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VOLUME 33

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VOLUME 16

*The Problem of Christ
in the Work of
Friedrich Hölderlin*

MARK OGDEN

Published by

THE MODERN HUMANITIES RESEARCH ASSOCIATION

for

THE INSTITUTE OF GERMANIC STUDIES
UNIVERSITY OF LONDON

MODERN HUMANITIES RESEARCH ASSOCIATION
TEXTS AND DISSERTATIONS
(formerly Dissertation Series)
VOLUME 33

INSTITUTE OF GERMANIC STUDIES
(University of London)
BITHELL SERIES OF DISSERTATIONS
VOLUME 16

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ISBN 978-1-83954-671-6
doi:10.59860/td.b6accda

Published by
The Modern Humanities Research Association
for
The Institute of Germanic Studies
(University of London)

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STRAND, LONDON WC2R 2LS
ENGLAND

ISBN 0 947623 36 1

ISSN (Bithell Series of Dissertations) 0266-7932

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Institute of Germanic Studies, University of London

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Printed in England by
W. S. MANEY & SON LIMITED
HUDSON ROAD LEEDS

CONTENTS

	PAGE
<i>Preface</i>	vii
<i>Texts and abbreviations</i>	viii
INTRODUCTION	1
CHAPTER ONE: HÖLDERLIN AND TÜBINGEN (1788–93): THE PROBLEM OF CHRIST DEFINED.	
I Introduction	6
II C. F. Sartorius	9
III G. C. Storr and J. F. Flatt	13
IV The reception of Kant (1)	16
V Hölderlin's Tübingen hymns	27
VI The reception of Kant (2)	31
CHAPTER TWO: THE LATENT CHRISTOLOGY OF <i>HYPERION</i>	
I Introduction	46
II Johannine christology	51
a. Incarnation	52
b. Wisdom christology	52
c. The Father–Son relationship	53
d. The release of the Spirit	54
e. Eighteenth-century reinterpretations of John: Lessing and Hegel	55
III The latent christology of <i>Hyperion</i>	58
a. 'Es war da!': Diotima as the incarnation of Beauty	58
b. 'non coereri maximo, contineri minimo, divinum est'	63
c. Der heilige Tausch	69
d. Die Theokratie des Schönen	75
e. The death of Diotima	81
f. Narration and Salvation	84
CHAPTER THREE: <i>DER TOD DES EMPEDOKLES</i> AND HEGEL'S CHRIST	
I Introduction	89
II The 'Frankfurt Plan'	91
III First version	92
IV Second version	107
V Third version	109

	PAGE
CHAPTER FOUR: 'FRIEDENSFEIER' AND THE NAMING OF CHRIST	
I Introduction	130
II 'Wie wenn am Feiertage . . .'	132
III 'Brod und Wein'	139
IV 'Der Mutter Erde' and the naming of the earth	143
V Naming and the private world	150
VI 'Friedensfeier': Christ named	155
CONCLUSION	174
<i>Bibliography</i>	179
<i>Index</i>	185

PREFACE

This work is the slightly revised version of a PhD thesis accepted by the University of Cambridge in 1987. The dissertation was concluded at the end of 1986, and for that reason does not make reference to any of the secondary literature on Hölderlin to have appeared since that date. However, it would be wrong not to mention here David Constantine's fine critical biography (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1988), the first to appear in this country for fifty years. The reader interested especially in 'Friedensfeier', which is discussed in my final chapter, might also like to note Jochen Schmidt's recent article, 'Friedensidee und chiliastisches Geschichtsdenken in Hölderlin's "Friedensfeier"', *DVLG*, 62, Heft 1 (1988), 99–130.

I owe a considerable debt of gratitude to my PhD supervisor, Dr Nicholas Boyle, for his penetrating advice and painstaking reading of my work, I would also like to thank the examiners of the thesis, Professor Roger Paulin and Dr Howard Gaskill, and also those who read it for the Editors of the Bithell Series, for their suggestions, some of which I have tried to make use of during the revision of the typescript. Any Hölderlin scholar owes considerable thanks to the staff of the Hölderlin-Archiv in Stuttgart, and in my case this especially meant Frau Maria Kohler, whose personal kindness is extraordinary. The generosity of Emmanuel College, Cambridge in providing computer equipment helped considerably with the final revision of the typescript. Finally I should like to thank the Editors of this series for accepting the dissertation for publication.

TEXTS AND ABBREVIATIONS

Almost all references to the works of Hölderlin are to: Friedrich Hölderlin, *Sämtliche Werke (Große Stuttgarter Ausgabe)*, edited by F. Beißner and A. Beck (Stuttgart, 1946–85). References are in the form 1:47, where 1 = the volume number and 47 = page number. I do not distinguish parts of volumes, e.g. 1,1:47 or 2,1:54 since pagination is continuous within each volume. There is no use of the familiar abbreviation GStA/GSA. Thus all references in this volume in the simple form 1:47 (with or without line number following, e.g. line 30) are to the *Große Stuttgarter Ausgabe*. References to the other major modern critical edition of Hölderlin's works, where they occur, are abbreviated as, e.g. FA (= *Frankfurter Ausgabe*), X, 236 (= volume and page number).

The other abbreviations used in references to works by other frequently cited authors are:

I. Kant, GS (+ volume and page number) = I. Kant, *Gesammelte Schriften*, herausgegeben von der königlichen preußischen Akademie der Wissenschaften (Berlin 1902–).

F. Schiller, NA (+ volume and page number) = F. Schiller, *Werke (Nationalausgabe)*, edited by J. Petersen and H. Schneider (Weimar, 1943–).

Nohl = G. W. F. Hegel, *Theologische Jugendschriften*, edited by H. Nohl (Tübingen, 1907).

All Biblical references are taken from a representative eighteenth-century edition of Luther's Bible, *Biblia, das ist die gantze heilige Schrift, verdeutschet durch M. Luther* in Verlegung der Johann Andrea Endterischen Handlung (Nürnberg, 1768).

Abbreviations for periodical titles are in accordance with those used in *The Year's Work in Modern Language Studies*.

HJb = *Hölderlin-Jahrbuch*

Parentheses: [] indicates something supplied by me, otherwise, round brackets are used in the usual way.

INTRODUCTION

The 'problem of Christ' with which this study is concerned is not the problem of interpreting the explicit appearance of the figure of Christ in Hölderlin's late hymns 'Der Einzige', 'Patmos' and 'An die Madonna'.¹ By the 'problem of Christ' I mean, rather, a problem which arose for a whole age because, in Hölderlin's day, a more or less stable theological context for thinking about Christ was challenged by an unstable and rapidly changing context created by new philosophical presuppositions and demands. The stable theological context had as its main points of reference the ideas of Fall, Incarnation, Redemption and Final Judgement, and the assumption that authoritative knowledge about what these ideas meant was provided by the Bible. Together they formed a scheme of salvation in which men, apart from the free-will fatally and culpably exercised by their ancestor Adam, were largely passive. God acted on man's behalf through the life, death, and resurrection of his Son. This theological context was rendered unstable first by the rise of historical biblical criticism, which called into question the absolute authority of the Bible. J. S. Semler's *Abhandlung von freier Untersuchung des Kanons* (1771–75) could be said to have started in earnest a process in which biblical texts came to be seen as historically conditioned products, largely the result of particular needs and circumstances at the time of their composition. With J. G. Eichhorn's studies of the primitive, mythological character of the Old Testament literature in the 1780s and 1790s the process reached a certain climax. A further challenge to the established theology was the claim, expressed in various ways from the middle of the eighteenth century onwards, that man's reason should be the highest arbiter in all matters of belief. This claim amounted to a progressive demand for complete autonomy of the human subject in religion. With Lessing and Kant, this claim took the form of the exclusion from rational man's religion of all those elements in revealed religion incapable of rational proof or simply contrary to reason. Later, with Fichte and Schelling, it took the form of the foundation of an entire epistemology upon the totally free and unconditioned rational Ego.

Both historical biblical criticism and the demand for autonomy tended to reduce the significance of the role played by Christ in the traditional scheme of salvation. If doctrines such as the divinity of Christ and the final judgement of the whole world through him (e.g. Acts 17.31) could be shown by the new criticism never to have been part of the teaching of the man Jesus himself, then the basis for regarding him as the unique saviour — in and through whom the

whole cosmos was being perfected and would finally be consummated (Colossians 1.13–20) — was seriously undermined. And besides, to give to a remote historical individual such a supreme position in the matter of contemporary man's regeneration was to contradict the demand for autonomy. Thus in Kant's *Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft* of 1793² there occurred an explicit and complete disjunction between the archetype of the Son of Man (a man fully pleasing to God), which was seen as an innate notion found in every man's reason, and the historical instantiation of that mental archetype, Jesus of Nazareth. If the goals of man's regeneration and of the ultimate, universal attainment of the Good (by which I mean the secularized form of the idea in Colossians 1.20) were of no importance to those who challenged the traditional theological context, then this contradiction would have been of no consequence. But of course the age of Hölderlin was passionately committed to both these goals, and at the same time acutely aware of how far from realization they seemed to be.³

These problems, then, arose once the theological context began to look unsatisfying: who or what could take the place of Christ, the unique saviour, as the agent of man's regeneration, or his salvation? who or what could take the place of Christ as the guarantor that the vicissitudes and failures of man's historical life would in some way lead to, or at least not ultimately frustrate, the attainment of the Good? These problems together constitute what I mean by the 'problem of Christ'. Thus the 'problem of Christ' encompasses all those problems which *resulted from* the fact that in Hölderlin's day the established understanding of Christ became highly problematic. Since the demand was for man's complete autonomy, the solutions to these problems had to be sought within man. Yet the philosophical anthropology of Hölderlin's age was ambitiously broad: 'within man' could mean within his innate rationality, within his moral reasoning, within his aesthetic sense, within his intuition or feeling — or within different combinations of these.

To show properly how directly or indirectly and at what specific points the thought of such figures as Lessing, Schiller, Kant, Hegel, and others (all discussed or alluded to in what follows) is a response to the 'problem of Christ' would of course require detailed studies of each. It is the aim of this study to show that there is, at each major stage of Hölderlin's work from 1788 to about 1801, an engagement with this 'problem of Christ', to explain the terms of that engagement, and thereby to show that we cannot properly understand Hölderlin's work if we restrict our questions about Christ to the late hymns. Nowhere in the Hölderlin texts which form the core of my argument is Christ mentioned by name: the 'problem of Christ' which this dissertation investigates is thus to a great extent a latent problem. Although I frequently use the term 'christology' as part of my analysis, I do not think that Hölderlin himself has a christology: but I do believe that there is a series of christological debates running through his

work. By treating the issue of Christ as a continuing problem I have thus hoped to avoid the temptation of turning Hölderlin's thoughts on Christ into a closed theological system.

The justification for reading Hölderlin from a christological perspective is an immanent justification, derived from the material discussed in each chapter, and it is therefore also specific to each chapter. In chapter one, the justification lies in the fact that the intellectual life of the Tübingen seminary where Hölderlin spent the years 1788–93 was a remarkable microcosm of the general situation described above and at the same time a good deal more complex and differentiated than is usually claimed. This complexity means that any view of Hölderlin's experience in Tübingen as a simple loss of faith in orthodox Christianity (with its apparent concomitant, loss of interest in christological questions) largely misses the point. Because the choice is not exactly a choice between orthodox Christianity and no Christianity at all, we *can* ask what christological implications Hölderlin's thinking and writing in Tübingen have. In chapter two, enquiry into the 'concealed christology' of *Hyperion* is justified for two reasons. First, the Latin motto which prefaces both the 1794 fragment of *Hyperion* and the final version and which summarizes many of the novel's themes is a variation of an established christological topos. Secondly, Hölderlin explicitly equates, in a letter written no more than six months after the completion of *Hyperion*, the concept of 'Gefühl seiner selbst und anderer Wesen', which plays a key role in the novel, with the 'ächte[s] Christusgefühl, daß wir und der Vater Eins sind'. In chapter three the approach to *Der Tod des Empedokles* is determined in part by the obvious parallels between Empedokles and Christ but above all by Hölderlin's close contact with Hegel, whose writings in the period of *Der Tod des Empedokles* focus on the meaning of Christ's life and teaching. Three of the four poems which form the main part of my discussion in chapter four allude unmistakably to Christ. More important than this, the poet himself adopts the perspective of one looking for the signs of God's presence in his own day and sees poetry as one of the modes of God's self-revelation.

A christological reading of Hölderlin's work in the period 1788–1801 is, then, justified by wholly immanent criteria. However, it is not only justified, it is also necessary, since, in Hölderlin scholarship as a whole, this kind of approach has not been applied to anything written before *Der Tod des Empedokles*.⁴ Consequently, one frequently encounters the assumption that Hölderlin's engagement with the figure of Christ in the late hymns from 1801 onwards is a *return* to the Christ of Hölderlin's youthful piety, a return adumbrated, at the very earliest, in *Der Tod des Empedokles*.⁵ Of course, as far as explicit mention of Christ is concerned, there is a gap of ten years, between the poem 'Die Bücher der Zeiten' of 1788 and Hölderlin's poem to his grandmother of December 1798. But Hölderlin's latent christological concerns are being worked out in precisely this period.

In order to be able to argue for the presence of these concerns at all, it is necessary to risk portraying Hölderlin in a one-sided fashion. I am aware that it is true for Hölderlin, as for his generation as a whole, that the hope for man's regeneration and the attainment of the Good is a political as well as a religious hope and that the two forms of the one hope are interdependent.⁶ Something of this interdependence emerges in chapter four, but to exhibit it fully, more would have to be said than has been possible here. I am aware too that Hölderlin's christological concerns are not merely intellectual problems but also intensely felt personal dilemmas and that a complete discussion of 'the problem of Christ' in Hölderlin's work would have to ask *why* Hölderlin, this particular and peculiarly sensitive man, has continuing christological concerns and *why* they change in the way they do. On the other hand, it cannot be true, on my understanding of what christology is for Hölderlin, that Christ is only to be taken as the 'figure' of a specific 'emotional situation'.⁷ Christ is for Hölderlin part of a system of thinking that is certainly very particular but it is not particular in the sense of having only restricted significance, once understood. A poem which speaks of the 'Geseze, die unter Liebenden gelten' (2:137, lines 44 f.) could hardly be more universal in its capacity for increasing the reader's 'potential for experience'.⁸ Such lines actually *belong* to that system of thinking of which Christ is a part. Their full potential for increasing our experience will ultimately, it is true, be realized through the power of the poems to engage us emotionally (Constantine, pp. 66 f.), but only if we also understand that they play such a vital role in Hölderlin's poetry because they speak of the laws of *divine*, and not merely human, love. It is to this potentially universal system of thinking that Hölderlin scholarship must continue to try to gain access, however difficult the task may be, so that our understanding is also engaged in the recreation, within us, of Hölderlin's experience of love.

NOTES TO THE INTRODUCTION

1. I will not be discussing any of Hölderlin's poems written after 'Friedensfeier' in 1801. Only after an exhaustive analysis of 'Der Einzige', 'Patmos' and 'An die Madonna' could one seriously attempt to connect them in detail with the particular issues to which this study is devoted — and, for reasons of space, that would have to be the task of another book. Taking into account the sheer number and the density of the revisions the first two poems undergo, each would require very extensive discussion. The dissertation of Michael Franz, 'Das System und seine Entropie: "Welt" als theologisches und philosophisches Problem in den Schriften Friedrich Hölderlins' (unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Saarbrücken, 1982), attempts, in the appendix, a detailed textual reconstruction of 'Der Einzige' in all its phases, and connects the hymn with Hölderlin's 'philosophical system' as represented *in nuce* by the essay 'Urteil und Seyn'. The dissertation is essential reading for anyone concerned *primarily* with Hölderlin's theoretical writings from about 1795 onwards. I have tried to sketch out the possible connections between some of the themes of the present study and Hölderlin's work after 1801 in the last few pages of my Conclusion. The reader could also profitably consult D. Lüders, 'Die unterschiedene Einheit (eine Grundstruktur im Spätwerk Hölderlins)', *JFDH* (1963), 106–38 and (1964), 102–19.
2. This work is discussed in detail in Chapter One.
3. See, for example, Schiller's *Über die ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen*, 8. Brief: 'Denn woher diese noch so allgemeine Herrschaft der Vorurteile und diese Verfinsternung der Köpfe bei allem

Licht, das Philosophie und Erfahrung aufsteckten? . . . die Philosophie selbst, welche uns zuerst von ihr abrünnig machte, ruft uns laut und dringend in den Schoss der Natur zurück — woran liegt es, daß wir immer noch Barbaren sind?' (Schiller, NA, xx, 331).

4. Two exceptions are: W. Binder, 'Hölderlin: Theologie und Kunstwerk', *HJb* (1971–72), 1–29 and A. Oertle, *Christus bei Hölderlin: Ein Versuch, Hölderlins Werk theologisch-kritisch zu lesen* (Zürich, 1974). Binder's essay is indispensable as an example of one possible approach to Hölderlin's 'theology'. However he only mentions the theology of the Tübingen seminary (the subject of my chapter one) briefly, and in the context of speculation about Hölderlin's knowledge of Luther (p. 21). Furthermore, he understands the 'christology' of *Hyperion* in this essay in a quite different sense from that proposed in my Chapter Two. Oertle's book tends simply to juxtapose, rather uncritically, a selection of comments from secondary literature on the theme of Hölderlin and Christ and a selection of comments from modern theologians.
5. See for example, R. Th. Stoll, *Hölderlins Christus Hymnen — Grundlagen und Deutung* (Basel, 1952), pp. 11–65.
6. See M. Leube, 'Die geistige Lage im Stift in den Tagen der französischen Revolution', *Blätter für württembergische Kirchengeschichte*, 35 (1935), 149–71 and P. Cornehl, *Die Zukunft der Versöhnung: Eschatologie und Emanzipation in der Aufklärung, bei Hegel und in der Hegelschen Schule* (Göttingen, 1971).
7. See D. Constantine, 'The meaning of a Hölderlin poem', *OGS*, 9, (1978), 45–67 (p. 67): 'Thus, reading Hölderlin, it is not a matter of struggling to clarify a system of Greece and Hesperia, or Christ, Dionysus, Herakles and the rest, and then of assessing it for correctness, coherence, originality, etc., but rather of responding as best we can, poem by poem, to the emotional situation of which those are the figures'.
8. Constantine, *ibid.*: 'But the great virtue of poetry, its binding quality, is that it increases in the reader his potential for experience'.

CHAPTER ONE

HÖLDERLIN AND TÜBINGEN (1788–93): THE PROBLEM OF CHRIST DEFINED

(i) *Introduction*

The Protestant theological seminary (or *Stift*) in Tübingen had existed since the sixteenth century in order to provide the Church in Württemberg with its theologians and ministers, and to a lesser degree, the state of Württemberg with its bureaucrats.¹ For most of those admitted to the seminary as theology students, the five years in Tübingen came as the culmination of an education which had, from their earliest years, been directed towards the attainment of the philological, theological, and pastoral skills deemed necessary for a learned defender of the faith and shepherd of the flock. The theological candidates themselves may well have seen their training at the seminary in rather more worldly terms than this, since the 'Stift' was traditionally the route to a secure and influential clerical office in Württemberg. Yet in order to realize their ambition for such security and influence, the students had to enter by a narrow gate: admission was by an examination open only to the best-qualified children of the established Württemberg families. This system safeguarded the Church's control over access to its privileged ranks:

Closed to the artisan class, the peasantry and even to most of the officials, education at the *Stift* was the surest way to achieve prestige in a society in which the Church monopolized cultural and intellectual power, and in which only the clergy enjoyed a university education.²

It is not my aim to describe in detail the history and function of the seminary³ but merely to emphasize, as a prelude to my remarks about the intellectual significance of Hölderlin's years there, the fact that the *Stift* was consciously catering for an élite and that it was doing so with a specific goal in mind. The seminary was intended as a theological hothouse, although, as we shall see, some found the atmosphere stifling rather than beneficial to growth.

Almost since the start of serious Hölderlin scholarship itself, there have been attempts to reconstruct the teaching offered by the *Stift* during Hölderlin's years there and, on the basis of this and other data about Hölderlin's own reading and

intellectual interests at the time, to assess the part played by the experience of Tübingen in the emergence of the major themes of work. Hölderlin scholars have not been alone in this venture, since the fact that the poet's years at the *Stift* (1788–93) coincided exactly with those of Hegel and almost exactly with those of Schelling (1790–95) has led a number of those interested in the beginnings of German idealism to focus on the same area. Where appropriate, reference will be made to their writings below.

As a basic preliminary step, it is useful to consider what general picture of the Tübingen period has emerged in Hölderlin scholarship over the years. Julius Klaiber's *Hölderlin, Hegel und Schelling in ihren schwäbischen Jugendjahren* (Stuttgart, 1877) is largely biographical and, as the title suggests, does not deal specifically with the years spent in Tübingen. Its positivist emphasis is continued by W. Betzendörfer in his *Hölderlins Studienjahre im Tübinger Stift* (Heilbronn, 1922) and yields a reasonably detailed and clear picture of what life inside the seminary was like for the theology students of the 1780s and 1790s, as well as giving brief sketches of the personalities and theological positions of the main teachers, and a general description of the structure and content of the theology course.⁴ This is extremely valuable, as it establishes the main sources for an understanding of the theology which Hölderlin, Hegel, and Schelling encountered: the dogmatic textbook of C. F. Sartorius and the work of G. C. Storr and J. F. Flatt. Betzendörfer also turns his attention briefly to the junior teachers known as *Repetenten* and advances the highly suggestive hypothesis (p. 25) that their influence on the students must, by virtue of their closer contact with them, have been greater than the influence of the professors. Yet apart from a reference (p. 22f.) to the passionate Graecophilia of C. Ph. Conz (in the *Stift* as a *Repetent* from 1789–92), Betzendörfer fails to follow up his own hypothesis.

The broad outlines of Betzendörfer's picture of the structure and content of the theological teaching reappear in the works of Hermelink, Harris, and Brecht,⁵ but with different emphases and degrees of detail. Hermelink, whose history is a history of the theology of the Evangelical Church in Baden-Württemberg, gives more space than the others to the figure of G. C. Storr but does not relate his discussion of the latter's views specifically to Hölderlin and is not concerned to give a close scrutiny of Tübingen theology from 1788–93. By contrast, this certainly is part of Harris's wider intention of plotting Hegel's intellectual development. Nevertheless, the focus in this work is clearly and quite rightly on Hegel, and Hölderlin appears largely in the footnotes. Harris too mentions the possibility of an influence of the *Repetenten* on the students (specifically here on Hegel), but considers it unlikely except perhaps in the cases of the 'Repetenten' Conz, Bardili, and Mauchardt with regard to whom he suggests, in passing, one or two possible areas of mutual interest shared with Hegel.⁶ Brecht, whose article brings together information about the institutional structures of the seminary, comments on its internal dynamics and on

some of Hölderlin's reactions to these, takes up Betzendörfer's original suggestion and describes the relations between the *Repetenten*, their superiors, and the students under them. He characterizes the theological position of the junior teachers thus: 'Die Repetenten waren es, die dem apologetischen Kantianismus von Storr und Flatt einen radikalen, konsequenten Kantianismus entgegengesetzt haben' (Brecht, p. 31). As we shall see, this comment indicates precisely the crucial area of debate in the seminary in the period 1788–93, but fails to make what will be seen to be vital differentiations between the views of the various *Repetenten*.⁷

The works of Müller, Kurz, and Kondylis⁸ set out to provide a coherent overall picture of the intellectual significance which Tübingen held for Hölderlin. Müller clearly feels that the reception of Kant's philosophy at the seminary is a factor of considerable significance for an understanding of Hölderlin, and indeed he has a chapter entitled 'Kant und die Tübinger Stiftsphilosophie' (pp. 87–121). The central example chosen to illustrate the relationship of the two is J. F. Flatt's *Briefe über den moralischen Erkenntnisgrund der Religion überhaupt und besonders in Beziehung auf die Kantische Philosophie* (Tübingen, 1789). This is a work to which we shall return later. Müller is right to see in the 'letters' a revealing example of the way Kant was received by the Tübingen theologians themselves, but in general his discussion in this chapter is too unsystematic and allusive to be satisfying. His presentation lacks a clear focus and so denies the reader any sense of what the years in Tübingen as a whole must have meant for Hölderlin.

The same objection cannot be levelled at the works of Kurz and Kondylis: the thesis underlying both studies, and which the many wide-ranging references to and analyses of other thinkers are designed to reinforce, is that Hölderlin is to be seen as one of the major contributors to the process whereby, in the Germany of the 1790s, a philosophy of the unity of opposites, *Vereinigungsphilosophie*, emerges from the struggle to come to terms with Kant and what was perceived as his legacy of dualism. Plato, Spinoza, Hemsterhuis, Jacobi, Schiller, Kant, Herder: all are adduced to reveal the internal dynamics of this process. In the case of Kondylis we see a painstaking reconstruction of the emergence of the Hegelian dialectic, with considerable reference to the Tübingen phase. Yet if Hölderlin and his fellow students eagerly devoured Hemsterhuis, Jacobi, and all the others (when they had time for private reading), they were also exposed for hour upon hour to a variety of theological instruction which is discussed in a few pages by Kondylis (and solely with reference to G. C. Storr) and not at all by Kurz. The result is twofold: in the first place, the impression emerges that, to a man, Hölderlin, Hegel, and Schelling (and virtually everyone else in the *Stift* apart from the teachers themselves), because they were radically opposed to the 'leaven' (*Sauerteig*)⁹ of Tübingen theology, were forging ahead on their own to create an Idealist philosophy. The corollary is that there is no adequate impression of what the particular seeds of their (gradual and in each case distinctive)

dissatisfaction were. It is essential to see that in Tübingen at this time theology and philosophy converge in a critical area of debate whose terms are defined by the closely related words *Vereinigung* and *Versöhnung*, the first the aim of the emergent Idealist philosophy, the second a traditional function of Christ in Christian theology. Until we have a better picture of the Tübingen theology we shall only have half the story.¹⁰

(ii) *C. F. Sartorius*

The *Kandidaten* spent five years at the *Stift* in all. The first two years represented a preliminary course of study and were concluded by the *Magister* examination in which the students were called upon to defend publicly theses propounded by their professors. During these two years the students of Hölderlin's entry attended lectures on logic and metaphysics (by either A. F. Bök or J. F. Flatt), oriental languages (by C. F. Schnurrer), moral philosophy and psychology (A. F. Bök or J. F. Flatt), history (Ch. F. Rösler), and physics (C. F. Pfeiderer).¹¹ The material presented in the lectures was worked over again in detail in the so-called *Repetitionen* (lasting two hours, but shortened to one hour 'in den Hundstagen'; Brecht/Sandberger, p. 57) which were held to complement the lectures and supervised by the *Repetenten*. Thus, for example, the lecture by J. F. Flatt on 'Logik und Metaphysik' announced for 15 February 1789 was accompanied by a *Repetition* (given by H. W. G. Dapp) on the theme 'de existentia dei' (ibid., p. 62). The *Repetenten* were chosen from among the best graduates of the seminary and were generally between five and ten years older than the students under their supervision. They continued in this complementary role during the second phase of the students' training, when the emphasis switched from philosophy and philology to dogmatic theology, biblical exegesis, and polemics.¹² The classes of the *Repetenten* now continued on a weekly basis (again, each session lasting two hours) and the material they worked through, instead of being drawn from the lectures, was taken from a work of dogmatic theology: in the years 1788–93 the textbook in use was the *Compendium Theologicae Dogmaticae* of C. F. Sartorius (first introduced in 1782), a work of thirty-five sections or 'loci', each generally devoted to one theological topic. Thus on 27 March 1791 the *Repetenten* Weber, Kappf, and Diez took classes on 'Locus II' from Sartorius's work, the section entitled 'de scriptura sacra I' while on 10 July the same three had as their theme 'Locus XI', 'de persona Christi'. The entire textbook, some six hundred pages of Latin, was worked through three times in the three years following the *Magister* examination, at a rate of one or two sections per week. The intention behind this relentless timetable can be seen from this passage from the statutes of 1793:

Der Locus theologicus am Montage dauret Nachmittags von 2, und in den Hundstagen von 3 bis 4 Uhr . . . Denselben sollen nun alle Magister besuchen und die Aufmerksamkeit

und Stille nicht durch unordentliches Weglaufen unterbrechen; besonders aber auf die Vorbereitung den möglichsten Fleiß verwenden; die Definitionen und Divisionen sich bekannt machen und genau prüfen; die Dogmen, ihre verschiedenen Vorstellungsarten, ihren Werth auch nach ihrem Ursprung und ihrer Geschichte, ihren Einfluß auf andere Lehrsätze sowohl als auf die Besserung und Beruhigung der Menschen, ihre Beweisgründe untersuchen; die Schriftstellen in den Grundsprachen und im Zusammenhang nachschlagen und sich vermittelst der Philologie und anderer Hilfswissenschaften und einer gesunden Hermeneutik von der Richtigkeit oder Unrichtigkeit ihrer Beweiskraft überzeugen; über die Streitfragen, ihre Entstehung, richtige Bestimmung, Wichtigkeit und wahres Verhältniß gegen andere Lehrsätze, über ihre Auseinandersetzung und Beantwortung nachdenken; auch die besten Schriften über alles dieses nachlesen und von allem deutliche, bestimmte und zusammenhängende Begriffe zu erhalten suchen. Die sich diese Mühe geben, werden nach dem Vortrage des Repetenten begierig und leicht im Stande seyn, denselben zu fassen und zu wiederholen und recht zu benutzen und die vorgelegten Fragen und Argumente fertig und gründlich zu beantworten. (Brecht/Sandberger, pp. 56f.)

We can well imagine that after three years of this regime, many of the students would be able, if not necessarily willing, to reproduce much of Sartorius's material by heart. According to the 1752 statute each student was to be required to own a personal copy of this standard textbook¹³ and Hölderlin certainly possessed his at his death.¹⁴ Granted the place given to the *Compendium* in the curriculum, an awareness of its character in general and of its teaching on some specific questions would seem to be essential. It is clear from the formulations of the 1793 statutes that the work was to be the tool with the help of which students would become thoroughly familiar with the main Christian doctrines in their historical, moral and apologetical aspects. Yet the emphasis on the historical character of the articles of faith ('ihren Werth auch nach ihrem Ursprung und ihrer Geschichte') was not used, as it had been twenty years earlier in the pioneering work of Semler,¹⁵ in the service of a relativization of their binding character. Rather it was meant to provide the young theologians with an arsenal of weapons with which they could challenge and defeat the neologistic enemy on his own ground. It was a work of orthodoxy in an age already considerably aware of and open to rationalist critique of received theological opinion. Yet Sartorius's work was clearly considered to have failed in its task of erecting a dam against the rationalist tide, since in 1801 it was withdrawn and replaced by another. This certainly cannot have been because it made too many concessions to the spirit of the age, as the following examples will show.

The opening three 'loci' are entitled 'de religione et Theologia' and 'de scriptura sacra I & II'. Sartorius's awareness of the challenges to orthodoxy betrays itself in the treatment of the question of authority: Christianity is a revealed religion, i.e. a religion that has been 'given' to man by means of some form of divine self-disclosure or revelation. How are we to be sure that this revelation has indeed occurred and is not merely the self-fulfilling wish of religious minds? (My phrasing, not that of Sartorius). We know because we

have the historical record of that revelation: a written testimony to events in which God disclosed himself.

But how do we know that the Bible is such a witness to these momentous events? The argument's circular course closes with the Bible's self-authenticating claim to be an inspired text. Of course, the 'close' of one argument is only the opening of another, for the precise meaning given to the word 'inspired' will determine the degree of authority which can be claimed for the 'inspired' text. Sartorius avoids equating 'inspired' with 'dictated by God', but the concessions go no further than this; the Bible does not merely *contain* the word of God, the words of the Bible *are* the words of God.¹⁶ Thus ideas which had already gained a considerable measure of acceptance by this time, such as that of the non-Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch and the theory of accommodation¹⁷ are either ignored or treated as blasphemy (Kolb, p. 60). Sartorius's view of Scripture entails, then, a refusal to follow the trend of many late eighteenth-century 'enlightened' interpreters of Christianity and see Jesus, stripped of his historically conditioned phrasing, as a sage whose teaching accords with the natural light of reason.¹⁸

Sartorius's lack of sympathy for new developments in theology, which should already have become amply evident, is of even more importance for our purposes when it comes to his views on man's original state, on the nature of sin, on the person and work of Christ and on the last things. From 1756 onwards (if not before then), the year when Rousseau's essay *Discours sur l'origine de l'inégalité parmi les hommes* of the previous year appeared in German translation, speculation on man's original, uncorrupted condition must have seemed to many a thinking German to be anything but the concern of pedantic academic theologians alone. We will see how, in the wake of Rousseau, such speculation became an area of vital interest. The essential background to this speculation is the kind of orthodoxy represented by Sartorius when he argues that man's original state is not to be seen in terms of the analogy of childhood, a childhood from which man emerged as his reason developed,¹⁹ nor indeed in terms of a covenant of works (*Foedus operum*) between pre-fall man and God, in which man co-operated with God in perfect obedience to divine law and was not therefore technically a recipient of divine grace²⁰ but, rather, it is to be seen as a condition of unsurpassed excellence: 'Primus homo creatus est in IMAGINE DIVINA, quae praecipua illius gloria fuit. . . . Ea est *perfectio spiritualis, in Sapientia, Justitia & Sanctitate consistens* . . .'.²¹ Soul and body are in perfect harmony since the soul has not yet become the slave of concupiscence: 'Ad imaginis divinae gloriae accessit CORPORIS *optima constitutio*, valetudo, robur, sensuum vividae perceptiones: cum absentia morbi, doloris, molestia . . .' (§ 160 (3)). Man, then, is created in the image of God. Original sin is seen by Sartorius as the loss of that divine image: man is now so corrupt that he is 'cut off from the spiritual good' (§ 174), a view which the eighteenth century found increasingly unpalatable

(Hirsch, pp. 30 and 45). Thus once again, Sartorius relentlessly restates an idea which many of his contemporaries were already abandoning.

If for Sartorius man is a helpless sinner then it is not surprising that he identifies the doctrine of the atoning death of Christ as 'centrum et fundamenta christianismi' (§ 275). Kant would declare, eleven years after the publication of Sartorius's *Compendium*, that the very idea of transference of guilt from one person to another ran counter to true morality (Kant, GS, VI, 72). Sartorius also adhered firmly to the doctrine of *communicatio idiomatum*, according to which Christ partook fully of both the human and divine natures, which 'inter-communicated' within the one person. The doctrine had originally been advanced in an effort to explain the hypostatic union. Sartorius's statement of the *communicatio* (§ 236) is thoroughly orthodox: he held to the view that Christ was at all times fully human and fully divine but that humanity and divinity are nevertheless essentially different. The conceptual difficulties of the *communicatio* are evident enough, but, in addition, research into the Messianic use of the term 'Son of God' among the Palestinian Jews of Christ's day as compared with the use of the title in the apostolic age had, by the late eighteenth century, suggested that the idea of being equal with God as his eternally-begotten Son and co-creator was not part of Jesus's self-understanding at all but was merely a later accretion.²² Indeed the conclusion drawn from this research had been accepted by the theologian J. C. Döderlein and incorporated into his *Institutio Theologiae Christianae* (1780), the work which J. F. Flatt made use of for his course in 'Moraltheologie'. Thus two different theological handbooks both in use at the *Stift* at the same time are diametrically opposed in their views of a central Christian doctrine, that of the full divinity of Christ: nothing could reveal more clearly that Sartorius's *Compendium* was part of a conscious rearguard action.

Mention must finally be made of Sartorius's teaching on the last things. His guiding text is Revelation 20. 1-4. Sartorius admits that these verses have been interpreted in a number of ways, but considers nevertheless that they point clearly enough in the direction of a double millennium, an earthly millennium and a heavenly millennium (§ 294). Sartorius is following here the interpretation of Bengel, although he does not actually name him.²³ For Bengel the thousand years referred to in verse 3 ('und warf [den Drachen] in den Abgrund . . . daß er nicht mehr verführen sollte die Heiden, bis daß vollendet wurden tausend Jahr') are to be understood as a millennium on the earth, during which all the good previously spoilt by Satan will come to fruition and be enjoyed by man. The millennium referred to in verse 4 however ('Und ich sahe . . . die Seelen der Enthaupteten . . . die nicht angebetet hatten das Thier . . . diese lebten und regierten mit Christo tausend Jahr') is the thousand year reign of the faithful with Christ in heaven.²⁴ Thus there are two distinct millenia and Sartorius, following Bengel, understands them as *consecutive*. The consummation of history does not take place until the thousand year reign of the faithful is over

and all are raised for the last judgement: then there is a new heaven and a new earth (Revelation 20. 11; 21. 1 — see §677–81). The full meaning of the Kingdom of God, on this reading of Revelation, cannot be exhausted by the hope of the triumph of good in the world. This means that the Kingdom of God is not to be understood in a temporal, political sense at all: Sartorius's interpretation of Revelation 20 is in conscious opposition to chiliasm and is politically highly conservative.²⁵ The Kingdom of God is to be the re-creation of the cosmos, the coming of the New Jerusalem. Sartorius upholds the transcendent nature of the divine economy literally to the last.

(iii) *G. C. Storr and J. F. Flatt*

Gottlob Christian Storr (1746–1805), whose own theological handbook replaced that of Sartorius in 1802, undoubtedly saw himself as part of that same effort to defend orthodox opinion. Storr taught the students of the *Stift* throughout the years Hölderlin spent there, and was a professor in the theology faculty of the University of Tübingen from 1777 to 1797. His considerable literary output cannot concern us in detail here.²⁶ Its importance for us lies in the way it exemplifies the tendency evident from Sartorius and in the way it left a clear mark on Hölderlin's thinking at a specific time in his studies.

Storr is usually linked with the theological tendency which has come to be known as *Supernaturalismus*. The label is neat, in that it identifies an important area of concern for Storr (the supernatural elements in Christianity) but can encourage a rather unilluminating and cursory categorization which cannot give us a genuine sense of his position. 'Storr ist das Haupt des biblischen oder biblisch verständigen Supernaturalismus', writes Kolb.²⁷ This consists, in the case of Storr, not only in holding on to the *real* supernatural character of the events *perceived* in the Bible (one might say, by the historically conditioned horizons of its writers) as the supernatural workings of God, but in transforming them from a source of embarrassment (which they were to many an eighteenth-century theologian, if he did not dismiss them altogether from the outset) into the main foundation of the authority of the Christian religion. Storr has this to say on the question of that authority in the preface to his dogmatic textbook:

Was aber eine wahre Philosophie, welche die Grenzen der menschlichen Vernunft kennt, nicht geradezu verneinen und werfen kann, weil sie nichts gewisses weiß, und sich doch nicht auf bloße Mutmaßung stützen will, das wird man doch wohl auf die Versicherung derer annehmen dürfen, von denen man weiß, daß sie *auf einen neuen, für andere Menschen unzugänglichen Weg zu ihren Kenntnissen gelangt sind und die Schranken der menschlichen Schwäche nicht durch Einbildung und falsche Anmaßung, sondern wirklich (vermöge besonderer in ihrem Innern vorgegangenen Tatsachen) überschritten haben.*²⁸ (my emphasis)

Revelation, in which the otherwise acknowledged limits of human reason are for Storr, as a matter of actual (psychological) fact, transcended, possesses an

authority which is qualitatively different from and therefore vastly to be preferred to, that of philosophy — the source of which is human and not divine. Thus Kant is answered by the appeal to a different kind of knowledge than the knowledge which was under examination in the *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*. The fact that for Kant it would be nonsensical to make such a claim to divinely revealed knowledge (since if its channel of communication is inaccessible to 'other' people, even the purported recipients of the revelation will be unable to say anything at all about how or whence the so-called knowledge came) is for Storr a matter of indifference.

Storr's emphasis on the unique status of revealed knowledge necessarily entails a total rejection of the view of the Bible as a historically conditioned human construct. Like Sartorius, he will have nothing to do with this view, claiming, 'daß es eine grundlose Beschuldigung sei, wenn man ihnen [the New Testament writers] aufbürden sollte, daß sie sich der Aussprüche Jesu nicht immer recht erinnern, und manche alte jüdische Vorurtheile in seine Lehre gemengt haben'.²⁹ He refers us to John 16. 13–15:

Wenn aber jener, der Geist der Wahrheit kommen wird, der wird euch in alle Wahrheit leiten. Denn er wird nicht von ihm selber reden, sondern was er hören wird, das wird er reden, und was zukünftig ist, wird er euch verkündigen. Derselbige wird mich verklären, denn von dem Meinen wird ers nehmen, und euch verkündigen.

Thus the Bible is safe from the neologistic critics because, in another version of the circular argument we have already seen in Sartorius, it bears witness to its own authority. The Johannine writings in particular are welcome grist to Storr's supernaturalist mill; referring to an earlier statement of his argument, Storr writes:

daß die von Jesu verrichtete Wunder und die, seinen Verehrern nach seiner Verklärung mitgetheilte Wundergaben . . . vorzüglich bestimmt gewesen seien, gerade die Nachrichten von der Person Jesu zu bestätigen. Müssen nun nicht diese Nachrichten, die in den ganzen Vortrag des N.T. so innigst verwebt sind, die an so vielen Stellen so aufs angelegentlichste behauptet werden, zu deren Beglaubigung Gott selbst so grosse Wunder gethan hat, bei jedem Leser, der von der Göttlichkeit der Lehre Jesu und seiner Apostel wirklich überzeugt ist und gegen Gott wahre Ehrerbietung hat, einen solchen Grad der Wichtigkeit und ein solches Ansehen erhalten, daß er sie unmöglich mit ruhigem Gewissen als unerheblich und für ihn nicht gehörig beiseitelegen kan?

(Über den Zweck . . . , pp. 484 f.)

The ground of Storr's method of argumentation is then the Bible itself, taken as accurate and literally true. Johann Friedrich Flatt (1759–1821), described by Harris as 'probably the most intelligently faithful pupil and disciple of G. C. Storr' (p. 78), and one of Hölderlin's main teachers for three of the five years, is clearly willing to adopt the same apologetic procedure as his mentor.³⁰ However, Flatt was initially a philosopher, only transferring to the theology faculty in 1792, and as such was concerned not merely to refer to the Bible's own

self-authenticating statements but to argue philosophically for the logical possibility of the events there described. A good example for our purposes, since it forms part of the immensely important debate on the Fall of Man, is his essay *Beytrag zur Aufklärung der Stelle Genesis II:17 und der Geschichte des Falls der ersten Menschen* (Flatt, pp. 189–218).

The essay takes the form of a fictive exchange of letters between two people, one of whom admits his worries about the historical accuracy of the Genesis account of man's Fall to another, who attempts to reassure him. The sceptic contends that a proper understanding of the divine prohibition in Genesis 2. 16 f. requires a level of intellectual sophistication (e.g. the concepts of 'ought' and of a divine will) which Adam, if historically really the 'first' man, could not yet have acquired. Is than Adam merely the invention of a primitive philosopher trying to explain, in a graphic way, the origin of evil? The reply to the sceptic does not attempt to assert that Adam did indeed have such a sophisticated mind, but rather that once the possibility is admitted of God causing sense impressions in Adam's mind and indeed of instigating directly specific events in the external world, everything described in Genesis 2. 5–8 can be explained solely in terms of Adam's 'sinnliche Begriffe'. To take one (ludicrous) example, Flatt suggests that Adam may have arrived at the idea that it would be wise not to eat the fruit after seeing some animal eat it and then die (spectacularly exploded by a divinely engineered lightning bolt) and concluding that he had witnessed a 'unmittelbare Wirkung des Unsichtbaren' (Flatt, pp. 207 f.). When Adam subsequently hears a terrifying thunderclap (Genesis 3. 8, 'Und sie höreten die Stimme Gottes des Herrn, der im Garten gieng, da der Tag kühle worden war'), he is reminded of the death of the animal and flees: not because he has been 'told' by God that he is 'guilty'.

Flatt's essay is certainly awkward and tortuous and it is hard to believe that he can have won many over to the historical camp by it. Yet despite the intellectual slightness of the piece, it is important to realize exactly what is going on in it: Flatt is not attempting to deny that the Genesis account as we now have it contains the language and concepts of a later more sophisticated age (that of Moses, in Flatt's view the author) but he *is* attempting to deny that it contains *nothing* but mythological invention and hopes thereby to salvage the idea of a divine, omnipotent, invisible being who makes his transcendent will known to men (by whatever means) in historical events. Without this idea, the theory that the Biblical narrative of the Fall is a mythological invention about the origin of evil creates the possibility of a whole range of interpretations of man's 'fallenness'.

Flatt cannot have failed to be aware of this possibility: the work of J. G. Eichhorn, who had introduced the notion of myth into biblical studies,³¹ had already been absorbed into the syllabus at the *Stift*.³² Furthermore Flatt taught in an institution of which the representative head was the Old Testament scholar

and Orientalist C. F. Schnurrer (1742–1822). Schnurrer was unsympathetic to the new developments in philosophy³³ but was certainly well abreast of contemporary trends in biblical scholarship.³⁴ Schelling dedicated to him his essay *De Malorum Origine* of 1792,³⁵ and Schelling's use of comparative mythology and textual criticism shows that the pupil is seeking to emulate the master. Hölderlin also wrote his *Magister* dissertation for Schnurrer — a comparison of Hesiod's *Works and Days* and *The Wisdom of Solomon* (4:176–88). Some of its arguments clearly derive from Schnurrer, for example the idea that there is no substantial difference in kind between the supposedly inspired biblical text and the pagan work (M. Brecht, 'Hölderlin und . . .', p. 41). The case of Schnurrer shows once again how conservative and progressive influences existed side by side in the *Stift*. Storr, the arch-conservative, was prepared to accept the authority and leadership of Schnurrer, the 'modern' biblical scholar, perhaps precisely because he knew himself to be out of step with the spirit of the age and in no real position to refuse all compromise with his colleagues. Yet the compromise that seems to have arisen was shaky and can only have led to weakness and uncertainty (M. Brecht, 'Die Entwicklung . . .', p. 92).

(iv) *The Reception of Kant (1)*

I have been trying in the preceding pages to give some impression of the theological orthodoxy as Hölderlin would have encountered it in Tübingen from 1788 onwards. For Hölderlin, of course, listening to the lectures of Flatt and Storr or working through the *Compendium* of Sartorius cannot have constituted a discrete, intellectual experience, separable from the whole matrix of competing ideas in Tübingen. One of the most crucial elements of that entire matrix, as will already have become clear (particularly in the case of the defensive tactics of Storr), is the thought of Kant. By 1790, the year when the third of his *Critiques* appeared,³⁶ the impact of Kant had become enormous. Adickes lists no less than 739 works on Kant (including reviews) which had been published by the end of 1790.³⁷ The range of the penetration of the Kantian philosophy was no less startling than its statistical level. Apparently no one was safe: Franz Xaver Bronner, in his autobiography, reports that in the early 1790s Kantian jargon could be heard echoing around the cloisters of Southern German monasteries whenever the monks took their daily constitutions.³⁸ And we know that Kantian catchphrases also filled the air in Tübingen: Rudolf Magedau, who left the *Stift* in 1791 (having formed a close friendship with Hölderlin) recalled the sermons given by the students in the refectory thus, 'Kants Philosophie machte die meisten Köpfe schwindeln, und die Canzel wiedertönte von Zeit und Raum und dergleichen' (6:578).

Such contemporary testimonies bear eloquent witness to the excitement generated by the work of Kant. What lay behind this excitement, even if not

necessarily always finding precise articulation, was the feeling that Kant had created an entirely new context for talk of God and religion. After Kant's *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, the onus of demonstrating that the believer's faith in God could be underwritten by metaphysics lay with the theologians or their allies. Kant believed he had shown that pure reason (exemplified by rationalist metaphysics of the kind practised earlier in the century by Wolff), instinctively seeking the unconditioned unity of all possible predicates in the idea of a most perfect being, illegitimately hypostasizes this idea by attributing to it also the predicate of existence. By this sleight of hand a mere idea is transformed into a personal God.³⁹ Kant also shows in detail what flaws are contained in the three traditional proofs of God's existence, viz. the ontological proof, the cosmological proof and the physico-theological or teleological proof. Since Kant's whole critique of philosophical theology at this point depends on his prior definition of spatio-temporal phenomena as the only possible objects of real knowledge, it follows that we also cannot *know* that a most perfect being, who could not by definition be such a spatio-temporal phenomenon, does *not* exist. Thus Kant's adherence to his own self-imposed limitations appears to create room for *faith* in the religious sphere even as it denies the possibility of real *knowledge* in that sphere. This is certainly how many understood Kant: we have already seen how Storr seizes on the notion that there are certain things which 'eine wahre Philosophie, welche die Grenzen der menschlichen Vernunft kennt, nicht geradezu verneinen und verwerfen kann . . .' to argue for the reasonableness of belief on the basis of divine revelation. Yet although not untypical — Jacobi could perhaps count as another example — this approach can hardly be considered a real engagement with Kant. As we have seen, it ignores the fact that the concept of revelation itself is, on Kantian premises, suspect. Furthermore it takes no account of the fact that Kant, far from opening the door to any kind of subjectivism, himself had proposed a 'metaphysic of morals' in place of rationalist theology.

The reception of Kant in Tübingen will concern us directly or indirectly for the rest of this chapter. My concern is to show that reception as it progresses, since this form of presentation will correspond most closely to Hölderlin's own intellectual experience. It must have been clear to most people by 1790 that theology would have to meet Kant on the ground staked out by all three Critiques and not merely with a flight into the noumenal sphere declared out of bounds to normal human reason in the *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*. It was evidently clear by then to J. F. Flatt. In 1789 his *Briefe über den moralischen Erkenntnisgrund der Religion überhaupt und besonders in Beziehung auf die kantische Philosophie* appeared in Tübingen. The work, which in all probability formed the basis of the lectures on Kant by Flatt which Hölderlin attended in 1790 (see Harris, p. 74, fn. 4) indicates areas of the Kantian debate which will be crucial for Hölderlin. It uses the device of letters (once again) to set up a debate in which the following

questions are discussed: 1. Is it valid to derive religion from the basic law of morality? 2. Is Kant's moral 'proof' of God the only valid one?

First, Flatt rehearses Kant's arguments for maintaining that the ideas of God, immortality and freedom are necessary postulates of practical reason.⁴⁰ As Flatt understands Kant, the idea of God must be postulated in order that we can believe that 'eine Einrichtung der gesamten Natur nach moralischen Zwecken (oder eine genaue Zusammenstimmung des Reichs der Natur mit dem Reiche der Sittlichkeit)' is guaranteed (Flatt, p. 9). According to Kant's own statement of this idea such an exact correspondence of the realms of morality and nature is the *summum bonum*, the highest good, in which virtue and happiness are related as condition to conditioned, or cause to effect, and happiness is in proportion to virtue. The notion of the *summum bonum* is a requirement of practical reason, since for man to be able to act morally he must have the conviction of a necessary connection between virtue and happiness. Man's own experience, however, suggests to him at the most a contingent connection. God, as the one who governs the realm of nature, is the ground of the conviction that the connection is, despite appearances, necessary. God is thus 'proved' for Kant by the dictates of man's inner moral sense. The same is true of the idea of immortality: we are forced to think of another existence beyond our life in the sensible world since it is clear that this world offers no evidence of the necessary connection between virtue and happiness. As for freedom, there could not for Kant be any universal sense of obligation, any 'ought', without it.

It can be seen that Kant's 'God' is to be thought of primarily as the cause of the whole of nature. As such, God must be distinct from nature, an Ultimate Cause outside nature's chain of causality. Furthermore, in so far as his function is to bring the realms of nature and morality into harmony, he must possess the attributes of intelligence and will (see Copleston, p. 32). Each of these characteristics of God is, according to Kant, unknowable by speculative reason but required by practical reason. This is the point at which Flatt's critique of Kant begins in earnest. There are three main lines of attack: Kant's use of the concept of causality, Kant's radical separation of the noumenal and the phenomenal realms, and the way Kant arrives at the attributes of God.

Flatt contends that if God, who must on Kantian terms be thought of as a purely noumenal being,⁴¹ is seen as the cause of the harmony of virtue and happiness we have an illegitimate use of the category of causality, the use of this category having already been restricted by Kant to the phenomenal realm (Flatt, p. 52). It is undoubtedly true that there is an inconsistency in Kant's treatment of causality both on this question and when he talks of the representation which things-in-themselves⁴² cause in us. The purpose of Flatt's criticism, however, is not merely to expose the weaknesses of Kant's arguments and so discredit a thinker who was making 'die meisten Köpfe schwindeln', although this is part of his purpose. Flatt also wants to ask whether the Ultimate Cause of the

correspondence of virtue and happiness *must* be thought of as distinct from the world, rational and unconditioned, or whether other conceptions are also legitimate (p. 68). He clearly believes that Kant only insists on the 'otherness' of this Ultimate Cause because of a false juxtaposition of the sensible and the intelligible. How, Flatt asks, if we grant Kant's epistemological premises, can we claim to know enough about the intelligible realm (and the intelligible minds it contains) to be able to distinguish it (and them) categorically from the sensible world of our empirical experience? (We see here, as in Storr, the appeal to the grey areas just beyond the limits to our knowledge set up by Kant.) Or again, conversely, can we really say categorically that finite minds, which after all partake in some way of the intelligible realm (for example in their sense of moral imperatives), are yet lacking the kind of knowledge of the laws of nature which the creation of the highest good requires? (p. 61) I suggested that Flatt's purpose is not merely a negative one, but to see the full extent of his more positive intention it is necessary to read between his lines to a certain extent. A clue is given, I believe, in this sentence: 'Kant selbst behauptet, daß auf den Fall, daß jedermann thäte, was er soll, die vernünftige [sic] Wesen selbst, unter der Leitung moralischer Prinzipien, Urheber ihrer eigenen und zugleich anderer dauerhafter Wohlfahrt seyn würden' (pp. 58f.). Flatt is using Kant's own words against him to suggest that the highest good is theoretically realizable without recourse to any divine regulative mechanism operating on the universe. The purpose of his argument here cannot be to deny the credibility of such a belief in God, since it is clear from this work and his other essays that he is a fairly orthodox Christian theist. Rather, he is suggesting that the fulfilling of the moral law could itself, in this finite existence, be the cause of man's happiness. I think it very probable that there is even more behind these words. In one of the essays in the collection *Vermischte Versuche* entitled 'Etwas über die Beziehung der Lehre Jesu von seiner Person auf die Denkart der palästinensischen Juden' Flatt describes the primary end ('Hauptzweck') of the appearance of Jesus, the Messiah, as the creation of 'moralische geistige Glückseligkeit' (*Vermischte Versuche*, p. 235). Thus Flatt seems to see in the life and teaching of Jesus an example of the convergence of virtue and happiness taking place without any need to postulate immortality or an Ultimate Cause. If so, it might well be objected that Flatt has failed to take into account Kant's distinction between a contingent and a necessary convergence of virtue and happiness (see Copleston, p. 129), but his intention is more important for us than his achievement. That intention is surely to suggest that man's religious experience must not and need not be seen in terms of the absolute dichotomy between the intelligible and the sensible, or between reason and nature.

As I have indicated, Flatt's critique of Kant is not designed to deny the importance of the idea of God, although it might, on a superficial reading, appear to be doing that at times. When Flatt questions Kant's attribution of

intelligence and will to his Ultimate Cause, he does so with Kant's own critique of the physico-theological argument in mind (*ibid.*, p. 92). That critique was based on the contention that it is a misuse of reasoning to infer a transcendent, invisible Cause endowed with intelligence and will from the observation of apparent design in nature. Flatt (again, whether rightly or wrongly) asserts that Kant's moral 'proof' of God is similarly 'transcendent' in its method and cannot therefore be said to have any advantage over other 'proofs' (p. 63). The adoption of the moral 'proof' is tantamount to saying 'Ich will, daß ein Gott sey' (p. 72). Of course, Flatt is not afraid himself to use reasoning which is, in Kantian terms, 'transcendent'. Thus the positive side of his critical examination of Kant is intended to be a rehabilitation of the cosmological and physico-theological arguments for the existence of God and thereby of discourse about God which is 'constitutive' and not merely 'regulative'.⁴³ Flatt concludes his *Briefe* with a passage which will not surprise us coming as it does from the pen of a pupil of Storr:

So zulänglich aber auch nach meiner Meinung der cosmologische und physico-theologische Beweis, selbst in Hinsicht auf die nähere Bestimmung des Begriffes von Gott ist, soweit nemlich diese zu unserer Beruhigung und zur Unterstützung der Moralität erfordert wird, so vorteilhaft scheint es mir doch, in Hinsicht auf gewisse Subjecte besonders, zu seyn, mit demselben den von den Wundern hergenommenen Beweis und die Offenbarung zu verbinden.⁴⁴

Since God is postulated by Kant in order to guarantee the ultimate convergence of reason (understood in its practical moral aspect) and nature, the core of the theologians' debate with Kant in Tübingen is, as the preceding discussion makes clear, the question of teleology. Yet there is also another, complementary aspect of Kant's thought which contributed significantly to the intellectual context from which Hölderlin's thinking about Christ emerges, namely the question of man's beginnings. This is articulated most specifically in Kant's work *Mutmaßlicher Anfang der Menschengeschichte* of 1786.⁴⁵ The essay first appeared in the first issue of 1786 of the *Berlinische Monatsschrift*. It is extremely probable that Flatt, in view of his interest in Kant and in view of his own *Beytrag zur Aufklärung der Stelle Genesis II.17*, would have read the essay. Furthermore Schelling lists Kant's work among the various contributions to the theme at the beginning of his own essay *De Malorum origine*. Since this was a dissertation written for C. F. Schnurrer, it is likely that Schnurrer drew Schelling's attention to Kant. The *Mutmaßlicher Anfang* . . . was, then, almost certainly known to teachers and students alike by 1788. In his *Kritik der praktischen Vernunft* and his *Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten* Kant had been concerned to show that freedom is the necessary precondition of morality. In the *Mutmaßlicher Anfang* his theme is 'eine Geschichte der ersten *Entwicklung* der Freiheit' (p. 49 — my emphasis).

Kant is aware that for many people conjecture would seem to have no place in the writing of history, since history relies primarily on factual 'Nachrichten'. He

answers this possible objection by arguing that a principle of analogy guides our conjectures about the earliest beginnings of human experience: there is no need for invention here, 'wenn man voraussetzt, daß diese [Erfahrung] im ersten Anfange nicht besser oder schlechter gewesen, als wir sie jetzt antreffen: eine Voraussetzung, die der Analogie der Natur gemäß ist, und nichts Gewagtes bei sich führt' (p. 49). By this 'analogy' Kant means that, basic human nature remaining constant throughout history, the first development of moral freedom now will be analogous to the first development of moral freedom at the time when human history began. Thus Kant's method is to establish the entitlement of human reasoning (described here as 'Einbildungskraft in Begleitung der Vernunft' — p. 50) to such a 'conjectural history' of the development of freedom *before* referring to the document (Genesis 2–4) which reports the same event 'als wirkliche Nachricht'.

Two points should be noticed: Genesis is not dismissed as unhistorical (Kant makes no mention of the idea of myth) but neither is it in any way necessary to Kant's undertaking. True, Kant invites the reader to compare, step by step, his account with that in Genesis in order to see whether they agree (p. 49), but whether they do or not, Kant's right to his own conjectural history stands. It could not, of course, be otherwise, since Kant's only interest in writing the essay is in order to explore the development of freedom, thus if Genesis is to adduced at all, it must be seen to illustrating that same process. By this manoeuvre Kant leaves the tasks of testing the historical accuracy of the Genesis 'report' ('deren Prüfung auf ganz anderen Gründen als bloßer Naturphilosophie beruht' — p. 51) and of comparing the two accounts to the reader. It is only in the light of these observations about Kant's method that one can understand his readiness to take both the words of the serpent (Genesis 3.1, 4–5) and, simultaneously, the words of God (Genesis 3. 13–20) as the voice of reason within man (pp. 51, 54).

What overall view of man's beginnings results, then, from these conjectures? Man's behaviour is at first guided by instinct, which all creatures obey. Instinct is seen as primarily biological, as the senses of taste and smell which yield 'das Vermögen der Vorempfindung der Tauglichkeit oder Untauglichkeit einer Speise zum Genusse' (p. 51). It is this biological instinct which is spoken of in Genesis 3. 2f. according to Kant. In as far as man is an animal like all others he is enslaved to this 'voice of nature' and his state is described by Kant as the 'Gängelwagen des Instinkts' or the 'Vormundschaft der Natur'. His condition is therefore one of subhuman 'Rohigkeit' (p. 55). The state of nature, so highly regarded by Rousseau, is therefore not one of freedom but of compulsion. As such it is pre-moral. This evaluation is of course only available to the rational observer, retrospectively. The state of instinct is actually experienced as a delightful garden, 'der ihn [den Menschen] ohne seine Mühe versorgte' (p. 50). Man's 'Fall' is his discovery of the faculty of reason and his first use of it to make a free choice among the objects around him, instead of simply obeying instinct's

commands. The voice of nature or instinct is overpowered by the voice of reason, the capacity to choose freely: Kant refers us to Genesis 3. 1. Granted that freedom is the *sine qua non* of morality, man's 'Fall' must be regarded positively. Of course man's freedom to choose can be exercised in a way that is contrary to morality and man must learn to use his freedom properly. A crucial moment in this learning process is, according to Kant, expressed in Genesis 3. 21, which he glosses in the following way, 'das erstemal, daß er [der Mensch] zum Schafe sagte; den Pelz, den du trägst, hat dir die Natur nicht für dich, sondern für mich gegeben, ihm ihn abzog und sich selbst anlegte . . .' (p. 54). Thus Kant sees this part of the Genesis narrative as depicting man's realization that the other animals are not ends in themselves but means to man's own ends (in this case the end of physical warmth with the help of clothes of animal skins). Man comes to see himself as 'der Zweck der Natur' and therefore reasons, however gropingly, that no member of mankind may use another as a mere means. Thus 'fallen' man, in exercising the faculty he has discovered in his 'Fall', comes for the first time to be on a par with all rational or higher beings⁴⁶ in an ironic reversal of the traditional Lutheran view according to which man's original sin entails the loss of the divine image.

This very positive evaluation of man's departure from the state of nature is however subject to an important qualification, namely that although the freedom thereby acquired is a gain from the perspective of the whole race it can be seen as a loss from that of the individual. It is axiomatic for Kant that freedom is an essential ingredient of the 'Vollkommenheit' of the race (p. 56). Yet for the individual the ability to choose is not necessarily accompanied by a sufficiently detailed knowledge of the possible (harmful) consequences of a specific course of action for pain to be avoided. Kant's elaboration of this qualification widens to become an analysis of how, in a much more general and contemporary way, the ends of nature and the ends of culture (understood as the product of rational beings working together) are at odds (p. 56). For example, many natural human instincts (such as the desire to procreate) cannot be satisfied at all, or they become perverted, in a complex 'cultured' society, such as Kant felt existed in his own age. The resolution of these tensions will take the form of the transformation of human culture into something as natural as the state of instinct which man left. 'Vollkommene Kunst' will once again become 'Natur', 'Kunst' being understood as all forms of human mastery and transformation of the natural world including (most importantly) the art of 'Geselligkeit und bürgerlichen Sicherheit' (p. 58). Thus the absence of conflict characteristic of man's state of happy but ignorant instinctual innocence, his garden of Eden, will be re-created by human effort, indeed by political effort: only 'eine vollkommene bürgerliche Verfassung'⁴⁷ will bring this about.

M. H. Abrams has shown how Kant's essay is typical of a considerable number of works in the last quarter of the eighteenth century in Germany which

all rewrite the biblical story of the loss and future recovery of Paradise and which 'evaluate the fall as a fortunate self-division, because it was the necessary first step upon the educational journey by which thinking and striving man wins his way back toward his lost integrity, along a road which looks like a reversion but is in fact a progression.'⁴⁸ He mentions the names of Lessing, Herder, Schiller, Fichte, Hegel and Schelling alongside that of Kant.⁴⁹ Although he is right to link these names, there are of course differences of presentation and detail between the thinkers. Whereas Schiller in his *Etwas über die erste Menschengesellschaft* is the closest to Kant, Schelling⁵⁰ is not content to pass over the question of the historicity of Genesis as a matter for others to decide; he writes in part as a philologist and so marshals the whole arsenal of scholarly arguments for seeing the Genesis narrative as the mythological expression of primitive philosophy. My concentration on Kant here has not been intended to suggest that the works of the others were unknown in Tübingen, but merely to underline once again the centrality of Kant for the intellectual situation in Tübingen. Anyone in the *Stift* as familiar with Kant as Hölderlin was⁵¹ would, by 1790, have been made to think anew about what grounds the Christian theology he had been taught could offer for the future hope it proclaimed and about how that hope was to be described. He would have been faced with the question: if man's Fall, as narrated in Genesis, can really be given a positive sense, what place do the Christian scheme of salvation and its central figure Christ now have? The notion of a 'happy' Fall is itself a traditional theological topos (M. H. Abrams, p. 208): Adam's sin can be seen as a *felix culpa* because it is the essential condition of the revelation of God's grace in the Incarnation. Once this topos is secularized, the place of the Incarnation, the coming of God in the flesh, is taken by Reason, by the coming of reasoning, free choice, analysis, to creatures of instinct.

