָוִד וְלְכָל־לַיְלָה  
 כָּל־לַיְלָה — כָּל־לַיְלָה  
 אֲשֶׁר עָשָׂה לְדָוִד וְלְכָל־לַיְלָה  
 כָּל־לַיְלָה — כָּל־לַיְלָה  
 אֲשֶׁר עָשָׂה לְדָוִד וְלְכָל־לַיְלָה


§36

הַלְלֵךְ דָּוִד  
 וְכָל־לַיְלָה כָּל־לַיְלָה  
 אֲשֶׁר עָשָׂה לְדָוִד וְלְכָל־לַיְלָה  
 כָּל־לַיְלָה — כָּל־לַיְלָה  
 אֲשֶׁר עָשָׂה לְדָוִד וְלְכָל־לַיְלָה  
 כָּל־לַיְלָה — כָּל־לַיְלָה  
 אֲשֶׁר עָשָׂה לְדָוִד וְלְכָל־לַיְלָה

§34 B 34, M 34, V 27; Metr. 27d §35 B 35, M 35, V 29; Metr. 27b §36 B 36, M 36, V 28; Metr. 28

1 [הַלְלֵךְ דָּוִד] om. V 11 [הַלְלֵךְ דָּוִד] om. V 16 V: וְכָל־לַיְלָה אֲשֶׁר עָשָׂה לְדָוִד וְלְכָל־לַיְלָה BM 17 [הַלְלֵךְ דָּוִד] om. V 19 V: וְכָל־לַיְלָה, Metr.: וְכָל־לַיְלָה BM 20 V: לְדָוִד וְכָל־לַיְלָה BM | וְכָל־לַיְלָה BM: וְכָל־לַיְלָה וְכָל־לַיְלָה V 21 + [דָּוִד] BM | וְכָל־לַיְלָה V: וְכָל־לַיְלָה וְכָל־לַיְלָה BM

§34



§35

*Seventh division*<sup>56</sup>

Things are constituted:

- either of matter (ύλη) and shaping<sup>57</sup> form (εἶδος), for instance, the four elements (στοιχεῖα),
- or of what is analogous to matter and shaping form, for instance, a statue (ἀνδριάνς).<sup>58</sup>

§36

*First division*<sup>59</sup>

Property is said of

- what occurs to one species alone but not to all of it, as doing geometry which is characteristic not of every man;
- what (occurs) to the entire species but not to it alone, as being biped;

<sup>55</sup> Cf. Division 6 attached to the chapter “On Differentia” in Proba’s commentary (ms. Erbil 169, fol. 21v). It presents a summary of Proba’s argument (cf. fols. 13v–14r). It appears in narrative form in *Metr.*

<sup>56</sup> Cf. Division 7 attached to the chapter “On Differentia” in Proba’s commentary (ms. Erbil 169, fol. 21v). It summarizes Proba’s text (cf. fol. 19v).

<sup>57</sup> Syr. *myaqnana*, a derivative from the noun *yuqna* which is a loanword from the Gr. εικόν. The adjectival form here means “shaping, producing a form, imprinting an image”. It is not found either in the Greek text of the *Isagoge* or in the Syriac translations of it.

<sup>58</sup> This division ultimately goes back to *Isag.* 11.12–17, but it modifies Porphyry’s text.

<sup>59</sup> Cf. Division 1 attached to the chapter “On Property” in Proba’s commentary (ms. Erbil 169, fol. 22v), presenting a summary of Proba’s text (cf. fol. 22r).

כּוּחַ סְחָבָה — כּוּחַ סְחָבָה, חֶסֶד לֵב חַלְבָּה — כּוּחַ סְחָבָה  
כּוּחַ סְחָבָה

כּוּחַ סְחָבָה, חֶסֶד לֵב חַלְבָּה — כּוּחַ סְחָבָה, חֶסֶד לֵב חַלְבָּה  
כּוּחַ סְחָבָה, חֶסֶד לֵב חַלְבָּה

5

חֶסֶד לֵב חַלְבָּה

§37

כּוּחַ סְחָבָה, חֶסֶד לֵב חַלְבָּה — כּוּחַ סְחָבָה, חֶסֶד לֵב חַלְבָּה  
כּוּחַ סְחָבָה, חֶסֶד לֵב חַלְבָּה — כּוּחַ סְחָבָה, חֶסֶד לֵב חַלְבָּה  
כּוּחַ סְחָבָה, חֶסֶד לֵב חַלְבָּה — כּוּחַ סְחָבָה, חֶסֶד לֵב חַלְבָּה

10

חֶסֶד לֵב חַלְבָּה

§38

חֶסֶד לֵב חַלְבָּה  
כּוּחַ סְחָבָה, חֶסֶד לֵב חַלְבָּה — כּוּחַ סְחָבָה, חֶסֶד לֵב חַלְבָּה  
כּוּחַ סְחָבָה, חֶסֶד לֵב חַלְבָּה — כּוּחַ סְחָבָה, חֶסֶד לֵב חַלְבָּה

§37 B 37, M 37, V 30; *Metr.* 29 §38 B 38, M 38, V 25; *Metr.* 30a

1 כּוּחַ סְחָבָה BM: כּוּחַ סְחָבָה V: כּוּחַ סְחָבָה, חֶסֶד לֵב חַלְבָּה BM | כּוּחַ סְחָבָה BM  
כּוּחַ סְחָבָה scr: כּוּחַ סְחָבָה BM: כּוּחַ סְחָבָה V 3 כּוּחַ סְחָבָה, חֶסֶד לֵב חַלְבָּה V: כּוּחַ סְחָבָה, חֶסֶד לֵב חַלְבָּה BM  
4 כּוּחַ סְחָבָה, חֶסֶד לֵב חַלְבָּה BM: כּוּחַ סְחָבָה, חֶסֶד לֵב חַלְבָּה V 5 חֶסֶד לֵב חַלְבָּה] om. V 7 חֶסֶד לֵב חַלְבָּה + חֶסֶד לֵב חַלְבָּה BM  
8 כּוּחַ סְחָבָה, חֶסֶד לֵב חַלְבָּה] + חֶסֶד לֵב חַלְבָּה, חֶסֶד לֵב חַלְבָּה BM, sim. *Metr.* 9 חֶסֶד לֵב חַלְבָּה BM, sim. *Metr.*: חֶסֶד לֵב חַלְבָּה  
V | חֶסֶד לֵב חַלְבָּה + חֶסֶד לֵב חַלְבָּה BM 10 חֶסֶד לֵב חַלְבָּה] om. V 12 חֶסֶד לֵב חַלְבָּה  
כּוּחַ סְחָבָה BM: חֶסֶד לֵב חַלְבָּה, חֶסֶד לֵב חַלְבָּה V 13 חֶסֶד לֵב חַלְבָּה V: חֶסֶד לֵב חַלְבָּה BM

- what (occurs) to all of a species and to it alone but not always, as turning grey in old age;
- what (occurs) to all of a species, to it alone, and always, as being capable of laughing (is characteristic) of man alone.<sup>60</sup>

§37

*Second division*<sup>61</sup>

Property is also said

- from form, as the erect posture (is a property) of man;<sup>62</sup>
- from potentiality, as laughing (is a property of man);<sup>63</sup>
- from actuality, as crawling (is a property) of a snake.<sup>64</sup>

§38

*Division of accident*<sup>65</sup>

Accidents are

- either separable, as sitting, standing, or sleeping;
- or inseparable, as the blackness of a pitch or a raven.<sup>66</sup>

<sup>60</sup> Cf. Porphyry, *Isag.* 12.13–22. See also §7 above based primarily on Porphyry's text.

<sup>61</sup> Cf. Division 2 attached to the chapter "On Property" in Proba's commentary (cf. ms. Erbil 169, fol. 22v), summarizing Proba's argument (cf. fol. 22r-v). A revised version of it appears in *Metr.*

<sup>62</sup> This characteristic of man goes back to Aristotle (*De Part. Anim.* 656a13), and it was probably known to Syriac scholars through Galen (cf. *De Usu Partium* 181.13 Kühn: εἶπομεν ἀνθρώπων μόνον ὀρθὸν ἵστασθαι). It is recorded (in the context of Galenic ideas) in Job of Edessa, *Book of the Treasures* (see Mingana 1935: 338.25–25) and appears as a definition of the term *ἄνθρωπος* (ἄνθρωπος) in Bar Bahlul's *Lexicon* (I.216 Duval).

<sup>63</sup> Ammonius stresses in *In Isag.* (109.20–22 Busse) that laughing is proper to man in potentiality.

<sup>64</sup> Proba attributes this division to the Platonic school (ms. Erbil 169, fol. 22r). *Metr.* also mentions Plato in this context.

<sup>65</sup> This division is the only one attached to the chapter "On Accident" in Proba's commentary (ms. Erbil 169, fol. 24r).

<sup>66</sup> Cf. Porphyry, *Isag.* 12.23–13.8. In mss. B and M, we find a definition of accident attached to this division that is based on *Isag.* 12.25–26.

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§39

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§39 B 39, M 39; *Metr.* 30b

2 ῥῥῥῥ ῥῥῥῥῥῥῥ M: ῥῥῥῥ ῥῥῥῥῥῥ B

§39

*(Last) division*<sup>67</sup>Ten combinations:<sup>68</sup>

- Genus: with differentia, with species, with property, with accident.
- Differentia: with species, with property, with accident.
- Species: with property, with accident.
- Property: with accident.

The End of the Divisions of Porphyry the Philosopher.

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<sup>67</sup> Cf. §§9–10 above. This division refers to the last part of the *Isag.* and to the last part of Proba's commentary. It summarizes Proba's argument (cf. Baumstark 1900: 8.16–9.7).

<sup>68</sup> Syr. *mettazwganuta*, corresponding to Gr. συζυγία. On the ten syzygies, or combinations of the five main terms of the *Isagoge*, cf. the anonymous Syriac scholia on the *Isagoge* that comment on the division of this treatise into several parts (Baumstark 1900: 36.13–14).



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## T2: On the Division of Substance



## *On the Division of Substance*<sup>1</sup>

- §1 At the beginning of the study of a book<sup>2</sup> we should say the following. There are several kinds of speech. Not all of them are found in every book, and not every writer makes use of them all. Rather, each (writer) applies the kind (of speech) in which he is trained and that suits him. We may briefly list the types of reasoning as follows: dividing, defining, synthetical, and analytical, (the process) of which is the reverse of (synthetical reasoning). These are all (ways) of showing something.<sup>3</sup> But in order to make this account comprehensive to the hearers, I will explain each one of them to you in a way that is comprehensible.
- §2 Now, things that exist are grasped by those who have no knowledge of them by means of explanations that are not confused and unordered. But before explanations are given to such people, they (are instructed) solely by way of division. It is (only) after things have been divided that one defines them, revealing immediately their nature in their definition.<sup>4</sup> If it is still necessary to produce a (more elaborate) explanation of these things, one may apply synthesis and its counterpart, analysis. For instance, I might say:<sup>5</sup> “Substance is a universal entity which embraces multiple things beneath it”.<sup>6</sup> If someone with no knowledge observes this, he will find it confusing and unordered. But the one who would truly love to grasp such things shall first turn to the following division of them.
- §3 One provides a proper dividing account by taking the universal substance and dividing it, saying the following. Universal substance that is all-embracing

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1 The version of the title in ms. L. Ms. D: “First chapter: On the division of substance, on the division of created beings, and on the qualities of bodies”. Ms. C: “Further, another treatise of philosophers on how various things differ from one another”. Ms. E: “A chapter explaining the divisions of substance extracted from a chapter in a writing of Galen”.

2 Cf. Gr. τὰ προλεγόμενα.

3 Cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 34.20 Busse. Ammonius states here that, according to Plato, there are four methods applied in logic, i.e. division, definition, demonstration, and analysis (κατὰ διαίρεσιν καὶ ὀρισμὸν καὶ ἀπόδειξιν καὶ ἀνάλυσιν). Synthesis is also mentioned as the reverse process of analysis. It seems that the Syriac text makes demonstration the general method to which the four others are subordinated.

4 Cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 34.17–35.3 Busse; Sergius, *In Cat.* §198 (226–227 Arzhanov).

5 The following passage (beginning with the definition of substance in §2 and ending with §6) appears as part of the collection of philosophical definitions that was transmitted as an appendix to Theodore Bar Koni’s *Book of Scholia* under the name of Silwanos of Qardu (see Hespel 1983: 36.4–39.6).

6 Cf. Sergius, *In Cat.* §166 (198.6–7 Arzhanov).



is divided into body and incorporeal. What is incorporeal is further divided into God, angels, and souls. Body is also divided, namely into animate body and non-animate body. And animate (body) is further divided into animal, plant, and animal-plant<sup>7</sup>. Animal, in turn, is divided into horse, dog, man, and suchlike, while each one of these species is further divided into what belongs to it. For instance, universal man is divided into Hippocrates and Galen, and into all other men. Plant is further divided into olive, cedar, and other things like that. And each one of these species is further divided into other things that belong to it. Similarly, animal-plant is divided into sponges (σπόγγος) and all beings in the water that are hard-shelled<sup>8</sup>, for instance oyster and shellfish. These are called animal-plants because they are placed between animals and plants.<sup>9</sup>

§4      Animals have five faculties: generation, nutrition, growth, sensation, and that of motion from place to place. However, plants have only three of them, i.e. generation, nutrition, and growth. They are deprived of sensation and movability. Sponges, shellfishes, and everything that belongs to their genus possess four

7 Or “zoophyte”. Syr. *ḥayyut neṣbta*, corresponding to Gr. ζώοφυτον.

8 Syr. corresponds to Gr. ὀστρακόδερμος.

9 The same division appears in the form of a tree diagram in T1 §27 (based on Proba’s commentary on the *Isagoge*). Cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 70.13–17; 77.14–87.1 Busse; Sergius, *In Cat.* §166 (198–199 Arzhanov); Job of Edessa, *Book of Treasures* II.13 (Mingana 1935: 349).



of these faculties: generation, nutrition, growth, and sensation. The ability to move is not found among them either. Since they are capable of sensation, they are superior to plants, but, since they cannot move, they are inferior to animals. Hence they are placed between those two, and their nature is properly called animal-plant. That they have sensation is apparent from experience: if someone touches a sponge or one of the shellfishes inside water, they immediately contract and shrink. Yet, when one stays away from them, they spread out, stretch out, and unfold. This makes it evident that they have sensation, which they share in common with animals. But their being bound to one spot and their inability to move from one place to another indicate their relation to plants.<sup>10</sup> Inanimate body is further subdivided into trees, stones, and other things like that.

§5 So, a dividing account is acquired in the above manner. This is the nature of its subsistence, that you take universal things and divide them skilfully and successively; and herein lies the first method<sup>11</sup> of logic.<sup>12</sup> Further, someone defines (something) after having already discovered the division of things that are clearly differentiated.<sup>13</sup> Then he selects for himself from this division those things which are suitable for the definition of the object that he wants to define and (subsequently) produces a definition which suits the nature of things. For instance, if someone wishes to define man, he observes the division which has been given and discovers that man is beneath the genus of living being. Hence

<sup>10</sup> Cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 77.18–87.1 Busse: τὸ μὲν γὰρ φυτὸν τὰς τρεῖς ἔχει δυνάμεις μόνας, τὴν θρεπτικὴν τὴν αὐξητικὴν καὶ τὴν γεννητικὴν, τὸ δὲ ζῶον πρὸς ταύταις ἔχει καὶ τὴν αἰσθητικὴν δυνάμιν καὶ τὴν μεταβατικὴν τὴν ἀπὸ τόπου εἰς τόπον· τὸ οὖν ζωόφυτον μέσον ἐστὶν ἀμφοτέρων, ἔχει γὰρ πρὸς ταῖς τρισι δυνάμεισι καὶ τὴν ἀπτικὴν αἰσθησιν, οὐκέτι μέντοι ἀπὸ τόπου ἐπὶ τόπον ἀμείβει, οἷά ἐστι τὰ ὄστρεα καὶ οἱ σπόγγοι· προσπεφύκασι μὲν γὰρ ταῖς πέτραις, προσιόντος δὲ τινος ἀντιτύπου μὲν συστέλλονται, ἡδέος δὲ διαχέονται.

<sup>11</sup> Syr. *niša*, “goal, aim”, but here it is used with the meaning of “method”. Cf. the following §6.

<sup>12</sup> Cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 35.4–5 Busse: διαρετικῆς μὲν γὰρ ἔργον ἐστὶ τὸ διαρεῖν τὸ προτεθὲν γένος εὐτάκτως εἰς τὰς οἰκειὰς διαφοράς.

<sup>13</sup> On the need to divide something before defining it, see Ammonius, *In Isag.* 35.10–11 Busse; Sergius, *In Cat.* §§197–199, 290 (224–227, 304–307 Arzhanov). Sergius uses the expression *’omanuta mpallganita*.



he says: “So, man is a living being.” But since there are plenty of other living beings, he shall also add that (man) is rational in order to differentiate (man) from (living beings) that are irrational. However, given that there are other rational beings, for instance, demons and angels, he further adds that (man) is mortal. So, a complete definition of man is produced when he says that (man) is a mortal rational living being. By calling (man) living being, he differentiates him from all those beings that are deprived of life. But since he has not (yet) differentiated (man) from animals or from angels, he shall add (to that) by also calling (man) rational. He thereby differentiates (man) from living beings that are irrational, although not yet from (other) rational living beings. By adding that (man) is mortal, he differentiates him from the latter. Thus (man’s) nature alone is established in a definition like that. These things are sufficient for explaining what defining account is.<sup>14</sup>

§6 Further, one applies the synthetic method when he takes those things that acquire subsistence of their essence in intellect, combines them in word, and produces one thing from them. For instance, one will take head, neck, breast, hands, belly, and legs, and produce from them in word one complete human body; or take different words, phrases, and chapters and produce from them one treatise. The analytical method reverses this (process), thus acquiring its subsistence when someone takes those things that are composed of something and dissolves them into the primary natures from which they are composed. For instance, someone will take a human body and dissolve it into those things from which it is composed, namely, into head, neck, breast, hands, belly, and legs. He will then take these and dissolve them into those things that are prior

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14 Cf. Sergius, *In Cat.* §§153–154 (186–189 Arzhanov).



to them, that is, into nerves, bones, and flesh. He will in turn take these and dissolve them even further into the things from which they acquire their composition, that is, the four humours (χυμοί), i.e. blood, phlegm, red bile, and black bile. He will again take these and further dissolve into those things that are prior to them, that is, into the four elements (στοιχεῖα) from which they are constituted. Finally, he will take the elements and ascend from them to their primary cause, which is matter (ὕλη) and form (εἶδος). Thus, by (following) this process, he will start from the human body which is visible to everyone, and by dissolving it step by step will ascend to the primary cause, i.e. matter and form, which is known only by the universal nature.<sup>15</sup>

§7 Genus, species, differentia, accident, and property:<sup>16</sup> Substance is divided into body and incorporeal. Body is divided into animate and inanimate. Animate body is divided into animal, animal-plant, and plant. Among inanimate bodies dry trees and stones are known. Animal is divided into rational and irrational. Rational is divided into man and angel. Man is divided into Socrates and Plato. Irrational living being is divided into ox, horse, and other four-footed (animals), as well as into reptiles, birds, and those living in the water.

§8 Again, concerning substance: Substance is a most generic genus, and it encompasses many things. It is divided into two differentiae, i.e. what is created and what is uncreated. And what is created is divided into body and incorporeal. Body is further divided into other differentiae that are beneath it, namely,

15 Cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 36.1–7; 37.7–13 Busse. For the last sentence, cf. Philoponus, *In Phys.* 16.29–17.22 Vitelli. See also T6 §14, which is a revision of the text above.

16 The subtitle lists the five terms explicated in Porphyry's *Isagoge*. However, this paragraph is only loosely connected to the *Isagoge* itself and seems instead to be based on a graphical division of substance, an example of which is found in Division 1 attached to the chapter "On Species" in Proba's commentary on the *Isagoge*. This division is also found in T1 §27 above.



animate body and inanimate body, and what has perception and what is deprived of perception. And animate body is divided into other species, i.e. living and lifeless body, and that which is movable and that which is deprived of motion. Movable (body) is further divided into differentiae that are beneath it, namely, rational and irrational, and man and animal. Man is divided only into separate individuals who are confined by the nature, namely, Plato, Alcibiades, and other names.<sup>17</sup>

§9 Now, to put it briefly:<sup>18</sup> All lower differentiae partake in the names of those that are above them, but the higher ones are not called by (the names) of the lower ones. So, every man is a living being, is animate, and is a substance. But not every living being is a man, such as animals; neither is every animate being living, such as plants. And furthermore, not everything that is a substance is animate, such as stones and pieces of dry wood, for these are substances, but they are not called animate. In this way, every living being is called animate and a substance, and everything animate is also called a substance. However, not everything that is a substance is necessarily corporeal, or animate, or living, or man. Hence, what was stated has become clear, i.e. that all genera which are higher than others share their names with those that are lower.

§10 Another division: There is the unity of a generic name which signifies the unity of a nature of different individuals — for instance, the names “God”, “man”, “animal”, and so on. And there is the unity of a specific name which signifies the unity of an individual<sup>19</sup> (combining) different natures — for instance, “man” (refers) to soul and body, and “Christ” to divinity and humanity.<sup>20</sup> Generic names are predicated of specific ones, just as Gabriel, Paul, a

<sup>17</sup> With the exception of the first three sentences, this whole paragraph derives from Sergius, *In Cat.* §166 (198.7–16 Arzhanov).

<sup>18</sup> The whole paragraph is a verbatim quotation (with slight modifications in the last sentence) from Sergius, *In Cat.* §169 (200.20–202.5 Arzhanov). Thus, the expression, “to put it briefly”, does not refer to the previous paragraph but to Sergius, *In Cat.* §168.

<sup>19</sup> Syr. *qnomā*, corresponding to Gr. *ὑπόστασις*.

<sup>20</sup> Cf. T6 §19. For the analogy between the soul-body relationship in man and the unity of the divine and human natures in Jesus Christ, cf. Severus of Antioch, *Epistle* 25 (Brooks 1973: 230); Philoponus, *Arbiter*, ch. 3 (Sanda 1930: 5.12–15).

לְיָמֵינוּ. אֵין מִן דְּלִיבְרִיבְרִיב אֶפְלֵסֵם וְאֶפְלֵסֵם  
כְּעֵד דְּסִיבְרִיב. לֵד דְּמִן כְּסִיבְרִיב מְחִיבְרִיב לְיָמֵינוּ: מִן דְּמִן  
לִיבְרִיב אֶפְלֵסֵם אֵין מְחִיבְרִיב וְאֶפְלֵסֵם. לֵד מְחִיבְרִיב כְּסִיבְרִיב אֵין  
לֵד אֵין דְּלֵד יָמֵינוּ.

5 כְּעֵד לְיָמֵינוּ דְּסִיבְרִיב: אֵין מְחִיבְרִיב אֵין דְּסִיבְרִיב אֵין דְּלִיבְרִיב.  
לֵד מְחִיבְרִיב כְּסִיבְרִיב מְחִיבְרִיב דְּמִן מְחִיבְרִיב: אֵין דְּלִיבְרִיב  
אֵין דְּסִיבְרִיב אֵין מְחִיבְרִיב אֵין. כְּעֵד דְּמִן מְחִיבְרִיב דְּמִן מְחִיבְרִיב  
מְחִיבְרִיב כְּעֵד לְיָמֵינוּ דְּסִיבְרִיב אֵין דְּלִיבְרִיב. אֵין  
10 דְּמִן כְּעֵד דְּסִיבְרִיב לֵד מְחִיבְרִיב מְחִיבְרִיב אֵין מְחִיבְרִיב אֵין מְחִיבְרִיב.  
אֵין לֵד מְחִיבְרִיב מְחִיבְרִיב מְחִיבְרִיב: אֵין דְּלִיבְרִיב אֵין  
כְּעֵד: אֵין דְּלֵד מְחִיבְרִיב.

כְּעֵד מְחִיבְרִיב מְחִיבְרִיב, מְחִיבְרִיב מְחִיבְרִיב מְחִיבְרִיב.  
מְחִיבְרִיב מְחִיבְרִיב מְחִיבְרִיב מְחִיבְרִיב: אֵין מְחִיבְרִיב מְחִיבְרִיב מְחִיבְרִיב  
15 מְחִיבְרִיב מְחִיבְרִיב מְחִיבְרִיב. אֵין מְחִיבְרִיב מְחִיבְרִיב מְחִיבְרִיב.  
מְחִיבְרִיב מְחִיבְרִיב מְחִיבְרִיב לֵד מְחִיבְרִיב מְחִיבְרִיב מְחִיבְרִיב: אֵין  
אֵין מְחִיבְרִיב מְחִיבְרִיב. אֵין מְחִיבְרִיב מְחִיבְרִיב מְחִיבְרִיב מְחִיבְרִיב  
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מְחִיבְרִיב מְחִיבְרִיב מְחִיבְרִיב מְחִיבְרִיב מְחִיבְרִיב מְחִיבְרִיב  
10 מְחִיבְרִיב. אֵין מְחִיבְרִיב מְחִיבְרִיב מְחִיבְרִיב מְחִיבְרִיב. מְחִיבְרִיב  
מְחִיבְרִיב מְחִיבְרִיב מְחִיבְרִיב מְחִיבְרִיב מְחִיבְרִיב מְחִיבְרִיב.

§11 L 9, D 11 (the first word only) §12 L 10 §13 L 11

דְּלֵד יָמֵינוּ 4 L אֵין דְּלֵד | לֵד אֵין | דְּמִן מְחִיבְרִיב אֵין מְחִיבְרִיב L: לִיבְרִיב אֶפְלֵסֵם 3  
L אֵין דְּלֵד מְחִיבְרִיב: SCR: אֵין מְחִיבְרִיב L | אֵין מְחִיבְרִיב SCR: אֵין מְחִיבְרִיב 11 L דְּלֵד יָמֵינוּ: D:

certain horse, and suchlike (are called) by the name “living being”. But they are not manifested and differentiated through generic (names), which means that Gabriel, Paul, and a certain horse are not comprehended through “living being”, although there is nothing that makes them unrelated to one another.

§11 By means of the generic names “substance”, or “nature”, or “living being”, or “man”, no individual person (πρόσωπον) may be comprehended, neither those of the Trinity nor those of Gabriel, Paul, or of a certain horse. The individual names of each one of them are embraced by the generic names “divinity”, “living being”, and “man”, since it is necessary to predicate a generic name of a specific name. However, an angel, a man, or a horse is comprehended not through the (generic) name “living being” but by means of the divisive names<sup>21</sup> “rational” and “mortal”, (i.e. they are) either rational and immortal or irrational and mortal.

§12 Of (things) that are of the same genus,<sup>22</sup> there may be homonymy<sup>23</sup> and heteronymy.<sup>24</sup> An example of homonymy in the same genus is James son of Zebedee and James son of Alpheus,<sup>25</sup> while an example of heteronymy is Paul, Peter, and others. If (things belong) to different genera,<sup>26</sup> then there is no homonymy in the strict sense, except for some specific usage, for instance, when one would call some man “Michael”, some horse “Sergius”, or the dog of Orion the “dog(-star)”, and the rest.<sup>27</sup>

§13 When the generic name is short, it designates many heterogeneous things. For instance, “living being” (encloses) angels, men, and animals. When the generic name is long because it has a differentia attached to it, it designates

21 I.e. the divisive differentiae, Gr. αἱ διαίρετικαὶ διαφοραί, cf. Porphyry, *Isag.* 9.25–10.21.

22 Or “are in homogeneity”. The Syriac reflects the Greek expression ὁμογενής.

23 The expression *šawyt šma* is not found in Sergius’ commentary (cf. §118, where he applies the construct *damyat šmahe*). But it does appear in the early anonymous translation of the *Categories* and in Jacob of Edessa’s version (see, e.g., the translation of *Cat.* 1a1).

24 Heteronyms are not mentioned by Aristotle in the *Categories*, but they are discussed by the Alexandrian commentators. Cf. Sergius, *In Cat.* §120 (158–159 Arzhanov), where Sergius discusses synonymy and heteronymy together.

25 I.e. two of Jesus’ twelve Apostles.

26 Or “in heterogeneous things”. The whole paragraph goes back to the commentaries on Aristotle, *Cat.* 1b16: τῶν ἑτερογενῶν καὶ μὴ ὑπ’ ἄλληλα τεταγμένων ἕτεραι τῷ εἶδει καὶ αἱ διαφοραί (“of heterogeneous things not subordinate one to another the differentiae are also different in kind”). Various manuscripts containing this passage from the *Cat.* offer two variants of the first word: either τῶν ἑτερογενῶν or τῶν ἐτέρων γενῶν (cf. the note of Simplicius in *In Cat.* 57.21 Kalbfleisch). It seems that the Syriac expression, which includes the construct state applied mostly to translate composite Greek words, reflects the former reading rather than the latter.

27 The “specific usage” of the names here is illustrated by applying a name of an angel to a human being, that of a human name to a horse, and the name of an animal to a star. The latter is a classical example of homonyms, cf. Sergius, *In Cat.* §118 (156–157 Arzhanov).

לשמה כחשבה. אף כי היא נכונה ונכונה ונכונה ונכונה  
הכללה של כל המושגים הללו.

§14 אף כי היא נכונה ונכונה ונכונה ונכונה

כל המושגים הללו ונכונה ונכונה ונכונה ונכונה

5 לכל המושגים הללו ונכונה ונכונה ונכונה ונכונה

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כל המושגים הללו ונכונה ונכונה ונכונה ונכונה

כל המושגים הללו.

10 אף כי היא נכונה ונכונה ונכונה ונכונה §15

כל המושגים הללו ונכונה ונכונה ונכונה ונכונה

כל המושגים הללו ונכונה ונכונה ונכונה ונכונה

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כל המושגים הללו ונכונה ונכונה ונכונה ונכונה

15 אף כי היא נכונה ונכונה ונכונה ונכונה

כל המושגים הללו ונכונה ונכונה ונכונה ונכונה

אף כי היא נכונה ונכונה ונכונה ונכונה §16

כל המושגים הללו ונכונה ונכונה ונכונה ונכונה

כל המושגים הללו ונכונה ונכונה ונכונה ונכונה

only (those things) that belong to one genus.<sup>28</sup> For instance, if you take the name “living being” and attach “rational” and “immortal” to it, then it designates angels.<sup>29</sup>

§14 The generic names encompass the (names) of the species that are beneath them, which are at the same time genera of what is beneath them. For instance, substance, which has nothing above itself, is a most generic genus. Its species is living being, which is also the genus for angels, men, and animals. Beneath it, there are the names “angel”, “man”, and “horse”. Further beneath them, there is Gabriel, or Paul, or a certain horse, which are not further divisible into something beneath them.<sup>30</sup>

§15 Again, concerning substance: The substance of created beings is a most generic genus. Its species is body, which is a genus of the species animate and inanimate body. They, in turn, are called genera of the most specific species, which are men, animals, plants, dry trees, and stones. These, in turn, are themselves divided into indivisible particulars, i.e. into a certain man, or a certain animal, or such-and-such kind of plant, e.g. a fig, an olive tree, and so on; and also of the stones: either emeralds, or jaspers, or sardonyxes, and the rest.<sup>31</sup>

§16 Definition is what designates only that thing of which it is, differentiating and separating it from all other things.<sup>32</sup> Definition of philosophy: when a man becomes like someone great as much as possible.<sup>33</sup> Definition of word: a symbol

<sup>28</sup> The Syriac expression probably derives from the Gr. μονογενής.

<sup>29</sup> Cf. Sergius, *In Cat.* §§153–154 (186–189 Arzhanov) and commentaries on *Cat.* 1b16, e.g., Ammonius, *In Cat.* 31.14–30 Busse.

<sup>30</sup> Cf. Sergius, *In Cat.* §§165–169 (196–203 Arzhanov).

<sup>31</sup> Cf. T1 §27 and T2 §3.

<sup>32</sup> Cf. Sergius, *In Cat.* §§153–154 (186–189 Arzhanov). The Syriac text most likely derives from Sergius, *In Cat.* 188.1–2. A similar definition appears in Ps.-Michael Badoqa, *Book of Definitions* 226 (98.9–10 Furlani). Cf. David, *Prolegomena*, 15.15–16 Busse: ὁ ὀρισμὸς περιορίζει τὸ πρᾶγμα τὸ ὑποκείμενον καὶ χωρίζει αὐτὸ ἐκ τῶν ἄλλοτρίων.