Hölderlin's reaction to these issues reaches a climax during the period of his most intense work on the novel *Hyperion*, immediately after leaving Tübingen. Yet since I will argue that *Hyperion* is not, contrary to the common perception of it, a clean break with Christianity, his response must be seen as it gradually evolves and must not be treated ahistorically. Hölderlin's *most* outspoken statements about the theology of the Tübingen seminary are contained in letters written well after his departure (6:185 f.; 6:308 f.). There is a danger that by being read back into the actual experience of Tübingen, these statements will create distortion and oversimplification.⁵² This need for caution applies equally, of course, in the case of the evidence about Hölderlin's views in the years 1788–93. Each piece of evidence must be weighed and considered on its merits. This evidence is of three kinds and we shall consider it according to the following categories: one of Hölderlin's letters, the text of one of his sermons, and his Tübingen poems.

In February 1791, Hölderlin writes a letter to his mother in which he gives her an account of his most recent sermon (6:63 f.) and explains to her the slow

germination of its themes in his mind. For about a year (line 49f.) Hölderlin has concerned himself with the question of proofs for the existence of God (line 25f.). This accords exactly with what we know of the curriculum he followed: Hölderlin took his *Magister* examination in the summer of 1790, following two years of study which included *Repetitionen* on the subject of God's existence and lectures on logic and metaphysics. In all probability these lectures included those of Flatt on Kant, whose content we can form a reasonable impression of on the basis of my discussion of Flatt's *Briefe*.

It is clear that Hölderlin has absorbed something of Kant. Foremost in his mind when he admits the persuasiveness of the 'scharfen Gegnern' (line 32) of the traditional proofs for God's existence must have been Kant.⁵³ Flatt's attempt to rehabilitate the cosmological and physico-theological proofs (a far from convincing attempt, it must be admitted) has made no impression on Hölderlin, who specifically mentions God's 'Eigenschaften, die wir aus der Natur erkennen sollen' (line 26f.) only to confess the logic of radical scepticism about reason's uses in such matters. The example of the rationalism of Spinoza whom Hölderlin calls a 'Gottesläugner nach strengen Begriffen' (line 35f.) only confirms the insight derived from Kant. Hölderlin takes refuge not in the voluntaristic moral 'theology' of Kant (as it almost seems he is about to do when he speaks of the 'longing' of his heart for the 'eternal', line 39f.) but in the supernaturalism of Storr. The belief of the heart is vindicated by the appeal to the authenticating miracles of Christ, 'Er zeigt durch Wunder, daß er das ist, was er von sich sagt, daß er Gott ist' (line 43f.). If Christ is thus 'proved' to be God, then his teaching about the existence, love, wisdom and power of God (line 45) must be reliable, however unreliable human wisdom may be. This is Storr's apologetic tactic exactly. There is even the possibility that Hölderlin is echoing not only Storr but also Flatt in the way he speaks of Christ: 'Er ist aufs innigste verbunden mit der Gottheit. Ist Gott selbst' (line 47f.). This very phrasing occurs in the essay of Flatt 'Etwas über die Beziehung der Lehre Jesu . . .'. There Flatt suggests that Jesus, whilst in general maintaining the secret of his identity, nevertheless gave hints to the Jews, 'Daß er der Gottheit ähnlich und mit derselben aufs innigste verbunden sey' (*Vermischte Versuche*, p. 268). It is noticeable that despite the presence of such a phrase in Hölderlin's letter, positively inviting exploration of the nature of Christ and his relation to God and men, Hölderlin's interest is strictly epistemological: Christ is the escape route from the labyrinth created by human reason — that is all.⁵⁴ (He will, however, exploit to the full the relational implications of the superlative of 'innig' in the essay 'Urteil und Seyn' of 1795, as we shall see in Chapter Two.)

The text of the sermon which Hölderlin is describing in the letter to his mother has in all probability not survived. There is, however, the draft for a sermon on II John 7–9 which, while not exactly datable, can be reliably assumed

to be from the Tübingen period and, on the evidence of the closeness of its ideas to those developed in the letter to Hölderlin's mother, most probably from late 1790/early 1791. In his commentary on these lines Hölderlin sees the real meaning of the Incarnation as the provision of reliable teaching for mankind concerning the 'besten Weg zur Glückseligkeit' (4:173, line 8f.). Not that Hölderlin denies that Jesus was God Incarnate, any more than he had done in the letter to his mother, but here again he is less interested in the ontological status of Jesus as God in the flesh than in his verbal utterances, for these seem to have greater significance for men's — epistemological — needs. Christ's teaching provides the clarity and certainty about God which our own ideas lack (4:173, lines 20–24). In support of this, Hölderlin repeats his statement of Storr's argument from the miracles but also claims that Christ's teaching possesses authority of its own based purely on its evident and inherent 'Reinigkeit und Einfalt' (4:173, line 27f.). Hölderlin might appear to be doing nothing more than repeating the classic eighteenth-century 'enlightened' view of Christ as the perfect moral teacher, especially as he also plays off that teaching against 'Aberglaube', a favourite term in the 'enlightened' vocabulary for such things as belief in miracles, yet for Hölderlin, who (crossing Lessings 'ugly, broad ditch' of history with careless ease)⁵⁵ speaks of the miracles as 'unwiderlegbaren Tatsachen' (4:173, line 30f.), this 'Aberglaube' must mean something else. For Storr, the enemy was not just the new biblical criticism but also, to a certain degree, the elaborate dogmatic constructions of the Church (H. Hermelink, p. 302). It is thoroughly plausible therefore that Hölderlin is following Storr here too when he speaks of 'Aberglaube'. The mere possibility of such a reading should make us sceptical of the view that Hölderlin's time in Tübingen represents a simple loss of faith in the face of stubborn and obscurantist 'supernaturalism'.

Man's need for clear and certain ideas about God — his epistemological need — exists alongside another one, namely the need for 'Glückseligkeit'. Christ has met this need by promulgating in his teaching the 'Gesetz der Liebe' (4:174, line 7), the law to love God and one's fellow men. Hölderlin's statement that this 'law' is no obstacle to human freedom clearly reflects an awareness of Kant's distinction between autonomy and heteronomy of the will and Kant's conviction that only that 'law' which the autonomous moral subject legislates for himself can guarantee his freedom (*Grundlegung*; GS, iv, 433). At the same time the influence of Kant is uneven: Hölderlin prizes Christ's law so highly because it accommodates itself to human nature ('für die Menschheit angemessen', 4:174, line 4). The implication behind this, although it is not spelt out explicitly, is that love is the impulse which is most natural to man and therefore most able to produce the state of 'Glückseligkeit' because it satisfies both the will and the feelings. It is clear from the way Hölderlin speaks of the joys of trust in God ('... wie aber diese Reinigkeit des Herzens den Menschen für Freuden empfänglich

macht, kann nur der begreifen, der es erfährt', 4:174, line 23f.) that love of God is for him not a mere paraphrase for commitment to Kant's moral law. To this extent, when Hölderlin speaks of the Christian 'Gesetz der Liebe' he is, in all probability consciously, denying Kant's opposition of 'practical' and 'pathological' love (GS, iv, 399). As we shall see, Hölderlin's reflections on love are continued in his Tübingen poetry. This persistent exploration of love in relation to man's religious life is one of the key elements of the reception of Kant, not just by Hölderlin but by a significant group of others in Tübingen as well.

In another respect, however, Hölderlin appears to be unaware of the full Kantian resonance of the terms he is using. He speaks of 'sittliche Freiheit' itself as 'das höchste Gut, das unser Herz beglücken kann' (4:174, line 9) using the term 'das höchste Gut' in the common everyday sense, even though elsewhere in the sermon he does speak of the prospect 'daß, wenn einst die Harmonie der seelenlosen Natur aufgelöst ist, die viel höhere Harmonie der sittlichen Welt beginnen werde' (4:174, line 34f.) — which is a reasonable paraphrase for the realization of the *summum bonum*. This Kantian terminology has clearly replaced the apocalyptic imagery of 'Die Bücher der Zeiten' (1:69–74) as a description of the end towards which the cosmos is moving, yet the more recognizably Christian elements of the sermon — the reliance on the miracles, the trust in God as wise Father, the doctrine of Christ as God Incarnate — are not brought into confrontation with Kantian ideas at all. The sermon is to a remarkable degree the product of its intellectual context, yet in a totally unsynthesized way. One can well imagine Hölderlin's *Repetenten* asking him afterwards how the Incarnation itself (and not just the teaching of the incarnate 'Lehrer der Menschheit') might relate to the final telos — the 'Harmonie der sittlichen Welt' — or how exactly the *summum bonum* was to be conceived.

It might be objected that to submit to such close scrutiny a solitary draft of a sermon which Hölderlin was obliged to preach as part of his training and to infer so much from it about Hölderlin's own attitudes is to overinterpret. While it is certainly to be regretted that not more of the sermons have survived, there is no reason for not taking this one as a faithful reflection of Hölderlin's thinking in Tübingen. The uneasy co-existence within the sermon of ideas derived from both Storr and Kant shows that Hölderlin is not merely mouthing the words he knew his superiors wanted to hear. Doubtless some students occasionally or even habitually did this, yet there is plenty of evidence to show that during Hölderlin's time in Tübingen precisely the unabashed outspokenness of the students was a real cause for concern:⁵⁶ a mood clearly prevailed in which it was not felt necessary to be especially tactful. And Hölderlin's own attitude to his sermons is far from negative: in the letter to his mother already discussed he explains that 'Ich führte gerne eine Materie aus, deren genaue und richtige Erkenntnis mir täglich wichtiger ward.' (6:63, my emphasis).

(v) Hölderlin's Tübingen hymns

A mere glance at the titles of Hölderlin's poems from this period is enough to indicate that they emerge from the same convergence of theology and philosophy as we saw in the letter to his mother and the sermon draft: 'Hymne an die Göttin der Harmonie', 'Hymne an die Unsterblichkeit', 'Hymne an die Freiheit', 'Hymne an die Menschheit', and so on. Since they are 'hymns', we will need to ask what kind of religious celebration they represent. Since they are offered in praise of such things as freedom, immortality and harmony, we will need to ask how such concepts interrelate in the poems. Hölderlin's poetic production in the years 1790-93 should be seen against the background of the intensely religious consciousness that speaks through the lines of his pre-Tübingen work. Here, if anywhere, we find the emotional intensity of Pietism; the poems speak of a world which, because of its frivolity, self-indulgence and cynicism is openly hostile to the pursuit of virtue, a task to which the 'Ich' of the poems resolutely and demonstratively commits himself. Resistance to the world is a harshly ascetic undertaking; whatever satisfaction it may give derives exclusively from the prospect that the reward will be release from all 'Erdenstand' (1:34, line 90), when the last trumpet call sounds and the soul can contemplate 'Die Klarheit des Höchsten' (1:34, line 100). Thus the sensual and the spiritual are radically opposed. The belief that the spiritual will ultimately triumph in the life of the believer and in the cosmos as a whole ('am grossen Weltenmorgen', 1:17, line 61) is an act of faith in the power and wisdom of God. So, accordingly, is the belief that virtue (in this world) will be rewarded by happiness (in the next); there is nothing about the structure of this world to suggest that it will be so. In this scheme of things, Christ is seen as the one who shed his blood for sinners (1:15, line 14) and heaven is a place of reunion with loved ones, now enjoying incorruptibility (1:20, lines 170-72).

The violent antitheses which these pre-Tübingen poems express are not, then, mediated in any real sense; the simple belief in the better world to come merely guarantees that, for the believer, the source of conflict will be removed. His 'release', his longed-for spiritual freedom, cannot be brought about by any mediating force in this world; he must wait. In contrast to this we have seen how, in the sermon, Hölderlin is able to define Christ's 'Gesetz der Liebe' as the means of 'sittliche Freiheit', as 'das höchste Gut'. We saw how this was partially, but not wholly traceable to Kant. The Tübingen poems 'Hymne an die Freiheit' (first version 1792, second version 1793) and 'Hymne an die Göttin der Harmonie' (1790/91) represent a much more developed and sustained exploration of the connection between love, freedom, and the law.

Each poem uses the historical schema of paradise-fall-state of division/separation-regeneration. In the first version of 'Hymne an die Freiheit' (1:139-42), the idyllic state is presented in highly allegorical form; love and innocence

walked together 'unter Blumen' (line 18) and all man's actions sprang from love — spontaneously and without prior reflection that the loving act was also the morally good act: 'Unverkennbar in der schönen Hülle/Wusste Tugend nicht, wie schön sie war' (line 35 f.). Man's freedom consisted precisely in his absence of any self-consciousness, as is clear from the allegorical account of the Fall presented by the 'goddess' Freedom herself:

Wehe nun! — mein Paradies erbebte!

.....

Wehe! weinend floh' ich mit der Liebe
Mit der Unschuld in die Himmel hin

.....

Kek erhob sich des Gesezes Ruthe
Nachzubilden, was die Liebe schuf.

(lines 41–50)

The 'Gesez' is the rational embodiment or codification of the moral principle which love had obeyed instinctively and unselfconsciously. It commands as an external force, lording it over man, who consequently feels himself to be — and is — a slave. As such, the 'law' negates the creative power which love exercises in human affairs and cannot produce the 'fruit' of perfected humanity. 'Öde stehn und dürre die Gefilde,/Wo die Blüthen das Gesez erzwingt; . . .' (1:136, line 56 f.). The 'goddess' then announces that the slavery is over:

Ach! es zieht zu lang entbehrter Lust
Unbezwänglich mich die Liebe nieder . . .

.....

Liebe hat den langen Zwist geschlichtet,
Herrschet wieder! Herrscher der Natur!

(lines 57–64)

The notion of the deity being drawn towards the world of men by love is, of course, a perfectly familiar one in Christian tradition (e.g. John 3.16). Yet such talk of a personal deity is only possible in Hölderlin's hymn because of the (thoroughly transparent) allegorizing: freedom only 'played' intimately (line 23 f.) with man in the primeval paradise in the sense that man was himself blissfully free of any awareness of 'law'.

Similarly, the love which 'draws' the goddess Freedom back down to earth, would, to be meaningful at all, have to be the love for mankind in the goddess's heart (the presence of this love is precisely what is asserted in John 3.17). Since the goddess is merely an allegorical cipher⁵⁷ and since love is pictured as having 'fled' to heaven with the goddess when man 'fell' (line 45 f.), love must literally vanish from the position the poem gives to it in the historical schema of Man's Fall and regeneration. It cannot perform any task of regeneration or reconciliation which man himself does not perform, since if it is 'really' to exist at all it must be in men's hearts. Yet the whole point is that man in his present 'fallen'

state is devoid of love. All that saves the poem from being an elaborate house of cards, in fact, is Hölderlin's conscious use of personification and allegorization as rhetorical means towards the end of bringing about that very renaissance of love which the poem celebrates as purported fact. Hölderlin describes the workings of such personification in the essay on Hesiod and Solomon:

Die Personifikation abstrakter Begriffe hat wie die Kürze ihren ästhetischen Wert. . . . Der Dichter will aber auf das Empfindungs- und Begehrungsvermögen wirken, oder welches einerlei ist, er hat Schönheit und Erhabenheit zum Zweck. Er muß also abstrakte Begriffe, . . . so darstellen, daß sie klare Begriffe oder Total-Vorstellungen werden, das ist, er muß sie versinnlichen. Und dies ist das Werk der Personifikation abstrakter Begriffe. (4:192)

In the case of Hölderlin's poem, the poet's goal in trying to affect 'das Empfindungs- und Begehrungsvermögen' is not merely aesthetic but also moral and spiritual. When he writes, 'Strahlst du uns in königlicher Ferne, / Freies kommendes Jahrhundert an', the declaration that a new, freer age is (almost) actual is meant to encourage and inspire. This rhetorical tactic is even more evident in 'Hymne an die Göttin der Harmonie' (1:130), where a series of subjunctives (expressing unfulfilled wish and appeal) alternates with a series of emphatic indicatives (expressing actual occurrence). Thus the poem itself is an active part of the process of regeneration; Hölderlin has created a poetical variation on the philosophical secularization of the story of Man's 'Fall' and 'salvation' epitomized by Kant.

In its treatment of the notion of 'Gesetz', however, the first version of the 'Hymne an die Freiheit' is clearly unsatisfactory. 'Gesetz' is evaluated wholly negatively, whereas in the sermon we saw the beginnings at least of a very positive view of it. Hölderlin in fact reworked this hymn in 1793 and gave 'law' a very different interpretation. Whereas in the 1792 version 'law' and love had been diametrically opposed, we can now read, 'Treu der Liebe seligen Gesetzen/ Lebt die Welt ihr heilig Leben frei' (1:158, line 47f.). The 'law' of love appears to be extended from its use in the personal realm (which was clearly the sphere of the 'Gesetz der Liebe' in the sermon) to embrace the whole of nature. The order of the cosmos (the regular movements of the planets for example) results from a self-imposed adherence to love's 'laws' on the part of the whole — or almost the whole — created order. Man alone has 'fallen' from the freedom of this divine life (lines 61ff.). He is now enslaved, but he has a higher 'law' than that of his own fallen condition to look to. The hope that his life will once again be characterized by justice, freedom and virtue is predicated upon the regenerative power of love as seen in the life of nature (lines 89ff.). The revised 'hymn to freedom' thus makes use of the idea that there is a connection between the world of nature and the moral life of man.

The possibility and nature of this connection are established, as Strack has shown, by means of Hölderlin's liberal interpretation of and reflection upon

Kant's *Kritik der Urteilskraft*.⁵⁸ Hölderlin's intention is seen most clearly in the way the second version of the 'Hymne an die Schönheit' (1791) is prefaced by a motto which is a free paraphrase of Kant: 'Die Natur in ihren schönen Formen spricht figürlich zu uns, und die Auslegungsgabe ihrer Chifferschrift ist uns im moralischen Gefühl verliehen' (1:152). The directness of the connection between our aesthetic experience and our moral sensibility which is asserted here exceeds anything to be found in Kant's third Critique (Strack, p. 18f.). By making our moral sense the interpreter of the beauty of nature, Hölderlin seeks to free aesthetic experience from any association with purely disinterested contemplation (*ibid.*, p. 14). In this way, the experience of beauty becomes a catalyst to moral renewal. The 'goddess' addresses these words to her devotees in a version of the Christian call to repentance and new birth which is not only secularized but, most significantly, aestheticized:

Mahnt im seeligen Genieße,
 Mahnet nicht, am Innern sie
 Nachzubilden, jede süße
 Stelle meiner Paradiese,
 Jede Weltenharmonie?
 Mein ist, wem des Bildes Adel
 Zaubersch das Herz verschönt,
 Daß er niedre Gier verhöhnt,
 Und im Leben ohne Tadel
 Reine Götterlust ersehnt.

(1:155, lines 111–17)

The harmony perceived in nature's beauty — the 'Adel' of its appearance — is to transform man's heart and so make it desire the good. Thus the poet does not carry alone the responsibility of inspiring moral change, exclusively by means of the rhetorical tactics discussed above: he can appeal to the Beauty he has discovered in nature, 'Leihe, daß er leb' und prange/Deinen Adel dem Gesange, . .' (1:154, line 63f.). Thus equipped, poetry will be able 'magically' to transform the inner man. There is no absolute need, as there was in the first version of the 'Hymne an die Freiheit', to picture the deity (in this poem the 'goddess' Freedom, but interchangeable *in functional terms* with all the other ideals celebrated in these Tübingen hymns) being 'drawn' back down to the earth she had been forced to leave. For the divine presence has never really been lost,

Schon im grünen Erdenrunde
 Schmeckt' ich hohen Vorgenuß

 Schon in Antiphilens Schöne
 Kannst' ich dich, Urania!

1:153f., lines 41f., 68–70)

Aphrodite Urania, whose 'Zaubergürtel' gives to the whole cosmos its harmony (1:130 and 438f.) embodies beauty and truth. To stand in the presence of

this goddess, who is 'Schönheit in der Urgestalt' (1:152, line 15), is to be perfected: hers is the realm of 'vollendeter Dämonen' (line 13). The experience of the beauty of nature is a foretaste of that perfection — Elysium is already present in the bosom of nature (1:156, line 139f.).

In assigning to beauty this crucial position in the process of man's regeneration Hölderlin is following Schiller, although on certain questions they also differ, as we shall see in the next chapter. As Hölderlin was entering the *Stift*, in 1788, Schiller was composing 'Die Künstler', the poem which presents the aesthetic perspective as the one which alone enables man to see the order behind the apparent chaos and meaninglessness of his experience and the poem which sees beauty as the veiled form of the truth to which we will ultimately attain, 'Was wir als Schönheit hier empfunden/Wird einst als Wahrheit uns entgegengehn' (Schiller, NA, I, 202). As Beissner has pointed out (1:438 and 457), Hölderlin's hymn to beauty implicitly rejects Schiller's rigorous distinction between Urania's appearance as Cypria or Beauty and her final, awesome appearance as she is in herself — as Truth unveiled. And yet Hölderlin's reply to Kant does still at this stage bear traces of dualistic thinking: the pleasure given by the beauty of the earth, significant though it is morally, remains a mere 'Vorgenuß' of the joys to come. Strack is surely right to point out that Plato's *Phaedrus* can be sensed at many points in the 'Hymne an die Schönheit'⁵⁹: the singer is inspired by the sight of phenomenal beauty to an even greater desire for 'Schönheit in der Urgestalt', 'des Kammers morsch Gefieder' (line 34) is transformed, just as in *Phaedrus* the wings of the soul begin to grow again in the presence of earthly beauty.⁶⁰ The dominant imagery of the hymn remains that of flight on an upward path, towards the heavens.

In 1791, then, Hölderlin's position is this: he acknowledges that man has a profound religious need, that Paradise has been lost and must be regained; he identifies love as the power which can recreate man and progresses from the hope that such love might be engendered by the rhetorical force of the poem itself to the belief that the beautiful harmony of sensuous, empirical reality, which results from nature's obedience to love's 'laws', can awaken in men desire for the good, because it 'speaks' a language which our moral sense can interpret. This move must be seen as the move of a mind struggling, alongside many others in these years, with Kant's effective exclusion, in the three Critiques, of 'Sinnlichkeit' in the broadest sense from the business of man's perfection. But alongside those who, like Schiller, wished to save 'Sinnlichkeit' for religion in the general, secularized sense, there were others, hitherto all but ignored by Hölderlin scholarship, who wished to save it explicitly for Christianity.

(vi) *The Reception of Kant (2)*

It seems likely that both versions of 'Hymne an die Schönheit' were composed before the end of 1791, i.e. just less than two years before Hölderlin's departure

from the *Stift*. In the course of those two years, two works of major significance for the question of 'Sinnlichkeit' in religion were to appear: Fichte's *Versuch einer Kritik aller Offenbarung* (1792) and Kant's *Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft* (1793). Together they ensured that the religious debate within the seminary, far from abating, actually grew in intensity.

Fichte's essay (a last ditch attempt by the author to put himself on the intellectual map and, not incidentally, to earn some desperately needed money) appeared anonymously at Easter 1792.⁶¹ By 1793, the *Versuch einer Kritik* . . . had to be reprinted and C. Ph. Conz, writing early in 1794, can already refer to it as 'berühmt'.⁶² Of its impact in Tübingen, H. S. Harris has this to say, 'With the departure of Diez and the publication of the *Kritik aller Offenbarung* and of Kant's essay on 'Radical Evil', a completely new situation comes into being by the end of 1792 . . .' (Harris, p. 108, fn.).

The statement needs some explanation: C. I. Diez (a *Repentent* from 1790–92) was the 'Kantischer enragé' (7:1, Dokument 54), and according to contemporary opinion within the *Stift*, the truly radical Kantian there, intent on brushing aside all attempts, like that of Storr, to save orthodoxy. Harris (p. 98, fn. 3) claims that 'his interpretation of Kant was generally accepted until the publication of the *Kritik aller Offenbarung*' without offering any real evidence for this. Compared with the radical Kantianism of Diez, Fichte's work may to some have appeared reactionary, as Harris claims (p. 108), but the question here is whether Hölderlin was among them. Harris thinks he was and therefore classes Hölderlin among the 'radical disciples of the Critical Philosophy' battling against the moderates.⁶³ His evidence is Hölderlin's letter to Hegel of 26 January 1795 (6:154–56), in particular the comment, 'Anfangs hatt' ich ihn [Fichte] sehr im Verdacht des Dogmatismus . . .'. Does 'Anfangs' refer to Hölderlin's reading of Fichte before the appearance of the *Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre* and *Die Bestimmung des Gelehrten* (from 1794 onwards), that is to the *Versuch einer Kritik* . . ., or does it mean Hölderlin first started reading these later works? If the letter is considered as whole the latter possibility is the only plausible one, since the phrase which occurs later in the letter, 'So schrieb ich noch in Waltershausen, als ich seine ersten Blätter las . . .' must refer back to 'Anfangs' and only the *Grundlage* . . . and the *Die Bestimmung* . . . appeared in instalments (i.e. as 'Blätter'). Furthermore, Hölderlin's explanation of what he means by 'Dogmatismus', namely Fichte's flawed conception of the 'absolutes Ich', cannot be made to apply to the *Versuch einer Kritik* . . . at all; the whole problematic of the 'Ich' has not yet arisen explicitly for Fichte at this stage. Thus there appears to be no compelling evidence for saying that Hölderlin saw Fichte's essay as reactionary. It is of course likely, though not certain, that he read it. What then might the Hölderlin of the Tübingen hymns we have just discussed make of the work?

Reading the *Versuch einer Kritik* . . . we can understand why it was at first taken to be by Kant. We hear the by now familiar moral arguments for the

existence of God, for immortality and for God as the guarantor of the equilibrium of virtue and happiness (GA, pp. 19–23). There is also a rejection of any claims made *a posteriori* on behalf of so-called miracles that they are instances of divine revelation (GA, p. 160). Revelation is, nevertheless, on *a priori* grounds conceivable or logically possible (GA, p. 49) — this admission was presumably one of the main sources of the view that Fichte was adopting a reactionary stance. Of course reason itself decides whether the possibility has in any given instance become actual. Revelation is thus given a small foothold, but it is one which in its turn is dependent on the question: Is revelation needed, in practical terms, for the practice of morality? The answer takes the form of an admission that in ethically immature individuals or nations (e.g. the ancient Israelites with their highly anthropomorphic view of God) religion may have to appeal to man's imagination, that is to say to a faculty which is 'sinnlich' but at the same time not determined according to natural laws (GA, p. 67). All anthropomorphic images of God are such concessions to man's 'Sinnlichkeit'. Fichte admits that God may have to be conceived of as 'eine verkörperte praktische Vernunft ('λογον')' (GA, p. 93f.) — but here the 'embodiment' is something that only occurs as a mental image and it could never claim to correspond to something in the empirical world. Only the imagination needs to be satisfied, and so the decisive criterion becomes the usefulness of the idea rather than its 'truth' (in the sense of its correspondence to something actual). Thus although Fichte combines the Greek 'λογον' and the word 'verkörpert' in one phrase, there can be no suggestion of any belief in the Incarnation. Fichte treats the doctrine of the Resurrection in the same way: it is a pragmatically necessary way of visualizing the 'Fortdauer unsres Ichs' which is postulated by practical reason (GA, p. 94f.). Would this have aroused the anger of Hölderlin, as Harris's picture of him as a Kantian radical suggests it must have done? Hardly: there is very little difference in function and definition between the deities of Hölderlin's Tübingen hymns and the 'verkörperte praktische Vernunft' of Fichte. In each case the personification functions by giving moral exhortation and encouragement and is defined as an imaginative picturing of the human ideal. Yet we know that by the time of the *Versuch einer Kritik* . . . Hölderlin had taken a major step by prefacing his second version of the 'Hymne an die Schönheit' with the motto freely adapted from Kant, thereby upgrading Nature's 'schöne Formen'. This raises the intriguing possibility that Hölderlin may have objected to Fichte's essay, if he did at all, not because it was a betrayal of the original, radical Kant but because it did not go as far *beyond* Kant as Hölderlin himself had begun to want to go.

Those who objected to Fichte's essay for the first of these two reasons would no doubt also have greeted Kant's *Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft* with some dismay, primarily on account of the ideas contained in the first section of work, which appeared in February 1792, just over a year in advance of the remaining sections of the work. The very title of this first section

was bound to shock many, 'Von der Einwohnung des bösen Prinzips neben dem guten: oder Über das radikale Böse in der menschlichen Natur'. Goethe's reaction cannot have been untypical: in a letter to Herder and his wife written on 7 June 1793 (following scornful comments about Lavater), he writes,

Dagegen hat aber auch Kant seinen philosophischen Mantel, nachdem er ein langes Menschenleben gebraucht hat, ihn von mancherlei sudelhaften Vorurteilen zu reinigen, freventlich mit dem Schandfleck des radikalen Bösen beschlabbert, damit doch auch Christen herbeigelockt werden, den Saum zu küssen.⁶⁴

The adjective 'radikal' was of course what caused offence, suggesting as it did (through the Latin etymology) that there was a form of evil in man that went to the very *roots* of his nature. It must have seemed to many as if the Christian doctrine of original sin, which 'enlightened' thinkers had toiled so long and hard to discredit, was being reinstated by one of their own greatest champions. Kant describes this 'radical evil' as a tendency within man to invert the proper hierarchy of the incentives ('Triebfedern') which motivate his actions, so that the incentive of self-love becomes the condition of obedience to the moral law, whereas such obedience should in fact itself be the condition of the satisfaction of 'Selbstliebe' (Kant, GS, VI, 36). This is not the same as making evil one's guiding principle of action, but it is nevertheless something which 'den Grund aller Maximen verdirbt' (p. 37). The radical evil in man is, Kant concludes, 'Verkehrtheit des Herzens . . . ein böses Herz . . .' (p. 37). The paradox in need of solution is that this radical evil is found in human beings, who by definition are free moral agents, and is nevertheless 'als natürlicher Hang durch menschliche Kräfte nicht zu vertilgen' (p. 37).

What prospect is there of a solution? Kant readily admits that any solution would have to take the form of a complete revolution in a man's disposition, that is to say 'eine Art von Wiedergeburt' (p. 47): Kant refers to John 3.5, where Jesus speaks to Nicodemus of the need to be born again. Such radical change is necessary because the corrupt state of the ground of all man's maxims precludes improvement by gradual change. Yet this 'new birth' must, Kant thinks, be our own work if any moral value is to attach to it: hence he makes no mention of the 'new birth' being 'from above', as Jesus says it must be (John 3.6). Man must *hope* that he can achieve this change of heart without ever *knowing* himself whether he is making progress towards that goal (p. 51). Kant is well aware that in Christian theology (especially in Pauline theology, e.g. Ephesians 4.24) the change of heart or the 'putting on of the new man' is made to be causally dependent on repentance and faith in Christ, as the one who died for the believer's sins. Yet in his own theology the link between these two events is a very different one. Admittedly Kant states that, 'Im praktischen Glauben an diesen Sohn Gottes (sofern er vorgestellt wird, als habe er die menschliche Natur angenommen) kann nun der Mensch hoffen, Gott wohlgefällig (dadurch auch selig) zu werden' (p. 62). However this 'Son of God' is an 'Urbild der

sittlichen Gesinnung in ihrer ganzen Lauterkeit' (p. 61), which, before there is any question of actual historical realization, man finds *within* him, although he cannot grasp how such an idea could have taken root in his mind. Kant further states, 'Es bedarf also keines Beispiels der Erfahrung, um die Idee eines Gott moralisch wohlgefälligen Menschen für uns zum Vorbilde zu machen; sie liegt als solches schon in unserer Vernunft' (p. 64). But if the presence of the *idea* does not require any historical realization, does the *practice* of living in conformity to that idea nevertheless require it? Only in a limited sense, says Kant, because even the example of an actually occurring human life which was fully pleasing to God, though it may move us, could not itself function as a pattern for our imitation. The human life in question (Kant means of course the life of Christ) would for us be the *analogy* which helped us imagine such moral perfection. Yet in Kantian terms such analogies have very restricted use:

Das ist der Schematism der Analogie (zur Erläuterung), den wir nicht entbehren können. Diesen aber in einen Schematism der Objektsbestimmung (zur Erweiterung unseres Erkenntnisses) zu verwandeln ist Anthropomorphism, der in moralischer Hinsicht (in der Religion) von den nachtheiligsten Folgen ist. (p. 65)

If we indulge in anthropomorphism we suggest that the historical life is more important than the principle it represents. In sum, the historical elements of a religion are, and must remain, irrelevant for Kant. Although his talk of 'radical evil' is an admission that men's behaviour is in practice governed far more often by their sensuous ('sinnlich') natures than by their moral maxims, true religion itself should not, ideally, make use of anything other than man's own unfathomable moral will. The many mysteries of which Christianity speaks (grace, atonement, election, the Trinity, and so on) lie beyond 'the limits of mere reason' (pp. 142 ff.). They are thus both epistemologically extraneous and practically superfluous, where they are not directly harmful.

Kant's essay on religion differs from Fichte's *Versuch einer Kritik* . . . in many matters of detail, but when seen from the perspective of Hölderlin's growing interest in the connection between the moral and the aesthetic realm it can be taken — and must have been taken by Hölderlin, who very probably read it in Tübingen⁶⁵ — as powerful reinforcement of the view espoused by both thinkers that anything in religion which appeals to man as a sensuous ('sinnlich') being (e.g. anthropomorphism, archetypes or 'Urbilder' and incentives to act other than for duty's own sake) must have a strictly pragmatic, secondary, and short-term function.

We have seen that Harris considers Kant's essay on 'radical evil' and Fichte's *Versuch einer Kritik* . . . to have been the major factors in the creation of 'a completely new situation' in Tübingen in 1792. Yet no real impression of the nature of that new situation emerges from his or anyone else's account. We have also seen that the two works of Fichte and Kant raised, in a sustained and closely argued way, the question of the place of 'Sinnlichkeit' in religion. Kant's *Kritik*

der praktischen Vernunft had been well absorbed into the intellectual life of the *Stift* by 1792, as we have seen from the work of Flatt. That work had elaborated a theory of morals which was explicitly intended to dispense with any reference to how men *do in fact* behave and to concentrate instead on how they *should* behave, regardless of all contingent factors. The *Kritik der praktischen Vernunft*, then, deliberately left unanswered the question of how to apply the moral theory to human lives. Kant's admission of an element of 'radical evil' in 1792 brings this question right to the forefront of the religious debate. This is the question which, above all others, occupies the minds of those in the *Stift* in 1792–93, and most especially the minds of three of the *Repetenten* — C. Ph. Conz, G. C. Rapp and C. G. Bardili.

The *Repetenten* occupied a position of some importance in the teaching programme of the seminary. In addition to their responsibility for the *Repetitionen* and the 'loci' they were also expected to take responsibility for the overall intellectual and moral development of the students.⁶⁶ This was clearly a task delegated to them by the 'Ephorus', the representative academic head of the seminary. Such a role gave them the opportunity to develop a far closer relationship with the students than was either possible for, or even desired by, the senior teachers.⁶⁷ Indeed this closeness seems to have been positively encouraged: each student was assigned to a particular *Repetent*, who also shared accommodation with that group of students (6:570). It is true that they also had a responsibility to keep the 'Ephorus' informed of students' progress and attitudes (7:1, Dokument 102), a task which was clearly a *potential* source of mistrust between themselves and the students. In the case of Hölderlin at least there seems to have been no tension. 'Mein Repetent ist der beste mann von der Welt. . .', he writes to his sister in November 1790 (6:57).⁶⁸ He evidently considered that a *Repetent* was in a position to exercise a powerful intellectual influence not merely on the younger students but on the *Stift* as a whole. Having suggested to Hegel in November 1795 that the latter ought to consider a return to Tübingen as a *Repetent*, Hölderlin adds, '. . . für Dich war es wohl Pflicht, insofern Du den Todtenerwecker in Tübingen machen könntest'.⁶⁹

Against this background the links which Hölderlin had with Conz (a *Repetent* from 1789–92), Rapp (1790–93), and Bardili (1789–90)⁷⁰ cannot fail to be of vital interest for our understanding of his thinking about religion in the years 1792–93. In addition to the weekly *Repetitionen* and 'loci' Hölderlin attended a class given by Conz during the summer of 1790 on Euripides's tragedies and a class by Bardili on the use of profane authors in theology during the winter semester 1789/90 (H. S. Harris, p. 74, fn. 6). Conz continued to take an interest in Hölderlin well after the latter's departure from Tübingen (7:1, Dokument 110). Furthermore, although there is no concrete evidence of any particular personal contact between Rapp and Hölderlin, the latter possessed the first two volumes of the *Allgemeines Repertorium für empirische Psychologie und verwandte*

Wissenschaften (edited by another *Repetent*, I. D. Mauchart), in which Rapp's essay *Über moralische Triebfedern, besonders die der christlichen Religion* appeared in two parts.⁷¹ How then do Conz, Rapp and Bardili respond to the 'new situation' created by Fichte and Kant? The evidence is to be found in the essay of Rapp, in the work of Conz which appeared in Tübingen in 1794 under the title *Abhandlungen für die Geschichte und das Eigenthümliche der späteren Stoischen Philosophie, nebst einem Versuche über Christliche, Kantische und Stoische Moral*, and in Bardili's *Sophylus oder: Sittlichkeit und Natur als Fundamente der Weltweisheit. In zwei Gesprächen, nebst einer Abhandlung über den Geist des Zeitalters* (Stuttgart, 1794).

The very title of Bardili's work is programmatic. The realms of morality and nature are seen very much in the spirit of Hölderlin's revised 'Hymne an die Freiheit': the world of nature is ordered according to laws no less purposeful than those which apply in the moral sphere. To see the two as discontinuous realms is to create a false antithesis, for

es existiert nur ein und ebendieselbe, die organische Natur durchdringende, geistige Kraft . . . und jede . . . Organisation ist daher das Resultat einer, nach den Gesetzen der Notwendigkeit wirkenden Materie, und einer, diese Wirkungen für sich und nach dem Gesetze der Zwecke möglichst benutzenden, geistigen Kraft. Du wirst anbethen, wenn du einmal völlig einsiehst, mit welcher Weisheit der weltordnende, oberste Geist dies Ineinanderfließen ungleichartiger Kräfte veranstaltet. (Bardili, p. 96f.)

Such are the basic premiss and spirit of Bardili's work. It clearly belongs to the debate about 'Sinnlichkeit' in religion which we have been analysing, but although Bardili frequently alludes to Kant, his work is not as close an engagement with the latter as the essays of Conz and Rapp, and so we shall concentrate on these. Bardili's work, however, also contains some remarkably close parallels with *Hyperion*, and will therefore be mentioned again in the next chapter.

In two important respects Conz and Rapp agree with the view of Christianity which Kant adopts in *Die Religion* . . . , in particular with his view of the teaching of Jesus: when stripped of the contingent elements deriving from its Jewish setting, this teaching can be seen to centre on the appeal for a 'Sinnesänderung' and, consequent upon this, for a striving towards moral perfection. Conz cites Matthew 4.17, 'Thut Busse, das Himmelreich ist nahe herbey kommen' and Matthew 5.48, 'Darum sollt ihr vollkommen seyn, gleichwie euer Vater im Himmel vollkommen ist' (cf. Kant, GS, vi, 48 and 159). Christ, we are told, 'suchte die locker gewordenen Bande zwischen Sittenlehre und Religion wieder zu befestigen oder nur anzuknüpfen' (Conz, *Abhandlungen*, p. 133). The implication is that 'religion' without morality is worthless and that morality is therefore the only really worthwhile part of religion. Both Conz and Rapp hold, with Kant, that if it is seen as 'natural religion', Christianity turns out to be an anthropocentric code of morality.⁷² Granted their agreement with Kant on this question, Conz and Rapp could hardly have differed from Kant in their view of

Christ himself. Jesus perfectly lived out his own moral teaching and was therefore for his disciples an 'Ebenbild der Gottheit' and for us today 'ein Muster der Reinheit'.⁷³ (The distance between C. I. Diez and these other *Repetenten* becomes particularly evident at this point: Diez was reported to have described Jesus as a 'Betrüger' who had 'sich hinreißen lassen' (7:1, Dokument 54).

Conz and Rapp are not, however, simply jumping uncritically on the bandwagon of Kant's work on religion and morality. They are concerned not just to restate Kant's ideas where they agree with him but also to show that by admitting the presence in man of 'radical evil' Kant has (however reluctantly) opened the door to wide-ranging discussion of moral incentives (Triebfedern). Thus Conz (p. 158) argues that the apostles consciously used their beliefs about Christ — such as the belief in his mediatorial and redemptive role, in his risen presence with them and so on — as incentives for their own striving for moral perfection, and Rapp (p. 181 f., vol. II) claims that Christianity equips its adherents with another powerful incentive — the 'Geist der Heiligung' which cannot simply be 'weginterpretiert' or 'wegphilosophiert'. However the most important element which Rapp and Conz discern in Christianity is love, and it is their emphasis on love which clearly marks their work off from Kant's *Die Religion* . . . and indeed from Fichte's *Versuch einer Kritik* . . .

The Kantian distinction which we have already alluded to between 'practical' love and 'pathological' love was based upon Kant's reflection on the biblical command to love one's neighbour, even one's enemy (Matthew 5.43–45). Kant had concluded that 'Liebe als Neigung' could not be commanded: 'Neigung' is defined by Kant elsewhere as 'die habituelle sinnliche Begierde' (GS, VII, 251). If the obedience to the command to love is determined, in whole or in part, by desire for the object then clearly the will is not performing autonomously. If love is taken as 'Neigung', then, 'eine Pflicht zu lieben [ist] ein Unding' (GS, VI, 401). The only love which can be commanded is 'praktische Liebe', which Kant paraphrases in the *Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten* as, 'Wohltun aus Pflicht, selbst wenn . . . unbezwingliche Abneigung widersteht . . .' (GS, IV, 399 f.). This 'practical' love, since it is a matter of the will, alone has moral value.

It follows that 'moral' love cannot for Kant be directed towards a beloved object or an object of desire, or at least that there is only *one* thing that could be the object of such love, and that is the moral law itself (which if it is an object at all, clearly is so in a rather different sense from the sense in which we usually talk of objects of desire). Man is to make, ' . . . die bloße Liebe zum Gesetze . . . sich zum *beständigen obgleich unerreichbaren* Ziele seiner Bestrebung . . .' (GS, V, 84; my emphasis). This is one of the reasons why Kant has to reformulate a phrase like 'die Liebe Gottes' so that 'Gottes' becomes the equivalent of our categorical moral duty: 'Furcht Gottes ist diese Gesinnung in Befolgung seiner Gebote aus schuldiger (Untertans-)Pflicht, d. i. aus Achtung fürs Gesetz; Liebe Gottes aber, aus eigener freier Wahl, und aus Wohlgefallen am Gesetze (aus Kindespflicht)'

(GS, vi, 182). The other reason of course is that 'God' is not for Kant an 'object' at all and so cannot meaningfully appear in a phrase as an 'objective' genitive. Kant does however admit that man, in his weakness, experiences the need to love an object and so he allows that the 'moralische Endzweck der Vernunft', i.e. the Highest Good, should serve as this 'object' (GS, vi, 7, fn.).

This concession by Kant is what lies behind the defence of Christianity undertaken by both Rapp and Conz. Christianity has the ability to engender love within men and thereby provides a powerful 'Triebfeder' towards performance of the moral law. For it is the Christian religion, according to Conz, 'die uns *das Gesetz im Gesetzgeber lieben lehrt*'⁷⁴ (my emphasis). Kant had declared love of the moral law to be man's constant but unattainable goal: Conz replies that Jesus's teaching about God (the Legislator of the moral law) as the loving 'Father' of men makes that goal attainable. The law is presented in the 'lovable' guise of a fatherly Legislator. And it is of course only a guise: neither Conz nor Rapp is asserting categorically that there is such a Legislator (each is too good a Kantian for that).

This might seem to be no great advance beyond the *Versuch einer Kritik . . . or Die Religion . . .*, and yet it is. Rapp and Conz argue not only that love is essential for the performance of the moral law, but also that, contrary to the tendency of Kant to see 'Neigung' as something inferior to 'Achtung' and even morally suspect, it is an integral part of true, 'moral' love: 'Wahre Liebe' comprises both 'Achtung' and 'Zuneigung' (Rapp, pp. 173, 171), it is 'ein Gefühl, das von der praktischen Vernunft in der Sinnlichkeit gewirkt wird, ein Gefühl, das eben so wenig, als das der Achtung gegen das Gesetz, ursprünglich sinnlich ist' (p. 176). Furthermore, 'ohne Gefühlsvermögen wäre sie eben so unmöglich als ohne reine praktische Vernunft'. Thus love is elevated to a position where it mediates Nature ('Sinnlichkeit') and Reason ('Vernunft'). In an important respect Conz and Rapp therefore do go beyond Kant. However, in as far as they both admit that such ideas about God are pragmatic devices and would not need to be part of 'die reine Sittenlehre' (Conz, *Abhandlungen*, p. 164), they remain tied to Kantian premises. The object of the love which Christianity, as opposed to 'pure' morality, evokes — God as Father — is not what *determines* the will to do the good. Otherwise Rapp could not argue that reverence for the moral law is the *precondition* of our reverence for the Legislator (p. 136, vol. II). The question as to what determines the will is extremely important for Kant:

Alle praktische Principien, die ein Object (Materie) des Begehungsvermögens als Bestimmungsgrund des Willens voraussetzen, sind insgesamt empirisch und können keine praktische Gesetze abgeben. Ich verstehe unter der Materie des Begehungsvermögens einen Gegenstand, *dessen Wirklichkeit begehrt wird*. Wenn die Begierde nach diesem Gegenstande nun vor der praktischen Regel *vorhergeht* und die Bedingung ist, sie sich zum Princip zu machen, so sage ich . . .; dieses Princip ist alsdann jederzeit empirisch.

(GS, v, 21, my emphasis)

If the desire precedes the practical principle, we have an empirical, i. e. not 'pure' use of practical reason. Hölderlin had stated quite clearly in his essay on Hesiod and Solomon his belief in the importance of affecting 'unser Empfindungs- und Begehrungsvermögen'. His 'goddesses' of freedom and harmony, which were designed to do just that, can now be seen to be no different, as 'objects' of the 'Begehrungsvermögen', from the 'archetype' Christ as he is presented by Kant or Fichte. Both they and Christ represent 'pure' uses of practical reason: what the religious devotee really wants in each case cannot be these 'goddesses' themselves, cannot be the real, historically attested Christ, but only the moral perfection they all stand for. However, I suggested, on the basis of the work of F. Strack, that the 'Hymne an die Schönheit' can be seen as a decisive progression beyond the other Tübingen hymns undertaken by Hölderlin in order to link the aesthetic (and automatically, therefore, also the sensuous) and the moral. What, after all, is the object of the poet's 'Begehrungsvermögen' or desire in this hymn? The second stanza makes it clear, 'Schönheit in der Urgestalt' (1:152, line 15). There can be no doubt that, in the words of Kant already quoted, this is an object 'dessen Wirklichkeit begehrt wird', and the 'reality', in the case of a goddess of Beauty, must necessarily be 'sinnlich' — as indeed the hymn makes clear at every point. Does Beauty then, as the object of the 'Begehrungsvermögen' which determines the poet's will, conflict with the moral imperative, as on Kantian premises it must do? Far from it: 'Mein ist,' the goddess declares, 'wem *des Bildes* Adel/Zauberisch das Herz *verschönt*' (1:155, line 116f., my emphasis). Love 'als Neigung' is seen by Hölderlin, along with Rapp and Conz, as thoroughly compatible with morality. Thus in the hymn the pursuit of Beauty and the pursuit of moral regeneration are indivisible.

I argued earlier that Hölderlin's use of the phrase 'Gesetz der Liebe' in his sermon is a dissension from Kant's view of love. My comments on the work of Conz and Rapp allow us to see that dissension as part of a wider context of critical reception of Kant's moral theory in the *Stift*. Whereas Diez evidently urged a form of Kantianism which would sever all links with Christian theology, Conz and Rapp argue for the necessity of certain 'Triebfedern', primarily love, which only Christianity provides. Hölderlin cannot have failed to be aware of their arguments, as the biographical evidence shows. In the Tübingen hymns love comes to have an equally vital role in the business of man's regeneration, which is presented, it is true, in a secularized form analogous to Kant's restatement of the Christian scheme of salvation. However, in his definition of the object of man's love — Beauty — and in his evaluation of that object, Hölderlin goes beyond Kant, Fichte, Conz, and Rapp towards a position which, because of its emphasis on the element of sensuous embodiment, is closer to the Christian and 'incarnational' view of religion than anything else we see in Tübingen in the years 1790–93, with the exception, of course, of the view put forward by the 'supernaturalist' camp. It is only when

seen against the background of this Kantian debate with the *Stift* that the full significance of the Tübingen hymns (which appear so *unlike* Christian hymns) for Hölderlin's thinking about Christ emerges.

Hölderlin reminded Hegel in a letter of July 1794 that when they both left the *Stift* the previous autumn it had been 'mit der Losung — Reich Gottes' (6:126). Harris is no doubt right to point out that "Reason and Freedom" was what they meant by their talk of "Kingdom Come" (p. 106) and to interpret the idea of the Kingdom of God shared by the friends in terms of the Kantian understanding of a Kingdom where men, having become masters of their 'sensible' natures, obey the moral law as if it came from God, the highest Lawgiver, although in fact they prescribe it for themselves — and do so without any need to be coerced, showing their obedience in practical action (p. 112). For Kant the Kingdom is indeed a matter of the inner disposition of individuals who have been 'reborn': his favourite text is Luke 17.20f., 'Das Reich Gottes kommt nicht mit äusserlichen Geberden. Man wird auch nicht sagen: Sihe hie oder da ist es. Denn sehet, das Reich Gottes ist inwendig in euch'. Kant uses the Luke passage to stress the purely moral character of the Kingdom of God. This does not mean that the 'invisible church' constituted by such 'reborn' individuals must remain hidden to remain 'pure'. Indeed, it is destined to become universal and therefore public (see 6:762). Yet even when made universal its sole definition is in terms of the self-legislating moral agent. We have seen that in vital ways Hölderlin begins to go beyond Kant in Tübingen, and it is clear that any use of the 'Losung — Reich Gottes!' must have included *for him* reference to the idea of Beauty and therefore have implied more than the Kantian watchwords Reason and Freedom alone suggest. In the 'Hymne an die Schönheit', it is the presence of Beauty that creates the possibility of social renewal:

Stiegst du so zur Erde nieder,

 Freut' und küßte brüderlich
 Groll und wilder Haader sich.

(lines 31, 37f.)

We shall see in the next chapter how Hölderlin's developing concept of Beauty gives rise to an understanding of the Kingdom of God which is radically *unKantian*.

A detailed consideration of the intellectual forces at work in Tübingen during Hölderlin's time there shows, then, how his own thinking about the Christian scheme of salvation emerges from the conflict of a traditional position upheld by Sartorius, Storr, and Flatt, and a far-reaching restatement of that traditional position which is the result of the work of Kant. The manner of Kant's reception in the *Stift* means that the question about man's 'salvation' or regeneration comes to be detached from the actual person of Christ and linked with the question about the ultimate convergence of *Reason and Nature*, and more

specifically, with the question about the grounds for believing in this convergence and about the agency which will produce it. In the 'Hymne an die Schönheit' we see evidence of Hölderlin's thinking on these matters beginning to take a decisively original turn, although it is one that must be seen in relation to the thought of others who were involved in the Kantian debate. To show how that beginning is developed and refined will be the task of the analysis of *Hyperion* in the next chapter.

NOTES TO CHAPTER ONE

1. From 1770 onwards this function was performed increasingly by the new 'Karlsschule' in Stuttgart, founded by Karl Eugen in that year with the task of training efficient state servants.
2. F. G. Nauen, *Revolution and Human Freedom: Schelling, Hölderlin and Hegel and the Crisis of Early German Idealism* (The Hague, 1971), p. 15.
3. This has been done in the full-length study by M. Leube, *Die Geschichte des Tübinger Stifts*, 3 vols (Stuttgart, 1932–36).
4. The students spent two years in the philosophy faculty and three years in the theology faculty, but for convenience I will refer to the whole five years of study as the theology course.
5. H. Hermelink, *Die Geschichte der evangelischen Kirche in Baden-Württemberg von der Reformation bis zur Gegenwart* (Stuttgart, 1949); H. S. Harris, *Hegel's Development: Towards the Sunlight 1770–1801* (Oxford, 1972); M. Brecht, 'Hölderlin und das Tübinger Stift', *HJb* (1973–74), 20–49.
6. Harris, p. 81. Harris points to the interest in descriptive psychology which Hegel shared with Mauchart.
7. Brecht has more recently given a more detailed study of the views of the *Repetenten*, 'Die Anfänge der idealistischen Philosophie und die Rezeption Kants in Tübingen (1788–93)', in *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Universität Tübingen 1477–1977*, edited by H. Decker-Hauff (Tübingen, 1977), pp. 381–428.
8. E. Müller, *Hölderlin: Studien zur Geschichte seines Geistes* (Stuttgart, 1944); G. Kurz, *Mittelbarkeit und Vereinigung: Zum Verhältnis von Poesie, Reflexion und Revolution bei Hölderlin* (Stuttgart, 1975); P. Kondylis, *Die Entstehung der Dialektik. Eine Analyse der geistigen Entwicklung von Hölderlin, Schelling und Hegel bis 1802* (Stuttgart, 1979).
9. See, typically, Hegel's 1794 letter to Schelling, where he speaks approvingly of Schelling's work on the mythological content of the Old Testament (see note 35 below) and expects that it will help 'den alten Sauerteig auf die Seite zu schaffen' (*Briefe von und an Hegel*, vol. I, edited by J. Hoffmeister (Hamburg, 1952), p. 11). Hegel adopts a phrase of Jesus (e.g. Matthew 16.11) to express his opposition to the representatives of Christian orthodoxy, thereby implying that he and his like-minded friends are the *true* followers of Jesus. Thus although the opposition to orthodoxy is clear, it is wrong to assume that this opposition was felt by its advocates to be anti-Christian.
10. I have discussed those works dealing with Hölderlin and Tübingen which I consider to be the most significant contributions. Mention could also be made of Roy C. Shelton, *The Young Hölderlin*, German Studies in America, 10 (Bern and Frankfurt, 1973) and of F. G. Nauen (see note 2. above). Shelton deliberately sets out to explore the psychological determinants of Hölderlin's utterances until the Waltershausen period and relegates 'Geistesgeschichte' to a position of secondary importance. Yet much of Hölderlin's youthful idealism, intellectual intensity, and use of abstract formulation derives from the peculiar mentality of his whole generation and peer group. F. G. Nauen provides a more political and less detailed version of Kondylis's basic argument but his references to 'orthodox' (p. 24) and 'conventional' (p. 25) Christianity are given no content and he sees 'our trio' simply as 'angry young men' (p. 20) or 'student radicals' (p. viii): this is too undifferentiated.
11. W. Betzendörfer, p. 39f. and M. Brecht and J. Sandberger, 'Hegels Begegnung mit der Theologie im Tübinger Stift', *Hegel-Studien*, 5 (1969), 47–81 (pp. 61–65).
12. Thus in the winter term 1790/91 Lebrecht lectured on 'Controversien', Uhland on Micah, Habakuk, Zephaniah, Storr on 'Dogmatik (nach Sartorius)' and St. John's Gospel, and Maerklin on 'Praecepta theologiae moralis de officis'. For details see Harris, p. 89.
13. M. Brecht, 'Die Entwicklung der alten Bibliothek des Tübinger Stifts', *Blätter für Württembergische Kirchengeschichte*, 63 (1963), 70.

14. See the list of books in Hölderlin's library at his death printed in Müller, p. 22.
15. On Semler see E. Hirsch, *Geschichte der neueren evangelischen Theologie*, vol. iv (Gütersloh, 1952), pp. 48 ff. and K. Aner, *Die Theologie der Lessingzeit* (Halle-Saale, 1929), pp. 98 ff. and pp. 208 ff. especially.
16. C. Kolb, 'Die Kompendien der Dogmatik in Württemberg', *Blätter für Württembergische Kirchengeschichte*, 51 (1951), 59 f. Semler would, with qualifications, have accepted the former proposition.
17. Defined in *Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart*, vol. i (Tübingen, 1957), p. 209 as the notion that 'Jesus und die Apostel haben die jüdischen Vorstellungen selber nicht geteilt, sondern sich ihnen pädagogisch angepaßt (z.B. Messiasgedanke, Engel, Dämonen, Opfer- und Sühnegedanke, eschatologische Bilder).'
18. An example would be Wieland, in his 'Über den freien Gebrauch der Vernunft in Glaubenssachen' (1787), *Gesammelte Schriften*, Deutsche Kommission der preußischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, vol. xv (Berlin, 1930), pp. 111-73.
19. The paradigmatic expression of this view is Lessing's *Die Erziehung des Menschengeschlechts* of 1777.
20. See the article on 'Föderaltheologie' in *Theologische Realencyclopädie* (Berlin and New York, 1983), p. 249.
21. C. F. Sartorius, *Compendium Theologicae Dogmaticae* (Stuttgart, 1782), § 153. Subsequent § references will be included, in this form, in parentheses in my main text.
22. Hirsch (p. 36) instances the work of one theologian in this area, J. D. Heilmann (1727-64).
23. Mention of Bengel in connection with the *Compendium* of Sartorius should not be taken to suggest that there was any significant Pietist influence on the theology taught in Tübingen at this time. Pietism undoubtedly had been a force in the Württemberg of the eighteenth century, as is made clear by M. Brecht in his two articles, 'Die Entwicklung . . .', and 'Zum sozialen und geistigen Umfeld von Hölderlins Jugend', in *Bausteine zur geschichtlichen Landeskunde von Baden-Württemberg* (Stuttgart, 1979). However, this influence had declined considerably by the 1780s, to the extent that the attempts by the *Repetent* Dann (in the *Stift* 1785-90) to revive a Pietist circle or 'cell' there met with little success: he was even requested by G. C. Storr to be less zealous (see M. Brecht, 'Zum sozialen . . .', p. 355). For the fuller argument in support of a thoroughly non-Pietist view of the *Stift* see M. Brecht, 'Die Entwicklung . . .' (passim), and D. Narr, 'Berührung von Aufklärung und Pietismus im Württemberg des achtzehnten Jahrhunderts', *Blätter für württembergische Kirchengeschichte*, 66-67 (1966/67), 264-77. Pietism is usually advanced as part of Hölderlin's religious outlook by means of an appeal to the Swabian tradition of spirituality in which such names as Andréä, Oetinger, and Bengel feature prominently. This is the case in R. Minder, *Hölderlin unter den Deutschen und andere Aufsätze zur deutschen Literatur* (Frankfurt am Main, 1966), pp. 20-46, where references to these famous Pietists throng the opening pages. Pietism is also considered to be of vital importance for German Idealism as a whole in R. Schneider, *Schellings und Hegels schwäbische Geistesansichten* (Würzburg-Anmühle, 1938) and E. Benz, 'Johann Albrecht Bengel und die Philosophie des deutschen Idealismus', *DVLG*, 27 (1953), 528-54. The most circumspect and convincing discussion is that of P. H. Gaskill, 'Christ and the Divine Economy in the work of Friedrich Hölderlin' (unpublished PhD dissertation, University of Cambridge, 1971). The articles of Brecht and Narr should help to see all this debate in its proper perspective: the point is not that Pietism is insignificant in general, but that the study of it can do very little to increase our understanding of Hölderlin's most intense and sustained exposure to theology, the years in Tübingen.
24. See *Die Offenbarung des Johannes, nach der Auslegung von J. A. Bengel*, edited by B. Burgbachen (Verlag Ernst Franz Metzgingen, Württemberg, 1975), pp. 112 f.
25. See P. Cornehl, pp. 30-31 for a description of the post-Reformation Lutheran orthodoxy on these matters of eschatology.
26. See the article, 'Die ältere Tübinger Schule', in *Realencyclopädie für protestantische Theologie und Kirche*, edited by A. Hauck (Leipzig, 1908), xx, 148-59.
27. Kolb, p. 71. The combination of 'biblisch' and 'verständlich' is well explained by Harris, 'In Storr's system the purpose of historical research was to remove sceptical doubts concerning the authenticity of the canon, and the purpose of philosophical research was to raise sceptical doubts to a rational certainty of reason's incapacity to investigate the supernatural, while at the same time exhibiting the moral necessity of supernatural knowledge' (Harris, p. 94). Thus it is rational to doubt the possibility of rational demonstration of the truth of the Christian religion and at the same time rational to believe the statements of a Bible still vindicated by historical research.
28. G. C. Storr, *Lehrbuch der christlichen Dogmatik*, 1. Theil, 2. verbesserte und vermehrte Auflage (Stuttgart, 1813), ins Deutsche übersetzt von D. C. C. Flatt, pp. xii-xiv.