<sup>33</sup> Cf. the definition of philosophy traditionally ascribed to Plato, as “becoming like god as much as possible for man” (see, e.g., Ammonius, *In Isag.* 3.7–9 Busse). Elias adds that what Plato meant by “becoming like god” is pious behaviour: ἐπειδὴ μὴ ἠρκέσθη ὁ Πλάτων εἰπεῖν τὴν φιλοσοφίαν ὁμοίωσιν θεῶν κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν ἀνθρώπῳ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν τρόπον τῆς ὁμοιώσεως προσέθηκεν εἰπὼν ‘ὁμοίωσις δὲ ἐστὶ δίκαιον καὶ ὅσιον γενέσθαι μετὰ φρονήσεως καὶ ταῦτα γινώσκειν’ (Elias, *In Isag.* 18.2–5 Busse). Cf. Sergius, *In Cat.* §8 (70.9–10 Arzhanov); Ps.-Michael Badoqa, *Book of Definitions* 4 (23.1–2 Furlani).



whose meaning is not revealed. The property of wisdom: true comprehension of what exists.<sup>34</sup>

§17 Genus is, for instance, living being. Species is, for instance, man. Differentia is, for instance, rational. Property is, for instance, laughing. Accident is, for instance, white or black, man's sitting or standing up.<sup>35</sup> A definition of genus is: what is predicated of multiple things that differ from each other in species, and its differentia is in the way it exists, for instance, the name of some living being.<sup>36</sup> Species is what is predicated of multiple things that differ from each other in number, and its differentia is in the way it exists.<sup>37</sup> Differentia is that by which a species surpasses (its) genus. For instance, man surpasses living being through rationality and being mortal.<sup>38</sup> Property is what is characteristic of one species only, of all of it, and all the time, as man being capable of laughter.<sup>39</sup> Accident is what appears in something and may be separated from it without its destruction.<sup>40</sup> Place is such a limit of a body that encloses in its interior part what is placed into it.<sup>41</sup> Time is an interval in-between which is a number of motion.<sup>42</sup>

§18 Again, on substance: Substance is a most generic genus. Body is a species and a genus. Animate body is a species and a genus. Living being is a species and a genus. Universal man is a species only and hence a most specific

34 The first definition of philosophy (i.e. "love of wisdom") in the Alexandrian commentary tradition was "knowledge of beings as beings" (see, e.g., Ammonius, *In Isag.* 2.22–23 Busse: φιλοσοφία ἐστὶ γνῶσις τῶν ὄντων ἢ ὄντα ἐστὶ). Cf. Sergius' definition of the aim of the theoretical part of philosophy as "true comprehension and knowledge of all existing things" (*In Cat.* 108.8 Arzhanov). See also Paul the Persian, *Introduction* (Land 1875: 1.4); Ps.-Michael Badoqa, *Book of Definitions* 1 (20.4–5 Furlani).

35 Cf. the second half of T1 §2 based on Porphyry, *Isag.* 2.17–22 (anon. Syr. trans.). Cf. also T1 §26 based on Proba's commentary on the *Isagoge*. The same passage appears as T3 §6.

36 The definition is based on Porphyry, *Isag.* 2.14–17 (anon. Syr. trans.). Cf. T1 §1 and Ps.-Michael Badoqa, *Book of Definitions* 9 (29.11 Furlani).

37 The definition is based on Porphyry, *Isag.* 5.20–21. Cf. T3 §2 and Ps.-Michael Badoqa, *Book of Definitions* 9 (30.11–12 Furlani).

38 Quotation from *Isag.* 10.22–11.1: διαφορά ἐστὶν ἢ περισσεύει τὸ εἶδος τοῦ γένους. ὁ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος τοῦ ζώου πλέον ἔχει τὸ λογικόν καὶ τὸ θνητόν. The Syriac text is based on the anonymous translation of the *Isagoge* that is quoted here in corrupted form.

39 Definition based on the anonymous Syriac translation of *Isag.* 12.17–18: συνδεδράμηκεν τὸ μόνῳ καὶ παντὶ καὶ αἰεί, ὡς τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ τὸ γελαστικόν. Cf. Sergius, *In Cat.* §208 (234.12–14 Arzhanov) and Division 4 attached to Book III (260.8–9); see also Ps.-Michael Badoqa, *Book of Definitions* 13 (33.6–7 Furlani).

40 Definition based on *Isag.* 12.24–25 (the Syriac text represents the early anonymous translation).

41 A verbatim quotation from Sergius, *In Cat.* §141 (180.21–22 Arzhanov).

42 This definition of time combines elements of various arguments presented by Sergius in *In Cat.* §282. It is originally based on Aristotle's discussion of time in the *Physics*, book 4. Cf. Ps.-Michael Badoqa, *Book of Definitions* 50 (50.7–10 Furlani).



species.<sup>43</sup> Moreover, of substances some are simple and some are composite. Of simple ones some are superior to the composite ones and some are inferior to them. Those that are inferior to the composite ones are matter (as considered) by itself or form which is joined to it. Those (substances) that are superior to the composite ones are the divine ones. The composite (substances) are either universal or particular. Particular ones are, for instance, Plato, Socrates, and others. Universal ones are species and genera, i.e. body, animate body, and living body. Universal man is a species and a genus, and the same applies to corporeal, animate, and living.<sup>44</sup>

§19 The properties of substance, which are the same as its definition, are the following: that it is not in something (else) but everything is in it; that it provides everything it is predicated of with its name and definition; that it clearly signifies a particular this; that nothing is contrary to it; that it does not admit of a more and a less; that, being the same and one, it is receptive of contraries.<sup>45</sup>

§20 All created beings obviously fall under two differentiae: some of them are bodies and some are incorporeal.<sup>46</sup> And furthermore, those that are incorporeal are in particular understood as follows: some of them have subsistence in themselves and have no need for other things through which they would come to be,<sup>47</sup> for instance, angels, demons, and souls of men; and some of them, on

<sup>43</sup> Cf. T1 §4 and Division 5 attached to Book II of Sergius, *In Cat.* (162.10–14 Arzhanov).

<sup>44</sup> The second part of this paragraph (“Moreover ... living”) corresponds in general to Division 2 attached to Book III in Sergius’ commentary (258.2–9 Arzhanov), differing from it only in some details toward the end. The last statement, i.e. that universal man is both a species and a genus, contradicts what was said a few lines earlier, and this contradiction goes back to the tree diagrams attached to Sergius’ commentary.

<sup>45</sup> With the exception of the first sentence, which sums up the arguments found in Sergius, *In Cat.* §§197–202, this list corresponds verbatim to Division 5 attached to Book III of his commentary (260.11–18 Arzhanov). The same text appears in Ps.-Michael Badoqa’s *Book of Definitions* as a list of the six characteristic properties of “nature”, a term that is used as a synonym for substance (cf. 26.9–27.2 Furlani).

<sup>46</sup> A nearly verbatim quotation (with a few minor differences) from Sergius, *In Cat.* §358 (364.18–20 Arzhanov).

<sup>47</sup> A definition of substance, cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 19.9–10 Busse, and Sergius, *In Cat.* §95 (142.17–19 Arzhanov). The Syriac text is a verbatim quotation from Sergius’ commentary.

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§21 L 17, C 6 §22 C 7 §23 L 18, C 8

1 . . . . . L: . . . . . CD | . . . . . DL: . . . . . C | . . . . . + . . . . . C 2 . . . . . om. C | . . . . .  
 DL: . . . . . C 3 . . . . .<sup>1</sup> DL: . . . . . C | . . . . .<sup>2</sup> DL: . . . . . C 4 . . . . .  
 . . . . . inv. L 5 . . . . . CD: . . . . . L | . . . . . om. CL 6 . . . . . om. CL 7 . . . . .  
 om. D | . . . . . om. CL | . . . . . D: . . . . . CL 8 . . . . . CL: . . . . . D 9 . . . . . om. L  
 10 . . . . . om. L 11 . . . . . om. C 12 . . . . . C: . . . . . L | . . . . . L:  
 . . . . . C | . . . . . L: . . . . . C | . . . . . L: . . . . . C 13 . . . . . om. C  
 14 . . . . . L: . . . . . C 17 . . . . . C: . . . . . C 19 . . . . . C: . . . . . L

the contrary, do not have subsistence in themselves but come to be through other things.<sup>48</sup> The latter are further comprehended by way of division as follows: some of them come to be in bodies, some in incorporeals, and some in bodies and incorporeals. Examples of those things that come to be in bodies are blackness and whiteness, bitterness and sweetness. Examples of what comes to be in incorporeals are virtue and vice, knowledge and ignorance. Examples of what comes to be in both bodies and incorporeals are passion and anger, love and hatred, which are found in angels and in beasts.<sup>49</sup>

§21 Philosophy is divided into theory and practice.<sup>50</sup> Theory, in turn, is divided into knowledge and mathematical sciences. Knowledge is further divided into the knowledge of divine things and the knowledge of natural things.<sup>51</sup> The mathematical sciences are divided into music, astronomy, geometry, arithmetic, and the rest.<sup>52</sup> Practice is divided into rule over all people, (rule) over one's own house, and (rule) over oneself. (Division into) law-givers and upright judges is attached to it.<sup>53</sup>

§22 All things that are simple in the world are either words, or concepts that are signified, or things that are known.<sup>54</sup> As for the words, they do not exist naturally, while concepts exist naturally; also, things exist naturally.<sup>55</sup>

§23 Everything that is in something else is said (as follows): as in time, as in a place, as in a container, as parts in a whole, as a whole in (its) parts, as species

48 Cf. Sergius' definition of the nine categories other than substance, in *In Cat.* §§96–97 (see particularly 144.2–3 Arzhanov).

49 For this paragraph, cf. particularly Sergius, *In Cat.* §§358–363 (364–369 Arzhanov).

50 For this paragraph, cf. Division 1 attached to Book I of Sergius' *In Cat.* (104.3–10 and 446 Arzhanov), T1 §11, and Ps.-Michael Badoqa, *Book of Definitions* 6 (25.3–9 Furlani). The division presented here does not correspond completely to either of the aforementioned versions.

51 This division is not found elsewhere. Both Sergius and the Alexandrian commentators divide theory into three parts: theology, physics, and mathematics (cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 11.22–23 Busse; Elias, *Prolegomena* 27.35–36 Busse).

52 It is not clear what the author of the Syriac text means with “the rest”, since traditionally the list of mathematical sciences included only the four mentioned disciplines (i.e. the *quadrivium*).

53 Cf. the tree diagram 1 following Book I of Sergius' commentary, where the division into the law-givers and judges is simply attached to the division of practice into four parts (447 Arzhanov).

54 This division appears in Sergius' commentary and in the Alexandrian exegetes in the sections dealing with the question of the goal of the treatise *Categories*. Cf. Sergius, *In Cat.* §§65–71 (120–127 Arzhanov).

55 This paragraph has clear parallels with, and is probably based on, Division 2 attached to Book II of Sergius' work (160.17–20 Arzhanov).



in a genus, as a genus in species, as form in matter, as the governing in a governor, as in an end, as an accident in a substance.<sup>56</sup>

§24 Everything that is divided, (is divided) either as a word into objects that are not similar, e.g. (dog is divided) into land-dog, water-dog, dog of Orion,<sup>57</sup> and the (dog) on an image; or as a genus into species, e.g., living being (is divided) into man, ox, horse, and the rest; or as something is divided into parts, (which are either) similar, e.g. bone, wood, and suchlike, or dissimilar, e.g. feet, hands, and suchlike.<sup>58</sup>

§25 Property is divided (as follows). It occurs either in one species but not in all of it, as all mathematical sciences; or in all of (a species) but not only in it, as being biped; or in one (species) and in all of it but not always, as turning grey in old age; or in one (species), in all of it, and always, as man being capable of laughter or horse being capable of neighing — this is property in the strict sense.<sup>59</sup>

§26 Of quantities, some have parts that are separate and delimited from one another, and some are in a single unity that has no parts separate from one another, such as line, surface, body, place, time; while those (whose parts are) separate are number and language.<sup>60</sup> Furthermore, of the parts (of quantities), some have position and remain in their place, others are not fixed and are brought forth one by one, such as time, number, and language; while those whose parts remain in their place are line, surface, body, and place.<sup>61</sup>

§27 Of things, some have only a name in common, for instance, land-dog and water-dog, dog of Orion, and things like that, which are called “of similar name”

<sup>56</sup> The same list appears as the first division attached to Book III of Sergius' commentary (256.10–21 Arzhanov). In the commentary itself, it is discussed alongside the definition of accident (§§135–152).

<sup>57</sup> I.e. Sirius, cf. Sergius, *In Cat.* §118 (156–157 Arzhanov) and Division 6 after Book II (164–165).

<sup>58</sup> Cf. Sergius, *In Cat.* §§180–181 (210–213 Arzhanov). The Syriac text is probably not based on Sergius' text proper but on Division 3 attached to Book III (258.10–20). Cf. a different account of this division in Ps.-Michael Badoqa, *Book of Definitions* 14 (35.9–14 Furlani).

<sup>59</sup> This paragraph corresponds verbatim to Division 4 attached to Book III of Sergius' commentary (260.2–9 Arzhanov). It appears twice in T1. See T1 §7 based on *Isag.* and T1 §36 based on Proba's commentary on *Isag.* Cf. also Ps.-Michael Badoqa, *Book of Definitions* 13 (33.1–11 Furlani). A revised version of this list was included in the collection of philosophical riddles (Furlani 1919: 116.14–18).

<sup>60</sup> This sentence finds a close parallel in Division 1 attached to Book IV in Sergius (326.8–11 Arzhanov), although it differs from the latter in some details.

<sup>61</sup> Beside a few modifications, the second part of this paragraph corresponds to Division 2 attached to Book IV in Sergius' commentary (326.13–17 Arzhanov).



(i.e. homonyms); some have only a definition in common, and they belong to the same genus, for instance, stone, rock, and flint, which are called “of similar kind”; some have a name and a definition in common, for instance, Alexander the Macedonian and Alexander Paris, who belong to the same species; and some have neither a name nor a definition in common, for instance, wood, stone, man, and suchlike.<sup>62</sup>

§28 All (ways of saying that) something is prior to something else differ in every respect (from one another): (it is) either in time, or in reason, or in nature, or in greatness, or in number. One thing is prior to the other in time when the period which it occupied is more distant (from us) than the time when what is spoken in relation to it happened. Prior by nature is that which (when eliminated) eliminates what is said in relation to it along with itself, but which is not eliminated along with the other; and that which, when what is spoken (in relation to it) comes to be, is necessarily introduced along with it but whose correlate does not necessarily follow it when it comes to be itself. For instance, (this may be said about) animal and horse.<sup>63</sup>

§29 The parts of universal substance are, for instance, man, horse, bull, and dog. The parts of a particular substance are those which constitute a body, for instance, head, hands, and legs.<sup>64</sup>

§30 Opposition is either as relatives, or as contraries, or as capacity and privation, or as constructions (of speech). Also, opposition is either in words, (for instance) “Socrates is running” (or) “Socrates is not running”, or in things. (The latter is) either in association with another thing, such as white and black, or by itself. (The opposed things) either change into one another, e.g. the contraries, or do not change, e.g. relatives, capacity and privation.<sup>65</sup>

62 This paragraph presents a slightly different version of Division 6 attached to Book II of Sergius' commentary (164.2–10 Arzhanov). Cf. T1 §25. See also Ps.-Michael Badoqa, *Book of Definitions* 36 (45.16–46.3 Furlani) and one of the items included in an anonymous Syriac collection of philosophical riddles (Furlani 1919: 117.16–24).

63 With the exception of the first sentence, this paragraph is a nearly verbatim quotation (with minor changes) from Sergius, *In Cat.* §§338–339 (348.6–8, 11–15 Arzhanov), where Sergius discusses two kinds of priority (i.e. in time and by nature) in the context of the question of relatives being simultaneous. However, the list of the types of priority at the beginning does not correspond to the one presented by Sergius in §§438–443 and in Division 3 after Book VII. It must derive from another source. Cf. Ps.-Michael Badoqa, *Book of Definitions* 39 (46.15–47.2 Furlani) and the Syriac collection of philosophical riddles (Furlani 1919: 119.25–120.7).

64 This paragraph derives from Sergius, *In Cat.* §344 (352.16–18 Arzhanov). Sergius treats this issue in his discussion of the topic of relatives.

65 This paragraph presents Divisions 2 and 3b after Book VII of Sergius' commentary (440.12–16; 442.3–11 Arzhanov), preserving the schematic structure of these divisions. Cf. Ps.-Michael Badoqa, *Book of Definitions* 37 (46.6–9 Furlani).



§31 Movement proceeds sometimes straightforwardly and sometimes in a circle. The one that proceeds straightforwardly has six kinds. It goes either up, or down, or right, or left, or forward, or backwards. In cyclic movement either the whole body that is subject to it moves from place to place, as (a wheel) of a wagon or (a wheel of) a harrow, which is called threshing;<sup>66</sup> or the body which is its subject does not move from place to place, while only its parts are affected, as the wheel of a millstone, or an instrument of torture, or as the heavenly sphere [which is fixed and unmovable]<sup>67</sup> and which does not move from place to place, except in its parts only.<sup>68</sup>

§32 The qualities<sup>69</sup> of a body are: hot and cold, wet and dry. Its states (τάξεις) are: life and death, health and disease. Its shapes (σχήματα) are: standing and sitting, walking and reclining, being silent and talking. Its movements are: hunger, sleep, passion, anger, fear, distress, hatred, laziness, perturbation, cunning, rage, pride, sorrow, grief, and wickedness. The opposites of its movements are: satiety, wakefulness, loathing, tranquillity, courageousness, gladness, love, diligence, serenity, integrity, modesty, humility, cheerfulness, consolation, and goodness. Furthermore, its senses are: sight, hearing, smell, taste, touch. Breath follows everything in the body, since one lives through it. Death, on the contrary, is not connected with any movement of the body but brings everything to an end.<sup>70</sup>

66 The Syriac text is most likely corrupt. Cf. Sergius, *In Cat.* §447 (437 Arzhanov): “the wheel of a wagon which changes its place while moving in a circle” (for the Syriac text, cf. 436.21–22).

67 These words, which do not fit grammatically into the sentence (the verbs stand in plural, while the subject of the sentence is singular), are most likely an insertion based on a marginal gloss. Cf. Sergius, *In Cat.* §447 (436.24–438.1).

68 This whole paragraph goes back to Sergius, *In Cat.* §447 (436–438 Arzhanov). It presents in narrative form the division that was apparently originally attached to Book VII but that has not been preserved in the extant witnesses to Sergius’ work. However, this division does appear as the last tree diagram in the collection of the “Divisions of Aristotle” that transmitted separately the tree diagrams based on Sergius’ commentary (see ms. B fol. 19r and ms. M fol. 17v).

69 Syr. *muzzaga*. Cf. a discussion of various Syriac terms for “quality”, including *muzzaga*, in Sergius, *In Cat.* §§99 and 354–355.

70 The lists of qualities, shapes, movements, etc. of bodies in this paragraph derive from the second part of Evagrius Ponticus’ *Letter to Melania* (Vitestam 1964: 12.11–12; 13.5–14.1; 16.2–6).



- §33 They say<sup>71</sup> that among animals some inhale (air) from outside, some from inside, some from both, and some from all sides. Those animals which are said to inhale (air) from outside are men and all (other) that have lungs. Those which (inhale) from inside are fishes and all primitive reptiles.<sup>72</sup> (Those) from both sides are bees (which inhale) through the bands of their wings. Those (which inhale air) from all sides are demons and all rational (natures) whose bodies are made of air.<sup>73</sup>
- §34 The intellect which possesses a body does not see incorporeals; but when it becomes incorporeal it does not see bodies.<sup>74</sup>
- §35 Sensation and sense are not the same things, neither are sensitive and sensible. Sensation is a faculty by means of which we usually perceive material entities. Sense is an organ in which the faculty of sensation is realised. A living being is sensitive when it possesses the faculty of sensation. And what is sensible is something that falls under sensation. But intellect is not like this, for it is deprived of all four of them.<sup>75</sup>
- §36 When a sensible eye observes something visible, it does not see it in its entirety. An intelligible eye either does not see or, when it does, it observes that thing which it sees apart from everything that surrounds it.<sup>76</sup>
- §37 The only-begotten is someone before whom nothing has been generated, nor is (anything generated) after him.<sup>77</sup> The first-begotten is someone before whom no one has been generated, although there are others after him.<sup>78</sup>

71 Preserved in ms. L only, §§31–36 derive from Evagrius Ponticus' *Kephalaia Gnostica* (ms. L contains references to the particular *kephalaia* in the form of the letters). The quotations follow the unabridged version (S2 according to A. Guillaumont).

72 Evagrius' text uses the word *hršh*. A. Guillaumont interpreted this as a rare form that means "throat" (cf. Ramelli 2015: 219). However, it seems that the Syriac text above offers a better variant.

73 Evagrius Ponticus, *Kephalaia Gnostica* (S2) IV.37 (153.1–5 Guillaumont; cf. Ramelli 2015: 219).

74 Evagrius Ponticus, *Kephalaia Gnostica* (S2), IV.86 (173.10–11 Guillaumont; cf. Ramelli 2015: 242).

75 Evagrius Ponticus, *Kephalaia Gnostica* (S1=S2), I.36 (32.11–34.5/33.11–35.5 Guillaumont; cf. Ramelli 2015: 32–33). The quotation appears in the corrupted form and was corrected in some of its details based on Evagrius' text. Cf. the definitions of the same terms in Ps.-Michael Badoqa, *Book of Definitions* 86–92 (60.4–61.3 Furlani).

76 Evagrius Ponticus, *Kephalaia Gnostica* (S1=S2), II.28 (70.12–72.2/71.10–73.2 Guillaumont; cf. Ramelli 2015: 108).

77 Evagrius Ponticus, *Kephalaia Gnostica* (S2), IV.16 (143.3 Guillaumont; cf. Ramelli 2015: 205). As noted by Guillaumont, the Greek version of this sentence appears in the *Doctrina Patrum* (with reference to Evagrius as its source): μονογενής ἐστὶν οὐ ἄλλος οὐ προετέχθη καὶ μεθ' ὃν ἕτερος οὐ γέγονε (Diekamp 1907: 263.10–11).

78 Evagrius Ponticus, *Kephalaia Gnostica* (S2), IV.20 (143.12–13 Guillaumont; cf. Ramelli 2015: 186).

ח. חתומים בחיובם וכן הוצאות שיש להן חובות. וכן  
 חסות. וכן גם הוצאות אחרות וכן הוצאות אחרות.  
 וכן. חלוקה גם הוצאות אחרות. וכן.  
 חלוקה גם, וכן הוצאות אחרות.

§38

5 חלוקה גם, וכן הוצאות אחרות. וכן.  
 חלוקה גם, וכן הוצאות אחרות. וכן.  
 חלוקה גם, וכן הוצאות אחרות. וכן.  
 חלוקה גם, וכן הוצאות אחרות.

§39

חלוקה גם, וכן הוצאות אחרות. וכן.  
 חלוקה גם, וכן הוצאות אחרות. וכן.  
 חלוקה גם, וכן הוצאות אחרות. וכן.  
 חלוקה גם, וכן הוצאות אחרות.

§40

10 חלוקה גם, וכן הוצאות אחרות. וכן.  
 חלוקה גם, וכן הוצאות אחרות. וכן.  
 חלוקה גם, וכן הוצאות אחרות.

§41

חלוקה גם, וכן הוצאות אחרות.

§42

- §38 When we are formed in the belly, we live the life of plants. When we are born, (we live) the life of animals. And when, finally, we have grown up, we live the life of either angels or demons. Now, the cause for the first kind of life is animate nature, for the second one is sensation, while (the cause) for the third one is our becoming capable of virtue and vice.<sup>79</sup>
- §39 A cloud is rarified vapour which became condensed in the air and is driven by the wind of the air. Because of its great thinness, it is light, but while it drifts by itself, the wind that drives it makes some kind of pressure on it, and it turns into heavy drops, and falls down.<sup>80</sup>
- §40 Every statement that is pronounced falls under one of three subject matters (ὑλη): it is either possible, or impossible, or necessary. Examples: “A man is walking”, “A man is flying”, “A man is a living being”.<sup>81</sup>
- §41 Logic is a capacity to differentiate thoughts and is the activity of intellect in the soul.<sup>82</sup>
- §42 It is characteristic of the human soul that it may learn, err, and remember.<sup>83</sup>

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79 Evagrius Ponticus, *Kephalaia Gnostica* (S2), III.76 (129.9–12 Guillaumont; cf. Ramelli 2015: 207).

80 Cf. Ps.-Aristotle, *De Mundo* 394a26–30. The Syriac version of this passage produced by Sergius of Reshaina (cf. de Lagarde 1858: 141.29–142.6) does not correspond verbatim to the text above but shows close parallels to it and might even have served as its source.

81 A classification of propositions (statements) pertaining to Aristotle's *Prior Analytics*.

82 Cf. Ps.-Michael Badoqa, *Book of Definitions* 32 (44.14–45.2).

83 Quotation from Severus of Antioch's *Second Letter to Sergius the Grammarian* (Lebon 1949: 136.25–27).



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## T3: Natural Demonstration



*Natural Demonstration by the Chief Physician Sergius<sup>1</sup>*

§1 All living beings are one in genus but multiple in species. Man is one in species but multiple in number and in individual entities. Because of that, Galen states that (man) is one and not one,<sup>2</sup> as we have said. Also, living being is one in genus but is not one in species.

§2 Definition of substance: what is self-subsistent.<sup>3</sup> Definition of body: a three-dimensional substance.<sup>4</sup> Definition of accident: what appears and perishes without the destruction of its subject.<sup>5</sup> Definition of water: wet and cold body. Definition of nature: the principle of motion and rest.<sup>6</sup> Definition of species: what is predicated of multiple things that are differentiated from one another in number and whose differentia is in what they are.<sup>7</sup>

§3 Definition of differentia is: what is predicated of many things that differ in species, and its differentia is in (answering the question) what kind of thing it is. For rational and mortal are predicated of man when (answering the question) what kind of thing man is and not when (answering the question) what he is. For if someone asks what man is, it is appropriate to say, “living being”. If, however, he would further ask what kind (of living being), it is proper to give the answer, “rational and mortal living being”. For since all things are constituted from matter and form or have subsistence from something similar to matter and form, just as a statue is (constituted) from matter which is bronze and form which is its figure, so also the universal and the particular man are (constituted) of genus which is similar to matter and of the differentia which is similar to an image, while the whole composition, i.e. rational mortal living being, is similar to a statue.<sup>8</sup>

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1 T3 is a collection of fragments deriving from various sources, one of which is Sergius' commentary on the *Categories* (see §§10–11). It also includes fragments from Porphyry's *Isagoge* and Proba's commentary on the *On Interpretation*. It is only in this sense that Sergius is related to T3.

2 Cf. Galen, *De Elementis* (De Lacy 1996: 76–79 = I.434.5–436.2 Kühn).

3 Cf. Jacob of Edessa, *Encheiridion* 235.8 Furlani.

4 Cf. Ps.-Michael Badoqa, *Book of Definitions* 58 (52.12 Furlani).

5 Porphyry, *Isag.* 12.24–25. The text corresponds to Athanasius' translation. Another version of the same passage is quoted in §4, below.

6 A very similar definition of nature appears in Jacob of Edessa's *Encheiridion* (227.11–13 Furlani). It is based on Arist. *Metaph.* 1015a13–15 (cf. Furlani 1921: 272). Cf. also Arist. *Phys.* 192b20–23.

7 Definition based on Porphyry, *Isag.* 5.20–21. Cf. T2 §17 and Ps.-Michael Badoqa, *Book of Definitions* 30.11–12 Furlani; Jacob of Edessa, *Encheiridion* 239.5–7 Furlani.

8 This whole paragraph is a quotation from Porphyry, *Isag.* 11.7–17. The Syriac text derives from the early anonymous translation of the *Isagoge* (cf. Brock 1988: 25.6–26.5), corresponding to it almost in every detail, albeit containing some minor differences.



- §4 Definition of accident is: what appears and vanishes without the destruction of its subject. It is divided into two: either it is separable or inseparable. That a man has to sleep is a separable accident. Blackness, on the other hand, as soon as it occurred may not be separated from a raven or an Ethiopian, although it is possible that someone would imagine in his mind a white raven or Ethiopian, thus separating in his mind their colour from them without destruction of their subjects.<sup>9</sup>
- §5 Definition of man is: rational mortal living being, receptive of intellect and knowledge. Definition of title (κεφάλαιον): a phrase which may comprise multiple words in the form of a few. Definition of living being: animate sensitive substance. Defining account: account which in a few words signifies the substance of the subject.
- §6 So, genus is, for instance, living being. Species is, for instance, man. Differentia is, for instance, rational. Furthermore, characteristic property is, for instance, being capable of laughter. And accident is, for instance, white or black, and when someone is sitting or standing.<sup>10</sup>
- §7 Now, the most generic genus is that above which there is no other genus. The most specific species is that which has no other species below it. And between the most generic genus and the most specific species there are other entities which are at the same time genera and species, depending on whether they are taken in relation to one thing or to another.<sup>11</sup>
- §8 Alexander on natural things:<sup>12</sup> We see that among natural things some exist on behalf of themselves and some on behalf of other things. For instance, a man exists on behalf of himself, while a hand and a leg exist on behalf of (the body) to which they belong and which they make complete. And just as we have seen this in natural things, so too we shall observe that among crafts some exist on behalf of themselves, while some exist on behalf of other things, thus being similar to natural entities. For instance, the craft of producing bows exists not

9 Just like the previous paragraph, §4 is a verbatim quotation of Porphyry, *Isag.* 12.24–13.3 according to the 6th-cent. anonymous translation (cf. Brock 1988: 29.2–9) from which it deviates in some minor details. Cf. §2 above.

10 The text is identical to T2 §17 (first part). It ultimately goes back to Porphyry, *Isag.* 2.17–22.

11 Just as §§3–4, this paragraph derives from the *Isagoge* (4.16–20). It again derives from the 6th-cent. anonymous translation (cf. Brock 1988: 9.9–14), differing from it in minor details.

12 The name in the subtitle most likely refers to Alexander of Aphrodisias. The following text derives from the introductory part of Proba's commentary on the *On Interpretation* that is heavily dependent on the Greek sources. In the extant witnesses to Proba's work, we find no references to Alexander, although he is quoted by Proba on another occasion, i.e. in the second part of his commentary on the *Isagoge* (cf. Baumstark 1900: 6.17). In his commentary on the *On Interpretation*, Ammonius frequently quotes Alexander, and it is possible that these quotations served as a source for Proba.



on behalf of itself but on behalf of archery, while archery exists not on behalf of another craft but on behalf of itself.<sup>13</sup>

§9 And further:<sup>14</sup> also, the aim of logic is to differentiate between truth and falsehood.<sup>15</sup>

§10 And further, from the chief physician Sergius, from Book Six:<sup>16</sup> Now, this third species (of quality, which includes) affections and affective faculties, is subdivided into four parts. For either it occurs to one whole species of things, like (whiteness to) snow, white lead, and swan;<sup>17</sup> or it is found not in one whole genus but in its parts, like whiteness and blackness in horses, men, and other living beings; or, further, it is present in things naturally and from birth, like blackness of Ethiopians and ruddiness of Illyrians; and finally, it appears but may be easily lost, like redness caused by shame or pallor caused by fear.

§11 These qualities, however, occur not only in (human) bodies and in (other) bodies but also in the soul. For just as blackness is present in an Ethiopian from birth, so too anger, or madness, (or) anything like that sometimes appear in the soul from the first birth of a man. And also, just like pallor appears in the body as a result of fear and redness as a result of shame, so too the soul may become irascible, or mad, or change in other ways from some affection.

§12 There are three persons (πρόσωπα): the first, the second, and the third.<sup>18</sup> The first person is from whom speech originates. The second is to whom one speaks. The third is about whom one speaks.

§13 There are seven preliminaries (κεφάλαια) that should be investigated before the reading of every book.<sup>19</sup> First of all, it is necessary to understand that before the reading of every book certain preliminary questions should be investigated. Because of this, one shall first state how many preliminary questions there are and why they should be investigated. Now, the preliminaries to be studied before every book are seven, and they are the following: goal,

13 Proba, *In De Int.*, introduction (62.3–63.6 Hoffmann).

14 The adverb “further” (*tub*) signifies that the following text derives from the same source, i.e. Proba’s commentary.

15 Proba, *In De Int.*, introduction (63.13–14 Hoffmann).

16 The following §§10–11 derive from Sergius, *In Cat.* §§374–375 (380.1–15 Arzhanov), whose text is quoted in some parts in the corrupted form. Sergius’ account shows parallels to Ammonius, *In Cat.* 86.2–12 Busse and Philoponus, *In Cat.* 147.9–149.10 Busse.