29. G. C. Storr, *Über den Zweck der evangelischen Geschichte und der Briefe Johannis*, second edition (Tübingen, 1810), p. 210. The first edition was published in 1786.
30. See J. F. Flatt, 'Beitrag zur philosophischen Untersuchung der Wunder Jesu und der Apostel', in *Vermischte Versuche* (Leipzig, 1785), especially p. 152, where we read, 'Die Wirkung der Wunder Jesu und der Apostel konnte also wohl keine andere seyn, als Überzeugung von dem göttlichen Ansehen der Wunderthäter'.
31. See *Theologische Realencyclopädie* (Berlin and New York, 1983), ix, 370.
32. See Brecht/Sandberger, p. 65 where the timetable refers to Eichhorn's 'Introductione in Vet. Test'.
33. M. Brecht, 'Die Entwicklung . . .', p. 77.
34. He acquired for the library of the *Stift* works by Michaelis, Eichhorn, and Paulus (M. Brecht, 'Die Entwicklung . . .', p. 91). Schnurrer's own teaching was thoroughly in the spirit of Semler's work: see M. Leube, 'Die geistige Lage im Stift . . .', p. 151.
35. See F. W. J. Schelling, *Gesammelte Werke*, historisch-kritische Ausgabe im Auftrag der Schelling-Kommission der bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, edited by H. M. Baumgartner (Stuttgart, 1976), I: 1, 49–146. We read here that Schelling considered the theory of the non-Mosaic authorship of Genesis to be 'längst erwiesen', p. 109.
36. *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* appeared in 1781, *Kritik der praktischen Vernunft* in 1788, and *Kritik der Urteilskraft* in 1790.
37. E. Adickes, *German Kantian Bibliography* (New York, 1970; reprint of the original edition of 1893–96).
38. F. X. Bronner, *Leben, von ihm selbst erzählt*, 1795/96 cited in *Stoffe, Formen, Strukturen: Studien zur deutschen Literatur*, edited by A. Fuchs and H. Motekat (Munich, 1962), p. 3. Bronner (1758–1850) had been a Benedictine monk before fleeing the monastery and spending the rest of his life as a scholar, archivist, and poet.
39. See F. Copleston, S. J., *A History of Philosophy* (New York, 1964), vi, ii, 77–99.
40. For an exceptionally clear explanation of Kant's reasoning on this and the following points, see F. Copleston, pp. 124 ff.
41. See Kant, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, second edition (Riga, 1787), p. 700f. (= Reclam, Stuttgart, 1966, p. 699).
42. See Kant, *Prolegomena zu einer jeden künftigen Metaphysik*, edited by K. Vorländer (Hamburg, 1976), p. 42.
43. See Kant, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, p. 698. The Ideas of speculative reason have no constitutive use (the extension of our knowledge beyond what empirical experience can tell us) but only a regulative use (the unifying of the manifold given in empirical experience, understood as a mental process).
44. J. F. Flatt, *Briefe über . . .*, p. 109. Flatt defends more fully this 'transcendent' use of the category of causality in the *Fragmentarische Beiträge zur Bestimmung und Deduktion des Begriffes und Grundsatzes der Causalität* of 1788: see Adickes, *German Kantian Bibliography*, p. 80.
45. I will be referring to the text of the essay as contained in: I. Kant, *Kleinere Schriften zur Geschichtsphilosophie, Ethik und Politik*, edited by K. Vorländer (Hamburg, 1973).
46. Kant, *Mutmaßlicher Anfang*, p. 54f. Kant is no more specific than this about these 'higher beings' (Genesis 3.22 clearly refers to God), as indeed his epistemology will not allow him to be.
47. Kant, *Mutmaßlicher Anfang*, p. 57 (footnote). Although Kant is clear enough that the 'perfecting' of the human face will indeed take this form, his confidence about the imminence of the event varies: see the essay *Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht* in the edition by K. Vorländer, pp. 5–20, esp. 'achter Satz'.
48. M. H. Abrams, *Natural Supernaturalism: Tradition and Revolution in Romantic Literature* (London, 1971), p. 217. (Ch. 4: 'The Circuitous Journey through Alienation to Reintegration'.)
49. The works he has principally in mind are: Lessing: *Die Erziehung des Menschengeschlechts* (1777); Herder: *Die Altteste Urkunde des Menschengeschlechts* (1774); Schiller: *Etwas über die erste Menschengesellschaft nach dem Leitfaden der mosaischen Urkunde* (1790).
50. When discussing Schelling, Abrams does not mention his *De Malorum Origine* of 1792, perhaps because he considers it too early. Yet its date is precisely the reason for its closeness to the ideas of Kant and Schiller and it ought to be mentioned as evidence of how widespread writing of this kind on Genesis was. In addition to Kant, Herder, and Flatt, Schelling mentions in his essay the names of J. G. Eichhorn and H. E. G. Paulus.
51. Hölderlin's 'Abgangszeugnis' contains the interesting line: 'Philologiae, inprimis graecae, et philosophiae, inprimis Kantianae, et litterarum elegantiorum assiduus cultor' (7:1, Dokument 129).
52. By 'over simplification' I mean the kind of statement we find, for example, in Fuhrmans's collection of Schelling's letters, 'Wenn Schelling in Tübingen seinen Glauben verlor . . . so war

- solches Schicksal nicht absonderlich. Ähnlich erging es bekanntlich Hegel, ähnlich Hölderlin . . . ' F. W. J. Schelling, *Briefe und Dokumente*, edited by H. Fuhrmans, vol. I (Bonn, 1962), p. 22), footnote 19. Compare M. Corßen, 'Die Tragödie als Begegnung zwischen Gott und Mensch', *HJb* (1948-49), 140: "... hatte sich Hölderlin schon während seines Theologiestudiums von der christlichen Tradition gelöst . . . '.
53. E. Müller's statement (p. 65) that 'Hölderlin hatte Ende 1790 Kant überhaupt noch nicht studiert' seems highly implausible.
 54. Hence, Adolf Beck's claim that the absence of any mention of the sacrificial death of Christ is a highly significant fact about the letter is misconceived. See 6:579f.
 55. In *Über den Beweis des Geistes und der Kraft* of 1777 Lessing had spoken of 'Der garstige, breite Graben, über den ich nicht kommen kann' to describe the gulf separating the historical belief that Jesus rose from the dead from the belief that this risen Jesus is the Son of God, which is a belief of a quite different order. See G. E. Lessing, *Werke*, edited by Herbert G. Göpfert, 9 vols (Munich, 1970-79), VIII, 13.
 56. See M. Leube, 'Die geistige Lage im Stift . . . ; passim.
 57. It is certainly true to find Müller (p. 67) claiming that we are dealing here with real epiphanies of 'gods' which the poet revered and which are disclosed to him in a visionary way worthy of a Medieval mystic.
 58. F. Strack, *Ästhetik und Freiheit: Hölderlins Idee von Schönheit, Sittlichkeit und Geschichte in der Frühzeit* (Tübingen, 1976), pp. 9-22.
 59. Strack, p. 93. Compare R. B. Harrison, *Hölderlin and Greek Literature* (Oxford, 1975), pp. 44ff.
 60. Plato, *Phaedrus* (250d), *The Dialogues of Plato*, translated and edited by B. Jowett, fourth edition (Oxford, 1953), III, 156f.
 61. I am following the text as printed in J. G. Fichte: *Werke, Gesamtausgabe der bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften*, edited by R. Lauth and H. Gliwitsky (Stuttgart, 1962-), I, 1. This edition also provides the information about the essay's publishing history. Reference to the work will be in the form GA + page number and will be in parentheses in the main text.
 62. C. Ph. Conz, *Abhandlungen für die Geschichte und das Eigenthümliche der späteren Stoischen Philosophie, nebst einem Versuche über Christliche, Kantische und Stoische Moral* (Tübingen, 1794), p. 143.
 63. H. S. Harris, p. 108f. Compare also D. Henrich/Döderlein, 'C. I. Diez Ankündigung einer Ausgabe seiner Schriften und Briefe', *Hegel-Studien*, 3 (1965), 281. Strack (p. 29) takes the position of Diez to stand for all the *Repetenten*.
 64. *Goethes Briefe*, edited by Robert Mandelkow, Hamburger Ausgabe, 4 vols (Hamburg, 1964), II, 166 (letter 536).
 65. We know that by 16 January 1794 Hölderlin was able to recommend 'die neueste Schrift von Kant' (6:105).
 66. 7:408, where we read a report of a visit to the *Stift* by the Duke Karl Eugen during which he puts these questions to the *Repetenten*, 'Wissen die Herren auch, welchen wichtigen Einfluß Ihr Amt nicht nur auf das Wohl meines Stifts, sondern auch auf das ganze Vaterland hat? . . . daß 600,000 Seelen — so viel habe ich in meinem Land — treue Seelsorger von Ihren Händen erwarten?'
 67. Magenau complained of the 'Enntfernung der Vorgesetzten und überhaupt aller Professoren der Universität von ihren Zöglingen' (7:1, Dokument 52).
 68. Hölderlin's *Repetent* was C. F. Weber, author of *Beiträge zur Geschichte des neutestamentlichen Kanons* (Tübingen, 1791) and also of *Christian Friedrich Schnurrers Leben, Charakter und Verdienste* (Kannstadt, 1823), which reveals the extent of Schnurrer's personal contact with well-known biblical scholars such as Eichhorn and Michaelis.
 69. Hegel seems to have shared this estimation of the potential of the *Repetent* position: in a letter to Schelling of 30 August 1795 he claims that the '*Repetentenkollegium*' could 'wenn es aus gut organisierten Köpfen bestünde manchen Nutzen stiften' (*Briefe von und an Hegel*, p. 31 f.).
 70. See also Brecht/Sandberger for biographical details (pp. 58 ff.).
 71. See the catalogue of Hölderlin's books in Müller, p. 21. The first two volumes of the *Repertorium* were published in Nürnberg in 1792. Its general tenor can be gauged from some of the other titles; 'Können Furcht und Hoffnung Triebfedern einer rein sittlichen Handlungsweise seyn?', 'Ein paar Worte über den Streit der Sittlichkeit und der Kunst'.
 72. Conz, *Abhandlungen* . . . , pp. 154 and 167 and Rapp, *Über moralische Triebfedern*, p. 149 (vol. II).
 73. Conz, *Abhandlungen* . . . , pp. 157 and 167 and Rapp, *Über moralische Triebfedern* . . . , vol. II: 'Urbild der Heiligkeit' (p. 168) and 'Ideal von Heiligkeit' (p. 207).
 74. Conz, *Abhandlungen* . . . , p. 167. Cf. the parallel phrasing in Rapp, *Über moralische Triebfedern* . . . , p. 153 (vol. I) and p. 136 (vol. II) where Rapp speaks of a 'Substitut'.

CHAPTER TWO

THE LATENT CHRISTOLOGY OF *HYPERION*

(i) *Introduction*

In September 1793 Hölderlin's *Promotion* took their final examinations in Tübingen. Hölderlin was also required to appear two months later before the *Konsistorium* in Stuttgart as the final stage of the process of qualifying as a minister. Since this appearance entailed giving a 'sample' sermon, he spent part of the autumn preaching in the villages around Nürtingen, while at the same time waiting to hear the outcome of efforts to obtain, through Schiller, a position as private tutor in Waltershausen.

Hölderlin's employment in the von Kalb household lasted just over a year. It came to an end in January 1795, after the relationship between tutor and pupil, which had begun to work so well, slowly deteriorated and became unworkable. This failure must not obscure the fact that Hölderlin invested considerable energy in the task, as he saw it in a letter to Schiller of April 1794, of bringing the boy 'zum Bewußtsein seiner sittlichen Freiheit' (6:111), of leading him out of the innocent 'state of nature' into fully conscious freedom as a moral agent. This programme bears the hallmark of Schiller, and of course of the philosopher who was in many important respects Schiller's own mentor — Kant. It is a particular application of the wider ambition which Hölderlin expressed on leaving the *Stift*: the ambition of awakening in his contemporaries 'Diese Keime von Aufklärung, diese stillen Wünsche und Bestrebungen Einzelner zur Bildung des Menschengeschlechts . . .' (6:93). For Hölderlin believes that his contemporaries are not free, they are 'verdorben', 'knechtisch' and 'träge' (6:92). In both these letters we still hear the echo of Kant's voice, proclaiming in his 1784 essay *Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklärung?* that '*Aufklärung ist der Ausgang des Menschen aus seiner selbstverschuldeten Unmündigkeit. Unmündigkeit ist das Unvermögen, sich seines Verstandes ohne Leitung eines anderen zu bedienen. . .*'.¹

During this time Hölderlin preached at least twice in Waltershausen.² He also had friendly contact with the minister in Waltershausen, J. F. Nenninger, a progressive mind though doubtless hardly a theologian of any weight (6:651f.). The relative social and geographical isolation of his position gave Hölderlin considerable opportunity for 'Selbstbildung' (6:118). He had with

him, presumably on arrival, Kant's *Die Religion* . . . , but it is clear that the *Kritik der Urteilkraft* was a major focus of his attention for a large part of this year (6:119, 126). This reading was pursued in parallel with study of 'die Griechen' (6:120), undoubtedly above all the reading of Plato,³ significant, as we have seen, for the 'Hymne an die Schönheit'. In April Hölderlin read Schiller's *Über Anmut und Würde*, which had appeared in Schiller's own journal *Thalia* the previous summer, and commented on it enthusiastically to Neuffer (6:114), although, as we shall see, his later assessment of the work in relation to Kant's aesthetics is more significant.

Throughout the period in Waltershausen Hölderlin worked on *Hyperion*. There is evidence that the beginnings of the novel go back as far as the summer of 1792 (3:296 ff., cf. 6:86), a year before Hölderlin left the *Stift*, but nothing seems to have survived of this earliest phase of the work. The fruit of Hölderlin's work in Waltershausen appeared in *Thalia* in November 1794 under the title *Fragment von Hyperion*. The manuscript of this version has not survived. There is however a copy by another hand of a small section of it, the so-called 'Waltershäuser Paralipomenon' (3:577 f.). In November Hölderlin took his pupil to Jena, where they stayed until near the end of December. Fichte had begun to teach there in July, lecturing on the material published in the same year as *Einige Vorlesungen über die Bestimmung des Gelehrten und Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre (1. und 2. Teil)*. He appeared in Hölderlin's eyes as 'die Seele von Jena' (6:139). The university also boasted the young philosopher Immanuel Niethammer, as well as Schiller himself. Goethe was an occasional visitor (6:704) to the 'Klubb der Professoren' (6:140). Through introductions by Schiller and through the respect which the private tutor of Charlotte von Kalb⁴ would have enjoyed, Hölderlin was able to meet all of these luminaries and it is no wonder that in such a heady intellectual atmosphere he could feel himself, with little exaggeration, to be in the presence ' . . . der wahrhaft großen Geister . . .' (6:139).

A short stay in Weimar at the end of December, during which Hölderlin also met Herder (6:148), preceded the departure from the von Kalb household. In the same month Hölderlin had, for the second time that year, chosen not to take up living in one of the parishes near to Nürtingen. With some savings and a quarter-year's salary from Charlotte von Kalb, he was able to establish himself independently in Jena. This made possible further contact with Schiller and attendance at Fichte's lectures (6:703 f.). In the early part of 1795, reaction to the thought of Fichte, as the latter was expounding it week by week in Jena, is prominent in Hölderlin's letters, most notably those to Hegel in January (6:154–56) and to Hölderlin's brother in April (6:162–65). The essay fragment 'Urteil und Seyn' (4:216 f.) must have been written at this time, for it develops Hölderlin's critique of Fichte in the first of these letters by refusing to locate the ground of reality in anything which does *not* transcend the subject-object distinction. Probably in May, Hölderlin met Fichte, Novalis, and Niethammer

in the latter's home, a meeting whose substance was summarized thus: 'Viel über Religion gesprochen und über Offenbarung und daß für die Philosophie hier noch viele Fragen offen bleiben' (7:2, Dokument 152). Apparently not all religious questions could necessarily be answered by the emerging post-Kantian philosophy. Hölderlin left Jena suddenly at the beginning of June, for reasons which are unclear, and returned home to Nürtingen.

Throughout the stay in Jena, Hölderlin was reworking *Hyperion*: it seems certain that the manuscripts of both the metrical fragment of the novel (3:186–98) and the (also unfinished) version entitled *Hyperions Jugend* (3:199–234) were written in the period between the publication of the (prose) *Fragment*, in November 1794, and about July 1795 — and probably in that order (3:310). On 20 March 1795 Cotta agreed on Schiller's recommendation, to publish the novel when it was complete. The manuscript sent to Cotta in December 1795 was, however, neither of these but one which Hölderlin must have prepared in the second half of 1795 and in which he reverted to the epistolary form — Beissner's 'vorletzte Fassung' (3:235–52). Although the absence of the intellectual stimulation Hölderlin had experienced in Jena led to frequent 'Maladie und Verdrub' (6:180) in Nürtingen, these months were crucial for the final version of the novel, since they brought a decisive crystallization of Hölderlin's thoughts on the role of the aesthetic.

In June 1795, Johann Gottfried Ebel, a friend of Isaak Sinclair, had undertaken to try to procure for Hölderlin a post as private tutor with the Gontard family in Frankfurt. In his letter to Ebel in September, Hölderlin sets out his own views on 'die Bildung des Menschen'. To educate a human being means to draw him out of 'dem Zustande seines schuldlosen . . . Instinkts . . . dem Zustande der Natur' (6:178) and to awaken in him an awareness of 'sein höheres Bedürfnis' (6:179) — which is to think and act in conformity with the highest principle he can know, that of Reason. The task of the educator is to clear the ground of 'stones' and 'thistles' so that 'die Geister . . . überall sich mittheilen' and can together form the 'unsichtbare streitende Kirche' (6:184f.).

At the very end of 1795 Hölderlin arrived in Frankfurt to attempt once more to put into practice his educational ideals. The work on *Hyperion* continued, probably with the second part of the version which had not been completely ready for Cotta in December. By May Hölderlin considered he needed only about two months to finish the novel (6:207 and 3:311). Although this prediction turned out to be far from accurate, part 1 must have been with Cotta in its final form from about June 1796 onwards.

In June Hölderlin wrote in ecstatic terms to Neuffer about his nascent love for Susette Gontard, the mother of his pupil:

Ich bin in einer neuen Welt . . . Lieber Freund! es giebt ein Wesen auf der Welt, woran mein Geist Jahrtausende verweilen kann und wird . . . Lieblichkeit und Hoheit, und Ruh und Leben, u. Geist und Gemüth und Gestalt ist Ein seeliges Eins in diesem Wesen. . . .;

konnt' ich werden, wie ich jezt bin, froh, wie ein Adler, wenn mir nicht diß, diß Eine erschienen wäre . . .?(6:213)

Susette presented a stark contrast with the 'Steifigkeit, . . . Geist- und Herzensarmuth . . .' which Hölderlin found elsewhere in the business classes of Frankfurt (6:220, cf. 6:270).

In October 1796, Hölderlin was able to inform Hegel that a relation of the Gontard family was willing to employ him as a private tutor (6:219f.). Hegel had been a private tutor in Bern since leaving the *Stift* in September 1793. As we have seen, there had been contact between the two friends since that date, and while not frequent, this contact was inspired by a strong sense of intellectual comradeship. That sense was clearly quickened for Hegel by the prospect of a reunion: his poem 'Eleusis', written in August 1796 and dedicated to Hölderlin, contains the invocation,

des alten Bundes . . .
 . . . der freyen Wahrheit nur zu leben,
 . . . Frieden mit der Sazung,
 die Meinung und Empfindung regelt, nie, nie einzugehn.⁵

Hölderlin complains only that he will have to wait until January for Hegel's arrival: 'Ich hätte noch manches Dir zu sagen . . . Der Tag des Wiedersehens wird uns ziemlich verjüngen' (6:222).

Hegel began his employment in Frankfurt in mid-January 1797, and Hölderlin found his company 'sehr wohlthätig . . .' (6:236). In the same month Hölderlin turned down yet another living which his mother had suggested to him, explaining to her that 'Des Lehramt ist . . ., bei den jezigen Zeiten wirksamer, als das Predigtamt' (6:233). Hölderlin's joy in the presence of Susette continued, but in a letter to Neuffer of February 1797 he came to see her significance for his intellectual endeavours as well as for his personal happiness,

Mein Schönheitssinn ist nun vor Störung sicher. Er orientiert sich ewig an diesem Madonnenkopfe. . . . Majestät und Zärtlichkeit, und Fröhlichkeit und Ernst, und süßes Spiel und hohe Trauer und Leben und Geist, alles ist in und an ihr zu Einem göttlichen Ganzen vereint. (6:236f., my emphasis)

Susette thus combines in her nature antithetical attitudes and qualities. Most importantly, she embodies a pattern of experience — the intermingling of joy and suffering — which the letter sees as divinely sanctioned, a sign of the gods' love (*ibid.*, line 60f.). Susette's 'hohe Trauer' results from her being displaced in ' . . . dies arme, geist-und ordnungslose Jahrhundert. . . .' Yet since the 'hohe Trauer' is an *integral* part of her beauty, the poverty of the present age is also, in a sense, legitimized. Hölderlin does not draw this conclusion explicitly himself, although in a series of letters between November 1796 and September 1797 he develops the idea that 'der idealische Kopf' is advised, if he wishes to 'be perfected', 'das Empirische, das Irdische, das Beschränkte sich zum Elemente

zu machen' (6:252). For Susette, the present age, which is not her natural element, is only too painfully 'limited'.

In April 1797 the first part of *Hyperion* finally appeared: 'Zufällige Umstände verzögerten die Herausgabe so lange', Hölderlin explained to Neuffer (6:236). By August 1797 work on the second part must have been well advanced, since in that month Hölderlin told his brother, 'Mein *Hyperion* hat mir schon manches schöne Wort eingetragen. Ich freue mich, bis ich vollends mit ihm zu Ende bin' (6:247). The delay in the publication of the second part until September 1799 must therefore have been largely due to Cotta. It seems reasonable to assume that by the end of 1797 *Hyperion* was essentially finished (see 3:313 f.).

Hegel's own writing during the first six months in Frankfurt centred on the contrast between the Jewish religion and the religion which Christ and John the Baptist came to inaugurate.⁶ Between January and July 1797 he produced a number of short manuscripts which characterize the Jewish religion as one of division, or rather, of the denial of the union which should exist between man, his environment and his God: this division Christ made it his purpose to overcome. In the manuscripts written between July and the end of the year Hegel explores the meaning and religious significance of love as an overcoming of the most basic divisions, above all that between subject (the lover) and object (the beloved).

In the late eighteenth century in Germany, the position of private tutor always contained the potential for humiliating treatment of the tutor by his employers.⁷ In Hölderlin's case, this potential seems to have been realized more and more painfully from about November 1797 onwards. A letter of that month explains how '... sich immer zwei Parthien für und gegen mich bilden ...' (6:256) and indicates that he is already considering a move from Frankfurt. To what precise extent the love he shared with Susette Gontard was a cause of the antagonism either then or indeed when he finally left in September 1798 — after wounding words from Susette's husband — is not fully clear (6:888 f.), but it can hardly have been an irrelevant factor.

Hölderlin's letters in late 1797 and early 1798 reveal severe disenchantment with the spiritual quality of the lives he saw around him: he describes the particular social milieu in which he has to live as '... gestaltlos, seel- und lieblos ...' (6:253) and complains at the '... Kälte und geheime Unterjochungssucht der Menschen ...' (ibid.) and the 'Mangel an Natursinn bei den Gelehrten und Geschäftsleuten, ... religiöse Slaverie ...' (6:263). Yet the general poverty reinforces Hölderlin's determination to hold fast to the 'god within', the *θεῖον* (6:278), and to nurture those relationships in which all can be given and received without '... ärmliche Rivalität ...' (6:279). This determination expresses Hölderlin's enduring faith in the divine image with which all are endowed and his hope that not even the pressure of an alienated or artificial society will eradicate it. Such pressure represents for Hölderlin the power of 'Schicksal'. It is a power which cannot be avoided and indeed which must not be avoided if the

individual is to progress to maturity. Thus Hölderlin can write to his brother-in-law in January 1798, 'Ich habe das Schicksal so weit ehren gelernt, daß ein tieferfahrener Geist der einzige ist, bei dem ich noch gerne in die Schule gehen möchte' (6:261). The letter is a reply to an invitation to become a godparent to his sister's second child, and Hölderlin's expression of thanks to the father 'daß Sie auf diese Art Meinen Sinn auf ein unschuldig Wesen geheftet haben, das nun dem Schicksal und der lebendigen Welt entgegenwächst' (6:260, my emphasis) effectively reiterates his growing willingness to accept as positive the power of 'Schicksal'. For Hölderlin, the baptism is an outward sign of his faith that the child will attain maturity in and through the encounter with a possibly hostile and 'soulless' world. Hölderlin's own expression of this faith begins by sounding almost indistinguishable from his earlier, 'Kantian' statements about education but becomes something radically different. In the following passage the change can be seen after the verb 'hervorgehen':

Ich betrachte auch seine Taufe als ein Zeugniß unseres Glaubens an die künftige Menschenwürde des Kindes, unserer Hoffnung, daß das heilige unentwickelte Leben hervorgehen wird zum Gefühle seiner selbst, und anderer Wesen, zum Gefühle der lebendigen Gottheit, in der wir leben und sind, zu dem ächten Christusgeföhle, daß wir und der Vater Eins sind . . . (6:260f.)

What is this 'genuine' 'Christusgeföhle', and what connection does it have with the goal of spiritual maturity? These are questions which Hölderlin scholarship seems to have failed even to pose. And yet we can neither fully understand the novel *Hyperion* — the story of 'Die Auflösung der Dissonanzen in einem gewissen Karakter . . .' (3:5) — unless they are posed nor find answers to them if we treat the novel merely as Hölderlin's celebration of pagan Greece after the liberating rejection of Christianity on leaving Tübingen.⁸

Along with the letter just cited, these concerns, then, emerge from the Waltershausen and Frankfurt period and define the context for a proper understanding of *Hyperion*: reflection on the nature of Beauty, inspired by Kant and Plato, on Beauty's fate in a hostile world and on the creation of an 'invisible church' or community of fellow-members of the 'Reich Gottes' (See the end of chapter one and 6:762).

(ii) *Johannine christology*

The genuine 'Christusgeföhle' which for Hölderlin describes the goal of spiritual maturity, that inward process for which baptism is an outward sign, is the feeling 'daß wir und der Vater Eins sind'. To know what is for Hölderlin 'genuinely Christian' we must therefore turn to the gospel of John, for the letter is a clear allusion to the 'High Priestly' prayer of Jesus in John 17. 21 ff.: 'Auf daß sie alle eines seyen, gleichwie du Vater in mir und ich in dir, daß auch sie in uns eines seyen . . . daß sie eines seyen, gleichwie wir eines sind'. Christ's prayer is

for the apostles and for all those who will believe because of their witness. It is a prayer that these believers will share in the intimate union which already exists between Father and Son — so that the ‘wir’ of Jesus’s words will come to include those who have become ‘Gottes Kinder’ (John 1.11) through Christ, and thus be a universal ‘wir’, as it is in Hölderlin’s letter. By linking the relationship between the Father and the Son with the ultimate goal of the community of all believers (‘. . . daß sie eines seyen . . .’), John 17.21, implicitly at least, encompasses the whole of Johannine christology. The mutual indwelling of the Father and the Son of which Jesus speaks constitutes a relationship of love which has existed since before the foundation of the world (John 17.24). It is only because the Father ‘gave’ the Son to the world through the Incarnation (John 3.16) that men can now be drawn into that same relationship. But this ‘giving’ means not just ‘sending’ (in the Incarnation) but also ‘giving up’ (in the Crucifixion), for it is by being ‘lifted up’ on the Cross that the Son draws men to himself and therefore also to the father (John 12.32). Finally, the means by which Christ’s prayer in John 17.21 is answered is the sending of the Holy Spirit who will lead believers into all the truth (John 16.13) and therefore, specifically, into the truth that they are one with the Father and Son. Johannine christology is thus acted out within the movement of a departure from the Father and a return to him (John 16.28). Its essential moments are Incarnation, Crucifixion, and the release of the Spirit. This is the christology which will provide the focus for the rest of what is said in this chapter.

(a) Incarnation

For John, the man Jesus of Nazareth is the incarnate Word. The Word was not only with God from the beginning, but was God (John 1.1): completely one with God and yet, paradoxically, distinct from him. When this divine Word takes on human flesh, it is God himself who becomes incarnate. For this reason, the incarnate Word exhibits the divine glory and fullness of God himself (John 1.14, 16). When Jesus is asked to show the disciples the Father, he replies ‘Wer mich sihet, der sihet den Vater’ (John 14.9). No more of the Father can be revealed in human form than has been revealed in Christ (John 1.17, 18). One of the purposes of the first epistle of John is to uphold the paradox of the appearance of the infinite God in the finite form of a human life and to refute the heresy which denied that Christ was ‘der wahrhaftige Gott’ (I John 5.20). Like the gospel (verse 14), the epistle emphasizes that this revelation of the true God is validated by the witness of the ordinary human senses:

Das da von Anfang war: das wir gehöet haben, das wir gesehen haben mit unsern Augen, das wir beschauet haben und unsere Hände betastet haben, vom Wort des Lebens — und das Leben ist erschienen, und wir haben gesehen und zeugen und verkündigen euch das Leben, das ewig ist, welches war bey dem Vater und ist uns erschienen. (I John 1.1–2)

(b) Wisdom christology

The Johannine notion of a pre-existent Word who was with God before anything was made (John 1.3) derives in part from a clearly established tradition in the canonical and deuterocanonical Wisdom literature of the Old Testament which depicted Wisdom as a divine, pre-existent being in many ways the equal of God, although generally still in some sense dependent on Him. Its existence and language would undoubtedly have been familiar to someone with Hölderlin's background and training. Indeed in the essay written for Schnurrer in 1790, 'Parallele zwischen Salomons Sprichwörtern und Hesiods Werken und Tagen' (4:176–88) Hölderlin gives a quotation in Hebrew of Proverbs 8.22 (4:180), one of the major texts from this tradition, and the essay as a whole gives plenty of attention to the personification of abstract concepts such as Wisdom. Proverbs 8.22 (which is necessary for the sense) and 8.29–31 read as follows:

Der Herr hat mich gehabt im Anfang seiner Wege, ehe er was machte, war ich da . . . Da er den Grund der Erde legte, da war ich der Werkmeister bey ihm, und hatte meine Lust täglich und spielete für ihm allezeit. Und spielete auf seinem Erdboden, und meine Lust ist bey den Menschenkindern.

Wisdom is here personified as having been with God from the beginning, and although this stops short of attributing deity to Wisdom, in many of the other related texts traditional divine attributes are given to the personified figure. In the first place, Wisdom's existence is 'von Ewigkeit her' (Proverbs 8.23), she came into being before the creation of the world (cf. The Wisdom of Solomon 9.9, Sirach 24.9 and Job 28.25–26). Furthermore, Wisdom is the co-Creator, with God, of the entire universe: this is implied in Luther's 'Werckmeister' and stated directly in the Wisdom of Solomon 7.22 and 8.4–6. For the author of the Wisdom of Solomon (9.1), this leads to the identification of Wisdom as the Word of God. Accordingly, Wisdom shares God's own omnipotence and omniscience. She mirrors the eternal light that proceeds from God and is the image of his goodness: ' . . . ein Glantz des ewigen Lichts, und ein unbefleckter Spiegel der göttlichen Krafft und ein Bild seiner Gütigkeit' (Wisdom of Solomon 7.26).

This Old Testament tradition, as well as contributing to the Logos christology of John 1, was one of the main factors in the development of a *sophia* or Wisdom christology in the New Testament writings. I Corinthians 8.6, Colossians 1.16, and of course John 1.3 speak of Christ as the one through whom all things were made, the same function as was attributed to Wisdom in the Old Testament writings. Hebrews I, which Hölderlin preached on as a young man (4:171–72), speaks of Christ the Son of God as 'der Glantz seiner Herrlichkeit und das Ebenbild seines Wesens' (verse 3), using the same Greek word, *απαυγασμα*, translated 'Glantz', or 'Abglanz' by more modern translators, as was used in the Septuagint version of the Wisdom of Solomon 7.26.⁹ The notion of Christ as the 'image' of God is of course implicit in Jesus's claim in John 14.9.¹⁰

c) The Father-Son relationship

The first chapter of John speaks of Christ both as the Word who was with God and who was God and as the Son of the Father. It therefore contains the same tension as the Wisdom literature: the divine pre-existent being is the equal of God in every way and at the same time in some sense secondary or derivative — a reflection only of an authentic original, a Son only of a Father who is the ultimate source of all. By speaking of Christ as ‘the only Son of God, eternally begotten of the Father, God from God, Light from Light, True God from true God, begotten not made, of one being with the Father’, the Nicene creed attempted to solve this problem. The paradoxical combination of the temporal process of procreation with the timelessness of eternity in ‘eternally begotten . . .’ is intended to preserve the ‘homoousios’ without forfeiting the Sonship of Christ.

It is characteristic of John’s gospel as a whole to portray the relationship of the Father and the Son in terms of a self-glorification of the Son which yet only serves to glorify the Father. The movement towards and then at once away from an absolutizing of the self is seen most vividly in John 8.28: ‘Wenn ihr des Menschen Sohn erhöhen werdet, dann werdet ihr erkennen daß ich es sey und nichts von mir selber thue, sondern wie mich mein Vater gelehret hat so rede ich’. Luther’s ‘daß ich es sey’ translates the Greek ‘ἐγώ εἰμι’, the bald statement of existence without any qualifying predicate which, in its Hebrew form, is the sacred name of Jehovah (Exodus 3.14). Jesus states ‘I am what I am’, and in John 8.58, when he repeats the statement, the Jews try to stone him for blasphemy. And yet this absolute and eternal existence is an absolutely dependent existence: ‘daß . . . [ich] nichts von mir selber thue . . .’. The ‘lifting up’ of the Son of Man is probably to be understood as *both* the Crucifixion and the Ascension to sit at God’s right hand: the obedience of Christ in dying on the Cross and his subsequent exaltation *together* confirm that ‘the life he lived with the Father, and that the Father lived with him, was uninterrupted and indestructible.’¹¹ They confirm, that is to say, that Jesus is indeed, along with his Father, the ‘I am’. In John 17, the ‘lifting up’ of the Son is seen as the occasion for the mutual glorification of Father and Son: ‘Vater, die Stunde ist hie, daß du deinen Son verklärst, auff daß dich dein Sohn auch verkläre’ (John 17.1). The death of the Son is not just another martyrdom, for it will become the means of the salvation of the world and thereby glorify him. It is also the glorification of the Father because it is the completion of the work which the Son had been given on earth (John 17.4). Thus the last words of Jesus in John’s account of the Passion are ‘Es ist vollbracht’ (John 19.30). The mutual glorification which occurs in the Crucifixion thereby both depends on and confirms the perfect communion shared by Father and Son.

d) The release of the Spirit

The Trinitarian theology of John’s gospel is based upon the necessity of separation: the Son must leave, in the Incarnation, the eternal love enjoyed with

the Father, and then, as he goes to his death, leave the disciples so that the Spirit can unite them with each other and with the Father and the Son (John 16.7). The third member of the Trinity, the Holy Spirit can be understood in one sense as nothing other than this eternal love, as 'intimes Wir-beide eines göttlichen Urpaares . . . das in reziproker Selbstgenügsamkeit die Fülle des Lebens immer schon genießt . . . das dialogue Beieinandersein von Vater und Sohn, ein absolutes Selbstgespräch der Theologie.'¹² However the Trinity must, as it were, also 'produce' itself actively in the world as an essential part of the divine economy: the Spirit is generated by the Father and the Son and 'goes forth' from them in order to draw all men into the *same* relationship with the Father as the Son has always enjoyed. The community created by this work of the Spirit is thus necessarily one of complete equality. The prelude to Jesus's 'High Priestly' prayers to the Father is his declaration to the disciples that he is no longer to be thought of as their master: 'Ich sage hinfort nicht, daß ihr Knechte seyd, denn ein Knecht weiß nicht, was sein Herr thut. Euch aber habe ich gesagt, daß ihr Freunde seyd, denn alles was ich habe von meinem Vater gehöret hab ich euch kundgethan' (John 15.15). The Spirit is sent so that, through this elimination of the master-servant relationship, believers will become like Christ: of no lower status than the Son (see John 16. 23–27) and changed into his image. The idea of growth into Christ-likeness is one aspect of the Johannine understanding of salvation: 'Glaubet an das Licht, dieweil ihrs habt, auff daß ihr des Lichtes Kinder seyd' (John 12.36; cf. John 1.12, Romans 8.29). *All* believers will be one with Christ and the Father — this is the eschatological fulfilment characteristically envisaged in John's gospel.

e) Eighteenth-century reinterpretations of John: Lessing and Hegel

Of all the gospels, that of John was bound have the most appeal for a philosophical age. The paradox of John 1, which the Nicene creed expresses and upholds with the phrase 'eternally begotten', is for Lessing an issue of considerable importance, for it has to do with the possibility of conceiving of God as both one and many and therefore also with the possibility of a rational pantheism.¹³ In his *Das Christentum der Vernunft* of 1753 Lessing argues that because God, as the most perfect being, can only have been concerned from all eternity with 'Betrachtung des Vollkommensten', it follows that,

Gott dachte sich von Ewigkeit her in aller seiner Vollkommenheit: das ist, Gott schuf sich von Ewigkeit her ein Wesen, welchem keine Vollkommenheit mangelte, die er selbst besaß. Dieses Wesen nennt die Schrift den *Sohn Gottes*, oder welches noch besser seyn würde, den *Sohn Gott*. Einen *Gott*, weil ihm keine von den Eigenschaften fehlt, die Gott zukommen. Einen *Sohn* weil unserm Begriffe nach dasjenige, was sich etwas vorstellt, vor der Vorstellung eine gewisse Priorität zu haben scheint. Dieses Wesen ist Gott selbst . . . weil man Gott ohne Gott nicht deuten kann, oder weil das kein Gott seyn würde, dem man die Vorstellung seiner selbst nehmen wollte. Man kann dieses Wesen ein Bild Gottes nennen, aber ein identisches Bild. (*Werke*, VII, 278f.)

Something would have been lacking in God had he not been able to create, in his Son, a representation of himself ('Vorstellung') or had he not been able to place before himself ('Vorstellen') his own likeness. Since his Son is the identical image of the Father, the harmony between them must be the greatest harmony possible. A rational understanding of this harmony will see it as the third member of the Trinity: if the Spirit is defined as 'die Harmonie, welche vom Vater und Sohn ausgeht', rather than as proceeding solely from the Father (as in John 15.24), this ensures the most perfect symmetry — or integration of unity and diversity — possible within the Godhead. Lessing returns to the theme of the Trinity in his *Die Erziehung des Menschengeschlechts* (1777). Here it is discussed as an example of those truths contained in the New Testament '... die wir als Offenbarungen so lange anstaunen sollen, bis sie die Vernunft aus ihren andern ausgemachten Wahrheiten herleiten und mit ihnen verbinden lernen ...' (*Werke*, viii, 505). What is strange is that what is supposed to be Lessing's 'rational' interpretation of the Trinity (§73) explains only why the idea of an eternally begotten Son is an adequate 'popular' expression of a logical truth (that God's 'thinking' of himself must become a reality in his image, the Son) and says nothing at all about the Spirit. The reason for the omission is that in *Die Erziehung des Menschengeschlechts* Lessing is no longer principally concerned with the heuristic value of the doctrine of the Trinity for a rational conception of God as differentiated unity, but rather with its value for a theory of the historical perfection of religion: the third age of the 'eternal' gospel (§86) is, following its Joachimite inspiration,¹⁴ the age of the Spirit, when men will do the good for its own sake (§85). The unity of the Trinity which Lessing's omission leaves incomplete in §73 is to be completed historically by the final stage of man's spiritual 'education': 'das spekulative Manko begründet die progressive Universalität der christlichen Bildungsreligion' (H. Timm, *Gott und die Freiheit* . . . , p. 128).

The writings Hegel produced in the course of his first summer in Frankfurt (1797) are also distinctively Johannine in inspiration. They could almost be read as a speculative commentary on I John 1.16: 'Gott ist die Liebe, und wer in der Liebe bleibet, der bleibet in Gott, und Gott in ihm'. What interests Hegel is the religious significance of the kind of unity which a perfect love relationship exhibits. The metaphor of mirroring, suggested in Lessing's thoughts on the Son as the identical yet distinct 'image' of the Father and originally deriving, as we have seen, from the Wisdom literature of the Old Testament, is now used as a key explanatory notion:

Liebe kan nur stattfinden gegen das gleiche, gegen den Spiegel, gegen das Echo unseres Wesens. (*Der Geist des Christantums*, p. 358)

. . . nur in der Liebe allein ist man eins mit dem Objekt, . . . es . . . herrscht nicht und wird nicht beherrscht . . . (ibid., p. 357)

Die Religion ist eins mit der Liebe. Der Geliebte ist uns nicht entgegengesetzt, er ist eins mit unserem Wesen. Wir sehen nur uns in ihm — und dann ist er doch wieder nicht wir — ein Wunder, das wir nicht zu fassen vermögen. (Nohl, 377)

These thoughts are not yet connected explicitly with the view of Jesus's religion of love as the 'fulfilling' of the Jewish law — the connection comes in the course of 1798 and 1799 — but they are inspired by reflections from early 1797 on the fatal tendency of Abrahamic religion to set up rigid oppositions between subject and object, and even at this stage Hegel identifies this tendency as 'das Tote', which Jesus had to overcome (Nohl, 371; cf. 381).

Although Hegel considers love to be the essence of religion, he begins to see, probably in the autumn of 1798, that love does not encompass the whole of 'life' (which religion must do) — since life entails more experience of separation and division than love. Thus Hegel makes an important distinction: 'Liebe die Blüte des Lebens: Reich Gottes der ganze Baum mit allen notwendigen Modifikationen, Stufen der Entwicklung . . .' (Nohl, 394). The term 'Reich Gottes' describes for Hegel the individual and collective completion of 'die Entwicklung des Göttlichen in den Menschen' — the fully realized presence of the divine in the individual's heart and in the community's sense of sharing in the spirit of love: 'Im Reiche Gottes ist das Gemeinschaftliche, daß alle in Gott lebendig sind, nicht das Gemeinschaftliche in einem Begriffe, sondern Liebe, ein lebendiges Band, das die Glaubenden vereinigt, . . . diese Empfindung der Einigkeit des Lebens, in der alle Entgegensetzungen . . . aufgehoben sind' (Nohl, 321). Now Hegel does not connect the 'coming' of this kingdom in any way at all with Jesus's earthly ministry (e.g. his preaching in the parables of the Kingdom or his miracles as signs of the Kingdom) but focuses very deliberately on Jesus's words in Matthew 28.19f.

Darum gehet hin und lehret alle Völker und taufet sie im Namen des Vaters und des Sohns und des heiligen Geists und lehret sie halten alles was ich euch befohlen habe. Und siehe, ich bin bey euch alle Tage, bis an der Welt Ende.

To enter the Kingdom of God means for Hegel to enter personally into the relationship of Father, Son and Holy Spirit, and has nothing to do with what he dismissively terms the pronouncement of a baptismal 'Zauberformel'. The command to draw others, personally, into this triune relationship really means, so Hegel's further explanation reveals, 'Erfüllt sie mit der Beziehung . . . des Einigen, der Modifikation (Trennung) und der entwickelten Wiedervereinigung im Leben und Geist (nicht im Begriff)' (Nohl, 319f.)

The consummation of religious belief, which is to be found 'in der Rückkehr zur Gottheit, aus der der Mensch geboren ist' (Nohl, 318), can only come about through the tripartite process, in which the lost primeval unity with the divine is finally recovered but in which the moment of separation is preserved.¹⁵ Although Hegel arrives at this idea on the basis of reflection on Matthew's gospel, the believer's inner experience of the 'Trinity' can be seen to be patterned on John 16.28: 'Ich bin vom Vater ausgegangen und kommen in die Welt. Widerum verlasse ich die Welt, und gehe zum Vater'.

In spite of the considerable differences between Lessing and Hegel, the common focus they share must be emphasized: both arrive, through reflecting on a relationship of complete equality, at a Trinitarian understanding of the Kingdom of God (though in the case of Lessing we should probably have to call it the Kingdom of the Spirit). This is a radically different concept of the Kingdom from Kant's, which is based on the autonomy of the rational, self-legislating individual (see especially Kant, GS, VI, 121 f.).

(iii) *The latent christology of Hyperion*

a) 'Es war da!': Diotima as the incarnation of Beauty

We have seen how the encounter with Susette Gontard had given Hölderlin the confidence to tell Neuffer, 'Mein Schönheitssinn ist nun vor Störung sicher'. He had witnessed day after day the harmony of her being and had seen with his own eyes that Beauty was not an intellectual chimera but a living reality. Susette embodied for Hölderlin the answer to the question '... was schön und gut sey ...' (6.213) and did so in a way which made his theoretical 'knowledge' seem laughable (*ibid.*). The celebration of the discovery of Diotima in the final version of the novel (3:52) is the high-point of Hölderlin's poetic rendering of his Frankfurt experience. The sense of excited discovery and joyful reassurance which speaks out of the letters to Neuffer is echoed in this climactic passage of the novel;

Ich war einst glücklich, Bellarmin! Bin ich es nicht noch? Wär' ich es nicht, wenn auch der heilige Moment, wo ich zum erstenmale sie sah, der letzte wäre gewesen?

Ich hab' es Einmal gesehn, das Einzige, das meine Seele suchte, und die Vollendung, die wir über die Sterne hinauf entfernen, die wir hinausschieben bis an's Ende der Zeit, die hab' ich gegenwärtig gefühlt. Es war da, das Höchste, in diesem Kreise der Menschen- natur und der Dinge war es da!

Ich frage nicht mehr, wo es sey; es war in der Welt, es kann wiederkehren in ihr, es ist jezt nur verborgner in ihr. Ich frage nicht mehr, was es sey; ich hab' es gesehn, ich hab' es kennen gelernt. O ihr, die ihr das Höchste und Beste sucht, in der Tiefe des Wissens, im Getümmel des Handelns, im Dunkel der Vergangenheit, im Labyrinthe der Zukunft, in den Gräbern oder über den Sternen! wißt ihr seinen Nahmen? den Nahmen deß, das Eins ist und Alles?

Sein Nahme ist Schönheit.

Wußtet ihr, was ihr wolltet? Noch weiß ich es nicht, doch ahn' ich es, der Neuen Gottheit neues Reich, und eil' ihm zu und ergreiffe die andern und führe sie mit mir, wie der Strom die Ströme in den Ocean. Und du, du hast mir den Weg gewiesen! Mit dir begann ich. Sie sind der Worte nicht werth, die Tage, da ich noch dich nicht kannte — O Diotima, Diotima, himmlisches Wesen! (3:52f.)

It is undoubtedly true that Hölderlin could not have given to these lines the emotional and rhetorical intensity which they possess had he never met Susette Gontard. Yet they do not only encapsulate an emotional experience of the

author, they also summarize an intellectual development which began in Tübingen: Hölderlin's thinking on the nature and role of Beauty. We saw in chapter one how Hölderlin came to see the beauty of the natural world as a foretaste of the 'Vollendung' towards which men strive, but how his thinking remained dualistic — how man's ultimate goal, 'Schönheit in der Urgestalt', is in fact removed 'über die Sterne hinauf', where she reigns 'waltend über Orionen' (1:152, line 11). The step from the 'Hymne an die Schönheit' to the passage before us now may seem small, but it is one which Hölderlin was only able to take after himself rejecting his contemporaries' efforts to discover 'das Höchste . . . in der Tiefe des Wissens, im Getümmel des Handelns . . .'.

Long before Hölderlin even moved to Frankfurt, he clearly intended that Hyperion's search for his ideal should find its fulfilment in the beauty of the female figure. In the 'Waltershäuser Paralipomenon', she is not yet called Diotima, and she is not said to be the tangible presence of Beauty, although she is beautiful. Yet she gives to Hyperion a certainty which made — for a time at least — his strivings for 'Ewiges Daseyn . . .' (3:578) cease: 'Ach! Da sie mir erschienen war und mein ungedultig Herz noch Ruhe fand in der Einen Gewißheit, daß ein solches Wesen *unter uns auf Erden* lebte!' (5:577, my emphasis). The anguish of Hyperion in this fragment results from his misplaced demand, 'daß das Herrliche mein seyn sollte das meiner nicht bedurfte . . .' (ibid.). The same is the case in the *Fragment: Melite*, as the girl is there called, has no need of Hyperion's love, she lives 'in der Allgenügsamkeit einer Himmlischen' (3:171). Her only 'love' is the ideal which they both share and to which, directing his attention away from herself, she constantly points Hyperion:

Mit himmlischen Thränen bat sie mich endlich, den edlern stärkern Theil meins Wesens kennen zu lernen, . . . auf das Selbstständige, Unbezwingliche, Göttliche, das wie in allen, auch in mir sei, mein Auge zu richten — (3:179)

The difference in mood between the Waltershausen material and the climactic passage in the final version is not due simply to the fact that the Diotima of the final version abandons her 'Allgenügsamkeit' (which is then only apparent anyway) and gives herself in love to Hyperion, nor simply to the healing effect of the narration itself in the final version (which we will discuss below), but most importantly to the presence in this version of a more ambitious understanding of the concept of Beauty which Hölderlin was only beginning to develop in the autumn of 1794.

The catalyst was the reading of Schiller's essay *Über Anmut und Würde*. Hölderlin's initial enthusiasm (6:114) gave way to a more critical view by October 1794, when he wrote to Neuffer:

Vielleicht kann ich Dir einen Aufsatz über die ästhetischen Ideen schicken; weil er als ein Kommentar über den Phädrus des Plato gelten kann, und eine Stelle desselben mein ausdrücklicher Text ist, so wär' er vielleicht für Konz brauchbar. Im Grunde soll er eine Analyse des Schönen und Erhabnen enthalten, nach welcher die Kantische vereinfacht,

von der andern Seite vielseitiger wird, wie es schon Schiller zum Theil in s. Schrift über Anmut und Würde gethan hat, der aber doch auch einen Schritt weniger über die Kantische Gränzlinie gewagt hat, als er nach meiner Meinung hätte wagen sollen. (6:137)¹⁶

Hölderlin's intention is to write an essay on the 'aesthetic ideas' in the form of a commentary on Plato's *Phaedrus*, and in doing so to go further beyond Kant than Schiller had done. As a number of commentators point out,¹⁷ Hölderlin's 'ausdrücklicher Text' must have been *Phaedrus* (249 ff.), the passage in which the Idea is defined as 'a unity gathered together by reason from the many particulars of sense' and as 'the recollection of those things which our soul once saw while following God — when regardless of that which we now call being she raised her head up towards the true being'.¹⁸ In the case of Beauty, the earthly copy of the heavenly Idea is so radiant that whoever sees 'anyone having a godlike face or form' (*Phaedrus*, 251a) is reminded irresistibly of 'true being' and his soul once again grows wings to return to heaven. Beauty is thus for Plato in this passage 'die Erscheinungsweise des Guten überhaupt, des Seienden, wie es sein soll', and from it shines forth the 'Licht des Geistes, des Nous'.¹⁹

The status of Kant's 'aesthetic idea' is considerably more restricted than this. The 'ästhetische Idee', as it is experienced in the great work of art, displays a 'Schema des Übersinnlichen' of a kind which neither the understanding nor empirical sense experience (our only sources of genuine knowledge) can offer (Kurz, p. 67). The precise content of this 'Schema' cannot be reduced to conceptual terms. The 'ästhetische Idee' does give the beholder of beauty an elevating sense of pleasure, but the pleasure resides not so much in the recollection of the eternal as in the 'activity or freeplay of our cognitive powers'.²⁰ As Strack therefore rightly says: 'Den ästhetischen Ideen [Kants] geht Platos metaphysischer Schwung vollkommen ab' (p. 139). For Kant to have given his 'aesthetic idea' any actual *metaphysical* function and significance would have been for him to step beyond his own self-imposed 'Gränzlinie'.

In his essay *Über Anmut und Würde* Schiller certainly had 'gone beyond' Kant in one sense. In it he proposed 'eine neue transzendente Phänomenologie des "Gemüths" . . . , in der Vernunft und Sinnlichkeit, Pflicht und Neigung konvenieren' (Kurz, p. 17). In conscious opposition to the Kantian demand for obedience to the moral law *for its own sake*, regardless of subjective factors such as inclination, Schiller described the truly moral state as one of unforced obedience, which thereby exhibits a 'Struktur ungezwungener Übereinstimmung mit sich selbst' (ibid.). This structure manifests itself as Beauty. Like the *Repententen* in the *Stift*, Schiller also has recourse to the idea of love in his attempt to soften the rigour of Kant: when love is at work, 'es ist das absolut Große selbst, was in der Anmuth und Schönheit sich nachgeahmt und in der Sittlichkeit sich befriedigt findet, es ist der Gesetzgeber selbst, der Gott in uns, der mit seinem eigenen Bilde in der Sinnenwelt spielt' (Schiller, NA xx, 303).

Although this constitutes an advance over Kant, whose view of the relation between the objects of aesthetics and moral philosophy would not have allowed him to see 'Anmuth' as an expression of moral freedom (Strack, p. 41), it does not really give to Beauty the objective status Schiller thought he had given it: Beauty remains merely the reflection of the 'god within'.

The Platonic understanding of Beauty which clearly would have played a central role in Hölderlin's projected essay on the 'aesthetic ideas' is not abandoned, even if the complete essay was never written. Indeed it is only because this understanding is not abandoned that the inconclusive note of searching on which the *Fragment* ends can give way to the joyful certainty expressed in the final version (3:52). The penultimate letter of the *Fragment* ends 'Wir sind nichts; was wir suchen, ist alles' (3:184), the final letter with the words 'Es muß heraus, das große Geheimnis, das mir das Leben giebt oder den Tod' (ibid.). Hyperion's search is not over, even though he has witnessed in Melite the 'Allgütigkeit einer Himmlischen' (3:171).

In the first half of 1795, the distance from Schiller, which we have seen was suggested even as far back as the 'Hymne an die Schönheit', becomes quite explicit. The sage in *Hyperions Jugend* gives this advice to the narrator, 'Wenn dir als Schönheit entgegenkömmt, was du als Wahrheit in dir trägst, so nehm' es dankbar auf. . .' (3:202). The 'inner truth' spoken of her is not the 'god within', the voice of moral obligation, which Schiller saw 'imitated' in the external world. This 'deity' Schiller conceives as the goal of 'moralische Selbstständigkeit' towards which man strives — *endlessly*.²¹ Hölderlin's 'inner truth', on the other hand, is the 'Urbild aller Einigkeit' which, in accordance with the Platonic doctrine of recollection (*Phaedrus*, 249), 'wir im Geiste bewahren' (3:190). Beauty is the appearance of an original which grounds all unity, i.e. it is the appearance of 'true being'. Beauty is Truth: the symmetrical phrasing of the sage's pronouncement itself seems to insist on this. The appeal to Plato 'vergieb! man hat schwer an dir gesündigt' (3:237) at the end of the preface to the version Hölderlin worked on in the second half of 1795 brings to a climax, at least in terms of explicitness, the process we have been tracing. The preface states categorically that Beauty is nothing other than the presence of 'true being': '... jenes Seyn, im einzigen Sinne des Worts . . . ist vorhanden — als Schönheit . . .' (ibid.). In the final version, the discovery of Diotima becomes a postfiguration of the birth of Aphrodite Urania:

Schon damals kannst' ich dich, . . . du, die du mir einst, im Frieden der Schönheit, aus der trüben Woge der Welt stieg! Da kämpfte, da glüht' es nimmer, diß Herz. (3:23; cf. 1: 130f., also Harrison, pp. 97ff.)

. . . sie . . . stand vor mir in wandelloser Schönheit, mühelos, in lächelnder Vollendung da, und alles Sehnen, alles Träumen der Sterblichkeit, ach! alles, was in goldnen Morgenstunden von höhern Regionen der Genius weissagt, es war alles in dieser Einen stillen Seele erfüllt.

Man sagt sonst, über den Sternen verhalte der Kampf . . .

Ich weiß es anders. Ich bin den nähern Weg gekommen. Ich stand vor ihr, und hört' und sah den Frieden des Himmels, und mitten im seufzenden Chaos erschien mir Urania. (3:58f.)

Hyperion has seen and heard one in whom all promises of transcendence are fulfilled: 'das Höchste' has been discovered here in the world. At this climactic point, Hölderlin alludes unmistakably to the opening of John's gospel. John 1.10 reads as follows, 'Es war in der Welt, und die Welt ist durch dasselbige gemacht, und die Welt kannte es nicht'. Hölderlin's line '. . . es war in der Welt, es kann wiederkehren in ihr, es ist jezt nur verborgner in ihr' reproduces exactly the same structure of three self-contained main clauses of virtually equal length forming one sentence. The gospel speaks of the divine Logos which existed with God before the creation of the world and which has now taken on human form. Diotima, on the other hand, is not the incarnation of a pre-existent divine being but rather of an impersonal absolute — 'das Einzige'. However, these differences should not be allowed to obscure the very real significance of the verbal echo. In both cases we read the proclamation of the real, tangible presence in the world of what is for each writer the Absolute.

We have seen in the Johannine writings how the fact of this tangible presence is stressed. So too in *Hyperion*: just before the climactic proclamation of Diotima as the incarnation of 'Das Einzige', Hyperion reminds Bellarmin, 'Vergiß nicht, daß ich hatte, was du ahnest, daß ich mit diesen Augen sah, was nur, wie in Wolken, dir erscheint' (3:51). A little later Hyperion restates his privileged position, 'O ich hätte mögen Diotima seyn, da sie diß sagte! Aber du weißt nicht, was sie sagte, mein Bellarmin! Du hast nicht gesehn und nicht gehört' (3:58). The closeness of these passages, in wording and tone, to the opening of John's gospel and first epistle make it hard to imagine that Hölderlin is not deliberately creating a powerful theological resonance. This feeling is strengthened by the fact that the words in *Hyperion* which are a verbal echo of John 1.10, 'es war in der Welt', are in a certain sense superfluous, since the point has already been made with more than adequate emphasis by the earlier statement 'Es war da . . . in diesem Kreise der Menschennatur und der Dinge war es da!'.²²

Hölderlin critics have not been quick to draw attention to this parallel. Perhaps this is due to prejudice or perhaps, if we take a more charitable attitude, we should say that it indicates uncertainty as to how such an echo could be integrated into an overall view of the novel. Why should Hölderlin be concerned to allude to Christ at a point in the novel which proclaims Hyperion's faith in the metaphysical status of Beauty? After all, one might argue, Diotima is the only guarantor Hyperion *himself* needs of the truth that '. . . noch ist die Quelle der ewigen Schönheit nicht versiegt' (3:87).

Unless we are prepared to admit that, for Hölderlin too in these years, Christ is superfluous and therefore that the echo of John's gospel must be either thoroughly incidental or even accidental, we need then to answer the question:

what is it about Hölderlin's understanding of Beauty in this period that allows him even to suggest that between Beauty and the Incarnation there might be some kind of relation of analogy?

b) 'non coerkeri maximo, contineri minimo, divinum est'

Diotima, I have said, is the tangible presence in the world of 'das Höchste'. Hölderlin is able to give this 'absolute' the name of Beauty because he sees Beauty as the overcoming of that 'ewigen Widerstreit zwischen unserem Selbst und der Welt' (3:236) which defines man's 'fallen' condition and which stands as the obstacle between him and the 'Frieden alles Friedens, der höher ist, denn alle Vernunft . . .' (3:236), that is to say, the reconciliation of man and nature ' . . . zu einem unendlichen Ganzen . . .' (ibid.).²³ Thus Beauty achieves what neither 'Wissen' nor 'Handeln' (we might use the Kantian terms 'pure theoretical reason' and 'pure practical reason') can achieve. These formulations from the preface to the penultimate version underline the fact that Hölderlin's understanding of Beauty is inseparable from his reflections on the relationship between self and world or self and other — and this relationship is, in its most fundamental form, the relationship between subject and object.

The question about the nature of this relationship is the substance of Hölderlin's debate with Fichte and Schelling in 1795 and 1796. Hölderlin's conclusion, expressed primarily in the essay 'Urteil und Seyn', is that the type of 'transcendental' philosophy being developed by these two thinkers is unable adequately to grasp and define a 'Vereinigung des Subjekts und Objekts, die schlechthin stattfände' and that such philosophy cannot therefore articulate 'absolute being' (4:217). An unconditional union of the kind 'Urteil und Seyn' describes can in fact only be conceived 'aesthetically' (6:181, 6:203). Philosophy, understood as the attempt of the thinking subject to overcome the 'otherness' of its object, becomes dependent on experience in the sense that experience provides it, in Beauty, with the only adequate and worthy goal: ' . . . wir dächten und wir handelten nicht, . . . wenn nicht dennoch jene unendliche Vereinigung . . . vorhanden wäre . . . als Schönheit . . .' (3:237, cf. 3:81). It follows that actual experience (and not philosophy) offers the only possible demonstration of the truth of the claim that Beauty is a union of subject and object so intimate that 'gar keine Teilung vorgenommen werden kann, ohne das Wesen desjenigen, was getrennt werden soll, zu verletzen . . .' (4:216, 217). Thus Hölderlin must allow Hyperion's testimony to his own experience of Beauty to provide the real answer to Fichte and Schelling.

Hyperion's experience of Beauty is the experience of knowing Diotima, and the beauty of Diotima is the beauty of her relationship with the world around her. It is hardly necessary to demonstrate in detail the fact that she is characterized above all by her oneness with nature. This passage can serve as a typical example of what Hyperion frequently observes:

Unter den Blumen war ihr Herz zu Hause, als wär' es eine von ihnen. Sie nannte sie alle mit Nahmen, schuff ihnen aus Liebe neue, schönere, und wußte genau die fröhlichste Lebenszeit von jeder. Wie eine Schwester, wenn aus jeder Eke ein Geliebtes ihr entgegenkömmt, und jedes gerne zuerst gegrüßt seyn möchte, so war das stille Wesen mit Aug und Hand beschäftigt, seelig zerstreut, wenn auf der Wiese wir giengen, oder im Walde.

Und das war so ganz nicht angenommen, angebildet, das war mit ihr aufgewachsen. Es ist doch ewig gewiss und zeigt sich überall; je unschuldiger, schöner eine Seele, desto vertrauter mit den andern glücklichen Leben, die man seelenlos nennt. (3:56)

The relationship between Diotima and nature is a family relationship — no less intimate and spontaneous, and a relationship that grows naturally and is not artificially acquired. This is not sentimentalism: the challenge to the view that nature is, apart from Man, 'seelenlos' is made on the strength of an intellectual conviction that informs the whole of the final version of *Hyperion* — the conviction of the continuity of 'Geist' and 'Natur'.²⁴ For an earlier age, 'soul' may have expressed the idea of a *distinctively* human spiritual essence, but for Hölderlin the notion is obsolete. This conviction underlies Hyperion's description of the breeze which greets him on Kalaurea as 'das geistige Wehen': this spiritual wind that blows where it will is the element in which Diotima constantly moves. Nowhere is the rejection of any discontinuity between man and nature more emphatic than in Diotima's last letter to Hyperion, the letter which can be seen as her 'credo':

Nein, bei dem Geiste, der uns einiget, bei dem Gottesgeiste, der jedem eigen ist und allen gemein, nein! nein! im Bunde der Natur ist Treue kein Traum. Wir trennen uns nur, um inniger einig zu seyn, göttlicher friedlich mit allem, mit uns. Wir sterben, um zu leben . . . und darum ist sich alles gleich, was nur ein Leben ist, in der göttlichen Welt, und es giebt in ihr nicht Herren und nicht Knechte. Es leben umeinander die Naturen, wie Liebende; sie haben alles gemein, Geist, Freude und ewige Jugend. (3:148)

In the 'Bund der Natur', then, the endless oscillation between mastery and slavery that characterizes man's collective relationship with nature is ended, but this is not a victory bought at the price of the annihilation of all selfhood. The 'Bund der Natur' is a union of individuals who live 'umeinander' in close loving intimacy which stops short of indistinguishable identity.

The intimacy of Diotima's relationship with nature is said to be in direct proportion to her own innocence — to the fact that she possessed a mind 'der nicht wußte, was er wußte, was er war . . .' (3:57). It is the loss of this innocence which, at the collective level of mankind as a whole, is the prelude to a domineering attitude to the world of nature which seeks not harmony and balance but subjugation: 'Wir sind zerfallen mit der Natur, und was einst, wie man glauben kann, Eins war, widerstreitet sich jetzt, und Herrschaft und Knechtschaft wechselt auf beiden Seiten' (3:236).

Yet her relationship with 'den andern glücklichen Leben, die man seelenlos nennt' is threatened by her love for Hyperion. The moment at which she

confesses her love to him is a moment of fear as well as of joy — fear that by ‘giving’ herself to one individual she will be ‘taking’ herself away or removing herself from the rest of her beloved nature. The danger is that this self-giving, the very purpose of which is to create union, will only cause separation because of the exclusive nature of its new object. Only by seeing Hyperion as the medium through which she continues her love relationship with the flowers and the cycle of nature can the danger be averted: ‘aber die Blüthe des Mai’s und die Flamme des Sommers und die Reife des Herbsts, die Klarheit des Tags und der Ernst der Nacht, und Erd und Himmel ist mir in diesem Einem vereint!’ (3:76).

In this love relationship with the world, Diotima differs fundamentally from her prototype Melite in the *Fragment*. The beauty of this character is constantly seen as that quality of divine ‘Allgenügsamkeit’ which precludes the very possibility of love, and therefore of any form of Diotima’s family relationship, since it means complete spiritual self-sufficiency. The only ideal Melite can direct Hyperion towards is ‘das Selbstständige, Unbezwingliche, Göttliche, das wie in allen, auch in mir sei . . .’ (3:179, my emphasis).

Yet the *Fragment* fails to substantiate the idea that such a goal is either attainable or of ultimate value. The text ends on a note of restless searching, ‘Noch ahnd’ ich, ohne zu finden’ (3:184). Above all, the preface to the *Fragment* would appear to be presenting, in its use of the epitaph from the tomb of Ignatius Loyola, a significantly different ideal:

Der Mensch möchte gerne in allem und über allem seyn, und die Sentenz in der Grabsschrift des Lojola:

non coerceri maximo, contineri tamen a minimo

kann eben so die alles begehrende, alles unterjochende gefährliche Seite des Menschen, als den höchsten und schönsten ihm erreichbaren Zustand bezeichnen. In welchem Sinne sie für jeden gelten soll, muß sein freier Wille entscheiden. (3:163)

This ideal is an ideal of balance between two conflicting impulses: in the terms used in the metrical version of the novel, one is the ‘Trieb, unendlich fortzuschreiten, uns zu läutern’ and the other is the ‘Trieb, beschränkt zu werden, zu empfangen’ (3:195). There can be little doubt that the Diotima of the final version is meant to be seen as the embodiment of this ideal: there is no higher or more beautiful human existence Hyperion can conceive of than hers. (The supreme *collective* instantiation of the beauty she embodies was Athens. But the beauty of the Athenians derived precisely from their discovery of the secret of living, like Diotima, ‘mit dem Himmel und der Erde in gleicher Lieb’ un Gegenliebe’; 3:82.)

Diotima’s wish to be ‘in allem’, that is to share the closest possible intimacy with nature in all its manifestations, ‘contineri a minimo’, is evident enough in the passage we have already considered (3:56). But the life of ‘Natur’ transcends for Diotima the flowers and meadows around her home: it is the cosmic ‘göttliche Welt’ in which all is united ‘was nur ein Leben ist’ (3:148). Her very

openness to 'das geistige Wehen' which permeates all life on earth is what loosens her attachment to the *mere* earth. Reporting only his second meeting with Diotima, Hyperion writes:

Vorn am Rande des Berggipfels standen wir nun, und sahn hinaus, in den unendlichen Osten.

Diotima's Auge öffnete sich weit, und leise, wie eine Knospe sich aufschließt, schloß das liebe Gesichtchen vor den Lüften des Himmels sich auf, ward lauter Sprache und Seele, und, als begänne sie den Flug in die Wolken, stand sanft empor gestreckt die ganze Gestalt, in leichter Majestät, und berührte kaum mit den Füßen die Erde. (3:54 f.)

At the end of the novel Diotima sees her own imminent death in just these terms: as a flight upwards *from* the earth but *into* the life of cosmic 'Natur'. Hyperion's influence has been to so intensify her response to this life that she can no longer remain content 'auf diesem mittelmäßigen Sterne' (3:146). But departure from this world is, like the liberation of which the metrical version had spoken (3:195, line 146 f.), a kind of 'Läuterung': 'Entsetze dich nicht! Es läutert sich alles Natürliche, und überall windet sich die Blüthe des Lebens freier und freier vom gröberem Stoffe sich los' (3:144).