17 The Syriac text is corrupt.

18 Cf. Jacob of Edessa, *Letter on Syriac Orthography* (Phillips 1869: 15).

19 Just as §§8–9 above, the following paragraph derives from the introductory part of Proba’s commentary on the *On Interpretation*, whose text is quoted in the abridged form with some modifications (cf. 63.23–30, 64.1, 64.29–65.5, 65.10–18 Hoffmann).



usefulness, to whom (the book) truly belongs, order, reason for the title of the book, division into chapters, and where it leads to.<sup>20</sup> Now, the goal is the aim which we consider from the onset in our minds.<sup>21</sup> One shall inquire into the usefulness of a book, since we shall perform everything we intend to do with diligence and not with negligence, and we can do something diligently after we have learned the profits to be gained from it. Also, we ask beforehand from whom a book derives, since very often we put our faith in a writing without further examination because of the reliability and greatness of the person who (supposedly) composed it. And secondly, it is through the authority of those persons who are trustworthy that (some authors) introduce their evil ideas (δόγματα) and thereby make common people follow their evil teachings. One shall also inquire into the order, lest he extend the step of his foot farther than necessary, according to the saying of Plato.<sup>22</sup> Now, one shall inquire into the title of a book because it also serves as a guide to its aim. For while the aim may be revealed in multiple ways, the title of a book will often teach us about it in a concise manner. We also ought to inquire into the division into chapters, for when it is necessary to understand the subject matter in its entirety, it should be divided into parts that are easier to learn, and in this way the subject matter that should be understood will become clearer to those who approach it. This is the usefulness of the division into chapters. It is also necessary to learn what something agrees with in order to know to which part of crafts it belongs.<sup>23</sup>

<sup>20</sup> Cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 21.8–10 Busse: ὁ σκοπὸς τὸ χρήσιμον τὸ γνήσιον ἢ τάξις τῆς ἀναγνώσεως ἢ αἰτία τῆς ἐπιγραφῆς ἢ εἰς τὰ κεφάλαια διαίρεσις καὶ ὑπὸ ποῖον μέρος ἀνάγεται τὸ παρὸν σύγγραμμα. Ammonius thus describes the last preliminary point somewhat differently as the question “under what part (of philosophy) the current work is subsumed” (cf. Chase 2020: 34).

<sup>21</sup> Cf. Ps.-Michael Badoqa, *Book of Definitions* 49 (49.15 Furlani).

<sup>22</sup> A quotation from Plato’s *Phaedrus* 237b-c (cf. Elias, *In Cat.* 127.7–9 Busse) used by Proba in a passage which is missing in the fragment quoted here (64.18–20 Hoffmann). Nevertheless, the compiler of the present collection found it necessary to add the reference to Plato (absent in Proba’s text), although he does not actually quote the passage. For Plato’s quotation in Proba, cf. Arzhanov 2019b: 7–8.

<sup>23</sup> Cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 21.10 Busse, who speaks of parts of philosophy.



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## T4: Natural Treatise



## *Natural Treatise*<sup>1</sup>

§1 When you hear (the word) “substance”, you shall understand it as follows. Everything that has individual subsistence<sup>2</sup> and exists (by itself) is a substance,<sup>3</sup> be it men, or animals, or plants, or fishes, or stones, or angels, or demons, or souls. Also, the nature of the Holy Trinity is called substance.<sup>4</sup> If, however, someone asks you whether everything that exists is a substance, answer him “No.” But it is everything that subsists by itself that is substance.<sup>5</sup> And if one states to you that darkness and sin are substances, tell him “No.” Because neither darkness nor sin have individual subsistence, but we speak of darkness because of the absence of light and of sin because a man withdraws from doing good and is doing evil.

§2 Everything that subsists by itself is called substance, i.e. a certain nature that is formed, a certain essence that is found,<sup>6</sup> and a certain individual that subsists. Substance, nature, and essence — each one of them is comprehended and spoken of in two ways. One way is to speak of all of men; the other one is to speak of each man alone as separate from all men, i.e. to speak either collectively or about one man. Also, essence is spoken of a whole and of an individual who is separated in his particularity and singularity from all men. However, an individual is spoken of in one way only, for we do not say that an individual comprises multiple individuals but only himself.<sup>7</sup>

§3 And furthermore, if someone asks you whether the universal substance that embraces all individual men has individual being and exists for its own sake, answer him “No.” Rather, tell him that the universal substance embraces

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1 The term “natural” in the title most likely refers to substance (“nature”) as this forms the main subject matter of the present treatise.

2 Syr. *qnoma*, usually corresponding to Gr. ὑπόστασις.

3 Cf. the definition of *kyana*, “nature”, which appears as a synonym for substance in T5 §6 and in Ps.-Michael Badoqa, *Book of Definitions* 7 (26.1–2 Furlani). Cf. the use of *kyana* in the next §2.

4 Cf. T2 §11 and T7 §16.

5 Cf. Sergius, *In Cat.* 142.17–19 Arzhanov; Jacob of Edessa, *Encheiridion* 227.24, 228.18–19 Furlani.

6 Cf. Jacob of Edessa, *Encheiridion* 235.16–17 Furlani.

7 The four terms discussed in this paragraph — “substance” (*usiya*), “nature” (*kyana*), “individual being” (*qnoma*), and “essence” (*yata*) — form the main subject matter of Jacob of Edessa’s *Encheiridion*, a text that also discusses “person” (*paršopa*) and “species” (*adša*).



all individual men but has no individual being and does not exist for its own sake. And further, if someone asks you if substance is an individual, answer him: “Yes, if it is divided in itself.” And if he asks: “Give me an example”, tell him: “For instance, since Peter or Paul are differentiated through their names from the whole of the universal substance, each one of them is called substance, nature, essence, and individual.”<sup>8</sup>

§4 Further, when you hear that substance is the most generic genus, you shall understand it to mean that it embraces all genera. It is divided into body and incorporeal, and (further) into rational and irrational. (Body) is, for instance, all men, plants, and everything that falls under perception; while incorporeal is, for instance, angels, demons, and souls. Irrational is, for instance, bulls, donkeys, horses, and other animals. Regarding soul: everything that lives, grows, and moves is animate. Animate is, for instance, men, animals, and plants. Now, we call plants animate, even though none among them are moving from place to place. However, since they are nourished and grow, we still refer to them as animate.<sup>9</sup>

§5 When you hear the name “senses”, it means: sight, hearing, touch, taste of the palate, smell of the nostrils. For it is through these five senses that a man perceives and through which he acts, putting in motion everything that may be put in motion.<sup>10</sup> When you hear the name “elements”, it means the following: earth, water, fire, and air. These are the four elements, and everything which is body is constituted from them.<sup>11</sup> But angels, demons, and souls are called intelligible, since they are comprehended by intellect only and do not fall under any senses. The definition of angel is rational immortal living being. The definition of man is rational mortal living being, capable of understanding and

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<sup>8</sup> Cf. T5 §1. For the theological context of this passage, see Peter of Callinicum, *Contra Damianum* II.5 (CCG 29, 25 Ebied et al.)

<sup>9</sup> For the description of the “Porphyrian Tree”, cf. T1 §27; T2 §3 and §7.

<sup>10</sup> Cf. T2 §32, and T6 §9.

<sup>11</sup> Cf. T6 §10.



knowledge. Animal is irrational, mortal, and endowed with senses. Thus, in his definition man shares (something) with both angels and animals: with angels that he is rational and with animals that he is mortal like them.

§6 Now, if you wish to know how the aforementioned four elements are joined with one another, we ought to see that they are opposed to one another. Fire is opposed to water, and so is water to fire. Also, earth is opposed to air, and so is air to earth. But you should know that their opposition shall not trouble you. Fire is hot and dry, while water is cold and wet, and in this way they seem to stand in complete opposition. For hot is the opposite of cold, and dry of wet. You also shall know how air stands in opposition to earth: air is hot and wet, while earth is cold and dry. So, the hotness of air is the opposite of the coldness of earth, and also the wetness of air is the opposite of the dryness of earth. You also ought to know how they are joined. If you want to combine the elements of fire and water, you shall place air between them. For air shares one part of what it has with fire and the other part of what it has it shares with water, (namely) hotness with fire and wetness with water. And since it has affinity with both of these elements, when it is placed in-between, as it has been said, due to this it unites these two elements which are opposed to one another. Further, if you wish to unite earth and air, you shall place fire in-between, for fire shares one of its parts with earth and another one with air, namely, dryness with earth and hotness with air. And since it has affinity with both of these elements, it unites those elements which are opposed to one another when it is placed in-between.<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> Cf. T6 §11; T1 §33.



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## T5: On Genus, Species, and Particularity



*A Treatise Composed by Mar Sergius, Presbyter and Chief Physician,<sup>1</sup> on Genus,  
Species, and Particularity<sup>2</sup>*

§1 First of all, we shall explain that what the wise call genus is something that is grasped intellectually but does not subsist individually<sup>3</sup> and that is divided into multiple entities which differ from one another in species but not in number.<sup>4</sup> What we call species is not a fruit, as some believe,<sup>5</sup> but species, as the wise state, is what is divided into multiple entities that differ from one another in number but not in species.<sup>6</sup> For individuals<sup>7</sup> differ from one another in number, since every individual that exists is singular and differs in number from others that belong to its species. So, when we speak of Paul, Peter, Jacob, or any person, we mean that all of them are individuals and that each one of them differs from others only in number. Now, all of them belong to the species of man, and, even if they are many in number, they are still one in species. For when the Divine Scripture says that “man is like a vapour”,<sup>8</sup> it does not refer to a single individual, but by “man” it refers to the whole community of men which we call a species.

§2 The same holds for other living beings. All lions are one in species, and hence they all may be called one lion, for each of them is singular in number and does not differ from the plurality of lions. The same stands for horses: all horses are one in species, but each one of them is singular in number. Further, concerning birds: all eagles are one eagle in species, all doves are one dove, all partridges are one partridge, and all sparrows are one sparrow, but each one of the eagles, doves, partridges, and sparrows is singular in number. Further,

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1 Sergius of Reshaina (d. 536). A reference to Sergius as *qaššiša* was sometimes interpreted to mean “priest”, but it probably only expresses respect for his authority. It is highly unlikely that Sergius was in fact the author of this tract (cf. the Introduction).

2 As the title makes apparent, the treatise focuses on what is traditionally called the “Tree of Porphyry”, i.e. the hierarchical system of genera, species, and particulars as developed by Porphyry in *Isag.* 4–8 and as elaborated on in the Neoplatonic commentaries on both the *Isagoge* and the *Categories*.

3 *Qnoma'it*, i.e. as a concrete individual. The Syriac term here probably reflects the Gr. ὑποστατικῶς. The whole passage echoes the introductory part of the *Isagoge*, see 1.9–12 where Porphyry refuses to reflect on the ontological status of genera (cf. also *In Cat.* 75.25–29 Busse). The Syriac author, on the contrary, is interested in this issue (as were the Alexandrian commentators, cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 39.10–42.22 Busse) and states from the onset that genera and species have no real existence.

4 Cf. T2 §17; Ps.-Michael Badoqa, *Book of Definitions* 9 (29.11–12 Furlani).

5 The Syriac word *adša* means both “fruit” and “species”, cf. Sokoloff 2009: 11.

6 Cf. T2 §17; Ps.-Michael Badoqa, *Book of Definitions* 10 (30.11–12 Furlani).

7 Syr. *qnoma*, cf. T4 §2.

8 Ps. 143:4 Peshiṭta. The same reference appears in Peter of Callinicum, *Contra Damianum* II.5 (CCG 29, 27.4–6 Ebied et al.).



concerning fishes:<sup>9</sup> being in every respect similar to one another, they are one species, but each one of them is singular in number. And as for trees, all cedars are one species, and all cypresses are one species, but every concrete cedar and cypress is one in number. Further, concerning fruits: all apples are one apple in species, and all pomegranates are one pomegranate in species, but each one of them is a singular apple and a singular pomegranate in number. The same stands for seeds: all seeds of wheat are one seed of wheat in species, and all lentils are one lentil in species, but each seed of wheat is singular in number and each lentil is singular in number.

§3 And this holds not only for natures<sup>10</sup> but also for accidents. Your wisdom knows<sup>11</sup> that we call accidents those things which occur in natures but which are not natures themselves. For colours, figures, big and small size, and other things that we will not list further cannot exist in their own right but occur in a certain nature and exist in it — so that we know that this nature is one thing and they are another — and cannot appear without it.<sup>12</sup> Now, whiteness as a whole is one species, as well as blackness as a whole, redness as a whole, and the rest. But the whiteness of a certain goose, or of a certain pearl, or of any other particular thing, is whiteness that is one in number. And the blackness of a certain raven, or of one hair, or of any other particular thing, is blackness that is one in number. Also, every circle is one in species, every square is one in species, all curved forms are one in species, and everything simply is one in species. But the circular form of the sun and the moon, or that of a wheel or of a chariot, is one in number; each square form of a certain table or of a certain brick (κεραμίδιον) is one in number; and each curved form of a certain scroll or a certain bow is one in number. The same with tastes: all of sweetness is one species, all of bitterness is one species, all of saltiness is one species, and so on; but the sweetness in a certain drop of honey, the bitterness in a certain piece of

9 Ms. has “doves”.

10 Here and in what follows, the term “nature” (*kyana*) carries the meaning of “substance” (Gr. οὐσία, usually transliterated in Syriac as *ʿusiya*). Cf. §6, below.

11 The author here addresses an unknown person upon whose request the treatise might have been composed. It is, however, most likely, a fictional person, referring to any reader of the treatise. Cf. the beginning of Ps.-Michael Badoqa’s *Book of Definitions* (17.5 Furlani) where we encounter the same address. Here there is no doubt that the treatise was not composed with one particular person in view.

12 For this definition of accident, see Sergius, *In Cat.* §135–137 (176–179 Arzhanov); anonymous Syriac scholia on the *Isagoge* (Baumstark 1900: 56–57); Ps.-Michael Badoqa, *Book of Definitions* 8 (27–29 Furlani); and Bar Bahlul, *Lexicon* (453–455 Duval).



wormwood (*absinthium*), and the saltiness in a piece of salt, each of them is one in number.

§4 This is also what we find among intelligible natures. All angels are one angel in species, all seraphs are one seraph in species, and all cherubs are one cherub in species. But Gabriel, Michael, and every other (angel) is one in number. And it holds not exclusively for them but also for those things that are grasped only intellectually, for instance, for crafts. The whole of carpentry is one in species, as well as the whole of metalworking, the whole of tentmaking, and every other (craft) is one in species. But the carpentry of Joseph, the craft of metalworking of Hiram, and the craft of tentmaking of Aquila<sup>13</sup> — each one of them is singular in number. Thus, everything that exists only as belonging to some nature or in a nature — which exists for its own sake — is separated from one another in number but is united in species with everything that possesses all of what it possesses.

§5 So, as mentioned above, we call species that which is spread over multiple things all possessing the same as the others and that through which they are united while differing from one another only in number, i.e. in that one of them is singular and the other is singular. However, one species differs from another species not in number, since it is not even known how many entities there are over which a certain species is extended. Rather, species differ from one another through differentiae,<sup>14</sup> because not everything that one species has is also had by another one, for if both of them were in every respect similar these species would simply be one. When, in fact, there are two or however many species that have something in common, they are species in what differentiates them from one another, and what two or more species have in common is called genus. Now, let your knowledge take a tree as an example:<sup>15</sup> it has one shaft that is divided into two or several boughs, and every bough (is further divided) into branches, and every branch into rods, and every rod into twigs, and in all these orders (τάξεις) things differ from one another in some aspects

13 The examples refer to Joseph, the husband of Mary, who was a carpenter (cf. Mt. 13:55); Hiram who worked on Solomon's temple as a metalsmith (cf. 1 Kings 7:14); and Aquila, the fellow worker of the Apostle Paul, who is said to be a tentmaker in Acts 18:3.

14 Syr. *šuhlāpa*, corresponding to Gr. διαφορά. The use of *šuhlāpa* with this meaning is characteristic of Athanasius of Balad's version of Porphyry's *Isagoge* produced in the late 7th cent., as well as other Syriac authors of the 7th–8th cent., e.g. Jacob of Edessa. The 6th-cent. anonymous translation of the *Isagoge*, as well as Sergius of Reshaina and Proba, who both also belong to the 6th cent., use the term *puršana* instead, cf. T1.

15 This is apparently one of the earliest presentations of Porphyry's system of genera and species using the image of a tree. Cf. Barnes 2003: 109 n. 53.



and are one in others. Draw this image in your mind, and you will comprehend the orders (τάξεις) that we have spoken of.

§6 Now, let us say, by way of demonstration, that the genus of natural things is nature, for everything that a man says subsists individually<sup>16</sup> is a nature.<sup>17</sup> This nature that we call genus is divided into two species, body and incorporeal. Thus, body is a species of nature, and also incorporeal is a species of nature, and both of them are called by the name of their genus. So, when we are asked what body is, we answer that it is a nature. And when we are asked what incorporeal being is, we answer that it is a nature. So, they are one in their genus, but, because of the differentia, they are two species in relation to one another. It is therefore the differentia that divides a genus and produces species from it. If there is one differentia, then two species appear; and, if they are many, then multiple (species appear). But what divides a species is not the differentia but number. Thus, there is no differentia in man in that he is man, or in anything else that we call species, but Peter and Paul differ from one another only in number.

§7 Now, neither is every genus only genus, nor every species only <species>. There is, indeed, a genus that is only genus and that is not at the same time species, because there is no other genus above it that could be divided through a differentia and thereby be turned into a species. It is called the most generic genus.<sup>18</sup> And there is a species that is not divided through a differentia into other species so as to possibly be their genus but that is divided only into numerables,<sup>19</sup> i.e. into those things that differ from one another not in species but in number. This is called the most specific species.<sup>20</sup> And there are other

<sup>16</sup> Syr. *qnoma'it*, cf. §1, above.

<sup>17</sup> As noted above, the term *kyana*, “nature”, carries the meaning of “substance”. The same definition of “nature” is characteristic of Ps.-Michael Badoqa’s *Book of Definitions* (see 25.10–27.2 Furlani; cf. also 61.6). Sergius of Reshaina characterizes in nearly the same words what he calls by the loanword *'usiya*. See *In Cat.* §395: “Some natures exist in virtue of themselves and are called substances” (398.1–2 Arzhanov). Cf. Jacob of Edessa, *Encheiridion* (227.11–12 Furlani).

<sup>18</sup> Literally “genus of genera”, rendering the Greek term γενικώτατος. Cf. Sergius, *In Cat.* §94 (142 Arzhanov); Jacob of Edessa, *Encheiridion* (231.17 Furlani); Ps.-Michael Badoqa, *Book of Definitions* 11 (31–32 Furlani). The form of the Syriac expression in T5 slightly differs from these other texts in that it has the second word in status emphaticus (*gens gense*). In all of these other texts, it is in status absolutus (*gens gensin*).

<sup>19</sup> Syr. *metmanyana*, “what may be counted”. This term appears as a synonym of, or an explicative alternative for, *qnoma*, “individual”. Cf. Ps.-Michael Badoqa, *Book of Definitions* 93 (61.5–7 Furlani).

<sup>20</sup> Literally “species of species”. The Syriac expression derives from the Gr. ειδικώτατος. Cf. Sergius, *In Cat.* §93 (142 Arzhanov); Ps.-Michael Badoqa, *Book of Definitions* 12 (32 Furlani).



things between them that are at the same time species for the genera which are before them but genera for the species which are after them.<sup>21</sup>

§8 Now, here comes an explanation of the primary genus, which is the most generic genus of nature.<sup>22</sup> It is divided through a differentia, and two species appear, body and incorporeal, as we have said. Body, which is a species of nature, is further divided through a differentia into what is animate and called living being and what is inanimate, and it becomes their genus while they are its species. But lest we overburden our account with all the species, we will pick one species from each order, and this will serve as a sufficient explanation for the intelligent. So, body that is animate is called living being. It is divided through a differentia, and two species appear, rational and irrational. So, while it is a species of the genus that is before it, it is also the genus to those after it. Rational is further divided through a differentia, and two species appear, man and intelligible powers. And while rational is a species of living being, it becomes at the same time the genus for species that come after it, which are man and intelligible powers. Now, man is only a species of rational, and it is called a most specific species, since it is the last one. It is not divided through a differentia into other species so as to be a genus for them but (is divided) into particulars that differ from one another numerically. For Peter, Paul, and each particular man are differentiated from one another in number and not through differentiae of species. So, the primary genera that have no other ones above them are called the most generic, and they are genera only, for, since no other (genera) are prior to them, they cannot appear also as species. The last species, on the other hand, that have no other species after them are called the most specific and are species only, for they cannot appear also as genera, since they are not divided into other species but only into numerables, i.e. those entities that are separated from one another only in number and not in species.<sup>23</sup>

§9 However, what is grasped in the first place are these numerables, since what is separate and singular in number is what we first of all either see, or

21 Cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 70.18–20 Busse; Sergius, *In Cat.* §94 (142 Arzhanov); Theodore of Raithu, *Preparatio* 207–208 Diekamp.

22 Cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 70.7–10 Busse; Jacob of Edessa, *Encheiridion* 231 Furlani.

23 For the presentation of the “Tree of Porphyry”, cf. T1 §27; T2 §§3, 7–8, 15, 20.



hear, or touch, or smell, or taste, and from these things we come to the idea of what unites them, i.e. their species. And from the species we further comprehend the genera that are divided into species. Thus, we first of all see Paul, Peter, and each concrete man, and, since everything that one of them has the others also have, it is their whole assembly that shares the same characteristics that we call “man”. This “man”, which is divided into numerables that are separated one from another in number and that share the same characteristics, we call a species. But species is a species of something, which is its genus. Thus, we comprehend that man is a species of rational living being, while rational living being is the genus for man, which is its species, and (also) for other rational species. And rational, in turn, is not only the genus for the rational species, namely, for man and intelligible powers, but is also a species of living being, which is the genus of rational and irrational. Living being, in turn, which is the genus of rational and irrational, is a species of body, which is the genus for animate and inanimate. And body, in turn, is a species of nature, which is the genus for body and incorporeal. But nature, which is the genus for what is beneath it, is not also a species, for there is no other genus that is above it and of which it would be a species. That is why it is called the most generic genus.

§10 Thus, in intellect we divide the most generic genus, which is the highest one, and descend to the intermediary entities that are genera for those beneath them and are at the same time species for those that are above them, all the way down to the last species that is the most specific one, since it is not divided into other species, so that it might be a genus for them, but into numerables that are particulars and that differ from one another in number. But in the teaching process we ascend from the particulars to the most specific species, and from there we proceed upwards through the intermediary ones until the

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14 scrib. cod. ללכנר

most generic genus.<sup>24</sup> Thus, since in all things you will find these orders (τάξεις), we have set for your wisdom this kind (τύπος) of example, on the basis of which you would be able to comprehend the order (τάξις) of anything you like.

§11 So, if you wish, you would find in wooden things that wood is a most generic genus that is divided into wet and dry, which are the species of wood. Further, wet (wood) is the genus of the species of trees and of what does not reach the height of a tree, such as vine tree and the rest. Further, tree that is a species of wet wood is the genus of medical plants and of those that bear fruits. Further, the species of (trees) bearing (fruits) becomes the genus of fig tree, date palm, pomegranate, apple tree, and the rest. But fig tree or any other one is the most specific species, since it is divided not into other species but into individual fig trees. Also, fruit is a most generic genus. It is divided into those (fruits) that contain kernels and those that do not, into those that have no covering and those that have it. Those which contain kernels are divided into pomegranate, olives, and the rest. And olive is further divided into the fatty, the Aramaic, the Samaritan, the *colymbades*,<sup>25</sup> and so on. The *colymbades* or any other (olive) is a most specific species that is not divided into other species but into individual (olives) only. Also, grain is a most generic genus that is divided into species, some of which produce bread, other herbs, and still other vegetables. Also, (grains of) vegetables, which is a species of grains, is the genus of lentils, beans, and the rest. Lentils, however, are divided not into other species but into individual lentils.

§12 The same also applies to those things that are grasped only intellectually. Take craft as an example of a most generic genus. It is divided into the species of practice and rhetoric. Further, practice, which is a species of craft, is the genus of various species, i.e. (the crafts of treating) wood, metals, wool, and the rest. And further, the treatment of wood, which is a species of craft, is divided into other species, i.e. production of yokes, building of ships, and carpentry. But

24 For the two types of reasoning, analysis and synthesis, which are understood also in terms of descent and ascent, cf. T2 §§1–6. See also Ammonius, *In Isag.* 36.1–38.4 Busse.

25 Syr. *qlwbs*’ (in second case *qwlmbbs*), corresponding to the Talmud Aramaic *qlwpsyn* or *klwbsyn* (cf. Löw 1881: 137–138; Jastrow 1903: I.640–641) and deriving from Greek κολυμβάδες ἐλαῖαι (“olives swimming in brine”), refers to olives that were collected for food in contrast to those used for producing oil.



carpentry and everything else are most specific species, for they are not divided into other crafts but into such-and-such individual things that are separate from one another numerically.

§13 What has been said does not mean that these are the only genera that are separated and that they divide only into these species. Rather, what we have said is an example of such explanations through which one might comprehend and show the way for the lovers of learning who will receive a lot from a little. For in all created beings you will discover, if you wish, these three things: genus, species, and particularity. Species are assembled from particulars, and genera are divided into species, while those in-between are at the same time species and genera. They are species of what is above them and genera of the species that are beneath them. Sometimes many of them are found, sometimes they are few, and in some places they are not found at all.

§14 Now, to put it briefly, we call genus something that spreads over (several) species that are divided from one another through differentiae and not through number. We call species something that spreads over multiple things that are divided from one another through number and not through differentiae. However, there are particular species that do not spread over multiple numerables but are one also in number, for instance, the phoenix (φοῖνιξ). Even if, as we say, in reality there is only one (phoenix) and not many, since the differentia of those things that the phoenix alone has, while other species of birds do not have, differentiates it from the birds that belong to its genus, it is a species too despite being one in number. Hence, if we are asked what the phoenix is, we say that it is a species of bird.<sup>26</sup> For each species<sup>27</sup> or genus explains what is beneath it. So, if we are asked what Paul or Peter are, we give their species, man, as an answer. And if we are further asked what man is, we say, rational

<sup>26</sup> For this example, cf. Simplicius, *In Cat.* 371.14 Kalbfleisch (quoting Plotinus).

<sup>27</sup> Correction proposed by G. Furlani. The ms. has “man”.



living being, which is its genus. And if we are also asked what rational living being is, we say that it is an animate body. And further, if we are asked what animate body is (...).<sup>28</sup> And further when we are asked what body is, we say that it is a nature, which is a most generic genus. And each one of them is called by the name of that under which it is, while a differentia makes it complete.<sup>29</sup>

§15 I would like your intelligence to know that kind<sup>30</sup> also relates to species. Although what we call a kind is different from what we call a species, the latter may still actually be comprehended from it. For instance, we say that modesty is a species of virtue.<sup>31</sup> So, when a person is doing or saying something modestly, we call him of modest kind; and if you are asked about someone what kind of speech he speaks, we say, the modest one. And since licentiousness is a species of deceit, if we are asked what kind the words and actions of a deceitful person is, we answer that (it is) licentious. Also, since theft is a species of crime, if we are asked of what kind the thief's act of taking that which does not belong to him is, we say furtive. Thus, theft is a species of crime, so the implementation of the species is furtively, and this is what we call kind. Because of that, when we are asked about the deeds of a man, we answer that they are either of a good or of a bad kind. So, if we understand which kind certain deeds that have been done belong to, we say that they were either (done) cunningly, or simply, or apparently, or secretly. All of these are kinds, while cunning and simplicity are not kinds but species of intellect.

§16 We call model (τύπος) that which does not actually exist but which points to something else that actually exists. And even if it actually exists, what "model" refers to is the way in which something is similar to something (else).<sup>32</sup>

§17 We call quantity that by means of which something is comprehended as being small or big, few or many.

<sup>28</sup> The words "And further ... body" are marked red in the codex. It is likely that several words have dropped out here. The restored text should read: "... we say that it is a body".

<sup>29</sup> On applying the names of genera for the definition of species, see T2 §9, which derives from Sergius, *In Cat.* §169.

<sup>30</sup> Syr. *zna*, "kind, sort, way (of doing something)". Sergius popularized this term to represent "quality", cf. *In Cat.* §§ 354–355 (362–363 Arzhanov).

<sup>31</sup> Cf. the Syriac version of Ps.-Aristotle, *De Virt.* I.3 (Brock 2014: 94).

<sup>32</sup> Cf. Ps.-Michael Badoqa, *Book of Definitions* 135 (72.13–73.2 Furlani).



§18 We speak of unity when two things become one, or when one thing is one.<sup>33</sup>

The treatise of presbyter Mar Sergius on genera, species, and particularity came to an end.

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<sup>33</sup> Cf. a slightly different definition of this term in Ps.-Michael Badoqa, *Book of Definitions* 167 (85.11–12 Furlani).



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## T6: Logical Treatise in Ms. DS 27

<...> קלמ דסמ סד. לקלכא אדא אדא הלכסא הלכסא.  
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 נה. סד. לחמ הלכסא אדא: סלמ דמ דכסא ס' אדא.  
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§1 <...><sup>1</sup> comprises living beings, I mean, angels, men, and animals. And since it has been shown that there is one name for all of them who differ from one another in nature, it is thus called generic, while what it is comprised of are species. Now, species is something that comprises many things that differ in their individual subsistence but that are similar in essence,<sup>2</sup> for instance, man simpliciter, or horse and bull simpliciter, and so on. Every time you apply the name “man” loosely, not referring to a concrete individual, it is said universally, (designating all those) who do not differ in nature but who differ in their individual existence, namely, Simon, Daniel, and other men. The same stands for (the names) “horse” and “bull”, which (refer to) multiple (beings) that exist at different places and are distant from one another but that are not differentiated from one another, since they are embraced in their nature by something which is one.<sup>3</sup>

§2 Thus, you shall know that a genus is said of, and exists, so that it embraces multiple things that differ in nature. Species, on the other hand, is that which embraces multiple things that differ not in nature but in individual being. Now, since it is not divided into anything else, an individual being of each one of them — be it (the species) man, horse, or bull — is not called a species but a most specific species. For it was the custom of the wise to call something that cannot be divided and differentiated a most specific species. Thus, the species of Simon, Sergius, Daniel, or any other individual being they called most specific species, i.e. indivisibles, since in their nature, (these men) are similar and do not differ from one another; nor do any other species derive from them.<sup>4</sup>

§3 Further, differentia is that through which one thing differs from another either in nature, or in individual subsistence, or in any other thing that may be differentiated. For instance, through one thing men differ from angels, and through another thing men differ from animals. Also, animals differ from birds through something, while animals and birds, in turn, (differ) from plants, or trees, or stones, and so on. Now, the way in which one thing differs from the other is called differentia, since by means of it we differentiate and understand

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1 The beginning of the treatise is lost. The first five paragraphs deal with the five main terms of the *Isagoge*, starting with genus in §1. For the first sentence, cf. Ps.-Michael Badoqa, *Book of Definitions* 59 (53.7–11 Furlani).

2 The Syriac text has the word *su'rana*, “thing”, which functions here as a synonym for “nature”, cf. §2 below.

3 For the definition of genus and species, cf. T2 §17. However, the terminology of T6 differs from what we find in T2 which is based on the *Isagoge*.

4 It seems that the Syriac author is here confusing the terms “most specific species” and “individual”. See T1 §4, T2 §15, and T5 §7 for a clearer distinction between the two.



that through which this thing differs from that one and that through which they are similar.

§4 Further, property is that which manifests only a certain nature, and without it no nature of any kind may come to be. So, when eliminated, it eliminates its nature together with itself. For instance, the ability to laugh is the main property of man, and, if it is eliminated, then necessarily man is also eliminated, and the other way around, i.e. when man is eliminated, it is necessarily eliminated too. So, this is what the wise call property.<sup>5</sup>

§5 Further, accident is that which does not have subsistence by itself but only in the intellect and which may exist and not exist.<sup>6</sup> Among them, there are some which change, being dependent on the change of the nature in which they occur and not being something (by themselves); there are others that do not change while lasting (only) a certain time; and there are still others that are attached to something else, subsisting in it from its generation, for instance, a certain blemish that marks a leg or a hand, or blindness in animals, or anything else of this kind. Also, another example is white, black, red, and all other colours that appear in a nature. Among (accidents) there are ones that are sometimes separated from (the nature) and sometimes appear in it; and there are others that are completely concomitant with the nature in which they occur from the beginning until the end. So, this is what the wise call accident. And hence, everything that exists falls under what the wise called either (accident) or substance, as we have said above.<sup>7</sup>

§6 Further, when you hear (the name) “matter” (ύλη), you shall understand it as follows. Everything that has not yet been established and that has not become any particular thing has a certain likeness to matter.<sup>8</sup> Thus, matter is a prerequisite of knowing something intellectually. When it becomes established as a nature, it receives its properties and movements in which it comes to be and which are: lightness, heaviness, density, transparency, softness, hardness,

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5 The text above mingles two subject matters: definition of property in the strict sense (on which, cf. T2 §17) and definition of what is prior by nature, on which cf. Sergius, *In Cat.* §339 (348.11–22 Arzhanov). The latter issue is discussed in the second part of Proba’s commentary on the *Isagoge* (cf. Baumstark 1900: 5.12–28).

6 Cf. the definition of accident as something that “may exist or not exist” in *Isag.* 13.4 (Athanasius’ version).

7 For various definitions of accident, cf. particularly Ps.-Michael Badoqa, *Book of Definitions* 8 (27–28 Furlani).

8 Cf. *Isag.* 11.12–13 and T1 §35.



wetness, dryness, coldness, warmness, colour, shape (σχῆμα), form, space.<sup>9</sup> Each one of them taken by itself is not matter, but the most principle among them are shapes and meanings. However, when they hasten together towards one another and acquire all those movements, then matter is established. Now, understand and observe that each one of them is set in opposition to its counterpart: light vs. heavy, dense vs. transparent, soft vs. hard, wet vs. dry, cold vs. warm. All of them are mixed together, so that none of them has advantage over the other. And since you or (any other) reader might have difficulty in understanding what these names mean, I do not mind briefly explaining them to you.