It is no longer the flowers to which Diotima is drawn, but the stars (3:115),²⁵ those 'Blumen des Himmels' (3:54) which are quite literally 'above all' and which do not fade and pass away. This expression of the wish to be 'über allem', 'non coerceri maximo', is certainly free of the titanic egoism of Alabanda (3:141; cf. 3:37), for it is based upon faith in the 'Bund Natur', in which there is radical equality. Nevertheless Diotima's words 'Entsetze dich nicht' represent the destruction of that perfect balance between the wish to be 'in allem' and the wish to be 'über allem' which had characterized her up until Hyperion's departure for the war, during the time when she was still the place where 'die Kräfte des Himmels und der Erde trafen sich friedlich zusammen . . .' (3:145).

The life of Diotima, then, illustrates the truth encapsulated in the Latin motto, and her death can be seen as one demonstration of the ambivalence which Hölderlin's commentary on the motto (3:163) implies.²⁶ Yet it would be wrong to restrict the scope of the epitaph to this sole meaning. For the original context of the Latin words strongly suggests that Hölderlin saw in the antithesis of 'non coerceri . . . /contineri' an explicit theological, indeed christological meaning.

The exact source of the 'Grabsschrift' was a Latin work *Imago primi saeculi Societatis Jesu a Provincia Flandro-Belgica*, of 1640 (3:438). The *Imago* . . . appears not itself to have been in the library of the *Stift* or the University of Tübingen. Yet the ninety-five-line Latin epitaph is also cited in full on pages 214–17 of the first volume of P. P. Wolf's *Allgemeine Geschichte der Jesuiten von dem Ursprunge ihres Ordens bis auf gegenwärtige Zeiten* (Zurich, 1789). This book was, according to Lachmann, 'weit verbreitet'.²⁷

The line used by Hölderlin occurs in the opening section of the epitaph:

Cuius animus / vastissimo coerceri non potuit unius orbis ambitu, / eius corpus / humili hoc angustoque tumulo continetur. / Qui magnum aut Pompeium aut Caesarem aut Alexandrum cogitas, / aperi oculos veritati: maiorem his omnibus leges / Ignatium. / Non coerceri maximo, contineri tamen a minimo divinum est. (3:437)

The suggested reason for Ignatius's superiority to Pompey, Caesar, and Alexander is that whereas his his mind could not be contained by any geographical boundaries ('Cuius . . . ambitu') the empires of all of these rulers, great though they were, still had such boundaries. However Ignatius died and his body is now contained within a small burial mound. The 'divine' quality of which the final line speaks is said to derive from the antithetical combination of total mental or spiritual freedom in life and physical containment in death. However, although the antithesis may be striking, one would hardly expect any inferences about 'divinity' to be drawn from it. After all, the contrast between the immense (if not limitless) size of the three military empires and the size of their creators' tombs is itself striking enough, and yet it is quite clear that the case of Ignatius alone prompts the 'non coerceri . . . divinum est'. Or appears to. In fact another thought of a quite different order prompts the final line, a thought which, unlike the contrast between 'animus vastissimo ambitu' and 'corpus hoc tumulo' (a man's mind is one thing, his body is another altogether) but like the 'Non coerceri . . .' line, is a genuine paradox: the thought that Christ, who, as the one through whom all things were made (John 1.3), cannot be contained by any of them, is yet contained within the tomb (at his death) or the Virgin's womb (at his birth).

To the modern reader, of course this may well be far from obvious. At least, so it would appear from the secondary literature on the question. In general, those who have commented on the motto have seen it as the aphoristic statement of an ideal balance in human life but as nothing more. Thus Paul Böckmann writes:

Er [Hölderlin] deutet es dahin, daß der Mensch gern in allem und über allem sein möchte, daß also dem geistigen Selbständigkeitsstreben immer zugleich ein Ergebungsverlangen entspricht, dass Selbstverantwortung und Lebensverbundenheit sich dauernd ergänzen müssen'.²⁸

Paul Requadt expounds the phrase in a much less detailed way, but shares Böckmann's view: for him the motto expresses simply 'Das Gebot der Mäßigung' (*JDSG*, 10 (1966), 257).

Of course, these views are perfectly sound as far as they go, but what is striking is their lack of any theological awareness.²⁹ As far as I am aware, only one critic has advanced the argument that Hölderlin, by using the Ignatius epitaph, is attempting to create resonances that are not merely Christian but christological. In his recent monograph on *Hyperion*, Gaskill (p. 40f.) points to some representative examples of Medieval Latin hymnology in which the paradox of containment and non-containment is expressed:

Brevi sepulcro clauditur, qui caelo non capitur
 (He is enclosed in the narrow tomb, he whom the heavens cannot contain)
 (Peter Damian: Paschalis Rhythmus ad Procendendum)

But the real paradox is not so much that of Christ in the tomb as the paradox of Incarnation:

Quem nequit totus cohibere mundus
 Claudis in alvo
 (He whom the whole world cannot contain, you enclose in your womb)
 (Peter Damian: In Assumptione Hymnus)
 Intra te clauditur
 Que claudit omnia
 (In you is enclosed, he who encloses everything)
 (Alexander Neckham: De Virgine Cantio)

This is certainly evidence enough of the theological tradition which lurks behind the line from the Ignatius Loyola epitaph. Neither is there any reason to think of the tradition as an obscure relic from the theological past of which Hölderlin could not possibly have been aware. The idea occurs in Luther's hymn 'Gelobet seist du, Jesu Christ', contained in the hymn book in use in Württemberg at the time *Hyperion* was written:

Des ewigen Vaters einig Kind
 Jezt man in der Krippe findt:
 In unser armes fleisch und blut
 Verhüllet sich das höchste gut, hallelujah!
 Den aller Weltkreis nie beschloss
 Der liegt in Marien schoos:
 Er ist ein Kindlein worden klein
 Der alle ding erhält allein, Hallelujah!³⁰

More importantly, the key lines of the hymn are cited, with a slight variation, by Hegel in his so-called 'Systemfragment' of 1800, as an illustration of the idea that 'das in der Unermeßlichkeit des Raums unendliche Wesen ist zugleich im bestimmten Raume: "Den aller Himmel Himmel nicht umschloss / Der liegt nun in Mariae Schoss"' (Nohl, 349).

The echoes of John's gospel which we considered above are then neither accidental nor incidental. Diotima's presence on the earth is evoked in language which creates such echoes because the Beauty which *she* makes incarnate is the beauty of a certain kind of relationship with the world for which Hölderlin discovers, through the Ignatius Loyola motto, a precise analogy in the paradox of the appearance of the infinite God in human flesh. 'Non coerceri maximo, contineri minimo, divinum est' represents, if fully realized, the 'highest' and 'most beautiful' state man can achieve, and at the same time defines a recognizable strand of Christian thinking about the Incarnation.

c) Der heilige Tausch

Diotima is, then, a Christ-figure. Yet merely to say this, although it is perhaps already too much for those who see the period of the *Hyperion* work as essentially anti-Christian, is to say too little. We should of course be grateful to those who, like the late Wolfgang Binder, have probed the theological structures of thought in Hölderlin's work with great sensitivity and insight. Binder has pointed to the echo of John 1.10 in the passage of *Hyperion* we have discussed and, in the same essay, also observed:

'Diotima war "gegenwärtige Vollendung", in ihr trat Ewiges in die Zeit wie Gott in der Menschheit seines Sohnes. Daß sie war, verbürgt die Existenz eines Heils, das "jetzt nur verborgener" ist; was sie war, lebt in "ewiger, unzerstörbarer Klarheit" (δοξα) fort.'

He concludes 'daß noch vor Empedokles Diotima Hölderlins späteres Christusbild insgeheim präfiguriert.'³¹ Yet the christological significance of Diotima is not that she is simply a prefiguration of the 'Christusbild' that emerges in the later poems, and the 'salvation' she represents must be examined in its own right if we are to see the full extent of the latent christology of the novel. For *Hyperion* actually has as its overriding theme the 'salvation' of the central character, if by this word we can understand — as the New Testament suggests we can — the idea of growth towards spiritual maturity or growth into 'Christ-likeness'. The gospel of John virtually begins with this theme (John 1.12; cf. Romans 8.29) and later repeats it in the words of Jesus himself: 'Glaubet an das Licht, dieweil ihr es habt, auf daß ihr des Lichtes Kinder seyd' (John 12.36).

The words chosen in the preface to the final version to describe the theme of *Hyperion* are 'Die Auflösung der Dissonanzen in einem gewissen Charakter' (3:5). But we know that the resolution of these 'Dissonanzen' means, positively, the achievement of that balance between self and world which is the 'beauty' of Diotima. *Hyperion* must become a 'child' of the light he has witnessed in her, he must become that which he sees. We shall see how the logic of John 12.36 lies embedded in *Hyperion*'s way of thinking about and describing their love.

The goal of all of *Hyperion*'s striving can be said to be, whether explicitly or implicitly, precisely that 'Gefühl seiner selbst und anderer Wesen' of which Hölderlin's 'baptism letter' speaks. The process begins with the friendship with Adamas. When, 'wie Manen aus vergangener Zeit', they journey 'in's düstre Herz des alten Pelopones', the experience is the catalyst for intensified 'Selbstgefühl': 'dreifach fühlte ich ihn und mich' (3:14). Yet at times the 'schröckende Herrlichkeit' of the ancient world is too overpowering for someone who, like *Hyperion*, lacks 'das Element . . . , worinn er sich ein stärkend Selbstgefühl erbeuten könnte . . .' (3:18). Diotima is right to say to *Hyperion* 'Es ist eine bessere Zeit, die suchst du, eine schönere Welt. Nur diese Welt umarmtest du in deinen Freunden, du warst mit ihnen diese Welt' (3:67), but it is above all in the

embrace with her that Hyperion discovers the 'element' of his 'salvation', his 'Selbstgefühl'.

Diotima's fear of being disloyal to her beloved nature through her love for Hyperion (3:76) is transitory because of her faith that 'Erd' und Himmel ist mir in diesem Einen [i.e. Hyperion] vereint' (3:76). Such an elevated view of Hyperion might appear to fit uncomfortably with what we know of him when he arrives in 'Kalaurea': by his own admission the invitation finds him 'mitten in . . . finstern Tagen' (3:48), only shortly after he has experienced his most extreme feeling of nihilistic despair (3:45 f.). As he travels to the island he wants only to 'aus der Schale der Vergessenheit trinken' (3:49). Yet Hyperion is of course transformed into precisely the person who can become for Diotima the meeting place of 'Erd' und Himmel' by the very love which he awakens in her. He himself acknowledges this: 'ja! ich bin wirklich nicht der ich sonst war, Diotima! ich bin deines gleichen geworden' (3:73) and, later, 'Hattest du mich nicht ins Leben gerufen?' (3:152). Hyperion is transformed by the encounter with Diotima, and this transformation is mythologized to become a transfiguration into 'der herrliche Hyperion des Himmels' (3:73) or, alternatively, into the immortal Pollux (3:89). Yet although it is Diotima who introduces this mythological vocabulary, Hyperion's divine qualities are not imparted to him, but, rather, drawn out of him. '. . . hab' ich denn dich nicht ergründet' (3:72) she asks, suggesting that the encounter with her merely revealed depths hitherto concealed. Or again, 'er hat die Hülse durchbrochen, und steht, wie ein Frühling, da . . .' (ibid.), she asks, using the imagery of organic growth to emphasize the continuity and self-consistency of the change in Hyperion.

Because most of the letters in *Hyperion* are from the hand of Hyperion it is easy to overlook the fact that Diotima herself admits to having experienced similar transformation through the encounter with him. In the crucial final letter from Diotima we read of the 'neues Leben' (3:146) which began for her after meeting Hyperion and see her wondering 'ist die Natur in mir durch dich, du Herrlicher, zu stolz geworden, um sichs länger gefallen zu lassen auf diesem mittelmäßigen Stern?' (ibid.). Thus her own testimony to the experience of transformation adds a dynamic and in one sense corrective dimension to Hyperion's acclamation of her as 'das Einzige'. Through Hyperion she becomes what he at first hails her as. All of this depends on the existence of genuine love between the two people, for love is the transfiguring power: 'Und die Allwissenheit, womit wir uns durchschauten, und der unendliche Glaube, womit wir uns *verherrlichten!* Ja! eine Sonne ist der Mensch, allsehend, *allverklärend*, wenn er liebt, und liebt er nicht, so ist er eine dunkle Wohnung' (3:75, my emphases). Each of the lovers performs in relation to the other what Diotima, again out of love, had performed for the flowers around her: 'Sie nannte sie alle Nahmen, schuff ihnen *aus Liebe neue, schönere . . .*' (3:56, my emphasis).

Thus for the two lovers (as for the life of nature as a whole: see 3:58) 'fullness' comes about when each 'completes' or 'fulfils' the other in this process of mutual transfiguration. The following passage, which is the most concentrated statement anywhere in the novel of the nature of the Hyperion-Diotima relationship, reveals that the reciprocity is to be seen as nothing short of total:

War sie nicht mein, ihr Schwestern des Schiksaals, war sie nicht mein? . . . vereint mit mir in allen Tönen des Lebens?

Wo ist das Wesen, das, wie meines, sie erkannte? in welchem Spiegel sammelten sich, so wie in mir, die Stralen dieses Lichts? erschrak sie freudig nicht vor ihrer eignen Herrlichkeit, da sie zuerst in meiner Freude sich gewahr ward? Ach! wo ist das Herz, das so, wie meines, überall ihr nah war, so wie meines, sie erfüllte und von ihr erfüllt war, . . . Wir waren Eine Blume nur, und unsre Seelen lebten in einander, wie die Blume, wenn sie liebt, und ihre zarten Freuden im verschloßnen Kelche verbirgt. (3:61)

How can Hyperion 'fulfil' Diotima if he is not already himself abundantly 'filled'? Yet if he is thus 'filled', what can the source of his 'fullness' be other than Diotima herself? If she, however, is herself imparting 'fullness' to Hyperion, what need has she of being 'fulfilled'? Of course the circularity cannot be and is not meant to be escaped.

Furthermore the presence within the same letter of crucial occurrences of the verb 'erfüllen' and the imagery of mirroring is not accidental. Hyperion claims to have acted as the mirror which reflected back to Diotima her own light, that is to say her own 'Herrlichkeit'. Only so, in Hyperion's delight or joy at her beauty, does Diotima become conscious of herself as the 'perfected' or 'beautiful' being she is (clearly she is self-conscious in the minimal sense before this). The implication of this is that the ability properly to 'sich fühlen' and therefore also to attain 'Selbstgefühl' are signs of the enjoyment of 'Fülle'. To be 'fulfilled' by Hyperion, Diotima must see herself in him as in a mirror — and vice versa. We can see how the lovers enact the general principle enunciated theoretically by Hyperion in the Athens speeches: 'Der Mensch will sich fühlen, darum stellt er seine Schönheit gegenüber sich' (3:79).

The sense of consummation so strongly present in this passage is reinforced by our knowledge that the delicate balance expressed in the combination 'erschrak . . . freudig' is highly vulnerable. In the description of the way Love can err in *Hyperions Jugend* there is fright but, instead of joy, only despair since the element of self-recognition is lacking: 'Aber sie fühlt sich so ferne von ihm: die Fülle des Göttlichen ist zu gränzenlos, um vor ihrer Dürftigkeit umfaßt zu werden. Wunderbar! vor ihrer eigenen Herrlichkeit erschrickt sie' (3:203). Clearly the Diotima of the final version could never be said to feel herself at a painful distance from 'die Fülle des Göttlichen', yet there is nevertheless this same moment of doubt and fearful uncertainty preceding the joy of self-recognition in the other, Hyperion: 'Die Unschuldige! noch kannte sie die mächtige Fülle ihres Herzens nicht, und lieblich erschrocken vor dem Reichtum

in ihr, begrub sie ihn in der Tiefe der Brust' (3:76).³² This joy derives, moreover, not simply from self-recognition but also from the knowledge that the longed-for beloved, in this case Hyperion, is a real and tangible presence and not, as in *Hyperions Jugend* a mere projection which will vanish: 'Sie [i.e. die Liebe] ahndet nicht, daß es verschwinden wird im Augenblicke, da sie es umfaßt, daß der unendliche Reichtum zu nichts wird, so wie sie ihn sich zu eigen machen will' (3:203; cf. also 3:196).

Self-recognition in the other is, as Hyperion's apostrophizing of Diotima as 'die Unschuldige!' implies, in one sense a loss of innocence, because it is a 'fall' into self-awareness. Yet the adverb 'freudig' in the key letter to Bellarmin (3:61) clearly suggests that is a 'happy fall'. That benign loss of innocence can become a dangerous invitation to hubris and solipsism if the consciousness that the one acting as mirror is truly and independently 'other' disappears. This is, I believe, the meaning of Diotima's appeal to Hyperion, 'Geh . . . und zeige dem Himmel deine Verklärung! mir *darf sie nicht so nahe seyn*' (3:68, my emphasis). The content of his transfiguring vision is Diotima herself and so she must, as it were, hold 'herself' at a distance in order to remain consciousness of the other. Similarly, when she appeals to him, after another moment of 'Verklärung', thus: 'Verhülle dich nur und siehe dich selbst nicht: ich will dich hervorbeschwören, ich will — . . .' (3:72), Diotima is warning Hyperion that his image of himself (his own 'Herrlichkeit') cannot be immediate but must be mediated by another. 'Ich will dich hervorbeschwören . . .' can then be read as Diotima's offer of herself as his mediating mirror and, thus, confirmation of the total reciprocity of their relationship.

I have argued that the letter in which Hyperion claims to have been the 'mirror' of Diotima's 'glory' is the drawing-together and consummation of many scattered insights throughout the novel. The passage itself, however, does not reach a climax with this metaphor but with the metaphor of the flower in the penultimate sentence: 'Wir waren Eine Blume nur . . . verbirgt.' (3:61). The two lovers are pictured as a *single* flower, within which a relationship of love is being enjoyed. Because there is love, the two souls cannot become one in indistinguishable unity, since love, to remain love, needs an object.³³ The flower is closed to the outside world, for it has no need of it. The implication that the flower is self-fertilizing ('wenn sie liebt') serves to underline the idea that the lovers are thus integral parts of one, natural whole. Nature demands that they be together as one. At the same time it is a hint that even a love relationship as closed to the outside as this one would appear to be is destined, ultimately, to generate new life.

The full significance of this metaphor emerges when it is seen alongside others which also use flowers to evoke the nature of the lovers' relationship. In the letter immediately following the one I have been analysing we read, '. . . wenn ich oft, begraben in Lust und Schönheit, bei einem reizenden Geschäfte sie [i.e.

Diotima] belauschte, und um die leiseste Bewegung, wie die Biene um die schwanken Zweige, meine Seele schweift' und flog' (3:61). The simile does not suggest disinterested contemplation, although Hyperion is speaking of occasions when he would passively watch Diotima, but rather appetite and longing: he is, precisely, 'begraben in *Lust* und Schönheit' (my emphasis). The bee feeds on the nectar in the flower (which is necessarily implied) and the flower is pollinated by the bee: thus the relationship suggested by the simile is both fully mutual and, again, sexual or generative. In the account of the friends' time in Athens there occurs a simile which functions in an identical fashion and which is if anything more explicit still. 'Mein Geist umschwebte die göttliche Gestalt des Mädchens, wie eine Blume der Schmetterling, und all mein Wesen erleichterte, vereinnte sich in der Freude der begeisternden Betrachtung' (3:87). Finally, the simile is used with only slight variations in one of the earlier 'Diotima' poems:

Wie auf schwanker Halme Bogen
Sich die muntere Biene wiegt
Hin und wieder angezogen
Taumelnd hin und wieder fliegt. (1:214, lines 73–76)

In Hyperion's 'Wie waren eine Blume nur' the close proximity and potential for union expressed in these last three similes, or for intermittent union in the case of the poem, have become actual union, and union not merely of two distinct if complementary entities (the bee/butterfly and the flower) but union which is internal to a single entity, the union of the sexually complementary halves of the self-fertilizing flower. This suggests a deliberate effort on Hölderlin's part to intensify the metaphor and indeed between the preparatory manuscripts for the final version of the novel and that final, published version itself Hölderlin changed the phrase 'Wir waren eine Blume nur und unsere Seelen lebten *umeinander*' to the more drastic 'Wir waren . . . *ineinander*' (FA, x, 327; my emphasis). The small change encapsulates the full significance of their love. It is the fulfilment of the longing an earlier Hyperion had expressed in *Hyperions Jugend*:

Ach! wie ich oft glaubte, das Unnennbare zu finden, das mein werden sollte, dafür, daß ich mich selbst an das Geliebte verlor! — Das arme Wesen dachte . . . oft wirklich den heiligen Tausch getroffen zu haben, wo einer des andern Gott seyn sollte . . . (3:211)³⁴

The love between Hyperion and Diotima is also the consummation of Hyperion's other relationships. The fact that they are male friendships should not be allowed to obscure this. By his own admission Hyperion became for a time the 'Nachhall' of Adamas (3:13). Yet there is no suggestion that Adamas *needs* in any way this 'echoing' by Hyperion: they clearly relate as pupil and mentor with the imbalance which that entails. The relationship of Alabanda and Hyperion, on the other hand, has many of the features of the Diotima-Hyperion relationship. Although the important mirror metaphors are absent, the mutual

nature of their love is conveyed in striking formulations such as ‘Wir begegneten einander wie zwei Bäche . . . *ergreifend* und *ergriffen* mit gleicher Kraft’ (3:23, my emphasis) or ‘wie ein Gott, hatt’ ich *geherrscht* über ihn, und, wie ein Kind . . . hatt’ ich seinem Auge *gedient*’ (3:38, my emphasis). Indeed Alabanda confesses that Hyperion has enabled him to experience that ‘Selbstgefühl’ which is implied in the mirror metaphors used of the Hyperion-Diotima relationship: ‘mir ist es nimmer indeß so wohl gegangen, als da ich im Lichte deiner Liebe mich fühlte’ (3:106). However Alabanda and Hyperion part for the first time because of Alabanda’s refusal to be ‘gezüchtigt’ (3:37) and for the second time because of Alabanda’s unwillingness to threaten the love between Diotima and Hyperion — itself an acknowledgement that their relationship fulfils and supersedes his own with Hyperion.

We have seen that in Hegel’s speculations on love, inspired by the Johannine writings, he had stated: ‘Die Religion ist eins mit der Liebe . . . Wir sehen uns nur in ihm [dem Geliebten] — und dann ist er doch wieder nicht wir — ein Wunder, das wir nicht zu fassen vermögen’ (Nohl, 377). For Hölderlin as for Hegel, the miracle is that the beloved can appear to be an ‘other’ and yet at the same time be the very ‘Spiegel . . . unseres Wesens’. This was precisely the nature of the relationship between God and Wisdom in the Old Testament Wisdom literature and between God and Christ in the Wisdom christology it helped to create: Wisdom reflects perfectly, as ‘ein unbefleckter Spiegel’ (Wisdom of Solomon 7.26), the majesty of God, the Son is the exact image of the Father (Hebrews 1.3), and yet both Wisdom and the Son are distinct from God. The mutual indwelling of Hyperion and Diotima (‘unsere Seelen lebten ineinander . . .’, 3:61) is as intimate and yet as yet far from indistinguishable unity as that of the Father and Son, ‘. . . du Vater in mir und ich in dir . . .’ (John 17.21). For the author of Proverbs, the appropriate metaphor for this intimacy is that of play (Proverbs 8.30–31), an idea which Hölderlin is surely echoing when Hyperion, no longer in danger of ‘losing’ himself in the presence of Diotima’s beauty, says ‘die schöne Gegenwart rinnt mir in alle Sinnen herein, und ich halt’ es aus . . . ich bin deines gleichen geworden, und Göttliches spielt mit Göttlichem jetzt . . .’ (3:73). Finally, each of the lovers ‘fulfils’ and ‘glorifies’ the other. The ‘Herrlichkeit’ (or, in terms, e.g., of John 1.14, the divine ‘doxa’) of Diotima is concentrated and heightened by being focused in Hyperion (3:61). On the one hand, this means for Hyperion self-exaltation (he *alone* can reveal the ‘glory’ of the one who embodies ‘Das Einzige’) and on the other hand self-abasement (he is only what he is because of Diotima). The same pattern is found in Diotima herself: she is only ‘ein sterblich Mädchen’ (3:68) but is at the same time, and in her own words, the meeting place for Hyperion of ‘die Kräfte der Erde und des Himmels’ (3:145). Hyperion’s exclamation ‘. . . der unendliche Glaube, womit wir uns verherrlichten!’ (3:75) thus has the double sense characteristic of St John’s use of the term ‘glorification’: that of self glorification and glorification of the other (John 17.1).

d) Die Theokratie des Schönen

Between the early period of the Hyperion-Diotima love and the time when she shares with him in her final letter the vision of man's return to the 'Götterfamilie' (3:147), there occur Hyperion's departure for the military campaign and the physical decline which makes Diotima's death inevitable. The campaign and then, after its failure, the death of Diotima are each to be understood as steps towards the goal of making universal the paradigmatic qualities of their relationship. From the beginning of their love, their mutual indwelling, however perfect it may be, is seen as something which cannot be an end in itself, for the image which above all expresses that perfect reciprocity, 'Wir waren eine Blume nur . . .' (3:61) includes, as we have seen, a sexual, generative, i.e. *purposive* element. Diotima's response to Hyperion's 'Was kümmert mich der Schiffbruch der Welt, ich weiß von nichts, als meiner seeligen Insel' (i.e. the 'haven' of his love for her) (3:87) is made to echo and criticize his metaphor of the flower which 'hides' 'ihre zarten Freuden im verschloßnen Kelche' (3:61):

Willst du dich *verschließen* in den Himmel deiner Liebe, und die Welt, die deiner bedürfte, verdorren und erkalten lassen unter dir? Du mußt, wie der Lichtstral, herab . . . wie Apoll, erschüttern, beleben . . .' (3:88)

There may have been a time for the enjoyment of those 'zarte Freuden', but now it is time for their love to 'move outwards'. Sexual metaphors are strikingly pervasive in the novel, occurring also with reference to the Hyperion-Alabanda relationship and to that of man and nature as a whole. When Alabanda and Hyperion meet again after their estrangement, they do so as fellow soldiers in an army hoping to establish the 'Theokratie des Schönen' (3:96). Alabanda becomes like a bridegroom whose passion for the 'kommende Welt' is re-awakened by Hyperion (3.114; cf. 3:31). The same nuptial metaphor is used when Hyperion prophetically anticipates the renewal of nature: 'Ein verjüngtes Volk wird dich [Natur] auch wieder verjüngen und du wirst werden, wie seine Braut . . . Es wird nur Eine Schönheit seyn: und Menschheit und Natur wird sich vereinen in Eine allumfassende Gottheit' (3:90). This 'god' is not to be thought of as the name merely for the addition of two separate entities, for it is a 'new' god (3:53), a third term generated by a 'marriage'.

This employment of sexual language with reference to relationships that are not in any literal sense capable of procreation is a very striking use of metaphor, and perhaps nowhere more so than when Hyperion deliberately obscures the obvious sexual difference between the love of male and female and the friendship of two males in order to portray the new age as if proceeding with all the causal necessity and genetic consistency of a child from the womb: 'Die Liebe gebahr Jahrtausende voll lebendiger Menschen; die Freundschaft wird sie wiedergebären' (3:63). The exemplars of such heroic friendship are Harmodius

and Aristogiton, and the intensity of their friendship is conveyed by a parallel which, in the context of Hölderlin's work as a whole, is certainly sexual '... die Blize durfte wohl der Mann nicht fürchten, der geliebt seyn wollte mit Harmodius Liebe' (ibid.). The pairing of 'Blize' and 'Liebe' in Hölderlin's work almost inevitably suggests the myth of Zeus fathering Dionysus by Semele (e.g. 2:119. lines 50–53).

The one significant relationship in the novel which would be capable of literal reproduction is that of Diotima and Hyperion. It seems hardly accidental that the possibility of offspring from this union is mentioned at a moment when all hopes of 'der neuen Gottheit neus Reich' (5:53) have evaporated and when Hyperion has told Diotima he must leave her. Diotima acquiesces: 'Ich will auch keine Kinder: denn ich gönne sie der Slavenwelt nicht, und die armen Pflanzen welkten mir ja doch in dieser Dürre vor den Augen weg' (3:131). She has realized that to have a child now would merely be to bring into the world another human life whose lot would be to suffer from the universal malaise of alienation. In a sense the only 'child' they can enjoy until that alienation is overcome is the 'god' of their love. This is why Hyperion considers that their union cannot really become a sanctified marriage until 'die schöne Gemeinde' they hope for is created. The 'blessing' pronounced before he departs for the campaign is proleptic and temporary (3:100f.).

Real sexual reproduction, then, would perpetuate alienation: even the child of Hyperion and Diotima would feel alienated from his or her fellow human beings — who are the 'Slavenwelt' — if not necessarily from nature. Metaphorical sexual reproduction, on the other hand, indicates that the realization of the eschatological vision of the novel, which is the realization of 'Das Eine in sich selber Unterschiedene', will be like a man and woman coming together as *one* in sexual intercourse and giving their union separate and tangible existence in the shape of their child, so that both unity and distinction are real. The two become one flesh but that one flesh is not the vanishing point of their different identities: 'Die Vereinigten trennen sich wieder, aber im Kind ist die Vereinigung selbst ungetrennt worden', as Hegel wrote in November 1797 (Nohl, 381).

From the moment of Diotima's question 'Willst du dich verschließen . . .' (3:88), Hyperion begins to accept that the 'Vollendung' he had discovered in her, which was a (shared) state of being, itself points to a much wider 'Vollendung', which will be a process. It is not only the retrospective narrator who realizes that in one sense Diotima was only a beginning ('Mit dir begann ich'; 3:53) but also the Hyperion of the narrated past events. For as long as the hope of creating a 'Theokratie des Schönen' is strong in him, Hyperion is quite able to be separated from the one with whose soul his own had communed (3:104). This is due not least to the fact that in Hyperion's mind the 'Theokratie des Schönen' is both patterned on Diotima's 'beauty' (3:114) and at the same

time a further enhancement of it: 'Seelenvolles Mädchen! du bist so schön izzt! Wie wirst du dann erst, wenn das ächte Klima dich nährt, in entzückender Glorie Blühen!' (3:109).

Diotima also perceives Hyperion's relation to the future he is hoping to create as a further 'glorification' of his nature. This takes the form, as has been argued convincingly by Ryan and others,³⁵ of Hyperion taking on the role of poet-priest who will serve 'der göttlichen Natur' (3:149). As she prophesies this role for him she wishes: 'O könnt' ich dich sehn in deiner künftigen Schöne' (ibid.). The poet-priest is not merely celebrant of the life of nature but also agent of the spiritual regeneration of human life — such at least is Diotima's prophetic dream (3:131).

Thus the future 'glory' or 'beauty' of the two lovers as individuals and the eschatology of the novel as a whole are interdependent. It follows that the element of purpose in their relationship, we might say its telos, can be understood in the light of general characteristics of the universal eschatological fulfilment which the novel anticipates but *cannot* describe. It is evident that Hyperion believes that a collective return of the Greeks to that 'Olymp des Göttlichschönen (3:96) which they once inhabited has as its precondition political liberation, for 'Der neue Geisterbund kann in der Luft nicht leben, die heilige Theokratie des Schönen muß in einem Freistaat wohnen . . .' (3:96). There is, furthermore, little doubt that the revolutionary ardour embodied in Hyperion and Alabanda can be connected with Hölderlin's own enthusiasm for the French revolution.³⁶ Indeed it has been pointed out that the three watchwords of the French revolution — fraternity, equality and freedom — are introduced in a disguised form into the final speeches of the three main characters.³⁷ Undoubtedly the 'Freistaat' Hyperion imagines would have to be democratic and egalitarian: if it is to make possible the 'heilige Theokratie des Schönen' it must eschew all repression, tyranny and inequality, since the beautiful is that which neither dominates nor is dominated (3:236). However it seems equally clear that the meaning of the 'Theokratie des Schönen' is not merely reducible to the meaning of such a political structure. In fact the synonym used for the 'Theokratie des Schönen', 'der neue Geisterbund' (3:96), clearly has resonances which transcend the purely political. The key feature of that 'Geisterbund' will be not so much (or at least not only) the universal franchise as the universal dissemination of 'Geist'. A particular political structure may encourage this but it cannot bring it about by coercion, since 'Geist' (like love) is free (3:31). If 'Geist' is universally present in this way, so too will be man's sense of divinity (in the double sense of awareness of his own divinity and sensitivity to all that is 'göttlich' — see 3:32). Hyperion is adamant that the anticipated victory over the Turks should not be regarded as a military victory only: '. . . es muß sich alles verjüngen, es muß von Grund aus anders seyn: voll Ernsts der Geist und heiter alle Arbeit! *nichts, auch das kleinste, das alltäglichste nicht ohne den Geist* und die Götter . . .' (3:111, my emphasis).

The centrality of these ideas about 'Geist' for the eschatology of the novel could hardly be more apparent than in Diotima's last letter before her death, since here 'Geist' is seen as that which enables the collective realization of differentiation-within-unity: '. . . Wie sollt' ich scheiden aus dem Bunde, der die Wesen alle verknüpft? . . . Nein, bei dem Geiste, der uns einiget, bei dem Gottesgeiste, der jedem *eigen ist und allen gemein!* nein! nein! . . .' (3:148, my emphasis). The 'Bund' is indeed universal: her 'uns' means 'alles . . . was nur ein Leben ist, in der göttlichen Welt' (ibid.) and later Hyperion echoes her faith: 'Ihr Quellen der Erde! ihr Blumen! und ihr Wälder und ihr Adler und du brüderliches Licht . . . frei sind wir, gleichen uns nicht ängstig von außen . . . innigst im Innersten gleichen wir uns' (3:159). This egalitarianism, comprising, as it does, all that is animate, is in a sense far more radical than any political philosophy could be.

Nevertheless, this should not be taken to suggest that the eschatology of the novel is ultimately *not* concerned with the hope of realizing the 'Geisterbund' in concrete, political terms. We saw in chapter one how in Tübingen the concept of the 'Unsichtbare Kirche' was linked with the goal of making visible this hidden 'Kingdom of God'. When this same hope is expressed in *Hyperion*, the time of fulfilment may be uncertain but the ultimate fact of fulfilment is not:

. . . fragst du mich, wann diß seyn wird? Dann, wann die Lieblingin der Zeit, die jüngste, schönste Tochter der Zeit, die neue Kirche, hervorgehen wird aus diesen alten befleckten Formen . . . ich kann sie nicht verkünden, . . . aber sie kömmt gewiß, gewiß. (3:32)

However it might be objected that the respective 'credos' of Diotima (3:148) and Hyperion (3:159) cited above are not really eschatological at all, since they express a faith in the eternal *cycle* of self-regenerating nature and not in a telos towards which history is moving in a *linear* fashion. This would seem to be particularly true of Diotima's words: 'Sieh auf in die Welt, Ist sie nicht wie ein wandelnder Triumphzug, wo die Natur den ewigen Sieg über all Verderbniß feiert?' (3:148). It is true that these passages contain no expression of any political or historical faith. This fact is to be seen, of course, in the light of the devastating failure of the military campaign in which Hyperion had participated and which was to have laid the foundation for the 'Theokratie des Schönen'. That failure prompts in Hyperion in the first place a death-wish (which is frustrated when he recovers from his wounds) and then a wish to retreat into the former enjoyment of the 'god' of their love (3:133).

Hyperion's hope of retreat into a mountain idyll is shown to be illusory. By the time Diotima receives his letter her death is already unavoidable (3:144). The final statement of the novel is not an endorsement of a nature mysticism which renounces faith in human history and is therefore inimical to either political or Christian hope, for the two 'credos' themselves have a purpose — namely to inspire Hyperion in his development into a 'Priester . . . der göttlichen Natur'

(3:149). In other words, their purpose is to renew the eschatological momentum which the failure of the military campaign had arrested. This argument does not depend on the hypothesis of some projected Christian continuation of *Hyperion*,³⁸ since the rekindling of hope can be observed in the change in Hyperion's attitude between the statement of *his credo* (i.e. at the end of the narrated events) and the narration of his story to Bellarmin. Whereas Hyperion, before he begins to narrate, makes the pronouncement, 'Es fallen die Menschen, wie faule Früchte, o laß sie untergehn, so kehren sie zu deiner [Nature's] Wurzel wieder' (3:159), as narrator he can feel inspired by the *recollection* of the physically dead Diotima to address all those who seek 'das Höchste' in these terms: 'Wußtet ihr, was ihr wolltet? Noch weiß ich es nicht, doch ahn' ich es, der neuen Gottheit neues Reich, und eil' ihm zu und *ergreiffe die anderen und führe sie mit mir*' (3:53, my emphasis). He speaks as the inspirational poet-priest, no longer merely content to worship nature for its eternally maintained unity alone, but ready to lead others into that relationship with nature which constitutes the 'allumfassende Gottheit' (3:90) — the end towards which the whole novel points.

The main features of the eschatology of *Hyperion* can, then, be summarized as follows:

The 'Theokratie des Schönen' is modelled on the love of Diotima and Hyperion. At the last, 'Geist' will be universal or 'gemein': it will be infused into everybody and everything, and will therefore be the medium of the unity of all that lives. 'Geist' will nevertheless be 'jedem eigen' (3:148): it will be particular to each individual, not merely the element in which all, as it were, live and move, but also the spirit 'owned' by each living body.

Consequently the community created by this final 'Begeisterung' will be radically egalitarian.

The ideal remains that of a historical telos, and does not become absorbed into an ahistorical faith in the cycle of nature.

It must now be clear that all of these features are closely paralleled in the account, in John 14–17, of the work of the Holy Spirit in furthering the divine economy. In the gospel, the intimacy shared by the Father and the Son is to become the universal quality of the community of believers through the work of the Spirit. Jesus ceases to be the 'master' of the disciples, for they have been told all that he knows about the Father. It might be objected, however, that the parallel is incomplete in one crucial sense: the ultimate goal for which Jesus prays in John 17, the union of all believers with and in the Father (verse 21), would seem to have little relevance for the interpretation of a novel in which there is no 'father' deity. Yet this very point confirms the Johannine inspiration of Hölderlin's thinking. Jesus prays that the Father will be in the disciples, as they are in the Father (John 17.21, 26). Thus the basis for continuing to use the hierarchical term 'Father' is, implicitly, negated. Of course, Jesus continues to use metaphors of spatial location, movement and subordinate position: the disciples must be in the same

'place' as Jesus (17.24) even though he is going 'away' from them (16.28) and although the Father is 'in' the Son (17.23) he retains the title Father. Yet Jesus also announces the end of metaphorical language: 'Solches habe ich zu euch durch Spruchwort ['in Sprüchen und Bildern' in modern translations] geredet. Es kommt aber die Zeit, daß ich nicht mehr durch Spruchwort mit euch reden werde, sondern euch frey heraus verkündigen von meinem Vater' (John 16.25).

The 'community of the spirit' in *Hyperion* is the 'Theokratie des Schönen', but since Beauty is nothing other than differentiated unity, the 'god' of this 'theocracy' can only be the community itself — its members perfectly united but yet distinct from each other. In the passage of *Hyperions Jugend* which, because it is a vision of the future 'göttliche Gemeinde', corresponds to what I have termed Diotima's credo (3:148), a god is spoken of who is not named, nor celebrated in any particular temple or on any particular day, although he is 'uns nah . . . wie wir uns selbst sind' (3:224). This deity bears, unmistakably, the features of the New Testament's Father (see Acts 17.23–24, 27–28). He remains unnamed not because the eschatological fulfilment has not yet come (in this passage from *Hyperions Jugend* it has) nor because he is unknown (as for St Paul's Greeks he is unknown, Acts 17.23) but because the eschatological fulfilment requires, precisely, the end of metaphorical names. The passage from *Hyperions Jugend* is itself very close in spirit to the gospel of John, specifically to John 4.19–24, the story of Jesus and the Samaritan woman. Both passages prophesy that the tribal mentality in religion will end (see John 4.20–21) and that God (or 'the one' of 3:224) who does not dwell in specific physical locations (whether in temples or on mountains) will be worshipped properly, 'im Geist und in der Wahrheit' (John 4.23). Jesus, however, makes the crucial statement 'Gott ist ein Geist' (John 4.24):³⁹ the name 'Father', which is a metaphor when used of God, is replaced by something which is neither metaphorical, nor concrete nor indeed an abstract concept but which is a predicate of the kind Hegel was exploring when, discussing Johannine statements such as 'Gott war der Logos', he wrote ' . . . diese Sätze haben nur den täuschenden Schein von Urteilen, denn die Prädikate sind selbst wider Seiendes, Lebendiges' (Nohl, 306). Diotima's 'one god' is 'Geist' — the spirit animating the harmonious community.

The 'genuine' Christuserlebnis is perfectly realized in this ideal community because such a community represents the most fitting and most universal 'element' for the experience of 'Gefühl seiner selbst und anderer Wesen'. Before he met Diotima, Hyperion had spoken of the plight of a man who is faced with the 'schrökende Herrlichkeit des Altertums' yet lacks the ' . . . Element, worinn er sich ein stärkend Selbstgefühl erbeuten könnte . . .' (3:18) and we have seen how, in Diotima, he discovered that 'element'. When 'die neue Kirche', which is another name for 'die Theokratie des Schönen', finally emerges, it will itself be the 'Element der Geister' (3:32) in which the experience of 'Gefühl seiner selbst

und anderer Wesen', the 'Gefühl der lebendigen Gottheit, in der wir leben und sind' will be universal. This experience alone is true life: 'Dann, dann erst sind wir . . .' (3:32). The 'genuine' 'Christusgefühl' is the one that sees beyond metaphors to the truth that we and the 'Father' are indeed one, because 'he' is as close to us as we are to ourselves or, rather as we are to each other.

e) The death of Diotima

The whole approach which has been adopted in this chapter inevitably invites the question: can the death of Diotima be connected in any way with the death of Christ? There are evidently certain similarities, but they are essentially superficial. It is true that in the gospel of John the death of Christ is linked inextricably with the consoling promise of the coming of the Holy Spirit (John 16.17) and the departure of Jesus is thus seen to herald even greater intimacy between the Father, the Son and the disciples. Diotima discerns a similar purpose in her death: 'Wir trennen uns nur, um inniger einig zu seyn . . .' (3:148). 'Geist' will console not only the dying Diotima but also Hyperion. 'Du müßtest untergehn, verzweifeln müßtest Du doch wird der Geist dich retten' (3:147). However there is no sense in which the 'Geist' of Diotima here speaks is 'released' only after and through her death — as is quite definitely the case in John's gospel. In fact the consolation derived from Diotima's death is predicated not upon any event or new state of affairs which the death might indicate (comparable with the presence of the Holy Spirit within the disciples) but upon one of Hölderlin's general philosophical tenets which could, in theory at least, just as easily have been enunciated at the beginning of the novel. This is the belief that because separation and differentiation create the conditions for 'Selbstgefühl', and because the latter is essential to man's spiritual maturity, separation must be beneficial. The belief is expressed in its most abstract, universal and therefore revealing form in the essay 'Über den Unterschied der Dichtarten':

. . . denn es ist ewiges Gesetz, daß das gehaltreiche Ganze in seiner Einigkeit nicht mit der Bestimmtheit und Lebhaftigkeit sich fühlt, nich in dieser sinnlichen Einheit, in welcher seine Teile, die auch ein Ganzes, nur leichter verbunden sind, sich fühlen, so das man sagen kann, wenn die Lebhaftigkeit, Bestimmtheit, Einheit der Teile, wo sich ihre Ganzheit fühlt, die Grenze für diese übersteige, und zum Leiden, und möglichst absoluter Entschiedenheit und Vereinzlung werde, dann fühle das Ganze in diesen Teilen sich erst so lebhaft und bestimmt, wie jene sich in einem ruhigern, aber auch bewegten Zustande, in ihrer beschränkteren Ganzheit fühlen . . . (4:268)

This essay was probably composed in the summer of 1800, and Hölderlin is stating his 'ewiges Gesetz' very specifically in relation to poetic forms, yet the continuity with his thinking in the *Hyperion* period is apparent enough. The association here of suffering and genuine 'Selbstgefühl' we first encountered in the metrical version of the novel:

... denn würd in uns
 Das Göttliche von keinem Widerstande
 Beschränkt — wir fühlten uns und andre nicht
 (3:195, lines 141–43)

Since Diotima's death is, in a sense, a random instantiation of this general law, it is not really meaningful to think of the death as a *necessary* sacrifice in the same way that the sacrificial death of Christ is held to be both necessary and unique. It is perfectly possible to imagine the creation of the 'schöne Gemeinde' (3:101) the lovers dream of without the need of Diotima's *death*. Such a 'Gemeinde', if realized, would have produced that 'Fühlbarkeit des Ganzen' of which Hölderlin's Homburg essay also speaks (4:269) automatically, by including *many* 'schöne Menschen' — among whom could have been Diotima herself. Had the military campaign of liberation not in fact turned into one of plunder, for example (a fact totally unconnected with Diotima), the foundations of that 'Gemeinde' would have been laid.

Thus whilst insisting that *Hyperion* is profoundly christological in a way which Hölderlin scholarship has completely ignored, we must nevertheless disagree with Binder's view, also taken up by A. Oertle,⁴⁰ that by her death, because it is 'sacrificial', Diotima prefigures the Christ of the later poems. Indeed it is even possible to argue that in her death Diotima finally *fails* to be Christ-like, if we take as our guide to what is Christ-like the christology implied in Hölderlin's use of the Ignatius Loyola epitaph. Diotima's claim that there is a purpose behind her death, as there is behind all death and separation (3:148), is a triumphing of faith which comes *after* she has accepted the imminence of her own death and which, as she knows, is not to be confused with the identification of the actual *cause* of her decline. She is quite explicit about that cause:

Dein Feuer lebt in mir . . . aber das hätte schwerlich geschadet, und nur dein Schicksaal hat mein neues Leben mir tödtlich gemacht . . . du entzogst mein Leben der Erde, du hättest auch Macht gehabt, mich an die Erde zu fesseln . . . doch da dein eigen Schicksaal dich in Geistesensamkeit, wie Wasserfluth auf Bergesgipfel trieb . . . da entschied es sich mit mir und wird nun bald enden'. (3:146f.)

Diotima dies because Hyperion's own 'Schicksal' leads him away from that ideal balance expressed paradigmatically in the Ignatius Loyola epitaph and, as I have argued, associated through the epitaph with Christ himself. Diotima dies precisely because she succumbs fatally to the danger of Hyperion's own apparent failure to preserve the ideal balance: the crucial moment is when she is led to believe that Hyperion 'sei aufgefliegen in die alte Freiheit . . .' (3:147), away from the earth, away from a willingness to be 'contained within the smallest'. This can of course be seen as analogous to the death of Christ in that the death occurs because of someone *else's* 'sin', yet the connection in *Hyperion* is tragically accidental and hardly predestined 'from the foundation of the world' (see especially Revelation 13.8). Binder is thinking of the lines from the

early drafts of 'Friedensfeier' ('... schnell verhüllt war jenes Freudige, das/Du reichtest ... So ist schnellvergänglich alles Himmlische ...'; 2:131, lines 40–43) when he claims that Diotima is like Christ in that she too is 'zu früh hinweggenommen', and in a sense this claim is perfectly true. Yet the important idea in the 'Friedensfeier' drafts is that this premature departure is 'umsonst nicht' (2:131, line 43), that there is a transcendent divine plan which actually *explains* the brevity of Christ's appearance among men. This is far from being the case with the death of Diotima. It is not true of her that '... nicht zu leben, zu sterben warst du gesandt ...' (2:132, line 72). Instead of comparing Diotima in this way to the Christ of a significantly later work, we should really note the telling contrast at this particular point with the gospel which we have seen to be of such relevance for the novel. Jesus says of his own death:

Niemand nimmt [mein Leben] von mir, sondern ich lasse es von mir selber. Ich habe es Macht zu lassen und habe es Macht wieder zu nehmen. Solches Gebot hab ich empfangen von meinem Vater. (John 10.18)

With this confidence go the words attributed to Jesus on the Cross when he died: 'Es ist vollbracht' (John 19.30). The completion of all the work the Father had given the Son to do appears compressed into this one moment. This moment of triumph, of the mutual glorification of Father and Son, contrasts with Hyperion's sadly deceived hope that Diotima would be 'glorified' by the 'Theokratie des Schönen' (3:109). The contrast shows that Hölderlin, despite suggesting an analogy between the death of Christ and the death of Diotima, establishes no *inner* and *necessary* connections between Diotima's death, the notion of sacrifice, and the spiritual destitution (and therefore resistance to spiritual revolution) of the age in which and people among whom she lives.

And yet Hölderlin had seemed to be beginning to make connections of this kind in his view of Susette Gontard's relationship to her own age, by linking her beauty with her 'hohe Trauer' (6:237). *Hyperion* explores the beauty of mutual indwelling in the life of love, and looks forward, on the basis of this, to a spiritual community which will be the collective enactment of that love. The creation of the community entails forsaking the haven of love, at first only for a time ('... bis die schöne Gemeinde, die wir hoffen, uns vermählt', 3:101), but then permanently, because of Diotima's death. This loss is accepted as part of a wider acceptance of the power of 'Schicksal', the word that expresses the historical contingency of the human condition. Hyperion's song (3:143) contrasts the eternal and unchanging existence of the gods, which defines them as 'schicksallos', with the blind, hourly suffering of humankind. Yet, as he relates the past, he accepts that '... jeder Athemzug des Lebens unserm Herzen werth bleibt, ... alle Verwandlungen der reinen Natur mit zu ihrer Schöne gehören' (3:103). To accept this much is to accept a great deal, yet it is in a sense less that the 'theology' of the novel promises. The concealed christology of *Hyperion* is a christology of beauty but not of suffering.⁴¹

f) Narration and Salvation

It is a measure of the depth of the christological resonances in the novel that Diotima's death can nevertheless be linked with the idea of salvation, in spite of the fact that it is not a necessary and unique 'Opfertod'. For it cannot be denied that there is some notion of salvation present in Diotima's mind as she takes her leave of Hyperion: 'Du müßtest untergehn, verzweifeln müßtest Du, doch wird der Geist dich retten' (3:147). Coming as it does at the beginning of what I have termed Diotima's 'credo', this is clearly a significant statement. The most vivid example we have seen of Hyperion in despair occurs at the end of Book 1 of the first part of the novel (3:45 f.), before he has met Diotima. The cause of his despair is the feeling that human life is something which 'nie zu einer Reife gelangt' (3:45) and that man, if left between the two poles of his spiritual history — as they are sketched in the prefaces to earlier versions of the novel (see 3:163; 3:236 f.), and represented here by the 'Pflanzen' and the 'Sternen' — is endlessly restless and 'bricht . . . auseinander' (ibid.). If this is the despair from which 'der Geist' will 'save' Hyperion, then clearly salvation must mean enjoyment of that 'highest' and 'most beautiful' state, which, as we argued earlier, is the combination of the impulses to be 'in allem' and 'über allem'. Whereas despair at man's apparent inability to attain 'Reife' leads to the disintegration of the human self, man's complete spiritual integration is what Hölderlin's letter to his brother-in-law calls the 'Gefühl seiner selbst'. Salvation at the collective level is then the corporate sense of unity with but distinction from others, the 'Gefühl seiner selbst und anderer Wesen, das Gefühl der lebendigen Gottheit, in der wir leben und sind'.

'Salvation' understood as 'Gefühl seiner selbst' is then the consolation Hyperion must strive for after the death of Diotima. This 'Selbstgefühl' requires that man 'confront' his own beauty in an act of 'Gegenüberstellen' (as in the key statement on 3:79). In fact it is only Diotima's absence through death that prompts Hyperion to 'confront' his beauty (which is both his own and Diotima's) in and through his narration of the past to Bellarmin. We know that when both lovers were alive each acted as the 'Spiegel' for the other's beauty, but it is only the narrator Hyperion, who has survived Diotima, who tells us (and himself) this, thereby raising to the level of conscious articulation the function of their relationship as a means of engendering the 'Gefühl seiner selbst'. Indeed one could argue, as Aspetsberger has done (pp. 102 ff.), that the letters themselves represent the beginnings of that poetic activity prophesied for Hyperion by Diotima (3:149).

It is worth considering some examples which show how, in the act of narrating his past, Hyperion must try to give an adequate picture of the beauty of Diotima without succumbing to the danger of complete self-diremption and so forfeiting the possibility of a saving 'Selbstgefühl'. This example is typical:

Ich kann nur hie und da ein Wörtchen von ihr sprechen. Ich muß vergessen was sie ganz ist, wenn ich von ihr sprechen soll. Ich muß mich täuschen, als hätte sie vor alten Zeiten gelebt, als wüßt' ich durch Erzählung einiges von ihr, wenn ihr lebendig Bild mich ergreifen sol, daß ich vergehe im Entzücken und im Schmerz . . . (3:59, my emphasis)

Hyperion's fear is justified, as shortly after this letter, when he is narrating the embrace with Diotima which follows her confession of love (something about which there can be no pretence of mere second-hand acquaintance) he has to break off and exclaims, ' . . . o Bellarmin! die Sinne vergehen mir und der Geist entflieht' (3:76) The past experience has become too vividly present: Hyperion is in danger of forgetting that he, as the narrator, is no longer the one whose own individual identity was virtually erased by the intensity of that past moment of ecstatic union. (Hyperion breaks off and exclaims 'o Bellarmin!' because he is about to relate the climax of an encounter no less intense than the one of which he writes 'Es ist heir eine Lüke in meinem Daseyn. Ich starb . . .'; 3:72.) In other words, he is in danger of losing that sense of selfhood which the narrative, as an act of 'Gegenüberstellen', must create and strengthen.⁴²

'Geist', as that which is 'allen gemein' but 'jedem eigen', cannot be allowed to 'flee' if the narrative is to 'save' Hyperion. It is because Hyperion perseveres in the painful task that he can later write, 'O Freund! am Ende söhnet der Geist mit allem uns aus' (3:103). Thus Diotima's death, in that it is the occasion for Hyperion's letters to Bellarmin, is indeed connected with a certain notion of 'salvation'. Although that notion is clearly far removed from any orthodox understanding of the meaning of Christ's death, it is thoroughly consistent with the 'immanent' theology of the novel which I have been arguing for. Wolfgang Binder is no doubt right to claim that art itself in *Hyperion* takes on 'Bestimmungen der Christologie',⁴³ yet this is true not so much because, as he argues, art is 'Kind . . . Werk, Offenbarung des Eigen in der Zeit' as on account of the fact that, through narrative art, the narrator, Hyperion, is 'renewed' (cf. 3:79) and 'saved'.

NOTES TO CHAPTER TWO

1. The essay appeared in the *Berlinische Monatsschrift* of December 1784, pp. 516 ff.
2. See A. Beck, *Hölderlin: Chronik seines Lebens* (Frankfurt am Main, 1975), p. 51 f.
3. See Harrison, chapter 2.
4. Charlotte von Kalb was 'eine nicht unwichtige Figur in der Literaturgeschichte des späten 18. Jahrhunderts'. See S. Wackwitz, *Friedrich Hölderlin* (Stuttgart, 1985), p. 19.
5. G. W. F. Hegel, *Der Geist des Christentums, Schriften 1796–1800*, edited and introduced by W. Hamacher (Frankfurt am Main, 1978), p. 337.
6. In Hegel, *Theologische Jugendschriften* (Nohl, 368–377). The datings of Hegel's manuscripts given by G. Schüler (see *Hegel-Studien*, 2 (1963), 111–59) are on the whole accepted by most scholars.
7. See H. Gerth, *Bürgerliche Intelligenz um 1800*, new edition (Göttingen, 1976; first edition, 1933), *passim*.
8. This is on the whole the general view, a consequence on the one hand of an inadequate understanding of the nature of the theological and philosophical debates going on in the *Stift* during Hölderlin's time there, and on the other hand of one-sided reading of the novel. Thus

Böckmann writes of the *Hyperion* period, 'Durch die Rückwendung auf die Antike soll es gelingen, aus dem überlieferten Offensbarungsglauben herauszutreten und ein lebensimmanentes Weltverständnis so auszulegen, daß die Kraft des Glaubens und der Begeisterung, der Liebe und der Schönheit erhalten bleibt', (cited by Strack, p. 130). See also H. Lübin, 'Hölderlin und das Christentum', *Symposion*, 3 (1954, 237-402 and 4 (1955), 217-234; Lübin speaks of the experience of the encounter with Diotima as 'das ur-Heidnische', p. 271 (1954). This suggests that the only alternative to the kind of Christianity represented by Storr and Flatt was the beauty of pagan Greece. Yet we saw in chapter one that there were other alternatives which their advocates certainly did not feel to be un-Christian.

9. See J. G. Eichhorn, *Kritische Schriften* (Leipzig, 1795), iv, 203.
10. For a detailed exposition of the development from wisdom literature to New Testament christology, see R. G. Hamerton-Kelly, *Pre-existence, Wisdom and the Son of man: a study in the idea of pre-existence in the New Testament* (Cambridge, 1973).
11. J. Marsh, *Saint John* (Harmondsworth, 1968), p. 360.
12. H. Timm, *Geist der Liebe (Die Ursprungsgeschichte der religiösen Anthropologie — Johannismus)*, (Gütersloh, 1978), p. 152 f.
13. H. Timm, *Gott und die Freiheit: Studien zur Religionsphilosophie der Goethezeit* (Frankfurt am Main, 1974), p. 120.
14. See P. H. Gaskill, 'Christ and the Divine Economy . . .', p. 100.
15. One could show that most of the histories of personal and collective religious belief in *Hyperion* follow this pattern. However one example from the novel shows particularly clearly (precisely because it corresponds to what is really a digression in Hegel's argument) how close the affinity between Hölderlin and Hegel is. In the passage describing Hyperion's arrival in 'Kalaurea' the breeze ('das geistige Wehen') envelops and caresses all living creatures, the experience being such that the air takes on a fluid quality: it is 'das leichte . . . klare, schmeichelnde Meer, in dem sie lebten und webten' (3:50). For Hegel too the only adequate metaphor for the intimacy of the perfected relationship with the divine is that of immersion in water — and so he takes Jesus's command to his disciples to baptize others strictly as a metaphor, which he then paraphrases thus: 'euer Jüngermachen sei, daß ihr sie in das Verhältnis des Vaters, Sohnes und heiligen Geistes einweiht, daß es wie das Wasser den in Wasser Getauchten in allen Punkten ihres Wesens "sie" umfließe und umfühle' (Nohl, 320). This 'baptism' is the realization of the Trinity within the believer or community, not the sign of assent to a doctrine. Similarly, the islanders' experience as described by Hyperion is a momentary realization of what the universalization of 'Geist' would make permanent.
16. It has been generally accepted that this essay had either been lost or that Hölderlin never wrote it. Strack, however (p. 99), has suggested that the fragment *Über das Gesetz der Freiheit* (4:211 f.) was part of the project.
17. W. Böhm, *Hölderlin* (Halle-Saale, 1928), I, 143, Kurz, p. 69, Strack, p. 69 f. and p. 138.
18. *The Dialogues of Plato*, III, 156.
19. Strack, p. 129. Strack is citing Gadamer's *Wahrheit und Methode*.
20. J. Kemp, *The Philosophy of Kant* (Oxford, 1968), p. 104.
21. Schiller, NA, I, 251, lines 150 and 171 and NA, xx, 10, 205, and 243.
22. Harrison claims that in this passage ' . . . one cannot fail to see the influence of Plato . . .'. As we have seen ourselves, Plato is the source of the conception of Beauty which informs the final version of *Hyperion*. Yet significantly for my own (in no way contradictory) argument about John's gospel, Harrison omits the phrase 'es war in der Welt . . .' from his excerpt of the letter (see Harrison, p. 68). Kempter, in his study *Hölderlin und die Mythologie* (Zürich, 1929), p. 143, gives a list of references to 'Biblisches im *Hyperion*', but this key allusion appears not to be among those he lists.
23. This definition of Beauty as the overcoming of the antagonism between self and world is itself a revision of Plato to the extent that it is based upon an understanding of love as 'Vereinigung von Strebensrichtungen, deren eine aufs Unendliche, deren andere auf Hingabe ging. Die eine verstand er aus der Beziehung zum Ursprung, die andere aus der Beziehung zu dem, das gleich uns die Einigkeit des Seins verlor.' For Plato, on the other hand, love is primarily understood 'nur als den ersten Flügelschlag einer neubefiederten Seele hinauf in den überhimmlischen Ort' (D. Henrich, *Hegel im Kontext* (Frankfurt am Main, 1967), pp. 19 and 27). This revision is part of Hölderlin's involvement in the 'Liebe/Selbstheit' debate inspired by the work of Hemsterhuis: see Kurz, pp. 16-31 and Henrich, pp. 13-22.
24. For a discussion of the different paths that led to this conviction and how it was articulated in Hölderlin's day, see C. Jamme, "'Ein ungelehrtes Buch": die philosophische Gemeinschaft zwischen Hölderlin und Hegel in Frankfurt 1797-1800', *Hegel-Studien*, Beiheft 23 (Bonn, 1983), 99-118.

25. Diotima's attraction to the stars is one of a series of remarkable parallels with Bardili's *Sophylus* . . . which, taken together, make the probability that Hölderlin knew the work, which I argued for in chapter one, seem like a near certainty. In Bardili's work we read that a certain 'Diotime' 'beschäftigte sich eben izt mit Aufsuchen der Sterne' and that these stars are 'Bothen der Unsterblichkeit' (p. 87). The concept of an 'exzentrische Bahn' is also used to explain Sophylus's own 'errings' (p. 21), and the notion of 'Selbstgefühl' functions as a synonym for 'life' in its highest realization (p. 79). Kurz (p. 52) notes the use of the 'exzentrische Bahn', but does not connect Bardili with Hölderlin's time in Tübingen. P. Requadt acknowledges A. Beck's alerting him to the occurrence of the name 'Diotime' in Bardili, but uses it merely to explain Hölderlin's change from the earlier Melite. See P. Requadt, 'Das literarische Urbild von Hölderlins Diotima', *JDSG*, 10 (1966), 251, fn. 4. Otherwise I have found no mention of Bardili.
26. It should be acknowledged that Hölderlin's use of the epitaph does suggest that the enjoyment of both states is *itself* precarious, that, as Gaskill has argued, 'the perennial human ambition to be both in and above everything has to be seen as profoundly ambivalent, potentially destructive or redemptive' and that 'the way [our free will] is used. . . will determine whether we produce anarchy or paradise.' See P. H. Gaskill, *Hölderlin's Hyperion* (University of Durham, 1984), p. 36. The two possibilities might then be seen as being dramatized in the figures of Diotima and Alabanda. The latter illustrates more vividly than any other figure in the novel the dangers of 'das ungeheuerere Streben, Alles zu seyn, . . .' (3:18).
27. E. Lachmann, 'Non coerceri maximo', *Anzeiger der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften (phil.-hist. Klasse)*, 86 (1949), 334-42 (p. 335).
28. P. Böckmann, *Hölderlin und seine Götter* (Munich, 1935), p. 83.
29. Not surprisingly, Hölderlin's use of the line has also aroused comment from Jesuit quarters. H. Rahner, to whom we owe our knowledge of the source of the line, offers a discussion which is, naturally, written from a theological standpoint, but which is concerned much more with how Ignatius Loyola himself, as an exemplary Christian mystic, embodied the truth of the 'non coerceri' phrase than with its *christological* resonances. Rahner's argument, in brief, is that Hölderlin was able vaguely to sense the uniquely Christian truth lived out in dazzling clarity by Ignatius: 'Wir nehmen uns das Recht, den Dichter im Tiefsten, was er gemeint hat, christlich zu deuten': H. Rahner, 'Die Grabschrift des Loyola', *Stimmen der Zeit*, 139 (1946), 321-37 (p. 328). Another article, by the Jesuit A. Keller, follows a very similar direction and, like that of Rahner, it veers too much towards hagiography and too far from Hölderlin's text to be of any real use to Hölderlin scholarship. See A. Keller, 'Uns vom Größten nicht eingegrenzt und deshalb im Kleinsten zu finden, das ist göttlich': Zu Hölderlins "Hyperion" und ignatianischer Gesinnung', *Geist und Leben, Zeitschrift für Ascese und Mystik*, 48 (1975), 327-40.
30. See *Württembergisches Gesangbuch, zum Gebrauch für Kirchen und Schulen von den Herzoglichen Synodus nach dem Bedürfnis der gegenwärtigen Zeit eingerichtet* (Stuttgart, 1791), p. 80 (hymn no. 84).
31. W. Binder, 'Grundformen der Säkularisation in den Werken Goethes, Schillers und Hölderlins', in *Aufschlüsse: Studien zur deutschen Literatur* (Zürich, 1976), p. 60.
32. A. Beck has pointed to F. L. Stolberg's *Fülle des Herzens* and the extracts he gives show that for Stolberg too there was a connexion between 'Fülle' and 'Selbstgefühl'. Yet the extracts also seem to indicate that Hölderlin's emphasis on 'fullness' achieved *only* through reciprocal 'reflection' was quite distinctive. See A. Beck, 'Fülle des Herzens', *Iduna* (1944), 88ff. (esp. p. 96).
33. This was one of the main positions in the 'Liebe/Selbstheit' debate analysed by Kurz and Henrich.
34. *Hyperion* strikingly anticipates some of the formulations used by Novalis and F. Schlegel to convey the divine quality — and religious implications — of a totally reciprocal love relationship. See, for example, F. Schlegel, *Werke, Kritische Ausgabe, herausgegeben von J.-J. Anstett, H. Eichner, E. Behler* (München-Paderborn-Wien), V, 54 and 60 and Novalis, *Schriften*, Second edition, edited by P. Kluckhohn and R. Samuel (Stuttgart, 1960), pp. 278-89.
35. L. Ryan, 'Hölderlins "Hyperion": ein romantischer Roman?', in *Über Hölderlin*, edited by J. Schmidt (Frankfurt am Main, 1970), pp. 175-212 (p. 196f.). See also F. Aspetsberger, *Welteinheit und epische Gestaltung: Studien zur Ichform von Hölderlins "Hyperion"* (Munich, 1971), p. 153.
36. See P. H. Gaskill, *Hölderlin's Hyperion*, p. 34.
37. J. Link, "'Hyperion" als Nationalepos in Prosa', *HJb* (1969-70), 158-94 (p. 182).
38. Eudo C. Mason appeals to this rumour of a projected continuation in his explanation of the novel's view of death: Eudo C. Mason, 'Hölderlin und Novalis: Einige Überlegungen', in *Exzentrische Bahnen: Studien zum Dichterbewußtsein der Neuzeit* (Göttingen, 1963), pp. 112-14.