§7 Now, lightness refers to something that is especially light in its nature and is not actually inclined towards what is below it but instead constantly rises towards what is above, for instance, fire, for fire is light in its nature, and its flames are not obliged to go downwards but constantly ascend upwards. Heaviness is established as the complete opposite of what is light. For heaviness is when something contains weight in its nature and is therefore not inclined to ascend upwards, and even when it is thrown up by men, it will fall down because of its weight, for example, a stone, a piece of iron, and suchlike whose nature is heavy. That is why they are set as opposites to one another, for it is because of one of them that things go up and because of the other that they come down.

§8 Further, something is dense when it is condensed, hard, and firm in its texture, its structure, or in anything like that, for instance, earth, which is thick in its structure, and bodies of stones and wood. Something is thin when it is pure, thin, and soft, and air is seen in it. Thus, we say that air is thin because it is not condensed like earth. So, you may take two garments and place them separately in front of you, and through one of them light becomes visible for you such that it reaches you unhindered, but the other (garment) will prevent the rays of light from reaching your eyes so that they do not go through <...> to

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9 Cf. Sergius, *In Cat.* §§236–242 (262–269 Arzhanov).

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§9

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§10

those which are outside the garment <...>, and it also hinders the rays of the sun so that they do not reach us. So, the one which does not prevent the light from going through because of its purity and thinness is called thin; while that one which hinders the light from reaching your sight because of its thickness is called dense.<sup>10</sup>

§9 Further, something is called soft when it feels soft to the touch, for instance, cotton of goats, linen, and silk. On the other hand, hard is, for instance, stones, wood, and suchlike that have something hard in them. Hot is, for instance, fire; and cold is, for instance, snow, ice, and suchlike. Form and shape (refer) to something that has been previously formed and has received a shape, or when something was engraved on a piece of wood, on a tablet, or something like that which acquires only the form and the shape of that whose form it is but which is not actually this thing. Finally, space is duration and length of the events in time that are placed either far apart or nearby. So, all these things signify matter.

§10 Further, when you hear the name “senses”, this is how you shall understand it.<sup>11</sup> A man has five senses in his body, each of which is established as some sort of door and entrance through which he sees, hears, touches, tastes, and scents good or bad smells. They are the following. First is the sight of eyes: all things that are seen as bodies are seen through this sense. Second is the hearing of ears, for all things heard — be it knocking, or murmur, or anything else — are heard through this sense. Third is the touch of hands, for all things that fall under touching may be felt through the touch of the hands. Fourth is the taste of the palate, for all things that are accessible for tasting — whether they are bitter or sweet — may be differentiated by means of the palate’s sense of taste. Fifth is the smell of the nostrils, for all things that have some smell — whether foul or pleasant — are perceived by the nostrils, and this sense is able to differentiate between the effects that they make. Thus, a man perceives

<sup>10</sup> Cf. Sergius, *In Cat.* §378 (382 Arzhanov).

<sup>11</sup> For the following paragraph, see the first part of T4 §5. Cf. also T2 §32.



through these five senses, and all things that are set in motion are set in motion through them. Without them no man may come to be, and, if they do not exist, then a man does not exist either; but if a man exists, then from necessity they exist in him as well.

§11 Further, if you hear the name “elements” (στοιχεῖα), you shall know that they are the following: fire, earth, water, and air. These are the four paternal elements that constitute all things in this world, namely, men, animals, and suchlike.<sup>12</sup> Now, you shall know that there are two worlds, namely, the intelligible and the perceptible. The intelligible one is in heaven, and in it there are higher powers, I mean angels and all intelligible spirits that, because they have no bodies, may come to be in intellect only. The perceptible world, on the other hand, is the one in which there are men, animals, and all bodies. Hence, the former is far from the constitution of the senses and the elements, while the latter is constituted by them and may not reach fulfilment without taking part in them, since the former is the place of those entities that are incorporeal, while the latter is the place of those entities that are bound by bodies. Now, the demons and souls fall neither under the elements nor under the senses, since they are not bodies but rather thin spirits and intelligible beings.<sup>13</sup>

§12 Now, look and understand that the elements are opposed to one another and are joined to one another. For fire is opposed to water insofar as it is hot and dry, while water is cold and wet. Hot is the opposite of cold, just as dry (is the opposite) of wet. Also, earth is opposed to air insofar as air is hot and wet, while earth is cold and dry. The hotness of air is opposed to the coldness of earth, just as the wetness of air (is opposed) to the dryness of earth. Now, if you wish to unite those two elements that are opposed to each other in this way, I mean fire and water, you shall place between them air, which is hot and wet,

<sup>12</sup> For the expression “paternal elements”, cf. Theodore Bar Koni, *Book of Scholia I* (Scher 1910–1912/I: 22.2–3).

<sup>13</sup> The whole paragraph appears to be a revised version of the second part of T4 §5.



and they will immediately be united. For air possesses two parts; one of them is hotness through which it is united with fire, and the other one is wetness through which it is united with water. Since it has these relations, as we have said, and since it is placed in-between, it is united through them with both elements, which turn out to be the opposites of one another.<sup>14</sup>

§13 Furthermore, if you wish to unite earth and air that turn out to be the opposites of one another, you shall place between them fire, which is hot and dry, and they will immediately be united. For fire possesses two things: one of them is hotness, which unites it with air, and the other is dryness, through which it is united with earth. And since (fire) has relations with both of them insofar as it is in-between them, it unites these two elements with one another, even though they are opposed to one another. Also, fire and earth and water and air, which are similarly set apart, may be united with one another in the same way, if you wish. Furthermore, there are other names in which the same elements come to be and exist, I mean the four humours (χυμοί): blood, phlegm (φλέγμα), black bile, and red bile. Now, blood is hot and wet, like air. Phlegm is cold and wet, like water. Black bile is cold and dry, like earth. Red bile is hot and dry, like fire.<sup>15</sup>

§14 Hence, the synthetic account of bodies consists of the following.<sup>16</sup> When someone would first like to apply synthesis to bodies, he will take those things that subsist in intellect and combine them in word, making them one thing. For instance, one would take head, neck, breast, hands, belly, and legs and produce from them in word one complete body of a man or of something else; or take names, chapters, and different phrases and produce from them one treatise. The method that reverses the synthetic one (i.e. analysis) does not go in the

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<sup>14</sup> Cf. T4 §6.

<sup>15</sup> Cf. Ps.-Michael Badoqa, *Book of Definitions* 76–79 (58.1–13 Furlani).

<sup>16</sup> The following paragraph is based on the description of the two methods of logic, synthesis and analysis, as described in T2 §6.



same direction, but instead ascends from below upwards. Thus, one will first take those things that are composites and dissolve them into those natures of which they are composed. For instance, one will take a human body and dissolve it into those things of which it is composed, i.e. into head, neck, breast, hands, belly, and legs. All these he will further dissolve into those things that are prior to them, I mean into nerves, bones, and flesh. He will also take these and dissolve them into other things of which they are composed, i.e. into the four humours: blood, phlegm, red bile, and the other (bile). He will also take them and dissolve them into those things that are prior to them, i.e. into the four elements out of which the body is formed. Then he will also take the elements and ascend from them to their primary cause, which is matter and form. (Thus,) in one way someone may do synthesis of any body he wishes, while in the other way he could do analysis by dividing any body he wishes.

§15 Let us further observe what body and corporeality are. One thing, namely, is body, and another is corporeality, which is capable of motions. So, corporeality is pure matter that may receive motions, while there is no motion in it yet.<sup>17</sup> Body, on the other hand, is a form (εἶδος) of something that is in actuality skilfully brought from matter into form, I mean either in the image of a man, or a bull, or anything else like that. Hence, we do not call corporeality body, since it is grasped only intellectually.

§16 Let us further say what sensation and sensible are, and what sense and sensitive are. Sensation is a faculty by means of which we usually perceive material entities. Sensible is what falls under sensation, for instance, a stone, or a piece of wood, or another body like that. Sense is an organ in which the faculty of sensation is realised, for instance, a hand, or a leg, or other members like them. Further, a living being is sensitive when it possesses the faculty of

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17 Cf. Ps.-Michael Badoqa, *Book of Definitions* 68 (55.3–4 Furlani).

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1 ארבעה עשרה ימים scr.: ארבעה עשרה ימים cod.

sensation. For instance, one can say that of a man, or a horse, or other species (of living being) like that.<sup>18</sup>

§17 Now, let us also speak about different ways of signifying something with names. Of names, some signify natures, for instance, “air”, “earth”, “fire”, “man”, and suchlike; and some signify what natures have, for instance, “hotness” and “coldness”, “rationality” and “sensibility”, and other things like that which natures may have. Further, some of them designate what belongs to natures, for instance, that it is not possible for bodies to be invisible and immortal, that stones and wood may not be intelligent and rational, and suchlike.<sup>19</sup> Further, some of them designate things that occur to natures, for instance, “burning”, “wet”, “cold”, “shaken”, “born”, “grown up”, “dried up”, and suchlike. And some designate things that affect natures, for instance, “destruction”, “death”, “suffering”, “grief”, “disease”, and suchlike.<sup>20</sup> Further, some of them signify what occurs in a nature by custom, for instance, being white or black, and suchlike. Further, some of them (refer) to what is in a nature, I mean a hand, a leg, or other members (of a body) like them. Some of them signify that which is after nature, for instance, that a man might be a scribe or a doctor, or (acquire) any other craft like that. Further, some of them (signify) something that relates to nature, I mean “old” or “young”, or “time”. For neither space nor time exist in a nature, but a nature exists in space and time. Further, some of them are said figuratively, for instance, when we call a man god, just as Moses was called like that, or when we describe God in terms of members (of a body), for instance, “eye”, “hand”, “ear”, or when we call a statue an image of a man, and other things like that.

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<sup>18</sup> This paragraph is based on T2 §35 (which, in turn, derives from Evagrius Ponticus).

<sup>19</sup> Cf. a distinction between substances (“natures”) and accidents in §5 above.

<sup>20</sup> Cf. a description of the categories of acting and being-affected in Sergius, *In Cat.* §§106–107 (150 Arzhanov).



§18 Further, there are generic names; there are specific names; there are natural names; and there are individual names. Generic (names) are those that enclose beneath themselves multiple species of different nature but that are not enclosed by them. Further, specific (names) are those that enclose only individuals that differ not in nature but in their individual being. Further, natural (names) are those that signify nature, for instance, (the names) “man”, “animal”, or other things. And individual (names) are those that signify a particular individual enclosed by them and that do not enclose other ones.<sup>21</sup>

§19 Further, there is the unity of a generic name which signifies the unity of a nature of different individuals — for instance, the names “man”, “animal”, and so on. And there is the unity of a specific name which signifies the unity of an individual (combining) different natures — for instance, a man is constituted of soul and body.<sup>22</sup> Of (things) that are of the same genus, there may be homonymy and heteronymy. Examples of homonymy in the same genus are Alexander the Macedonian, Alexander the Athenian, Alexander the King, and other names like that. Examples of heteronymy in the same genus are Plato, Socrates, Aristotle, and others like them, who have the same nature but differ in the names by which they are called. If (things belong) to different genera, there is homonymy in some specific usage that is, however, not real. For example, when someone applies human names to animals and calls a horse “Sergius” or by any other human name; or when a star of Orion is called “dog”, while in reality it is not a dog; or when a certain man is called a god, while in reality he is not a god; or when a certain man is called by the name of angels, e.g. Gabriel, Michael, and so on.<sup>23</sup>

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21 Cf. T2 §10.

22 This paragraph corresponds nearly verbatim to T2 §10. Cf. also T2 §11.

23 The second part of this paragraph has clear parallels in T2 §12.



§20 Furthermore, when a generic name is short, it designates many heterogeneous things. For instance, the name “living being” is in itself a short name that encloses many genera, I mean angels, men, and animals. When, however, the generic name is long because differentiae are attached to it, it designates only (those things) that belong to one particular genus. For instance, if you take the name “living being” and attach “rational” and “immortal” to it, then it designates only angels.<sup>24</sup>

§21 Now, generic names encompass the species that are beneath them, which are at the same time genera of what is beneath them. For instance, substance is a genus of living being, so that living being is a species of substance. But this living being, which is a species of substance, is the genus for what is beneath it, namely, for angels, men, and animals. What is said to be beneath the latter are individuals, either an angel, or a man, or an animal, or something similar.<sup>25</sup>

§22 Now, what follows are the Greek terms that are found in the treatise *Isagoge* and which are translated into Syriac: *teoretikon* (θεωρητικόν) means “theory”, *praktikon* (πρακτικόν) means “practice”, *matematikon* (μαθηματικόν) means “sciences”, *geomturiya* (γεωμετρία) means “measurement of land”, *aritmētique* (ἀριθμητική) means “numbering”, *astronomiya* (ἀστρονομία) means “law of the stars”, *musiqe* (μουσική) means “playing on a cithern”, *politikon* (πολιτικόν) means “care of cities”, *’eqonomiqon* (οἰκονομικόν) means “care of houses”, *’etiqon* (ἠθικόν) means “care of morals”, *’etimologia* (ἔτυμολογία) is when you try to find out where (a word) comes from <...><sup>26</sup>

<sup>24</sup> For this paragraph, cf. T2 §13.

<sup>25</sup> For this paragraph, cf. T2 §14.

<sup>26</sup> The listed terms are not found in Porphyry’s *Isagoge* but trace back to the commentaries on Porphyry’s treatise, which include the discussion of the parts of philosophy. It is likely that §22 derives from tree diagrams like those we encounter in T1 §11 and §13.



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## T7: Logico-Theological Treatise in Ms. DS 28



§1 <...> only He is living in the most proper sense, and He is the source of life for all living beings.<sup>1</sup> Also, only He is rational and immortal in the most proper sense, and He is the giver of rationality and immortality, while others are receivers (of them) and not givers. For just as “no one is good except the one God”;<sup>2</sup> so too nothing is living, or rational, or immortal in the proper sense save for Him alone. But since He in no way partakes in the created beings, it is (only) in an imprecise and undiscerning way that one may speak of Him as (one does) of a certain genus, i.e. (in terms) of relation.

§2 So, when I say “Godhead” or “God”, I mean that the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are one genus and one species, namely, Godhead, i.e. a nature that is uncreated, infinite, invisible, and ungenerated, creator, producer-of-everything, all-mighty, all-seer, from whom everything that exists comes to be and to whom it belongs; and that it is proper for Him to be in hypostases that are distinct and unconfused in Him. For we teach what the God-clad fathers believed, namely, that there is one Godhead and indivisible substance, and Three of the One and One of the Three. And we believe what we teach, while we anathematize and repudiate those who neither believe nor explain it this way.<sup>3</sup>

§3 Further, when I say “creature”, I encompass everything that has been created. What I mean is the whole of created, rational, and immortal nature, the whole humanity and every body, whether living or not living, and every genus and species of animals, I mean birds, reptiles, those in water, animal-plants, plants, herbs, i.e. everything that is green, gold, silver, bronze, iron, tin, lead, glass, stones, soil, and all other things that God created and that came into being. For since all of them are creatures that were made, exist in time, and derive from one (source), they are said of as one certain genus and one species, and hence they are brothers, i.e. creatures, or creatures of God.

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1 As it becomes clear from the context, God is the subject.

2 Mk 10:18.

3 Cf. the confession based on the faith of the Fathers by Peter of Callinicum in the *Anti-Tritheist Dossier* (Ebied et al. 1981: 75.28–76.3) and in *Contra Damianum* II.1.50–58 (CCG 29, 4–7 Ebeid et al.).



§4 Now, when I say “rational creature”, I include angelic and heavenly powers as well as all men. Since they are creatures and rational, they too are spoken of as one genus and one species, namely, rational creature. Further, when I say “intelligible, rational, immortal, and incorporeal creature”, I mean angelic powers and human souls. Since they are incorporeal, intelligible, rational, immortal, invisible, and receptive of intellect and knowledge, they too are one particular genus and one species, namely, rational immortal creature.