39. Although Luther translates 'Gott ist ein Geist', the article is incorrect and is not found in modern translations.
40. A. Oertle, *Christus bei Hölderlin* . . . , pp. 63 ff.
41. R. Eppelsheimer is one of the few commentators to give much attention to the letter which formed the starting point of my discussion of *Hyperion*. He remarks, 'Hölderlin gliedert seine Aussage offenbar sehr bewußt: Gott-Vater-Gefühl, Christusgefühl und Gefühl der Menschenwürde, — das ist keine zufällige Dreiheit. Wo der späte Hölderlin den Christusnamen zuerst wieder nennt, tut er dies aus *trinitarischer* Sicht. Es scheint us, als höbe Hölderlin mit diesem Satz seine eigene keimende Christologie aus der Taufe': R. Eppelsheimer, *Mimesis und Imitatio Christi* (Bern, 1968), p. 203. The implication behind this statement is that 'Gefühl der Menschenwürde' corresponds in some unspecified way to the Holy Spirit: yet in his discussion of Hölderlin's 'Trinity', which deals only with the poetry after 1800, Eppelsheimer associates the third member of the Trinity with the 'jungfräuliche Erde', and *not* with the human community (pp. 192 ff.). As we have seen in my chapter two, it is in the vision of the ideal community in *Hyperion* that we see the fulfilment of the 'Gefühl seiner selbst und anderer Wesen' as the unfolding of the Trinitarian deity through 'Geist'. And, as I argue in Chapter Four, the fate of the vulnerable and innocent earth is associated not with the Spirit but with Christ himself in the poetry after 1800. The letter is indeed as important as Eppelsheimer senses, but because of a latent christology in *Hyperion* rather than because it anticipates the late poetry.
42. Cyrus Hamlin has given a highly suggestive discussion of the relation between self-consciousness and retrospective narration in *Hyperion* and Wordsworth's *The Prelude*: Cyrus Hamlin, 'The Poetics of Self-Consciousness in European Romanticism. Hölderlin's *Hyperion* and Wordsworth's *The Prelude*', *Genre*, 6 (1973), 143–73, but see also, for a dissenting view of Hamlin's assessment of Fichte's influence on *Hyperion*, my 'Amor dei intellectualis: Hölderlin, Spinoza and St John', *DVLG* 63 (1989), 420–60.
43. Wolfgang Binder, *Friedrich Hölderlin: Studien*, edited by Elizabeth Binder and Klaus Weimar (Frankfurt am Main, 1987), p. 57. This essay, 'Theologie und Kunstwerk', originally appeared in *HJb* (1971–2), 1–29.

CHAPTER THREE

DER TOD DES EMPEDOKLES AND HEGEL'S CHRIST

(i) Introduction

I have argued that in *Hyperion* Hölderlin's thinking is essentially theological. The 'theology' of the novel was seen to be patterned on a form of speculative christology in which the eternal love of Father and Son is directed outwards and seeks realization in the world through the Holy Spirit — the third member of the Trinity. The love of Hyperion and Diotima — in many ways analogous to the love of Father and Son — could not be allowed to remain as a private haven from an unloving world but was forced to encounter that world and therefore submit itself to suffering and deprivation. However Diotima's death revealed that the implied theology of the novel was incomplete in one crucial respect: the sacrifice of her life was not connected in any necessary way with the wider historical circumstances portrayed in the novel, and was therefore not understood theologically — that is to say, as part of a positive divine plan being realized in and through the essentially negative events of history. The wider historical circumstances portrayed in the novel are *only* negative: they merely frustrate the realization of the 'Theokratie des Schönen'. The novel does indeed yield the insight that *everything* must suffer, even 'die heilige Natur' herself (3:150), but this very universality is precisely what denies the unique significance of any particular human (i.e. historical) suffering. It will be the argument of this chapter that Hölderlin's *Der Tod des Empedokles*¹ develops and deepens the theological impulses seen in *Hyperion* by focusing — repeatedly — on precisely these issues: the sacrifice which love entails and its connection with the events of history.

The first allusion to Hölderlin's work on *Empedokles* occurs in a letter to his brother of August 1797: 'Ich habe den ganz detaillierten Plan zu einem Trauerspiel gemacht, dessen Stoff mich hinreisst' (6:246 f.). In the same letter Hölderlin reports that he is making good progress with *Hyperion* (i.e. the second part of the novel), and he looks forward to finishing it. His mind is already turning to the tragedy, and from now on until the end of 1799 or possibly early 1800 it will be a constant concern.

It is to be assumed that *Empedokles* was still very much on Hölderlin's mind between the writing of the plan and the time when the writing of E1 seems to

have started in earnest, about September 1798. In that month, Hölderlin had finally been forced to leave the Gontard household (6:255–58; 6:888 f.) and had moved, with the help of Sinclair, from Frankfurt to nearby Homburg vor der Höhe. In a letter of November 1798 we read, ‘Es ist etwas über einen Monath, daß ich hier bin, und ich habe indessen ruhig, bei meinem Trauerspiel . . . gelebt’ (6:288).

It seems likely that Hölderlin was at work on E2 from the spring of 1799 until June or possibly later in that year. In June 1799 he wrote to Neuffer telling him that the work now only needed its final act and that he had plans to publish it in his projected literary journal *Iduna* (6:323). However when he quotes from the play in a letter of the same date to his brother (6:331), he uses not E1 but E2, of which only some seven hundred lines exist.

We cannot say with certainty when E3 was begun and when it too was abandoned. However, granted that E2 was still in progress as late as June 1799, it seems reasonable to suppose that Hölderlin had, by the autumn of that year, begun work on yet another version. *Empedokles* is mentioned in two letters of September 1799, to Schiller and to Susette Gontard (6:363–65; 6:366 f.): in one of them the author considers that there may still be three months of work to do on the project (6:367), so that it seems unlikely that Hölderlin is here referring to the same version which in June he claimed as almost ready — we have, after all, what must have been intended as one of the later scenes of E2 (4:113–18). The letter to Schiller shows, furthermore, an evident concern with tragedy as a distinctive genre and mentions Hölderlin’s own ‘Versuch’ in this field, *Empedokles*. This would suggest that the version being written at the time of the letter to Schiller was concurrent with those theoretical reflections on tragedy in general and the tragic conflicts of *Empedokles* in particular entitled ‘Grund zum Empedokles’. Since the plan of E3 occupies the reverse side of a manuscript sheet which Hölderlin used for the last page of the ‘Grund zum Empedokles’ (4:710), the usual opinion that E3 was produced, along with the essay and two plans (4:163–68) between about September 1799 and early 1800, seems perfectly cogent. For these reasons also E3 and the essay will have to be discussed together.

Although Hölderlin left Frankfurt only nine months after Hegel’s arrival there, there is good evidence that they were in frequent contact with each other for at least a year after this date.² These biographical facts alone suggest the intrinsic likelihood of continued mutual influence. One of the most interesting pieces of external evidence is the reported comment of Hegel that he and Hölderlin discussed the latter’s plans for *Empedokles* frequently, and indeed over ‘mehrere Jahre’ (7:544). What this clearly implies is that the *Empedokles* material of his friend was of absorbing interest to Hegel during the three years (1797–99) when his own writing was focused almost exclusively on Christianity, its founder and its historical ‘fate’. We will need to ask why this should have been so.

From the summer of 1798 onwards Hegel began to develop, from the writings of 1797 on love and on the character of the Jewish religion (Nohl, 368–82), those essays generally known under the single editorial title '*Der Geist des Christentums und sein Schicksal*' (Nohl, 245–342). The first version of these essays was produced in the autumn of 1798 and the winter of 1798/9, and is thus almost exactly contemporary with Hölderlin's work on E1, and had certainly been completed by the time Hölderlin began work on E2. We shall see that both groups of writings are essential to an understanding of *Empedokles*.

Although considerable effort has been devoted to the study of the relationship between Hegel and Hölderlin in the years 1796–1800, most recently in the massively detailed work by Christoph Jamme,³ the full implications for our reading of Hölderlin's *Empedokles* have, I believe, yet to be worked out. This failure can be traced to the generally held view that it is only with E3 that we begin to witness something recognizably Christian, a view which is linked with the assumption that Hölderlin must have begun to find his way 'back' to Christianity as a result of the encounter with Hegel: Hegel was, after all, the one still actively involved in writing on theological topics, not Hölderlin. Thus Jamme, referring to Petzold's earlier suggestion,⁴ argues that Hölderlin's letter to his mother of January 1799 (which I shall be discussing below) marks 'den Beginn einer Neubewertung der Gestalt Christi, zu der Hölderlin unter dem Einfluß Hegels bereits in Homburg gefunden haben muß',⁵ and later that the 'fortschreitende Aufwertung des Christentums im Spätwerk' [i.e. the late hymns from 1800 onwards) may have been due to Hegel's theological work in Frankfurt. (Jamme, p. 343). For Jamme, these comments are part of a wider thesis that for the two friends, the dialectical 'Umgestaltung der Vereinigungsphilosophie', in which conflict, division and suffering are finally accepted and given 'dialectical' meaning, occurs with E3 and the second, revised version of Hegel's '*Der Geist des Christentums*' — that is to say, towards the end of 1799 (Jamme, p. 133). I wish to propose a reading of *Empedokles* which shows that the influence cannot have been as one-sided as this and that acceptance of suffering is already present in outline in the E1 and, indeed, that it is present in a specifically christological way.

(ii) *The Frankfurt Plan*

The so-called 'Frankfurter Plan' (4:145–48), apart from giving an outline of the plot in five separate acts, pinpoints very specifically the reason for Empedokles's suicide in Mount Etna: he throws himself into the crater in order to unite himself '... mit der unendlichen Natur ...' (4:147). Death is to be for Empedokles the overcoming of that which stands in the way of experiencing 'grossen Akkord mit allem Lebendigen ...' (4:145), that which forces him to experience any 'Verhältnisse', however 'beautiful' they may be, as restricting and frustrating — in short, death is to be the overcoming of the '... Gesetz der Succession ...'

(*ibid.*), Hölderlin's phrase for the law which defines the human condition as temporal, finite and historical.

There is an exact parallel to this expression of the motivation behind the death of Empedokles in the second part of *Hyperion*, which we know Hölderlin was working on at the time he drew up the plan for the tragedy: 'Gestern war ich auf dem Aetna droben. Da fiel mir der grosse Sicilianer ein, der einst des Stunden-zählens satt, vertraut mit der Seele der Welt, in seiner kühnen Lebenslust sich da hinabwarf in die herrlichen Flammen . . .' (3:151 f.). It is precisely Empedokles's unwillingness to tolerate the sequential nature of all his experiences, the fact that they pass irrevocably with the passing hours, that drives him to his death.

The Empedokles of the Frankfurt plan is said to be ' . . . auch in wirklich schönen Verhältnissen unbefriedigt . . .' (4:145). His dissatisfaction with life and longing for death are not primarily due to the 'ugliness' of the particular historical circumstances under which he happens to live, but rather to the fact that *any* historical, human conditions whatsoever must by their very nature deny him the possibility of living ' . . . frei und ausgebreitet, wie ein Gott. . .' (*ibid.*). The plan makes it clear that Empedokles's death-wish is above all ' . . . eine Nothwendigkeit, die aus seinem innersten Wesen folge' (4:148). At this stage of Hölderlin's thinking about the tragedy, then, there is no *necessary* connection between the death of the central character and the wider, impersonal conditions of his life. Yet although necessity is associated with ' . . . seinem innersten Wesen . . .', there are even here suggestions of other, contingent factors: Empedokles's dissatisfaction is exacerbated by one of the religious festivals of the 'Agrigenter' (4:146) and this is presumably to be linked with the fact that among the population he has both followers and opponents. However, although this implied conflict over religion must obviously be reckoned among the ' . . . zufälligen Veranlassungen zu seinem Entschlusse . . .' (4:148), we are told nothing about its substance.

(iii) *The first version*

The religious conflict around which the drama of E1 centres is unmistakably analogous to the conflict between Jesus and the Jews of his day which Hegel discusses in his writings of January–November 1797. In both, man's relationship to the divine is conceived in terms of two radically opposed alternatives, expressed in the antithesis Life/Union: Death/Division. The religion of Empedokles is one of the union of man and divine nature, the religion of his opponents — represented by Hermokrates — is one of disregard for and separation from nature.

Thus the historical situation of Empedokles is no longer of only marginal importance, as it was in the Frankfurt plan: his tragedy is the tragedy of the man fundamentally at odds with his own age. It is Hegel who, in the months between

this plan and his friend's first version of *Empedokles*, turns his own attention quite explicitly to the historical context of the emergence of Christianity, although he does not yet see that context in tragic terms. For Hegel, Christianity comes into being against the background of (and in sharp conflict with) a religion whose God is '... höchste Trennung ...' (Nohl, 374): Abraham's response to the call to become the father of many nations (Genesis 17.4) takes from the outset the form of separation from all that is dear to him and therefore also of negation of every channel through which he can experience the divine. As a nomad he has '... die Beziehung, in die ihn seine Jugend mit der Natur um ihn gesetzt hatte, aufgegeben, und dieser durch Einbildungskraft belebten Beziehung, d.h. den Göttern, denen er gedient hatte, entsagt' (Nohl, 368). Of course Abraham believes he is following his God when he severs all these relations with nature and that he is compensated for all he has lost because he is now following one who is the Lord and Creator of all. But this Lord is the one who must protect him from nature, since he has given up the security of his former existence: the divine is no longer experienced because of his closeness to nature but because of his vulnerability to it and the divine takes on the guise of a guardian 'Vorsehung'. Abraham now has '... keinen griechischen Gott, ein Spiel mit der Natur, dem er für einzelnes dankt, sondern einen Gott, der ihm Sicherheit seines ungewissen Daseins gegen dieselbe gewährt, der ihn schützt, der Herr seines ganzen Lebens ist' (Nohl, 369). It is the belief in God as the Lord of his *entire* life that gives to Abraham the sense of a unified existence which formerly he had enjoyed as a sedentary cultivator of the land, but Hegel stresses that the locus of this unity has now become external to Abraham — it is in a sense no longer *his* unity but that of God. And because of this Abraham and his God can only relate in terms of 'Herrschaft' and 'Knechtschaft'. The Greeks, by contrast, had a religion in which the decisive element was that of 'Spiel', but for Abraham this is no longer the case. The water used by Abraham for his livestock was 'ein erzwungenes Eigentum, das nur beherrscht, ... mit dem nicht gespielt werden konnte ...'.⁶ Such is the religion which Abraham bequeaths to the Jewish people and therefore also to Jesus, a religion which denies life rather than enhancing it, a religion which lacks all life — 'das ewig Tote'. 'In einer solchen Periode', Hegel writes, 'hatten die Essener, hatte ein Johannes, ein Jesus in sich selbst Leben geschaffen ...' (Nohl, 371).

The Jews cannot, then, offer a religious individual like Jesus or John the Baptist any spiritual 'life', and it is precisely this shortcoming which brings Empedokles into conflict with the inhabitants of Agrigentum. This is not to deny that it is the 'sin' of Empedokles (making himself a god; 188, E1) which precipitates the particular confrontation portrayed in the play. However, it is clear that, from his earliest childhood, Empedokles has been developing a kind of piety which cannot (and never could) be accommodated within the religion

of Agrigentum. Its source is the world of nature, not the world of institutional religion. Addressing Hermokrates, the priest, Empedokles says,

Ach! als ich noch ein Knabe war, da mied Euch
 Allverderber schon mein frommes Herz, das
 unbestechbar innigliebend hing
 An Sonn und Aether und den Boten allen
 Der grossen ferngeahndeten Natur.

(522–26, E1)

It is not *simply* that Hermokrates is a particularly offensive ‘purveyor’ of religion (Empedokles sees in him a man ‘der Heiliges wie ein Gewerbe treibt’; 532, E1), but rather that human teaching is in any case at this point superfluous and irrelevant. Empedokles freely admits that his childhood devotion, while intense in its love and unshakable in its intuitive confidence, was ‘blind’ — he could not at first even distinguish sun, earth, water and aether as elements of one single spiritual presence and reality (‘die Allebendige’; 374, E1). Yet when he received his spiritual sight, it was not from any human source: ‘es hattens mich die Menschen nicht gelehrt’ (372f., E1). Nature, not man, is for Empedokles the great educator, as indeed she is for Hölderlin himself in the poem ‘Da ich ein Knabe war . . .’, written in the same year as E1:

Ich verstand die Stille des Aethers,
 Der Menschen Worte verstand ich nie.
 Mich erzog der Wohllaut
 Des säuselnden Hains
 Und lieben lernt ich
 Unter den Blumen. (1:267, lines 26–31)⁷

Empedokles’s use of the verb ‘erziehen’ shows that he bases his ‘nature religion’ very consciously on a notion of the development of the individual towards spiritual maturity, and (as we have seen) it is just such a notion that informs Hölderlin’s talk of an ‘ächttes Christusgefühl’. Furthermore, Hegel makes use of precisely the same notion in an explicitly Christian context, namely an exegesis of Matthew 18. 10f. Most importantly, focusing on the way Empedokles claims to have been ‘reared’ by nature allows us to see how there is, from E1 onwards, an underlying conception of love as self-giving and sacrificial and, therefore, how a Christian inspiration of the drama is present from the beginning.

In the letter of January 1798 Hölderlin had expressed his hope that ‘das heilige unentwickelte Leben [des Kindes] hervorgehen wird . . . zu dem ächten Christusgefühle . . .’ (6:261). The spiritual life of the child is still in a sense dormant: all is potential, nothing yet fulfilled. In another sense, however, that life is already partaking of the divine, for it is ‘heilig’. The child, as we cannot fail to realize from the rest of Hölderlin’s work (see, above all, 3:10) is not ‘heilig’ solely because of what it can *become*, but rather because its intuitive sense of the divine has not yet been corrupted. But Hölderlin knows that we cannot remain

as children (3:10). He shares this knowledge of course with Hegel, who, probably in the autumn of 1798,⁸ sketches a fascinating interpretation of Christian salvation as 'das Werden wie Kinder'. His text is Matthew 18.10f.:

Sehet zu, daß ihr nicht jemand von diesen Kleinen verachtet. Denn ich sage euch: Ihre Engel im Himmel sehen allezeit das Angesicht meines Vaters im Himmel. Denn des Menschen Sohn ist kommen, selig zu machen, was verlohren ist.

Jesus has just told his audience that only by becoming like little children can they expect to enter the Kingdom of Heaven. Hegel suggests that when Jesus then goes on to speak of the 'angels' of the little children, we should not take this as a reference to '... objektive Wesen...', but rather as an image for the idea of their '... unentwickelte Einigkeit, das Bewußtlose, ihr Sein und Leben in Gott...'. To say that the angels of the children 'look on' the face of God does not need to imply, Hegel argues, that the child actually experiences any 'Entgegensetzung' between itself and God (as might be suggested by the idea of God being 'looked on', i.e. perceived as object) since '... ein Mensch, der die Sonne immer anschaute, wäre nur ein Gefühl des Lichts, das Gefühl als Wesen. Der ganz in der Anschauung eines anderen Menschen lebte, wäre dieser andre selbst, nur mit der Möglichkeit eines Anderseins...' (Nohl, 315). 'Salvation' consists, for Hegel, not in remaining like a child, but in becoming again like a child: 'vollendetes Leben' is the reconciliation of both 'Einigkeit' and 'Trennung'.⁹

These thoughts of Hegel represent then, along with their parallel in Hölderlin's letter, the specifically Christian articulation of the ideas that inform Empedokles's retrospective account of his childhood. Empedokles too enjoyed as a child an intuitive, pre-rational¹⁰ closeness to the divine: even though unconscious of the nature of its object, his love was 'unbestechbar' (524, E1) — the ground of and pattern for his mature veneration of Nature. We can say also that the warning issued by Jesus in Matthew 18.10 is one that Hermokrates of E1 has failed to heed: he 'despises' the child Empedokles in the sense that he will not recognize and respect the presence in him of '... Des Herzens freie Götterliebe...' (531, E1).

More important than all of this however is the fact that already in E1 nature is seen to have the capacity for self-giving and suffering and that it is these features that provide the *model* for the sacrifice of Empedokles in E3. If Empedokles has, by E3, become Christ-like, as is often argued, it is because the nature who rears him is herself Christ-like.

Certainly Empedokles knows what he has learnt from nature. His discovery of the '... himmlisch Licht...' (372, E1) is not simply the discovery that 'Du lebst!' (380, E1) but also that it is of the very essence of the light to impart itself to all and thereby to transform everything into its own image,

Und wie du heiter wandelst um die Sterblichen,
Und himmlischjugendlich den Schein
Von dir auf jedes eigen überstrahlst,
Dass alle deines Geistes Farbe tragen,

So ward auch mir das Leben zum Gedicht.
 Denn deine Seele war in mir, und offen gab
 Mein Herz, wie du, der ernsten Erde sich,
 Der Leidenden, . . . (381–88, E1)

The light, as one elemental aspect of nature, ‘gives itself’ to another, the earth. Empedokles, under divine compulsion (‘Denn deine Seele war in mir . . .’), imitates this self-giving and it is this willingness to imitate nature which, *before* any ‘sin’ is committed, creates the possibility of his death,

. . . und oft in heilger Nacht
 Gelobt ichs ihr, bis in den Tod
 Die Schicksaalvolle furchtlos treu zu lieben
 . . .
 So knüpft ich meinen Todesbund mit ihr.’ (Variant: 4:460, line 3)
 (392–94, E1)

Empedokles cannot become fully initiated into the life of nature and enjoy all of its ‘Freuden’ (396–401, E1) *until* he has made this immediate self-offering and committed himself to future suffering — even ‘unto death’. It could not be otherwise, since those ‘Freuden’ themselves grow out of ‘Müh und Liebe’ — they are the joys of the earth, ‘die Schicksaalvolle’, who is subject to change and above all, as we shall see, to human abuse. Only those ready, like Empedokles, to commit them themselves to ‘Müh und Liebe’ will be true initiates of nature: the elitism implied in 398–40, E1 has nothing to do with the acquisition of esoteric knowledge, but everything to do with readiness to suffer.

This picture of nature is maintained throughout the drama: her self-offering in love is as characteristic of the phase during which Empedokles is first initiated as of his maturity, right up to the moment when he sins. He chastises himself for ignoring that the immanent, life-giving forces of nature are characterized precisely by this element of selfless love, ‘Als die Genien der Welt/Voll Liebe sich in dir vergassen, dachst du/An dich . . .’ (338–40, E1).¹¹ The negative connotations of ‘sich vergessen’, which it had in Hyperion’s desire ‘. . . in seeliger Selbstvergessenheit wiederzukehren in’s All der Natur’ (3:9) are completely absent: the motivation has changed from the desire of Hyperion to escape from the suffering of the human world to a longing, in the case of the ‘Genien der Welt’, to be ‘found’ in that world. It is of course Christ who, according to Philippians 2, ‘äusserte sich selbst und nahm Knechtgestalt an, ward gleich wie ein anderer Mensch und an Geberden als ein Mensch erfunden. Er niedrige sich selbst und ward gehorsam bis zum Tode, ja zum Tode am Kreuz’ (Philippians 2.7f.).

Christ’s obedient self-abasement leads to his death. In one sense of course this obedience means that the purpose of God can be fulfilled. In another sense, however, Christ’s very willingness to humble himself provides the occasion for the sin which the Jews commit in crucifying the Lord of Glory (see Acts 8. 32f.

and I Corinthians 2.8). It is just so with Empedokles. The almost servile faithfulness and transparency of nature's 'love' are themselves the *cause* of his 'sin' against her. Because nature, servant-like, makes no claims,¹² Empedokles treats her as a servant,

Verachtet hab ich dich, und mich allein
 Zum Herrn gesetzt, ein übermütiger
 Barbar! *an eurer Einfalt hielt ich euch,*
 Ihr reinen immerjünglichen Mächte!
 Die mich mit Freud erzogen, mich mit Wonne genährt;
 Und *weil ihr immergleich mir wiederkehrtet,*
 Ihr Guten, ehrt ich eure Seele nicht'

(472–78, E1, my emphases)

This failure to give honour to nature is a failure to see that the 'servility' proceeds not from mere stupidity or 'simplicity' but from love — and therefore that it has a purpose, that of drawing man into union with nature. The sin, in other words, is the sin of thinking of the 'Genien der Welt' as 'blöde Knechte' (342, E1).

If the sin of Empedokles is the introduction of the element of 'Knechtschaft' and its concomitant, 'Herrschaft', into his relationship with nature, then his sin reproduces in effect the attitude which underlies the whole of Agrigentum's religion, an attitude typified above all by the figure of Hermokrates. In the religion for which he speaks we see the paradoxical coexistence of a wish to control and manipulate nature and a slavish fear of it. The tendency towards manipulation is most evident in Hermokrates's clash with Empedokles in Act 1. The priest appears to defer to the gods when he says he will allow Empedokles to speak, '... weil es noch/Die Götter dulden. Vieles dulden sie...' (587f., E1). Yet in fact his 'gods' are not the long-suffering, Christ-like 'Genien der Welt' known to Empedokles, they are the traditional 'Vaterlandsgötter' of Agrigentum. As such they can no doubt be regarded by Hermokrates as 'unsre Götter' (623, E1), although his words imply that these gods only belong to the people *mediately*, through the priestly office. However, the real hubris of Hermokrates does not lie here, but rather in the way he claims the authority to exclude Empedokles, in the name of these *local* gods, from the whole of the life of nature. His curse rehearses the banishment from each of the elemental aspects of nature in turn: 'Quelle' (water), 'Licht', 'Erde', 'Luft', 'Flamme' (fire) (633–40, E1). '... du kehrest nicht zurück/Zu dem, *was unser ist* ...', he says (641f., E1). A later scene in the play ironically reverses this arrogation, to gods who are merely the product of human tradition, of power over the whole of divine nature. Empedokles's drink from the mountain stream ('Siehe! nahe blinkt/ Ein Wasserquell; *der ist auch unser*' (1164f., E1), marks his return to the bosom of nature and consigns his sin to the past (1176, E1). From the top of Etna he can then enjoy the simultaneous presence of 'Ströme ... Meer ... Sonnenlicht ... Erde ... Geist ... [i.e. the 'Aether' or air]' (1195ff., E1). Finally, his death in the

crater of Mount Etna must clearly be taken as the reply to Hermokrates's 'und [wer], wenn du stirbst, die Grabesflamme dir/ Bereitest, wehe dem, wie dir!' (651f., E1). Thus the 'Herrschaft' which Hermokrates had claimed in pronouncing his curse is denied by nature herself.

The paradoxical counterpart to this urge to manipulate and control is fear. Pausanias lays this charge against the priest,

. . . Viel hast du getan, Hermokrates
So lang du lebst, hast manche liebe Lust
Den Sterblichen *hinweggeängstigt*,
Hast manches Heldenkind in seiner Wieg'
Erstickt . . . (1370–73, E1, my emphasis)

The religion of Agrigentum is hierarchial and accords considerable authority to its priests: this authority has been abused to produce fear in its adherents, and Hermokrates's chilling invocation of the 'Rachegötter' (597ff., E1) illustrates what he means. The fear of the Agrigentines also springs from the primitive and mechanistic conception they themselves have of their gods: prayer is offered for sunshine and rain (163f., E1) as if the gods are located in some way outside the cycle of nature and the world of men and yet have the power to impinge upon it. The paradoxes of the religion of Agrigentum are expressed in these telling phrases from the essay 'Grund zum Empedokles' of late 1799: '. . . die Welt um ihn [Empedokles] . . . lebt . . . in jenem freigeisterischen . . . Nichtanerkennen des Lebendigen von einer Seite, von der andern in der höchsten Dienstbarkeit gegen die Einflüsse der Natur . . . in herrischer Furcht des Unbekannten . . .' (4:160, 162).

This description of how those around Empedokles relate to nature matches almost exactly, as must now be clear, Hegel's analysis of the strange position of the nomad Abraham — denying his earlier contact with the natural world in all its manifold relations, yet mercilessly exposed to its rigours in his desert existence, seeking protection and compensation in his God, who is in essence 'höchste Trennung', fearful and yet arrogant at the same time.¹³ Hegel's comment about how Jesus had 'in sich selbst Leben geschaffen', in a period whose religion was blighted by 'das ewig Tote' (Nohl, 371), can be applied directly to Empedokles.

I have been arguing that the central theme of E1 is the theme of man's tyrannical abuse of nature and his consequent self-alienation from her, and that in a sense the most basic conflict in the play is that between 'die geduldige Natur' and an anthropocentric 'will to power' of which *both* Empedokles and Hermokrates are guilty, even though they are, at the immediate dramatic level, opponents. Because nature's defining quality is that of self-sacrificial love, it is possible to see her as Christ-like. She too is humble and must become 'acquainted with grief' (Isaiah 53.3). If Empedokles *himself* is to be seen as Christ-like in

E1, it must be *primarily* on the basis of his 'imitatio Christi' — that self-giving which first allows him intimacy with nature and which then leads him to 'give himself up' in the crater of Mount Etna. For this reason I have so far deliberately not discussed the question of an explicit Christ-Empedokles parallel. However, the question is clearly implied by any use of the term 'imitatio Christi', and indeed by my suggestion that Hölderlin's presentation of the spiritual development of Empedokles is close to the ideas he shared with Hegel about the nature of growth towards Christian maturity — towards the 'ächtens Christusgefühl' or 'das Werden wie Kinder'.

Is then Empedokles a 'Christ figure' in his own right? It is impossible to deny that even the relatively casual reader of E1, equipped with no more than a mediocre knowledge of the gospels, would be struck by certain parallels. For example, Empedokles's dispelling of the storm clouds (17–19, E1) is reminiscent of Jesus's calming of the storm on Lake Galilee (e.g. Mark 4.35 ff.). There would also seem to be an unmistakable allusion, in the lines '... und die Wasser unter der Erde/strebten da herauf, wo sein Stab den Boden berühre!' (14f.), to Moses's similar exploit in Exodus 17.6. As the one who provides 'living' water (John 4.10) Christ is typologically prefigured by this incident.¹⁴ The healing of Panthea (42 ff., E1), although not an exact parallel, recalls the incident in which a young girl (like Panthea the daughter of an important local figure) is brought back to life (Luke 8.49–56). As well as reported incidents of this sort, there are moments in the play when we seem to catch a faint echo of a phrase from the New Testament, if nothing more, as when Pausanias's words about the Agrigentines, 'Und leicht gelüftet sies, und wär es nur/Um seines Mantels wegen, ihn zu töten' (1150f., E1) remind us of Matthew 27.35. The presence of such parallels has of course been noted in critical literature on *Empedokles*.¹⁵ However even an exhaustive list of all cases is of little help unless some pattern in the way they are used is established.

In fact the parallels in E1 present us with a picture of Empedokles which is both highly ambiguous and highly instructive for our view of the final version and the essay 'Grund zum Empedokles'. Put briefly, the ambiguity is this: Empedokles appears both as an enlightened religious teacher aloof from the hopeless corrupt religion of his day and *at the same time* as one whose function will be to commit himself in love to his own age and indeed to sacrifice himself for its failings.

Like Jesus, Empedokles clashes with the religious authorities of his day. He clashes with them *because* they are authorities. The hatred and fear evident in the first appearance of Hermokrates and Kritias stem from the realization that Empedokles is eroding their religious authority: 'Ich sage dir: sie wissen nichts denn ihn/Und wünschen alles nur von ihm zu haben' (line 200f.). The chief priests in Jerusalem feared Jesus for the same reason: 'Ihr sehet, daß ihr nichts ausrichtet. Siehe: alle Welt läuft ihm nach' (John 12.19). This is of course a

religious question as well as one of personal pride. Hermokrates is the guardian of the 'Vaterlandsgesetze' and 'die Gebräuche', and it is these and the gods associated with them that Empedokles urges the Agrigentines to abandon: 'Was euch *der Väter Mund erzählt, gelehrt, / Gesetz und Bräuch*', *der alten Götter Namen, / Vergesst es kühn, . . .*' (1538–40, E1). Similarly Jesus with his frequent 'Ihr habt gehört . . . Ich aber sage euch . . .' (e.g. Matthew 5.2 ff., *passim*). Empedokles, in urging the Agrigentines to forget the traditions they have been taught, is not seeking to replace the authority of those traditions with some new authority of his own (which, admittedly, Jesus to some extent is doing, at least as interpreter of the Law); the point is that their religious experience should cease to be mediated by any 'authoritative' priestly figure at all (1625–30, E1).

Hegel's comments on the Sermon on the Mount in '*Der Geist des Christentums*', in the autumn of 1798, follow this train of thought by arguing that Jesus's 'fulfilling' of the Law divests the commandments of 'das Gesetzliche, die Form von Gesetzen' and points to 'was sie erfüllt, aber als Gesetze aufhebt, und also etwas Höheres ist . . . Einigkeit der Neigung mit dem Gesetze . . .' (Nohl, 266–68). For this reason it releases men from the sense that they are acting 'obediently' to some authority outside themselves. Jesus's 'commands' are commands with respect to their linguistic form, but in reality they are 'das Lebendige' or 'ein Sein' — and therefore the 'Synthese . . ., in welcher Subjekt und Objekt ihre Entgegensetzung verloren haben . . .' (Nohl, 268). This is one aspect of Jesus's attack on the 'positivity' of Jewish religion (Hegel defines a 'positive' religion as 'eine wider- oder übernatürliche . . . welche Begriffe, Kenntnisse enthält, die für den Verstand und die Vernunft überschwänglich sind, Gefühle und Handlungen fordert, welche aus dem natürlichen Menschen nicht hervorgehen würden, sondern nur, was die Gefühle betrifft, durch Vorrichtungen, gewaltsam hervorgetrieben, was die Handlungen betrifft, nur durch Befehl und aus Gehorsam, ohne eigenes Interesse getan werden'). (Nohl, 139).

It can be said that Act 2, scene 4 of E1 is the attempt of Empedokles to end the 'positivity' of the Agrigentines. This involves persuading them to end not only their dependence on the priests and the traditions they embody, but also to abandon any thoughts they have of merely replacing their subservience to Hermokrates with subservience to Empedokles himself. The analogy Empedokles uses in reply to their request that he should become their king — that of the eagle encouraging its young to leave the nest and fly (1451 ff., E1) — has its source in Deuteronomy 32.11, where we read that the Lord has cared for his people, 'Wie ein Adler ausführet seine Jungen, und über ihnen schwebet. ER breitete seine Fittiche aus, und nam ihn [Jacob] und trug ihn auf seinen Flügeln'. Hegel refers to this image in his own discussion of the Jews' 'positivity' and makes the melancholy comment, 'Nur vollendeten die Israeliten dieses schöne

Bild nicht, diese Jungen sind keine Adler geworden: sie geben eher im Verhältnis mit ihrem Gotte das Bild eines Adlers, der Steine, getäuscht, erwärmte, ihnen seinen Flug vormachte . . .’ (Nohl, 256).¹⁶ When the Agrigentines ruefully proclaim, ‘Wir wären götterfrei mit ihm [Empedokles] gewesen’ (1426, E1), Hölderlin introduces deliberate ambiguity: *they* perhaps mean that they would be free from all gods except their new god and king Empedokles (of whom they use the verb ‘anbeten’, line 1425), Empedokles would undoubtedly want them to mean ‘as free *as* gods’ (beholden to no priests anymore) and ‘free *from* all gods’ (which had for them been external and ‘positive’). It is clear, in any case, that the goal of the religious educator — Hölderlin’s Empedokles and Hegel’s Jesus — is the development in others of spiritual autonomy, ‘eignes, unabhängiges Leben’, as Hegel puts it (Nohl, 314).

Nevertheless, although Empedokles’s repudiation of priestly authority is clear enough, he does not wish to see the inhabitants of Agrigentum break completely and irrevocably with the past. The obviousness of the Jesus/Jews — Empedokles/Agrigentum parallel, and in particular the fact that for Hegel Jesus was *fundamentally* opposed to everything in Judaism, ‘und suchte sein Volk darüber zu erheben’ (Nohl, 261), makes it easy to think that this is the case. Yet if we say, with Jamme, that ‘Empedokles wie Jesus predigen nicht Vermittlung, sondern einen radikalen Bruch mit der . . . Tradition’ (Jamme, p. 299), we will find these words from Empedokles’s parting admonition awkward to explain:

Wenn dann die glücklichen Saturnustage,
Die neuen, männlichern, gekommen sind,
Dann denkt vergangner Zeit, dann leb, erwärmt
Am Genius, der Väter Sage wieder!’ (1634–37, E1)

The religious tradition nurtured by earlier generations *can* become vital and living again, provided it is ‘erwärmt am Genius’. The precondition of such a revitalization is, for each individual, that experience of communion with ‘die göttlichgegenwärtige Natur’ (1628, E1) which Empedokles describes when he recalls how he was first ‘reared’ by nature. Thus Empedokles *first* appeals to the Agrigentines to ‘give themselves’ to nature (1533, E1) and *then* holds out the prospect that ‘der Väter Sage’ can be revived. A ‘nature’ religion need not, on these terms, exclude an element of human tradition, because nature can regenerate men in a way which is no less personal, decisive and permanent than the ‘new birth’ of which the New Testament speaks:

Die göttlichgegenwärtige Natur
Bedarf der Rede nicht; und nimmer lässt
Sie einsam euch, wenn *einmal* sie genaht,
Denn unauslöschlich ist der Augenblick/Von ihr . . .’
(1628–32, Hölderlin’s own emphasis)¹⁷

If the moment of encounter with divine nature can never be erased, then human tradition could never thereafter supplant it as the major and life-imparting element of the religion, and so represents no threat. Empedokles's task as 'educator' will have been accomplished if he can induce the Agrigentines to 'give themselves' just once, for then the danger of 'positivity' would cease to be real.

Seen in terms of this 'educational' role, the figure of Empedokles is, then, unambiguous enough, even if we take into account his concessions to tradition. Yet I have already argued that if Empedokles is to be regarded as Christ-like then it must be primarily on the basis of his insight into the 'humility' of nature and his commitment to imitate that humility. Ambiguity arises because Empedokles, the enlightened educator, having delivered to Agrigentum his 'Heiligtum' (1500 ff., E1), is concerned only with his reunion with nature. Thus we see this reaction to the appearance on Etna of the Agrigentines: 'In dieser heiligen Stunde noch! . . . / . . . Da fällt die Rotte mich noch einmal an . . .' (1278, 1282, E1). Although his death in the crater of Etna is an act of self-sacrifice to nature (earth and fire) in atonement for his own sin of self-elevation, by this self-sacrifice he leaves the world of men, lived out on the earth, who is 'schicksaalvoll' (394, E1) — and yet it is precisely this world of men which nature, *his pattern*, faithfully and unquestioningly serves, making it habitable and fruitful in the perennial cycle of its seasons (286 ff., E1). Unlike Empedokles, nature cannot grandly withdraw from the presence of sinners: she must love her enemies, as Christ 'commanded' his followers to do (Matthew 5.44), for it is true of the cosmology of Hölderlin as well as of Jesus that the Father 'lässet seine Sonne aufgehen über die Bösen und über die Guten, und lässet regnen über Gerechte und Ungerechte' (Matthew 5.45).¹⁸

The curse Empedokles pronounces on Sicily, and above all Hölderlin's marginal note on this passage, are highly significant in this respect. Empedokles says, with the 'holy' wrath of an Old Testament prophet:¹⁹

. . . es stehe dürr
 Das Land, wo sonst die Purpurtraube gern
 Dem bessern Volke wuchs und goldne Frucht
 Im dunklen Hain, und edles Korn . . . (755–58, E1)

He reverts momentarily to a mechanistic understanding of nature, one which implies 'Herrschaft', 'Gewalt', manipulation, — but by whom, if not by himself? Hölderlin's uneasiness about these lines (he later drew a line through them in the manuscript) suggests that he was aware of the ambiguity in the portrayal of Empedokles which they would have highlighted. This could, I think, have been inferred from the fact of the deletion alone. As it is, he adds in the margin this comment:

'Keinen Fluch! er muss lieben, bis ans Unendliche hin, dann stirbt er, um nicht ohne Liebe zu leben und ohne den Genius; er muss den Rest von Versöhnungskraft, der ihm

vielleicht ohne das wieder in sein voriges heiligheiteres Leben hätte zurückgeholfen, gleichsam *aufzehren*. (4:481, Hölderlin's emphasis)

It must not be the business of Empedokles to pronounce curses, both for the reason I have just suggested and, more importantly still, because the extent of his willingness to love must be seen to be unaffected by the resistance it meets from his fellow-men. It can readily be seen that a new conception of Empedokles's role is emerging here. In the first version as it stands, it is not the case that Empedokles's death *only* occurs when all the love of which he is capable has been expended, when his 'Versöhnungskraft' (which *is* love) has been exhausted. Empedokles decides he will die well before the scene in which the Agrigentines try to 'woo' him back (the fourth scene of the second act), and his death results from his 'Bund' with nature, and not from his relationship with them. Indeed he is finally reconciled with them (1486, E1) and yet at the moment he pronounces the reconciliation his resolve to die could not be stronger. Hölderlin's marginal note indicates that he is beginning to see the death of Empedokles as something which has less and less to do with the latter's personal sin of hubris. In this other marginal note to the opening scene of Act 2, where the sufferings of exile are most evident, Empedokles begins to be seen as victim:

Hier müssen die ausgestandenen Leiden und Schmähungen so dargestellt werden, dass es für ihn zur Unmöglichkeit wird, je wieder umzukehren und sein Entschluss zu den Göttern zu gehen mehr abgedrungen als willkürlich erscheint, dass auch seine Versöhnung mit den Agrigentern sich als die höchste Grossmut darstellt. (4:501)

Again, the timing of his death is, in this version, not connected with the depth of his suffering but with his prayer that he should be given a sign as soon as spiritual 'Läuterung' became necessary (1675 ff., E1).

It would seem then that this evidence of a change in Hölderlin's understanding of the Empedokles figure points us back towards those passages which speak of the patient, suffering earth and in particular towards the passage which establishes *this* love relationship as the reference point for all of Empedokles's experience ('... und oft in heilger Nacht/Gelobt ichs ihr, bis in den Tod/Die Schicksalvolle furchtlos treu zu lieben'; 392–94, E1). In a strange way the Empedokles of E1 seems to anticipate at this point how, in E2 and especially E3, his own fate will come to be patterned almost exclusively on that of the earth,

... und wenn ich oft
Auf ferner Bergeshöhe saß und staunend
Des Lebens heilig Irrsal übersann,
Zu tief von deinen Wandlungen bewegt
Und eignes Schicksal ahndend,
Dann atmete der Aether ... (401–06, E1)

Empedokles's 'Schicksal' in this version is indeed resolved on a mountain, for it is on Etna that he is welcomed back into union with nature as a whole. What he

experiences then is also 'holy' — the representative elements of nature laid out, as it were, before him (1198 ff., E1). However, 'des Lebens heilig Irrsal' is not the realm of nature but of history, and the 'Wandlungen' are not the regular and comforting cycles of the seasons but the disturbing commotions of man's historical life. The trees may lose their leaves as autumn changes into winter, and so be subject to change in one sense, but they are nevertheless for Empedokles symbols of all that is 'irrelos' in the life of divine nature (see line 288, E1). Thus the 'holiness' of nature itself derives at least in part from its *avoidance* of 'Irrsal'. The 'Wandlungen' of which Empedokles here speaks are 'deinen' — the earth's — only because the earth is their arena; it is the 'fate' of the earth to be the passive arena of the chaos of history. Yet although it contrasts so strongly with the order of Empedokles's beloved nature, he can nevertheless discern in the confusion of human affairs something which is 'holy' — some dimension which is still unspecified but which even here he connects with his own future 'fate'. Certainly Empedokles knows that he suffers because of 'der Sterblichen Irrsal' and must allow the wounds of love to be healed by the 'aether' (compare lines 406f. and 328f., E1), but the crucial presence of the adjective 'heilig' indicates that the travail of history is not merely something for which solace must be sought but something *in* which the meaning of Empedokles's own fate must be discovered. His intuition of 'eignes Schicksal' results from the — as yet undeveloped — insight that 'Irrsal' can be seen to be 'holy'.

We have then in E1 significant evidence that the conception of the nature and role of the central character was being modified and rethought even as Hölderlin wrote.²⁰ Empedokles is Christ-like in the way that, as one bringing religious 'enlightenment', he clashes with priestly authority and seeks to liberate his people *from* 'positivity' and *to* a new, child-like directness in their relationship with the divine. But although the religious educator can curse his ignorant antagonist and call down a drought upon his land, strong in the conviction of the rightness of his own cause, the one who models himself on the earth (and who must, therefore, like Christ, forgive his enemies) cannot. Hölderlin becomes aware that Empedokles must win, if at all, by the power of his love. The margin note, 'Keinen Fluch! er muss lieben . . .' seems to echo Jesus's rebuke to the two disciples who, in emulation of Elijah (II Kings 1. 9–16), wanted to call down fire upon the inhospitable Samaritans, an episode related in a passage of Luke's gospel which is designed to stress the Son of Man's willingness to suffer (Luke 9.51–59). As we have seen, Empedokles's actual curse was deleted, but later, in the second act (1140ff., E1), Pausanias threatens to burn the peasant's house down precisely because he refuses to extend hospitality to Empedokles, who is portrayed in the scenes following on after his banishment (Act 1, scene 9 onwards) as one who, as Jesus says of himself in the Luke passage, 'hat nicht, da er sein Haupt hinlege' (Luke 9.58). Empedokles rebukes Pausanias, albeit gently; 'Sei ohne Sorge, Sohn!' (1145, E1).

As we approach Hölderlin's E2 and E3, we are faced, then, with two major questions. In the first place, we have to ask how Hölderlin will integrate into the play his conviction that Empedokles '... muß lieben, bis ans Unendliche hin ...' and, secondly, we have to consider in what sense Empedokles's fate is made to depend on 'Des Lebens heilig Irrsal', man's chaotic and yet somehow sacred history. The passage in which Empedokles recalls his pact with the earth (386 ff., E1) hints that there is a connection between these two questions, but it remains in this version a hint.

In E1 Empedokles's death does have an historical significance of a kind. It *will* make a difference to the inhabitants of Agrigentum whether Empedokles dies or not, and in two senses. First, his death — which he understands as a timely submission to nature — is to serve as an example to them. He appeals to them, 'O gebt euch der Natur, eh sie euch nimmt!' (1533, E1). The renewal they need must issue from a metaphorical death — a death to all those religious traditions to which they have been enslaved in the past. In other words, the renewal in their collective religious life will, Empedokles hopes, become a fact of history thanks to the encouragement his example offers them. Conversely, the advancement of their history towards such renewal could be impeded if Empedokles were not to die. He knows that the regeneration of one individual cannot be a *substitute* for the regeneration of an entire community, but he nevertheless recognizes that the divine economy often requires that there should be an individual catalyst,

Oft sagt ich euch: es würde nacht und kalt
Auf Erden und in Not verzehrte sich
Die Seele, sendeten zu Zeiten nicht
Die guten Götter solche Jünglinge
Der Menschen welkend Leben zu erfrischen. (703–07, E1)

Such 'Jünglinge' are occasional mediators of men's relationship with the 'gods', necessary although that relationship always aspires to be direct and unmediated. Because they are only mediators, there is a constant danger that they will jeopardize that which it is their function to guarantee. Just as the 'sending' of these mediators into the world is necessary, so, therefore, is their death:

... Es muß
Bei Zeiten weg, durch wen der Geist geredet
...
Damit es [das Gefäß] nicht zu andrem Brauche dien',
Und Göttliches zum Menschenwerke werde.
(1747 f., 1755 f., E1)

The religious mediator must die lest he himself, by being idolized, becomes a part of a religion which is mere 'Menschenwerk', that is to say a 'positive' religion.

The death of Empedokles is thus historically significant in a double sense: it is significant as an example which may bring about historical change (a renewed religious life in Agrigentum) and it is significant as the safeguard against the danger that his life might actually create the kind of slavish dependence — this time on Empedokles himself — which it is his purpose to overcome by word and example.

None of this, however, adds up to an absolutely necessary connection between the direction history takes in the particular case of Agrigentum and the death of this unique individual Empedokles. Indeed all of the words we have just quoted are quite clearly intended by Empedokles to be general statements which apply to anyone chosen by the 'gods' for the task of spiritual awakening. When he speaks of 'solche Jünglinge' he has in mind Pausanians, and not himself, but it could of course be applied to anyone through whom 'der Geist geredet' — the coming *and* the departure of any such person would be no less necessary than the coming and departure of Empedokles of Pausanias. But is Empedokles not in fact uniquely significant? It has been suggested that when Empedokles puts to Pausanias the question, 'Wofür/Erkennst du mich?' (1847, E1) and receives the reply, 'O Sohn Uraniens!', Hölderlin is alluding to the moment when Jesus asks the same question of his disciples and receives from Peter the answer, 'Du bist der Christ Gottes' (Luke 9.20).²¹ The suggestion is certainly attractive, for we do feel that this is another of those places in the play where we are somehow close to the New Testament. Yet as Benn aptly observes, referring to the poem 'Gesang des Deutschen' (1799), Urania (because she is the 'letze und . . . erste aller Musen . . .', 2:4, line 51 f.) 'recalls the most glorious age of the past and prepares the new age of glory . . .'.²² If therefore Empedokles is indeed the 'Sohn Uraniens' (he clearly accepts Pausanias's use of the title; line 1848, E1) then, like the poet in 'Gesang des Deutschen' (lines 51 f., 59), he anticipates the new age but must wait for it to be realized: he must 'guess' ('erraten'; 2:4, line 60) what Urania is preparing, and can at the most announce that the new age is imminent. This subordinate position, that of a 'Sohn', is perhaps even more explicit in the words which Hölderlin first used for Pausanias's reply, 'O Götterbote!' (4:560, line 14). Now this eschatological tension is precisely what is *eliminated* by Peter's confession: the Christ, who is to come, has now indeed come.²³

If the sound of an echo from the New Testament still seems to persist it is perhaps because the identity of John the Baptist is, elsewhere in the gospels, the subject of a very similar question and because his reply, like that of Pausanias, points the questioner away from the immediate present (the Baptist insists that he is not the one who 'is to come') and towards the future: 'Ich bin eine Stimme eines Predigers in der Wüste: Richtet den Weg des HERRN!' (John 1.23). There can be no doubt that Empedokles accepts that his role is similar, indeed just before Pausanias's 'O Sohn Uraniens!' he speaks to Pausanias of his relation to

the future in terms which unmistakably echo some other words of John the Baptist;

Mein Liebling! gerne weich ich, lebe du
 Nach mir; ich war die Morgenwolke nur,
 Geschäftslos und vergänglich! und es schlief
 Indes ich einsam blühte, noch die Welt;
 Doch du, du bist zum Tag geboren. (1708–12, E1)

The Baptist expresses almost exactly this thought at John 3.30: 'Er [Jesus] muß wachsen, ich aber muß abnehmen'. Such parallels, striking though they are, might appear to introduce confusion into the argument: is then Pausanias suddenly the 'Christ figure' of the play, the one whose way Empedokles, imitating John the Baptist now, must prepare? In a sense, at this point, the answer must be yes. Yet the real question is not; who 'stands for' Christ in the play?, but; of what kind is the relationship between the individual who channels the divine spirit to men and the new age which is to come? Empedokles's words to his 'Liebling' do not indicate that Pausanias is the one without whom the new age cannot come, only that he, as a 'Jüngling', will play a significant part in it. At the same time, the Empedokles/John the Baptist parallel suggests that Hölderlin is moving towards precisely such a conception — that of an individual whose life and death are absolutely indispensable for the inauguration of the new age, since the coming of the 'Christ of God' whom John awaits *is*, definitively, the coming of the Kingdom. In the third version, Hölderlin once again alludes to New Testament questions about the identity of the Christ and, once again, it is in connection with the Baptist. On that occasion, however, it is Empedokles who, like Jesus in Luke 7.22 ff., refers the questioner to the evident signs that he is indeed the one who is to come and *that there is no other*.

(iv) *The second version*

When Hölderlin quotes from his 'Trauerspiel' in a letter to his brother of June 1799, the passage chosen to give an impression 'wes Geistes und Tones die Arbeit ist' (6:330), the passage which he takes to be representative of the spirit and mood of the whole, is the revised version of the very passage on which the arguments in the preceding pages have been based (371–409, E1). As Hölderlin moved on to a second version of the tragedy, he clearly felt that one theme was of such overriding importance that its main exposition in the play deserved to be quoted in full to the person in whom he had just confided at length and with eloquence and force some of his most deeply held convictions about art, religion and philosophy and the relation of all of these to nature. The function of all of these seminal human activities, so the letter argues, must be to ensure that mankind 'sich . . . bescheiden und fromm vor dem Geiste der Natur beuge, . . .'

(6:329). And the passage which represents the spirit of the revised version of the tragedy is Empedokles's own pious and humble confession of faith in nature.

In view of this letter, consideration of E2 must start from this reworked passage. The changes now introduced reveal the direction of Hölderlin's thinking. I have argued already that the 'education' of Empedokles by a nature which, characteristically, is self-giving can be seen as a form of 'imitatio Christi', particularly if the Christ imitated is thought of as the Christ of Philippians 2. Now the lines,

Und wie du heiter wandelst um die Sterblichen,
 Und himmlischjungendlich den Schein
 Von dir auf jeden eigen überstrahlst,
 Dass alle deines Geistes Farbe tragen,
 So ward auch mir das Leben zum Gedicht. (385–89, E1)

are replaced by the following,

. . . und so wie du
 Das Leben nicht an deinem Tage sparst
 Und sorgenfrei der goldnen Fülle dich
 Entledigest, so gönnt auch ich, der Deine,
 Den Sterblichen die beste Seele gern. (407–11, E2)

Whereas in the earlier lines the impression evoked is primarily that of pervasive and transforming light, with the focus clearly on its universal effects, the revision makes explicit what this universal beneficence had only implied for nature herself (represented by the light in this instance): a willingness to hold nothing back, to be divested of her own 'fulness', without a care for security or selfish enjoyment. Nature does not seek to keep this 'fulness', which *is* her divine life, to herself as the sole ('ledig') proprietor. Hölderlin here moves even closer to the tone and language of Philippians 2. 5–11, particularly through the use of the verb 'entledigen'. The effect on Empedokles himself has also changed. For the relatively bland and uninformative 'So ward auch mir . . .', which suggests at the most Empedokles's *private* joy, we now have '. . . so gönnt auch ich . . .', a change which emphasizes that he has not merely learnt that self-giving is characteristic of the internal life of nature (as when the aether comes with healing to the earth or when the sun bathes the earth in light; 387 and 406, E1) but that this quality is also directed outwards towards the world of men and that his own communion with nature (which is perhaps what is implied by the phrase 'die beste Seele') must therefore also benefit in some way his fellow mortals.

It could of course be argued that this is already the case in E1, that from the beginning Empedokles's joys never remain solely private; witness his desire to pass on to the Agrigentines in Act 2 his 'Heiligtum'. However, the adverb 'gern' in the phrase '. . . so gönnt auch ich . . .', implies something more than mere altruism, as if Empedokles were confessing to having indulged ('gönnt') not only the 'Sterblichen' but also himself. The phrase points us in fact to an idea

which is completely new in E2 and which, by E3, has become of crucial importance for Hölderlin's conception of Empedokles's death: the idea that it is excessive love for men that constitutes his sin.

Nowhere in E1 do we find a statement about Empedokles of this kind; '... er wird es büßen/Daß er zu sehr geliebt die Sterblichen' (l. 62f., E2). It is true, as Benn points out (p. 205), that Hölderlin is here borrowing fairly directly from *Prometheus Vincitus*, where Prometheus accuses himself in a very similar way. And it is also true that the Hermokrates of E2 tends to see the sin of Empedokles throughout as a re-enactment of the sin of Prometheus. Empedokles is accused of stealing from heaven 'die Lebensflamme' (36, E2), that knowledge of the gods which he, as one of the 'Lieblinge des Himmels' (18, E2), has been granted but which Hermokrates considers to be 'Unauszusprechendes' (176, E2). For Hermokrates, this sin is the *consequence* of excessive love for ordinary mortals, but what clearly interests him and enrages him is the sin itself and not, specifically, its motivation. In Hermokrates's sight, Empedokles is guilty of subverting his priestly authority because he has drawn the people into a more immediate experience of the divine than they should be allowed. The conflict between the two still centres, as it did in E1, on Hermokrates's insistence that 'Nicht gegenwärtig werden/Darf Göttliches vor ihnen [den Menschen]' (13f., E2) and the challenge to this religious 'positivity' mounted by Empedokles. Thus although the idea that Empedokles has 'loved too much' is introduced, it is only in the context of what is already known and admitted to be his primary sin — arrogance: Empedokles acknowledges (340f.) that Hermokrates is right to call him 'der Übermütige' (134, E2).

Yet even granting these qualifications, the words of Hermokrates '... er wird es büßen, ...' remain arresting and intriguing. The reason for this is the existence of Hölderlin's 'Keinen Fluch! er muss lieben bis ans Unendliche hin ...' in the margin of the E1 manuscript. As we read Hermokrates's words, we *already* have an intimation that the author is beginning to connect in his mind Empedokles's death and the idea of love which, in some sense or other, is excessive. In some sense or other — this of course leaves much room for differing interpretation and for revision: it could not be claimed at all that the two comments about Empedokles's love are, in E2, brought together and integrated into any overall understanding of life and death. But a new direction to Hölderlin's thinking is emerging: the 'self-giving' of nature is intensified and, as if the one who models himself on nature has to respond, his love begins to emerge as a love which extends to the 'uttermost'. For our purposes, this is the real significance of E2.

(v) *The third version*

The third version is even shorter than the second, which itself runs to no more than 724 lines. Yet it is clear even from the 500 lines of this last 'Versuch' that

Hölderlin's conception of the tragedy has undergone another significant change. This chapter began by analysing the religious conflict which, I argued, formed the centre of E1. Empedokles and Hermokrates were seen to represent fundamentally antagonistic religious stances. This remained true of E2, since even there the basic charge of 'Übermut' could still be levelled against Empedokles. Yet in E3 there is no representative of priestly authority and thus no alternative religious standard by which Empedokles could be judged. Instead, Hermokrates is replaced by Manes, who is not one of Empedokles's compatriots. There is a crucial encounter between Manes and Empedokles (occupying about one third of the fragment's 500 lines) just as in E1 Hermokrates and Empedokles were brought face to face. Yet although Manes does begin by accusing Empedokles of the arrogance of considering himself to be 'Des Himmels Liebling' (337, E3) he knows that his accusation can become irrelevant if Empedokles is indeed the one unique individual whom such arrogance actually befits: 'Nur einem ist es Recht, in dieser Zeit, / Nur einen adelt deine schwarze Sünde' (369f., E3). Unlike Hermokrates, Manes is not concerned to win a religious power struggle by convincing others of the guilt of Empedokles. Rather, his only real concern is to establish the truth about who Empedokles is. Although he begins with confident pronouncement (335 ff., E3) he soon turns to the anxious and far from disinterested question: 'O sage, wer du bist! und wer bin ich?' (402, E3).

What this means is that questions which were only implied in earlier versions are now the very substance of the play. One of these questions (which could not have been raised by someone like Hermokrates, granted the nature of his concerns) is this: Is Empedokles the pure, sinless 'sinner', the one whose sin paradoxically ennoble him? This question depends in its turn on another: What is Empedokles's relationship to his own age? For Manes makes it clear that the historical context is vital: 'Nur einem ist es Recht, *in dieser Zeit*'. Because the historical conditions are as they are, only one type of relationship to his age is possible for the one who is 'der neue Retter' (383, E3). Whatever other forms of 'salvation' might be conceivable in different circumstances, the present age precludes them all.

This last point is one to which we must return in a moment. However, although the question of whether Empedokles is indeed the 'sinless' sinner cannot be fully answered in isolation from the question about historical context (only raised during the encounter with Manes), Empedokles himself does begin to answer it in his opening monologue. There, the charge of excessive love, which had entered E2 obliquely, in the words of Hermokrates, is found on the lips of the 'sinner' and is central to his self-understanding,

Denn viel gesündigt hab ich von Jugend auf,
Die Menschen menschlich nie geliebt, gedient,
Wie Wasser nur und Feuer blinder dient.

Darum begegneten auch menschlich mir
 Sie nicht, o darum schändeten sie mir
 Mein Angesicht, und hielten mich, wie dich
 Allduldende Natur! . . . (35–41, E3)

Empedokles sees the sin for which he has been banished as merely another instance of what has been his 'besetting' sin from his youth. This in itself contrasts strongly with the whole presentation of his sin in the earlier two versions, where it was seen as a decisive and identifiable movement of arrogance, as specific even as a single utterance (e.g. 95 ff., E2). His sin now is a characteristic attitude, and this attitude he associates with 'Allduldende Natur'. As we have seen, men's callous abuse of nature results directly from her 'blind' self-giving. Empedokles too has been 'blind' in the way he has not loved and served 'menschlich', or, as Hölderlin's earlier version of this line expressed it, in the way he has loved 'ohne Mass' (4:644, line 7). What was perceived, momentarily, by Hermokrates as the *motivation* for a quite different sin (62 f., E2) has become the 'sin' itself. The change in Hölderlin's thinking is dramatic: whereas in the first version Empedokles sees his sin as an arrogant self-elevation above nature in which he replicates the typical attitude of the rest of mankind, in the third version he sees it as a tendency to love blindly which replicates the typical quality of nature and which invites the abuse of the rest of mankind.

Even though E3 is brief and fragmentary it seems clear that Hölderlin was seeking to portray Empedokles throughout as one whose main quality is his love. Although this version does not include any direct encounters between Empedokles and the Agrigentines, his violent hostility towards them, so evident at times in E1, is absent now. He was banished 'mit Hohn und Fluch' (26, E3) but his attitude is conciliatory, indeed he admits 'wohl hab ichs verdient!' (32, E3). Pausanias can recall his master's love for the people, speaking of 'Die ungetreue Menge, die du zogst,/Die du am Herzen hegstest, Liebender!' (85 f., E3). In Manes's description of the 'saviour', love is the dominant feature, '... liebend /Nimmt er, was sterblich ist, an seinen Busen, ...' (384 f., E3). And when Empedokles replies to Manes's question 'Bist du der Mann?', he too stresses the relationship which he (finally, at last) enjoys with the 'Volk': 'Und freie feste Bande knüpften wir, ...' (446, E3). While it is true that these thoughts are not completely original to E3 (see, for example, line 89, E1), they are now given far greater weight and are absolutely central to what has become the main issue of the tragedy: the question of the identity of 'der neue Retter'.

For this is how Manes describes the essential nature of this individual,

... denn wie die Rebe
 Von Erde und Himmel zeugt, wenn sie getränkt
 Von hoher Sonn aus dunklem Boden steigt,
 So wächst er auf, aus Licht und Nacht geboren.

(371–74, E3)

The one whose function is to reconcile men and the gods partakes, as he must do, of two natures — a heavenly nature and earthly nature: he is born of light (representing the 'Himmel') and darkness (representing the earth). He is of the earth, and so his love is both *for* the earth (the world of men) and *from* the earth — the 'dunkle Mutter' (242 and 476, E3) whose defining quality is long-suffering love. At the same time he has been 'drawn out' of the earth (like the vine) or 'reared' by the loving touch of the light from heaven. Although it may be true that elsewhere in Hölderlin's work this dual nature is ascribed to man in general (e.g. 'Der Mensch', 1:263) it is here clearly the special prerogative of one individual. When Empedokles had himself posed the question about his identity in E1, line 1847) the reply, echoing that of John the Baptist at John 1.23, had preserved a degree of eschatological tension. Now it is Manes who appears in the role of the Baptist when he states that the one who is to come is 'Ein Grössrer . . . denn ich!' (371, E3), reproducing the sense if not the exact wording of the prophet's 'Der ist's, der nach mir kommen wird . . . deß ich nicht werth bin, daß ich seine Schuhriemen aufflöse' (John 1.27). If Empedokles *is* this 'greater one', whose function cannot be performed by another 'lesser one', then the eschatological tension has been resolved, as in the gospels it is resolved when Jesus is identified as the unique Saviour and Anointed One of God.