§5 Now, if someone says that there are many genera and various species among them that are not visible to us, particularly among souls and angels, the only thing we shall say is that the one who wishes to distinguish between different natures, substances, and species among the intelligible created natures shall be asked by the lovers of truth to most properly demonstrate their difference and division, i.e. how they differ from one another. However, until he has demonstrated this, I do not consider them to deviate from how they were defined. As for us, just as we have said previously, we state neither that there is one nature and one substance of everything that exists nor that there are multiple different substances and natures (into which) we divide (things). Instead, God and the doctors (inspired) by Him have given us a definition and an explanation concerning each one of these things, and it is these definitions and explanations that we adhere to and that we preserve as a stable and immovable anchor. So, again, when I say “rational mortal creature”, I include in this expression all men. Hence we speak of them as of such things that belong only to one particular genus and one species, namely, rational mortal creature or rational mortal living being.

§6 Further, when I say “body”, I include in this word the four elements — I mean earth, fire, water, and air — and all things that, as I have said above,



originate from them, namely, human bodies, animals, birds, reptiles, those in the water, animal-plants, plants, every grass, all herbs, gold, silver, bronze, iron, tin, lead, glass, stones, dry wood, and everything that originates from earth, or from fire, or from water, or from air. Since all of them are corporeal and sensible, they too together belong to one particular genus, and they also are one species, namely, body or sensible nature. But when I say “living body”, I comprise human bodies, all animals, all birds, all reptiles, all those in the water, all animal-plants, all plants, every grass, every herb, every body that lives and nourishes itself. Since they are corporeal, living, and nourish themselves, they are said of as one genus and one species, namely, living and nourished body. But when I say “living sensitive body”, I thereby grasp human bodies, animals, birds, reptiles, those in the water, and animal-plants. Since they are sensible and living, nourished, and sensitive, they are one particular genus and one species, namely, living, nourished, sensitive body. Now, when I say, “body that is living, nourished, sensitive, and moving, i.e. changing one place for another”, I grasp in this expression human bodies, animals, birds, reptiles, and swimming nature. Since all of them are sensible, living, nourished, sensitive, and moving from place to place, they too are one particular genus and one species, namely, living, nourished, sensitive, and moving body.

§7       When I say “animals”, i.e. four-footed living beings, I mean the neighing animals, i.e. horses, and together with them all bulls, all donkeys, and all (other) four-footed. Since all of them walk on four (feet), they are one genus and one species, namely, animal or four-footed living being. And when I say “birds”, I encompass in this word eagle, dove, stork, swallow, hawk, goose, and the whole



flying genus. About them we also say that, since they have wings and fly, they are one particular genus and one species, namely, winged birds, that is winged flying nature. But when I say “reptiles”, I mean the whole nature of those kinds of (animals that have) bile, (i.e.) ants, newts, and all genera of reptiles. About them too we say that, since they creep and crawl on the ground, they are called one genus and one species, namely, the reptiles, that is crawling nature. And when I say “those living in the water” or “living souls that are in the water” or “reptiles that are in the water”, I mean all genera of fishes, dolphins, crocodiles, and all genera whose habitation is in the water. About them we also say that, since they live in the water from which they receive breath and life, they are one certain genus and one species, namely, the swimming nature.

§8 Further, when I say “animal-plants”, I embrace sponges, shellfishes, and every body that is planted and does not move from place to place (but that) lives and senses. All of them, since they live and sense but are planted and immovable, are one certain genus and one species, namely, animal-plants. And when I say “plants” or “trees”, I embrace olive, vine, glue, apple, myrtle, pomegranate, pistachio, and every tree and every plant. Since they are bodies that are immovable, senseless, living, nourished, and growing, they are one certain genus and one species, namely, tree or plant. Now, when I say “grass” or “herbs”, I mean wheat, barley, lentils, lily, savory, everything that is rooted in the earth, every herb and every grass. Although there are plenty of genera among them and different species without number, they are one certain genus and one species, namely, grass or herbal grass.

§9 When I say “horse”, I grasp every horse; when I say “bull”, I in the same way grasp all bulls; and when I use the name “dog”, I grasp all dogs. Just as



when I say “eagle”, I grasp all eagles; and also, when I apply the name “snake”, I comprehend all snakes. Further, in the name “dolphin” all dolphins are embraced, and in the name “sponge” all sponges. In the name “olive” all olives are included, and in the name “apple” all apples. Similarly, in the name “wheat” the whole of wheat is included, while in the name “lily” the whole of lilies. To sum up, every name that has just been mentioned as well as every single name of each genera of animals, birds, reptiles, or swimming nature, or animal-plants, or plants, or grass of the earth that remained unmentioned in this account, all of them have one and the same form (σχήμα) and image that is imprinted on them; they all acquire one and the same motion; and they demonstrate that they are one genus and one species.

§10 For horse is defined as neighing animal and bull as animal ploughing soil, while dog (is defined) as animal that barks, or, if one wishes, as animal that loves its master, hates strangers, and protects what is entrusted to it. In the same way, each one of the genera has its characteristic and its individual name that differentiate it from other ones, even if it is not known. Now, all of gold is one species, and all of silver is one, all of bronze is one, iron is one, tin is one, lead is one, glass is one, stones are one, and so on, i.e. each one of them is spoken of as one species that, by means of knowledge and craft, are divided into certain genera, species, and individuals.

§11 Hence, I have clearly shown to you both that there are genera and species and that they are incomprehensible unless there is an unlimited substance that embraces them all and exceeds everything else. I have also explained to you that some of the entities include and embrace only individuals, some of them only species, some of them species embracing (other) species, and some (include) substances. Now, unlimited substance, living being, rational living being, rational immortal living being, creature, and rational creature — all of them encompass substances but not in the same way. For what (is called)



unlimited substance includes four substances and embraces everything that is in them, I mean uncreated substance, rational immortal created substance, sensible substance, and rational mortal substance, which is also (called) living being but which excludes all bodies that have no life in them. As for rational living being, (it includes) three (substances), I mean uncreated substance, rational immortal substance, and rational mortal substance. As for rational immortal living being, (it includes) two (substances), I mean uncreated substance and created rational immortal substance. As for creature, it includes also three substances that are all creatures, and they are: created rational immortal substance, sensible substance, rational mortal substance. As for rational creature, (it includes) two (substances), I mean created rational immortal substance and rational mortal substance.

§12       Body (comprises) not substances but rather multiple genera and various species. For even if each one of the genera that are in it is substance, not each of them is one, but all of them are one. So, all of body exists and is spoken of only as one substance, namely, body or sensible substance. For if body and incorporeal, intelligible and sensible are the divisions of substance, it is evident that body is one substance. Hence, body comprises not substances but species and species embracing (other) species, namely, body that is living and that is bereft of life; the one endowed with senses and the one bereft of senses; the one that is movable, i.e. that moves from place to place, and the one that is immovable; the one walking on four (feet), the one flying, reptiles, those living in the water; animal-plants, plants, and the grass of the field, i.e. the herbs.

§13       But also these species — I mean the one walking on four feet, and the one flying, reptiles, those living in the water, animal-plants, plants, and grass, i.e.



herbs — all of them embrace multiple genera and various species. For the (species) of (those walking on) four feet embraces the (species) of horse, the one of bull, the one of dog, and many more. The (species) of bird (embraces the species) of eagle, the one of dove, the one of raven, the one of swallow, the one of pigeon, and many more. The (species) of reptiles, further, contains (the species) of snake, the one of ant, the one of newt, and the rest. But also (the species) of those in the water (includes the species) of fish, the one of dolphin, the one of crocodile, together with many others. The (species) of animal-plant (includes the species) of sponge, the one of shellfish, and everything that is planted, living, and has senses but that is immovable. Also, the (species) of plants (includes the species) of olive tree, the one of the vine tree, the one of the glue, the one of apple tree, the one of pistachio, and many others. And finally, the (species) of grass of the field or herbs (includes the species) of wheat, the one of barley, the one of lily, the one of mint, the one of rue, and all the rest.

§14 And all these genera and species — I mean, horse, bull, dog, eagle, dove, raven, swallow, pigeon, snake, ant, newt, fish, dolphin, crocodile, sponge, shellfish, olive tree, vine tree, glue, apple tree, myrtle, pistachio, wheat, lily, mint, and rue — so, to put it briefly, each one of the genera and species of animals, birds, reptiles, swimming nature, animal-plants, plants, and grass of the field, i.e. herbs, includes and encompasses no substances, genera, or species but contain only individuals, i.e. certain persons (πρόσωπα), into which they are divided. Thus, even the human nature includes and is divided only into individuals, i.e. persons, but not into substances, genera, and species.

§15 And also the impregnable and incomprehensible Godhead that is worshipped by everyone neither comprises nor is divided into substances, genera, and species (away with such an idea!) but (comprises and is divided) into only hypostases and persons, and not into innumerable, as with other genera, but only into three, I mean the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. And since the Godhead does not extend beyond them, it does not result in an



assembly of gods; nor is it limited below them. In this way we avoid both the contraction of divinity in Judaism and the plurality (of gods) in paganism. The evil of both of them is similar, even though it is found in the opposites. But the (divine) hypostases and persons remain the same, and, as we have demonstrated, they are sufficient to speak of. Thus, what has been said about it previously suffices for us for a clear exposition of this issue.<sup>4</sup>

§16 Now, an individual,<sup>5</sup> or a person (πρόσωπον), is some entity that has an essence, i.e. that subsists properly and on behalf of itself. So it is something that is embraced but not embracing, inseparable and indivisible. For instance, when I say, “neighing animal”, I mean the genus of horse, i.e. not only one horse but all of them. One horse, on the contrary, is only an individual and not a genus, for it is not all horses but only one of them. So, each horse is only one individual and one person, while all of them are one genus. Thus, each one of those falling under the genus of neighing is an individual and a person, namely, each one of those that neigh or each horse. The same stands for bulls: every one that partakes in this animal that ploughs earth, i.e. every bull, is an individual. Similarly with dogs: each one of them that is encompassed by this genus of barking animal is an individual, i.e. each one of those who bark, or each dog. Now, concerning men: their genus is rational mortal living being, while each one of those who partakes in this genus of rational mortal living being is an individual, for instance, Adam, Eva, Seth, Abraham, Isaak, Jacob, Peter, Paul, John, and any other man. The same (holds) for celestial powers: one individual is Gabriel, another one is Michael, and similarly each one of the holy angels is only one individual and one person. And in the same way (we speak) about the Holy Trinity: the genus is Godhead, while the hypostases are each one of them

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4 A large part of this paragraph appears as a paraphrase of Gregory of Nazianzus' *Theological Oration* 38.8 (cf. Gallay 1978: 118.14–20). The Syriac text turns out to be closer to the later version (*versio nova*) than it is to the old translation (cf. Haelewyck 2005: 59.2–10). The same argument, however, appears multiple times in Peter on Callinicum's polemical treatises, cf. the *Anti-Tritheist Dossier* (Ebied et al. 1981: 77.1–10).

5 Syr. *qnoma*, “individual being”, the same term is translated as “hypostasis” when referring to the Trinity.



who partakes and exists in this genus that is venerable and elevated above all, namely, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit.

§17 So, this was the account regarding individuals. But what shall we say of their difference, i.e. how they are differentiated from one another? Now, the differentiation of individuals among humans is the following: one human being is Adam, another one is Eva, another one is Seth, and in this no differentiation, distinction, or division between them may be seen at all. But Adam was formed, while Eva came out of his rib, and Seth was generated not from somewhere else but from both of them, i.e. from Eva and Adam. So, Adam neither came out nor was generated; Eva was neither formed nor generated; and Seth was neither formed nor came out. But it was Adam who was formed by the hand of God; it was Eva who came out of him without being generated but by way of going forth; and it was Seth who was generated. They are described and differentiated from one another by means of these properties: Adam through his formation, Eva through her coming-out, and Seth through his generation. These are the properties with which each one of them is endowed, through which they came to be and existed, which are found in them only, which accompany them, which are united with them, which are completive of them, which are seen in them, which are imprinted in them, and which differentiate them from others, while also demonstrating who they are, i.e. one of them is Adam, another one is Eva, and still another one is Seth, that is, one of them is formed, another came out, and still another was generated.

§18 And further, Peter is a man, Paul is a man, and John is a man, and in this regard there is no distinction between them. However, in terms of the properties that each one of them has they seem to differ from one another. For instance, when I say the name Peter, I mean the son of Jonah, from Bethsaida, the brother of Andrew, the first and most prominent among the Apostles. When I say the name Paul, I mean the man from the city of Tarsus, who was raised up in Jerusalem at the feet of Gamaliel, who was fully educated in the law given through Moses, who persecuted the Church of God, dragging men and women and delivering them to prison, but who afterwards became servant, Apostle,



and preacher of He Whom he had once persecuted and a diligent warrior on His behalf, spreading His Name among the nations, among kings, and among sons of Israel, doing it by means of God's revelation. And further, when I say John, I mean the son of Zebedee, the brother of Jacob, who fell on Jesus' chest and from that moment on drank from the stream of the divine teaching and elevated preaching, and who raised his voice so that eventually he was called the son of thunder. Thus, as I said, each one of them may be grasped distinctly through his particular properties. To sum up, each one of men is a man, for every one of them is a rational mortal living being who is capable of intellect and knowledge. This is a complete definition of man, and concerning it there is no distinction between them. But there are other things that divide and differentiate them, namely, time and place, sizes and measures, dignity and power, craftsmanship, and, in a word, all things that each one of them appears to have individually in comparison to others.<sup>6</sup>

§19 The differentiation between the hypostases<sup>7</sup> of the venerable and holy Trinity is not understood in a different way but only by means of the characteristic properties of the persons, i.e. through fatherhood and sonship, which are ingeneracy, begottenness, and procession.<sup>8</sup> Each one of them is God and Godhead, i.e. substance and nature that is uncreated, infinite, invisible, incomprehensible, everlasting, without beginning, creator and producer of everything, immortal, incorruptible, unchangeable, almighty, all-seeing, all-governing. All of these (characteristics) are both worthy of and reflect the divine nature that is in them, and in this regard no difference between them may be seen. However, each (hypostasis) is endowed with something that is characteristic of it alone, which is joined to it and imprinted in it, which is known as (its) mark that is not shared,<sup>9</sup> which differentiates it from the other two hypostases and thereby reveals it as something distinct.<sup>10</sup>

<sup>6</sup> Cf. Basil of Caesarea, *Contra Eunomium* II.4 (Sesboüé 1983: 18–20). This passage is quoted in Peter of Callinicum, *Contra Damianum* II.8.14–33 (CCG 29, 95–97 Ebied et al.).

<sup>7</sup> Syr. *qnoma*, the same term was translated above as “individual”.

<sup>8</sup> Cf. Peter of Callinicum, *Anti-Tritheist Dossier* (Ebied et al. 1981: 99.28–100.27).

<sup>9</sup> On the individual “marks” of the hypostases, cf. Peter of Callinicum, *Contra Damianum* III.13.51–64 (CCG 32, 347 Ebied et al.).

<sup>10</sup> Cf. Peter of Callinicum, *Contra Damianum* II.8 (CCG 29, 95–105 Ebied et al.).



§20 For instance, the Father is God and has essentially everything that is worthy of God, and that was mentioned already. At the same time, He essentially has something that is joined to Him alone, imprinted in Him, and is understood as His property that separates Him (from other hypostases), namely, the fatherhood, which means that He has not come to be from anything but is ungenerated and that it belongs to Him alone to have no single cause from which He appeared.<sup>11</sup> In the same way, the Son is God, and everything that is fitting for God is found in Him. Having everything that belongs to God, He essentially has something characteristic of Him alone that is joined to Him and imprinted in Him, i.e. a distinctive and unshared property that separates and constitutes His hypostasis, namely, His sonship or begottenness. Also, the Holy Spirit is God, consubstantial with the Father and the Son, venerated in the same way as them and having in Him everything fitting for the divine nature that is also found in the Father and the Son. At the same time, He has essentially something that is joined with Him alone and imprinted in Him, a distinct property that is not mixed and not shared (with others) but that belongs only to this hypostasis, and that is procession.

§21 Thus, each of the three hypostases has a property that essentially belongs to it and is found in it (alone), namely, the fatherhood of the Father, the begottenness of the Son, and the procession of the Spirit. Each one of them is God and possesses everything fitting for God but also simultaneously always contains what belongs to it alone as its characteristic property, what is comprehended as something found only in it. What I mean is that the Father is Father and not Son or Spirit, and the Son is Son and not Father or Spirit, and the Holy Spirit is Holy Spirit and not Father or Son. This is how the Holy Trinity is differentiated and understood in the discernment of the properties of the three hypostases, which are one in substance, i.e. one and only Godhead, while the division of hypostases is this and of this kind.

The End.

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<sup>11</sup> Cf. Peter of Callinicum, *Contra Damianum* III.13.64–91 (CCG 32, 347–349 Ebied et al.), quoting Gregory of Nyssa, *De differentia essentiae et hypostaseos* [Ps.-Basil, *Ep.* 38], cf. Parmentier 1990.



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