Hegel, while evidently sharing Hölderlin's sense of the importance of the religious context out of which the 'saviour' emerges, sees the Baptist differently: 'Der Täufer Johannes war nicht das Licht; er zeugte nur von ihm; er fühlte das Einige, aber es kam nicht rein, nur in bestimmte Verhältnisse beschränkt zu seinem Bewusstsein; er glaubte daran aber sein Bewusstsein war nicht gleich dem Leben . . . Ungeachtet Johannes nicht selbst das φῶς war, so war es doch in jedem Menschen, der in die Menschenwelt tritt . . .' (Nohl, 307). What distinguishes the Baptist (or any other man) from Christ is the level of consciousness of 'das Einige', of or consciousness of the fact that he and God are 'von gleicher Natur' (ibid.). This interpretation can only serve to emphasize, by contrast, that for Hölderlin in E3 the awaited 'saviour' differs from other men in being uniquely equipped ('aus Licht und Nacht geboren'; 374, E3) to perform a certain function and not simply in possessing a (temporary) advantage over other men in the clarity of his sense of the divine. When Manes states 'Ein Grössrer ist, denn ich!' he means to distinguish himself from the one he awaits in terms of the role each must play, and this is in fact much closer to the force of the Baptist's own words as they are reported in the synoptic gospels than to the interpretation of the Baptist's significance which Hegel draws out of the prologue to John's gospel (1. 6–10). The one who is to come will offer a baptism such as John cannot offer (e.g. Matthew 3.10). He will act differently, and not simply think differently.

The Empedokles of E3 is, then, presented as the 'sinless' sinner, the one whose only sin is to have loved to excess. He is no longer involved in a conflict

over rights and wrongs in religion, and so no longer relates to his own age, people and place as one who knows the truth and castigates them for their ignorance and blindness. Instead of corrective education, he comes to give love and service. The service for which his birth 'aus Licht und Nacht' has destined him is that of reconciling 'die Menschen und die Götter' (388, E3) in a period and community where they are alienated from each other. We shall have to say more about the manner and significance of this reconciliation: the point to be made here is that this view of Empedokles's role, although prepared by Hölderlin's marginal revisions to E1 and implied by Empedokles's self-dedication to the earth there (393 ff., E1), is now brought into full prominence.

When we consider this reading of Hölderlin's last 'Versuch' alongside the poem which the author composed for his grandmother at the very end of 1798 (1:272 f.), it is hard to resist the conclusion that the new picture of Empedokles grows directly out of Hölderlin's contemporary understanding of Christ. The poem gives a portrait of Christ which strikingly parallels the features attributed to Empedokles in E3. Christ is the 'Freund unserer Erde' (line 8), and it is the quality of his earthly life which earns him this title,

Allversöhnend und still mit den armen Sterblichen ging er,
Dieser einzige Mann, göttlich im Geist dahin.
Keines der Lebenden war aus seiner Seele geschlossen
Und die Leiden der Welt trug er an liebender Brust.

(1:272, lines 13–16)

Christ's love involves him in the suffering which is the lot of ordinary mortals, not merely through his death on the Cross (which the poem alludes to in the lines which follow these) but, equally, through the very fact of his readiness to 'walk with' others. Hölderlin thus chooses to stress the unassuming ('still') and yet universal nature of the love manifested for the 'armen Sterblichen' during Christ's earthly ministry. The love of the 'saviour' envisaged by Manes is also all-inclusive . . . liebend/nimmt er, *was sterblich ist*, an seinen Busen, . . .' (384, E3, my emphasis). And we have seen how Empedokles's love disregarded the worthiness of its object: 'Die ungetreue Menge, die du zogst, / Die du am Herzen hegstest, . . .' (85 f., E3). Hölderlin's understanding in both the poem and the dramatic fragment is that love which is of this scope and quality is *in itself* capable of bringing about reconciliation between the human and the divine; for in both the 'Versöhnung' is said to occur through the *living presence* of the mediator (385–88, E3). However, in the poem, the benefits which Christ brings to suffering mankind are clearly also linked with his death, even if the adverb 'allversöhnend' itself is not: 'Mit dem Tode befreundet' er sich, im Namen der andern/ Ging er aus Schmerzen und Müh siegend zum Vater zurück' (lines 17–18). This may lack the precision of a theological explanation of Christ's death, but it makes the connection which, from a theological viewpoint, we would expect: Christ's death is for the sake of others and is thus a continuation of

the unselfishness expressed in the reconciling love of his earthly life. We must then ask whether the death of Empedokles in E3, with its new emphasis on his life of love, is also understood to have a connection with the earthly 'ministry'. What, in other words, is now the meaning of Empedokles's death?

In the two earlier versions Empedokles went to his death primarily in personal atonement for a recognizable sin. Death was for him a necessary 'Läuterung' (1682, E1). It is true that his death was also portrayed as being governed by a higher, supra-individual necessity: 'Es muss/ Bei Zeiten weg, durch wen der Geist geredet . . .' (1747, E1). In E3 Manes makes it quite plain that 'der neue Retter' dies although he is pure,

So lenkt er aus, der Abgott seiner Zeit,
Zerbricht, er selbst, damit durch *reine Hand*
Dem Reinen das Notwendige geschehe
Sein eigen Glück, das ihm zu glücklich ist, . . .

(393–96, E3, my emphases)

There is thus no element of *personal* atonement in the death of this unique and 'pure' individual. Indeed Manes's words seem to indicate that Hölderlin was also trying to eliminate any suggestion that others could be held responsible for his death, whereas his marginal revisions to the first version, at least, indicate that at this stage he still saw the death as the result of 'die ausgestandenen Leiden und Schmähungen' (4:504) — Empedokles driven to his death by the mistreatment he receives at the hands of the Agrigentines. From where does the necessity of the death then derive, if not from the need to atone for a personal sin? Manes's own answer is identical to that given by Empedokles himself in E1,

Und daß, wenn er erschienen ist, der Sohn
Nicht größer, denn die Eltern, sei, und nicht
Der heilige Lebensgeist gefesselt bleibe . . . (389–91, E3)

The channelling of this 'Lebensgeist' through chosen individuals, itself part of the divine economy, must not be allowed to serve the purposes of 'positivity'. 'Der heilige Lebensgeist' must not become entrapped within the adulation of one particular individual.

This necessity is however far from being the complete meaning of Empedokles's death. Manes's imperative applies in any age — hence the general phrasing of Empedokles's parallel explanation (1747f., E1) suggests a recurrent necessity. 'Der neue Retter' of E3, the unique individual whose sin ennobles him, does not, however, arise in any age. He arises, specifically, in an age of extreme crisis and confusion, an age characterized by 'Empörung', 'wilde Zwietracht', 'Streit' (379–86, E3). His sin of 'Übermut' is considered as righteousness ('Nur einem ist es Recht') because, granted the gravity of the crisis his age is experiencing, there has to be one in whom the antagonism between man and the gods can spend its force (386, E3). When Empedokles replies to the question 'Bist du

der Mann?' (399, E3), he points to the same historical conditions (lines 425, 428, 435, E3), implying that he too acknowledges that 'der neue Retter' can only be identified and understood in relation to this particular historical moment.

Manes and Empedokles agree, then, in their diagnosis of the age to which 'der neue Retter' must bring peace. Yet although both also consider it necessary that this mediator must die, neither connects directly the necessity of his death with the turmoil of the particular historical moment. It is just this direct connection which Hölderlin makes in the essay 'Grund zum Empedokles'. The content of tragic drama (as Hölderlin is trying to produce it) is defined thus: 'Es ist die tiefste Innigkeit, die sich im tragischen dramatischen Gedichte ausdrückt' (4:150, lines 1–2). The meaning of 'die tiefste Innigkeit' becomes clearer as, in the subsequent elaborations, it is paraphrased as 'ein unendlicheres Göttliche' (*ibid.*, line 8f.), as 'das Lebendige' (itself used in E2 as a virtual synonym for 'Göttliches' (14–16, E2), as 'das Göttliche, das der Dichter in seiner Welt empfindet und erfährt' (*ibid.*, 17f.) and, finally, the ideal state where 'Natur' and 'Kunst' are 'harmonisch entgegengesetzt', 'im reinen Leben' (4:152, line 11). 'Die Vollendung', a term whose dependence on the notion of unity-in-difference became clear in the earlier analysis of *Hyperion*, is this 'harmonious juxtaposition' — the presence of 'das Göttliche' (4:152, line 19). Thus the tragic 'poem' expresses the divine, as far as the poet can experience it 'in seiner Welt'. It does so, therefore, not in a utopian way, as the ideal image of some 'other' world, but in full acknowledgement, if not direct, undisguised representation, of the conflicts which the poet's 'real' world contains. Those conflicts, and the divine presence which speaks through them, must be translated into 'einen fremden analogischen Stoff' (4:150, line 16). It is clearly not the case that in Agrigentum, Hölderlin's 'analogous' setting, 'Natur' and 'Kunst' are 'nur harmonisch entgegengesetzt'. On the contrary, Agrigentum is the arena for a serious conflict between the two principles, since 'der lebhaft, allesversuchende Kunstgeist seines Volks' (4:158, line 5) is the embodiment of that 'Übermut' which encourages self-elevation above nature: Empedokles's original sin in the first two versions.²⁴

It is the very seriousness of the clash between 'Natur' and 'Kunst' which, in the first place, actually produces a character like Empedokles: 'Je mächtiger das Schicksal, die Gegensätze von Natur und Kunst waren, um so mehr lag es in ihnen, sich immer mehr zu individualisieren, einen festen Punkt, einen Halt zu gewinnen . . . So individualisiert sich seine Zeit in Empedokles . . .' (4:157, lines 28–30; 158, line 1). Empedokles 'embodies' — he is literally the bodily expression of — the clash between the two antagonistic principles. As Hölderlin portrays this process of 'embodiment' in the essay,²⁵ Empedokles appears solely as the 'product' of a tendency which is inherent ('um so mehr lag es in ihnen') in entirely impersonal forces. Empedokles exists because he is needed as a 'fest[er] Punkt'. It is the seriousness of the antagonism between 'Natur' and 'Kunst'

which also demands the death of Empedokles. 'Grund zum Empedokles' begins with a discussion of the aesthetic question of how, in the tragic ode and tragic drama, 'das Göttliche' is expressed. Empedokles is himself 'born' to be a poet (4:156, line 1). Yet it is the extreme character of his own age that prevents Empedokles from giving adequate articulation in poetry to 'das Göttliche . . . das [er] in seiner Welt empfindet und erfährt'. Neither is action (presumably political) a fitting response to that age. Empedokles's own life is in fact the only appropriate expression and representation of the extremes of his age:

. . . das Schicksal seiner Zeit . . . erforderte ein Opfer, wo der ganze Mensch das wirklich und sichtbar wird, worin das Schicksal seiner Zeit sich aufzulösen scheint, wo die Extreme sich in Einem wirklich und sichtbar zu vereinigen scheinen . . . (4:156, lines 25–27)

Hölderlin alludes to the death of Empedokles even as he discusses what the living, visible individual man represents: Empedokles is destined to be 'sacrificed' from the moment he is destined to embody the conflicts of his age. This is because although his age is too seriously estranged from 'das Reine' to recognize any expression of it *other than* literal embodiment, that age is for the very same reason in need of a *universal* reconciliation of 'Kunst' and 'Natur' and cannot remain content with their reconciliation in one exemplary individual.

The impression that Empedokles has resolved 'das Schicksal seiner Zeit' is therefore an illusion, and however necessary this illusion may be, it is no less necessary that it should be dispelled. Empedokles must die, for if he continues to live, reconciling in his person the spheres of 'Natur' and 'Kunst', then the illusion that nothing remains to be done will not be revealed for what it is, since the Agrigentines (enjoying through Empedokles a vicarious sense of harmony) will continue to mistake partial fulfilment for universal reconciliation, something which remains completely outside their experience (4:156, lines 30–34). These thoughts are of course in some respects a restatement of earlier arguments against the danger of 'positivity' (particularly line 1750, E1). However the crucial difference is the emphasis on the determining influence of the historical moment: Empedokles is a victim of one thing only, his own acutely alienated age. His death is required less by the general law enunciated in E1 and applicable to any age (1747, E1), than by the tendency of two impersonal forces, *when at a certain moment each is present in extreme form*, to coalesce in one individual and then to move apart once again.²⁶

This account of Empedokles's significance in 'Grund zum Empedokles' is the culmination of that train of thought which began when Empedokles, in E1, glimpsed a connection between the 'Irrsal' of history and his own 'Schicksal'. There, and again in E2, the suffering of nature, the model for Empedokles's own suffering, was traced to mankind's abuse of her. This abuse flows directly from attitudes which the essay characterizes as 'Eine freigeisterische Kühnheit' (4:158, line 24) and 'Nichtanerkennen des Lebendigen' (4:160, line 21 f.). Yet

until E3 and 'Grund zum Empedokles' there was no substance to the thought that this 'Irrsal' of history was in some way 'holy'. What lends the thought substance now is the idea that it is the historical crisis *itself* which both 'gives birth to' and ensures the timely death of 'der neue Retter'. Secular history is revealed, in all its conflicts, to be 'Heilsgeschichte'. Because in E3 Empedokles's only 'sin', like that of nature, is to love 'ohne Mass' he submits willingly to the logic of history and thereby proves that 'Der Menschen wechselnd Irrsal' (416, E2) is indeed 'heilig'.

Before Hölderlin saw the relationship of the 'saviour' Empedokles to his age explicitly in such terms, both he (indirectly) and Hegel (directly) had articulated an understanding of the relationship of the saviour Christ to *his* age which is directly analogous. The second section of '*Der Geist des Christentums . . .*', written in the autumn of 1798 or very early in 1799, begins: 'Jesus trat nicht lange vor der letzten Krise auf, welche die Gärung der mannigfachen Elemente des jüdischen Schicksals herbeizog. In dieser Zeit der inneren Gärung . . . gingen dem letzten Akte mehrere partielle Ausbrüche vorher' (Nohl, 261). The same metaphor of fermentation can be found in Manes's description of the circumstances of the appearance of his 'saviour' (375, E3; cf. 2:7, line 34). Hegel had begun to analyse the elements of the Jew's crisis, which we discussed in the first part of this chapter, as early as 1797. He now begins to refine that analysis by suggesting that Jesus's appearance does not merely happen to coincide with the Jews' last crisis, rather that it precipitates the crisis, for his opposition to their religion is total (Nohl, 261). Hegel stresses that because this clash was in effect a 'Kampf des Reinen mit dem Unreinen' Jesus was forced to warn would-be followers of the consequences: '. . . ich kam nicht, sagte er, der Erde Frieden zu bringen, sondern das Schwert; ich kam, den Sohn gegen seinen Vater zu entzweien, die Tochter gegen ihre Mutter, die Braut gegen ihre Schwieger' (Nohl, 329). It is precisely this disintegration of the most fundamental human relationships which is for Empedokles the major symptom of the crisis of his day (425 ff., E3).

Hölderlin, we saw, describes the tragic drama as a vehicle for the disguised expression of 'das Göttliche, das der Dichter in seiner Welt empfindet und erfährt . . .'. There is no doubt that from the time he composed 'Der Grund zum Empedokles', towards the end of 1799, onwards Hölderlin did begin to discern some divine presence working within the events of his contemporary world. That belief is not announced with the triumphant tone we hear in 'Friedensfeier' (1801), but it is present as the belief that political turmoil, if not an epiphany like the peace of Lunéville, is nevertheless the paradoxical 'revelation' of a concealed god. In 'Der Zeitgeist' of July 1799 we read:

Zu lang schon waltest über dem Haupte mir,
Du in der dunklen Wolke, du Gott der Zeit!
Zu wild, zu bang ists ringsum, und es

Trümmert und wankt ja, wohin ich blicke.

.....

Lass' endlich, Vater! offenen Augs mich dir
Begegnen! (1:300, lines 1–4, 9f.)

'Die Völker schwiegen, schlummerten . . .' of 1797 (1:238) already implies this kind of faith in a divine purpose at work in history since it sees the first of the three coalition wars (1793–97) as the work of 'das Schicksal', work which is designed to keep the nations of Europe from the metaphorical 'sleep' of spiritual and political apathy and indifference. If *Empedokles* is 'ein kühneres und fremderes Gleichnis' (4:150, line 28f.) for this type of perception of Hölderlin's contemporary world, then the letter to his mother of January 1799 becomes highly significant, containing as it does a direct comparison between the poet's times and a third period of history — the period of Christ's ministry. The letter is in part an attack on, ' . . . die Schriftgelehrten und Pharisäer unserer Zeit, die aus der heiligen lieben Bibel ein kaltes, geist- und herztötendes Geschwätz machen . . .' and who have made Christ's 'Wort zum Buchstaben, und ihn, den Lebendigen, zum leeren Götzenbilde, . . .'. These are the people who 'Christum ärger töten als die Juden' (6:309, lines 59–65). Thus for Hölderlin the killing of Christ is being re-enacted in his own day. Although the latter-day Scribes and Pharisees (presumably professional theologians and clerics) purport to worship Christ, it is the worship of an idol and the *effect* is the same as when the historical Jesus was rejected outright by Jewish religious leaders. Both sets of people make of religion something devoid of 'Geist', something 'positive' in the sense in which we have used that term when discussing Hegel. Religion in Hölderlin's day is therefore in the same state as it was when Jesus began his ministry, except that the perverters of true religion now come from the Christian camp (6:310, lines 83–87). Fear is the determining characteristic of this present age of spiritual sterility: fear disrupts men's relationship to the divine and, indirectly, their relationship to each other, since it inspires, according to 'Der Abschied' (1800), malice, vindictiveness, and 'Weltsinn' (2:26).

The malaise of fear is not merely the cause of the private suffering of the lovers in 'Der Abschied', it is for Hölderlin the underlying reason for Europe's political turmoil in the late 1790s. When he wrote 'Der Frieden' in 1799 Europe was experiencing the second coalition war between revolutionary France and its allied opponents: two of the major arenas of the conflict, Italy and Switzerland, are alluded to in the poem (2:6, lines 20–22; cf. 2:391, line 18). The causes however do not lie simply in Europe's recently formed and rapidly changing constellations of power, they are both deeper and more ancient: 'Wer hub es an? wer brachte den Fluch? von heut/Ists nicht und nicht von gestern . . .' (2:6, line 25f.). At work is the old, unholy alliance of the 'will to power' and the fear of one's fellow man:

Zu lang, zu lang schon treten die Sterblichen
Sich gern aufs Haupt, und zanken um Herrschaft sich

Den Nachbar fürchtend, und es hat auf
Eigennem Boden der Mann nicht Segen. (lines 29–32)

The desire for power cannot be restricted to a political meaning, as we have already seen in the case of Hermokrates's aspiration to manipulate nature in the cause of his religion. In 'Dichterberuf' (1800) Hölderlin sees this desire manifested in the sphere of modern scientific knowledge: his own generation is 'ein schlaues Geschlecht' which

. . . zu kennen wähnt . . .
Das Tagslicht und den Donnerer, und es späht
Das Sehrohr wohl sie all und zählt und
Nennet mit Namen des Himmels Sterne.
. . . Doch es zwinget
Nimmer die weite Gewalt den Himmel. (2:47 f., lines 47–56)

Modern, scientific man may indeed be able to observe and name the stars, but nature (in the form here of the 'Himmel') cannot by this method be made to 'yield itself' to man in the exemplary (and for Hölderlin only meaningful) sense in which that is seen to occur in the life of Empedokles. Because the 'Sehrohr' represents the attempt at coercion (knowledge as power) it also represents the absence of love, and where love is absent, there is fear. Thus Hölderlin returns explicitly, again as part of a castigation of the present age, to the interdependence of fear and the exercise of power in 'Der Archipelagus' (1800). In this case it is economic power:

Aber weh! es wandelt in Nacht, es wohnt, wie im Orkus,
Ohne Göttliches unser Geschlecht. Ans eigene Treiben
Sind sie geschmiedet allein, und sich in der tosenden Werkstatt
Höret jeglicher nur und viel arbeiten die Wilden
Mit gewaltigem Arm, rastlos, doch immer und immer
Unfruchtbar, wie die Furien, bleibt die Mühe der Armen.
Bis, erwacht vom ängstigen Traum, die Seele den Menschen
Aufgeht . . . (lines 241–48, my emphases)²⁷

Hölderlin's view of his own age, as it is articulated in these poems of 1799 and 1800, thus corresponds closely to the analysis of the Jewish mentality given by Hegel and to his own account of the dominant attitude in Agrigentum. The whole character of the relationship between the Jews and their God and the Jews and the world, as Hegel had described it from the second half of 1797 onwards, is informed by underlying fear — of a God who is all-powerful and who demands subservience and of a world which is hostile because the God of the Jews is (paradoxically) a jealously guarded national possession. And as we have seen, the religion of Agrigentum not only depends for its authority on a fear of priestly power but contains itself a more basic element of fearfulness about the life of nature as a whole; the Agrigenter live 'in herrischer Furcht des Unbekannten' (4:162).

However, Hölderlin's exploration, through 'einen fremden analogischen Stoff', of the significance of Christ's life and death ultimately goes further than that of Hegel and it does so in a way which prepares for the late hymns, in which Christ is given so explicitly central a position. As we have seen, the *Grund zum Empedokles* understands the death of Empedokles in terms of the need to solve 'das Problem des Schicksals' (4:156, line 32), which is a universal problem affecting an entire community and age, in a universal manner. Reconciliation must be the direct experience of all. The essay therefore holds out the prospect that after Empedokles's death 'die kämpfenden Extreme aus denen er [the mediator] hervorging' will be 'schöner versöhnt und vereinigt, als in seinem Leben' (4:154, line 13f.). Yet for Hegel the 'fate' of Christianity is precisely the fact that the reckless love which Jesus taught cannot be universalized. The private circle of love which he initiated cannot become a fully developed and 'public' religion: 'Im Reiche Gottes kann es keine Beziehung geben, als die aus der rücksichtslosesten Liebe . . . hervorgeht', and yet 'Wegen der Verunreinigung des Lebens konnte Jesus das Reich Gottes nur im Herzen tragen' (Nohl, 328). This insight into the inadequacy of *sheer* love as a basis for the Kingdom is the frustration of the hopes with which Hegel left Tübingen and which, as we saw in chapter two, he still nurtured when he arrived in Frankfurt. Hegel uses the metaphor of organic growth to point up the extent of Jesus's failure: 'Liebe die Blüte des Lebens; Reich Gottes der ganze Baum mit allen notwendigen Modifikationen, Stufen der Entwicklung . . .' (Nohl, 398) and when Empedokles seeks to convince Pausanias that they must be separated (through Empedokles's death), he echoes the metaphor almost exactly,

Die Liebe stirbt in ihrer Knospe nicht
Und überall in freier Freude teilt
Des Lebens luftger Baum sich auseinander. (178–80, E3)

For Hegel, the love of Christ and his followers does die a metaphorical death, the victim of the unloving Jewish spirit. The final speeches of E3 show us, I think, how Hölderlin justifies the optimism of Empedokles by a bold and radically new vision of a love which cannot be put to death.

The climax of this version is ushered in when Manes puts the question 'Bist du der Mann?'. This, as we have suggested, can be read as an echo of the question which John the Baptist puts to Jesus from his prison cell, 'Bist du der da kommen soll, oder sollen wir eines andern warten?' (Luke 7.19). Jesus's reply points John to his healing miracles: they are to be taken as 'signs' which themselves 'indicate' the answer to the question:²⁸

. . . saget Johanni wieder, was ihr höret und sehet: Die Blinden sehen und die Lahmen gehen, die Aussätzigen werden rein und die Tauben hören, die Todten stehen auf und den Armen wird das Evangelium gepredigt. (Matthew 11.3–5)

All of these works are acts of loving service to suffering mankind, even to those who have suffered death itself. Clearly reference to miracles of a different type (for example Jesus's walking on the water or his calming of the storm) would not adequately answer the question about his identity: when asked who he is, Jesus replies, in effect, that he is the one who brings his love (a love stronger than death) to bear on human need.

When Empedokles replies to Manes's question he does so by referring not merely to the way he has appeased 'der scheidende Gott' (437, E3) of Agrigentum during his lifetime, but also to a sign which is about to be given: '. . . denn heute bereitet er, der Herr der Zeit, zur Feier, / Zum Zeichen, ein Gewitter mir und sich' (465–67, E3). Because the 'Gewitter' is a sign it needs to be interpreted:

. . . wenn itzt, zu einsam sich,
 Das Herz der Erde klagt, und eingedenk
 Der alten Einigkeit die dunkle Mutter
 Zum Aether aus die Feuerarme breitet,
 Und itzt der Herrscher kömmt in seinem Strahl,
 Dann folgen wir, zum Zeichen, das wir ihm
 Verwandte sind, hinab in heilge Flammen. (474–80, E3)

The 'Gewitter' is interpreted as the 'descent' (in the lightning bolt) of Zeus, the king or 'ruler' of the gods. Zeus is of course the thunderer; thus Empedokles suggests that only one who is 'des Donnerers Vertrauter' will have a correct understanding of what is about to happen (471 f., E3). Yet this sign is being prepared by 'der Herr der Zeit', the 'deity' who has already been described by Manes as 'finster blickend über der Empörung' (379, E3). It seems clear from the apostrophization of the 'god' 'in der dunklen [i.e. storm] Wolke' as 'du Gott der Zeit' in 'Der Zeitgeist' (1:300) that the 'Donnerer' and the god mysteriously active in the chaos of history are to be thought of as one. But if we therefore 'demythologize' this part of Empedokles's speech and think of the 'Herr der Zeit' merely as the power of 'Schicksal'²⁹ or as the 'Geschichtsprozess' (Jamme, p. 313 f.) we miss its main point, which is the idea of a divine descent — for which Zeus provides the mythological archetype.

The descent of the 'Herrscher' enacts the re-creation of a mythological primeval unity once enjoyed by the earth and the heavens. This unity is a topos which we have already encountered in *Hyperion* (3:54) and which, in that context, was a cosmic projection of the completely mutual self-giving of the two lovers. Empedokles 'reads' the fire emerging from the crater of Etna as an expression of longing for the lost unity and the noise from the crater (possibly) as the groaning of the earth as it suffers the pain of separation from its 'beloved'. In the *Hyperion* passage, 'Gewitterwolken' are one partial and temporary recreation of that unity, the life-giving rain they discharge being a 'Genuß' for the earth. The lightning is, in Empedokles's mind, similarly an expression of self-giving love, for by coming 'down' to 'die dunkle Mutter', the 'Herrscher'

abandons his position of dominance. If that position is not abandoned, the primeval unity cannot be restored.

Empedokles knows that this sign is a sign *for him* (465–67, E3). What, for Empedokles, will the descent of the ‘Herrscher’ signify? Surely it will confirm his conviction that his calling is to be a servant and not a ruler. He knows the danger of the exclusive nature of the people’s adulation (448–50, E3) and so can see that his way must not be the way of temporal power (455f., E3). Yet the sign of the ‘Gewitter’ has a further level of meaning which takes the figure of Empedokles, for the first time, into the realm of myth.

The sign which Empedokles awaits is to be an act of *cosmic* reconciliation. If the primeval separation of the earth and the heavens is overcome, then clearly reconciliation is universal and complete. By associating the death of Empedokles in Mount Etna so closely with this cosmic drama, Hölderlin suggests that his death is itself in some way instrumental in the re-creation of the ‘alte Einigkeit’ — that he himself becomes in his death a *cosmic* mediator. Empedokles sees his own death, the moment for which is about to be signalled by the lightning bolt, as a *sign* in its turn ‘daß wir ihm / Verwandte sind, . . .’ (479f., E3): thus the meaning given to the death of the ‘saviour’ by Manes (391, E3) cannot exhaust its *significance*. Only if Empedokles’s death is seen as a loving descent into the earth, an act of condescension, does the idea of a ‘relationship’ between him and the one who ‘comes down’ ‘in seinem Strahl’ become fully meaningful. Certainly such a reading of the text must be tentative,³⁰ but this final scene is itself tentative throughout, for the precise reason that the characters themselves are seeking a proper understanding of the saviour’s identity and mission. Empedokles’s self-understanding here is quite new and is surely inspired by the parallel which Pausanias draws in the preceding scene between his mentor and Hercules,

Beim göttlichen Herakles! stiegst du auch,
Um die Gewaltigen, die drunten sind,
Versöhnend die Titanen heimzusuchen,
Ins bodenlose Tal, vom Gipfel dort,
Und wagtest dich ins Heiligtum des Abgrunds,
Wo duldend vor dem Tage sich das Herz
Der Erde birgt, und ihre Schmerzen dir
Die dunkle Mutter sagt — o du der Nacht,
Des Aethers Sohn! ich folgte dir hinunter! (ll. 235–44, E3)

Like Manes (372–74, E3), Pausanias refers to the dual nature of Empedokles’s origin, but unlike Manes (who had seen it as the qualification for the role of a *living* mediator only) he identifies the ‘son of the night’ as the one who, like Hercules, could take his work of reconciliation even into the realm of ‘die dunkle Mutter’, that is to say into the realm of death, the underworld. It is true that Hölderlin here conflates four different mythological traditions: the tradition that

Hercules wrestled with and defeated death in the underworld, the (separate) legends that the monster Typhon and the giant Enceladus lay buried beneath Mount Etna (see Benn, p. 207) and the story of the imprisonment of the Titans. However the meaning of Pausanias's vision is clear: beyond his own death in the crater, Empedokles is seen bringing solace (if not, explicitly, release) to those who are captive and comfort to the 'dunkle Mutter'. Implicit in Pausanias's words is, furthermore, the thought that this costly act of love will bring with it the reward of elevation to divine status or glorification, since he refers to Hercules as 'göttlich', an epithet he earns after, and as a consequence of, the completion of his Labours — the most heroic of these being his descent into Hades.³¹

Thus the sign which Empedokles awaits can be read as a sign to him that he is called to perform actually the work which Pausanias only describes hypothetically. For us, the readers of the text, this means that Empedokles's story becomes inserted into a mythological scheme. His willingness (though innocent) to go 'hinab in heilige Flammen' (line 480) is a sign to others that he is 'der neue Retter' not just because of what he has done during his lifetime but because, through his death, he is related to a myth of cosmic reconciliation. This is certainly very different from the way his willingness to die is represented in the earlier two versions. There, it is also seen as a sign, most clearly at the end of E2: 'Denn einmal bedurften/Wir Blinden des Wunders' (723 f., E2). The 'miracle' needed is not a physical healing of the eyes but a metaphorical return of sight to those who cannot see that the 'heilig All' of nature is deathless. Empedokles's self-sacrifice 'bears witness' to this truth (717, E2). However, this is a sign whose value is strictly educational; it is for those who are left behind to learn from Empedokles's example so that they can *themselves*, by their revitalized communal religious life, begin to be reconciled to the gods. If they do not learn, there is no help for them — as the whole tone and spirit of Empedokles's parting exhortation in E1 make clear.

In this *purely* educational sense, none of the miracles listed in Matthew 11.3 ff. (to which we have seen a parallel in 399, E3) are signs. They all alleviate real suffering and some of them overcome the power of death itself. They all, however, occur during the earthly ministry of Jesus, and as such only bring about a partial and occasional reconciliation of mankind and God, and thus fall short of that idea of cosmic reunion which Hölderlin seems to be exploring in the final scene of E3.

Yet on one other occasion, when Jesus is asked quite explicitly for a sign, he gives an answer which the two passages I have been analysing (235 ff., and 474 ff., E3) echo in a remarkable way. The request (Matthew 12.38) comes from the 'Schriftgelehrten und Pharisäer', whose modern-day equivalents Hölderlin had attacked so bitterly for their 'killing' of Christ, 'den Lebendigen' (6:308). Jesus answers:

Die böse und chebrecherische Art suchet ein Zeichen, und es wird ihr kein Zeichen gegeben werden denn das Zeichen des Propheten Jonas. Denn gleich wie Jonas war drey Tage und drey Nächte in des Wallfisches Bauch, also wird des Menschen Sohn drey Tage und drey Nächte mitten in der Erde seyn. (Matthew 12.39–40)

Luther's 'mitten in der Erden' translates the Greek 'ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ τῆς γῆς', which is given in modernized forms of Luther's Bible as 'Schoß der Erde', but in almost all English versions of the New Testament quite literally as 'heart'. Hölderlin's use of the phrase 'Herz der Erde' twice (240f. and 475, E3) in contexts which picture the death of the 'saviour' and his descent into the earth, is surely an attempt to create a powerful Christian resonance in precisely the passages which express a new understanding of Empedokles's death.

In the early Christian tradition, reflection on the three days and nights spent by Jesus in the 'heart of the earth' gives rise to the teaching that during this period he descended into hell. In Peter's first sermon after Pentecost (Acts 2. 14ff.) Psalm 16 is invoked as evidence of the fact that the Resurrection was foretold in the Old Testament scriptures: the soul of the Holy One of God was not to be abandoned to Hades (verse 27) nor his flesh allowed to see corruption. Peter (quoting from the Septuagint) uses the Greek word, '(εις) Αἴδην' signifying the underworld, the place of the dead. Luther translates Acts 2.27 'Denn du wirst meine Seele nicht in der Helle [Hölle] lassen'. This tradition is developed in Ephesians 4.7–10, where Paul argues that if Christ has ascended into the heights then he must also have descended 'hinunter . . . in die untersten Oerter der Erde', and in I Peter, where we read that after his death Christ went 'in the spirit', 'und hat geprediget den Geistern im Gefängnis' (I Peter 3.19). This probably alludes to the fallen angels, who, according to the pseudepigraphic I Enoch 10.11–14, were imprisoned in an abyss, awaiting judgement for their rebellion. (Pausanias imagines Empedokles descending 'ins Heiligtum des Abgrunds'; 239, E3). These same angels are said, in Jude 6, to be imprisoned 'mit ewigen Banden im Finsternis'. I Peter 4.6 appears to widen the scope of Christ's preaching by stating, quite simply, that the gospel was preached to 'den Todten'. The tradition which these passages embody explains why the New Testament, when speaking of the exaltation of Christ, claims that he will receive praise and honour not only from everything in heaven and on earth but also from everything *under the earth*. Apart from Revelation 5.13, this idea can also be found in Philippians 2.10, at the end of that hymn to Christ's self-emptying love which implicitly guides the whole process of reformulation by which Hölderlin finally arrives at the Empedokles figure of E3.

It could be objected that to use a passage which explicitly invokes the Hercules myth as support for Christological reading of the ending of E3 is to indulge in wilful distortion. Yet the Hercules story, which until Pausanias's words has not been used anywhere in *Empedokles*, is only appropriate *at all* because of the way Hölderlin has been gradually drawing out the implications of Empedokles's

closeness to the suffering earth, and that closeness is a theme which demands, as I have attempted to show, to be considered with an ear for its Christian resonances. It could also be pointed out that Hölderlin's most significant uses of the Hercules myth from 1800 onwards, when he had certainly abandoned *Empedokles* for good — I mean, of course, the various versions of 'Der Einzige' and 'Brod und Wein' — are based on an explicit wish to explore the common ground it shares with the story of Christ. To deny that there is present here (235, E3) an implicit wish to do the same is to go against what we know, with hindsight, to have been the emerging direction of Hölderlin's thinking.

The interpretation I have offered of the way Empedokles's death is presented in E3 reveals the far-reaching nature of the change in Hölderlin's conception of Empedokles's role since E1. There, one indication of the direction of that change was the marginal note '... er muß lieben, bis ans Unendliche hin ... er muss den Rest von Versöhnungskraft ... gleichsam aufzehren' (4:481). If Empedokles begins finally to be cast in the role of cosmic mediator, then clearly Hölderlin has left far behind the idea that the tragic hero's 'Versöhnungskraft' could be exhausted by the spiritual poverty of the world around him. The phrase 'bis ans Unendliche hin' now comes, in a sense, into its true meaning: whereas, before, the imperative to love 'limitlessly' was in fact limited by the moment of death ('dann stirbt er. . .'), the love of the one who descends through his death to where the suffering 'Herz der Erde' lies hidden is more truly 'unendlich'. The marginal note seems to echo John 13.1, '... wie er hatte geliebet die seinen, die in der Welt waren, so liebete er sie biß ans Ende'. The Greek suggests that John probably intends a double meaning: Jesus not only loved his followers right up to the moment of his death, he loved them to the uttermost (by dying for them).³²

In this way, Hölderlin begins to diverge significantly from Hegel, as I have already suggested. For the statement '... dann stirbt er, um nicht ohne Liebe zu leben und ohne den Genius ...' is actually more appropriate to Hegel's Jesus, whose 'glorification', although associated clearly enough with his death, is an essentially private affair, a kind of moral victory *over* the world (tinged with a strong element of tragedy), rather than a cosmic victory *on behalf of* the world:

... die Verherrlichung des Menschensohnes in diesem Untergange ist nicht das Negative, alle Beziehungen an sich mit der Welt aufgegeben zu haben, sondern das Positive, der unnatürlichen Welt seine Natur versagt, und sie lieber im Kampf und Untergang gerettet ... zu haben.' (Nohl, 317)

Jesus's refusal to be contaminated by the world is for Hegel his 'Schönheit der Seele' (Nohl, 286). The presence of a world which is fundamentally antagonistic to Jesus Hegel terms 'das vollständigste Schicksal' (*ibid.*), but, as Jesus withdraws from contact with that world, 'so hat er sich zugleich über alles Schicksal erhoben' (*ibid.*). The tragic irony of this 'victory' over 'das Schicksal' is the fact that it prevents the Kingdom of God, which Jesus came to initiate, from ever

being realized. This is therefore Hegel's melancholy conclusion about Jesus's undertaking:

Diese Beschränkung der Liebe auf sich selbst, ihre Flucht vor allen Formen, wenn auch schon ihr Geist in ihnen wehte, oder sie aus ihm entsprängen, diese Entfernung von allem Schicksal ist gerade ihr grösstes Schicksal, und hier ist der Punkt, wo Jesus mit dem Schicksal zusammenhängt und zwar auf die erhabenste Art, aber von ihm litt. (Nohl, 324)

Empedokles's relation to 'das Schicksal' is, we can now see, finally quite different. His own 'fate' is, like that of the earth, 'Die Schicksaalvolle', to fall victim to the 'Irrsal' of history, or to the power of 'fate' at work in his own age. But that 'Irrsal' can be seen as something holy. Whereas, furthermore, in Hölderlin's initial conception of Empedokles, his death was quite simply escape from the power of 'Schicksal', in E3 it is (at the very least) participation in the healing of the division which is the archetypal expression of the power of 'Schicksal' — the division of heaven and earth (3:54). The 'glorification' of the new 'saviour', by contrast with Hegel's 'Verherrlichung des Menschensohnes', is the validation of his self-sacrifice by a cosmic sign. The tragedy ceases to be a tragedy, as of course it also does in the New Testament preaching, which sees the Cross as the means of cosmic reconciliation:

Denn es ist das Wohlgefallen gewesen, daß in ihm alle Fülle wohnen sollte, und *alles* durch ihn versöhnet würde zu ihm selbst, *es sey auff Erden oder im Himmel*, damit daß er Friede machte durch das Blut an seinem Kreuz, durch sich selbst. (Colossians 1. 19f., my emphases)

In this chapter I have attempted to show that the various *Empedokles* versions, and the theoretical reflections which accompany them, constitute a project which is no less theological, indeed which is even more profoundly theological, than the novel *Hyperion* and that the 'theology' which they embody is recognizably Christian. If the continuity of Hölderlin's concern with the problem of Christ is to be fully appreciated, it is essential to see his work on the Empedokles theme in the context of Hegel's Frankfurt essays. More important still, it is essential to realize that the first version of *Empedokles* already contains implicitly what the third version makes explicit — the idea that Empedokles is to give himself up 'even unto death' out of love for others and that his death, like the death of Christ, is both wholly necessary and wholly innocent. The necessity derives in the case of Empedokles from the way the movement of history culminates in a moment of crisis from which the only possible exit is the death of the individual in whom the antitheses of the age were most clearly embodied. The historical crisis portrayed in the drama, and discussed in the 'Grund zum Empedokles' essay, is exactly analagous both to the spiritual crisis out of which, according to Hegel's analysis, the religion of Christ is born and to that which for Hölderlin afflicts his own age. Yet the spiritual chaos and disorientation of

Agrigentum, the 'Irrsal' of its history, calls forth the 'Retter' and is thus shown to be 'heilig', and this is why Hölderlin can speak of the 'tragic poem', his *Empedokles* project, as an analogue not merely of the godlessness and confusion of his own age and country but also of 'das Göttliche . . . , das der Dichter in seiner Welt empfindet und erfährt'. It is true of both Agrigentum and Germany in the late 1790s, that secular history becomes 'Heilsgeschichte'.

NOTES TO CHAPTER THREE

1. In what follows I shall use the following forms of reference: 1) *Empedokles* when speaking of Hölderlin's entire project, without specific reference to any of the successive versions; 2) E1, E2, E3, to identify each of these versions as given in volume IV of the GStA; 3) *Empedokles* to refer to the central character of the work. Line references within my own text will be in the form: 344, E1, i.e. line 344 of the first version.
2. W. Kirchner, *Hölderlin: Aufsätze zu seiner Homburger Zeit* (Göttingen, 1967), p. 120.
3. Christoph Jamme, "'Ein ungelehrtes Buch'" . . .
4. E. Petzold, *Hölderlins 'Brod und Wein': ein exegetischer Versuch* (Darmstadt, 1967 = reprint of the original edition, Sambor, 1896), p. 37f.
5. Jamme, p. 208. Virtually the same argument appears in J. Hoffmeister, *Hölderlin und Hegel* (Tübingen, 1931). Hoffmeister (p. 41) connects the 'Verchristlichung' of the figure of *Empedokles* with a sudden discovery of Christ — 'des lange gesuchten, unbekanntes Gottes' — for the first time, around 1799.
6. This passage is included in Hamacher's more recent edition of Hegel's theological writings, which contains some material not published by Nohl, notably what look to be notes for the passage on Abraham. See G. W. F. Hegel, *'Der Geist des Christentums'. Schriften 1796–1800*, edited with an introduction by W. Hamacher (Frankfurt am Main, Berlin, Vienna, 1978), p. 351.
7. The mutual enjoyment of 'Knabe' and nature is, significantly, characterized by the element of 'play': see 1:266, lines 4–8.
8. This material first occurs in some notes given in Nohl, 398–402, but is also incorporated without substantial changes in the fourth of the *'Der Geist des Christentums'. . . essays* (see Nohl, 315). Schüler considers the date of both versions of the material to be autumn 1798/early 1799.
9. '... der unentwickelten Einigkeit stand die Möglichkeit der Reflexion, der Trennung gegenüber; in dieser ist die Einigkeit und Trennung vereinigt, ein Lebendiges, das sich selbst entgegengesetzt worden war (und sich selbst igt fühlt) aber diese Entgegensetzung nicht absolut machte' (Nohl, 379). This means that the basic structure of 'salvation' is Trinitarian, if we take as 'Trinitarian' the Hegelian interpretation analysed in Chapter Two, 'Eighteenth-century reinterpretations of John: Lessing and Hegel' (see pp. 55f. above).
10. For Hegel, 'Reflexion' and 'Trennung' operate as virtual synonyms: see preceding note.
11. Hegel uses 'Genien' to mean something very similar when he writes of the Jews, '... sie hatten . . . aller Genien, in denen die Menschen vereinigt sind, sich entäussert und die Natur in fremde Hände gelegt . . .' (Nohl, 290).
12. *Empedokles* refers to the trees as 'die Bescheidenen' (287, E1). Cf. also 3:155, 'die geduldige Natur'.
13. The Jews as a whole are said, in the last of the *'Der Geist des Christentums'. . . essays* to be proud in their very servility, '... aber sie gefielen sich zu sehr in dem Stolge ihrer Knechtschaft . . .' (Nohl, 325).
14. H. G. Boehm contrasts this 'living' relationship with the water with the 'lifeless' water of Abraham described by Hegel (see note 6 above). His point complements mine, since Jesus functions for Hegel as the antithesis in every way to Abraham. See H. G. Boehm, 'Das Todesproblem bei Hegel und Hölderlin (1797–1800)' (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Marburg, 1932), p. 72.
15. Hoffmeister (p. 49f., fn. 29) lists a number of situational parallels: Jesus and the Pharisees / *Empedokles* and Hermokrates; Jesus and his women followers / *Empedokles* and Delia and Panthea; *Empedokles*'s refusal of the crown / Jesus's rejection of temporal power (John 12.36), and so on. Yet he does not attempt any overall christological reading of the work. Indeed his interpretation of the death of *Empedokles* in particular seems to me to be inadequate. See below note 20.

16. Kempter (p. 128f.) includes the lines from Empedokles's speech in a list of 'biblische Gleichnisse', but (surprisingly) does not bother to give the biblical source, neither (more importantly) does he refer to Hegel's use of the Deuteronomy passage as an illustration of the failure of Jewish religion.
17. Compare this with II Corinthians 5.17, cf. also 1530, E1: 'Neugeborene'.
18. The 'himmlisch Licht' which Empedokles addresses in lines 367ff. sends its rays 'auf jedes eigen', without partiality.
19. See, e.g., Amos 4.9; 7.1-3, and Deuteronomy 28.22.
20. Hoffmeister (p. 42) is adamant that in E1 the central character is 'ein promethischer Schwärmer, der sein Leben in den Tod zusammendrängt — nicht der in Knechtsgestalt leidende Menschensohn ...'.
21. For example by P. Böckmann, *Hölderlin und seine Götter* (Munich, 1935), p. 258.
22. Friedrich Hölderlin, *Der Tod des Empedokles*, edited by M. B. Benn (Oxford, 1968), p. 202.
23. The structure of Luke's gospel narrative seems, at this point, to be designed to emphasize this overcoming of the eschatological tension: immediately after Peter's confession, he places Jesus's statement 'Es sind etliche von denen, die hie stehen, die den Tod nicht schmecken werden, bis daß sie das Reich Gottes sehen' (Luke 9.27). One line of interpretation here holds that the 'visible' and apparently imminent 'appearance' of the Kingdom to which Jesus refers is his own Transfiguration, narrated by Luke immediately after these words. Some of those standing before Jesus as he speaks (namely Peter, John, and James) are thus vouchsafed a vision of the 'Kingdom' — well before their deaths. See A. R. C. Leaney, *A Commentary on the Gospel according to St. Luke* (London, 1958), p. 166.
24. I have argued that the sin of which Empedokles is guilty in E1 and E2 — the sin of self-elevation over nature — is, in its institutionalized form, the religion which the priest Hermokrates represents. In E2 Empedokles speaks of his sin in terms which make the continuity between the portrayal of Agrigentum in the play and the vocabulary used in the essay quite explicit:

... o Geist,
Geist, der mich gross genährt, du hast
Dir deinen Herrn, hast, alter Saturn,
Dir einen neuen Jupiter
Gezogen, einen schwächeren nur und frecheren. (349-52, E2)

The usurping of Saturn's place by his son Jupiter becomes here a figure for the usurping of nature's rightful place of pre-eminence by the son she has reared, Empedokles. As it is clear from the poem 'Natur und Kunst oder Saturn und Jupiter' (and particularly from some of its variants, see 2:457), the myth of the relationship between Saturn and his son represents for Hölderlin, in more general terms, an archetype of the relationship between 'Natur' and 'Kunst', of what it should be and of how it has been perverted. Thus when Hölderlin speaks, in the essay, of the 'Kunstgeist' of the Agrigentines, it is evident that he means the same attitude which, from the beginning, has been said to constitute Empedokles's sin.

25. For a reliable overall description and analysis of this process, and of the essay in general, see L. Ryan, *Hölderlins Lehre vom Wechsel der Töne* (Stuttgart, 1960), pp. 332-44.
26. Again, see Ryan, pp. 332ff., on this point. See also the 'Entwurf zur Fortsetzung der dritten Fassung', where Manes is given the role of identifying Empedokles as 'der Berufene, der tödte und belebe, in dem und durch den eine Welt sich zugleich auflöse und erneue' (4:168).
27. In 'Friedensfeier' the threat of a re-emergence of this combination (expressed, as if to heighten the paradoxical interdependence, by the compound adjectival noun 'furchtsamgeschäftiges') casts a shadow over Hölderlin's faith that the peace of Lunéville betokened a change of heart on the part of his age. See 3:538, line 156.
28. The gospel of John in particular often presents the miracles of Jesus as signs whose purpose is to engender belief in Christ as the Son of God, see John 20.30f., 2.11 and *passim*. See also R. Bultmann, *Das Evangelium des Johannes* (Göttingen, 1941), p. 78f.
29. As in G. Wagner, *Hölderlin und die Vorsokratiker* (Würzburg, 1937), p. 118.
30. Not so tentative, however, that we can regard Hoffmeister's view of Empedokles's death as a plausible alternative: of Jesus and Empedokles he writes (p. 50, fn. 29), 'Die treibende Idee bei beider Selbstverständnis des Untergangs ist die Unendlichkeitssehnsucht.' There is a similar view of the death of Empedokles in H. Rumpf, 'Die Deutung der Christusgestalt beim späten Hölderlin' (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Frankfurt am Main, 1958), where Christ is said to be, in Hölderlin's late hymns, 'immer deutlicher dem Menschlichen, dem Konkreten, dem Geschichtlichen zugeordnet — all jenen eingegrenzten Wirklichkeiten also, die Empedokles jauchzend hinter sich läßt. So erscheint der Tod des Empedokles schließlich auch nicht mehr als Sühne, er wird zum Fest' (p. 125). It is precisely in the third version of the tragedy — i.e. 'schließlich' — that his death ceases to be a private act of escape and becomes, through the

christological associations discussed above (p. 123f.), a sacrificial and atoning act. Contrary to Rumpf's claim (p. 133), Empedokles does encounter, though his descent to 'the heart of the earth' (p. 124 above), 'das Dämonische des Bösen'. By playing off the Christ of Hölderlin's late hymns *against* Empedokles, instead of reading the drama in the light of the gospels and of Hegel's essays, Rumpf distorts the picture.

31. In his analysis of 'Der Rhein' (1801), Hötzer shows how, underlying the poem, is the idea of Hercules as 'Urbild des harmonischen Ausgleichs von göttlicher Schicksallosigkeit und menschlicher Schicksalsgebundenheit' and argues that 'die im Wesen und in der Gesalt des Halbgotts sichtbar vollzogene Versöhnung göttlichen und menschlichen Lebens steht am Beginn der Wiedervereinigung des gespaltenen Kosmos'. He is right to stress that Hercules's apotheosis *results from* his heroic endurance of mankind's 'Schicksalsgebundenheit', but wrong to suggest that the healing of the cosmos is only heralded by 'Der Rhein' in 1801: the words of Pausanias here are clearly about just this healing. See U. Hötzer, *Die Gestalt des Herakles in Hölderlins Dichtung* (Stuttgart, 1956), pp. 104, 105.
32. See C. K. Barrett, *The Gospel according to St. John* (London, 1955), p. 365.

CHAPTER FOUR

'FRIEDENSFEIER' AND THE NAMING OF CHRIST

(i) Introduction

The purpose of this chapter will be to show how the christological concerns identified in chapters two and three are developed in the years 1800 and 1801 and brought to a climax in the poem 'Friedensfeier'. The climax takes the form of a hymn which celebrates the coming of the *eschaton* within history and which makes this eschatological fulfilment dependent upon the universal acknowledgement of Christ, the Prince of Peace. Other poems discussed in this chapter, notably 'Wie wenn am Feiertage . . .', 'Der Mutter Erde' and 'Brod und Wein', will be seen to mark successive stages in Hölderlin's attainment of this faith in the historical realization of the *eschaton* and in his thinking about what the acknowledgement of Christ must entail.

The period from the summer of 1799 to the end of 1801 is characterized, in the first place, by a tension between Hölderlin's belief in the spiritual vocation of the poet in his time and his difficulty in establishing himself independently as a writer — and so in finding a proper channel through which to reach his contemporaries. The period is, secondly, characterized throughout by a deep interest in the political affairs of Europe.

The example of the projected literary journal *Iduna* illustrates the first point: the major purpose of the journal, according to the letter to Schelling of July 1799, was 'die Menschen, ohne Leichtsinn und Synkretismus, einander zu nähern . . .' (6:347). To this end, Hölderlin tried to obtain the collaboration of Schiller, Goethe, Heinse, Bouterwek, Matthison, F. W. Jung, and Schelling (6:931). Yet we also know that Hölderlin hoped to be able to live solely from his earnings as editor (6:349). The failure of the plans for the journal, due in part to the indifferent response of 'die Berühmten' (6:366), thus frustrated two ambitions. Yet even after this failure, in November 1799, Hölderlin can overcome his bitterness and write to his mother, 'Ich bin mir tief bewußt, daß die Sache, der ich lebe, edel, und daß sie heilsam für die Menschen ist . . .' (6:372) and in January 1800 he claims, again to his mother, 'daß ich den Menschen mit meinem jezigen Geschafte wenigstens eben so viel diene und fromme, als im Predigt- amte . . .' (6:384). Hölderlin left Homburg in June 1800 and returned home to

Nürtingen, but then spent the rest of the summer and the autumn in Stuttgart as a guest of Christian Landauer, an educated businessman who had taken an interest in Hölderlin from 1795. This period of relative calm and contentment could not dispel the anxieties about long-term financial security: Hölderlin realized that there was no alternative to another job as private tutor, and in January 1801 he left for Hauptwil in Switzerland to take up a post with the family of Anton von Gonzenbach.

This employment was to last until April and so Hölderlin returned home once again. That summer he asked both Schiller and Niethammer for help in establishing himself in Jena, where he planned to lecture on Greek literature (6:421–23). It seems very probable that neither of them replied. As Hölderlin was determined not to take on a living in the Protestant Church, there was no choice but to seek employment yet again as a private tutor. In December 1801 he left for Bordeaux: 'Ich habe lange nicht geweint. Aber es hat mich bittere Thränen gekostet, da ich mich entschloß, mein Vaterland noch jetzt zu verlassen, vielleicht auf immer. Den was hab' ich lieberes auf der Welt? Aber sie können mich nicht brauchen' (6:428).

Hölderlin's stay in Homburg, and above all the friendship with Sinclair, had brought him into contact with men who were directly involved in the political life of their day and who at the same time nurtured passionate hopes of political change (see 6:900–02).¹ Undoubtedly this gave Hölderlin a keener awareness than he had had before of the relations between revolutionary France and the other European powers and of the *political* necessity of peace. He had observed, almost since his departure from the *Stift*, the material deprivation and insecurity caused in southern Germany by the wars, and for a time in 1799 these evidently became acute (6:363 and 6:975). Hölderlin can thus have been under no illusions about the *economic* necessity of peace. Above all, though, he sees that peace is *spiritually* necessary, since 'die großen gewaltsamen Erschütterungen unserer Zeit', so he writes in November 1799, threaten finally to paralyse in men's hearts 'die lebendige Seele, ohne die doch überall keine Freude und kein rechter Werth in der Welt ist . . .' (6:373f.). When he wrote these words, Hölderlin had probably already read the letter from Ebel of the same month, in which the latter, whose revolutionary fervour had taken him to Paris in 1796, wrote with disenchantment of the 'Schmutze der hiesigen wirklichen Menschenwelt' (6:995).

It is against this background that we must read the letters of December 1800 (6:406–08), and February and March 1801 (6:413–21). They are inspired by the emerging political peace, but their language is religious and links them directly with the eschatological vision of 'Brod und Wein' and 'Friedensfeier' and with crucial definitions of the highest goal of poetry in the philosophical essays from the Homburg period.

(ii) 'Wie wenn am Feiertage . . .'

Hölderlin's discovery that the chaos of history conceals a deeper, sacred purpose is, as I have tried to show in the last chapter, amply documented in the later phases of his work on *Empedokles* and in some of the poems written in 1799 and 1800. However it is the hymn 'Wie wenn am Feiertage . . .' of late 1799 (2:677) which expresses this belief most dramatically and which at the same time, by giving decisive thematic significance to the position and role of the poet, may be regarded as a programme for the hymns which Hölderlin will write from 1800 to 1803. In effect, the poem defines what is to be the task of the poet of 'Wie wenn am Feiertage . . .' and of all the poets with whom he associates himself:

Doch uns gebührt es, unter Gottes Gewittern,
Ihr Dichter! mit entblößtem Haupte zu stehen,
Des Vaters Strahl, ihn selbst, mit eigner Hand
Zu fassen und dem Volk ins Lied
Gehüllt die himmlische Gabe zu reichen. (lines 56–60)

It is clear from the rest of the hymn that this 'Strahl' is nothing other than the divine meaning with which the turbulence of history is replete ('deutungsvoll', line 41) — the presence of God in history. No other subject is fitting for the poet, as 'Dichterberuf' (1800) also argues, with rhetorical intensity:

Der Höchste, der ists, dem wir geeignet sind,
.....
Ihr ruhelosen Taten in weiter Welt!
Ihr Schicksalstag', ihr reißenden, wenn der Gott
Stillsinnend lenkt, wohin zorntrunken
Ihn die gigantischen Rosse bringen,
Euch sollten wir verschweigen . . .?
(2:46 f., lines 14, 25 ff.)

The poets *may* not remain silent about the storms of history in which God is present, 'stillsinnend'. It is their task to mediate to others this presence and so, through their poetry, to play a part in the revelation of God. The structure and dynamics of this revelation are more complex than such bald statements can suggest, but by declaring in 'Wie wenn am Feiertage . . .' that the poet's role consists in *nothing less* than mediation of God, Hölderlin establishes decisively the overall perspective from which the poems we will be considering in this chapter must be viewed.

The 'event' which the hymn 'Wie wenn am Feiertage . . .' celebrates is the 'awakening' of 'nature'. The moment at which this 'occurs' is the inspiration for the poem, as the fourfold repetition of 'jetzt' in the third and fourth strophes emphatically demonstrates (three times the adverb occurs either at the beginning or the end of a line). What the poet has 'seen' in this moment is to be what the poem speaks of: 'Jetzt aber tags! Ich harrt und sah es kommen,/ Und was ich

sah, das Heilige *sei* mein Wort' (line 19f., my emphasis). There is, as well as the awakening of nature, a renewed stirring of 'die Begeisterung . . . die Allerschaffende' (line 26f.), and the recognition of 'Die Allebendigen, die Kräfte der Götter' (line 36). Together these separate aspects constitute the moment of divine revelation.

If 'nature' is said to have awoken 'mit Waffenklang', then this is surely an allusion to the second coalition war,² which ended in 1799. The 'Taten der Welt' which particularly concerned Hölderlin in the second half of the 1790s were precisely the first and second coalition wars, as the poems discussed in the third chapter show. The interpretation of these conflicts as an antidote to spiritual 'Schlummer' is already familiar from the fragment 'Die Völker schwiegen, schlummerten . . .'. Yet in 'Wie wenn am Feiertage . . .' it is 'nature' who has awoken, and not the nations. The event transcends, while including, the purely human sphere. Thus the 'Waffenklang' of the present historical moment, which refers to something quite specific in the political arena and which may well shake the people of Europe into spiritual wakefulness, is actually only the occasion for the *re*-awakening of 'nature' from her periodic and therefore familiar 'sleep' 'unter den Völkern' (line 15). The idea of 'nature' sleeping 'unter den Pflanzen' is of course easy enough to grasp in terms of the cycle of the seasons, that is to say in terms of our conventional understanding of the word 'nature', but this conventional sense can scarcely accommodate the implications of 'oder unter . . . den Völkern'. What meaning can we attach to 'Natur' if we are told that it is something active in (or re-activated by) the events of history but simultaneously that it is 'älter denn die Zeiten' (line 21) and that it is, for the poets at least, 'wunderbar allgegenwärtig' (line 11f.)?

These are the sorts of questions that lie behind Martin Heidegger's interpretation of 'Wie wenn am Feiertage . . .'.³ He is surely right to ask how we can understand the idea of 'nature' being 'allgegenwärtig'. If 'nature' is indeed present in all things, whether in the natural or historical spheres, it does seem to follow that neither the second coalition war, nor anything else Hölderlin might have chosen to see as the occasion of the 'awakening' can itself be a complete expression of 'nature'. Neither can 'nature' be the aggregate of all things, since it is and always has been 'allgegenwärtig' ('älter den die Zeiten', line 21) and does not therefore only come into being when they are added together (Heidegger, pp. 55 ff.). Heidegger's analysis of the word 'Natur' draws out the implications of 'allgegenwärtig' and shows that although the re-awakening of nature has the force of a decisive moment of revelation it remains at the same time, partially at least, a concealment — in Heidegger's terms, it is both 'Lichtung' and 'Verbergung'.⁴

Nature's awakening, I have suggested, is actually a re-awakening. Strophe 4 of the hymn does essentially no more than describe the revelatory event of strophe 3 from the perspective of the poets who are witness to it. To line 23 ('Die

Natur ist jetzt mit Waffenklang erwacht'), the exact centre of the 9-line third strophe, correspond lines 32 and 33 ('Und was zuvor . . . erst jetzt'), the centre of the fourth strophe, although less exactly so because the syntactic unit is longer. The awakening of nature cannot be separated from 'was zuvor geschah' even if this was 'kaum gefühlt': the present moment merely reveals fully what was sensed before, however incompletely. The poet's response to 'den Zeichen, den Taten der Welt' in his own present has therefore the character of a recollection: the soul of the poet, 'Unendlichem/Bekannt seit langer Zeit' (line 45 f.), experiences a tremor of 'Erinnerung', and this is essential to the creation of 'Gesang'. Thus it can be said that the poet is a poet precisely because he recognizes, in the present, 'was zuvor geschah'. Lines 34–36 of the hymn restate in different form the 'central' idea of strophe 4 (lines 32–33):

Und die uns lächelnd den Acker gebauet, [in the past, 'Zuvor']
 In Knechtsgestalt, sie sind erkannt, [now, 'jetzt']
 Die Alleebendigen, die Kräfte der Götter.

The present 'Taten der Welt' allow the recognition of an earlier presence of the divine. This, then, is what gives the present 'event' celebrated in the hymn the character of a disclosure and this is why the hymn attracts Heidegger, for it seems to exemplify his key concept of 'Lichtung . . . des Seienden'.

What of Heidegger's 'Verbergung'? There is in the hymn, and particularly in strophe 4, something of that movement of simultaneous revelation and concealment which Heidegger speaks of. The indeterminacy of lines 32–33, with the use of 'was' as their subject, could hardly be greater. We know only *that* something has become 'offenbar', but we do not know *what*. The next two lines 'Und die uns lächelnd den Acker gebauet, / In Knechtsgestalt, sie sind erkannt, / . . .', appear to be overcoming this indeterminacy, since they seem to allude both to the myth of Apollo's service as herdsman and slave under Admetus and to Philippians 2.7 and the 'Knechtsgestalt' which Christ is there said to have taken upon himself. For a moment it seems as if the revelation given in the present is to include the actual naming, in the same sentence, of the Christian Son of God and one of the most important of the Greek deities. Yet although the allusions are clear, no names are given. This double allusion was substituted by Hölderlin for these lines from the earlier prose version of the poem, which evoke in general terms the revitalization of nature:

. . . und was zuvor geschah, doch kaum gefühlt uns Schlafenden,
 was täglich noch geschiehet, in göttlicher Bedeutung
 ist es offenbar geworden und eine neue Sonne scheint über uns
 es blühet anders denn zuvor der Frühling, wie Waldes Rauschen,
 von göttlichem Othem bewegt, . . . (2:668)

In the prose version, the grace of nature is and always has been a daily occurrence, although its full significance is only now realized. In the metrical

version (lines 32–36) this idea is still present by implication, especially if we hear the echo of 'Dichterberuf', where, when the same action, that of working the fields, is spoken of, the past tense is dropped (2:47, line 49). However to invoke Apollo and Christ, even indirectly, is a significant change, since it shows, fleetingly, the movement towards what might be called the ideal form of hymn, the hymn which, on the model of Pindar, celebrates the gods and heroes by *naming* them. Beissner points out that 'Wie wenn am Feiertage . . .' reveals, in its use of metre, Hölderlin's ambition to emulate Pindar more clearly even than some of the later hymns (2:677). We must add that by alluding to Philippians 2.7, itself thought to be part of an early Christian hymn, Hölderlin is also necessarily suggesting Philippians 2.9–11, which tells us that because of Christ's self-abasement he had been given a name 'der über alle namen ist' (the name of 'Herr') and that this name will be confessed by all. The Christian hymn thus connects, causally, Christ's taking on of a 'Knechtsgestalt' with his naming and the final, universal confession of that name.

Yet the incomplete, though strongly suggested, 'disclosure' of lines 34–35 gives way to a 'Verbergung', itself admittedly not total, in line 36: the fourth strophe ends by reverting to a much more indeterminate way of speaking of the divine, with the vague plural 'Die Allebedigen' and the depersonalized 'Kräfte der Götter' (line 36). Because of this, 'Sie sind erkannt' suggests not that the particular gods who, according to the traditions of their own religions, took on 'Knechtsgestalt' can now be recognized (in that sense of the verb 'erkennen') for who they are and therefore named: indeed 'sie sind erkannt' cannot suggest this, because Apollo and Christ have no syntactical place in these lines. Rather, 'sie sind erkannt' suggests that the character of the divine in general is now known (in the other sense of 'erkennen'), through the violent and powerful 'Waffenklang' of the present moment, to consist, successively, of self-effacing service and of power.

It is the main task of the hymn to act as the vessel for this knowledge. The poem itself refers us to the 'song' of the poet if we would know more of 'Die Allebedigen, die Kräfte der Götter': 'Erfragst du sie? Im Liede wehet ihr Geist' (line 37), the question indicating perhaps Hölderlin's *own* awareness that the previous strophe had been both revelation and concealment. Poetry, as such a vessel, is pictured in the organic metaphor of line 38 f.: 'Wenn es der Sonne des Tags und warmer Erd / Entwächst . . .'. Metaphorically, poetry is born of the powerful, majestic heat of the sun (2:147, line 161 f. and 191, line 30 f.) and the lowly, suffering, loving earth (1:263, line 22 and 2:146, line 150 f.). This metaphor of poetry's 'growth' is used to emphasize the nature of the revelation that has now occurred: like the song that celebrates them, the gods combine service (and, by implication, weakness) with power and majesty. The 'Knechtsgestalt' which once partially obscured their 'Kräfte' has now been cast off in the 'Waffenklang' of the historical moment. The danger of the poet's task

derives precisely from the powerful intensity of the divine presence in the 'storms' which have been sweeping across Europe: only if the poet's heart is 'pure' will he be able to endure this intensity (lines 61–66). It is true that the nature metaphor used for this historical turmoil in 'Wie wenn am Feiertage . . .' is that of the 'Gewitter', whereas line 38 names the sun as one of poetry's two sources; but in the mythology of Hölderlin's later poetry as a whole Apollo the Sun god and Zeus the Thunderer are frequently invoked together, and in 'Der blinde Sänger' they merge completely (2:55, lines 25 ff.). Böschstein, in his study of 'Der Rhein', rightly concludes: 'Der Donnergott Zeus nimmt den Sonnengott Apoll in sich auf und wird zum einen Himmels- oder Tagesgott, der das "himmlische Feuer" des Geistes zur Erde sendet'.⁵ Thus in 'Wie wenn am Feiertage . . .' we find poetry associated, by means of the myth of the birth of Dionysus, with Zeus as well (lines 45–47).

We have seen how, as a celebration of the 'event' of nature's awakening, 'Wie wenn am Feiertage . . .' aspires to act as a channel for the revelation that the divine partakes both of weakness and power and how it implies, both by its Pindaric form and by the specific allusions of line 34 f., a further stage of revelation, beyond this general insight, which would involve *naming* the gods. In chapter two, Diotima's vision of the future 'göttliche Gemeinde' in which all the gods would be named (3:224) was shown to be connected with the notions of 'Gefühl seiner selbst und anderer Wesen' and 'genuine' 'Christusgefühl'. 'Wie wenn am Feiertage . . .', which also employs at a crucial point the verb 'sich fühlen', anticipates Hölderlin's renewed attempt, in the hymns after 1800, to create in and through his poetry that 'Gemeinde' in which Christ and all the other gods can be named in the presence of the one Father.

Lines 25–28 interpret the deeper meaning of the 'awakening' of nature in the coalition wars:

Und hoch vom Aether bis zum Abgrund nieder
Nach festem Gesetze, wie einst, aus heiligem Chaos gezeugt,
Fühlt neu die Begeisterung sich,
Die Allerschaffende, wieder. (lines 25–28)

It may at first seem strange in the extreme to find that the 'Waffenklang' of war is the occasion for a form of 'Selbstgefühl', which until now we have only seen associated with beauty, harmony, and peaceful community. Yet in *Hyperion*, where these associations are made, the campaign to free Greece also provides the occasion for both Hyperion and Alabanda to experience at the personal level that 'Gefühl seiner selbst' which they hope to be able to make universal by the liberation of Greece. When Alabanda is reunited with Hyperion on the campaign, following their long estrangement, he speaks of his own decline into lifelessness: he is 'das dürre Land' and Hyperion comes 'wie ein glücklich Gewitter' (3:106). Hyperion's reply implicitly denies that he will return Alabanda to life by any personal charisma and points instead to another kind of

‘Gewitter’, the ‘Gewitter’ of military action which is the centre of ‘Wie wenn am Feiertage . . .’:

Stille, sagt’ ich, du nimmst mir die Sinnen, und wir sollten gar nicht von uns sprechen, bis wir im Leben, unter den Taten sind. Ja wohl! rief Alabanda freudig, erst, wenn das Jagdhorn schallt, da fühlen sich die Jäger. (3:107)

This suggests that ‘life’ away from the action of the liberation campaign has been mere ‘existence’, something that lacks the felt intensity which the two friends now anticipate and which therefore does not merit the name ‘Leben’. ‘Sich aber nicht zu fühlen, ist der Tod’ the sage of the metrical version of *Hyperion* has asserted, in the context, admittedly, of what were largely epistemological questions (3:195). This is shown by the *Hyperion*-Alabanda exchange to hold true at the more experiential level. The imminence of death in battle is shown to be another catalyst of ‘Selbstgefühl’, precisely because it generates such an intense feeling of life. *Hyperion* is about to seek death in the sea-battle of Chios: ‘Ein tiefes Lebensgefühl durchdrang mich noch. Es war mir warm und wohl in allen Gliedern. Wie ein zärtlichscheidender, fühlte zum letztenmale sich in allen seinen Sinnen mein Geist’ (3:124). The closeness to ‘Wie wenn am Feiertage . . .’ is particularly striking here. *Hyperion* thinks that he is about to suffer death. Yet in the moment before death, spirit permeates all that is its ‘other’ or all that is ‘sinnlich’. This spirit can only ‘feel itself’ at all because it lingers ‘in all seinen Sinnen’, for we know from the metrical version of the novel that ‘der reine Geist’ has no ‘Selbstgefühl’ (3:195, my emphasis). Hölderlin was under no illusions about the destructive effects of the coalition wars. The theodicy achieved in ‘Wie wenn am Feiertage . . .’ is possible because Hölderlin sees that the destruction and death Europe was experiencing produces by its very intensity a universal (‘hoch vom Aether bis zum Abgrund nieder’, line 24) infusion of ‘Geist’, a ‘Be-geisterung’.⁶

The two *Hyperion* passages (3:107, 3:124) occur in the context of military conflict whose ultimate aim, at least as perceived by the two friends, is the establishment of that ‘Theokratie des Schönen’ which would itself be the *full* realization of ‘Selbstgefühl’, since under it *all* would enjoy both ‘Gefühl seiner selbst’ and ‘[Gefühl] anderer Wesen’. Hölderlin’s use of the verb ‘sich fühlen’ in these passages therefore presents the violence of the campaign as a kind of foretaste and guarantee of the ideal which is to come, and thereby in a sense sanctions it. The same is true of ‘Wie wenn am Feiertage . . .’: if the war is the occasion for a form of ‘Selbstgefühl’, even if this is only a violent stirring from death-like slumber and does not yet involve individual persons in any conscious way, then the community which will realize the feeling that ‘wir und der Vater eins sind’ or the ‘Gefühl seiner selbst und anderer Wesen’ is nevertheless already implied.

It is important to emphasize this, because for the most part ‘Wie wenn am Feiertage . . .’ presents the relationship between the community and the

revelation of the divine in significantly different terms. The hymn clearly speaks of the poets as a distinct group with a role which is theirs alone. It is the calling of the poets to submit to the dangerous nearness of God in the tumultuous events of history and to pass on 'Des Vaters Strahl . . . ins Lied/Gehüllt' (lines 58–60) so that the 'sons of the earth' may drink the 'heavenly fire' without any danger. Their 'song' is the result of the way they gather into themselves 'Des gemeinsamen Geistes Gedanken' (line 43), but the translation of these 'thoughts' into poetry depends for its success entirely on the purity of their hearts and not on those who are to receive the gift. 'Gesang' is, then, something created on behalf of the community by those who stand in a privileged relationship to the divine. In the community which fully realizes everything implied in the notion of 'Selbstgefühl', however, there is no need for 'Gesang' to be provided by a privileged group; 'der Einklang unserer Geister . . . feiert ihn [the 'one' god] allein' (3:224). 'Gesang' ceases to be a gift passed from the poets to the others and becomes instead the *name* for the community which knows of no such separate categories:

Viel hat von Morgen an,
 Seit ein Gespräch wir sind und hören können voneinander,
 Erfahren der Mensch; *bald sind wir aber Gesang*
 (3:536, lines 91–93, my emphasis)

The 'wir' here is universally inclusive, just as the possessive pronoun is in Diotima's vision of the 'Einklang unserer Geister'. 'Wie wenn am Feiertage . . .', as the fragmentary last two strophes show, fails to consolidate that 'wir', even for the comparatively restricted community of the poets. Yet in its use of the key verb 'sich fühlen' it nevertheless shows the goal towards which Hölderlin's hymnic poetry aspires.

'Wie wenn am Feiertage . . .' is then a programme for the hymns written between 1800 and 1803. Indeed, in the light of the way poets are addressed by one of their own number and given their high calling, it would be no exaggeration to call the hymn a manifesto. The decisive moment given such emphasis by the repetition of 'jetzt' is not only the re-awakening of nature but also the moment which fires and inspires the poets:

. . . so ist
 Von neuem an den Zeichen, den Taten der Welt jetzt
 Ein Feuer angezündet in Seelen der Dichter. (lines 29–31)

I have stressed the reference to contemporary history in the 'Taten der Welt'. Yet in strophe 5 the poets' song is said to grow out of 'Wettern . . . die vorbereiteter in Tiefen der Zeit . . . hinwandeln . . . unter den Völkern' (lines 39–42, my emphasis). These 'Wetter' are the tempestuous events of past history. Furthermore, these events are *themselves* to be seen as 'Des gemeinsamen Geistes Gedanken', which came to rest in 'der Seele des Dichters' and are then turned into 'song'. This reading of lines 40 ff. must be maintained against the fact that

Beissner places a full stop after 'Völkern' in line 42, thereby separating 'Wettern' and 'Gedanken' grammatically. Neither the manuscript of the prose version nor that of the metrical version of 'Wie wenn am Feiertage . . .' contains a full stop at this point. 'Des gemeinsamen Geistes Gedanken' is thus a further predicate qualifying 'Wettern' (see P. Szondi, p. 268): the 'other storms' (line 39) are the subject of the verb 'sind' (line 43). Such an interpretation of the 'Wetter' of history as the 'thoughts' of the 'Geist' which is common to all nations (and is therefore transhistorical) would not be unique in Hölderlin's poetry, for in 'Der Mutter Erde' (probably written in 1800) we read:

Denn wenn er schon der Zeichen genug
Und Fluthen in seiner Macht und Wetterflammen
Wie Gedanken hat der heilige Vater (2:123, lines 15–17)

Admittedly these are the thoughts of the 'Father', the highest God, but from about this time onwards Hölderlin begins to use 'Geist' and 'Gott' almost interchangeably,⁷ and indeed used 'göttlich' instead of 'gemeinsam' in the prose version of the line 43 of 'Wie wenn am Feiertage . . .' (2:669). The poets are, then, to read the signs of their own time and of earlier times as the thoughts of God, at least as far as he is understood to be immanent in history.

'Wie wenn am Feiertage . . .' is not merely a blueprint for hymns yet to be written, it is itself a hymn, and the 'event' it celebrates reveals that the gods are now known in both their weakness and their power, their abasement and their exaltation. Yet in the very way this knowledge is disclosed there is an element of concealment — the gods are known but not named. The hymn implies (without in any way being able to describe) that 'göttliche Gemeinde' in which all the gods will be named and honoured and in which the one God whose worship embraces that of all others will be present in the 'Einklang unserer Geister'. It is only by observing how these themes are elaborated after 1800 that we can grasp Hölderlin's thinking about Christ in 'Brod und Wein' and 'Friedensfeier'.

(iii) 'Brod und Wein'

Editors of Hölderlin's poetry have offered somewhat different dates for the elegy 'Brod und Wein' (2:90–95), although all place it within the period between the summer of 1800 and the first few months of 1801. The manuscript evidence does not allow a more precise dating. Whether 'Brod und Wein' is placed at an earlier or later point within the period in question, there is no doubt that it was composed at least three months *after* 'Wie wenn am Feiertage . ..'. And yet, it might well seem that the hymn cannot fairly be taken as the reference point for what is, from a formal and thematic point of view, evidently an elegy. How can a poem which is a manifesto and calls on the poets to discern the presence of God in contemporary history be used to interpret one which is so clearly a lament and

which looks back in sadness to what has been lost? The answer depends on seeing that the naming of the divine in 'Brod und Wein' is the crucial element in the full flowering of Greek religion and that the evocation of this lost glory is implicitly also a demand that a community which can adequately celebrate the gods must be re-created. It also depends on seeing that the elegiac poet's own day itself contains vital signs of renewed divine presence.

A detailed commentary on 'Brod und Wein' cannot be attempted here. Jochen Schmidt's study, which does make some claim to comprehensiveness, runs to 218 pages,⁸ the early study by E. Petzold to 157 pages,⁹ and 120 pages of Martin Simon's 1982 dissertation are given over to the elegy.¹⁰ The subtitle of Schmidt's work, 'Die Entwicklung des hymnischen Stils in der elegischen Dichtung', indicates however that its author attaches considerable importance to the theme of the naming of the gods, since such naming within the poem is identified as one of the dominant characteristics of the hymnic style (Schmidt, pp. 21 ff.). For Simon, there runs through the entire poem a contradiction between the poet's ideal of a united community and the poet's own beliefs about the Self, and this contradiction manifests itself in the way that no object can be found for the activity of naming, so that 'naming' becomes an abstraction which itself can only be 'named', but not performed (Simon, pp. 231, 282f.). These interpretations agree, then, that the notion of the naming of the gods is indispensable to an understanding of the poem. Yet Schmidt fails to bring out the full significance of 'naming' because his analysis of parallel passages dealing with the same theme pays too little attention to their context and emphasis, whereas Simon is led by a concept of 'rational mythology' which is, in my view, defective to the conclusion that 'naming' takes on such 'comprehensive vagueness' (p. 282) that it becomes meaningless.

'Brod und Wein' is structured around the metaphor of day and night. The entry of the gods into the 'house' that stood ready for them ('Seliges Griechenland', line 55) is the advent of luminous clarity — the 'day' of the 'Himmlischen' (line 72). The temples and sacred sites which they inhabited are now, in the poet's present, ruined and deserted and the 'day' has given way to the darkness of night. Those who must dwell in this world-historical darkness themselves become 'Schatten' (line 153): they are both 'shadows' of what they could and should be and also 'shades', beings who are (spiritually) dead and who have descended, in effect if not literally, to the underworld (cf. 2:110, line 241 f.). This condition is summarized as a separation from the presence of 'Vater Aether'. When, as in Greece, his name can again be heard on the lips of every individual (line 65f.), that separation will have been overcome: '. . . denn wir sind herzlos, Schatten, bis unser/Vater Aether erkannt jeden und allen gehört (line 153f.).

The collective acclamation of 'Vater Aether' is the final response to a progressive revelation, it is not for the Greeks nor for any other people an

instinctive mode of religious feeling and perception. The central triad of the elegy, strophes 4–6, is devoted to describing the structure of this revelation. At the beginning of strophe 5 we read:

Unempfunden kommen sie erst, es streben entgegen
Ihnen die Kinder, zu hell kommet, zu blendend das Glück,
Und es scheut sie der Mensch, kaum weiss zu sagen ein Halbgott
Wer mit Namen sie sind, die mit den Gaben ihm nahn.

(lines 73–76)

'Die Himmlischen', who are the subject of these lines (see line 72), are at first so dazzling that the intensity of the experience precludes any ordering reflection upon the nature of the gods themselves. 'Unempfunden' must be taken, as in Schmidt's gloss on these lines, to mean 'nicht als das empfunden, was sie eigentlich sind' (p. 89), since an experience of this kind can hardly be said to be simply 'unfelt'. Names, if they were possible, would express precisely this 'real' nature which cannot yet be specified and which therefore remains unknown. This is not to say that this first experience of the divine cannot count as 'knowledge' of a kind, since these unknown 'gods' are known to be the fundamental unity behind all appearances, through the one name which has long been theirs: 'Eines und Alles' (line 84). Greek religion, as we know from *Hyperion*, is the love and expression of beauty (3:79) and since beauty is only adequately expressed as 'Das Eine in sich selber unterschiedene', to this one name, 'Eines und Alles', must necessarily be added others which make known the gods in their differences. This is the necessity which stands behind the verb 'müssen' in the last line of strophe 5:

So ist der Mensch; wenn da ist das Gut . . .
. . . kennet und sieht er es nicht.
. . . nun aber nennt er sein Liebstes,
Nun, nun müssen dafür Worte, wie Blumen, entstehn.

(lines 87–90)

The single name 'Eines und Alles' must be replaced by a plurality of names. The almost unbroken use of the present tense in strophe 5, the universal force of 'Der Mensch' where it is used (lines 75 and 87) and the gnomic ending of the strophe (lines 87–90) all indicate that the concern is with the general features of the development of human religion in any culture. Although the present tense continues after line 94, it is now an historic present, employed to lend extra vividness to the synopsis of man's religious history which follows in lines 95–98. The flowering of names for the gods which was announced in line 90 is now shown to have occurred as national cultures have arisen in response to this cultic need (line 95), producing 'die schönen Tempel und Städte' (line 97) — where *individual* deities are honoured. Hölderlin is thinking primarily of the Greeks (the only places named in the remainder of strophe 6 are Greek), partly of course because Greece for him is, in religious culture, everything that Germany

is not, but partly also because he sees their religious development as perfectly illustrating the general pattern. It is this general perspective which accounts for the absence of any specific divine names from this strophe, and not, as Simon claims with reference to the alleged frustration of the demand expressed in line 90, the fact that 'within the context of a rational mythology the pantheon is obsolete: there can be no object of "naming", and "naming" can only be an "Idee"' (p. 231). This notion of a 'rational mythology', which Simon takes to be Hölderlin's means of instigating a new 'Volksreligion' in his own present (p. 225), has in fact no place in strophe 6, precisely because the present tense used is an historic present which describes how temples — and thus also the divine names associated with them — were indeed created, supremely by the Greeks. By naming Thebes, Athens, Olympia, and Corinth Hölderlin is also either naming gods more or less explicitly (Athene) or implying the names of gods such as Dionysus or of the heroic victors of the games. More explicit reference is absent not because it is impossible but only because it is not needed.

The unity behind the manifold appearances of the divine, expressed in the name 'Eines und Alles', is preserved in the name which brings to a climax the maturing religious consciousness of the Greeks — 'Vater Aether'. This is the name in which the names of other deities are 'aufgehoben', in the double sense of the word characteristic of Hegel. For as the 'father', this god is clearly pre-eminent among all other gods ('Patmos' will speak of him as 'der Vater . . . der über allen waltet', 2:172, line 222f.) and yet, also as the 'father', he cannot be separated from his sons: the god who comes 'unter die Schatten' (line 156) comes precisely as 'des Höchsten Sohn' (ibid.), representing the 'father' until the time when he will 'belong' to all. A nation like the Greeks, which has many gods and many holy sites and thus the potential for religious disunity, is united in the worship of the 'father'. Thus the invocation of the name 'Vater Aether' is necessarily performed collectively: 'Vater Aether! so riefs und flog von Zunge zu Zunge / Tausendfach, es ertrug keiner das Leben allein' (line 65f.), and the worship itself unites the community:

. . . und über Bergen der Heimat
 Ruht und waltet und lebt allgegenwärtig der Aether,
 Daß ein liebendes Volk in des Vaters Armen gesammelt,
 Menschlich freudig, wie sonst, und Ein Geist allen gemein sei.
 ('Der Archipelagus'; 2:110, lines 237 ff.)

The three successive acts of naming I have been analysing — naming of the gods as 'Eines und Alles', the creation of individual names for the gods once these become 'die Offenbaren' (line 83), and the acclamation of 'Vater Aether' as the mythological expression of their unity *and* distinctness — encompass then the archetypal development of religion as exemplified by the Greeks. Yet because the poet's own present is so severely alienated from the divine, its rediscovery of the 'father' cannot be a mere re-enactment of the Greek model. *Its* starting point

cannot be that of child-like innocence which strives towards the divine with naive spontaneity (line 73f.): here the Greeks *are* to be distinguished from other nations and cultures, for they alone have this childlikeness as a national characteristic (4:134, line 347f.).

(iv) ‘Der Mutter Erde’ and the naming of the earth

‘Brod und Wein’ is very reticent about how the ‘Hesperian’ experience would have to differ from the Greek. Yet one thing is clear: the darkness of the spiritual night will continue ‘Bis daß Helden genug in der ehernen Wiege gewachsen . . .’ (line 117f.). These ‘Helden’ are the absent ‘Starken’ referred to in line 135 (‘noch fehlen die Starken zu höchsten / Freuden . . .’). They are simultaneously bemoaned as absent and anticipated as returning. The question of their return is crucial, since the fragmentary hymn ‘Der Mutter Erde’, probably composed at almost exactly the same time as ‘Brod und Wein’, assigns to *them* the task of ‘naming’ ‘mother earth’ and makes the return of the ‘father’ dependent upon *her* name being both pronounced and acknowledged. Schmidt is surely right to claim that, in Hölderlin’s poetry after 1800, ‘Von der Einkehr und Gegenwart, vom Erkennen dieses allumfassenden und über allem thronenden göttlichen Wesens [Vater Aether] hängt das Glück der Welt, die Erfüllung und Schönheit menschlichen Daseins ab. Sie ist letztes Ziel von Hölderlins Hoffen und Dichten’ (p. 210). ‘Brod und Wein’ makes this clear enough and, as we shall see, ‘Friedensfeier’ emphatically confirms it. Yet we will understand the full structure of the divine economy in neither unless we also understand what is implied by the idea of ‘naming’ the earth. For this, the thoughts Hölderlin noted down for the completion of ‘Der Mutter Erde’ must be cited in full. I give them with the manuscript’s own linebreaks, as reproduced by Beissner in the *Große Stuttgarter Ausgabe* — words or letters in brackets, unless square, are supplied by him:

O Mutter Erde! du allversöhnende, allesduldende!
 hüllest du nicht so u. erzählest
 [space of two lines]
 und wie um jenen Erstgeborenen
 dass ich
 Gemildert ist seine Macht, verhüllt in den Strahlen 5
 u. die Erde birgt vor ihm die Kinder
 ihres Schosses (in) den Mantel, aber, wir erfahren ihn doch.
 und kommende Tage verkünde, da
 Viel Zeiten sind vorübergegangen, und oft hat einer von
 dir ein Herz im Busen gefühlt. Geahndet haben 10
 die Alten, die frommen Patriarchen, da sie wachten bis jezt
 und im Verborgenen
 haben, sich selbst geheim, in tief verschlossner Halle dir

auch verschwiegene Männer gedienet, die Helden aber,
 die haben dich geliebet, am meisten, und dich die
 Liebe genannt

oder sie (haben) dunklere Nahmen dir, Erde, gegeben, denn es
 schämet, sein Liebstes zu nennen sich von Anfang der 15
 Mensch, doch
 wenn er Grösserem sich genaht, und der Hohe hat es
 geseegnet, dann
 nennt (er), was ihm eigner ist, beim eigenen Nahmen.
 und siehe mir ist, als hört' ich den grossen Vater sagen,
 dir sei von nun die Ehre vertraut, und 20

Gesänge sollest du empfangen in seinem Nahmen,
 und sollest indes er fern ist und alte Ewigkeit
 verborgener und verborgener wird,
 statt seiner seyn den sterblichen Menschen, wie
 du Kinder gebahrest und erzog(st) für ihn, so will er wenn 25
 die erkannt ist, wieder senden sie und neigen
 zu die Seele der Menschen. (2:683–84)

Hölderlin's method of producing a prose draft of projected hymnic verse (another example would be 'Wie wenn am Feiertage . . .', see 2:667 ff.) allows us here to see with great clarity a constellation of ideas which have considerable cohesion and startling implications for the other poems we are discussing in this chapter.¹¹ The definition, in 'Brod und Wein', of the darkened present as the absence of the 'Vater' recurs here exactly: the present is a period of waiting for the 'father' to return, an interim stage in which he has to be represented by the earth. Even though the verb 'neigen' appears to need a reflexive pronoun 'sich', and even though '*die Seele*' is puzzling, the last two lines surely allude to his gracious return, which is dependent upon the earth being 'recognized' (here virtually in the sense of 'anerkannt'): it will only occur 'wenn die erkannt ist'. The most obvious antecedent for the feminine article here is 'Ehre' (line 20). 'Alte Ewigkeit' (line 22) is nearer, yet its position in the clause which speaks of the remoteness of the 'father' and the adjective 'verborgener' make it almost impossible to connect this feminine noun with anything other than the 'father'.

Thus only when the honour which the earth has already been given by the 'father's' command (line 19f.) is actually acknowledged can the 'father' return. Lines 13–18 must be read as a statement that the earth is properly honoured when it is named by its 'own' name. Man's naming of 'sein Liebstes' is the naming of the earth or of 'was ihm eigner ist': here the plural force which 'sein Liebstes' had in 'Brod und Wein' (line 89), where the task was the bestowing of names on individual gods as yet anonymous, has no place, for the only issue is that of pronouncing the right name for the earth. What hinders the pronouncement is not ignorance (as in line 75f. of 'Brod und Wein') but 'Scham', a natural reticence about that which is most dear to man. This is overcome 'wenn er [der

Mensch] sich Grösserem genaht', a phrase which, vague though it is, must be read in the light of the overall metaphorical scheme of nearness and distance ('indes er fern ist . . . wieder [sich] neigen') and so taken to suggest, perhaps, a change of heart which begins to draw men back towards the 'father'. More importantly, the 'Scham' is overcome in the most exemplary manner by *those who have loved the earth the most* (line 14f.) — the 'Helden' on whom the poet's darkened present in 'Brod und Wein' waits. Thus naming is here not a mythopoeic act (e.g. identifying one of the manifold appearances of the divine 'Eines und Alles' as Apollo) but an act of worship and reverence — an act of love.¹² The name the 'Helden' give to the earth is 'die Liebe', the earth's 'own' name, the name which reveals more of her nature than the 'dunklere Nahmen' which 'Scham' occasionally dictates so that the truth about her can, in the period of waiting, remain in dark obscurity. This name is the fitting name because 'mother earth' is the one who is apostrophized as 'du allesversöhnende, allesduldende!' (line 1).

In the previous chapter I argued that Empedokles's relationship with the earth, which is seen as long-suffering and sacrificially self-giving, is vital for our understanding of the christological significance of the drama. These lines from Hölderlin's projected continuation of 'Der Mutter Erde' indicate that the theme is not only pursued after the end of the work on *Empedokles* but that, if anything, it gains in importance: the idea that the earth must be named *as* love, and that this naming is an essential part of the divine economy, is nowhere in *Empedokles* stated with this directness. And yet it is strongly suggested in that part of Empedokles's farewell speech to the Agrigentines in E1 which begins at line 1518 ('Nicht ratlos stehen lass ich euch . . .'; 4:65f.). Empedokles has already refused the invitation to become their king and now makes his appeal 'O gebt euch der Natur, eh sie euch nimmt!' (line 1533). He has a vision of all that will flow from this act of self-offering:

Wenn dann der Geist sich an des Himmels Licht
Entzündet, süßer Lebensothen euch
Den Busen, wie zum erstenmale, tränkt . . .
. . . wenn euch das Leben
Der Welt ergreift . . . (lines 1542–47)

This total immersion in the 'süßer Lebensothen', which *is* the 'Leben der Welt',¹³ must for Empedokles have quite specific and revolutionary social consequences: 'O dann, ihr Lieben! teilet Tat und Ruhm / Wie treue Dioskuren; jeder sei / Wie alle . . .' (lines 1557–59). Castor and Pollux are invoked as types of a radical equality, in which the differences between individuals are overcome by an act of love. In all important respects this corresponds very closely to the Greek celebration of 'Vater Aether' and its consequences:¹⁴

Vater Aether! so riefs und flog von Zunge zu Zunge
Tausendfach, *es ertrug keiner das Leben allein:*
Ausgeteilt erfreut solch Gut . . .

('Brod und Wein'; 2:92, lines 65–67, my emphases)

For the Agrigentines — who correspond, as far as their position in the scheme of 'salvation history' is concerned, to the poet's own contemporaries in 'Brod und Wein' and to those, in the lines from 'Der Mutter Erde', for whom the 'father' is 'fern . . . und alte Ewigkeit/verborgener und verborgener wird' — all of this means a change of heart, or rather a recovery of their own hearts and so the ability and desire to 'name' the earth once again:

. . . denn liebend gibt
 Der Sterbliche vom Besten, schliesst und engt
 Den Busen ihm die Knechtschaft nicht . . .
 Von Herzen nennt man, Erde, dann dich wieder . . . (1572, E1)

Until the self-giving to nature has occurred and they have therefore abandoned that paradoxical attitude towards her which combines will to power and fearful servility, they too will be 'herzlos' and unable to perform this naming, which is a renewed acknowledgement of and thus an act of love and thanksgiving towards their 'mother' (cf. line 1574f.). It is also, quite specifically, the pronouncement of a name, as Hölderlin's first version of these lines shows: 'Und fröhlich dankend ruft man, Erde! dich/Beim Nahmen . . .' (4:541, line 8f.). The name most appropriate to this joyful thanksgiving is 'die Liebe'.

These things are, in Empedokles's vision, immediate consequences of the spiritual rebirth of Agrigentum. The naming of the earth becomes part of a wider, single 'Lobgesang' (line 1581) to nature as a whole. However, Empedokles also looks forward to this renewed intimacy with nature issuing in a revitalization of precisely those religious traditions which he had at first (lines 1538ff.), as the precondition of renewal, commanded the Agrigentines to forget:

Wenn dann die glücklichen Saturnustage,
 Die neuen, männlicheren, gekommen sind,
 Dann denkt vergangner Zeit, dann leb, erwärmt
 Am Genius, der Väter Sage wieder!
 Zum Feste komme, wie vom Frühlingslicht
 Emporgesungen, die vergessene
 Heroenwelt vom Schattenreich herauf,
 Und mit der goldnen Trauerwolke lagre
 Erinnerung sich, ihr Freudigen! um euch. (lines 1634–42)

These 'new' days of Saturn represent in *Empedokles* a re-creation of that primeval state of harmony '. . . zu Saturnus Zeit/Da freundlich unter uns der Hohe lebt' (line 1404) and as such are clearly the eschatological fulfilment of Empedokles's hopes.¹⁵ Not until the celebration of nature as a whole (including the earth) is complemented by this collective act of remembrance of past myths and 'heroes' can the regeneration of Agrigentum be said to have reached its climax.¹⁶ In Diotima's eschatological vision of the 'göttliche Gemeinde', which contains a strong emphasis on remembrance, both elements combine and yet are clearly

distinguished: it is a celebration of the 'Heiligen in allen Zeiten und Orten . . . Heroën des Morgen- und Abendlands' *and* of the earth, sun, water, and aether (3:224).

In the world-historical night of 'Brod und Wein' the 'heroes' who could name the earth and so prepare that 'fulfilment' to which line 151 of the elegy alludes are, as we have seen, absent. When finally the 'heroes' have 'grown' in the 'ehernen Wiege' (line 117), which *is* this period of darkness, the gods will return to the earth (line 119). It is because the Greeks never lost their love for the earth, and thus had no need to re-affirm it by naming her, that the Greek landscape, the Greek earth, was itself a 'Haus der Himmlischen' (line 55), a 'Festlicher Saal' (line 57), a place where the gods could dwell. The spiritual poverty of Hölderlin's own, 'Hesperian' age is inseparably connected with its attitude to nature, particularly to the earth, and has *produced* those wars which have ravaged the European countryside. We shall see how Hölderlin's euphoria about the peace of Lunéville in February 1801 allows him to create, in the metaphor of the opening strophe of 'Friedensfeier', a landscape which, healed of the wounds of war, is ready to receive the gods, and, furthermore, that it is only when such a landscape *can* be described that Christ himself can be named as the 'Fürst des Fests'.

Indeed the lines from 'Der Mutter Erde' which we have been considering already point towards a connection between the naming of the earth and the naming of Christ, for they contain a remarkable echo of Peter's first epistle. Peter describes the way the revelation of Christ was prepared by the Old Testament prophets:

Und das Ende euers Glaubens davon bringen, nemlich der Seelen Seligkeit. Nach welcher Seligkeit haben gesucht und geforschet die Propheten, die von der zukünftigen Gnade auff euch geweissaget haben, und haben geforschet auff welche und welcherley Zeit deutete der Geist Christi, der in ihnen war, und zuvor bezeuget hat die Leiden, die in Christo sind, und die Herrlichkeit darnach, welchen es offenbaret ist, denn sie haben es nicht ihnen selbst sondern uns dargethan. (I Peter 1.9–12)

The epistle speaks of 'Propheten', Hölderlin in 'Der Mutter Erde' of 'Patriarchen' (line 11), but the distinction is slight. In 'Am Quell der Donau' (1801) both occur together as types of the 'Starken' of Asia, 'Die . . . / Zuerst es verstanden, / Allein zu reden / Zu Gott' (2:128, lines 79 ff.). One such patriarch was clearly Moses, the man who spoke with God alone on Mount Sinai (Exodus 19), and a figure who is also implied by the whole approach to the Old Testament exemplified in the epistle of Peter.¹⁷ Common to all those, *other* than the 'Helden', of whom Hölderlin speaks in 'Der Mutter Erde' — the 'frommen Patriarchen' (line 11), the 'verschwiegene Männer' (line 13) and the universal 'einer' (line 9) — is the experience of only partial awareness and understanding, precisely the fact that what they dimly sensed ('Geahndet', 'gefühl't', line 10) or could not grasp at all ('sich selbst geheim', line 13) was only to be made fully plain ('dargethan', as Peter's epistle says) to a later age. In the case of the lines from 'Der Mutter Erde', it

is the name of the earth that is revealed, 'die Liebe', and therefore also her nature as the one who is 'allesduldend' and 'allesversöhnend'. But the naming is also the giving of the 'honour' that is due but has been denied, the acknowledgement that the long-suffering love of the earth must no longer be abused. The revelation to which the 'Geist Christi' within the prophets pointed has the same dual aspect: it is a disclosure of the suffering Christ will undergo because of his love for mankind and of the 'Herrlichkeit darnach', his vindication in the events of the Resurrection and Ascension. Thus in its combination of 'Leiden' and 'Herrlichkeit' Peter's epistle reproduces the pattern of the christology of Philippians 2.9: 'Er niedrige sich selbst und ward gehorsam bis zum Tode, ja zum Tode am Kreuz. Darum hat ihn auch Gott erhöht, und hat ihm einen Namen gegeben, der über alle Namen ist'.

It seems conceivable that Hölderlin may have intended to make the connection I have been suggesting, which is striking enough, even more explicit. The first seven lines of the passage from 'Der Mutter Erde' are highly fragmented, and yet they seem to contain these thoughts: the earth's 'children', the human community to which the poet, by the use of 'wir', indicates he belongs, has some experience of the one who is called the 'Erstgeborene[n]', even though the latter's power is 'gemildert'; the earth herself protects them from the implied danger of his unmitigated power.¹⁸ 'Erstgeboren' occurs on only four other occasions in Hölderlin's poetry, and on three of them it is used in the singular. It refers to the Nile (2:104, line 10 f.), to the 'genius' of Greece (1:125, line 3) and to spring (1:202, line 10 f.). None of these meanings seems plausible in 'Der Mutter Erde'. The New Testament, on the other hand, uses the epithet 'firstborn' of Christ on five occasions: Matthew 1.25, Luke 2.7 (Mary's firstborn child), Romans 8.29, Colossians 1.15, 18. The most significant use for our present purposes is undoubtedly Colossians 1.18, since this verse is central to a highly eschatological passage, a passage which we have already seen to be of some importance for the third version of *Empedokles*:

Und er ist das Haupt des Leibes, nemlich der Gemeine, welcher ist der Anfang und der Erstgebohrne von den Todten, auff daß er in allen Dingen den Vorgang habe. Denn es ist das Wohlgefallen gewesen, daß in ihm alle Fülle wohnen sollte, und alles durch ihn versöhnet würde zu ihm selbst, es sey auff Erden oder im Himmel. (Colossians 1.18–20)

We have seen that the grand reconciliation to which *Empedokles*, 'Brod und Wein' and 'Der Mutter Erde' all look forward cannot take place until the earth is named. If Christ is the firstborn from the dead, then, following *St Paul's* logic here, he will be supreme 'in allen Dingen'. This supremacy will be realized when all things have been reconciled to God. If, in Hölderlin's text, 'Erstgeborener' is also being used as a title for Christ, as seems likely, the pre-eminent position which belongs to Christ as the 'firstborn' cannot, so the lines suggest, really become his until the honour due to the earth is 'erkannt' (line 26). Thus as long as the earth herself has not been 'named' by the 'Gemeine', she conceals, as it were, the full glory of Christ, his realized power.

To place such a burden of meaning on lines whose syntax is incomplete would clearly be a highly questionable procedure were it not for the two facts that the other lines from 'Der Mutter Erde' do indicate so clearly the place of the naming of the earth within the divine economy and that we know, from the combined evidence of *Empedokles* and Diotima's vision of the 'göttliche Gemeinde', that if Christ is to be remembered even as *one* of the 'Heiligen in allen Zeiten', without any *special* status, it must be after the earth has been named 'von Herzen' once more (1572, E1).

The argument which I have been advancing depends on distinguishing between 'mentioning by name' and 'acknowledging, giving due honour to' — perhaps by the use of a specific title or by a name which expresses the 'essence' of the name (the earth as 'die Liebe'). The reasons why Christ is not named in 'Brod und Wein' in this second sense should now be clear: the 'heroes' who would name him do not yet exist. The reasons why he is not named in the first sense could, since the publication of Jochen Schmidt's study, be said to belong to the conventional wisdom about the poem, which I have no wish to challenge. This says, quite rightly, that Hölderlin wishes to minimize the differences between Christ and the Greek gods, in particular Dionysus. To this end, Christ is presented as one member of the 'himmlische Chor' (line 132) and as one whose appearance on the earth is significant because it completes and marks the end of the Greek 'day' (lines 107f. and 130), that period of history when the gods were present among men in their full glory as 'die Offenbaren' (line 83). Christ thus appears as the last of the Greek gods.¹⁹ The syncretism is achieved in particular in the last two strophes. In strophe 8, the scope of Christ's institution of the Eucharist in the New Testament (as a memorial of his saving death and anticipation of his return) is widened so that bread and wine can be a memorial of *all* the gods and a promise of their *collective* return: indeed the 'gifts' of bread and wine are said to have been left by the entire 'himmlische Chor' (line 132). In strophe 9 the figures of Christ and Dionysus merge indistinguishably in the 'Fackelschwinger', the 'Syrier' who comes 'unter die Schatten' (line 155f.). As Schmidt points out (p. 161), the epithet 'Fackelschwinger', 'πυφωρος', is used by many of the Greek writers Hölderlin was familiar with when speaking of Dionysus. The 'Fackelschwinger' provides light for those who are in darkness: so too Christ, the light of the world (John 1.9; 12.46). The title 'des Höchsten Sohn' is often given to Christ (Luke 1.32, Mark 5.7) but, equally, it can apply to Dionysus, the 'Halbgott' fathered by Zeus, the highest god in the Greek pantheon. And Schmidt also observes, quite rightly, that the epithet 'der Syrier' can be attached to both Christ and Dionysus (p. 162). By avoiding any mention of the actual name of either deity, Hölderlin enables the full force of these syncretistic epithets to come across undiminished. His immediate intention is clearly to define the points of contact between Christ and the Greek gods, the wider intention is surely to create in his contemporaries a willingness to see

traditional distinctions blurred and so a readiness to celebrate all the gods together.

(v) *Naming and the private world*

For Martin Simon, however, the elegy does not have as its major purpose the communication of any such perspective on the relations between the gods, indeed communication in any sense is considered unimportant by comparison with the prime purpose of this poem and in fact all of the later poetry from the elegies onwards: this is said, in the opening abstract of his dissertation, to be the 'progressive creation of a private world made of the experiences of childhood and love'. This private world is said to be created *so that* society can be dispensed with as irrelevant (p. 226). If this is true, then we would have to ignore or somehow explain away the words which preface 'Freidensfeier', written probably within six months of 'Brod und Wein', and which are addressed not to Heine or Siegfried Schmidt or Hölderlin's relations, all of them possible fellow inhabitants of a private world, but to the general reading public, whose (antagonistic) tastes and attitudes Hölderlin believes he knows and whose indulgence he asks for. If the theory holds true only of the elegies, with their creation (primarily through rhythm, in Simon's view) of a mood of resignation and withdrawal, then we would have to explain why Hölderlin suddenly turns to poems like 'Friedensfeier', 'Patmos', and 'Der Einzige', which obey quite different rhythmical structures and therefore create different moods. Above all, we would have to show either that the themes of these poems are unconnected with the themes of 'Brod und Wein' or that they too aim at the creation of a private world. Simon's argument dissents from the common view of 'Brod und Wein' in a wholesale way and so demands to be considered in detail. Beyond this, his study implies that ideas are reducible to stylistic features ('... rhythm is the World Spirit', p. 272) and so demand not paraphrase but literary criticism. This involves the suggestion that study of the 'ideas' of the later, post-1800 poetry (i.e. its 'theology', precisely my concern) which is anything other than stylistic entirely misses the point. This is a substantial challenge to the vast body of Hölderlin research, especially German, which sees him as a 'theological' or a 'philosophical' poet, and Simon presents the challenge eloquently. He is right to insist on the importance of listening to the music of Hölderlin's verse, but it is right also not to relegate his poetry to the status of a beautiful but self-defeating soliloquy without just cause. The issue of how ideas and poetry interrelate for Hölderlin is crucial.

Simon states that the object of the poet's search in 'Brod und Wein', namely the gods of a pantheon, is incompatible with the poet's own beliefs and that he therefore 'does not, cannot even want them [the gods]' (p. 236). Also incompatible with the poet's beliefs is the idea of a united community which will name

those gods (p. 226). What Hölderlin does want is to enjoy the 'beauty of longing' (p. 225) and this entails not seriously wanting to leave the darkness of his own period of history (p. 284). The answer to the alienation of his own age from the divine is sleep and oblivion (p. 271). This interpretation of what is the real animus behind 'Brod und Wein' derives largely from highly sophisticated and sensitive observations about the effect of the rhythm in the poem on the overt meaning of the lines. Yet underpinning them all are the two assumptions that Hölderlin's 'own beliefs' are those expressed in the so-called 'älteste Systemprogramm des deutschen Idealismus' (4: 297-99), with its appeal for 'eine Mythologie der Vernunft', and that the foundation of the new religion which would be created by such a mythology is 'the potential unity of all consciousness in the transcendental structure subject-object' (p. 228).

In the new rational mythology, Simon argues, any phenomenon which happens, like Christ, to be a historical god must be stripped of its historicity and name (p. 247), since these things bind the divinity of the god to its individuality (p. 228). Such a restriction is irrational, since the essence of the rational is that it should be capable of being universalizable — made relevant to any age and culture. Names, because of their specific reference, stand in the way of such universalization. Rationalization of Greek religion (which in its original, mythological form was irrational by the new standards) therefore means elimination of the god's name and his employment as the personification of an idea. Thus Dionysus and Christ are said to be, in 'Brod und Wein', 'no longer subjects, living beings, but objects, personifications of ideas . . .' (p. 228). Hence the alleged incompatibility of the gods of a pantheon with Hölderlin's beliefs in the 'Systemprogramm'.

Several objections must be made. In the first place, 'naming' is here being used purely in the sense of 'mentioning by (proper) name', whereas I have tried to show that this is the least significant sense of the idea for Hölderlin's conception of the divine economy. Of course, in an approach which denies any eschatological perspective in 'Brod und Wein' and therefore any notion of 'proclaiming' and 'acknowledging', this is inevitable. Secondly, it is very hard to see how the 'Systemprogramm', whose authorship has in any case been the subject of lengthy debate,²⁰ supports such a characterization of the future rational mythology. It states that 'diese [neue] Mythologie . . . muß im Dienste der Ideen stehen, . . . Ehe wir die Ideen ästhetisch, d.h. mythologisch machen, haben sie für das Volk kein Interesse . . .' (4:299, lines 2-6). It need not follow from this that a mythology in the service of ideas must exclude names, and the 'Systemprogramm' makes no suggestion in that direction. The problem is that Simon takes the gods of Greek mythology to be 'irrational' (p. 228) and no better than the Egyptian monstrosities, whereas Hyperion defines them as an expression of the Greek's own beauty and the 'Systemprogramm' claims that 'der höchste Akt der Vernunft . . . ein ästhetischer Akt ist, . . .' (4:298, line 14f.).

A third objection concerns the claim that the foundation of the new religion is the notion of a 'potential unity of all consciousness in the transcendental structure subject-object'. If this is derived from the 'Systemprogramm', it can only be from the demand there expressed for 'Absolute Freiheit aller Geister, die die intellektuelle Welt in sich tragen, und weder Gott noch Unsterblichkeit ausser sich suchen dürfen' (4:298, lines 9–11). The demand sounds so much like the line of thought developed in Schelling's letter to Hegel of February 1795 (it is generally assumed that the 'Systemprogramm' was composed in the summer of 1796), with its bold statement 'Es gibt keine übersinnliche Welt für uns als die des absoluten Ichs',²¹ that one should be very wary of associating this part of the 'programme' with Hölderlin at all — especially as we know that Hölderlin had much to criticise in Fichte's notion of 'das absolute Ich' (6:155) and that Hölderlin and Schelling by no means always agreed (6:203). Yet because of the theory of the 'private world', Simon wants to be able to claim that the 'unity of all consciousness' is something *imparted by the transcendental subject* and therefore that when Hölderlin speaks of the 'Geist' that unites people with nature and with each other to form the 'Gemeinde', he is creating a private and purely poetic fiction: 'And the Ev [of the 'εν διαφερον εαυτω' formula], the unifying principle, is it not ultimately, — rationally — *the poet himself*, who stands before the All as transcendental subject, consciousness-imparting spirit?' (p. 230). This may have some relevance to Schelling, especially in his *System des transcendentalen Idealismus* (1800), but not to Kant²² (to whom Simon erroneously attributes the epistemology of the 'rational mythology', p. 227) and certainly not to Hölderlin. We need only compare Schelling's letter to Hegel, with its statement that 'Das A und O aller Philosophie ist die Freiheit' (Hoffmeister, p. 22) and that freedom is only to be found in the 'absolute' Ego, with Hölderlin's to his brother of March 1801, '*A Deo principium*. Wer diß versteht und hält, ja bei dem Leben des Lebens! der ist frei und kräftig und freudig, und alles Umgekehrte ist Chimäre und zergehet in so ferne in Nichts. . . . *a Deo principium* . . . Alles unendliche Einigkeit, aber in diesem Allem ein vorzüglich Einiges und Einigendes, das, an sich, *kein Ich ist*, und dieses sei unter uns Gott!' (6:419, my emphasis). That which imparts unity is for Hölderlin not subject, whether transcendental or otherwise.

'Brod und Wein' is not a closed, private world. The absence of divine names, rather than immobilizing the poem in self-contradiction, allows us to place the period of darkness during which no heroes can be found within the overall structure of the divine economy as Hölderlin understands it. The final strophe in particular points forward to 'Friedensfeier'. The elegy ends with the line 'Selbst der neidische, selbst Cerberus trinket und schläft' (line 160). The mythological creature who guards the exit from the underworld is given an epithet which is not used in the traditions and which therefore points to his meaning as a symbol for the present. The spirit of the present age, the period of spiritual darkness

which for those who must live in it is *like* the underworld, is for Hölderlin the spirit of envy. From Hauptwil, shortly after the peace of Lunéville, he writes to Christian Landauer about that envious spirit which destroys true community: 'Ich denke, mit Krieg und Revolution hört auch jener moralische Boreas, der Geist des Neides auf, und eine schönere Geselligkeit, als nur die ehernbürgerliche mag reifen!' (6:417). Homer's 'βορραεας'²³ symbolizes for Hölderlin the power which destroys love, 'der Leibenden Feind' (2:76, line 48), 'der Allverderber' (2:60, line 16), and is the power which holds sway during the harsh 'bronze' age, while the 'golden' age is still only a future hope. The sleeping of Cerberus, 'der neidische', is thus a metaphor for Hölderlin's political hopes. The letters he writes during the period when 'Brod und Wein' must have been written are the letters of a man watching the present for the birth signs of a new age. None more so than the letter to his brother of December 1800, written en route to Hauptwil: 'Aber daß der Egoismus in allen seinen Gestalten sich beugen wird unter die heilige Herrschaft der Liebe und Güte, daß Gemeingeist über alles in allem gehen . . . wird, diß mein' ich, diß seh' und glaub' ich . . .' (6:407). On 3 December 1800 a ceasefire in the hostilities between France and Austria began, and this was another stage in the peace process which had started in June 1800 and was to reach its climax in February 1801. Hölderlin clearly saw the ceasefire in these terms, for in the same letter he speaks of the 'Friede, der jetzt *im Werden* ist' (my emphasis). Yet in his eyes the political significance of the events is eclipsed by their spiritual significance, for 'der Friede . . . wird vieles bringen, was viele hoffen, aber er wird auch bringen, was wenige hoffen' (ibid.). This is the '. . . heilige Herrschaft der Liebe . . .'. The peaceful ending of 'Brod und Wein' flows directly from the turn of contemporary events which Hölderlin had been witnessing as he wrote the poem.

This interpretation of the sleeping of Cerberus must guide our interpretation of the 'coming' of the 'Fackelschwinger' who is Christ *and* Dionysus. Schmidt points to the political background to the ending of the elegy (p. 160f.), and Simon also links the attribution of the adjective 'neidisch' to Cerberus with the letter to Landauer (p. 279). Yet neither is, in my view, bold enough in his view of the meaning of this 'coming'. Schmidt argues that because both Christ and Dionysus belong to 'der himmlische Chor' (line 132), which is no longer present on the earth, and cannot therefore 'come down again' until all of the gods return (line 140), it is not possible to speak of these two gods being themselves present in the interim darkness. The conclusion is this: 'Weder Christus allein, noch Dionysus allein kommen in unserer Zwischenzeit unmittelbar herab, sie kommen *beide* herab, und *mittelbar*, im Wein' (p. 166). Simon agrees wholeheartedly (p. 226). Schmidt's conclusion rests on the view that Christ is in 'Brod und Wein' himself nothing more than the end-point of the Greek 'day' (p. 133f.).

Yet if contemporary political events are indeed as important as Schmidt himself argues, it seems strange that the divine presence which Hölderlin

perceives in them should be no different from that available in any place and in any period of history since the time when the 'gifts' of bread and wine were left for the whole of mankind. In the letters just quoted Hölderlin sees the ending of the 'Geist des Neides' as a sign of the coming *eschaton*: we cannot doubt that this is the force of phrases like 'die heilige Herrschaft der Liebe' and 'Gemeingeist' which will 'über alles in allem gehen'. I Corinthians 15.24–28, with its statement that the *parousia* of the Son will usher in the end of history and that the Son will only then be subjected to the Father, 'Auff daß Gott sey alles in allen' (modern translations sometimes render 'in allem') is clearly echoed in the letter to the brother. What can prevent us from seeing the sleeping of Cerberus as any less eschatological than this? Only the view that Christ belongs wholly to the Greek pantheon, both in his first appearance and his final return. Yet at the end of 'Brod und Wein', Christ and Dionysus (declared in 'Der Einzige' to be the one who restrains the violent warring of the nations; 2:154, line 59), are already returning themselves and not merely 'mittelbar, im Wein'. This cannot appear strange when seen in the context of that poem so often neglected in Hölderlin scholarship, the poem to Hölderlin's grandmother of December 1798:

Und vergessen ist fast, wer der Lebendige war.
Wenige kennen ihn doch und oft erscheint erheiternd
Mitten in stürmischer Zeit ihnen das himmlische Bild.

(1:272, lines 10–12)

This 'Bild' cannot be the mere recollection of what Christ was, since if he is 'the living one' he is, as in Revelation 1.18, 'der Lebendige', whom God has made alive 'von Ewigkeit zu Ewigkeit'.²⁴ The sense must be that it is the living Christ who is largely unknown, even though he appears in the storms of history, for the two parts of the second line can only be connected contrastively. Indeed it was to the seven churches experiencing their own troubled times that the Risen Christ of the opening chapters of Revelation spoke his words of encouragement and reproach. It is above all Christ, associated from the Tübingen period onwards with the 'Gesez der Liebe' (4:174), but also Dionysus with him, who constitute the source of the encouragement which Hölderlin found in the peace process he witnessed in the second half of 1800.

Martin Simon's analysis of the last six lines of 'Brod und Wein' seeks to show how the entire movement of the strophe is towards sleep and oblivion, yet he inadvertently lends credibility to the interpretation I have been advancing. On the alliterative music of line 157f., he comments: "'Lächeln . . . leuchtet . . . Licht . . .'" is the rhythmical image not so much of hymnic light breaking through the darkness as of a vision only granted, possible, at the moment of death. The inspiration, conscious or not, is Luke 2.29–32" (Simon, p. 274). The verses from Luke give the Song of Simeon:

Herr, nun lässest du deinen Diener im Friede fahren, wie du gesagt hast. Denn meine Augen haben deinen Heiland gesehen, welchen du bereitet hast vor allen Völckern. Ein Licht zu erleuchten die Heiden und zum Preis deins Volcks Israel.

But the moment of Simeon’s death is precisely the idea in the Luke passage which is *not* directly evoked by the rhythmical repetition of I-sounds. The alliteration suggests (undeniably, I feel) a biblical passage which *in its turn* suggests as one of its ideas, *but not the main one*, the death of the man who waited for the vision. What Simeon has seen, what *is* evoked by the I-sounds, is the fulfilment of all of Israel’s expectations in the light which has come to lighten the Gentiles (literally ‘the nations’). Thus the Song looks forward, implicitly, to the life, death and Resurrection of Christ, to his ‘enlightening’ of the nations as the Risen Christ: the ‘erleuchten’ is the effect he will have on history, just as ‘leuchtet’ in line 158 of ‘Brod und Wein’ is the response from some members, at least, of the warring European peoples (the ‘Seelige Weise’, line 157) to the coming of the ‘Fackelschwinger’ in Hölderlin’s present. Simon’s use of the echoed alliteration seeks to suggest that the ‘Selige Weise’ of line 157 are granted their vision in the moment before they fall asleep. But this can hardly be inferred from ‘Brod und Wein’ itself, and the ‘dying sequence’ of the *rhythm* of line 158, to which Simon refers (p. 274) can just as easily suggest peace and contentment now that the fulfilment is taking place as a longing for oblivion to forget the pain of non-fulfilment. Cerberus is indeed said to sleep, and *his* sleep betokens precisely the waking of the nations from the ‘üppigen Schlummer’ which is their warring (2:6, line 24).

(vi) ‘Friedensfeier’: *Christ named*

In ‘Friedensfeier’ the themes I have been discussing are brought to a climax and receive their boldest articulation. No single Hölderlin poem has received as much critical attention as this hymn or produced as many diverging interpretations. The question of the identity of the ‘Fürst des Fests’ has often been at the centre of the debate about the poem’s meaning, and this is inevitable and right, given that the emotional climax of the poem coincides with the controversial lines:

... denn darum rief ich
 Zum Gastmahl, das bereitet ist,
 Dich, Unvergesslicher, dich, zum Abend der Zeit,
 O Jüngling, dich zum Fürsten des Fests;
 (3:536, lines 109 ff.)²⁵

My aim here is to show, largely by reference to the detailed argument of others who advocate the ‘christologische These’, that the identification of the ‘Fürst’ as Christ is indeed the most plausible interpretation, and beyond that to show that

this identification accords impressively with an understanding of the divine economy which links the 'naming' of the earth and the 'naming' of Christ.

Until the earth herself is 'erkannt', so I have argued on the basis of 'Der Mutter Erde', the full glory of Christ, his Lordship, will remain concealed, 'verhüllt in den Stralen' (2:683), and to some extent rendered harmless. The notion of the revelation of Christ, and the potential danger it carries with it, would seem to be one of the core ideas out of which 'Friedensfeier' grows, for in the prose draft which Beissner takes as 'die verhältnismäßig früheste Niederschrift' (2:699) of the preparatory 'Versöhnender . . .' fragments,²⁶ we read:

. . . Seelig warst du damals aber seeliger
 jetzt, wenn wir des Abends mit den Freunden
 dich nennen und singen von den Hohen und rings
 um dich die Deinigen all sind. Abgelegt
 nun ist die Hülle. Bald wird auch noch anderes klar
 seyn, und wir fürchten es nicht. (2:699, lines 15–20)

The one addressed is the 'Jüngling' Christ. The lines are the imagined fulfilment of the wish just expressed, 'Darum sei gegenwärtig, Jüngling' (2:699, line 10). Thus the two temporal adverbs 'jetzt' and 'nun' relate to an anticipated present, and need not conflict with the future sense of 'bald': when Christ is indeed present, at the centre of all the 'Hohen', he will no longer be 'veiled' and there will be, in the words of the metrical fragment which this draft becomes, 'allerneuende Klarheit' (2:130, line 12). 'Friedensfeier' itself also exhibits throughout a tension between actual fulfilment and anticipated fulfilment, still fractionally future. Yet it says of Christ the Son 'nun erkennen wir ihn' (line 74, my emphasis) and, if the 'christologische These' is correct, the poem enacts itself the anticipated fulfilment by proclaiming that he is the 'Fürst'. Now if Christ is thus 'known' and 'named', the opening strophe of the hymn must be integral to its overall meaning.

Hölderlin there describes a landscape by means of the same metaphor he had used in 'Brod und Wein' when speaking of Greece as a 'Festlicher Saal' which had been built for the sole purpose of receiving the gods, a 'Saal' whose tables were the mountains and whose floor was the sea (2:91, line 55; 2:92, line 57). If in 'Friedensfeier' too the tables are to be thought of as mountains or hills, then the 'weithinglänzend' of line 5 may well suggest the effect of sunshine on the rain-soaked vegetation, especially as through the floor of 'das rauchende Tal' in line 120 (which must surely be connected with the 'tables', 'Zur Seite da und dort aufsteigend' in line 9) there still rumbles the noise of a (presumably passing) thunderstorm (line 121). 'Glänzend' is the word used to describe the trees in 'Wie wenn am Feiertage . . .' as they stand in the morning sunshine after the thunderstorm of the night (2:118, line 8). The lifting of the atmosphere after the thunderstorm would then be the sense of 'gelüftet' (line 3), with 'duftet' line 4)

evoking the image of vapour rising from grass which is now bathed in sunshine. And so on: 'grüne Teppiche' easily suggests the grass, and the 'Kelche' can be visualized as 'Blumenkelche'. If, then, we are dealing here with a landscape presented through the metaphor of a room, it is, as in 'Wie wenn am Feiertage . . .', a landscape refreshed and resplendent in the aftermath of the storm.

In the earlier hymn, the position of the poets, standing under the storms of history, was clearly meant to be a parallel to the trees, exposed to the thunder and lightning during the night, but now 'glistening' in the sun. The same connection between the literal and the metaphorical storms is surely present in 'Friedensfeier', for if the 'Boden, der vom Wetter noch dröhnet' (line 121) and the 'Leichtatmende Lüfte' (line 118) can be said to herald the guests whose presence actually constitutes the celebration of peace, it must be because peace is known to be imminent now that the air has cleared and that the thunder, if still audible, is moving further and further into the distance. Indeed the 'rauchende Tal' (line 120) can be seen, following Gaskill's attractive suggestion, to suggest not only the vaporizing rainwater but also the smoke still rising from a recently deserted battlefield.²⁷ It would thus seem to be impossible not to link the description of nature in the first and tenth strophes with 'das tausendjährige Wetter' (line 32) whose thunder is now dying away, 'übertönt von Friedenslauten' (line 33). The landscape is filled with 'himmlischen . . . Töne' (line 1 f.) because the noise of war has ceased. But the end of war is not merely the beginning of a long overdue period of peace in man's history, it is the end of history itself, the 'Abend der Zeit' (line 111), and thus marks the transition from the temporal to the eternal. The image of an idyllic, rejuvenated landscape has therefore to be seen as one of the signs that the final phase of 'salvation history' has begun. Gaskill is surely right to see in line 94 f. an echo of Genesis 9.12 f., where the rainbow which appears in the sky after the Flood is declared by God to be 'das Zeichen des Bunds, den ich gemacht habe zwischen mir und euch und allem lebendigen Thier bey euch *hinfort ewiglich*' (my emphasis).²⁸ This parallel becomes particularly significant if we recall that in 'Der Frieden' comparison with the Flood, whose total destruction God, in Genesis 9.15, promises will never recur, is used to intensify the horror of the coalition wars (2:6, lines 1–4).

The end of the wars allows nature to resume once again her primeval beauty and harmony (line 1), full, like Eden, of the most delicious fruits (line 6) and yet partaking at the same time of the dazzling mineral splendour of the New Jerusalem (ibid., cf. Revelation 21. 10–21), witnessing visually to the restored relationship between the human and the divine. By setting such a description at the beginning of 'Friedensfeier', Hölderlin suggests that the 'heilige Herrschaft der Liebe' he had anticipated in the letter to his brother (6:407) has, as its first expression, the ending of the abuse the earth has suffered because of 'Neid' and 'Egoismus' ('in allen seinen Gestalten', the letter had said, thereby including

political and military forms). Indeed, the 'Herrschaft der Liebe' begins when German soil, the main arena of the second coalition war, is granted peace. In the poem 'Gesang des Deutschen', written at the end of 1799, Germany is addressed as 'heilig Herz der Völker . . . / Allduldend, gleich der schweigenden Mutter Erd' (2:3, line 1 f.), and it is hard to imagine that the sufferings of war are not implied here alongside the explicit spiritual injuries inflicted by the 'Fremden' (ibid. line 4). Thus when Hölderlin also confides to his brother the hope that 'das deutsche Herz in solchem Klima . . . erst recht aufgehen . . . und . . . seine geheimen, weitreichenden kräfte entfalten wird . . .' (6:407), the underlying assumption is that this hope is justified because German territory is now at peace. But for the nations of Europe to renounce their 'Egoismus' means for Hölderlin that they must be ready to 'name' the earth once more — to acknowledge, as the Agrigentines were called to do, the part of it must play in their collective religious life and to celebrate it with thankfulness (1572, E1). If 'Freidensfeier' announces that the 'Herrschaft der Liebe' now prevails, it must be because of attitudes which enable men to *give* to the earth, and no longer take from her — the same attitudes which enable the 'heroes' to give her the name 'Liebe' (2:683, line 14).

If the arguments I have advanced above in relation to 'Der Mutter Erde' and *Empedokles* are correct, then such a picture of the decisive and ultimate restoration of the earth as we read at the beginning of 'Freidensfeier' cannot fail to generate the *expectation* that Christ will also now be 'named'. Of course, the interpretation of those highly disputed lines of 'Freidensfeier' which speak of the 'Fürst des Fests' (lines 109–12) now becomes critical. Such interpretation cannot, given the nature of Hölderlin's poetry, be entirely 'werkimmanent' — and indeed none of the many readings of the hymn tries to be. To the indispensable wider context I have been analysing belongs one further fact, namely that in the poem to his grandmother Hölderlin refers to Christ as 'den Freund unserer Erde' (1:272, line 8). If, as this suggests, Christ was for Hölderlin the friend of suffering, sinful *humanity* and also the friend of the silently suffering earth, then the earth's restoration will also be the prelude to his restoration.

Thirty years after the discovery of 'Freidensfeier', Maloney produced a detailed and careful assessment of the debate about its meaning, an examination of the premises of other major interpretations and their weaknesses, and a reading of his own which identifies Christ as the 'Fürst des Fests'.²⁹ To a large extent, what follows is based on his work. It would be superfluous to reproduce here his analysis of the positions of other interpreters, but he is right to point out that the early debate about the poem in the years immediately after its discovery was often too heated for the protagonists to reflect critically on the presupposition of their own exegesis. He performs this critical reflection himself, with the benefit of course of greater distance. If we assume, then, on the basis of Maloney's work, that none of the interpretations which sees the 'Fürst des Fests'

as someone or something other than Christ is convincing enough to command general support, the question arises: can Christ himself plausibly be identified as the 'Fürst'?

To answer yes to this question, one has to be able to say that in the crucial lines of strophe 9 the verb 'rufen' can, in line 112, reasonably be taken to mean 'ausrufen': thus Christ, whom no one except Beissner (3:566) doubts is the 'Jüngling' in 'Friedensfeier', as he clearly also is in the 'Versöhnender . . .' fragments, is proclaimed to be the 'Fürst des Fests'. If this is the meaning in line 112, rather than the idea that Christ is 'called before' the 'Fürst' (who would therefore have to be some other figure), then it is necessary to assume that the single verb form 'rufen + zum', used only once, has as a second meaning the idea of 'to call before' in the spatial sense, since 'denn darum reif / Zum Gastmahl . . . / . . . dich' is unambiguously spatial. And yet this is not necessarily disabling, as Hof has pointed out (see Maloney, p. 68), since the 'rufen + zum' construction is actually already being used differently in the two occurrences *before* the crucial line 112: once with a spatial sense ('Zum Gastmahl', line 110) and once with a temporal sense ('Zum Abend der Zeit', line 111). Thus the disruption of the grammatical symmetry which the sense of 'ausrufen' supposedly brings has in fact already occurred *before* line 112.³⁰ This disruption cannot therefore be used as an argument against taking the 'zum Fürsten des Fests' in a different sense from the other two 'zum' phrases. On the other side, Schillemeit has adduced several reasons for actually preferring the sense of 'ausrufen'. He points out that since the 'Jüngling' has already been 'called' to the 'Gastmahl' in line 110, for him then to be called to or before the one presiding at the symposium would be tantamount to pleonasm³¹ — something which it is particularly hard to accept since then, as Beissner points out, 'Von einer Steigerung, die doch die pathetische Wortfügung deutlich bezeugt, könnte keine Rede sein' (3:565). Schillemeit argues further that the sense of 'called before' gives the phrase 'rief ich' 'einen gestischen Charakter von dirigierend-befehlender Aufforderung' which hardly accords with the typical attitude of the poet towards the gods (p. 615). Finally he suggests that it is wrong to think of the 'Fürst' as someone who is already present and to whom another can therefore be summoned (ibid.). This is surely borne out by a close reading of strophe 2, the only other place in the poem where the 'Fürst des Fests' is actually mentioned: for although the poet already (lines 13–15) *thinks* he can see the one who *for him is the 'Fürst'*, he has subsequently to admit 'Nur Eines weiß ich, Sterbliches bist du nicht' (line 21), thereby calling into question his own initial feeling of recognition. The logic of this last point, and indeed of Schillemeit's other two arguments, is, I think, compelling.

For either of the two possible ways of reading 'denn darum rief ich / . . . dich zum Fürsten des Fests' the past tense of the verb 'rufen' is problematic. To which earlier 'calling before' or 'proclamation' can this past tense refer? Szondi's

answer involves connecting the 'Und manchen möchte ich laden, aber o du', (line 40) of 'Friedensfeier', which undoubtedly does refer to Christ, with the parallel passage in the 'Versöhnender . . .' fragments, which links the 'aber o du' with an explicit 'invitation' to be present, 'Sei gegenwärtig, Jüngling' (see Szondi, pp. 367–69). Yet the parallel is not really a parallel at all in so far as there is no mention of any 'Fürst' whatsoever in the 'Versöhnender . . .' drafts and the 'call' cannot therefore be a 'call' before *him*. On the other hand, it is possible to read line 15 of the hymn as *itself* the (first) bestowing of the title 'Fürst des Fests', if, following the suggestion made by Szondi elsewhere, the usual stress implied in most readings, 'Ihn *selbst* zu sehn, den *Fürsten* des *Fests*' is changed to 'Ihn *selbst* zu sehn, den *Fürsten* des *Fests*'.³² We could then conclude with Maloney that the problem of the past tense of 'rief' disappears, since 'Friedensfeier' *itself* contains two 'proclamations' that Christ is the 'Fürst':

Das erste Mal glaubt er 'Ihn selbst' zu sehen, den ersehnten Gast, den er im Beisatz als Fürst des Fests betitelt . . . Das zweite Mal nimmt der Dichter Bezug auf diesen Ausspruch, wenn er sagt, er habe ihn, den Jüngling, zum Fürsten des Fests gerufen — zum Fürsten, der er also in den Augen des Dichters selber ist.³³

Clearly other problems remain: if strophe 2 contains the bestowing of the title 'Fürst des Fests' upon Christ, then the statements made there about the 'Fürst' must be capable of applying plausibly to Christ. It must also be shown how the 'Tagwerk' ascribed to the 'Fürst' in this strophe relates to the 'Tagwerk' of line 81. Yet these questions have been dealt with more than adequately by Gaskill³⁴ and by Maloney himself (pp. 58 ff.) It can, then, be argued with a reasonable degree of confidence and on the basis of internal evidence only that in 'Friedensfeier' the poet gives to Christ the title 'Fürst des Fests'. Such an interpretation gains in credibility if we also take into account the connection I have claimed exists elsewhere in Hölderlin's work around this time between the 'naming' of the earth and the 'naming' of Christ and indeed it is revealing that in the 'Versöhnender . . .' fragments *neither* the idyllic description of a renewed landscape *nor* the proclamation of the 'Jüngling' Christ as 'Fürst' (or as anything else) is present.³⁵ But what does it mean to give this title to Christ?

Its meaning is connected, more than perhaps at first might seem to be the case, with the eschatological knowledge of the 'father'. Now, at the 'Abend der Zeit' (line 111), is the moment 'da wir kennen den Vater' (line 75). At the same time, because it is the moment of Christ's 'naming' as 'Fürst des Fests', it is the point at which he, Christ, is recognized and 'known' (we have 'Erkenntnis' of him). It is clear from strophe 9 that the mode of revelation at the moment when history reaches its climax is 'Gesang' (line 105), which now replaces 'Wunder' and the partially hidden presence of the gods in the storms of history (line 104). Indeed the change since 'Wie wenn am Feiertage . . .' here appears immense: whereas in the earlier hymn 'Gesang' was the form in which the poets, as a special category, mediated the presence of the gods to the ordinary 'Erdensöhne', here it is,

simply, the community of ‘heavenly ones’ and mankind as a whole, finally reconciled (line 92). Other poems from this period emphasize that there is no true knowledge of the ‘father’ other than through ‘Gesang’, most impressively ‘Der Mutter Erde’, which virtually articulates itself the difference between ‘Friedensfeier’, and ‘Wie wenn am Feiertage . . .’:

OTTMAR

Statt offener Gemeinde sing’ ich Gesang

.....

Doch wird ein anderes noch
 Wie der Harfe Klang
 Der Gesang seyn
 Der Chor des Volks
 Denn wenn er schon der Zeichen genung
 Und Fluthen in seiner Macht und Wetterflammen
 Wie Gedanken hat der heilige Vater,
 . . . unaussprechlich wär er wohl
 Und nirgend fänd er wahr sich unter den Lebenden wieder
 Wenn zum Gesange nicht hätte ein Herz die Gemeinde.

(2:123, lines 1, 11–20)

The second version of ‘Ermunterung’, which may have been produced as late as the beginning of 1801, looks forward to the time when

. . . er, der sprachlos waltet und unbekannt
 Zukünftiges bereitet, der Gott, der Geist
 Im Menschenwort, am schönen Tage
 Kommenden Jahren, wie einst, sich ausspricht.

(2:36, lines 25–28)

This ‘self-expression’ was, in the first version of the poem, a ‘self-naming’ (2:34, line 28). It is clear from lines 13–16 of the second version that this ‘Menschenwort’ is not mundane human speech, but song. And, as in the vision of Empedokles we have already discussed (1572, E1), a vital part of the renewed self-disclosure of the divine is a changed human attitude towards the earth (line 23 f.).

Thus the ‘father’ could not be known — revealed in this final, eschatological way — ‘Wenn zum Gesange nicht hätte ein Herz die Gemeinde’. By the time of ‘Friedensfeier’ Hölderlin’s highest god is unambiguously ‘der Vater Aether’, and he is both immanent and transcendent, the god of nature and of history. The second strophe of ‘Heimkunft’ is a hymn to this god: ‘Und noch höher hinauf wohnt über dem Lichte der reine / Selige Gott . . . / . . . Der ätherische . . .’ (2:96, lines 21 f., 24). The life he imparts to men is the fruitfulness of nature (line 28) and the renewal of their historical life (line 31). This god is more than just the ‘Geist’ animating the religious community (3:224), as it is graphically illustrated by his dwelling ‘über dem Lichte’, and so it is natural that he should receive a mythological name which expresses this supreme position — ‘der Vater’.

Nevertheless it remains true that the 'father' of 'Friedensfeier' can only now be *known* because 'we' ourselves are to become 'Gesang'. It is impossible to restrict this 'we' merely to the human community of celebrants, since the moment when 'we' are actually 'Gesang', which is not quite yet ('*bald* sind wir . . .', line 93), will coincide exactly with the moment when 'All ihr Unsterblichen' (line 115) are finally present 'in unserem Hause' (line 117). 'Gesang' will therefore encompass 'Die Seligen in jeglicher Weise' (line 107); those who, as gods, are by nature 'selig' and those whose bliss is *created* by the coming of the gods.

If the 'father' is not known until such 'Gesang' is a reality, and the son, Christ, is himself not 'known' until 'wir kennen den Vater', then what is the implied connection between knowledge of the son and the possibility of 'Gesang'? The answer to this question takes us to the heart of the christology of 'Friedensfeier' and, in a sense, to the high-point of all of Hölderlin's thinking about Christ. The celebration of peace, the 'Gastmahl' of line 110, cannot take place unless Christ is present: the emotional crescendo which the form of lines 109–12 produces itself makes this plain. Indeed Jochen Schmidt has offered an ingenious and not implausible explanation of the real logical force of 'darum' in line 109 which confirms that Christ is absolutely indispensable: 'Man muss dieses "hängen" [line 109] wörtlich nehmen: die himmlischen Gestalten "hängen" alle an ihrem Geliebtesten, und deshalb kann man sie gegenwärtig machen, indem man das Geliebteste ruft; sie werden so wie an einer Kette herbeigezogen: "darum" ruft der Dichter gerade das Geliebteste'.³⁶ However 'Versöhnender . . .' bears witness to the poet's anxiety about the correctness of his own desire for Christ to be a part of the gathering of all the 'Himmlischen' at the end of time. If Christ is to be present, Hölderlin must appeal to him to be himself reconciled to the other gods:

Und schöner, wie sonst, o sei
Versöhnender nun versöhnt daß wir des Abends
Mit den Freunden dich nennen, und singen
Von den Hohen, und neben dir noch andere sein.

(2:131, lines 57–60)

This appeal is later presented graphically through the metaphor of a setting sun, abandoning its zenith and thus also the position from which it dominates and dazzles all else (2:132, line 87f.). Will Christ be reconciled to the other gods? Even before 'Der Einzige', the tension this question generates is evident. Hölderlin's potent answer to the problem is the underlying confidence that 'Geist', of which it is said in 'Friedensfeier' that it '*. . . blüht/Rings abendlich . . . in dieser Stille*' (line 35f.), is the spirit of *all* truth, and therefore of the truth embodied in *all* gods. This must be the way to understand the idea, first articulated in 'Versöhnender . . .' (2:131, line 39; 2:132, line 70) and carried into 'Friedensfeier' in the thought of Christ's death overtaking him 'mitten im Wort' (line 49), that Christ did not fully express all he came to say. It is true that the

gospels do not suggest that Christ was prematurely silenced by death, against his will, yet John's gospel, which clearly inspires strophe 4 of 'Friedensfeier' and that strophe's earlier drafts, does contain Jesus's statement:

Ich habe euch noch viel zu sagen, aber ihr könnet es jetzt nicht tragen. Wenn aber jener, der Geist der Wahrheit komen wird, der wird euch *in alle Wahrheit leiten*. Denn er wird nicht von ihm selber reden sondern was er hören wird das wird er reden und was zukünftig ist wird er euch verkündigen. Derselbige wird mich verklären. (John 16.12–14, my emphasis)

One modern commentator suggests that this can be understood as a promise that the Spirit will guide the company of God's people *in* the whole realm of truth (rather than 'into').³⁷ Certainly the truth that the Spirit will reveal cannot, on Jesus's terms, be new truth in the sense of truth that is independent of the Son. The passage inevitably reminds the reader of the fourth chapter of the same gospel, where true worship of God is said by Jesus to be worship performed 'im Geist und in der Wahrheit' (John 4.22). This worship is the worship of a time that is still 'coming' (*ibid.*), although in Jesus himself, the one on whom the Spirit descended and remained (John 1.32), that time has already been anticipated. The manner of Hölderlin's allusion to this precise verse (John 4.22) in the first prose draft of 'Versöhnender . . .' (2:699) strongly suggests that the spiritual and 'truthful' worship promised by Jesus, or the whole realm of truth in which believers were to be guided, was for the poet worship of all the gods or life in a realm which all the gods could inhabit. Jesus, in John 4.21–24, contrasts both the Samaritan attachment to Mount Gerizim and the Jews' insistence on the importance of the Jerusalem temple with true worship 'im Geist und in der Wahrheit'. Hölderlin completely eliminates the distinction and fuses all the separate elements of Jesus's statement into a single vision of synthesized worship:

. . . und du
selber hast es gesagt, daß in Wahrheit wir auf
Höhen und geistig auch anbeten werden in Tempeln.

(2:699, lines 21–24)

Although Hölderlin's adaptation of Jesus's actual words here is often overlooked, Maloney has also drawn attention to it, and comments that 'die "Höhen" und "Tempel" eher an die Akropolis denken lassen als an die alten Bräuche der Juden und Samariter' (p. 52). The religion of ancient Israel was by 1800 by no means as unimportant for Hölderlin as this suggestion implies (see 2:128, lines 79–85), but in any case the point is surely that, in Hölderlin's eschatological vision, not merely the Acropolis but any and all high-places and temples are sanctified by the universal presence of 'Geist': religious rivalry is over. Grammatically, Hölderlin's version of John 4.21–24 makes it impossible to separate 'Wahrheit' from 'Höhen' (note the plural: in John it is one, specific

mountain) or 'geistig' from 'Tempeln' (again, a plural replaces the singular temple — in Jerusalem).³⁸

Does Hölderlin perhaps imagine that these words from the first draft of 'Versöhnender . . .' are the words the 'Jüngling' might have spoken if death had not caught him 'mitten im Wort' ('Friedensfeier', line 49)? It is tempting to speculate, although of course a definite answer to such a question is not necessary or possible, but one thing is certain for Hölderlin: the things which Jesus could or did not say have not been lost, since with the climax of history they have actually come to pass:

Und siehe! was du verschwiegest,
Der Zeiten Vollendung hat es gebracht.
Wohl wußtest du es, aber nicht zu leben,
zu sterben warst du gesandt,

(2:132, lines 70–72)

Yet the consummation of history *is* the celebration of peace, the gathering of all the gods, who thereby transcend the barriers formerly imposed on them by the 'high-places' and 'temples' with which they were associated. Thus the words imputed to Jesus by Hölderlin in his adaptation of John 4 and the unspoken words finally realized by 'Der Zeiten Vollendung' are, in intention, the same.

One part of the answer to the question about the connection between the knowledge of Christ and the possibility of 'Gesang' is therefore this: the gathering of all the gods, without which there will be no 'Gesang', will be made possible, the poet hopes, by Christ's own self-effacing attitude, his willingness to tolerate others beside him and by the fulfilment of the promise that 'in Wahrheit wir auf/Höhen und geistig anbeten werden in Tempeln'. Yet the hope that Christ will indeed be 'versöhnt' is not something Hölderlin has to generate artificially, as it were, by wilful distortion of Jesus's recorded words: it is based on his understanding of the whole meaning of Christ's earthly ministry. Of Christ, we recall, it was said 'Keines der Lebenden war aus seiner Seele geschlossen/Und die Leiden der Welt trug er an liebender Brust' (1:272, line 15). Of Christ it is said in the 'Versöhnender . . .' fragments, '. . . nicht zu leben, zu sterben warst du gesandt' (2:132, line 72). Above all it is Christ who, for the 'father' who sends him to earth, is 'Das liebendste, was er hatte' (2:132, line 64) — not the most *beloved* son, but the one who, as in John 13.1, loved his followers 'ans Ende', the one whose love went further than the love of any other, even unto death. Hölderlin's appeal to Christ to be reconciled to the other gods, '[am] Abend der Zeit', is grounded upon the self-offering which he believes characterized the earthly life. It is to the 'Versöhnender' himself that the call to be 'nun versöhnt' is addressed (2:131, line 58).

Yet to know the son as humble and self-giving is not to know him fully. From the very beginning of Hölderlin's work on the poem which became 'Friedensfeier' — the prose draft we have already quoted from — there is the

conviction that Christ’s full nature is only revealed at the end. ‘Es ist der Abend der Zeit, . . .’ that draft says and (specifically of Christ) ‘Abgelegt/nun ist die Hülle’ (2:699). From another perspective this then becomes the idea that Christ’s presence at the celebration will be his first full or true presence: ‘Sei gegenwärtig, Jüngling, jezt erst . . .’ (2:131, line 39). Christ is finally present in unveiled splendour because he is now surrounded by all those other gods who have manifested the divine in their own way and who now pay tribute to him. *As such tribute is given, Christ is made fully known and thus glorified.* In the prose draft, once again, the connection is plain:

. . . Seelig warst du damals aber *seeliger*
jezt, wenn wir des Abends mit den Freunden
 dich nennen und singen von den Hohen und rings
 um die Deinigen all sind. Abgelegt . . .

(2:699, my emphasis)

The rest of the draft makes it perfectly clear that ‘die Deinigen’ refers not to Christ’s followers, now in glory, but to all the other gods who have gathered and for whom Christ is, even at this early stage of the work, ‘ihr geliebtestes’ (2:699, line 16). Their position around Christ, making him their centre, is the position of worshippers, and it is thus because the naming of Christ is to be part of an act of worship that he will be ‘seeliger/jezt’. The adjective ‘seeliger’ is then replaced by ‘schöner’ (2:131, line 59), but the thought remains the same. The name or title ‘Fürst des Fests’ which is finally given in ‘Friedensfeier’ itself is implied from the moment Hölderlin pictures Christ as the centre of the gathering of gods, for it is surely the case, as Staiger originally argued,³⁹ that Hölderlin’s use of the word ‘Fürst’ is intended to convey something of the sense of the Old High German ‘furisto’, the first, the pre-eminent one. We have seen from *Hyperion* how closely Hölderlin associates the giving of names and the expression of love: Hyperion had said of Diotima that she named all the flowers by their (familiar) names but that she also ‘schuff ihnen aus Liebe neue, schönere [Namen]’ (3:56) and of himself that the world ‘lief unverschönert an mir vorüber’ when his love for nature had cooled and he merely repeated the ordinary names of objects (3:42). The bestowing of names was the creation of a relationship of love and at the same time the elevation of the named to a higher status: through the new names the flowers became Diotima’s ‘sisters’ (3:56). The same is true in ‘Friedensfeier’: it is because Christ is the ‘Geliebtestes’ of the gods that he receives the name ‘Fürst des Fests’. Yet as we have seen, Christ is only present at all because of his own self-effacing nature. What this means is that his ultimate elevation results from his initial self-abasement. At the high point of the poem — line 112 — we are pointed back to Philippians 2: because Christ humbled himself ‘hat ihn auch Gott erhöht und hat ihm einen Namen gegeben der über alle Namen ist’. The name given in ‘Friedensfeier’ is not a name that is above every name in the exclusive sense of ‘Herr’ intended in

Philippians (cf. Acts 3.12), but it is a name which, because it is acknowledged by all the other 'Himmlischen' ('die Deinigen', 2:699), places Christ above every other god — except the one Father.

This reading of 'Friedensfeier' is, I believe, a plausible extension of the argument that says that the title 'Fürst des Fests' is bestowed on Christ in the course of the poem. Yet even those who take the 'father' deity of the hymn to be the only possible candidate for this title naturally have to acknowledge the central position within the hymn of the invitation to the 'Jüngling' Christ to be present at the celebration (lines 40 and 112). In fact it is possible to argue — and this must be seen as a further dimension of the connection between knowledge of Christ and the possibility of 'Gesang' — that, whether or not Christ is the 'Fürst', the character of the celebrated peace as a whole is so closely bound up with Hölderlin's understanding of Christ that we can only really see that peace as a glorification of the 'Sohn', as a new, contemporary Transfiguration.⁴⁰

The completion of the 'work' of peace, which has long been in preparation (line 29f.), is the beginning of the rule of the law of love (line 89f.). This 'law' is not merely the command to love others (which has presumably *always* been in force, even if men have chosen to ignore it) but it is the summation of those laws which, as one of the drafts puts it, '... unter Liebenden gelten ...' (2:137, line 44). The exemplary love relationship in Hölderlin's entire work is that of Hyperion and Diotima and, as we saw in chapter two, a very particular 'law', modelled on the love of God the Father and God the Son, controls these two lovers: in their love, there is total and totally reciprocal self-giving and, at the same time, mutual glorification. Each 'loses' himself or herself in the other and yet each receives himself or herself back from the other, who acts as the mirror of the other's 'glory'. Their love is the enactment of the formal definition of Beauty as 'Das Eine in sich selber Unterschiedene'. Thus in 'Friedensfeier' the law of love is 'schön' *because* it is 'ausgleichend' and yet not destructive of all differentiation (the 'Seligen' are present 'in jeglicher Weise', line 107).⁴¹

In *Hyperion* there existed two distinct possibilities for the enjoyment of the Hyperion-Diotima love: the private idyll (3:133) or its full realization in the 'schöne Gemeinde', in which they will be 'truly' wed for the first time (3:101). In terms of the essay *Über Religion* their love — as long as it is not universalized through the 'schöne Gemeinde' — constitutes a private 'sphere' with its own god, the god of their particular love. Hölderlin argues that '... wenn es eine Sphäre giebt, in der alle zugleich leben, und mit der sie in mehr als nothdürftiger Beziehung sich fühlen, dann ... haben sie alle eine gemeinschaftliche Gottheit' (4:278). 'Friedensfeier' presents the law of love as holding sway 'von hier an bis zum Himmel' (line 90) or, in an earlier version, 'von der Erde bis hoch in den Himmel' (2:137, line 46) and is therefore about just this transcending of individual and essentially private spheres. The gods who come to the celebration of peace

(line 12, cf. line 114) are, by this very action, abandoning any insistence on the exclusivity of the ‘spheres’ which they have ‘inhabited’.

Because this abandoning is a form of self-abandon, a law of love which is patterned on the love of Hyperion and Diotima requires that the self-abandon be followed by ‘glorification’ — an intensification or enhancing of the god’s own glory — for this was what each of the lovers performed for the other in the novel. The type of presence which the gods now have, at the moment of peace, is indeed of a superlative kind: the beginning of strophe 9 demands to be read as a *qualitative* distinction between ‘Gesang’ and other modes of revelation. The closeness of strophes 8 and 9 to Diotima’s vision of the ‘göttliche Gemeinde’ (3:224) suggests that this heightened intensity of the gods’ presence should be understood as the intensity of *recollection*. In the syncretic ‘Göttertag’ envisaged by Diotima, ‘. . . da wählt jedes einen [Heiligen] aus, der seinem Herzen, seinem Leben am nächsten ist, und nennt ihn, und der herrliche Todte tritt mitten unter uns *in der Glorie seiner Thaten*, auch wer, geschäftig am stillen Heerde, mit reinem Sinne das seine that, wird nie von uns *vergessen* . . .’ (3:224, my emphases). This corresponds exactly to the process described in *Über Religion* according to which the ‘höheres Leben’ available to man ‘in jeder ihm eigentümlichen Sphäre’ (4:275) is experienced in all its fullness precisely because it is ‘im Geiste wiederholt’ (4:276). The gods are present in a superlative way at the celebration of peace because of the transfiguring power of this recollection.

‘Friedensfeier’ is an act of recollection of ‘All ihr Unsterblichen’ (line 115) or, in Diotima’s terms, of the ‘Heiligen in allen Zeiten und Orten’ (3:224). It therefore itself aspires to create poetically that sphere in which ‘alle zugleich leben’ (4:278) and thus to be a channel for the expression of ‘eine gemeinschaftliche Gottheit’ (ibid.). But this deity must, in ‘Friedensfeier’, be communal in the most universal sense possible: it is ‘. . . die gemeinschaftliche Seele, die allem gemein und jedem eigen ist . . .’ (4:282) and, in the words of Hölderlin’s letter to his brother of March 1801, the ‘. . . vorzüglich Einiges und Einigendes . . .’ in everything (6:419). In short, it is the highest god Hölderlin knows. When this god is worshipped and known, then ‘Gemeingeist’ really will be ‘all in all’ (6:407). Commentators have noted the importance of I Corinthians for ‘Friedensfeier’, and have in particular connected line 28 of the hymn (‘Da Herrschaft nirgend ist zu sehn bei Geistern und Menschen’) with I Corinthians 15:24: ‘Darnach . . . das Ende . . . wenn er aufheben wird alle Herrschaft und alle Oberkeit und Gewalt’.⁴² St Paul sees the end of all particular forms of ‘Herrschaft’ (the evil powers who have ruled the universe)⁴³ as the beginning of one single, monarchic rule, that of God the Father. For St Paul, *everything* is to be subjected to the Father *so that*, at the end of history, He may be ‘all in all’ (I Corinthians 15:28) — and this means the final and complete establishing of the Kingdom of God. Christ finally hands over the Kingdom, which he himself has been establishing (ibid., verse 26), to God and thereby submits himself to the

Father (*ibid.*, verses 24 and 28). It is true to point out, as Schmidt does ('Die innere Einheit' . . . , p. 140), that this element of subordinationism is absent from 'Friedensfeier' — all 'Herrschaft' has ended (verse 28). But it is not enough merely to observe this difference: we must ask *why* it is that the peace seems to deny the basis for any hierarchical relationship even though the hymn speaks of a 'Father' and a 'Son' (lines 74 and 76).

We have seen that 'Gesang' is, in Hölderlin's later poetry, the only medium of real knowledge of the Father. Even at the eschatological fulfilment, his presence is not unmediated. This is particularly clear from Hölderlin's allusion, in the essay *Das Werden im Vergehen*, to I Corinthians 15.28 (where St Paul *does* speak of the end of the mediating work of the Son):

Denn die Welt aller Welten, das Alles in Allen, welches immer ist, stellt sich nur in aller Zeit — oder im Untergange oder im Moment, oder genetischer im Werden des Monuments und Anfang von Zeit und Welt dar, und dieser Untergang und Anfang ist wie die Sprache Ausdruck Zeichen Darstellung eines lebendigen . . . Ganzen . . . (4:282)

Hölderlin's highest god — 'das Alles in Allen, welches immer ist' — is *never* given directly. It may be expressed *indirectly* through those moments at which the particular 'Wechselwirkung' between man and nature (4:282) declines, to be replaced by a new one — and Hölderlin undoubtedly felt that such a moment had come with the peace of Lunéville. At the moment when the hope '. . . bald sind wir aber Gesang' (line 93) is fulfilled, however, we *ourselves* become the 'sign' or 'expression' of 'das Alles in Allen':

Gesang . . . ist für den Dichter . . . das Ergreifen des allgemeinen Geistes überhaupt . . . Das poetische Ich ist damit zum Glied einer Gemeinde poetischer Ichs, des vaterländischen Ich geworden, das sich nun in seiner poetischen Individualität als einzelnes und allgemeines zugleich ergreifen kann. Sofern der Mensch in und mit einer Sphäre Zeichen und Sprache ihres höheren Zusammenhangs ist, wird er hier, in dieser Sphäre der Sphären [the sphere in which the 'gemeinschaftliche Gottheit' is experienced] selbst zum Gesang.⁴⁴

The extraordinary idealism of this vision of a poetic 'Gemeinde' can only be understood in terms of the law of love, 'das schönausgleichende' (line 90), discussed above. Only in obedience to that law's demand for self-abandon can individuals transcend the particular sphere in which they have experienced the divine and become part of a 'Chor' (see line 106) which expresses the 'gemeinschaftliche Gottheit' (4:278). The law of love which holds sway in 'Friedensfeier' is modelled on that pattern of self-abandon followed by glorification which is for Hölderlin ultimately christological, whether that pattern is derived from the 'eternal Son' christology of John's gospel (as in *Hyperion*) or from the 'servant' christology of Philippians 2 (as in 'Friedensfeier'). This means that 'Gesang' itself is an expression of the spirit of Christ:⁴⁵ for the gods to be celebrated together, it is necessary that they and their celebrants should be

‘gesinnet wie Jesus Christus auch war . . .’ (Philippians 2.5) — willing to abandon the exclusivity which belonged to their individual spheres.

The total eschatological event evoked in ‘Friedensfeier’ therefore bears the hallmark of Christ, and in *this way too* he is glorified — *not* by the intensity of recollection, as the other gods are.⁴⁶ We know the Son now, at the moment of peace (line 74), in all his fullness, because the peace exhibits ‘von hier an bis zum Himmel’ (line 90), and thus magnifies for all to see, the exemplary quality of his love. The Spirit, promised in John 16.12–14, has revealed the whole realm of truth (which is worship ‘auf Höhen . . . und . . . in Tempeln’, 2:699) and glorified Jesus. As the ‘Father’ is known *only* through ‘Gesang’, we cannot take at face value the apparent reversal of the christology of John’s gospel in line 74f.: ‘Und nun erkennen wir ihn [den Sohn], / Nun, da wir kennen den Vater . . .’ (cf. John 1.18; 14.6). This would *seem* to mean, as Schmidt writes, ‘daß bei den Menschen erst auf dem Grunde einer allgemeinen und vollkommen seelischen Offenheit für das Göttliche der Sinn auch für die einzelnen Epiphanien im beschränkten Feld der Geschichte reif wird’,⁴⁷ yet it cannot, for the essential medium of the knowledge of the Father only comes into being because of a ‘general and complete spiritual openness’ to *Christ*. Knowledge of the Father, through ‘Gesang’, must either be taken as simultaneous with (full) knowledge of the Son, or line 75 must be taken as a periphrasis for the idea of the institution of ‘Gesang’: but the Son cannot be made subordinate to the Father.

To say this is not to suggest that Christ is for Hölderlin the equal of the Father and that the use of the title ‘Sohn’ for Christ is therefore meaningless. Christ is clearly not in any ontological sense identifiable with the Father. Yet we must remember that Hölderlin reads the peace of Lunéville as the climax to the ‘Heilsgeschichte’ of contemporary events and that he identifies the peace especially with Christ by seeing in it the emergence of ‘die heilige Herrschaft der Liebe’ (6:407). His interest is less in questions of ontology than in the nature of God’s activity in history, and in ‘Friedensfeier’ the Son is not subordinate to the Father because that activity — in the poem’s terms, the gathering of ‘Geister<n> und Menschen’ into ‘Gesang’ — is so distinctively christological. Oscar Cullmann’s comments on I Corinthians 15.28 reveal both Hölderlin’s closeness to St Paul and the crucial difference between them:

. . . the final fulfilment of all redemptive activity is described precisely as a final ‘subjection of the Son’ to the Father . . . It is only meaningful to speak of the Son in view of God’s revelatory action, not in view of his being. But precisely for this reason, Father and Son are really one in this activity. Now we can say of the ‘Son of God’ . . . : he is God as God reveals himself in redemptive action. Therefore the kingdom in which we now live, before the end, is the ‘kingdom of the Son’. (Colossians 1.13)⁴⁸

I have argued that in the political events of 1800 and 1801 Hölderlin already discerns the *parousia* of Christ — not experienced like the coming of a thief in the night (I Thessalonians 5.2) but glimpsed as if from afar. Thus the end of history

is pictured as the 'Abend der Zeit' (line 111), a gradual lengthening of the shadows, a process that occurs *within* the 'day' of history.⁴⁹

In 'Friedensfeier', the 'kingdom of the Son' is not the penultimate stage of 'Heilsgeschichte', but its ultimate stage. The hymn alternates between what already is and what is yet to come (compare, for example, lines 10–12 and 112–17), but the summation of all that which is to come is expressed in the words '... bald sind wir aber Gesang' (line 93). Because 'Gesang' is the harmonious presence of 'Die Seligen in jeglicher Weise' (line 107), there can for Hölderlin be no greater 'fulfilment of . . . redemptive activity'. According to the scheme of I Corinthians 15.23–28 (verse 24: 'Darnach das Ende . . .'), the *parousia* of Christ ushers in the end (which is the end of history), and is thus in some sense distinct from it. (Indeed some commentators on the passage find room between the *parousia* and the end of all things for the millennial kingdom of Revelation 20.6; see C. K. Barrett, p. 356.) This distinction is absent from 'Friedensfeier': with Christ's presence at the 'Gastmahl', the end has come.⁵⁰

NOTES TO CHAPTER FOUR

1. See S. Wackwitz, *Friedrich Hölderlin* (Stuttgart, 1985), p. 27f.
2. See P. Szondi, *Einführung in die literarische Hermeneutik* (Frankfurt am Main, 1975), p. 251 and 2:679.
3. M. Heidegger, *Erläuterungen zu Hölderlins Dichtung*, fourth edition (Frankfurt am Main, 1971), pp. 49ff.
4. M. Heidegger, *Holzwege* (Frankfurt am Main, 1950), p. 59.
5. B. Böschstein, *Hölderlins Rheinhymne* (Zürich, Freiburg i. Br., 1959), p. 42f.
6. cf. the lines from 'Der Archipelagus': 'Immer, wie sonst, geleiten sie noch, die begeisterten Kräfte, / Gerne den strebenden Mann und über Bergen der Heimat / Ruht und waltet und lebt allgegenwärtig ver Aether' (2:110, lines 235ff.).
7. See 'Ermunterung': 'Und er der sprachlos waltet . . . / . . . der Gott, der Geist'; 2:34, line 25f.
8. J. Schmidt, *Hölderlins Elegie <<Brod und Wein>>. Die Entwicklung des hymnischen Stils in der elegischen Dichtung* (Berlin, 1968). See p. 7: 'Im Vordergrund steht die Erklärung des Gedichts bis in jede Einzelheit'.
9. E. Petzold, *Hölderlins <<Brod und Wein>>: ein exegetischer Versuch* (Sambor, 1896; reprinted Darmstadt, 1967).
10. M. Simon, 'Friedrich Hölderlin: The Theory and Practice of Religious Poetry — Studies in the Elegies' (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Durham, 1982).
11. Schmidt does quote lines 13–18 in the course of his 'Wortstudie' of 'nennen', but he does so very much in passing and seems to miss the main point by citing 'Der Mutter Erde' as an illustration of the thought that 'die Numina ins Wort zu fassen, bedeutet Überschreitung zugewiesener Grenzen . . .' (p. 97).
12. The connection of naming and loving comes out particularly clearly in 'Heimkunft': 'Und umsonst nicht steht, wie ein Sohn, am wellenumrauschten / Thor' und siehet und sucht liebende Nahmen für dich, / Mit Gesang ein wandernder Mann, glückseliges Lindau!' (2:98, lines 57–59). Several different senses of 'naming' can in fact be distinguished in Hölderlin's work: (1) naming as the work of the mythopoeic imagination, as in strophes 5 and 6 of 'Brod und Wein'. See also 2:4, line 50; 2:37, line 12; 2:128, line 89 (cf. 2:691, line 1); (2) naming as an act of remembrance and a confession of allegiance, as in 3:224; (3) naming as a *new* act of worship, as in 2:170, line 180f.; (4) naming as the revelation of the true, deepest nature of something or someone, as in 2:151, line 83 and 2:152, line 97.
13. cf. the *Hyperion* passage discussed in chapter two, where the air, 'das geistige Wehen', is said to be 'das leichte, klare schmeichelnde Meer, in dem sie lebten und webten' (3:50).
14. See especially also line 1590f. of E1: '... es atmet / Der Aether liebend immerdar um sie, . . .' (4:67). Benn is also struck by the closeness to 'Brod und Wein': see his edition of *Der Tod des Empedokles*, p. 194.

15. For an explanation of ‘männlicheren’, see Benn, p. 197.
16. M. Simon (p. 229) claims that, as part of the move towards ‘rational mythology’ in Hölderlin’s later poetry as a whole, the ‘old names’ of the gods (see *Empedokles*; 1539, E1) have to be replaced permanently.
17. See for example I Corinthians 10.1–5, where the people of Israel journeying through the desert are said to have drunk from the ‘supernatural rock . . . that was Christ’ (verse 4).
18. The prose draft for ‘Versöhnender . . .’ suggests that Christ’s unveiled presence is potentially frightening (2:699, line 29).
19. Schmidt points out (p. 108) that Schelling also adopted this view of Christ. See also M. Frank, *Der kommende Gott: Vorlesungen über die neue Mythologie* (Frankfurt am Main, 1982), pp. 252–56.
20. See S. Wackwitz, *Friedrich Hölderlin* (Stuttgart, 1985), pp. 77, 84f. for the relevant literature.
21. In: *Briefe von und an Hegel, I (1775–1812)*, edited by J. Hoffmeister (Hamburg, 1952), p. 22.
22. The transcendental subject or ego is for Schelling in this work that which guarantees the unity of our knowledge. He calls it an ‘intellektuelle Anschauung’ — but this term denoted for Kant a type of intuition whose content could never be constructed by consciousness. See F. Copleston, *A History of Philosophy* (New York, 1965), VII, i, 143f. and, on Kant, J. Neubauer, ‘Intellektuelle, intellektuale und ästhetische Anschauung: zur Entstehung der romantischen Kunst-auffassung’, *DVLG*, 46 (1972), 294–319, (p. 295).
23. See Homer, *The Odyssey*, Book 14, lines 475–77.
24. Anyone who reads Hölderlin is surely obliged to take seriously what he means when he speaks of Christ as ‘der Lebendige’, or as one who ‘still lives’ (2:171, line 205). In Hölderlin’s letter to his mother of January 1799, the ‘lebendig-tot’ antithesis occurs six times in the space of about thirty lines. Christ, ‘der Lebendige’, is here invoked against those whose religion is dead and who, through this dead religion, are trying to ‘kill’ Christ for the second time (6:309f.).
25. Subsequent references to ‘Friedensfeier’ in my main text will be in the form of a single line reference in parentheses. In all cases the text being used is 3:532–38.
26. In the *Große Stuttgarter Ausgabe* (2:130–37), Beissner gives three ‘versions’ of the fragmentary ‘Versöhnender, der du nimmergeglaubt . . .’, although the MS shows that no such clear distinctions are possible. I will refer to the poem either simply as ‘Versöhnender . . .’ or as the ‘Versöhnender . . .’ fragments, followed by a reference to the GStA.
27. P. H. Gaskill, ‘Hölderlin’s “Friedensfeier” and the Living Building’, *NGS*, 8, no 3 (1980), 169–88 (p. 184, fn. 7). Gaskill also makes some of the points about the landscape in my discussion.
28. P. H. Gaskill, ‘The “Fürst des Fests” in Hölderlin’s “Friedensfeier”’, *MLR*, 65 (1970), 94–115 (p. 103, fn.).
29. P. W. Maloney, *Hölderlins ‘Friedensfeier’: Rezeption und Deutung* (Frankfurt am Main, 1985).
30. B. Allemann, *Hölderlins ‘Friedensfeier’* (Pfullingen, 1955), p. 95f. and P. Szondi, p. 373.
31. J. Schillemeit, ‘. . . dich zum Fürsten des Fests’’, *DVLG*, 51 (1977), 607–27.
32. P. Szondi, *Hölderlin-Studien*, 3rd edition (Frankfurt am Main, 1977), p. 92.
33. Maloney, p. 93. Seifert’s claim that the question of the earlier ‘proclamation’ implied by the imperfect tense of ‘rufen’ is ‘schlechterdings nicht zu beantworten’ (p. 594, fn. 52) seems somewhat exaggerated.
34. P. H. Gaskill, ‘Christ and the Divine Economy . . .’, pp. 183ff.
35. Binder and Kelletat make this interesting observation on one section of ‘Versöhnender . . .’ (2:135, lines 69–76), ‘. . . erst im Durchgang durch die Natur konnten wir Christus von neuem und nun verstehend gewinnen’. See *Friedensfeier: Lichtdrucke der Reinschrift und ihrer Vorstufen*, edited by W. Binder and A. Kelletat (Tübingen, 1959), p. 40.
36. J. Schmidt, ‘Die innere Einheit von Hölderlins “Friedensfeier”’, *HJb*, 14 (1965/66), 125–75 (p. 170).
37. J. Marsh, *Saint John*, p. 538.
38. Cf. Rumpf (p. 98), ‘Da ist also ein Kult angesagt, der im Unterschied zum Wortlaut bei Johannes die Tempel und ihre Bindung an kosmische Örtlichkeiten nicht einfach verwirft, sondern die kosmisch-irdische Kultform der Tempel “geistig” durchdringen will’.
39. E. Staiger, ‘Hölderlin: drei Oden’, in *Meisterwerke deutscher Sprache aus dem neunzehnten Jahrhundert*, second edition (Zürich, 1948), p. 44.
40. Seifert, *Untersuchungen zu Hölderlins Pinder-Rezeption* (Munich, 1982), considers that the words ‘Seelig warst du damals aber seeliger / jezt’ (2:699) express the ‘Essenz der Christologie der Friedensfeier-Hymne’ (p. 368). He adduces a parallel with Pindar’s fifth Pythian ode to king Arkesilas, whose kingly dignity and standing are enhanced by his victory at the games. This interesting literary reminiscence reinforces, as Seifert’s whole argument implies (see e.g. p. 490), the crucial theological purpose of Hölderlin’s hymn: to be a vehicle for the ‘glorification’ of Christ at the end of time. Although Seifert may be right in the strict doctrinal sense to argue that Christ’s presence with all the gods is ‘entscheidende Abkehr von der christlichen

Lehre' (p. 368), he does not see that Christ's final 'Seeligkeit' results from a universal *affirmation* of the spirit which he, supremely, embodied. See my arguments above pp. 164–66, especially p. 165.

41. Seifert's detection (p. 592), in the 'Prosa-Entwurf' for 'Versöhnender . . .' (2:699), of allusions not merely to the fourth chapter of John's gospel but also to its *seventeenth* chapter shows that to understand the 'laws of love' in this way is not to be over-subtle or to over-interpret. Conversely, 'Häussermann's vague paraphrase of the 'Gesetze der Liebe' as the laws which reconcile 'Gut und Böse, . . . Licht und Schatten . . .' seems far too weak and loose. See U. Häussermann, *Friedensfeier: Eine Einführung in Hölderlins Christushymnen* (Munich, 1959), p. 229.
42. See for example J. Schmidt, 'Die innere Eineinheit . . .', pp. 135, 139 and P. H. Gaskill, 'Christ and the Divine Economy . . .', p. 188 f.
43. See C. K. Barrett, *A Commentary on the First Epistle to the Corinthians*, second edition (London, 1971), p. 357.
44. U. Gaier, 'Hölderlins vaterländische Sangart', *Hjb*, 25 (1986–87), 57.
45. Interpreting 'Gesang' in this way, we can see the full meaning of these lines from the prose draft of 'Versöhnender . . .' (2:699, my emphases):
Ein Chor nun sind wir . . .

.....
 es kehrt bald
 Ein Gott um den anderen ein, daß
 aber ihr geliebtestes auch, an dem sie alle hängen, nicht
 fehle, Und Eines all in dir sie all, sein,

 Darum sei gegenwärtig, Jüngling. Keiner, wie
 du, gilt statt der übrigen alle . . .

Christ represents more fully than any of the other gods the essential nature of the celebration of peace, and therefore in Christ alone do these others find their unity. Rumpf denies this: 'Daß die Göttlichen so unprofilert und austauschbar anmuten, gründet also in ihrer gemeinsamen elementarisch-lichthaften Wesensart. Namen und Eigenheiten werden zufällig. Das Eigentliche ist das Gemeinsame, jeder kann für alle stehen, keiner ist unersetzlich . . .' (p. 100). This is surely a misreading of the lines on which it is based: 'Einer ist immer für alle./Mir gleich dem Sonnenlichte!' (Versöhnender . . .', line 86 f.), since Christ, the Sun, can stand for all at this point in history not because of his 'lichthaften Wesensart' but because he willingly abandons his noonday zenith ('Am Abend deiner Tage', which Rumpf omits). Thus the general reference of 'einer' becomes quite specific because of the uniqueness of the historical moment and its demands. Seifert's illuminating suggestion (p. 570) that the transition from 'Gespräch' to 'Gesang' in 'Friedensfeier' echoes the movement of St Paul's thinking in I Corinthians 12–13 confirms that the essence of 'Gesang' is love. We should also note that in 'Der Mutter Erde' the period when 'Gesang' is not yet a reality (2:123, line 1) is implicitly linked with the fact that Christ is still 'verhüllt 2:683, line 18). In 'Patmos' the future acclamation of Christ as 'der Sonne gleich' is accompanied by 'der Stab des Gesanges, niederwinkend' (2:170, lines 179–83).

46. 'Verklärt' in line 88 of 'Friedensfeier' can be taken to apply to Christ, as Maloney has argued (p. 91 f.), though this may not be the most immediately obvious reference. J. Schmidt too admits that 'Das Wesen des Fürsten und das Wesen des Festes sind identisch' ('Die innere Einheit . . .', p. 132), though he does not take the 'Fürst' to be Christ.
47. J. Schmidt, 'Die innere Einheit . . .', p. 153. Eppelsheimer [referring to Hölderlin's letter to Sinclair of December 1798] takes a more specific view of what 'knowledge of the Father' means: 'Die allen weiteren Einsichten vorausgehende begründende Wahrheit der Vater-Erkenntnis ist doch die, daß das göttliche Ganze "durch und durch individualisiert" ist, das keine Kraft "monarchisch", das aber eine der Kräfte "temporär und gradweise" herrscht. Diese mythischen Grundeinsichten sind Vater-Erkenntnis, Erkenntnis des göttlichen Weltgrundes allgemeiner Art. Darauf baut die Erkenntnis des besonderen Gottessohnes Jesus Christus auf . . .' (p. 212). This view, being based on the completely ahistorical formulations of the letter to Sinclair, fails to do justice to the stress on the present moment in 'Friedensfeier' ('Und nun erkennen wir ihn, / Nun, da wir kennen den Vater', line 74 f.). If Eppelsheimer is right, knowledge of the Son ought to be possible at any random point in history.
48. O. Cullmann, *The Christology of the New Testament*, second edition (London, 1963), p. 293 f.
49. For this reason it is misleading to invoke biblical passages like Isaiah 65.17 and Revelation 21.1, with their eschatological vision of the *new* heaven and *new* earth which will *replace* the old, when discussing the 'andere Klarheit' of line 24, and in particular its earlier version, the 'allerneuernde Klarheit' which suffuses 'Himmel und Erd und Meer' (2:130). See J. Schmidt, 'Die innere

Einheit . . .', p. 135. The landscape of strophe 1 may have some of the visual splendour of the New Jerusalem but it is nevertheless 'der *altgebaute* . . . / Saal . . .' (line 3f., my emphasis), the same landscape which has been the arena of Europe's wars (line 121), albeit now renewed and refreshed as the storms of history die away.

50. Häussermann (p. 212) quotes Origen, in the translation by H. Urs v. Balthasar: ' . . . wenn alle Dinge befriedet sind, wenn Gott alles in allem sein wird, dann wird er nur noch Friedensfürst heißen'.

CONCLUSION

I began this study by defining the 'problem of Christ' as the set of problems which arose in Hölderlin's day because the established understanding of Christ's role in the scheme of salvation was being radically challenged. The effect of the challenge was to displace Christ from his central position in that scheme and make his role appear marginal or even wholly superfluous. Hölderlin's generation witnessed the dissolution of the bond between christology and soteriology which had, generally speaking, held firm since the writing of the epistle which had perhaps done most first to establish it, I Corinthians: 'Ist aber Christus nicht auferstanden, so ist unser Predigt vergeblich, so ist euer Glaube vergeblich' (I Corinthians 15.14). The 'christologies' I have been tracing through the major phases of Hölderlin's work do not constitute a fully coherent response to the 'problem of Christ'. And yet it is perhaps not accidental that in 'Friedensfeier', the high-point of Hölderlin's intellectual *and* emotional engagement with Christ, the logic of I Corinthians 15 should be so prominent.

We have seen that, from the revision of the 'Hymne an die Schönheit' in 1791 onwards, Hölderlin moved further and further away from the basic Kantian demand that religion should be freed from dependence of any kind on 'Sinnlichkeit'. It was only because of this critical attitude towards Kant that *Hyperion* had been able to portray Diotima as the *incarnate* Absolute and therefore also to allude so clearly in the novel to the gospel of John. Had the novel been no more than a Platonic revision of Kant's understanding of Beauty, then Diotima would have been content, as Melite was in the *Fragment*, to point Hyperion towards 'das Selbstständige, Unbezwingliche, Göttliche . . .' (3:179), since she herself would merely have been the earthly appearance of a heavenly ideal which would have been Hyperion's true goal. Yet in fact the beauty of Diotima was the beauty of a certain type of relationship with the world, and because this relationship demanded self-giving, the incarnated Absolute necessarily shared in the poverty of the world. Without this process of revision, first of Kant, then of Plato, *Der Tod des Empedokles* could not have been written. In the drama the necessity of suffering was, however, premised not upon the general nature of things (Beauty *is* differentiated unity, and therefore also separation) but upon the specific historical nature of things (extreme antitheses at a precise moment requiring a particular sacrifice).

All of these steps together explain why Hölderlin was able to write a poem like 'Friedensfeier'. Kant had excluded 'Sinnlichkeit', which encompassed for

him reliance on contingent facts of history, from the religion of an age which demanded political, intellectual, and religious freedom. That exclusion must clearly have been reversed when the presence of Christ, 'der Lebendige', in contemporary history has as its consequence that 'Herrschaft nirgend ist zu sehn bei Geistern und Menschen' (3:534, line 28). Kant's own use of I Corinthians 15 brings out the full extent of the difference between his response to the 'problem of Christ' and that of Hölderlin. In the section of *Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft* entitled 'Der allmähliche Übergang des Kirchenglaubens zur Alleinherrschaft des reinen Religionsglaubens ist die Annäherung des Reichs Gottes', Kant adduced I Corinthians 15.28:

Es ist also eine notwendige Folge der physischen und zugleich der moralischen Anlage in uns, welche letztere die Grundlage und zugleich Auslegerin aller Religion ist, daß diese endlich von allen empirischen Bestimmungsgründen, von allen Statuten, welche auf Geschichte beruhen, . . . allmählich losgemacht werde, und so reine Vernunftreligion zuletzt über alle herrsche, 'damit Gott sei alles in allem'.

(GS, vi, 121)

To say 'God is all in all' means for Kant that the pure religion of reason has finally been perfected in every individual. This does not mean that the presence of God *finally* ceases to be mediated, as for St Paul it does when he speaks of the ultimate submission of the Son: for Kant, *whenever* the religion of reason has existed in its pure form in men's hearts 'God' has been present immediately, for the term 'God' is only meaningful for him as the equivalent of the 'moralische Anlage in uns'. The fulfilment of I Corinthians 15.28 only depends on history in the sense that the universal rule of 'reine Vernunftreligion' comes about by a *gradual* process. St Paul's connection, in I Corinthians 15.14, of the *specific* historical event of the resurrection of Christ with our belief in the final establishment of the Kingdom of God is, Kant argues explicitly elsewhere, 'nicht bündig'. We believe that Christ is alive because our reason cannot accept that the soul of *any* human being as perfect as Jesus should not live beyond his bodily death (GS, vi, 40). We would believe in the immortality of the soul (which, for the creation of the Kingdom, is all that counts) if Christ had never lived. There is no need to argue that Hölderlin understands the nature of the resurrection of Christ in exactly the same way as St Paul understands it in I Corinthians. What is important is the fact that in 'Friedensfeier' the original interdependence of the two parts of I Corinthians 15.14 is re-established: salvation, the presence of the human and the divine spheres 'gastfreundlich untereinander' (line 105), depends upon the spirit of Christ because without that spirit 'Herrschaft' cannot be overcome. At the same time, the historical moment following Lunéville, the 'Zeitbild, das der große Geist entfaltet' (line 94), is itself the coming, within history, of Christ. This poetic and visionary linking of soteriology and christology through the medium of history is Hölderlin's most confident and most complete answer to the 'problem of Christ'.

We know from 'Patmos' and 'Der Einzige' how sadly tenuous the hope held out by 'Friedensfeier' really was to be, and I must briefly, in the form of an epilogue, outline what I take to be the major christological concerns of these hymns, even though the full story would take another complete study.¹ It is true that 'Patmos' envisages the eschatological exaltation of Christ in terms which are familiar from 'Friedensfeier':

Wenn nemlich höher gehet himmlischer
Triumphgang, wird genennet, der Sonne gleich
Von Starken der frohlockende Sohn des Höchsten,
Ein Loosungszeichen, und hier ist der Stab
Des Gesanges, niederwinkend,
Denn nichts ist gemein. . . . (2:170, lines 179–84)

But this type of naming, which is celebratory proclamation, is increasingly replaced in 'Patmos' and 'Der Einzige' by a form of desperate invocation whose purpose is to erect a bulwark against the spiritually destructive tendencies Hölderlin now discovers in history. The gospel story about the temptation of Jesus in the wilderness (Matthew 4.1 ff.) becomes, through a process of repeated revision,² the paradigm for what is arguably the central theme of both hymns: the struggle between the 'Todeslust der Völker' (2:158, line 53) and the spiritual vocation to remain faithful to earthly, that is to say historical, existence. This death-wish, expressed in the verb 'hinwegjauchzen', defines the role to which Christ, Dionysus and Hercules ('jene') are called:

. Nämlich immer jauchzet die Welt
Hinweg von dieser Erde, daß sie die
Entblößet; wo das Menschliche sie nicht hält. Es bleibt aber eine Spur
Doch eines Wortes; die ein Mann erhaschet. Der Ort war aber
Die Wüste. So sind jene sich gleich. (2:163, lines 71–75)

The scene of Jesus's temptation by Satan, a wilderness, can become the metaphor for this flight from the earth because the satanic insinuations recorded in the gospel narrative all aim at persuading Jesus prematurely to leave behind the constraints of ordinary human existence which he had willingly accepted in the Incarnation. For this reason, 'das Menschliche' offers the only hope of a brake on this 'hinwegjauchzen'. Many of Hölderlin's revisions of 'Der Einzige' are concerned with substantiating the claim 'So sind jene sich gleich', for example these lines about Christ, Dionysus and Hercules:

Alle Tage stehn die aber, als an einem Abgrund, einer
Neben dem andern. Jene drei sind aber
Das, daß sie unter der Sonne
Wie Jäger der Jagd sind oder
Ein Ackersmann, der atmend von der Arbeit
Sein Haupt entblößet, oder Bettler. (2:164., lines 91–96)

The ground of the comparison is the common willingness of the three to be exposed ('entblößet') to the heat of the sun — to accept the earth by sharing in its own fate. The 'abyss' at whose edge the three stand, as if to bar the route to it, can be read as an image for the ever-present threat of the death-wish, the wish to transcend the earth through death. Where it is not resisted, this wish will denude the earth and, at the same time, will erase all sense of personal identity and consciousness, the hallmarks of 'das Menschliche': Christ, Dionysus, and Hercules can be seen as brothers because, in another revision, they exemplify for the sake of others the readiness to 'hüten das Maß, daß einer etwas für sich ist' (2:158, line 55 f. — the death-wish is, precisely, the wish to be 'maßlos'). The three demi-gods must, for Hölderlin, be named in 'Der Einzige' not in order to be proclaimed or celebrated but in order that the invocation of their names can serve as a verbal talisman against the 'Todeslust der Völker': in 'Patmos' the same threat is evoked, probably on the basis of John 16:4 (see 2:186, line 174 f.); by the phrase 'das Zürnen der Welt', which in one of the revisions of the poem attracts the epithets 'begrifflos . . . namlos'. The proliferation of names in the later revisions of 'Patmos' can be seen in this same light: names associated above all with the spiritual history of the West (a history already implied in 'Friedensfeier' in the lines 'Viel hat von Morgen an/Seit ein Gespräch wir sind und hören können voneinander/Erfahren der Mensch') are invoked against the threat of a chaos in which all names and thus all personal identity would disappear.³

'Ungebundenes aber/Hasset Gott' we read in one of the manuscripts for 'Der Einzige' (2:159, line 72 f.): whereas in 'Friedensfeier' the drama was that of imminent fulfilment and consummation, in 'Der Einzige', and perhaps less emphatically in 'Patmos', the drama is that of divine judgement and threatened or actual absence. For the first time the theology of intercession and propitiation takes a central place in Hölderlin's poetry. God's anger at the perennial human longing for that which is 'ungebunden' does not turn to active judgement but is appeased by Christ (2:163, line 66 f. and 2:159, lines 73–75) and, in the words of a letter to Leo von Seckendorf of 1801, by 'die verschiedenen Schicksale der Heroen, Ritter und Fürsten, wie sie dem Schicksal dienen' (6:437 f.). The identification of isolated cases of spiritual steadfastness ('die Schrift des Barden oder Afrikaners'; 2:159, lines 79–80 — probably Klopstock and Augustine respectively — 'die Fahrt der Edelleute nach Jerusalem', Henry IV; 2:186, line 159 f.) becomes a strategy for the 'poetische Ansicht der Geschichte' (6:437) and entails a progressive widening of the scope of each of the hymns to include more and more historical material. The poetic story of Western spirituality since Christ, which the historical records tell, is inexhaustible ('Unabsehlich seit jenem [Christ] die Fabel'; 2:186, line 157 f.) and although it has a goal, the day of Christ ('Wie Morgenluft sind nämlich die Namen seit Christus'; 2:182, lines 163–64 — the morning breeze announces the day that is to come; cf. 1:302),

the energy of the two hymns derives almost entirely from the focus on the — sometimes, as now in Hölderlin's day — tortuous path towards that goal. Thus the eschatological fervour of 'Friedensfeier' gives way to a concern with the forms of God's interim *mediated* presence in history: 'Patmos' begins with the journey to the island of the one who witnessed the immediate presence of Christ ('... sahe ... Das Angesicht des Gotts genau'; 2:167, lines 79–80) and reaches its climax, like 'Friedensfeier', with the vision of the renewed immediacy of the divine in 'Gesang' (2:170, line 183), but between the privileged apostolic experience of St John and the end of God's work in history lie the departure of Christ from the disciples, of the disciples from each other, and the replacement of 'der lebendige Laut' (2:170, line 159) by the written word of Scripture. Hölderlin never in these hymns loses the faith that mankind's history, continually threatened as it is by the 'Todeslust der Völker', is the work of God. But the confident gestures of 'Friedensfeier' ('... denn darum rief ich/Zum Gastmahl, das bereitet ist,/Dich, Unvergeßlicher ...') have yielded to the resolution '... daß gepflegt werde/der feste Buchstab' (2:172, line 225). It is a more modest ambition, but still Hölderlin knows that 'Der Welt vergessen/Stilleuchtende Kraft aus heiliger Schrift fällt' (2:171, lines 192–93).

NOTES TO THE CONCLUSION

1. In addition to the more general studies by Rumpf, Gaskill, Guardini, Stoll, and Böckmann, the following seem to me to be the most substantial and worthwhile contributions to our understanding of 'Patmos' and 'Der Einzige': R. Unger, 'Hölderlin's "Patmos": Song as Interpretation' (PhD dissertation, Cornell University, 1972); A. Häny, 'Hölderlin's "Patmos"', *Schweizer Monatshefte*, 24 (1944/5); A. Maler, "'Wo Gefahr ist, wächst das Rettende auch': zu Hölderlins Bibeltopik", *Euphorion*, 77, Heft 2 (1977); W. Binder, 'Hölderlins Patmos-Hymne', in *Hölderlin-Aufsätze* (Frankfurt a.M., 1970); E. Lachmann, *Hölderlins Christushymnen* (Vienna, 1951); A. Warminski, "'Patmos": the senses of interpretation', *MLN*, 91 (1976), 478–500; K.-H. Stierle, 'Dichtung und Auftrag: Hölderlins Patmos-Hymne', *HjB*, 22 (1980/81), 47–68; R. Nägele, 'Fragmentation und fester Buchstabe: zu Hölderlins "Patmos" — Überarbeitungen', *MLN*, 97 (1982); D. E. Sattler, "'O Insel des Lichts!": "Patmos" und die Entstehung des Homburger Foliohefts', *HjB*, 25 (1986–87), 213–26; J. Schmidt, 'Zur Funktion synkretistischer Mythologie in Hölderlins Dichtung "Der Einzige" (erste Fassung)', *HjB*, 25 (1986–87), 176–213; R.-E. Schulz, 'Herakles-Dionysos-Christus', in *Die Gegenwart der Griechen im neueren Denken. Festschrift für H-G Gadamer* (Tübingen, 1960), pp. 223–60; B. Allemann, "'Der Ort war aber die Wüste ...'", in *Martin Heidegger zum 70. Geburtstag* (1959).
2. The dissertation of Michael Franz, 'Das System and seine Entropie: "Welt" als theologisches und philosophisches Problem in den Schriften Friedrich Hölderlins' (University of Saarbrücken, 1982), attempts, in the appendix, a detailed textual reconstruction of 'Der Einzige' in all its phases, and this appendix provides the grounds for claiming that the theme of the 'Todeslust der Völker' is of vital importance and that it must be connected with the image of the wilderness.
3. See the discussion in Rumpf, 'Die Deutung der Christusgestalt bei dem späten Hölderlin' (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Frankfurt am Main, 1958), p. 65.

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INDEX

- Abrams, M. H., 22
Aspetsberger, F., 84
- Bardili, C. G., 7, 36, 37
beauty, 30–31, 40–41, 49, 51, 83–86, 136, 141, 151, 166, 174
Betzendörfer, W., 7–8
Binder, W., 69, 82, 85
Brecht, M., 7
- Christ, 1–4, 9, 11–12, 20, 23–27, 35, 37–38, 40–41, 43, 45, 50, 55, 62, 67–69, 74, 81–82, 83, 85, 88, 95–99, 102, 104, 106–08, 113, 117–18, 120, 123, 124–28, 130, 134–36, 139, 147–49, 151, 153–56, 158–60, 162–78 *passim*. *See also* Jesus
Christusgefühl, 3, 51, 80–81, 88, 94, 99, 136
Conz, C. Ph., 7, 32, 36–40 *passim*
Cullmann, O., 169
- eschatology, 43, 77–79, 130–31, 146, 148, 151, 154, 160–61, 163, 168, 169, 172, 176, 178
- Fichte J. G., 1, 3, 23, 32, 35, 38, 40, 47, 63
Flatt, J. F., 9, 12, 14–20 *passim*, 24, 36, 41
- Goethe, J. W., 34, 47, 130
Gontard, S., 48, 50, 58, 83
- Harris, H., 7, 14, 32, 35, 41
Hegel, G. W. F., 2, 7–8, 23, 32, 36, 41, 47, 49, 50, 55–58, 68, 74, 76, 80, 90–95, 98–101, 112, 117, 119–20, 125–26, 142, 152
Heidegger, M., 133–34
Herder, J. G., 8, 23, 34, 47
- incarnation, 23, 25–26, 33, 40, 52, 54, 58, 62–63, 68, 176
- Jamme, C., 91
- Jesus, 1, 2, 11–12, 19, 24–25, 34, 37–39, 42–43, 45, 51–55, 57, 69, 80, 83, 86, 92–93, 95, 98–102, 106–07, 112, 117–18, 120–21, 123–28, 163–64, 169, 172, 175–76. *See also* Christ
- John, St., 14, 24, 28, 34, 42, 52–58, 62, 67–69, 74, 79–81, 83, 86, 88, 99, 106–07, 112, 125, 127–29, 149, 163–64, 168–69, 172, 178
- Kant, I., 1, 8, 12, 14, 16–42 *passim*, 46–47, 51, 58–61, 63, 174–75
Klaiber, J., 7
Kondylis, P., 8
Kurz, G., 8
- Lessing, G. E., 1, 23, 25, 55–56, 58
- Maloney, P., 158
Müller, E., 8
- Petzold, E., 140
Plato, 8, 31, 47, 51, 59–61, 174
- Rapp, G. C., 32, 36–40 *passim*
- Sartorius, C. F., 9–13 *passim*
saviour, 1, 2, 111–13, 117, 122, 124, 126
Schelling, F. W. J., 1, 7, 8, 16, 23, 63, 130, 152
Schiller, F., 23, 28, 31, 46–48, 59–61, 90, 130–31
Schmidt, J., 142–43, 149, 162, 168
Schnurrer, C. F., 9, 16
Spirit, Holy, 52, 54–58, 79–81, 88–89, 107, 137, 150, 152, 162–63, 169
Storr, G. C., 7, 8, 13–14, 16–17, 19–20, 24–26, 32
Strack, F., 29–30, 40, 60
suffering, 49, 81, 83, 89, 91, 95–97, 103, 112–13, 116, 118, 121, 123, 125, 135, 145, 148, 158, 174

This study sets out to challenge the usual approach to the question of Hölderlin's response to Christ, which focuses on no more than two or three late hymns, by tracing, through each major stage of Hölderlin's work, a series of latent christological debates. These debates, in which philosophy, theology, and poetry converge, represent Hölderlin's engagement with the urgent intellectual issues of his day. Dr Ogden offers a detailed account of the matrix of competing ideas in the famous Tübingen seminary and radical re-readings of the novel *Hyperion* and the dramatic fragments on the Empedokles theme before discussing the climax of Hölderlin's response to Christ in 'Friedensfeier' and other contemporary poems. It will be of interest not just to readers of Hölderlin but to all those interested in the intellectual history of late eighteenth-century Germany.